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how to enable Double Tap 2 Wake #1
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Install Kernel Adiutor than you can enable in wake settings. https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.grarak.kerneladiutor |
why didn't make a tips in the thread? |
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FI_DIRTY_INODE flag is not covered by inode page lock, so it can be unset at any time like below. Thread #1 Thread #2 - lock_page(ipage) - update i_fields - update i_size/i_blocks/and so on - set FI_DIRTY_INODE - reset FI_DIRTY_INODE - set_page_dirty(ipage) In this case, we can lose the latest i_field information. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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commit b0dc3a3 upstream. Qiu Xishi reported the following BUG when testing hot-add/hot-remove node under stress condition: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000025f60 IP: next_online_pgdat+0x1/0x50 PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP ACPI: Device does not support D3cold Modules linked in: fuse nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 vfat fat loop dm_mod coretemp mperf crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ablk_helper cryptd lrw gf128mul glue_helper aes_x86_64 pcspkr microcode igb dca i2c_algo_bit ipv6 megaraid_sas iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 i2c_core iTCO_vendor_support tg3 sg hwmon ptp lpc_ich pps_core mfd_core acpi_pad rtc_cmos button ext3 jbd mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif scsi_dh_alua scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_hp_sw scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh ahci libahci libata scsi_mod [last unloaded: rasf] CPU: 23 PID: 238 Comm: kworker/23:1 Tainted: G O 3.10.15-5885-euler0302 #1 Hardware name: HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO.,LTD. Huawei N1/Huawei N1, BIOS V100R001 03/02/2015 Workqueue: events vmstat_update task: ffffa800d32c0000 ti: ffffa800d32ae000 task.ti: ffffa800d32ae000 RIP: 0010: next_online_pgdat+0x1/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffffa800d32afce8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000001440 RBX: ffffffff81da53b8 RCX: 0000000000000082 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffa800d32afd28 R08: ffffffff81c93bfc R09: ffffffff81cbdc96 R10: 00000000000040ec R11: 00000000000000a0 R12: ffffa800fffb3440 R13: ffffa800d32afd38 R14: 0000000000000017 R15: ffffa800e6616800 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa800e6600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000025f60 CR3: 0000000001a0b000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: refresh_cpu_vm_stats+0xd0/0x140 vmstat_update+0x11/0x50 process_one_work+0x194/0x3d0 worker_thread+0x12b/0x410 kthread+0xc6/0xd0 ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 The cause is the "memset(pgdat, 0, sizeof(*pgdat))" at the end of try_offline_node, which will reset all the content of pgdat to 0, as the pgdat is accessed lock-free, so that the users still using the pgdat will panic, such as the vmstat_update routine. process A: offline node XX: vmstat_updat() refresh_cpu_vm_stats() for_each_populated_zone() find online node XX cond_resched() offline cpu and memory, then try_offline_node() node_set_offline(nid), and memset(pgdat, 0, sizeof(*pgdat)) zone = next_zone(zone) pg_data_t *pgdat = zone->zone_pgdat; // here pgdat is NULL now next_online_pgdat(pgdat) next_online_node(pgdat->node_id); // NULL pointer access So the solution here is postponing the reset of obsolete pgdat from try_offline_node() to hotadd_new_pgdat(), and just resetting pgdat->nr_zones and pgdat->classzone_idx to be 0 rather than the memset 0 to avoid breaking pointer information in pgdat. Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reported-by: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Suggested-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 20defcec264ceab2630356fb9d397f3d237b5e6d upstream in 3.2-stable Steven Rostedt reported: > Porting -rt to the latest 3.2 stable tree I triggered this bug: > > ===================================== > [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] > ------------------------------------- > rm/1638 is trying to release lock (rcu_read_lock) at: > [<c04fde6c>] rcu_read_unlock+0x0/0x23 > but there are no more locks to release! > > other info that might help us debug this: > 2 locks held by rm/1638: > #0: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04f93eb>] do_rmdir+0x5f/0xd2 > #1: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#9){+.+.+.}, at: [<c04f9329>] vfs_rmdir+0x49/0xac > > stack backtrace: > Pid: 1638, comm: rm Not tainted 3.2.66-test-rt96+ #2 > Call Trace: > [<c083f390>] ? printk+0x1d/0x1f > [<c0463cdf>] print_unlock_inbalance_bug+0xc3/0xcd > [<c04653a8>] lock_release_non_nested+0x98/0x1ec > [<c046228d>] ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x18/0x90 > [<c0456f1c>] ? local_clock+0x2d/0x50 > [<c04fde6c>] ? d_hash+0x2f/0x2f > [<c04fde6c>] ? d_hash+0x2f/0x2f > [<c046568e>] lock_release+0x192/0x1ad > [<c04fde83>] rcu_read_unlock+0x17/0x23 > [<c04ff344>] shrink_dcache_parent+0x227/0x270 > [<c04f9348>] vfs_rmdir+0x68/0xac > [<c04f9424>] do_rmdir+0x98/0xd2 > [<c04f03ad>] ? fput+0x1a3/0x1ab > [<c084dd42>] ? sysenter_exit+0xf/0x1a > [<c0465b58>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x118/0x149 > [<c04fa3e0>] sys_unlinkat+0x2b/0x35 > [<c084dd13>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x12 > > > > > There's a path to calling rcu_read_unlock() without calling > rcu_read_lock() in have_submounts(). > > goto positive; > > positive: > if (!locked && read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) > goto rename_retry; > > rename_retry: > rcu_read_unlock(); > > in the above path, rcu_read_lock() is never done before calling > rcu_read_unlock(); I reviewed locking contexts in all three functions that I changed when backporting "deal with deadlock in d_walk()". It's actually worse than this: - We don't hold this_parent->d_lock at the 'positive' label in have_submounts(), but it is unlocked after 'rename_retry'. - There is an rcu_read_unlock() after the 'out' label in select_parent(), but it's not held at the 'goto out'. Fix all three lock imbalances. Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 903124f upstream. memset() to 0 interfaces array before reusing usb_configuration structure. This commit fix bug: ln -s functions/acm.1 configs/c.1 ln -s functions/acm.2 configs/c.1 ln -s functions/acm.3 configs/c.1 echo "UDC name" > UDC echo "" > UDC rm configs/c.1/acm.* rmdir functions/* mkdir functions/ecm.usb0 ln -s functions/ecm.usb0 configs/c.1 echo "UDC name" > UDC [ 82.220969] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [ 82.229009] pgd = c0004000 [ 82.231698] [00000000] *pgd=00000000 [ 82.235260] Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM [ 82.240638] Modules linked in: [ 82.243681] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.0.0-rc2 #39 [ 82.249926] Hardware name: SAMSUNG EXYNOS (Flattened Device Tree) [ 82.256003] task: c07cd2f0 ti: c07c8000 task.ti: c07c8000 [ 82.261393] PC is at composite_setup+0xe3c/0x1674 [ 82.266073] LR is at composite_setup+0xf20/0x1674 [ 82.270760] pc : [<c03510d4>] lr : [<c03511b8>] psr: 600001d3 [ 82.270760] sp : c07c9df0 ip : c0806448 fp : ed8c9c9c [ 82.282216] r10: 00000001 r9 : 00000000 r8 : edaae918 [ 82.287425] r7 : ed551cc0 r6 : 00007fff r5 : 00000000 r4 : ed799634 [ 82.293934] r3 : 00000003 r2 : 00010002 r1 : edaae918 r0 : 0000002e [ 82.300446] Flags: nZCv IRQs off FIQs off Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel [ 82.307910] Control: 10c5387d Table: 6bc1804a DAC: 00000015 [ 82.313638] Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xc07c8210) [ 82.319627] Stack: (0xc07c9df0 to 0xc07ca000) [ 82.323969] 9de0: 00000000 c06e65f4 00000000 c07c9f68 [ 82.332130] 9e00: 00000067 c07c59ac 000003f7 edaae918 ed8c9c98 ed799690 eca2f140 200001d3 [ 82.340289] 9e20: ee79a2d8 c07c9e88 c07c5304 ffff55db 00010002 edaae810 edaae860 eda96d50 [ 82.348448] 9e40: 00000009 ee264510 00000007 c07ca444 edaae860 c0340890 c0827a40 ffff55e0 [ 82.356607] 9e60: c0827a40 eda96e40 ee264510 edaae810 00000000 edaae860 00000007 c07ca444 [ 82.364766] 9e80: edaae860 c0354170 c03407dc c033db4c edaae810 00000000 00000000 00000010 [ 82.372925] 9ea0: 00000032 c0341670 00000000 00000000 00000001 eda96e00 00000000 00000000 [ 82.381084] 9ec0: 00000000 00000032 