19

The UK

Sharon H. Mastracci, Ian Tyler Adams and Ning Kang

Everybody understands English, but nobody understands England
—European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker (Lawless 2019, para 10)

Westminster Palace is usually pictured from the East bank of the Thames, along a stretch that runs roughly North/South. It is the meeting place of the UK parliament: The House of Commons and the House of Lords. Big Ben, the clock tower, bookends the immense gothic-revival palace on the right. Farther to the right of Big Ben is a half-mile stretch, called Whitehall. This area runs from Trafalgar Square at its north end to Parliament Square to the south. Several government buildings are located on and around Whitehall, including Scotland Yard, Her Majesty's (HM) Treasury, Revenue, and Customs, the Ministry of Defence, the Old War Office, and the Department for International Development. Just as "Westminster" refers collectively to

S. H. Mastracci (✉)
Department of Political Science,
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA
e-mail: Sharon.mastracci@poli-sci.utah.edu

I. T. Adams
Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA
e-mail: ian.adams@utah.edu

N. Kang
Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
e-mail: ning.kang-2@manchester.ac.uk

M. E. Guy et al. (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Perspectives on Emotional Labor in Public Service*, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24823-9_19

Parliament, "Whitehall" is shorthand for central government administration in the UK. Compared to the structure of federal government in the USA, Australia, and Canada, UK government remains highly centralized even after several decades of devolution to local authorities as well as to the countries of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. "Whitehall" is the term used to grumble about "big government" in the UK just as "Washington" is the impersonal embodiment of government in the USA. This introduction describes the post-World War II growth of Whitehall and local governments, and their subsequent reforms.

The UK as a Modern Welfare State

Parliament's passage of the National Insurance Act (1946) and the National Assistance Act (1948) under Prime Minister Clement Attlee established the UK as a modern welfare state. These important laws created the British systems of worker's compensation, social security, and income assistance. These reforms also witnessed the creation of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948 as a consolidation of all local and charitable hospitals and medical providers. This created a national-level administration for comprehensive, universal healthcare free at the point of service.

British civil service increasingly professionalized with creation of the Civil Service College and the Civil Service Department. These innovations were implemented as a result of the Fulton Report in 1968, which had found that administrators were not professional enough, lacked management skills, and needed more technical and scientific expertise. At the same time, local government management and administration became increasingly professionalized during this period. Concerns about the professional credentials of civil servants were soon eclipsed by concerns over the efficiency of the system overall. "This period of incremental evolution and professionalization in the management of the public sector in the UK was to change during the 1970s, as concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of government came to transcend all else" (Andrews et al. 2013, 8). The British welfare state had grown too large to meet the demands placed on it: "The *Fulton* reforms of 1968 had largely run out of steam by 1974. The great Heath redesign of central government, announced with a confident flourish in October 1970, was already beginning to be dismantled by the beginning of 1970" (Pollitt 1990, 62). The decade ended with the election of a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher, who pledged to reform the UK government.

The story of postwar government in the UK is one of serial reform. While process concerns curb reform efforts in constitutional democracies that have complex federal structures such as in the USA, continual reform is embedded in the UK public service culture. Compared to other Anglophone countries, there are almost no such impediments to government-dictated change in UK civil service: "Much of the UK central government, the civil service, most government departments and civil service agencies have no basis in law and can be changed by executive decision by government ministers … many other changes can simply be imposed by the government so long as it can command a majority in parliament" (Talbot 2001, 282). In contrast, state and provincial autonomy limit how much change the central government can impose in local government in Australia, Canada, and the USA: "Local government in particular has no guaranteed constitutional status and, as such, has been subject to far-reaching structural and managerial reforms during the past 100 years that would not have been possible in countries with more decentralized political systems" (Andrews et al. 2013, 10).

The absence of such structural and legal obstacles allows UK central government to impose its will on local and national civil service. It is somewhat ironic, however, that reforms emphasizing responsiveness and accountability to the public would resist evaluation: "In the UK, reform has been continual, often intense, and sometimes harsh. Public sector employees have become accustomed to constant restructurings, downsizings, and new 'initiatives' … Ministers tended to take the line that reform was essential, and *self-evidently desirable*, and that formal, public evaluation might prove a delay and a distraction" (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, 274, emphasis supplied).

A culture of continual reform is further supported by the British tradition of generalist, agnostic public service, and an emphasis on results over process. The emphasis on civil servants as generalist administrators, rather than specialist s dedicated to a policy issue, arises again in the 1990s under New Labour and its assumptions about the motivations of professionals in Third Sector organizations. In contrast to dedicated specialists, the UK civil servant is an agnostic generalist. This structure further supports a culture of ongoing reform (Andrews et al. 2013, 11, emphasis supplied):

> Civil servants are regarded as people who work for the public and who are, at the most senior levels, charged with upholding the public interest above narrow sectional interests…rather than being experts in administrative law they are required to be generalists able to appreciate issues from many sides. The pragmatism that this culture produces makes it more open to reforms, in part,

> because British civil servants are trained to be responsive to such change, but also because there may be greater acceptance or understanding of the need for change…*results matter more than procedures*.

Results matter more than procedures. Public service in the UK is not bound by statutes governing process and protecting equity and will change (or be changed) to produce desired outcomes. Slow growth in the 1960s and economic crises in the 1970s prompted British lawmakers to challenge the seemingly endless rising costs of the central government. The first Thatcher ministry commenced in 1979 and pledged to address the failings of the state, reduce the size of the public sector, cut costs, and apply the same market discipline and management practices as private-sector business. In 1981, the Civil Service Department was eliminated, "and the Treasury assumed control over Whitehall through the Management and Personnel Office" (Andrews et al. 2013, 9).

Private-sector managerial practices were enforced in public-sector departments: "The UK has been very much part of the Anglophone, US-dominated world of managerialism, management consultants, and management gurus" (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, 271). Managerial reforms included the introduction of strategic planning, performance targets, and some pay-for-performance schemes. Managerialism is "the belief that all aspects of organizational life can and should be managed according to rational structures, procedures, and modes of accountability in the pursuit of goals defined by policymakers and senior managers" (O'Reilly and Reed 2012, 24). Bovaird and Russell (2007) characterize the managerialist agenda as little more than a recent vintage of Industrial Age time-and-motion studies: "Reforms in the early 1980s were essentially a crude neo-Taylorist form of managerialism" (307). The managerialist ethos is especially complementary to a generalist civil service responsible for results to the party in charge of a centralized government (Pollitt 1990).

With a few modifications during the New Labour governments under Prime Ministers Blair and Brown in the 1990s, British public service has steadily pursued a managerialist agenda in reaction to the rise of the post-war welfare state. This quest is sustained by the continued centralization of power despite devolutionary pressures and the absence of organizational structures or political counter-pressures that could curb reform efforts. The pursuit of reform since the late 1970s continues through today in an environment of austerity and uncertainty. As this *Handbook* goes to press, the effects on public service provision due to the departure of the UK from the European Union—"Brexit"—remain unclear. At minimum, the EU-funded

economic development initiatives that have benefitted former industrial areas of the West Midlands and blighted rural areas will end and become the responsibility of the UK. Whether promised economic growth in other areas, such as British fisheries, will offset the decline in economic supports formerly provided under EU-funded programs, remains unclear, may take years, and will likely never be known with certainty.

