

Deck the Halls With Seasonal Depression

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Introduction: What Was I Thinking?

- Increased Military spending is associated with a decrease in coups (Powell, 2012; Wright et al., 2015).
- Most people say dictators are buying off the military (Powell, 2012).
- But dictators may be able to use money to install “counterweights (Böhmelt & Pilster, 2015; De Bruin, 2018, 2021).”

Research Question


- Hence, the research question is: How are military expenditures associated with counterbalancing?
- H_A : Increases in military spending are associated with an increase in counterbalancing.

What's Your Source, Bro?

- De Bruin (2021): “Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010.”
 - Y : The number of counterbalancing organizations.
 - X_2 : Binary variable indicating democracy or not.
- Correlates of War Dataset: “NMC: National Military Capabilities”
 - X_1 : Military expenditures logged.

Stop Talking and Graph, Bro

COUNTERBALANCING



Let's See Them Stars, Bro

$$Y_{CB} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot X_{ME} + \beta_2 \cdot X_{DEM} + \epsilon$$

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Counterbalancing	
Logged Military Expenditures	0.051 (0.051)
Democracy (base = autocracy)	-1.042*** (0.231)
Constant	1.225* (0.709)
Observations	100
R ²	0.174
Adjusted R ²	0.157
Residual Std. Error	1.113 (df = 97)
F Statistic	10.224*** (df = 2; 97)
<i>Note:</i> *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

But, Mason, What if You are Right?

- There are a lot of variables I do not account for, so I probably have omitted variable bias.
- What if the relationship violates the linear relationship assumption?
- It's observational and a single year; thus, it's not drawn in i.i.d.
- In the future, we should examine the specific ways security and military forces can be armed and how this impacts coups.

References

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