RFID Hacking

Who's this? jof


- jof
- Telecoms and networking geek
- Infrastructure and Security
- First time workshop
- RFID-curious for ~3 years
- Good tools and visibility made all the difference
- Today's motivation:
 - Give more people information and tools to follow their own curiosity

RFID

- Contactless cards using RF energy to communicate
- With some identifying number
- Radio Frequency, IDentification

History


- IC Cards
- A bit of memory that can move around
- Microprocessors
- (Weak/DIY) Cryptograph
- Better Cryptography



Physics


• LC systems: a capacitor and a coil/inductor






• Dipole RF Antenna

Physics



Block Diagram

- A "reader" (standards: "PCD")
 - powers a coil with an alternating carrier wave, sometimes modulated with an signal with amplitude shifts
 - detects and demodulates signals from tags
- A "tag" (standards: "PICC")
 - couples to the reader and modulates its field-power consumption
 - alternating between absorption and reflection with a signal ("backscatter")




Interface Types



- Low Frequency (LF) -- 125-135 kHz
 - LC coil; long and thin wire coil
- High Frequency (HF) -- 13.56 MHz
 - LC coil; less-long, thin wire coil



- Ultra High Frequency (UHF) -- 850-950 MHz
 - Dipole Antenna



NFC

- More applications, more smartphones -- more standards
- Less distinction between reader and tag; multiple modes: classic reader/tag, NFC card emulation, peer-to-peer communications
- Industry standards group
- NDEF records and placement

Memory Tags

- Small flash, an RF frontend, and a microcontroller
- Generally, each with a unique ID set at the factory
- Optionally, some user-programmable data



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- Optionally, some user-programmable data
- Usually based on ISO 14443A ("type A")

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		U	ser	-pro	gra	mma	able	Da	ta				

"Unique" IDs

- Same number, every time (usually)
- What the vendor datasheet says
 - "the block is programmed and write-protected in production testing"
- What the developers hear
 - "This unique ID can be used to check for the presence of a known, previously-registered tag"
- What the world does
 - Third-party IC designers have created "magic" cards, whose UID can be changed arbitrarily
 - Uses additional command opcodes not used in the original protocol

"Good Enough" Implementations

- User's can't critique what they can't see
- Locks keep honest people honest
- Inexpensive and fast-to-implement UID-only systems are pervasive
- Weak cryptography prevents casual abuse
 - The door is shut, but it is not locked either

Reader Interactions

- Simplest: read just the "unique" ID and compare against a database
- More complex: reader authenticates to card, card authenticates to reader; protected memory contains a certificate or token
- Keys
 - Simple: same key for every tag
 - More-complex: diversified keys, based on the tag UID

Mifare Classic

- Cheap and widely deployed
- 1kB or 4kB of memory
- 1k: Laid out into 16 Sectors of 4 Blocks, each 16 bytes long
 - 64 blocks * 16 bytes == 1024 Bytes
 - 3 blocks of user-writable data per-sector
 - except Block 0 (contains UID and card data)

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Tools

- Card emulation
 - Magic Cards
 - Chameleon (Mini, Ultra)
- Proxmark3
- Low-level reader control (PN532 boards)

Proxmark3

- SDR is to Radio what Proxmark3 is to LF/HF RFID
- Software-defined interfaces with an FPGA enables supporting a huge variety of types
- Swappable antennas

PN532 Boards

- An NXP chip, mounted into a reference design board
- Integral PCB Antenna
- Supports multiple interfaces: UART, SPI, I2C

UARTS

- Awesome for connecting separate systems together: asynchronous, serial/ordered, flexible, scalable, no separate clock
- Transfers some atomic unit of bits in one direction: these days, 8 bits/1 byte at a time
- Held high, pulled low
- Ubiquitous in embedded electronics
- USB Adapters are useful for exploring new systems; frequently used for a text console to embedded OSes

Kits For Today

- PN532 Kit (Qty. ~40)
 - PN532 board, USB-Serial adapter, hookup wires, a Magic 4byte Mifare Classic card
 - €5-€10
- Proxmark3 Easy (Qty. 2)
 - Proxmark3 Easy with modern firmware, USB cable
 - €30-€50

Today's Reader

- Diversified keys based on UID
- Default access conditions
 - A key can read B key

Today's Reader

- Key Algorithm uses SHA256 for diffusion, XOR for a secret
 - Sector Pre-key: SHA256(UID + Sector Number + ("a"|"b"))[0 .. 5]
 - Sector Key: XOR(Secret, Sector Pre-key)

Today's Reader

- Example:
 - UID: 1A 1F 60 ED, Sector: 1, Key: A Example secret: 112233445566
 - Sector Pre-key:
 - SHA256(1A1F60ED0161)
 - b8d1d830f22a7d5e7f144fa49027baec816841c621fe79974d4ec1c8e1f2fe70
 - b8d1d830f22a
 - XOR(112233445566, b8d1d830f22a)
 - Sector 1 Key A: a9f3eb74a74c
- Cyberchef Link

Software

- VM Images
 - Based on Kali Linux. Hopefully with all software you'll want today.
 - https://github.com/nfc-tools/mfoc-hardnested
 - User/Password: kali/kali
- Compile-it-yourself
 - Based on libnfc; configure it for our reader:
 - Edit /etc/nfc/libnfc.conf and add:
 - device.connstring = "pn532_uart:/dev/ttyUSB0"
- Proxmark3: https://github.com/RfidResearchGroup/proxmark3/

Difficulty Levels

- Easy mode: one sector secured, stores a flag value and a difficulty level
 - Faster time-to-satisfaction (PN532: 5-30 mins, Proxmark3: 1 minute)
- Hard mode: sectors 1-15 secured, Sector 0 with default keys
 - Takes longer (PN532: best case ~1 hour, Proxmark3: ~3-5 minutes)

How To Play

- Come up to me to get a blue tag programmed
 - Easy Mode or Hard Mode
- Solder, assemble, and connect your reader
- Place the blank card on the reader and dump it with the default keys:
 - mfoc-hardnested -P 250 -T 50 -O blank.mfd -F
- Place the blue tag on the reader and run
 - mfoc-hardnested -P 250 -T 50 -O camp.mfd -F
- Success! Once you have both dump files, you can clone the card contents.

How To Play

- Examine your fresh dump file:
 - python3 ~/src/mfdread/mfdread.py ~/camp.mfd

How To Play

- Write the blue tag contents onto the blank card, using the blank card keys
 - This process changes the keys
 - nfc-mfclassic w a u camp.mfd blank.mfd

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