c0803a23 ee1aa840 00000001 c005d54c 249e2450 00000000 [ 82.389244] 9ee0: 200001d3 ee1aa840 ee1aa8a0 ed84f4c0 00000000 c07c9f68 00000067 c07c59ac [ 82.397403] 9f00: 00000000 c005d688 ee1aa840 ee1aa8a0 c07db4b4 c006009c 00000032 00000000 [ 82.405562] 9f20: 00000001 c005ce20 c07c59ac c005cf34 f002000c c07ca780 c07c9f68 00000057 [ 82.413722] 9f40: f0020000 413fc090 00000001 c00086b4 c000f804 60000053 ffffffff c07c9f9c [ 82.421880] 9f60: c0803a20 c0011fc0 00000000 00000000 c07c9fb8 c001bee0 c07ca4f0 c057004c [ 82.430040] 9f80: c07ca4fc c0803a20 c0803a20 413fc090 00000001 00000000 01000000 c07c9fb0 [ 82.438199] 9fa0: c000f800 c000f804 60000053 ffffffff 00000000 c0050e70 c0803bc0 c0783bd8 [ 82.446358] 9fc0: ffffffff ffffffff c0783664 00000000 00000000 c07b13e8 00000000 c0803e54 [ 82.454517] 9fe0: c07ca480 c07b13e4 c07ce40c 4000406a 00000000 40008074 00000000 00000000 [ 82.462689] [<c03510d4>] (composite_setup) from [<c0340890>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_setup+0xb4/0x418) [ 82.471626] [<c0340890>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_setup) from [<c0354170>] (usb_gadget_giveback_request+0xc/0x10) [ 82.481429] [<c0354170>] (usb_gadget_giveback_request) from [<c033db4c>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_request+0xcc/0x12c) [ 82.491583] [<c033db4c>] (s3c_hsotg_complete_request) from [<c0341670>] (s3c_hsotg_irq+0x4fc/0x558) [ 82.500614] [<c0341670>] (s3c_hsotg_irq) from [<c005d54c>] (handle_irq_event_percpu+0x50/0x150) [ 82.509291] [<c005d54c>] (handle_irq_event_percpu) from [<c005d688>] (handle_irq_event+0x3c/0x5c) [ 82.518145] [<c005d688>] (handle_irq_event) from [<c006009c>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0xd4/0x18c) [ 82.526650] [<c006009c>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c005ce20>] (generic_handle_irq+0x20/0x30) [ 82.535242] [<c005ce20>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c005cf34>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xdc) [ 82.543923] [<c005cf34>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c00086b4>] (gic_handle_irq+0x2c/0x6c) [ 82.552256] [<c00086b4>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0011fc0>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x74) [ 82.559716] Exception stack(0xc07c9f68 to 0xc07c9fb0) [ 82.564753] 9f60: 00000000 00000000 c07c9fb8 c001bee0 c07ca4f0 c057004c [ 82.572913] 9f80: c07ca4fc c0803a20 c0803a20 413fc090 00000001 00000000 01000000 c07c9fb0 [ 82.581069] 9fa0: c000f800 c000f804 60000053 ffffffff [ 82.586113] [<c0011fc0>] (__irq_svc) from [<c000f804>] (arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c) [ 82.593491] [<c000f804>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c0050e70>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x128/0x1a4) [ 82.601740] [<c0050e70>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0783bd8>] (start_kernel+0x350/0x3bc) [ 82.609890] Code: 0a000002 e3530005 05975010 15975008 (e5953000) [ 82.615965] ---[ end trace f57d5f599a5f1bfa ]--- Most of kernel code assume that interface array in struct usb_configuration is NULL terminated. When gadget is composed with configfs configuration structure may be reused for different functions set. This bug happens because purge_configs_funcs() sets only next_interface_id to 0. Interface array still contains pointers to already freed interfaces. If in second try we add less interfaces than earlier we may access unallocated memory when trying to get interface descriptors. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Opasiak <k.opasiak@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 85bd839 upstream. Izumi found the following oops when hot re-adding a node: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90008963690 IP: __wake_up_bit+0x20/0x70 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 68 PID: 1237 Comm: rs:main Q:Reg Not tainted 4.1.0-rc5 #80 Hardware name: FUJITSU PRIMEQUEST2800E/SB, BIOS PRIMEQUEST 2000 Series BIOS Version 1.87 04/28/2015 task: ffff880838df8000 ti: ffff880017b94000 task.ti: ffff880017b94000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810dff80>] [<ffffffff810dff80>] __wake_up_bit+0x20/0x70 RSP: 0018:ffff880017b97be8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffc90008963690 RBX: 00000000003c0000 RCX: 000000000000a4c9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffea101bffd500 RDI: ffffc90008963648 RBP: ffff880017b97c08 R08: 0000000002000020 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a0797c73800 R13: ffffea101bffd500 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00000000003c0000 FS: 00007fcc7ffff700(0000) GS:ffff880874800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc90008963690 CR3: 0000000836761000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 Call Trace: unlock_page+0x6d/0x70 generic_write_end+0x53/0xb0 xfs_vm_write_end+0x29/0x80 [xfs] generic_perform_write+0x10a/0x1e0 xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x14d/0x3e0 [xfs] xfs_file_write_iter+0x79/0x120 [xfs] __vfs_write+0xd4/0x110 vfs_write+0xac/0x1c0 SyS_write+0x58/0xd0 system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Code: 5d c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 f8 31 c0 48 8d 47 48 <48> 39 47 48 48 c7 45 e8 00 00 00 00 48 c7 45 f0 00 00 00 00 48 RIP [<ffffffff810dff80>] __wake_up_bit+0x20/0x70 RSP <ffff880017b97be8> CR2: ffffc90008963690 Reproduce method (re-add a node):: Hot-add nodeA --> remove nodeA --> hot-add nodeA (panic) This seems an use-after-free problem, and the root cause is zone->wait_table was not set to *NULL* after free it in try_offline_node. When hot re-add a node, we will reuse the pgdat of it, so does the zone struct, and when add pages to the target zone, it will init the zone first (including the wait_table) if the zone is not initialized. The judgement of zone initialized is based on zone->wait_table: static inline bool zone_is_initialized(struct zone *zone) { return !!zone->wait_table; } so if we do not set the zone->wait_table to *NULL* after free it, the memory hotplug routine will skip the init of new zone when hot re-add the node, and the wait_table still points to the freed memory, then we will access the invalid address when trying to wake up the waiting people after the i/o operation with the page is done, such as mentioned above. Signed-off-by: Gu Zheng <guz.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Reported-by: Taku Izumi <izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com> Reviewed by: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 29c4afc ] There is NULL pointer dereference possible during statistics update if the route used for OOTB responce is removed at unfortunate time. If the route exists when we receive OOTB packet and we finally jump into sctp_packet_transmit() to send ABORT, but in the meantime route is removed under our feet, we take "no_route" path and try to update stats with IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(asoc->base.sk), ...). But sctp_ootb_pkt_new() used to prepare responce packet doesn't call sctp_transport_set_owner() and therefore there is no asoc associated with this packet. Probably temporary asoc just for OOTB responces is overkill, so just introduce a check like in all other places in sctp_packet_transmit(), where "asoc" is dereferenced. To reproduce this, one needs to 0. ensure that sctp module is loaded (otherwise ABORT is not generated) 1. remove default route on the machine 2. while true; do ip route del [interface-specific route] ip route add [interface-specific route] done 3. send enough OOTB packets (i.e. HB REQs) from another host to trigger ABORT responce On x86_64 the crash looks like this: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020 IP: [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp] PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: ... CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G O 4.0.5-1-ARCH #1 Hardware name: ... task: ffffffff818124c0 ti: ffffffff81800000 task.ti: ffffffff81800000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp] RSP: 0018:ffff880127c037b8 EFLAGS: 00010296 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000015ff66b480 RDX: 00000015ff66b400 RSI: ffff880127c17200 RDI: ffff880123403700 RBP: ffff880127c03888 R08: 0000000000017200 R09: ffffffff814625af R10: ffffea00047e4680 R11: 00000000ffffff80 R12: ffff8800b0d38a28 R13: ffff8800b0d38a28 R14: ffff8800b3e88000 R15: ffffffffa05f24e0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880127c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 