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1.2) Use RSA for VRF seeds, without Salt for unique signatures. Hash Signature with block number to obtain VRF Seed needed by MiniComptrolller to calculate VDF Difficulty.
We are using mode RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 for RSA, which apparently has No Malleability because it has No Padding
. So, signatures are unique.
in an answer [2], Thomas Pornin writes that this "type 2" padding yields a weak signature scheme due to malleability of modular exponentiation. I understand that "type 1" (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) is for digital signatures and "type 2" (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) for encryption, yet I don't see how malleability can be applied here to break the security.
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1.2) Use RSA for VRF seeds, without Salt for unique signatures. Hash Signature with block number to obtain VRF Seed needed by MiniComptrolller to calculate VDF Difficulty
1.2) Use RSA for VRF seeds, without Salt for unique signatures.
Apr 28, 2021
1.2) Use RSA for VRF seeds, without Salt for unique signatures. Hash Signature with block number to obtain VRF Seed needed by MiniComptrolller to calculate VDF Difficulty.
We are using mode RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 for RSA, which apparently has No Malleability because it has No Padding
. So, signatures are unique.
References
[1] https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/76350/forgery-against-signature-using-rsaes-pkcs1-v1-5-padding
[2] https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/90489/pkcs1-1-5-encoding-is-there-a-reason-to-use-00-in-block-type/90490#90490
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: