


$$sk = x, pk = g, g^x$$

$$Enc(pk, 0) : y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \quad C = (g^y, g^{xy})$$

$$Enc(pk, 1) : y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p, z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \quad C = (g^y, g^z)$$

Dec(sk, C=(c1, c2)) if $c_1^x = c_2$ output 0
otherwise output 1

$$C_{DDH}(g, g^x, g^y, z) \xrightarrow{\mathcal{R}}$$



if $b=0$ output "real"
else output "random"



Disadvantages: - large ciphertexts (can only encrypt one bit at a time)
- not perfectly correct
may choose $z = xy$ w/ prob $\frac{1}{p}$

Σ_1 : KeyGen: sample $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, $sk = x$
 $pk = (g, g^x)$

Sign(pk, m): $\sigma = x + m$

Verify(pk, m, σ): check $g^m \cdot pk = g^\sigma$

$C_{\text{deleg}}(g, g^x) \xrightarrow{R} A_{\text{EUF-NMA}}(g, g^x) \xrightarrow{g^m \cdot g^x = g^{m+x}}$

$\xleftarrow{m, \sigma} x' = \sigma - m$
 $\xleftarrow{x'}$

EUF-CMA \nVdash :

request σ on random m

compute $sk = \sigma - m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

choose $m' \neq m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$

Sign(sk, m') = σ'

output (m', σ')

KeyGen: $sk = x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ $pk = (g, g^x)$

Sign($sk, m = (m_1, m_2) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G}$):

$$\sigma = m_1^{-x} \cdot m_2 = \text{Gamal.Dec}(sk, m)$$

Verify $\text{G}. \text{Enc}(pk, \sigma) = m$



choose $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$

outputs

$$g^r, (g^x)^r \cdot \sigma$$

w/ prob

$$1 - \frac{1}{p}$$

$$g^r \neq m_1$$

$$\text{KeyGen}_1 = \text{KeyGen}_0$$

$$\text{Enc}_1(\text{pk}, m) = \text{Enc}_0(\text{pk}, m \parallel 1)$$

$$\text{Dec}_1(\text{sk}, c) \equiv m \parallel b = \text{Dec}_0(\text{sk}, c)$$

if $b = 1$ output m
otherwise output sk

IND-CPA:

$\mathcal{E}_{\text{IND-CCA}_0}$

\mathcal{R}

\mathcal{A}_1

IND-CPA

pk
 $m_0 \parallel 1, m_1 \parallel 1$

pk
 m_0, m_1

c

c

b

b

IND-CCA1 adversary:
 $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m \parallel 0) \rightarrow c$
query $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c)$
gets sk
use sk to break
IND-CCA1

$$\text{KeyGen}_2 = \text{KeyGen}_0$$


$$\text{Enc}_2(pk, m) = \text{Enc}_0(pk, m) \parallel 1$$

$$\text{Dec}_2(sk, c \parallel b) = \text{Dec}_0(sk, c)$$

$C_{\text{IND-CCA}}$

R

$A_{\text{IND-CCA1}}$



IND-CCA Adversary (p^k)

Choose m_0, m_1

get $C^* = C' \| \Delta$

query $C' \| \Delta$ to Dec oracle

~~C^*~~

get m_b

output b