00000000c855b000 CR4: 00000000000007f0 Stack: ffff880127c03910 ffff8800b0d38a28 ffffffff8189d240 ffff88011f91b400 ffff880127c03828 ffffffffa05c94c5 0000000000000000 ffff8800baa1c520 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa05c94c5>] ? sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8.isra.20+0x85/0x140 [sctp] [<ffffffffa05d6b42>] ? sctp_transport_put+0x52/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa05d0bfc>] sctp_do_sm+0xb8c/0x19a0 [sctp] [<ffffffff810b0e00>] ? trigger_load_balance+0x90/0x210 [<ffffffff810e0329>] ? update_process_times+0x59/0x60 [<ffffffff812c7a40>] ? timerqueue_add+0x60/0xb0 [<ffffffff810e0549>] ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x29/0xa0 [<ffffffff8101f599>] ? read_tsc+0x9/0x10 [<ffffffff8116d4b5>] ? put_page+0x55/0x60 [<ffffffff810ee1ad>] ? clockevents_program_event+0x6d/0x100 [<ffffffff81462b68>] ? skb_free_head+0x58/0x80 [<ffffffffa029a10b>] ? chksum_update+0x1b/0x27 [crc32c_generic] [<ffffffff81283f3e>] ? crypto_shash_update+0xce/0xf0 [<ffffffffa05d3993>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x113/0x280 [sctp] [<ffffffffa05dd4e6>] sctp_inq_push+0x46/0x60 [sctp] [<ffffffffa05ed7a0>] sctp_rcv+0x880/0x910 [sctp] [<ffffffffa05ecb50>] ? sctp_packet_transmit_chunk+0xb0/0xb0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa05ecb70>] ? sctp_csum_update+0x20/0x20 [sctp] [<ffffffff814b05a5>] ? ip_route_input_noref+0x235/0xd30 [<ffffffff81051d6b>] ? ack_ioapic_level+0x7b/0x150 [<ffffffff814b27be>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xae/0x210 [<ffffffff814b2e15>] ip_local_deliver+0x35/0x90 [<ffffffff814b2a15>] ip_rcv_finish+0xf5/0x370 [<ffffffff814b3128>] ip_rcv+0x2b8/0x3a0 [<ffffffff81474193>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x763/0xa50 [<ffffffff81476c28>] __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60 [<ffffffff81476cb0>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x40/0xd0 [<ffffffff814776c8>] napi_gro_receive+0xe8/0x120 [<ffffffffa03946aa>] rtl8169_poll+0x2da/0x660 [r8169] [<ffffffff8147896a>] net_rx_action+0x21a/0x360 [<ffffffff81078dc1>] __do_softirq+0xe1/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8107912d>] irq_exit+0xad/0xb0 [<ffffffff8157d158>] do_IRQ+0x58/0xf0 [<ffffffff8157b06d>] common_interrupt+0x6d/0x6d <EOI> [<ffffffff810e1218>] ? hrtimer_start+0x18/0x20 [<ffffffffa05d65f9>] ? sctp_transport_destroy_rcu+0x29/0x30 [sctp] [<ffffffff81020c50>] ? mwait_idle+0x60/0xa0 [<ffffffff810216ef>] arch_cpu_idle+0xf/0x20 [<ffffffff810b731c>] cpu_startup_entry+0x3ec/0x480 [<ffffffff8156b365>] rest_init+0x85/0x90 [<ffffffff818eb035>] start_kernel+0x48b/0x4ac [<ffffffff818ea120>] ? early_idt_handlers+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff818ea339>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c [<ffffffff818ea49c>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x161/0x184 Code: 90 48 8b 80 b8 00 00 00 48 89 85 70 ff ff ff 48 83 bd 70 ff ff ff 00 0f 85 cd fa ff ff 48 89 df 31 db e8 18 63 e7 e0 48 8b 45 80 <48> 8b 40 20 48 8b 40 30 48 8b 80 68 01 00 00 65 48 ff 40 78 e9 RIP [<ffffffffa05ec9ac>] sctp_packet_transmit+0x63c/0x730 [sctp] RSP <ffff880127c037b8> CR2: 0000000000000020 ---[ end trace 5aec7fd2dc983574 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Kernel Offset: 0x0 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff9fffffff) drm_kms_helper: panic occurred, switching back to text console ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…_open commit e7ac6c6 upstream. Two SLES11 SP3 servers encountered similar crashes simultaneously following some kind of SAN/tape target issue: ... qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-801c:3: Abort command issued nexus=3:0:2 -- 1 2002. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-801c:3: Abort command issued nexus=3:0:2 -- 1 2002. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-8009:3: DEVICE RESET ISSUED nexus=3:0:2 cmd=ffff882f89c2c7c0. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-800c:3: do_reset failed for cmd=ffff882f89c2c7c0. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-800f:3: DEVICE RESET FAILED: Task management failed nexus=3:0:2 cmd=ffff882f89c2c7c0. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-8009:3: TARGET RESET ISSUED nexus=3:0:2 cmd=ffff882f89c2c7c0. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-800c:3: do_reset failed for cmd=ffff882f89c2c7c0. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-800f:3: TARGET RESET FAILED: Task management failed nexus=3:0:2 cmd=ffff882f89c2c7c0. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-8012:3: BUS RESET ISSUED nexus=3:0:2. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-802b:3: BUS RESET SUCCEEDED nexus=3:0:2. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-505f:3: Link is operational (8 Gbps). qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-8018:3: ADAPTER RESET ISSUED nexus=3:0:2. qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-00af:3: Performing ISP error recovery - ha=ffff88bf04d18000. rport-3:0-0: blocked FC remote port time out: removing target and saving binding qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-505f:3: Link is operational (8 Gbps). qla2xxx [0000:81:00.0]-8017:3: ADAPTER RESET SUCCEEDED nexus=3:0:2. rport-2:0-0: blocked FC remote port time out: removing target and saving binding sg_rq_end_io: device detached BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000002a8 IP: [<ffffffff8133b268>] __pm_runtime_idle+0x28/0x90 PGD 7e6586f067 PUD 7e5af06067 PMD 0 [1739975.390354] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP CPU 0 ... Supported: No, Proprietary modules are loaded [1739975.390463] Pid: 27965, comm: ABCD Tainted: PF X 3.0.101-0.29-default #1 HP ProLiant DL580 Gen8 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8133b268>] [<ffffffff8133b268>] __pm_runtime_idle+0x28/0x90 RSP: 0018:ffff8839dc1e7c68 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff883f0592fc00 RCX: 0000000000000090 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000138 RBP: 0000000000000138 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: ffffffff81bd39d0 R10: 00000000000009c0 R11: ffffffff81025790 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff883022212b80 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffff883022212b80 FS: 00007f8e54560720(0000) GS:ffff88407f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00000000000002a8 CR3: 0000007e6ced6000 CR4: 00000000001407f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process ABCD (pid: 27965, threadinfo ffff8839dc1e6000, task ffff883592e0c640) Stack: ffff883f0592fc00 00000000fffffffa 0000000000000001 ffff883022212b80 ffff883eff772400 ffffffffa03fa309 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffffa04003a0 ffff883f063196c0 ffff887f0379a930 ffffffff8115ea1e Call Trace: [<ffffffffa03fa309>] st_open+0x129/0x240 [st] [<ffffffff8115ea1e>] chrdev_open+0x13e/0x200 [<ffffffff811588a8>] __dentry_open+0x198/0x310 [<ffffffff81167d74>] do_last+0x1f4/0x800 [<ffffffff81168fe9>] path_openat+0xd9/0x420 [<ffffffff8116946c>] do_filp_open+0x4c/0xc0 [<ffffffff8115a00f>] do_sys_open+0x17f/0x250 [<ffffffff81468d92>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [<00007f8e4f617fd0>] 0x7f8e4f617fcf Code: eb d3 90 48 83 ec 28 40 f6 c6 04 48 89 6c 24 08 4c 89 74 24 20 48 89 fd 48 89 1c 24 4c 89 64 24 10 41 89 f6 4c 89 6c 24 18 74 11 <f0> ff 8f 70 01 00 00 0f 94 c0 45 31 ed 84 c0 74 2b 4c 8d a5 a0 RIP [<ffffffff8133b268>] __pm_runtime_idle+0x28/0x90 RSP <ffff8839dc1e7c68> CR2: 00000000000002a8 Analysis reveals the cause of the crash to be due to STp->device being NULL. The pointer was NULLed via scsi_tape_put(STp) when it calls scsi_tape_release(). In st_open() we jump to err_out after scsi_block_when_processing_errors() completes and returns the device as offline (sdev_state was SDEV_DEL): 1180 /* Open the device. Needs to take the BKL only because of incrementing the SCSI host 1181 module count. */ 1182 static int st_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) 1183 { 1184 int i, retval = (-EIO); 1185 int resumed = 0; 1186 struct scsi_tape *STp; 1187 struct st_partstat *STps; 1188 int dev = TAPE_NR(inode); 1189 char *name; ... 1217 if (scsi_autopm_get_device(STp->device) < 0) { 1218 retval = -EIO; 1219 goto err_out; 1220 } 1221 resumed = 1; 1222 if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(STp->device)) { 1223 retval = (-ENXIO); 1224 goto err_out; 1225 } ... 