Having set the context for the governmental context, this chapter proceeds as follows: First, we explore decades of public service reform in the UK, from public administration, to the management of public funds, to shared governance. Second, we discuss studies that have gauged national culture, including the World Values Survey, Hofstede's IBM studies, and the relationship between national culture and emotional labor. Third, we describe the current study: Survey respondents in the UK, dependent and independent variables, and the structural equation model that analyzes those relationships. Finally, we conclude with a summary of the results.

The chapter focuses on the more recent history of reform in UK government and how it has responded to demands of a modern developed economy. Public administration in what is now the UK has a very long history—long by Western standards, at least. In fact, the administrative state of modern England dates back at least a thousand years to the first English census—the *Domesday Book*—in 1086, under orders from William the Conqueror, King William I. Rather than this chapter trying to capture several centuries of administration, or even a few hundred years of administration under the defined power of a constitutional monarchy, the focus is on twentieth and twenty-first centuries administrative reform, for it is this context that best explains the current administrative culture. The modern history of the administrative state in the UK is a story of faith in the power and promise of reform.

Public-Sector Reform and New Public Management

The unique combination of concentrated power in central government and a faith in private-sector, market-like reforms renders the UK a special example of countries that implemented New Public Management (NPM) reforms. The UK has become "a kind of poster child for NPM and a negative advertisement for its worst excesses" (Andrews et al. 2013, 10). Many of the same factors underpinning rapid establishment of the UK welfare state in the decade following the World War II also underlie the speed and depth

with which government can and has pursued its reform agenda: "Given the considerable power that is wielded at the center of the British state, the constitutional and legal flexibility within the system offers the ruling political party in Westminster considerable scope for developing and implementing comprehensive and far-reaching policy programs—and, indeed, for terminating programs deemed unpopular or unsuccessful" (Andrews et al. 2013, 10). That is to say, just as Labour celebrated its landslide victory in the 1945 general elections and proceeded to implement a Post-War Consensus agenda that included general welfare state policies and nationalization of transportation, communications, and health care—largely within the five-year span from 1945 to the 1950 general election—so too would later Conservative governments dismantle much of the welfare state over the three Thatcher ministries from 1979 to 1990.

While the presence of a universally understood "Consensus" agenda in the UK from 1945 through the late 1970s is a matter of debate, the fact that UK government underwent extensive and radical growth and expansion over the period is unquestioned. Centralized power and legal flexibility make rapid change possible. A secure majority in parliament and the absence of legal and institutional barriers, such as strong trade unions, allow changes as quickly and frequently as the majority party wishes: "The unusual dominance of a single party form of executive within the British system gives governments an equally-unusual ability to realize their reform desires, even when these are controversial in Parliament or unpopular in the country … [S]ince 1979, governments have regarded continuing and deep administrative change as perfectly feasible" (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, 273).

NPM refers to a public-sector reform agenda in which private-sector competitive mechanisms are introduced to service delivery through performance targets, contracting out, and compensation schemes that mimic private sector pay for performance. Brown and Osborne distinguish between NPM and its predecessor, public *administration* (2005, 50, emphases in original):

> New Public *Management* sought to transform public services into more efficient and effective managerial, financial, and operational principles and practices. Public *administration* framed the operation of the public service as requiring the orderly application of rules, decisions, and actions based on consistency and rationality and this approach denoted the traditional model of public service…NPM has been adopted because of an ideological commitment to the economic, market competition model. Administration emphasizes the generalist while management emphasizes the specialist.

Management techniques such as strategic planning and fee-based service delivery are emphasized throughout government organizations, and mission-based activities are managed rather than administered. With its emphasis on results over process, the appeal of NPM transformed from rhetoric to reality: "It was only in 2002, after 20 years of rhetoric, that some central elements of the reform program (particularly business planning and performance management systems) were achieving a significant degree of acceptance and usage, and being regarded as valuable" (Bovaird 2007, 348).

Heralded by advocates of small government as efficient cost-cutting, NPM reforms were not without their critics. Performance-related pay was widely disliked as a market-based reform that would "undermine the basic principles of effective working in the civil service" (Bovaird 2007, 333). Performance targets were similarly derided. The focus on performance targets resulted in at least one high-profile scandal: One example of NPM's worst excesses is found in the hundreds of cases of neglect and premature deaths at the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust hospital, where the pursuit of performance targets and budget cuts took precedence over patient well-being for years (Mastracci 2016).

The NPM reform agenda gained popularity and was adopted by many OECD countries in response to a broad range of significant drivers of institutional change (Brown and Osborne 2005, 55):

> Globalization, a disaffected citizenry, blurring of the boundaries between private, public, and community sector organizations…financial cutbacks, restructuring on a global scale, increasing technological advances and changing labor demographics and higher expectations of services on the part of citizens.

Among several English-speaking countries in particular, "the UK is arguably a critical case for the evaluation of public service performance, since it is often said to have been the 'vanguard state' or at least one of the leading countries, of the New Public Management" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 413; see also Hood 1991). Internal characteristics—a highly centralized national government structure and few legal boundaries to curb reformers' zeal—combined with the external drivers listed above and led the UK to pursue an NPM agenda.

After a decade of postwar rebuilding and robust economic growth in the 1950s, stagnation and trade union strikes characterized the British economy in the 1960s. The period was also marked by violence resulting from ethno-nationalist conflict, called the "Troubles," in Northern Ireland. The number of Troubles-related deaths increased throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and

1980s, punctuated by riots in August 1969, Bloody Sunday in 1972, hunger strike deaths in 1981, and the Brighton Hotel bombing in 1984. To revive its sluggish economy in the 1960s, British lawmakers sought membership in the new European Economic Community (EEC). After failures to gain membership in the EEC in 1963 and 1967, Britain became a member in 1973. Throughout the 1970s, the UK experienced fragile economic growth and escalating inflation captured by the Retail Price Index. The "Winter of Discontent" of 1978–1979 witnessed widespread strikes by public-sector labor unions opposed to wage caps implemented by the Labour Party to control inflationary cost increases. Both major political parties—Labour and the Conservatives—proposed one reform after another (Pollitt 2013, 900):

> Over the past half century, the UK public sector may have been cumulatively the most reformed in the world. It has been in more or less continuous modernization since Mr. Heath became Prime Minister in 1970. Over the long term, it could be argued that the UK outpaces even the famous, radical, but only one-decade-long New Zealand reforms of 1984-1993.

Economic growth due to rebuilding after World War II and the rapid expansion of the welfare state were followed quickly by economic stagnation and complaints about inefficient government and high taxes. Labour governments were criticized for widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy, especially compared to the UK's European counterparts. Crises such as the widespread strikes by public sector trade unions demanding larger pay raises in 1978–1979, called the "Winter of Discontent," and independence movements in both Scotland and Wales, fueled dissatisfaction. Labour's majority soon gave way to the Conservative Party, which won its first of four consecutive parliamentary majorities in the 1979 general election.

1979–1997

Public-sector unions drew the most attention during the Winter of Discontent, as strikes by rail employees, NHS nurses and allied workers, truck drivers, ambulance drivers, trash collectors, and gravediggers severely disrupted economic activity in January and February 1979. Parliament was dissolved shortly thereafter, and a general election was held in May of that year. The Conservative campaign promised to curb inflation and limit the power of labor unions with the very effective campaign slogan against the

party in power: *Labour Isn't Working*. After the steady growth of the public sector throughout the decades after World War II, high taxes and high inflation were the targets of both parties. The Conservatives under new Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher won a convincing majority in 1979, followed by victories in the general elections of 1983, 1987, and 1992.

