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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} #795

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3 changes: 2 additions & 1 deletion holochain.tex
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
\usepackage{etoolbox}
\AtBeginEnvironment{quote}{\singlespace\vspace{-\topsep}\small}
\AtEndEnvironment{quote}{\vspace{-\topsep}\endsinglespace}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc} % for "foo" and 'foo' instead of ``foo" and `foo'.
\usepackage{url}
\SetWatermarkText{Draft}
\SetWatermarkColor[gray]{0.9}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ \subsection{Systemic Integrity Through Validation}
\Psi_{signature} = \mathcal{P}(Author_{real} = Author_{local} | \mathcal{C})
\end{equation}

If we constrain the context to remove the possibility of an adversary gaining access to an agent's private key and also exclude the possible (future) existence of computing devices or algorithms that could easily calculate or brute force the key, we might then assign a (constructed) confidence level of 1, i.e., ``absolute confidence". Without such constraints on $\mathcal{C}$, we must admit that $\Psi_{signature}<1$, which real world events, for instance the Mt.Gox hack from 2014\footnote{"Most or all of the missing bitcoins were stolen straight out of the Mt. Gox hot wallet over time, beginning in late 2011" \cite{mt-gox}}, make clear.
If we constrain the context to remove the possibility of an adversary gaining access to an agent's private key and also exclude the possible (future) existence of computing devices or algorithms that could easily calculate or brute force the key, we might then assign a (constructed) confidence level of 1, i.e., ``absolute confidence". Without such constraints on $\mathcal{C}$, we must admit that $\Psi_{signature}<1$, which real world events, for instance the Mt.Gox hack from 2014,\footnote{"Most or all of the missing bitcoins were stolen straight out of the Mt. Gox hot wallet over time, beginning in late 2011." \cite{mt-gox}} make clear.

We aim to describe these relationships in such detail in order to point out that any set $R_A$ of \textit{absolute requirements} can't reach beyond trivial statements - statements about the content and integrity of the local state of the agent itself. Following Descarte's way of questioning the confidence in every thought, we project his famous statement \textit{cogito ergo sum} into the reference frame of multi-agent systems by stating: \textbf{Agents can only have honest confidence in the fact that they perceive a certain stimulus to be present and whether any particular abstract a priori model matches that stimulus without contradiction,} i.e., that an agent sees a certain piece of data and that it \textit{is possible to interpret it in a certain way}. Every conclusion being drawn a posteriori through the application of sophisticated models of the context is dependent on assumptions about the context that are inherent to the model. This is the heart of the agent-centric outlook, and what we claim must always be taken into account in the design of decentralized multi-agent systems, as it shows that any aspect of the system as a whole that includes assumptions about other agents and non-local events must be in $R_C$, i.e., have an a priori confidence of $\Psi<1$. Facing this truth about multi-agent systems, we find little value in trying to force an absolute truth $\forall n,m \in N: \chain_n\eqbang\chain_m$ and we instead frame the problem as:
\\
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