1264 err_out: 1265 normalize_buffer(STp->buffer); 1266 spin_lock(&st_use_lock); 1267 STp->in_use = 0; 1268 spin_unlock(&st_use_lock); 1269 scsi_tape_put(STp); <-- STp->device = 0 after this 1270 if (resumed) 1271 scsi_autopm_put_device(STp->device); 1272 return retval; The ref count for the struct scsi_tape had already been reduced to 1 when the .remove method of the st module had been called. The kref_put() in scsi_tape_put() caused scsi_tape_release() to be called: 0266 static void scsi_tape_put(struct scsi_tape *STp) 0267 { 0268 struct scsi_device *sdev = STp->device; 0269 0270 mutex_lock(&st_ref_mutex); 0271 kref_put(&STp->kref, scsi_tape_release); <-- calls this 0272 scsi_device_put(sdev); 0273 mutex_unlock(&st_ref_mutex); 0274 } In scsi_tape_release() the struct scsi_device in the struct scsi_tape gets set to NULL: 4273 static void scsi_tape_release(struct kref *kref) 4274 { 4275 struct scsi_tape *tpnt = to_scsi_tape(kref); 4276 struct gendisk *disk = tpnt->disk; 4277 4278 tpnt->device = NULL; <<<---- where the dev is nulled 4279 4280 if (tpnt->buffer) { 4281 normalize_buffer(tpnt->buffer); 4282 kfree(tpnt->buffer->reserved_pages); 4283 kfree(tpnt->buffer); 4284 } 4285 4286 disk->private_data = NULL; 4287 put_disk(disk); 4288 kfree(tpnt); 4289 return; 4290 } Although the problem was reported on SLES11.3 the problem appears in linux-next as well. The crash is fixed by reordering the code so we no longer access the struct scsi_tape after the kref_put() is done on it in st_open(). Signed-off-by: Shane Seymour <shane.seymour@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Darren Lavender <darren.lavender@hp.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.com> Acked-by: Kai Mäkisara <kai.makisara@kolumbus.fi> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ecf5fc6 upstream. Nikolay has reported a hang when a memcg reclaim got stuck with the following backtrace: PID: 18308 TASK: ffff883d7c9b0a30 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "rsync" #0 __schedule at ffffffff815ab152 #1 schedule at ffffffff815ab76e #2 schedule_timeout at ffffffff815ae5e5 #3 io_schedule_timeout at ffffffff815aad6a #4 bit_wait_io at ffffffff815abfc6 #5 __wait_on_bit at ffffffff815abda5 #6 wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff8111fd4f #7 shrink_page_list at ffffffff81135445 #8 shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81135845 #9 shrink_lruvec at ffffffff81135ead #10 shrink_zone at ffffffff811360c3 #11 shrink_zones at ffffffff81136eff #12 do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8113712f #13 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages at ffffffff811372be #14 try_charge at ffffffff81189423 #15 mem_cgroup_try_charge at ffffffff8118c6f5 #16 __add_to_page_cache_locked at ffffffff8112137d #17 add_to_page_cache_lru at ffffffff81121618 #18 pagecache_get_page at ffffffff8112170b #19 grow_dev_page at ffffffff811c8297 #20 __getblk_slow at ffffffff811c91d6 #21 __getblk_gfp at ffffffff811c92c1 #22 ext4_ext_grow_indepth at ffffffff8124565c #23 ext4_ext_create_new_leaf at ffffffff81246ca8 #24 ext4_ext_insert_extent at ffffffff81246f09 #25 ext4_ext_map_blocks at ffffffff8124a848 #26 ext4_map_blocks at ffffffff8121a5b7 #27 mpage_map_one_extent at ffffffff8121b1fa #28 mpage_map_and_submit_extent at ffffffff8121f07b #29 ext4_writepages at ffffffff8121f6d5 #30 do_writepages at ffffffff8112c490 #31 __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffff81120199 #32 filemap_flush at ffffffff8112041c #33 ext4_alloc_da_blocks at ffffffff81219da1 #34 ext4_rename at ffffffff81229b91 #35 ext4_rename2 at ffffffff81229e32 #36 vfs_rename at ffffffff811a08a5 #37 SYSC_renameat2 at ffffffff811a3ffc #38 sys_renameat2 at ffffffff811a408e #39 sys_rename at ffffffff8119e51e #40 system_call_fastpath at ffffffff815afa89 Dave Chinner has properly pointed out that this is a deadlock in the reclaim code because ext4 doesn't submit pages which are marked by PG_writeback right away. The heuristic was introduced by commit e62e384 ("memcg: prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") and it was applied only when may_enter_fs was specified. The code has been changed by c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") which has removed the __GFP_FS restriction with a reasoning that we do not get into the fs code. But this is not sufficient apparently because the fs doesn't necessarily submit pages marked PG_writeback for IO right away. ext4_bio_write_page calls io_submit_add_bh but that doesn't necessarily submit the bio. Instead it tries to map more pages into the bio and mpage_map_one_extent might trigger memcg charge which might end up waiting on a page which is marked PG_writeback but hasn't been submitted yet so we would end up waiting for something that never finishes. Fix this issue by replacing __GFP_IO by may_enter_fs check (for case 2) before we go to wait on the writeback. The page fault path, which is the only path that triggers memcg oom killer since 3.12, shouldn't require GFP_NOFS and so we shouldn't reintroduce the premature OOM killer issue which was originally addressed by the heuristic. As per David Chinner the xfs is doing similar thing since 2.6.15 already so ext4 is not the only affected filesystem. Moreover he notes: : For example: IO completion might require unwritten extent conversion : which executes filesystem transactions and GFP_NOFS allocations. The : writeback flag on the pages can not be cleared until unwritten : extent conversion completes. Hence memory reclaim cannot wait on : page writeback to complete in GFP_NOFS context because it is not : safe to do so, memcg reclaim or otherwise. [tytso@mit.edu: corrected the control flow] Fixes: c3b94f4 ("memcg: further prevent OOM with too many dirty pages") Reported-by: Nikolay Borisov <kernel@kyup.com> Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…hore set exits commit 602b859 upstream. The current semaphore code allows a potential use after free: in exit_sem we may free the task's sem_undo_list while there is still another task looping through the same semaphore set and cleaning the sem_undo list at freeary function (the task called IPC_RMID for the same semaphore set). For example, with a test program [1] running which keeps forking a lot of processes (which then do a semop call with SEM_UNDO flag), and with the parent right after removing the semaphore set with IPC_RMID, and a kernel built with CONFIG_SLAB, CONFIG_SLAB_DEBUG and CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK, you can easily see something like the following in the kernel log: Slab corruption (Not tainted): kmalloc-64 start=ffff88003b45c1c0, len=64 000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkk.kkkkkkk 010: ff ff ff ff 6b 6b 6b 6b ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ....kkkk........ Prev obj: start=ffff88003b45c180, len=64 000: 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a .....N......ZZZZ 010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c0 fb 01 37 00 88 ff ff ...........7.... Next obj: start=ffff88003b45c200, len=64 000: 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 5a 5a 5a 5a .....N......ZZZZ 010: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 68 29 a7 3c 00 88 ff ff ........h).<.... BUG: spinlock wrong CPU on CPU#2, test/18028 general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables binfmt_misc ppdev input_leds joydev parport_pc parport floppy serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_rng virtio_console virtio_net iosf_mbi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr qxl ttm drm_kms_helper drm snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_piix4 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore crc32c_intel virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio pata_acpi ata_generic [last unloaded: speedstep_lib] CPU: 2 PID: 18028 Comm: test Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014 RIP: spin_dump+0x53/0xc0 Call Trace: spin_bug+0x30/0x40 do_raw_spin_unlock+0x71/0xa0 _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x10 freeary+0x82/0x2a0 ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10 semctl_down.clone.0+0xce/0x160 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa8/0x100 SyS_semctl+0x236/0x2c0 ? syscall_trace_leave+0xde/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 8b 80 88 03 00 00 48 8d 88 60 05 00 00 48 c7 c7 a0 2c a4 81 31 c0 65 8b 15 eb 40 f3 7e e8 08 31 68 00 4d 85 e4 44 8b 4b 08 74 5e <45> 8b 84 24 88 03 00 00 49 8d 8c 24 60 05 00 00 8b 53 04 48 89 RIP [<ffffffff810d6053>] spin_dump+0x53/0xc0 RSP <ffff88003750fd68> ---[ end trace 783ebb76612867a0 ]--- NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#3 stuck for 22s! [test:18053] Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip6t_REJECT nf_reject_ipv6 nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 xt_state nf_conntrack ip6table_filter ip6_tables binfmt_misc ppdev input_leds joydev parport_pc parport floppy serio_raw virtio_balloon virtio_rng virtio_console virtio_net iosf_mbi crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcspkr qxl ttm drm_kms_helper drm snd_hda_codec_generic i2c_piix4 snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer snd soundcore crc32c_intel virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio pata_acpi ata_generic [last unloaded: speedstep_lib] CPU: 3 PID: 18053 Comm: test Tainted: G D 4.2.0-rc5+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014 RIP: native_read_tsc+0x0/0x20 Call Trace: ? delay_tsc+0x40/0x70 __delay+0xf/0x20 do_raw_spin_lock+0x96/0x140 _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x10 sem_lock_and_putref+0x11/0x70 SYSC_semtimedop+0x7bf/0x960 ? handle_mm_fault+0xbf6/0x1880 ? dequeue_task_fair+0x79/0x4a0 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? kfree_debugcheck+0x16/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x19a/0x430 ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa8/0x100 ? do_audit_syscall_entry+0x66/0x70 ? syscall_trace_enter_phase1+0x139/0x160 SyS_semtimedop+0xe/0x10 SyS_semop+0x10/0x20 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 Code: 47 10 83 e8 01 85 c0 89 47 10 75 08 65 48 89 3d 1f 74 ff 7e c9 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 87 17 04 00 66 90 c9 c3 0f 1f 00 <55> 48 89 e5 0f 31 89 c1 48 89 d0 48 c1 e0 20 89 c9 48 09 c8 c9 Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks I wasn't able to trigger any badness on a recent kernel without the proper config debugs enabled, however I have softlockup reports on some kernel versions, in the semaphore code, which are similar as above (the scenario is seen on some servers running IBM DB2 which uses semaphore syscalls). The patch here fixes the race against freeary, by acquiring or waiting on the sem_undo_list lock as necessary (exit_sem can race with freeary, while freeary sets un->semid to -1 and removes the same sem_undo from list_proc or when it removes the last sem_undo). After the patch I'm unable to reproduce the problem using the test case [1]. [1] Test case used below: #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/ipc.h> #include <sys/sem.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <time.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <errno.h> #define NSEM 1 #define NSET 5 int sid[NSET]; void thread() { struct sembuf op; int s; uid_t pid = getuid(); s = rand() % NSET; op.sem_num = pid % NSEM; op.sem_op = 1; op.sem_flg = SEM_UNDO; semop(sid[s], &op, 1); exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); } void create_set() { int i, j; pid_t p; union { int val; struct semid_ds *buf; unsigned short int *array; struct seminfo *__buf; } un; /* Create and initialize semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { sid[i] = semget(IPC_PRIVATE , NSEM, 0644 | IPC_CREAT); if (sid[i] < 0) { perror("semget"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } } un.val = 0; for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { for (j = 0; j < NSEM; j++) { if (semctl(sid[i], j, SETVAL, un) < 0) perror("semctl"); } } /* Launch threads that operate on semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSEM * NSET * NSET; i++) { p = fork(); if (p < 0) perror("fork"); if (p == 0) thread(); } /* Free semaphore set */ for (i = 0; i < NSET; i++) { if (semctl(sid[i], NSEM, IPC_RMID)) perror("IPC_RMID"); } /* Wait for forked processes to exit */ while (wait(NULL)) { if (errno == ECHILD) break; }; } int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t p; srand(time(NULL)); while (1) { p = fork(); if (p < 0) { perror("fork"); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } if (p == 0) { create_set(); goto end; } /* Wait for forked processes to exit */ while (wait(NULL)) { if (errno == ECHILD) break; }; } end: return 0; } [akpm@linux-foundation.org: use normal comment layout] Signed-off-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com> Acked-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> CC: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com> Cc: David Jeffery <djeffery@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0470eb9 ] Kirill A. Shutemov says: This simple test-case trigers few locking asserts in kernel: int main(int argc, char **argv) { unsigned int block_size = 16 * 4096; struct nl_mmap_req req = { .nm_block_size = block_size, .nm_block_nr = 64, .nm_frame_size = 16384, .nm_frame_nr = 64 * block_size / 16384, }; unsigned int ring_size; int fd; fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, NETLINK_GENERIC); if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_RX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)) < 0) exit(1); if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_NETLINK, NETLINK_TX_RING, &req, sizeof(req)) < 0) exit(1); ring_size = req.nm_block_nr * req.nm_block_size; mmap(NULL, 2 * ring_size, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0); return 0; } +++ exited with 0 +++ BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at /home/kas/git/public/linux-mm/kernel/locking/mutex.c:616 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1, name: init 3 locks held by init/1: #0: (reboot_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81080959>] SyS_reboot+0xa9/0x220 #1: ((reboot_notifier_list).rwsem){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8107f379>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x39/0x70 #2: (rcu_callback){......}, at: [<ffffffff810d32e0>] rcu_do_batch.isra.49+0x160/0x10c0 Preemption disabled at:[<ffffffff8145365f>] __delay+0xf/0x20 CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 4.1.0-00009-gbddf4c4818e0 #253 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014 ffff88017b3d8000 ffff88027bc03c38 ffffffff81929ceb 0000000000000102 0000000000000000 ffff88027bc03c68 ffffffff81085a9d 0000000000000002 ffffffff81ca2a20 0000000000000268 0000000000000000 ffff88027bc03c98 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff81929ceb>] dump_stack+0x4f/0x7b [<ffffffff81085a9d>] ___might_sleep+0x16d/0x270 [<ffffffff81085bed>] __might_sleep+0x4d/0x90 [<ffffffff8192e96f>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2f/0x430 [<ffffffff81932fed>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5d/0x80 [<ffffffff81464143>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20 [<ffffffff8182fc3d>] netlink_set_ring+0x1ed/0x350 [<ffffffff8182e000>] ? netlink_undo_bind+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff8182fe20>] netlink_sock_destruct+0x80/0x150 [<ffffffff817e484d>] __sk_free+0x1d/0x160 [<ffffffff817e49a9>] sk_free+0x19/0x20 [..] Cong Wang says: We can't hold mutex lock in a rcu callback, [..] Thomas Graf says: The socket should be dead at this point. It might be simpler to add a netlink_release_ring() function which doesn't require locking at all. Reported-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Diagnosed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com> Suggested-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…fy a fault commit 2f84a89 upstream. SunDong reported the following on https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103841 I think I find a linux bug, I have the test cases is constructed. I can stable recurring problems in fedora22(4.0.4) kernel version, arch for x86_64. I construct transparent huge page, when the parent and child process with MAP_SHARE, MAP_PRIVATE way to access the same huge page area, it has the opportunity to lead to huge page copy on write failure, and then it will munmap the child corresponding mmap area, but then the child mmap area with VM_MAYSHARE attributes, child process munmap this area can trigger VM_BUG_ON in set_vma_resv_flags functions (vma - > vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE). There were a number of problems with the report (e.g. it's hugetlbfs that triggers this, not transparent huge pages) but it was fundamentally correct in that a VM_BUG_ON in set_vma_resv_flags() can be triggered that looks like this vma ffff8804651fd0d0 start 00007fc474e00000 end 00007fc475e00000 next ffff8804651fd018 prev ffff8804651fd188 mm ffff88046b1b1800 prot 8000000000000027 anon_vma (null) vm_ops ffffffff8182a7a0 pgoff 0 file ffff88106bdb9800 private_data (null) flags: 0x84400fb(read|write|shared|mayread|maywrite|mayexec|mayshare|dontexpand|hugetlb) ------------ kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:462! SMP Modules linked in: xt_pkttype xt_LOG xt_limit [..] CPU: 38 PID: 26839 Comm: map Not tainted 4.0.4-default #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R810/0TT6JF, BIOS 2.7.4 04/26/2012 set_vma_resv_flags+0x2d/0x30 The VM_BUG_ON is correct because private and shared mappings have different reservation accounting but the warning clearly shows that the VMA is shared. When a private COW fails to allocate a new page then only the process that created the VMA gets the page -- all the children unmap the page. If the children access that data in the future then they get killed. The problem is that the same file is mapped shared and private. During the COW, the allocation fails, the VMAs are traversed to unmap the other private pages but a shared VMA is found and the bug is triggered. This patch identifies such VMAs and skips them. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Reported-by: SunDong <sund_sky@126.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e674016 ] Since commit 2b018d5 ("pppoe: drop PPPOX_ZOMBIEs in pppoe_release"), pppoe_release() calls dev_put(po->pppoe_dev) if sk is in the PPPOX_ZOMBIE state. But pppoe_flush_dev() can set sk->sk_state to PPPOX_ZOMBIE _and_ reset po->pppoe_dev to NULL. This leads to the following oops: [ 570.140800] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000004e0 [ 570.142931] IP: [<ffffffffa018c701>] pppoe_release+0x50/0x101 [pppoe] [ 570.144601] PGD 3d119067 PUD 3dbc1067 PMD 0 [ 570.144601] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 570.144601] Modules linked in: l2tp_ppp l2tp_netlink l2tp_core ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel pppoe pppox ppp_generic slhc loop crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel jitterentropy_rng sha256_generic hmac drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel aes_x86_64 ablk_helper cryptd lrw gf128mul glue_helper acpi_cpufreq evdev serio_raw processor button ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 virtio_net virtio_blk virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio [ 570.144601] CPU: 1 PID: 15738 Comm: ppp-apitest Not tainted 4.2.0 #1 [ 570.144601] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 570.144601] task: ffff88003d30d600 ti: ffff880036b60000 task.ti: ffff880036b60000 [ 570.144601] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa018c701>] [<ffffffffa018c701>] pppoe_release+0x50/0x101 [pppoe] [ 570.144601] RSP: 0018:ffff880036b63e08 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 570.144601] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880034340000 RCX: 0000000000000206 [ 570.144601] RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88003d30dd20 RDI: ffff88003d30dd20 [ 570.144601] RBP: ffff880036b63e28 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 570.144601] R10: 00007ffee9b50420 R11: ffff880034340078 R12: ffff8800387ec780 [ 570.144601] R13: ffff8800387ec7b0 R14: ffff88003e222aa0 R15: ffff8800387ec7b0 [ 570.144601] FS: 00007f5672f48700(0000) GS:ffff88003fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 570.144601] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 570.144601] CR2: 00000000000004e0 CR3: 0000000037f7e000 CR4: 00000000000406a0 [ 570.144601] Stack: [ 570.144601] ffffffffa018f240 ffff8800387ec780 ffffffffa018f240 ffff8800387ec7b0 [ 570.144601] ffff880036b63e48 ffffffff812caabe ffff880039e4e000 0000000000000008 [ 570.144601] ffff880036b63e58 ffffffff812cabad ffff880036b63ea8 ffffffff811347f5 [ 570.144601] Call Trace: [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff812caabe>] sock_release+0x1a/0x75 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff812cabad>] sock_close+0xd/0x11 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff811347f5>] __fput+0xff/0x1a5 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff811348cb>] ____fput+0x9/0xb [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff81056682>] task_work_run+0x66/0x90 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff8100189e>] prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x8c/0xa7 [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff81001a26>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x16d/0x19b [ 570.144601] [<ffffffff813babb1>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f [ 570.144601] Code: 48 8b 83 c8 01 00 00 a8 01 74 12 48 89 df e8 8b 27 14 e1 b8 f7 ff ff ff e9 b7 00 00 00 8a 43 12 a8 0b 74 1c 48 8b 83 a8 04 00 00 <48> 8b 80 e0 04 00 00 65 ff 08 48 c7 83 a8 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 570.144601] RIP [<ffffffffa018c701>] pppoe_release+0x50/0x101 [pppoe] [ 570.144601] RSP <ffff880036b63e08> [ 570.144601] CR2: 00000000000004e0 [ 570.200518] ---[ end trace 46956baf17349563 ]--- pppoe_flush_dev() has no reason to override sk->sk_state with PPPOX_ZOMBIE. pppox_unbind_sock() already sets sk->sk_state to PPPOX_DEAD, which is the correct state given that sk is unbound and po->pppoe_dev is NULL. Fixes: 2b018d5 ("pppoe: drop PPPOX_ZOMBIEs in pppoe_release") Tested-by: Oleksii Berezhniak <core@irc.lg.ua> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 874bbfe upstream. My system keeps crashing with below message. vmstat_update() schedules a delayed work in current cpu and expects the work runs in the cpu. schedule_delayed_work() is expected to make delayed work run in local cpu. The problem is timer can be migrated with NO_HZ. __queue_work() queues work in timer handler, which could run in a different cpu other than where the delayed work is scheduled. The end result is the delayed work runs in different cpu. The patch makes __queue_delayed_work records local cpu earlier. Where the timer runs doesn't change where the work runs with the change. [ 28.010131] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 28.010609] kernel BUG at ../mm/vmstat.c:1392! [ 28.011099] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [ 28.011860] Modules linked in: [ 28.012245] CPU: 0 PID: 289 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G W4.3.0-rc3+ #634 [ 28.013065] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140709_153802- 04/01/2014 [ 28.014160] Workqueue: events vmstat_update [ 28.014571] task: ffff880117682580 ti: ffff8800ba428000 task.ti: ffff8800ba428000 [ 28.015445] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8115f921>] [<ffffffff8115f921>]vmstat_update+0x31/0x80 [ 28.016282] RSP: 0018:ffff8800ba42fd80 EFLAGS: 00010297 [ 28.016812] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88011a858dc0 RCX:0000000000000000 [ 28.017585] RDX: ffff880117682580 RSI: ffffffff81f14d8c RDI:ffffffff81f4df8d [ 28.018366] RBP: ffff8800ba42fd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09:0000000000000000 [ 28.019169] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000121 R12:ffff8800baa9f640 [ 28.019947] R13: ffff88011a81e340 R14: ffff88011a823700 R15:0000000000000000 [ 28.020071] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011a800000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 28.020071] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 28.020071] CR2: 00007ff6144b01d0 CR3: 00000000b8e93000 CR4:00000000000006f0 [ 28.020071] Stack: [ 28.020071] ffff88011a858dc0 ffff8800baa9f640 ffff8800ba42fe00ffffffff8106bd88 [ 28.020071] ffffffff8106bd0b 0000000000000096 0000000000000000ffffffff82f9b1e8 [ 28.020071] ffffffff829f0b10 0000000000000000 ffffffff81f18460ffff88011a81e340 [ 28.020071] Call Trace: [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106bd88>] process_one_work+0x1c8/0x540 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106bd0b>] ? process_one_work+0x14b/0x540 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106c214>] worker_thread+0x114/0x460 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff8106c100>] ? process_one_work+0x540/0x540 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81071bf8>] kthread+0xf8/0x110 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81071b00>] ?kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81a6522f>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 [ 28.020071] [<ffffffff81071b00>] ?kthread_create_on_node+0x200/0x200 Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8832317 upstream. Currently we do not validate rtas.entry before calling enter_rtas(). This leads to a kernel oops when user space calls rtas system call on a powernv platform (see below). This patch adds code to validate rtas.entry before making enter_rtas() call. Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 4 [#1] SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA PowerNV task: c000000004294b80 ti: c0000007e1a78000 task.ti: c0000007e1a78000 NIP: 0000000000000000 LR: 0000000000009c14 CTR: c000000000423140 REGS: c0000007e1a7b920 TRAP: 0e40 Not tainted (3.18.17-340.el7_1.pkvm3_1_0.2400.1.ppc64le) MSR: 1000000000081000 <HV,ME> CR: 00000000 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c000000000009c0c SOFTE: 0 NIP [0000000000000000] (null) LR [0000000000009c14] 0x9c14 Call Trace: [c0000007e1a7bba0] [c00000000041a7f4] avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x54/0x110 (unreliable) [c0000007e1a7bd80] [c00000000002ddc0] ppc_rtas+0x150/0x2d0 [c0000007e1a7be30] [c000000000009358] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98 Fixes: 55190f8 ("powerpc: Add skeleton PowerNV platform") Reported-by: NAGESWARA R. SASTRY <nasastry@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <hegdevasant@linux.vnet.ibm.com> [mpe: Reword change log, trim oops, and add stable + fixes] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 74e98eb ] There was no verification that an underlying transport exists when creating a connection, this would cause dereferencing a NULL ptr. It might happen on sockets that weren't properly bound before attempting to send a message, which will cause a NULL ptr deref: [135546.047719] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory accessgeneral protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN [135546.051270] Modules linked in: [135546.051781] CPU: 4 PID: 15650 Comm: trinity-c4 Not tainted 4.2.0-next-20150902-sasha-00041-gbaa1222-dirty #2527 [135546.053217] task: ffff8800835bc000 ti: ffff8800bc708000 task.ti: ffff8800bc708000 [135546.054291] RIP: __rds_conn_create (net/rds/connection.c:194) [135546.055666] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bc70fab0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [135546.056457] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000f2c RCX: ffff8800835bc000 [135546.057494] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: ffff8800835bccd8 RDI: 0000000000000038 [135546.058530] RBP: ffff8800bc70fb18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [135546.059556] R10: ffffed014d7a3a23 R11: ffffed014d7a3a21 R12: 0000000000000000 [135546.060614] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8801ec3d0000 R15: 0000000000000000 [135546.061668] FS: 00007faad4ffb700(0000) GS:ffff880252000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [135546.062836] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [135546.063682] CR2: 000000000000846a CR3: 000000009d137000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 [135546.064723] Stack: [135546.065048] ffffffffafe2055c ffffffffafe23fc1 ffffed00493097bf ffff8801ec3d0008 [135546.066247] 0000000000000000 00000000000000d0 0000000000000000 ac194a24c0586342 [135546.067438] 1ffff100178e1f78 ffff880320581b00 ffff8800bc70fdd0 ffff880320581b00 [135546.068629] Call Trace: [135546.069028] ? __rds_conn_create (include/linux/rcupdate.h:856 net/rds/connection.c:134) [135546.069989] ? rds_message_copy_from_user (net/rds/message.c:298) [135546.071021] rds_conn_create_outgoing (net/rds/connection.c:278) [135546.071981] rds_sendmsg (net/rds/send.c:1058) [135546.072858] ? perf_trace_lock (include/trace/events/lock.h:38) [135546.073744] ? lockdep_init (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3298) [135546.074577] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.075508] ? __might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.076349] ? __might_fault (mm/memory.c:3795) [135546.077179] ? rds_send_drop_to (net/rds/send.c:976) [135546.078114] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:611 net/socket.c:620) [135546.078856] SYSC_sendto (net/socket.c:1657) [135546.079596] ? SYSC_connect (net/socket.c:1628) [135546.080510] ? trace_dump_stack (kernel/trace/trace.c:1926) [135546.081397] ? ring_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2479 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2558 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:2674) [135546.082390] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.083410] ? trace_event_raw_event_sys_enter (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.084481] ? do_audit_syscall_entry (include/trace/events/syscalls.h:16) [135546.085438] ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit (kernel/trace/trace.c:1749) [135546.085515] rds_ib_laddr_check(): addr 36.74.25.172 ret -99 node type -1 Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 19cd80a upstream. It is not permitted to set task state before lock. usblp_wwait sets the state to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE and calls mutex_lock_interruptible. Upon return from that function, the state will be TASK_RUNNING again. This is clearly a bug and a warning is generated with LOCKDEP too: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5109 at kernel/sched/core.c:7404 __might_sleep+0x7d/0x90() do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<ffffffffa0c588d0>] usblp_wwait+0xa0/0x310 [usblp] Modules linked in: ... CPU: 1 PID: 5109 Comm: captmon Tainted: G W 4.2.5-0.gef2823b-default #1 Hardware name: LENOVO 23252SG/23252SG, BIOS G2ET33WW (1.13 ) 07/24/2012 ffffffff81a4edce ffff880236ec7ba8 ffffffff81716651 0000000000000000 ffff880236ec7bf8 ffff880236ec7be8 ffffffff8106e146 0000000000000282 ffffffff81a50119 000000000000028b 0000000000000000 ffff8802dab7c508 Call Trace: ... [<ffffffff8106e1c6>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [<ffffffff8109a8bd>] __might_sleep+0x7d/0x90 [<ffffffff8171b20f>] mutex_lock_interruptible_nested+0x2f/0x4b0 [<ffffffffa0c588fc>] usblp_wwait+0xcc/0x310 [usblp] [<ffffffffa0c58bb2>] usblp_write+0x72/0x350 [usblp] [<ffffffff8121ed98>] __vfs_write+0x28/0xf0 ... Commit 7f47735 (usblp: Implement the ENOSPC convention) moved the set prior locking. So move it back after the lock. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Fixes: 7f47735 ("usblp: Implement the ENOSPC convention") Acked-By: Pete Zaitcev <zaitcev@yahoo.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1b8e6a0 ] When a passive TCP is created, we eventually call tcp_md5_do_add() with sk pointing to the child. It is not owner by the user yet (we will add this socket into listener accept queue a bit later anyway) But we do own the spinlock, so amend the lockdep annotation to avoid following splat : [ 8451.090932] net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:923 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 8451.090932] [ 8451.090934] [ 8451.090934] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 [ 8451.090936] 3 locks held by socket_sockopt_/214795: [ 8451.090936] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff855c6ac1>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x151/0xe90 [ 8451.090947] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff85618143>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.090952] #2: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff855acda5>] sk_clone_lock+0x1c5/0x500 [ 8451.090958] [ 8451.090958] stack backtrace: [ 8451.090960] CPU: 7 PID: 214795 Comm: socket_sockopt_ [ 8451.091215] Call Trace: [ 8451.091216] <IRQ> [<ffffffff856fb29c>] dump_stack+0x55/0x76 [ 8451.091229] [<ffffffff85123b5b>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xeb/0x110 [ 8451.091235] [<ffffffff8564544f>] tcp_md5_do_add+0x1bf/0x1e0 [ 8451.091239] [<ffffffff85645751>] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x1f1/0x4c0 [ 8451.091242] [<ffffffff85642b27>] ? tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb+0x167/0x190 [ 8451.091246] [<ffffffff85647c78>] tcp_check_req+0x3c8/0x500 [ 8451.091249] [<ffffffff856451ae>] ? tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash+0x11e/0x190 [ 8451.091253] [<ffffffff85647170>] tcp_v4_rcv+0x3c0/0x9f0 [ 8451.091256] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091260] [<ffffffff856181b6>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xb6/0x2b0 [ 8451.091263] [<ffffffff85618143>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x43/0x2b0 [ 8451.091267] [<ffffffff85618d38>] ip_local_deliver+0x48/0x80 [ 8451.091270] [<ffffffff85618510>] ip_rcv_finish+0x160/0x700 [ 8451.091273] [<ffffffff8561900e>] ip_rcv+0x29e/0x3d0 [ 