Conservatives privatized several industries that had been nationalized by the Attlee ministry in the late 1940s. The mid-1980s witnessed the selloff of British Telecom, British Gas, the Airports Authority, and water and sewerage systems throughout the country: "about 800,000 employees were transferred from the public sector to the private" (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, 273). As mentioned earlier, the unique common-law system of the UK, as well as the absence of autonomous sub-national governments, allows for swift and comprehensive public-sector reform. Because of this expediency, during the Thatcher ministry, reforms to introduce market mechanisms into the public sector accompanied privatization and budget cuts. "The UK stands out for its vigorously-pursued market orientation and the emphasis on the explicitly 'managerial' side of the new public management" (Schroter 2007, 299). Alongside privatization, a focus on efficient service delivery also shrunk public sector headcount: "From 1979 until 1982-83, there was a fierce drive for economies and the elimination of waste. Civil service numbers were cut, first by 14 percent and then, subsequently, by a further six percent" (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, 273).

Public-sector reforms continued through the mid- and late 1980s as the Thatcher administration continued to win convincing majorities in general elections. Market mechanisms for the allocation of public resources were implemented on a larger scale, performance measurement systems were expanded, as were contracting-out schemes. An overarching emphasis on "customer service" characterized these reforms, and contracting out and market solutions were touted as the self-evident keys to improving customer service and value for taxpayer money.

The *Citizen's Charter* (Select Committee 1991) was an early, if not the first, formal statement recasting the UK citizen as a customer of public services, and it represents a departure from the traditional deference accorded to career civil servants. The *Charter* reflects a managerial agenda and "reinforced the view that citizens were consumers who needed market-like choice mechanisms, a perspective that had been implanted by some of Mrs. Thatcher's later reforms" (Pollitt 2013, 908). The *Charter* was founded on "six principles of public service which every citizen is entitled to *expect*" (Select Committee 1991, vi):

1. Explicit standards for each service
2. Information and openness
3. Choice and consultation
4. Courtesy and helpfulness
5. Easy-to-use complaints procedures and mechanisms for redress, and
6. Value for money.

The six principles above reveal a new culture, one that involves expectations and a relationship between a buyer and a seller. Among them, "4. Courtesy and helpfulness" is not only subjective and therefore based on the interpretation of the citizen/customer, but is also a clear display rule guiding the behavior of public servants in a modernized and responsive government service environment.

Public management reforms of the early 1990s have proven enduring: "Labels have frequently been changed, but some of the basic ideas of the *Charter* white paper have survived well into the 21st Century" (Pollitt 2013, 908). The citizen-as-customer ethos remains strong in the UK, just as it has remained a guiding principle across NPM-implementing countries. It is a durable concept that remains present in the twenty-first Century Public Servant narrative addressed later. However, other Thatcher-era reforms criticized by opponents were only partially accomplished.

Indeed, for all of the talk about reining in the state and cutting costs, the British welfare state was not dismantled, nor were strict market-based allocation mechanisms imposed throughout the public sector: "Conservatives failed to realize their ambition of 'rolling back' taxation, public expenditure, and public borrowing, although they may have succeeded in halting the long-term trend since WWII for all of these to rise substantially" (Talbot 2001, 286). The upward trajectory of government operating costs and taxes throughout the 1960s and 1970s was very likely curtailed by the measures implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, but any claims about the end of the British welfare state could only be overstatements by Conservatives and fear mongering by the opposition.

Privatization, aggressive contracting, and separating the buyer and provider roles in the public sector effectively hollowed-out certain public service delivery areas. However, relative to other Anglophone countries, the UK civil service maintains an extensive presence in communications and health care as a direct provider of services even today. In other areas such as transportation and economic development, the regulatory apparatus remains robust in the UK, compared to other NPM countries in the Anglosphere.

Even in the hollowed-out service delivery areas, the presence of the public sector remains substantial, even though central government personnel headcounts were slashed. The difference is in the nominal employer of the public servant: "A substantial increase in reported central government running costs in constant-price terms over three decades [is found], even—perhaps especially—in the Margaret Thatcher era, which is often depicted as one of ruthless slashing and burning as far as bureaucracy is concerned" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 420).

Local government operating costs demonstrate a similar increasing trajectory over the 1980s, through the 1990s, and into the present. Although the number of civil servants fell over the three-plus decades from the Thatcher government to the present, operating costs at both the national and the local levels have increased due to increased "consultancy costs and outsourcing contracts for IT and other services" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 424; see also 2015). Contracting out or "commissioning," when conducted properly, "should be cyclical, inclusive, and lead to an improvement in services" as well as lower costs through competition among potential providers (Rees et al. 2017, 179).

Commissioning was assumed to be a self-evident good and cost-effective public management strategy, despite its higher costs to taxpayers and inconsistent evidence of effectiveness (Elkomy et al. 2019). In their examination of commissioning mental health services, Rees, Miller, and Buckingham conclude that this approach to public service delivery still bears characteristics of the earlier large-scale welfare state (2017, 191):

> Neither represents the fulfillment of aspirations for fully marketized services, nor for the holistic or entirely deliberative process advocated by others … [W]e advocate caution therefore in portraying commissioning as either the revolutionary approach heralded by advocates or most feared by critics.

Thatcher-era reforms did, however, curb public-sector growth: "Critics from across the political spectrum concur that it was misguided for the state in the postwar period to have expanded into areas previously occupied by third-sector organizations" (Kelly 2007, 1009). Expansion of the British welfare state may have expanded into too many service delivery areas. Government may have grown too much. While the end of the twentieth century witnessed the end of Conservative majorities, the UK did not return to a big government period of the past. New Labour heralded the rise of the Third Sector in the provision of public services.

1997–2000

A landslide victory for the Labour Party in May 1997 ushered in the first of three ministries under Prime Minister Tony Blair. Although the Conservative Party was swept out of office, its reform narrative remained: "The new Labour government of 1997 reversed very little of what had gone before" (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000, 274). Kelly concurs in her discussion of the new government's motives: "Driven by its commitment to the market and the conviction of the inevitability of globalization, New Labour's administration has continued down the pathway of withdrawing government from the direct provision of services to the public" (2007, 1008). The tide had turned such that public service cost cutting and efficiencies remained persuasive political arguments, regardless of the party in charge. Central government as the primary provider of services would not return to the big government era of the 1950s (Andrews et al. 2013, 9):

> The 'hard' private sector management tools of contracting out and performance monitoring were still maintained, but were made subordinate to top-down hierarchical models of continuous improvement with often-elaborate, target-based, incentive systems. At the same time, these more conventional modes of governing and managing were supplemented with a greater emphasis on the need to strengthen the relationships between the different stakeholders involved in public-service design and delivery.

The decline of public administration throughout the late twentieth century "is brought into sharper relief by the concomitant rise of management" (Gabriel 1999, 402). UK public service delivery evolved from a somewhat passive administration of taxpayer-funded resources to a more active public management, and finally to the "third way," characterized as cooperative governance among multiple actors. The various stakeholders involved in design and delivery now included the state, the market, and civil society—that is, nonprofit and non-governmental organizations.

A third way of delivering public services depicted a network of relationships among private, public, and charitable sector organizations and introduced the notion of shared governance among them. Citizens have a role in decision-making in this new, mutually empowering system as consumers, where "buying becomes tantamount to voting, and market surveys the nearest we have to collective will" (Gabriel 1999, 405). Coined "New Labour," the Blair Ministry was clearly shaped by the long Conservative period of the 1980s and 1999s but demonstrated marked differences from pre-Thatcher

Labour governments. For example, "trade unions were kept much more in a position of being one amongst a wide variety of 'stakeholders' rather than favored partners as in earlier periods of Labour rule" (Talbot 2001, 298).

