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Mention rejection of 0-RTT #602

Merged
merged 3 commits into from May 3, 2018
Merged

Mention rejection of 0-RTT #602

merged 3 commits into from May 3, 2018

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martinthomson
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Our basic list of mitigations missed a fairly obvious one.

Mentioning it should help with the class of confusion Magnus N. had with the draft.

I decided not to include a note about the server being unable to examine early data before making this decision. That's just something people will need to discover for themselves. Generally, you have to decide whether you want 0-RTT without seeing any of it. Partly this is because it avoids a potential deadlock, but mostly it's because the TLS stack will not even decrypt 0-RTT if it is rejected.

This is mentioned elsewhere, but it's a valid technique.  The note here should help with the sort of confusion Magnus had in his secdir review.
@wtarreau
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wtarreau commented May 3, 2018

Looks good to me, and indeed clearer. Thanks.

@mcmanus
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mcmanus commented May 3, 2018

+1

@martinthomson martinthomson merged commit 9832827 into master May 3, 2018
@martinthomson martinthomson deleted the mention-reject branch May 3, 2018 23:25
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3 participants