

# When Manufacturers Become Resellers: Evidence from Automaker Involvement in the Secondary Market on Resale Value and New Car Pricing

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# Cannibalization vs. Resale Value

Markets for secondhand goods diverts potential sales away from the primary market

- Active secondary market decreases manufacturers' profit by 35% (CHEN ET AL. 2013)

Durable goods manufacturers take actions to impede the functioning of secondary market

- Planned obsolescence: textbook, phones, automobile (LIZUKA 2007)
- Reducing durability: Phoebus cartel in the 1920s (RUST 1986, LIEBOWITZ 1982)
- Digital rights management: eBook, e-Ticket (JOHNSON 2011)

## The Challenge

Consumers are drawn to products with a lower net cost of ownership

- Intel's 12th CPU hardware incompatible (motherboard) → AMD (same socket)

## The Opportunity

Secondary markets raise willingness to pay for new goods by providing resale value

- The higher the value of the used good a customer can recoup via resale, the lower the net cost of the new product becomes (ORAIOPoulos ET AL. 2012)

## Research Questions

- How do manufacturers of durable goods engage in the secondary market to leverage resale value of their products?
- What impact does their engagement in the secondary market have on the primary market?

# Overview of Paper

**Context:** The repeal of used car sales ban in South Korea followed by Hyundai's entry in October 2023 as a policy shock


- Hyundai can buy used cars when consumers trade-in their used unit for buying new car
- Hyundai is permitted to sell used cars <5 years and <100,000km

**Data:** Use VIN level administrative microdata for all new and used cars registered 2017-2024


**Quantify:** *ex-ante* depreciation rate  $\Rightarrow$  plausibly exogenous

- Compute Hyundai's trade-in prices compared to dealers' prices in a competitive market across various model of *ex-ante* depreciation rate

## Preview of Finding



## Preview of Finding



# Data

- Vehicle registration (new and used) microdata from DoT in Korea (2017 - 2024)
  - ▶ VIN(last 10 digits masked)-month level observations (new: 10.1m / used: 21.6m)
  - ▶ Make(e.g., Honda), model(e.g., Civic), model year(e.g., 2021), fuel type(e.g. Gasoline), mile, owner&previous owner's demographics, price/new price
  - ▶ **Owner address/usage address (Headquarter/CPO center)** ▶ Seocho
- Price is CPI-adjusted to 2020 level
  - ▶ New car price: Total cost to consumer (including all taxes)
  - ▶ Used car price: Net proceeds to car owner (excluding buyer's taxes) ▶ Doc

New Car Prices and Market Shares (2017-2024)							
	New Car Prices (unit: '000\$)					Sales	
	Mean	SD	p10	p50	p90	Count	Share
<strong>Hyundai Motor Group</strong>							
Kia	34.07	13.44	16.38	33.91	49.89	3,306,280	31.73%
Hyundai	34.50	12.18	20.03	33.55	50.11	3,290,109	31.58%
Genesis	69.76	18.87	50.43	65.54	94.25	683,825	6.56%
Subtotal						7,280,214	69.87%
<strong>Other Domestic</strong>							
Renault Korea	30.12	4.94	23.78	30.29	36.04	442,505	4.25%
GM Korea	22.01	7.52	13.39	21.73	32.23	395,188	3.79%
KG Mobility	30.31	8.68	21.49	27.37	43.86	382,811	3.67%
Subtotal						1,220,504	11.71%
<strong>Germany</strong>							
Mercedes-Benz	98.22	51.18	56.92	81.52	173.05	520,511	5.00%
BMW Group	74.98	42.35	40.69	67.75	124.02	512,976	4.92%
Volkswagen	84.15	61.14	38.15	61.02	167.01	251,925	2.42%
Subtotal						1,285,412	12.34%
<strong>Other Foreign</strong>							
Toyota Group	58.60	19.83	37.16	58.56	75.32	144,591	1.39%
Geely Holding	69.87	16.93	52.48	69.85	95.80	87,335	0.84%
Stellantis	56.64	31.20	33.06	45.67	88.74	84,936	0.82%
Ford Group	65.17	26.45	51.14	61.20	88.64	61,407	0.59%
Renault-Nissan	28.84	9.60	20.61	25.98	42.50	57,169	0.55%
Tata Group	103.32	56.13	55.62	79.99	198.50	55,259	0.53%
GM	58.20	33.15	35.43	52.85	86.79	53,775	0.52%
Tesla	77.86	23.25	61.53	71.43	92.66	52,475	0.50%
Honda	44.24	9.28	34.83	44.11	57.83	36,898	0.35%
Subtotal						633,845	6.08%
<strong>Total</strong>	43.94	29.96	19.39	36.79	72.45	10,419,975	100%

## Pre-Entry Resale Value Ratio (New to Age 1) by Model-Year-Fuel Level

	Mean	SD	p10	Median	p90	Count
<b>Hyundai Motor Group</b>						
Hyundai	0.837	0.139	0.714	0.838	0.969	169
Kia	0.817	0.118	0.709	0.824	0.933	195
Genesis	0.793	0.095	0.699	0.799	0.886	54
<b>Other Domestic</b>						
GM_Korea	0.775	0.156	0.636	0.764	0.868	46
KG_Mobility	0.750	0.068	0.678	0.744	0.823	42
Renault_Korea	0.698	0.135	0.527	0.726	0.836	36
<b>Germany</b>						
Mercedes-Benz	0.811	0.062	0.744	0.807	0.881	142
BMW Group	0.806	0.126	0.714	0.801	0.896	254
Volkswagen	0.819	0.068	0.754	0.822	0.900	107
<b>Other foreign</b>						
Geely Holding	0.831	0.068	0.738	0.826	0.896	27
Tesla	0.804	0.078	0.673	0.831	0.911	8
Honda	0.797	0.062	0.716	0.793	0.877	27
Toyota Group	0.778	0.079	0.684	0.789	0.876	54
Tata Group	0.755	0.042	0.712	0.749	0.807	32
Stellantis	0.740	0.073	0.637	0.747	0.827	62
Ford_Group	0.727	0.124	0.640	0.732	0.829	44
GM	0.717	0.091	0.575	0.731	0.806	38
Renault Nissan	0.673	0.146	0.317	0.709	0.812	18
Total	0.797	0.114	0.688	0.798	0.906	1,355

# Impact of *ex-ante* Depreciation Rate on Premiums

Among cars purchased by Hyundai Motor Group in Oct 2023 - Mar 2024,


$$w_{it}^H - w_{j(i)t}^D = \beta \left( 1 - \hat{\delta}_{j(i)}^1 \right) + \underbrace{Size_{j(i)t} + CC_{j(i)t} + Weight_{j(i)t} + Fuel_{j(i)t}}_{X'_{j(i)t}} \\ + \underbrace{Mile_{it} + Age_{it} + 1(\text{Gender}) \times 1(\text{Age}) \times 1(\text{Firm})}_{W'_{it}} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

- $w_{it}^H$  is the resale price of a used car  $i$  paid by Hyundai at time  $t$
- $w_{j(i)t}^D$  is average resale price of a model-fuel  $j$  paid by dealers at time  $t$
- $\hat{\delta}_{j(i)}^1$  is *ex-ante first year depreciation rate* of a model-fuel  $j$  at time  $t$
- $X'_{j(i)t}$  is a model-fuel  $j$  specific characteristics
- $W'_{it}$  is a car  $i$  specific characteristics
- $1(\text{Gender}) \times 1(\text{Age}) \times 1(\text{Firm})$  are saturated fixed effects
- $\varepsilon_{it}$  clustered by model-fuel

# Results

	Dependent Variable: Hyundai's Trade-in Premium ( $= w_{it}^H - w_{j(i)t}^D$ ) (unit: '000\$)					
	Full sample			Without outliers		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$1 - \delta_j^1 : 1st$ year RVR	-14.944*** (5.223)	-15.407*** (4.884)	-16.484*** (5.151)	-12.938*** (4.490)	-13.517*** (4.279)	-14.587*** (4.467)
Odometer ('000 mile)	-0.122*** (0.014)	-0.133*** (0.014)	-0.120*** (0.014)	-0.109*** (0.010)	-0.122*** (0.010)	-0.107*** (0.010)
Age	-1.953*** (0.234)	-1.897*** (0.231)	-1.954*** (0.234)	-1.685*** (0.189)	-1.627*** (0.188)	-1.681*** (0.190)
Displacement ( $cm^3$ )	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)
Weight (kg)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)
Size raw ( $m^3$ )	-0.780** (0.294)	-0.716** (0.295)	-0.736** (0.298)	-0.689* (0.353)	-0.624* (0.359)	-0.648* (0.357)
<b>Fuel type</b>						
(Baseline: Diesel)						
EV	-6.262*** (1.663)	-6.196*** (1.780)	-6.312*** (1.639)	-5.495*** (1.592)	-5.458*** (1.758)	-5.614*** (1.600)
Gasoline	0.709 (0.600)	0.735 (0.656)	0.639 (0.620)	0.837 (0.651)	0.886 (0.711)	0.790 (0.668)
Hybrid	-0.968 (0.787)	-0.909 (0.795)	-1.067 (0.786)	-0.937 (0.689)	-0.864 (0.717)	-1.040 (0.691)
<b>Size Type</b>						
(Baseline: Compact)						
Large	7.176*** (1.440)	6.384*** (1.502)	7.023*** (1.458)	6.753*** (1.390)	5.863*** (1.462)	6.596*** (1.399)
Medium	5.643*** (1.114)	5.044*** (1.131)	5.541*** (1.112)	5.035*** (1.019)	4.378*** (1.030)	4.936*** (1.008)
Constant	17.500*** (4.262)	19.102*** (3.649)	20.425*** (4.177)	14.330*** (3.262)	16.385*** (2.947)	17.367*** (3.279)
<b>Fixed Effects</b>						
Month		✓	✓		✓	✓
Demographics	✓		✓	✓		✓
N	2,742	2,742	2,742	2,688	2,688	2,688
R-sq	0.530	0.527	0.541	0.564	0.556	0.578
adj. R-sq	0.526	0.524	0.536	0.559	0.553	0.573

# Premium by Models



## Qualitative Evidence

- Hyundai's operating profit really outperformed in 2023. One reason for this is **the success of Genesis**. Typically, in manufacturing sector, the profit-cost margin isn't that high. Excluding some SUV models, Hyundai car's margin is about 2-5%. However, in the case of **Genesis, the margin exceeds 20%**.

*Anonymous Hyundai's employee (Aug 25, 2023)*

- The one of the most important things for auto-companies is to **justify the retail value [of their car]**. That way, people who have already bought the car won't complain about their purchases. Hyundai's current main [sales] target is the retail value of Genesis. They're trying to elevate the Genesis brand image up to the level of foreign brands. The BMW 5 series' prices range from \$60,000 to \$80,000, and **Genesis has almost caught up to that range**.

*Hyundo Shin, the CEO of Youcar (Jan 12, 2023)*

# Impact on New Car Prices

<b>Sample</b>	Dependent Variable: $p_{it}$					
	Full (1)	Domestic (2)	Hyundai (3)	Full (4)	Domestic (5)	Hyundai (6)
Post	-2.669 (2.155)	1.148 (0.961)	1.494 (1.089)			
Post×Hyundai				1.962 (1.391)	0.888 (0.566)	1.260 (0.944)
Post×Kia				1.936 (1.342)	0.974 (0.586)	1.327 (0.984)
Post×Genesis				3.325** (1.323)	3.310*** (0.575)	3.703** (0.925)
<b>Control Variables</b>						
Product Characteristics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Brand Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Month Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,741,861	1,487,706	1,365,042	1,741,861	1,487,706	1,365,042
R-sq	0.788	0.829	0.825	0.789	0.830	0.826
adj. R-sq	0.788	0.829	0.825	0.789	0.830	0.826

# Alternative Mechanism


# Selection Bias via Information Advantage

- Hyundai may have **superior information** than dealers about each car, and suggest different prices **based on unobservable quality**


		Observables	Unobservables	Dealer Offer	Hyundai Offer
Pre	A	15,000 km / 2 years	Smoker / 3 dogs / no oil change	\$10,000	-
	B	15,000 km / 2 years	Non-smoker / no dogs / frequent oil change	\$10,000	-
(S1)	A	15,000 km / 2 years	Smoker / 3 dogs / no oil change	\$10,000	\$9,000
	B	15,000 km / 2 years	Non-smoker / no dogs / frequent oil change	\$10,000	\$11,000
(S2)	A	15,000 km / 2 years	Smoker / 3 dogs / no oil change	\$10,000	\$11,000
	B	15,000 km / 2 years	Non-smoker / no dogs / frequent oil change	\$10,000	\$11,000