Moreover, New Labour retained prior governments' pro-managerialist reform initiatives such as the New Public Management performance targets and budget austerity. Thus, "laying off civil servants to hit headcount-reduction targets and re-hiring them as consultants … was said to have been widespread under the Thatcher government and indeed well into the 2000s" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 426). Victories were declared by slashing public-sector headcount. No victories could be claimed with respect to slashing public-sector budgets, however, because personnel costs to pay workers as consultants were just as high and often higher than when they were on government rolls. New Labour sought to distinguish its reform initiatives from previous ones by highlighting the role of the third sector, which included nonprofit organizations, community organizations, and voluntary organizations across a range of policy areas.

The inspiration for New Labour's embrace of the voluntary sector was the limited role that the third sector had played under previous Conservative administrations, coupled with a romanticized vision of the potential for voluntary organizations to deliver quality public services cheaper and more effectively than the public sector could. Reacting to the implementation of economic development initiatives under the Thatcher and Major governments, New Labour emphasized the untapped potential of third- or voluntary-sector organizations to deliver not only services but also shape policy in true community governance relationships with central government and local authorities (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002).

Voluntary associations were assumed to be better situated to address social needs because they were experts in their fields, not generalists like civil servants. Likewise, it was assumed that because they developed expertise and were meant to care about their subject matter and the clients they served, workers in charitable organizations would provide service superior to that of the objective, disinterested, and administrator. It was further assumed that workers in charitable organizations would not seek self-interest or seek to consolidate or expand their powers and that they would not be corruptible. These aspirations were meant to inspire government: "New Labour's mission for the third sector is a segment of its wider ambitions for the modernization of the UK's public sector" (Kelly 2007, 1004). Third-sector organizations were presumed to hold specialized information on the nature of the policy area and its recipients, a level of knowledge and responsiveness that was unrivaled by the public sector. Third-sector organizations also enjoyed a high

degree of public trust and the belief in their inherent ability to deliver better value for money and to do so more ethically than the public sector could.

However, public trust had been earned by these voluntary organizations through their efforts as advocates for their constituents. Closer co-governance with the public sector posed "real dangers for the voluntary sector, which could lead to the negation of its legitimate societal roles as independent watchdog and voice for the marginal and dispossessed … voluntary organizations run the risk of not being able to act independently of the state" (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002, 61). Although the New Labour government was sympathetic with the risks faced by voluntary organizations, "it continue[d] to be highly centralist and use top-down mechanisms such as regulation, inspection, and steering through advice and guidance" to ensure that public funds were being accounted for properly and that providers were responsive to the citizenry (Kelly 2007, 1015).

New Labour's Voluntary Sector Compact was launched in November 1998 (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002) at the national level, but the process of developing compacts at the local level was slow because local governments struggled to contain the boundaries of the scope of these compacts. For example, it remained unclear whether local government compacts with voluntary sector organizations should also include health, public health, environmental services, and police authorities. Voluntary sector compacts were employed in economic development initiatives, but questions arose regarding whether the scope of services should be more ambitious.

Complicating the picture, "New Labour's zeal for frequent initiatives" led to policy overload for both national and local governments, and their partner voluntary sector organizations (Kelly 2007, 1016). Moreover, New Labour did not hand over control to the voluntary sector for public service delivery and the "supposed control freakery of the Labour government's efforts to steer this increasingly-complex system was a target for opposition parties prior to the formation of the Conservative-led coalition government in 2010" (Andrews et al. 2013, 9). Costs were not contained under this approach, but the newfound power of the voluntary sector truly distinguished this period of public sector reform from earlier rounds of managerialist changes.

The continued development and implementation of reform initiatives was New Labour's expression of legitimacy during this time: "Throughout the Labour administration the reform of public services was displayed as a *totemic signifier of the intent and seriousness of the party*" (O'Reilly and Reed 2012, 21, emphasis supplied). It was left to other constituencies to evaluate the effectiveness of these initiatives, and we turn to the limited body

of evaluation literature shortly. In brief, problems with scoping these compacts, lines of authority, the limited discretion possessed by voluntary organizations, and fiscal austerity, dampened the potential for joined-up working between the public and third sectors. Public resistance to tax increases limited the ability of the Blair and Brown ministries to provide financial resources to national and local governments to implement the Voluntary Sector Compact or other initiatives undertaken during this period.

A significant weakness of New Labour's emphasis on the third sector was its unquestioned assumption of altruism as the primary, if not sole, motivator of voluntary-sector organizations: "The nature of the third sector's altruistic values are fragile foundations on which to build a new model of social welfare" (Kelly 2007, 1019). Indeed, integration of third-sector organizations into public service delivery through contracting "has not led to the straightforward public sector 'marketization' that advocates desire or that critics fear" (Rees et al. 2017, 175). The pursuit of government reform initiatives to legitimize government carried over from New Labour and was "also discernible in the early days of its successor Conservative-led coalition government" (O'Reilly and Reed 2012, 21). The financial market collapse in the USA and the subsequent worldwide Great Recession took precedence on the UK agenda shortly after Gordon Brown stepped in as Prime Minister after the Blair resignation in 2007. Public service reforms in the early twenty-first century were initiated under a dark cloud of fiscal austerity and glacially-slow economic recovery.

The Twenty-First Century Public Servant

Administration of public monies in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s morphed into management of resources in the 1980s and 1990s, and then into shared decision-making and governance in the twenty-first century (Needham and Mangan 2016). A coalition government formed after the 2010 general election, led by the Conservative Party under Prime Minister David Cameron. Governance and co-production across sectors—public, private, and nonprofit—characterizes the UK's version of twenty-first-century public service and is a product of all that preceded it. This version is described as "The hybrid form of neoliberal ideology and consumerist discourse that has driven public sector restructuring in the UK" (O'Reilly and Reed 2012, 35). This hybrid form of decision-making and public service delivery is characterized by an environment of low-trust relationships and public sector organizations that are designed according to principal/agent, transactional, and interactions.

Reforms emphasizing management over administration have manifested in the UK as government commissions out public service delivery and create performance targets to properly incentivize third-sector and private-sector organizations to fulfill the public good. From the late 1970s and continuing today, government agencies have been reformed and reorganized from hierarchical bureaucratic organizations with extensive rules, separate from the market, to quasi-market actors (Dunleavy and Hood 1994). This begs the question: Have these reforms improved the quality of public service delivery or at least cut costs?

Findings now show that public sector reforms in the UK—serial reforms—not only failed to cut costs but also diminished the quality of public sector services: "The UK over the three decades analyzed here somehow ended up in a lose/lose situation in which government cost substantially more to run in terms of reported running costs, while there were increasing creaks and groans on the side of perceived fairness and consistency, judged by the incidence of formal complaints and litigation" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 424). Emphasis on cutting headcounts led government agencies to contract out public service delivery and recategorize public servants and private- or third-sector employees. While this cut employment on government rolls, costs were at least as high and often higher than service delivery under the old model. Centralized authority in the UK, extensive growth in commissioning, and very limited devolution to regional governments, local authorities, or municipal governments, led to higher costs overall and little difference in service quality.

