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Fix new variant of the vulnerability in CVE-2023-35936.
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Guilhem Moulin noticed that the fix to CVE-2023-35936 was incomplete.
An attacker could get around it by double-encoding the malicious
extension to create or override arbitrary files.

    $ echo '![](data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fb%252elua)' >b.md
    $ .cabal/bin/pandoc b.md --extract-media=bar
    <p><img
    src="bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fb%2elua" /></p>
    $ cat b.lua
    print "hello"
    $ find bar
    bar/
    bar/2a0eaa89f43fada3e6c577beea4f2f8f53ab6a1d.lua+

This commit adds a test case for this more complex attack and fixes
the vulnerability.  (The fix is quite simple: if the URL-unescaped
filename or extension contains a '%', we just use the sha1 hash of the
contents as the canonical name, just as we do if the filename contains
'..'.)
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jgm committed Jul 20, 2023
1 parent db2594a commit eddedbf
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Showing 3 changed files with 17 additions and 4 deletions.
2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions src/Text/Pandoc/Class/IO.hs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -224,6 +224,8 @@ writeMedia :: (PandocMonad m, MonadIO m)
-> m ()
writeMedia dir (fp, _mt, bs) = do
-- we normalize to get proper path separators for the platform
-- we unescape URI encoding, but given how insertMedia
-- is written, we shouldn't have any % in a canonical media name...
let fullpath = normalise $ dir </> unEscapeString fp
liftIOError (createDirectoryIfMissing True) (takeDirectory fullpath)
report $ Extracting (T.pack fullpath)
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7 changes: 4 additions & 3 deletions src/Text/Pandoc/MediaBag.hs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -90,16 +90,17 @@ insertMedia fp mbMime contents (MediaBag mediamap) =
&& Windows.isRelative fp''
&& isNothing uri
&& not (".." `isInfixOf` fp'')
&& '%' `notElem` fp''
then fp''
else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> "." <> ext
else showDigest (sha1 contents) <> ext
fallback = case takeExtension fp'' of
".gz" -> getMimeTypeDef $ dropExtension fp''
_ -> getMimeTypeDef fp''
mt = fromMaybe fallback mbMime
path = maybe fp'' (unEscapeString . uriPath) uri
ext = case takeExtension path of
'.':e -> e
_ -> maybe "" T.unpack $ extensionFromMimeType mt
'.':e | '%' `notElem` e -> '.':e
_ -> maybe "" (\x -> '.':T.unpack x) $ extensionFromMimeType mt

-- | Lookup a media item in a 'MediaBag', returning mime type and contents.
lookupMedia :: FilePath
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12 changes: 11 additions & 1 deletion test/Tests/MediaBag.hs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ tests = [
let d = B.doc $
B.para (B.image "../../test/lalune.jpg" "" mempty) <>
B.para (B.image "moon.jpg" "" mempty) <>
B.para (B.image "data://image/png;base64,cHJpbnQgImhlbGxvIgo=;.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <>
B.para (B.image ";.lua+%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fa%2elua" "" mempty) <>
B.para (B.image "" "" mempty)
runIOorExplode $ do
fillMediaBag d
Expand All @@ -35,4 +35,14 @@ tests = [
(exists3 && not exists4)
exists5 <- doesFileExist ("foo" </> "d5fceb6532643d0d84ffe09c40c481ecdf59e15a.gif")
assertBool "data uri with gif is not properly decoded" exists5
-- double-encoded version:
let e = B.doc $
B.para (B.image ";.lua+%252f%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fb%252elua" "" mempty)
runIOorExplode $ do
fillMediaBag e
extractMedia "bar" e
exists6 <- doesFileExist ("bar" </> "772ceca21a2751863ec46cb23db0e7fc35b9cff8.png")
exists7 <- doesFileExist "b.lua"
assertBool "data uri with double-encoded malicious payload gets written outside of destination dir"
(exists6 && not exists7)
]

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