- Create "cells" by Mile(80)  $\times$  Age(24)  $\times$  Fuel(4)  $\times$  Model(270)
  - E.g., Mile (1-5,000km) - Age (year 1) - Fuel (Gasoline) - Model (Grandeur)
  - Compute  $\mu$  and  $\sigma$  for each cell, and get the coefficient of variation (CV) =  $\frac{\sigma}{\mu}$
  - Compare the distribution of CV b/a six months of Hyundai entry


# Distribution of CV by Ages




# Distribution of CV by Models (Full Sample)




## Distribution of CV by Models (Age < 5)



# Comparison of PDF



# Comparision of CDF




## Test Statistics

Test Name	Statistic	p-value
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test	0.0074	0.3359
Mann-Whitney U test	5.32E+08	0.2562
Median Test (Mood's test)	2.3024	0.1291
Mean test (T-test)	-0.6875	0.4917
Variance test (Levene's test)	0.5041	0.4776


## Alternative Mechanism 2: Predatory Pricing

- Used car industry is known for financial constraints because they should finance their wide selection of cars
  - ▶ Hyundai might have incentive to conduct predatory pricing by paying higher wholesale prices in order to expel small dealers

# Premium vs. $Q_{used}$



# Premium vs. Number of Dealers




# Conclusion

- I provide novel evidence how primary market firms leverage secondary markets not as a challenge but as a **opportunity**
  - ▶ Firms offer **\$1,648 higher trade-in prices for their cars with a 10% lower *ex-ante* first-year resale value ratio** in the secondary market
  - ▶ This strategy allows firms to charge **5.94% higher prices on average for new cars**, exclusively for models they offered higher trade-in prices
- Policy makers need to consider this unforeseen interplay between secondary and primary markets


Thank you!

# Appendix


# Depreciation Price vs. Age




# Depreciation Price vs. Age - Avante



# Depreciation vs. Age - Grandeur



# Depreciation Value vs. Age - G80



## Vehicle Registration Document

## • Data

#### ■ 자동차등록규칙「별지 제1호 서식」

다면 “유의사항”을 꼭 읽어보시기 바랍니다.

정경 세상

제 202008-026967 호		자동차등록증	
		최초등록일: 2020년 08월 26일	
①	자동차등록번호 87M13488	②	차종 소형 파운드
③	국가 표지 II (PORTER II)	④	제작 및 모델년도 HREKBR 2020
⑤	주자명 KMFZY7V7KHEU811358	⑥	취득 기관명 DICB
⑦	사용본거지 제주특별자치도 제주시 삼무로 83(연동)	⑧	주민등록번호 (별첨) 한글 표기 한글 표기
⑨	주소 서울특별시 강동구 희성로 38(의리도동)	⑩	

「자동차관리법」 제 8 조에 따라 위와 같이 등록하였습니다.

※ 유통사명: 자동차판매점 종류가 경기 또는 수소연료자동차의 경우 「친환경차」「친환경기기」「친환경물류기기」로 표기됩니다.

제주특별자치도지사의  
제주특별자치도지사의

- Transaction price  
 $= p + 0.1p = 1.1p$
  - $18,915,455 \times 1.1 = 20,807,000.5$
  - VAT(10%), registration tax(7%), bond purchase tax(1.15%)

차량자 출고(별도)가격(부가세제외): 18,915,455 원  
일련번호 070681


# Seocho: Hyundai's Headquarters County

▶ Data


$$q_{Art} = \sum_{A=1}^{10} 1(A) \cdot (\beta_{1A} + \beta_{2A} Seocho_r + \beta_{3A} Post_t + \beta_{4A} Seocho_r \times Post_t) \\ + \gamma_r + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{Art}$$

- $q_{Art}$  is the wholesale quantity purchased "for-sale" of used car age  $A$  at region  $r$  at period  $t$
- $Seocho_r$  is equal to 1 if  $r$  is Seocho
- $Post_t$  is equal to 1 if  $t$  is post Oct. 2023 inclusive
- $\gamma_r$  and  $\tau_t$  are fixed effects


# Quantity Changes of Vehicles across Age




# Quantity Difference of Vehicles across Age




# Quantity Difference of Vehicles across Mileages




# Quantity Difference of Cars Mileages < 100k




# Falsification Test: Hyundai's Freight Cars




# Falsification Test: Hyundai's Freight Cars



# Falsification Test: Non-Hyundai's Passenger Cars



# Falsification Test: Non-Hyundai's Passenger Cars



# Among Seocho: Usage Address

▶ Data