With expert knowledge and pre-existing relationships with client populations, third-sector organizations are key players in policy development and decision-making, rather than service-delivery agents responding to incentives. Public service delivery by private- and third-sector organizations in the UK is referred to as the *plural state*: "The evolution of this plural state has also seen a shift, first from the administration of government services to their management, and then from their management to their governance" (Brown and Osborne 2005, 5). One key difference between management "over" in a principal/agent relationship and governance "among" peer entities is found in decision-making and policy development. While as managers, public-sector organizations set targets and terms for non-governmental entities to deliver services, under a governance model, "voluntary and community organizations are now recognized as critical actors in the *development of* social policy within the plural state" (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002, 55, emphasis supplied).

It is believed that the central role of non-governmental actors will make public service delivery more responsive and improve quality. This theory has

been severely tested by evidence in a post-recession environment: "The old narrative of public-spirited but under-rewarded public servants was replaced by one of over-privileged public employees, especially after the crisis in public finances in 2008-2009" due to the worldwide Great Recession (Parry 2011, 364). NPM reforms pre-dated the worldwide financial crisis, but scrutiny of the public sector combined with austerity demands following the recession result in a political and social context in which the old UK welfare state of the 1950s will likely never re-emerge.

Even post-NPM reforms do not revive the prior welfare state model. Public leadership finds itself under increasing scrutiny not only as a result of the financial straits caused by the international financial crisis, but also as a result of narratives promulgated by New Public Management and now network governance reforms. These express distrust of civil servants and are coupled with increased pressure for accountability toward clients, employees, and local authorities (Teelken et al. 2012). As the failed promises of NPM were reckoned with, new theoretical propositions emerged: "The alternative to NPM networking is thus not a monolithic and bureaucratic state but a cooperative venture of practice institutions oriented toward the common good" (Overeem and Tholen 2011, 741). Whether the third sector can rescue public service delivery from high costs and low quality arising from NPM, reforms remain to be seen. The romanticized assumptions of the promise and possibility of third-sector delivery in the UK seem ripe only for a letdown.

The reform narrative—particularly the neoliberal, market-based NPM reforms of the Thatcher ministries and into the Blair government—scored political points but failed to improve the production and delivery of public services or cut costs. More often than not, the history of public-sector reforms in the UK is a story of solutions in search of problems: "Most reform exercises in the public services did not begin by looking at what was producing repeated complaints or litigation and taking that as the cue for what needed attention. Rather, those makeovers tended to start from ready-made solutions (such as outsourcing, IT, business methods, or managerial empowerment) looking for problems" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 425).

Reform for the sake of reform had its political uses as well. Compared to other Anglophone countries—even ambitious NPM countries—the UK "was a 'serial reformer' to a particularly marked degree" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 410). Enough policy analyses have now been conducted to conclude that championing reform may no longer yield the political benefits that it used to, even though few political and structural barriers prevent reforms from happening: "It is possible that, in the UK at least, the specifically political payoffs from tales of managerial reform may be dwindling. There have

been so many of them that skepticism among both the public and public servants is widespread…[the] stories have become unconvincing" (Pollitt 2013, 919). In other words, the faith in the promise of reform may have reached a saturation point.

Satire must bear at least a passing resemblance to its subject matter, lest it fails in its objective. The tug-of-war between Parliament and government was depicted in the popular BBC television sitcom *Yes, Minister*, where elected officials try to impose changes while the civil service undermines them. That tension continues to this day. Perhaps the most durable inheritance from the market-based reforms that began in the 1980s has been the perceptual switch from citizen to customer. Reforms alone were not responsible for this switch, as larger forces created a supportive environment, including the "increased ease of registering complaints with the advent of the Internet [and] even some long-term social trend toward greater litigiousness or propensity to make formal complaints" (Hood and Dixon 2016, 416). Customers demand responsiveness and quality service, and from the development and growth of the UK welfare state to today, demands on the system remain high.

The UK rapidly developed its welfare state infrastructure as it rebuilt in the 1940s and 1950s. From that time through the present, the British public sector has "gone from being overloaded in the 1960s/1970s to being 'hollowed out' in the 1980s/early 1990s, to 'congested' in the late 1990s/2000s and is now undergoing a period of serious retrenchment" (Andrews et al. 2013, 9). Scholars are divided whether public-sector reform has changed much about government in the UK besides headcount. Although the UK has earned "a reputation as one of the main pathfinders in both the rhetoric and practice of public sector reform" (Bovaird and Russell 2007, 325), "the paradox of public services and management in the UK over the past 20 years or so is that *everything has changed and nothing has changed*" (Talbot 2001, 299, emphasis supplied).

Measuring National Culture

Starting from the premise that national cultures have a notable impact on the dominant styles of management within a society, both private and public organizations are "culture bound" (Schroter 2007, 314). Culture plays a role in organizational practices and in the citizen–state encounter. It is gauged through the study of a people's—usually a nation's—shared values, norms, behaviors, rules, and symbols. What is important? Who is "we" and what do

we do? What is rewarded and what is punished? What is communicated and transmitted among "us"? What is ignored?

Data from two large-scale, long-term projects still inform our understanding of national culture to this day: Hofstede's IBM studies and the World Values Survey of Project GLOBE. Hofstede's original four dimensions provided the general framework for Project GLOBE: Power distance (PDI), Individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), Uncertainty avoidance (UA), and Masculinity vs. femininity (MAS). PDI captures a nation's tolerance for inequality: "The extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally" (Hofstede 1980, 331). IDV gauges the extent to which people in a nation are integrated into groups; the extent to which the "I" is emphasized over the "we." UA is the degree to which people tolerate ambiguity in a society. A nation that scores high on UA likely enforces strict behavioral norms and endorses strict laws and absolute truth to govern relationships. MAS captures a people's preference for "achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success [or] cooperation, modesty, and caring for the weak and quality of life" (Shermon 2016, 135). Two dimensions were added after the initial IBM studies in 1980: Future Orientation and Indulgence.

The UK ranks high on Individualism, low on Future Orientation, and near the middle on other dimensions of culture. Updates on the initial project from Hofstede et al. (2010) also rank the UK very high on Individualism, higher than average on Masculinity, and lower than average on Power Distance. As a country scoring high on Individualism, the UK is a culture where "there are loose ties between individuals, less social cohesion, and a higher responsibility to take care of yourself" (Bouckaert 2007, 47).

While an Individualist culture, the UK is imbued with a strong Collectivist streak via its welfare state and the demands of its citizens for public services. Brits "prove to be much more enthusiastic in their support for established mass welfare services … the NHS [is] part of the 'collectivist' element in British political culture" (Schroter 2007, 307). After decades of reforms that introduce market mechanisms to the allocation of public services, British public service is scaling back in all areas *except* health care: "Despite attempts to 'sell' partial privatization, [the NHS] remains something of a 'sacred cow' to the British electorate" (Andrews et al. 2013, 9).

Lower-than-average PDI seems counterintuitive in light of the British class system and the degree of control of central over local government due to centralized tax distribution. The UK's low PDI contradicts what we know about High-PDI countries: "High power distance countries accept greater inequalities, expressed as salary gaps, privileges, and status symbols.

There is also more centralization of power. This is a very hierarchical society" (Bouckaert 2007, 47). This seems a salient description of at least some dimensions of the UK, and other comparative scholars also observe this contradiction: "The British preference for strong political leadership has often been insufficiently appreciated … intimately linked is the alleged 'deferential' component of political life in Britain, which has eventually become the object of heated debates in political culture studies" (Schroter 2007, 302).

While no definitive resolution of the apparent contradiction is found in comparative-culture literature, we may gain insights from examining which countries score high on PDI: Countries in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Arab world score consistently high PDIs. Anglo and Germanic countries score low on PDI. Ultimately unsettled in the literature, PDI may be influenced by IDV, as high-PDI countries also tend to be Collectivist and low-PDI countries tend to be Individualist. Further research would sort out these dimensions.

The UK scores low on Uncertainty Avoidance, which "results in high risk taking, focusing on results even if that includes taking calculated risks. There is no uneasiness with exceptional situations, and ambiguity is considered to create degrees of freedom, which are taken. A culture of risk is part of this" (Bouckaert 2007, 48). It is notable that NPM was adopted widely throughout Anglo countries, where a "cluster of low power distance and low uncertainty avoidance resulted in a mixed cluster of Anglo-Saxon countries, including the so-called NPM countries": Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the USA (Bouckaert 2007, 50). While high IDV is both necessary and sufficient for the adoption of NPM reforms, with their emphasis on principal/agent relations, the UK also scores high on MAS, and higher than average on long-term orientation, and indulgence.

The World Values Survey (WVS) ranks the UK high on Secular/Rational Values and Self-Expression, which are analogous to Hofstede's IDV (Inglehart et al. 2014). Like the Hofstede dimensions of culture, WVS ranks the UK high on masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, and near the middle on future orientation. Unlike Hofstede et al. (2010), Project GLOBE and WVS score the UK high on Power Distance. This is a more intuitively supported finding given the British class system and the degree of central control in government. In WVS Wave 5, fully sixty percent of respondents in the UK ($n = 1041$) considered politics "Not Very Important" or "Not At All Important" to daily life (Inglehart et al. 2014). Nearly ninety percent of respondents indicated that they were not members of any political party and nearly eighty percent were not members of labor unions. Respondents tend to believe in the value of hard work for a better standard of living.

Roughly the same number of respondents felt government should take responsibility for providing for its citizens as those who felt individuals should provide for themselves, with the distribution between these two poles skewing slightly toward the individual (Inglehart et al. 2014). When asked about their level of confidence in government, however, about two-thirds responded, "Not Very Much" or "None At All" compared to one-third who answered "A Great Deal" or "Quite A Lot." Interestingly, this 65/35 split is not observed in respondent sentiment about British civil service. Respondents were more evenly split, albeit with a slight negative skew in their confidence in the civil service: 41.6% answered, "A Great Deal" or "Quite A Lot," while 49.3% answered, "Not Very Much" or "None At All."

Emotional Labor and Public Service Delivery

NPM reforms that introduced competitive-market dynamics to public-sector service delivery and emphasized the citizen as customer and a customer-service ethos may have only exacerbated emotional labor demands in public services (Thomas 2013). Mimicking private-sector service delivery, public-sector workers under NPM may experience emotional labor similarly to their counterparts in private-sector customer service. Where public service workers are assessed on customer satisfaction, and customer satisfaction derives from how a citizen perceives her or his interpersonal interaction with public servants, NPM increases the emotional labor demands upon public servants. But the concept of "the customer" is problematic in public services because it raises issues of inequality, oversimplification, and a lack of commitment to the public interest. The increasing demands of responsiveness and "customer satisfaction" may contribute to increasing levels of emotional labor (Rayner and Lawton 2017, 2). Public servants interact with the citizenry in higher-stakes contexts compared to typical consumer interactions with workers in retail settings. Higher-stakes interactions such as well-child visits in foster placements, or considering eligibility for council housing and other benefits, demand emotional labor.

The Study

Data from UK public servants, most of whom work for municipal and county government, are used to determine whether the latent variables of emotive capacity, pretending expression, and deep acting exist, and if so, how they relate to job satisfaction, burnout, and personal fulfillment.

Methodology

In March, April, and May 2015, we surveyed current and former local government employees ($n = 201$) while the first author was a Fulbright scholar hosted by the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV) at the University of Birmingham. Students in MPA classes with current or prior paid experience in government or nonprofit organizations comprised about a quarter of the sample ($n = 49$). Another one-quarter of the sample came from city government (Manchester $n = 21$; Birmingham $n = 34$), while about half came from county-level governments (Warwickshire $n = 68$; Yorkshire $n = 29$).

Demographic statistics for the respondents are displayed in Table 19.1. Sixty-one percent of respondents are under age 50, 64% are female, 88%

Table 19.1 Demographic characteristics: UK ($n = 201$)

	Frequency	Percent
Age		
Less than 30	15	7.46
30–39 years	46	22.89
40–49 years	62	30.85
50–59 years	65	32.34
60 or more	5	2.49
Not Answered	8	3.98
Gender		
Female	129	64.18
Male	67	33.33
Not Answered	5	2.49
Public service experience		
Less than 10	24	11.94
10–19 years	51	25.37
20–29 years	61	30.35
30 or more	60	29.85
Not Answered	5	2.49
Educational level		
Less than high school	0	0.00
High school graduate	8	3.98
Some college	17	8.46
2-year associate degree	12	5.97
College graduate	50	24.88
Some graduate school	39	19.40
Master's degree	64	31.84
Law degree (J.D., LL.B.)	1	0.50
Doctorate degree (Ph.D., M.D., Ed.D., etc.)	3	1.49
Not answered	7	3.48

have ten or more years of work experience, and concerning educational attainment, 78% have at least a college degree.

Table 19.2 displays the range of occupations claimed by respondents and reflects the local-government representation of this sample. Respondents were able to select multiple occupations. For example, someone may work in education in an administrative capacity or may work in neighborhood services and provide social services or transportation. The leading occupations are human resource management, community development and neighborhood services, general administration, social services, and information and communication.

Table 19.2 Occupational characteristics: UK

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
1. Administration	25	12.44
2. Community development/neighborhood services	28	13.93
3. Engineering, manufacturing, or production	2	1.00
4. Education	7	3.48
5. Disaster response	0	0.00
6. Finance or accounting	2	1.00
7. Firefighter	0	0.00
8. Health care	11	5.47
9. Housing	3	1.49
10. Human resource management	35	17.41
11. Information and communication	15	7.46
12. Law enforcement	3	1.49
13. Military	0	0
14. Public relations	1	0.50
15. Planning	3	1.49
16. Public works: streets, sanitation, utilities	2	1.00
17. Purchasing	0	0
18. Recreation and parks	1	0.50
19. Research and development	7	3.48
20. Social services	15	7.46
21. Transportation	3	1.49
22. Support services (e.g., plant/equip. maintenance)	0	0
23. Other	5	2.49
Not answered	33	16.42
Multiple selections (up to six selections from above)		
Two occupations	31	15.42
Three occupations	16	7.96
Four occupations	8	3.98
Five occupations	4	1.99
Six occupations	2	1.00

Emotional Labor Variables

The survey items used to capture emotional labor are reported below. Each was scored on a seven-point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7). The items in each variable are listed below.

Emotive Capacity

I am good at expressing how I feel.
I am good at getting people to calm down.
In my job I am good at dealing with emotional issues.

Pretending Expression

I hide my true feelings so as to appear pleasant at work.
In my job I act confident and self-assured regardless of how I actually feel.
I wear a "mask" in order to deal with clients/customers in an appropriate way.

Deep Acting

I try to actually experience the emotions that I must show to clients/customers.
I work hard to actually feel the emotions that I need to show to clients/customers.
I work at developing the feelings inside of me that I need to show to clients/customers.

Job Satisfaction

My job provides career development and promotion opportunities.
I feel I am being paid a fair amount for the work I do.
I feel satisfied with my supervisor.
Overall, I am satisfied with my job.

Burnout

I leave work feeling tired and run down.
I leave work feeling emotionally exhausted.
I feel "used up" at the end of the workday.

