

Quote MD/2019/05/572-PRO

Quote date: 09-mai-19

Quarkslab

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The Monero Lab

Reference	Description	Days	Price per day		Cost	
19-04-563-PRO	Core Dalek libraries review					
	Step 1 : Global understanding specification and components overview	5	\$	1 650,00	\$	8 250,00
	Step 2: Checking that the RandomX specification is cryptographically secure and doesn't allow algorithmic optimizations	12	\$	1 650,00	\$	19 800,00
	Step 3: Validating that the code matches the specification + vulnerability analysis	12	\$	1 650,00	\$	19 800,00
	Step 4: Verifying that implementation is "optimization free"	8	\$	1 650,00	\$	13 200,00
	50% at the launch of the mission 50% upon completion of the mission					
-				al \$ excl VAT	\$	61 050,00

Online payment max 30 days after bill

Late payment penalties: BCE rate + 10 points

Quarkslab, SAS au capital de 113 390 €

RCS : : Paris 538 485 897 SIRET : 538 485 897 00036

APE: 7490B

TVA FR: FR 12 538 485 897 00036

Payment to:

Banque : Banque Palatine RIB :40978 00022 1384828V800 25

IBAN : FR74 4097 8000 2213 8482 8V80 025

BIC:BSPFFRPPXXX

STATEMENT OF WORK

Description of the request

The Monero developer community has expressed interest in the RandomX proof-of-work algorithm. They want to realize a code review / audit of the algorithm for ensuring that :

- implementation of the protocol is well respected,
 - there are no vulnerabilities,
 - criterias for a proof of work are met.

Criteria for a proof of work algorithm are:

- 1) Optimization-free: There is no algorithmic speed-up that allows one to calculate the hash faster than the reference algorithm.
 - 2) Progress-free: Proof of work calculation doesn't depend on the history of previous calculations.
- 3) Approximation-free: It's not possible to achieve speed-up larger than the inverse rate of invalid hashes

Monero Lab expects a fully audit (implementation review and vulnerability analysis) of the basic implementation (hashing function itself which includes VM implementation).

On components used to speed up things (JIT,large pages etc.) and 3rd-party components (Blake, AES, Argon), only verify that they are correctly manipulated by randomx (lack of vulnerability). Analysis of components itsselves is out of scope.

For "optimization free" criteria, verifying that there is no other way for ASIC but to fully implement this VM and that there are no ways to make it run much faster on CPU than with current JIT code (around 4000-5000 lines of code to audit).

Quarkslab's work description

The evaluation work that Quarkslab will undertake includes the four following steps:

- 1- Global understanding specification and components overview
- 2- Checking that the RandomX specification is cryptographically secure and doesn't allow algorithmic optimizations
 - 3- Validating that the code matches the specification + vulnerability analysis
 4- Verifying that implementation is "optimization free"

At the end of the evaluation, Quarkslab will produce a report detailing the evaluation activities undertaken and results achieved.

Considering the novelty and difficulty of the task, we are proposing a team of 2 senior evaluators in cryptography, implementation of cryptography and vulnerability research.

The daily rate for this type of audit is 2000\$/day that is reduced to 1650\$/day in case report can be communicated and published in coordination with Monera Lab.

Detailed breakdown of the source tree

```
asm, blake2 > vulnerability analysis only
         tests -> can be skipped
           aes_hash.cpp 137
            aes_hash.hpp 29
   argon* -> vulnerability analysis only
 assembly_generator* -> can be skipped
             allocator.cpp 52
             allocator.hpp 37
        blake2_generator.cpp 53
        blake2 generator.hpp 37
            common.hpp 156
           configuration.h 112
             dataset.cpp 170
             dataset.hpp 77
   instruction.cpp 94 (printing removed)
           instruction.hpp 140
       instruction_weights.hpp 105
      instructions_portable.cpp 163
          intrin_portable.h 322
 jit_compiler -> vulnerability analysis only
            program.hpp 63
            randomx.cpp 241
             randomx.h 189
             reciprocal.c 59
             reciprocal.h 33
  soft_aes* -> vulnerability analysis only
          superscalar.cpp 888
           superscalar.hpp 51
      superscalar_program.hpp 71
        virtual_machine.cpp 128
         virtual_machine.hpp 67
         virtual_memory.cpp 121
         virtual_memory.hpp 27
vm_compiled* -> vulnerability analysis only
         vm_interpreted.cpp 663
         vm_interpreted.hpp 90
       vm_interpreted_light.cpp 47
       vm_interpreted_light.hpp 52
       ~4500 lines of code in total
```