Personal Fulfillment

I gain a strong sense of personal fulfillment at my job.
I feel like my job is something I want to do rather than something I have to do.
My work is a source of personal meaning in my life.

Table 19.3 Descriptive statistics and Cronbach's alpha: UK

	Mean	SD	Cronbach's alpha
Emotive capacity	5.200	1.034	0.6877
Pretending expression	5.025	1.208	0.6549
Deep acting	4.147	1.298	0.8068
Job satisfaction	4.776	1.192	0.6902
Burnout	4.255	1.479	0.8965
Personal fulfillment	5.174	1.321	0.8610

Table 19.3 provides means and standard deviations for these variables, as well as Cronbach's alpha, a measure of internal consistency. Three coefficients are above 0.80 (Deep Acting, Burnout, and Personal Fulfillment), which indicates very good interitem reliability well above the conventional threshold of 0.70. The other three variables achieve coefficients of 0.65 or above. Given the vulnerability of three- and four-item constructs to consistency statistics, as well as their prevalence in the literature, the results for Emotive Capacity, Pretending Expression, and Job Satisfaction are close enough to the ideal to be used in the analysis.

Findings

Table 19.4 displays results from maximum likelihood estimation of the effect of Emotive Capacity, Pretending, and Deep Acting on the workplace outcomes of Job Satisfaction, Burnout, and Personal Fulfillment. The theoretically specified model is an adequate representation of the data collected in a survey of public servants in the UK.

Of the nine relationships described in Table 19.4—relationships with each of three outcomes by three different independent variables—five of these paths are statistically different from zero. Emotive Capacity increases Job Satisfaction and Personal Fulfillment. Pretending Expression decreases Job Satisfaction and Personal Fulfillment, while it increases Burnout. None of the relationships between Deep Acting and the three outcomes are statistically different from zero.

There is no single best measure or approach to assessing SEM model fit. In a comparative study, model specification is driven by theory. Using UK data, this model performs adequately, although it is at the margins of acceptability. Model goodness-of-fit is shown at the bottom of Table 19.4. Root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is just below the 0.08 threshold and therefore indicates a good fit, and is the most accepted fit statistic. Alternative fit statistics present a more marginal picture.

Table 19.4 Structural model results: UK

Hypothesized paths	Coefficients	*p*-value
Emotive capacity → Job satisfaction	0.385*	0.000
Emotive capacity → Burnout	0.011	0.897
Emotive capacity → Personal fulfillment	0.326*	0.000
Pretending expression → Job satisfaction	–0.488*	0.000
Pretending expression → Burnout	0.448*	0.000
Pretending expression → Personal fulfillment	–0.277*	0.005
Deep acting → Job satisfaction	–0.047	0.557
Deep acting → Burnout	0.046	0.572
Deep acting → Personal fulfillment	0.047	0.554

Model fit: $\chi^2 = 314.530$ (df = 142), CFI = 0.878, RMSEA = 0.079, SRMR = 0.088

The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is slightly lower than the 0.90 critical value for good model fit, and the Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) is slightly higher than its 0.08 critical value. The *p*-value accompanying the model chi-squared is lower than its goodness-of-fit threshold, but is sensitive to sample size and model complexity to the degree that most models will not attain the minimum. Overall, the specified theoretical model is assessed as an adequate fit for the observed data.

The path coefficients are standardized and therefore directly comparable to one another. Emotive Capacity is positively and significantly related to Job Satisfaction and Personal Fulfillment, but not Burnout. Pretending Expression reduces Job Satisfaction and Personal Fulfillment while simultaneously increasing Burnout among respondents. Path comparison shows that Pretending Expression has nearly twice the negative effect on Job Satisfaction ($b = -0.490$) as it does on Personal Fulfillment ($b = -0.280$), while the statistically significant effects from Emotive Capacity are nearly equal for both Job Satisfaction ($b = 0.384$) and Personal Fulfillment ($b = 0.326$). Deep Acting is not a significant predictor of any modeled outcome, an interesting result that sets the UK apart from countries which are otherwise culturally similar such as the USA and Australia.

Figure 19.1 is a simplified diagram of the expected and demonstrated fit, with solid lines indicating a statistically significant relationship and dashed lines denoting paths that did not reach significance. The direction of statistically significant relationships is shown with either a positive or a negative sign.

Structural equation modeling allows for a simultaneous solution for all three dependent variables as explained by all three emotional labor covariates. As a whole, this model reinforces the "robust sequence" (Allen et al. 2014, 21) of effects from emotive pretending (also referred to as surface acting in the theoretical literature). Having to "fake it" by suppressing how one actually feels while displaying a different emotion, is positively related to



Fig. 19.1 Path diagram for the UK

increased burnout and negatively related to job satisfaction and feelings of personal fulfillment. Although Deep Acting possesses greater internal validity than the other two independent variables do (see Table 19.3), none of its relationships with the workplace outcomes Job Satisfaction, Burnout, or Personal Fulfillment are statistically different from zero.

Among Anglosphere NPM countries, results from the UK vary from those in Australia and the USA. Unlike its cultural cousins, for UK public servants, there is no significant relationship between authentic emotive expression and job outcomes. Instead, the relationships to job satisfaction, personal fulfillment, and burnout are better understood with respect to emotive capacity and emotive pretending and not authentic displays of emotion.

Conclusion

Decades of public-sector reforms and "the encroachment of market relations on political life" (Gabriel 1999, 404) have left their mark on the UK public service. The Individualist culture of the UK with a commitment to reform and a faith in market discipline to bring about efficiency has resulted in a public sector in flux. Centralized governmental power and a secure majority in Parliament allow continual and substantial change in the public sector (Pollitt 1990, 55):

> In Britain, the achievement of a superficially consistent set of decisions concerning civil service management requires little more than a strong executive with a consistent set of prejudices.

From the economic and political turmoil of the 1970s emerged a strong counterpoint to the bureaucratic and centrally-concentrated national government of the UK welfare state. This counterpoint, which Christopher Pollitt describes as the New Right, found fertile ground for reforms rooted in managerialist ideology. This fertile ground is essential to understanding postwar UK public service: "For international public management research, the fact that new organizational practices are adopted to enhance social legitimacy, and not to advance any means-ends efficacy urges scholars to understand the socio-cultural context of any public management reform" (Schedler and Proeller 2007, 15). Although NPM reforms emphasized headcounts and performance targets, promised efficiencies were never realized (Overeem and Tholen 2011). Postwar reforms were meant to implement managerialist ideology. A relatively high UK Individualism fosters a cultural environment in which the citizen easily became a consumer and spending money was accepted as an appropriate form of public action.

That fact that NPM reforms took hold most securely in Individualist cultures such as the UK does not surprise some comparativist researchers (Cheung 2012, 211, emphases supplied):

> Whereas public sector reforms in the West were originally driven by a distrust of the state and its bureaucracy, seeing government *as the problem* (inefficiency, crowding out the market, etc.) and seeking to install market supremacy, government in East Asia is arguably still held *as the solution to problems*, where people expect a competent and selfless bureaucracy to help drive social progress and economic prosperity; this resonates the centuries-old Confucian tradition of harmonious governance.

The Enlightenment emphasis on individual reason and liberty suggests that the solution to problems is neither collective action nor greater power afforded to institutions working on behalf of the collective. Rather, the solution is thought to be more individual freedom. In the UK, however, the central state has remained strong despite the ideological emphasis on devolution and reduced headcount: "Talk of decentralized management and of getting closer to the consumer has not penetrated very far down the hierarchies of our government departments and public services" (Pollitt 1990, 85).

Centralized power allowed the British welfare state to develop and expand rapidly during the Attlee ministry, while it also allowed extensive privatization and implementation of reform in the Thatcher years. Compared to constitutional democracies with federal structures—Australia and the USA—the UK still maintains a large and powerful central government.

Managerialism has left its mark, however, with citizens viewed as consumers and government agencies viewed as sellers. Perhaps this accounts for the lack of a relationship between authentically engaging in emotional labor and job satisfaction or personal fulfillment. There may be less identity with the job itself than would be the case if the citizen—state encounter were more meaningful than a simple customer—seller exchange.

References

Allen, Joseph A., James M. Diefendorff, and Y. Ma. 2014. "Differences in Emotional Labor Across Cultures: A Comparison of Chinese and U.S. Service Workers." *Journal of Business and Psychology* 29 (1): 21–35.

Andrews, Rhys, James Downe, and Valeria Guarneros-Meza. 2013. *Public Sector Reform in the UK: Views and Experiences from Senior Executives: Country Report as Part of the COCOPS Research Project.* Brussels: Coordination for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS). Accessed May 11, 2019. www.cocops.eu.

Bouckaert, Geert. 2007. "Cultural Characteristics from Public Management Reforms Worldwide." In *Cultural Aspects of Public Management Reform*, edited by Kuno Schedler and Isabella Proeller, 29–64. London: Elsevier Press.

Bovaird, Tony. 2007. "Triggering Change Through Culture Clash: The UK Civil Service Reform Program, 1999–2005." In *Cultural Aspects of Public Management Reform*, edited by Kuno Schedler and Isabella Proeller, 323–50. London: Elsevier Press.

Bovaird, Tony, and Ken Russell. 2007. "Civil Service Reform in the UK, 1999–2005: Revolutionary Failure or Evolutionary Success?" *Public Administration* 85 (2): 301–28.

Brown, Kerry, and Stephen P. Osborne. 2005. *Managing Change and Innovation in Public Service Organizations*. London: Routledge.

Cheung, A. B. L. 2012. "Public Administration in East Asia: Legacies, Trajectories, and Lessons." *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 78 (2): 209–16.

Dunleavy, Patrick, and Christopher Hood. 1994. "From Old Public Administration to New Public Management." *Public Money & Management* 3 (1): 9–16.

Elkomy, Shimaa, Graham Cookson, and Simon Jones. 2019. "Cheap and Dirty: The Effect of Contracting Out Cleaning on Efficiency and Effectiveness." *Public Administration Review* 79 (2): 193–202.

Gabriel, Yannis. 1999. "Management, Administration, and Critique in the 21st Century." *Administrative Theory and Praxis* 21 (4): 402–8.

Hofstede, Geert. 1980. *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hofstede, Geert, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov. 2010. *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind.* 3rd ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Hood, Christopher. 1991. "A Public Management for All Seasons?" *Public Administration* 69 (1): 3–19.

Hood, Christopher, and Ruth Dixon. 2015. "What We Have to Show for 30 Years of New Public Management: Higher Costs, More Complaints." *Governance* 28 (3): 265–67.

Hood, Christopher, and Ruth Dixon. 2016. "Not What It Said on the Tin? Reflections on Three Decades of UK Public Management Reform." *Financial Accountability and Management* 32 (4): 409–28.

Inglehart, Ronald, Christian Haerpfer, Alejandro Moreno, Christian Welzel, K. Kizilova, Jaime Diez-Medrano, Marta Lagos, Pippa Norris, Eduard Ponarin, and B. Puranen et al., eds. 2014. *World Values Survey: All Rounds—Country-Pooled Datafile Version.* Madrid: JD Systems Institute. http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp.

Kelly, Josie. 2007. "Reforming Public Services in the UK: Bringing in the Third Sector." *Public Administration* 85 (4): 1003–22.

Lawless, Jill. 2019. "Undone by Brexit, Theresa May Steps Down as Conservative Party Leader." *Chicago Tribune*, June 7. https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-theresa-may-steps-down-conservative-party-leader-20190607-story.html.

Mastracci, Sharon H. 2016. "Beginning Nurses' Perceptions of Ethical Leadership in the Shadow of Mid Staffs." *Public Integrity* 19 (3): 250–64.

Needham, Catherine, and Catherine Mangan. 2016. "The 21st Century Public Servant: Working at Three Boundaries of Public and Private." *Public Money & Management* 36 (4): 265–72.

O'Reilly, Dermot, and Mike Reed. 2012. "Leaderism and the Discourse of Leadership in the Reformation of UK Public Services." In *Leadership in the Public Sector: Promises and Pitfalls*, edited by Christeen Teelken, Ewan Ferlie, and Mike Dent, 21–43. Milton Park: Taylor & Francis.

Osborne, Stephen P., and Kate McLaughlin. 2002. "Trends and Issues in the Implementation of Local Voluntary Sector Compacts in England." *Public Money & Management* 22 (1): 55–64.

Overeem, Patrick, and Berry Tholen. 2011. "After Managerialism: MacIntyre's Lessons for the Study of Public Administration." *Administration & Society* 43 (7): 722–48.

Parry, Richard. 2011. "The UK Civil Service: A Devolving System." In *International Handbook on Civil Service Systems*, edited by Andrew Massey, 3–12. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

Pollitt, Christopher. 1990. *Managerialism and the Public Services: The Anglo-American Experience*. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Pollitt, Christopher. 2013. "The Evolving Narratives of Public Management Reform: Forty Years of Reform White Papers in the UK." *Public Management Review* 15 (6): 899–922.

Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2000. *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis.* London: Routledge.

Rayner, Julie, and Alan Lawton. 2017. "Are We Being Served? Emotional Labour in Local Government in Victoria, Australia." *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 77 (3): 360–74.

Rees, James, Robin Miller, and Heather Buckingham. 2017. "Commission Incomplete: Exploring the New Model for Purchasing Public Services from the Third Sector." *International Social Policy* 46 (1): 175–94.

Schedler, Kuno, and Isabella Proeller. 2007. "Public Management as a Cultural Phenomenon: Revitalizing Societal Culture in International Public Management Research." In *Cultural Aspects of Public Management Reform*, edited by Kuno Schedler and Isabella Proeller, 3–28. London: Elsevier Press.

Schroter, Eckhard. 2007. "Deconstructing Administrative Culture: Exploring the Relationship Between Cultural Patterns and Public Sector Change in the UK and Germany." In *Cultural Aspects of Public Management Reform*, edited by Kuno Schedler and Isabella Proeller, 299–322. London: Elsevier.

Select Committee on Public Administration Twelfth Report. 1991. *Citizen's Charter*. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmpubadm/411/41105.htm. Last updated July 8, 2008.

Shermon, Ganesh. 2016. *Disrupting Human Resources Talent Rules*. Accessed May 11, 2019. http://www.lulu.com/shop/ganesh-shermon/disrupting-human-resources-talent-rules/paperback/product-22982355.html.

Talbot, Colin. 2001. "UK Public Services and Management, 1979–2000: Evolution or Revolution?" *The International Journal of Public Sector Management* 14 (4): 281–303.

Teelken, Christine, Ewan Ferlie, and Mike Dent, eds. 2012. *Leadership in the Public Sector: Problems and Pitfalls.* Milton Park, UK: Taylor & Francis.

Thomas, John Clayton. 2013. "Citizen, Customer, Partner: Rethinking the Place of the Public in Public Management." *Public Administration Review* 73 (6): 786–96.