8451.091277] [<ffffffff855c74b7>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0xb47/0xe90 Fixes: a8afca0 ("tcp: md5: protects md5sig_info with RCU") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 248be83 ] In a low memory situation the following kernel oops occurs: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000050 pgd = 8490c000 [00000050] *pgd=4651e831, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000 Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] PREEMPT ARM Modules linked in: CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.4-at16 #9) PC is at skb_put+0x10/0x98 LR is at sh_eth_poll+0x2c8/0xa10 pc : [<8035f780>] lr : [<8028bf50>] psr: 60000113 sp : 84eb1a90 ip : 84eb1ac8 fp : 84eb1ac4 r10: 0000003f r9 : 000005ea r8 : 00000000 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 940453b0 r5 : 00030000 r4 : 9381b180 r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 000005ea r0 : 00000000 Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user Control: 10c53c7d Table: 4248c059 DAC: 00000015 Process klogd (pid: 2046, stack limit = 0x84eb02e8) [...] This is because netdev_alloc_skb() fails and 'mdp->rx_skbuff[entry]' is left NULL but sh_eth_rx() later uses it without checking. Add such check... Reported-by: Yasushi SHOJI <yashi@atmark-techno.com> Signed-off-by: Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@cogentembedded.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9b2761cb72dc41e1948c8a5512b4efd384eda130 upstream. The maximum chunks used by the function is (SPI_AGGR_BUFFER_SIZE / WSPI_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE + 1). The original commands array had space for (SPI_AGGR_BUFFER_SIZE / WSPI_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE) commands. When the last chunk is used (len > 4 * WSPI_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE), the last command is stored outside the bounds of the commands array. Oops 5 (page fault) is generated during current wl1271 firmware load attempt: root@debian-armhf:~# ifconfig wlan0 up [ 294.312399] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00203fc4 [ 294.320173] pgd = de528000 [ 294.323028] [00203fc4] *pgd=00000000 [ 294.326916] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM [ 294.331789] Modules linked in: bnep rfcomm bluetooth ipv6 arc4 wl12xx wlcore mac80211 musb_dsps cfg80211 musb_hdrc usbcore usb_common wlcore_spi omap_rng rng_core musb_am335x omap_wdt cpufreq_dt thermal_sys hwmon [ 294.351838] CPU: 0 PID: 1827 Comm: ifconfig Not tainted 4.2.0-00002-g3e9ad27-dirty #78 [ 294.360154] Hardware name: Generic AM33XX (Flattened Device Tree) [ 294.366557] task: dc9d6d40 ti: de550000 task.ti: de550000 [ 294.372236] PC is at __spi_validate+0xa8/0x2ac [ 294.376902] LR is at __spi_sync+0x78/0x210 [ 294.381200] pc : [<c049c760>] lr : [<c049ebe0>] psr: 60000013 [ 294.381200] sp : de551998 ip : de5519d8 fp : 00200000 [ 294.393242] r10: de551c8c r9 : de5519d8 r8 : de3a9000 [ 294.398730] r7 : de3a9258 r6 : de3a9400 r5 : de551a48 r4 : 00203fbc [ 294.405577] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000000 r0 : de3a9000 [ 294.412420] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user [ 294.419918] Control: 10c5387d Table: 9e528019 DAC: 00000015 [ 294.425954] Process ifconfig (pid: 1827, stack limit = 0xde550218) [ 294.432437] Stack: (0xde551998 to 0xde552000) ... [ 294.883613] [<c049c760>] (__spi_validate) from [<c049ebe0>] (__spi_sync+0x78/0x210) [ 294.891670] [<c049ebe0>] (__spi_sync) from [<bf036598>] (wl12xx_spi_raw_write+0xfc/0x148 [wlcore_spi]) [ 294.901661] [<bf036598>] (wl12xx_spi_raw_write [wlcore_spi]) from [<bf21c694>] (wlcore_boot_upload_firmware+0x1ec/0x458 [wlcore]) [ 294.914038] [<bf21c694>] (wlcore_boot_upload_firmware [wlcore]) from [<bf24532c>] (wl12xx_boot+0xc10/0xfac [wl12xx]) [ 294.925161] [<bf24532c>] (wl12xx_boot [wl12xx]) from [<bf20d5cc>] (wl1271_op_add_interface+0x5b0/0x910 [wlcore]) [ 294.936364] [<bf20d5cc>] (wl1271_op_add_interface [wlcore]) from [<bf15c4ac>] (ieee80211_do_open+0x44c/0xf7c [mac80211]) [ 294.947963] [<bf15c4ac>] (ieee80211_do_open [mac80211]) from [<c0537978>] (__dev_open+0xa8/0x110) [ 294.957307] [<c0537978>] (__dev_open) from [<c0537bf8>] (__dev_change_flags+0x88/0x148) [ 294.965713] [<c0537bf8>] (__dev_change_flags) from [<c0537cd0>] (dev_change_flags+0x18/0x48) [ 294.974576] [<c0537cd0>] (dev_change_flags) from [<c05a55a0>] (devinet_ioctl+0x6b4/0x7d0) [ 294.983191] [<c05a55a0>] (devinet_ioctl) from [<c0517040>] (sock_ioctl+0x1e4/0x2bc) [ 294.991244] [<c0517040>] (sock_ioctl) from [<c017d378>] (do_vfs_ioctl+0x420/0x6b0) [ 294.999208] [<c017d378>] (do_vfs_ioctl) from [<c017d674>] (SyS_ioctl+0x6c/0x7c) [ 295.006880] [<c017d674>] (SyS_ioctl) from [<c000f4c0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54) [ 295.014835] Code: e1550004 e2444034 0a00007d e5953018 (e5942008) [ 295.021544] ---[ end trace 66ed188198f4e24e ]--- Signed-off-by: Uri Mashiach <uri.mashiach@compulab.co.il> Acked-by: Igor Grinberg <grinberg@compulab.co.il> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e47301b06d5a65678690f04c2248fd181db1e59a upstream. Fix the below Oops when trying to modprobe wlcore_spi. The oops occurs because the wl1271_power_{off,on}() function doesn't check the power() function pointer. [ 23.401447] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [ 23.409954] pgd = c0004000 [ 23.412922] [00000000] *pgd=00000000 [ 23.416693] Internal error: Oops: 80000007 [#1] SMP ARM [ 23.422168] Modules linked in: wl12xx wlcore mac80211 cfg80211 musb_dsps musb_hdrc usbcore usb_common snd_soc_simple_card evdev joydev omap_rng wlcore_spi snd_soc_tlv320aic23_i2c rng_core snd_soc_tlv320aic23 c_can_platform c_can can_dev snd_soc_davinci_mcasp snd_soc_edma snd_soc_omap omap_wdt musb_am335x cpufreq_dt thermal_sys hwmon [ 23.453253] CPU: 0 PID: 36 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.2.0-00002-g951efee-dirty #233 [ 23.461720] Hardware name: Generic AM33XX (Flattened Device Tree) [ 23.468123] Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func [ 23.473690] task: de32efc0 ti: de4ee000 task.ti: de4ee000 [ 23.479341] PC is at 0x0 [ 23.482112] LR is at wl12xx_set_power_on+0x28/0x124 [wlcore] [ 23.488074] pc : [<00000000>] lr : [<bf2581f0>] psr: 60000013 [ 23.488074] sp : de4efe50 ip : 00000002 fp : 00000000 [ 23.500162] r10: de7cdd00 r9 : dc848800 r8 : bf27af00 [ 23.505663] r7 : bf27a1a8 r6 : dcbd8a80 r5 : dce0e2e0 r4 : dce0d2e0 [ 23.512536] r3 : 00000000 r2 : 00000000 r1 : 00000001 r0 : dc848810 [ 23.519412] Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment kernel [ 23.527109] Control: 10c5387d Table: 9cb78019 DAC: 00000015 [ 23.533160] Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 36, stack limit = 0xde4ee218) [ 23.539760] Stack: (0xde4efe50 to 0xde4f0000) [...] [ 23.665030] [<bf2581f0>] (wl12xx_set_power_on [wlcore]) from [<bf25f7ac>] (wlcore_nvs_cb+0x118/0xa4c [wlcore]) [ 23.675604] [<bf25f7ac>] (wlcore_nvs_cb [wlcore]) from [<c04387ec>] (request_firmware_work_func+0x30/0x58) [ 23.685784] [<c04387ec>] (request_firmware_work_func) from [<c0058e2c>] (process_one_work+0x1b4/0x4b4) [ 23.695591] [<c0058e2c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0059168>] (worker_thread+0x3c/0x4a4) [ 23.704124] [<c0059168>] (worker_thread) from [<c005ee68>] (kthread+0xd4/0xf0) [ 23.711747] [<c005ee68>] (kthread) from [<c000f598>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c) [ 23.719357] Code: bad PC value [ 23.722760] ---[ end trace 981be8510db9b3a9 ]--- Prevent oops by validationg power() pointer value before calling the function. Signed-off-by: Uri Mashiach <uri.mashiach@compulab.co.il> Acked-by: Igor Grinberg <grinberg@compulab.co.il> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ac75fe5d8fe4a0bf063be18fb29684405279e79e upstream. That prevents this bug: [ 2382.269496] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000540 [ 2382.270013] IP: [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd] [ 2382.270013] PGD 0 [ 2382.270013] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [ 2382.270013] Modules linked in: saa7134_alsa(-) tda1004x saa7134_dvb videobuf2_dvb dvb_core tda827x tda8290 tuner saa7134 tveeprom videobuf2_dma_sg videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_core v4l2_common videodev media auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace sunrpc tun bridge stp llc ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack it87 hwmon_vid snd_hda_codec_idt snd_hda_codec_generic iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core snd_seq pcspkr i2c_i801 snd_seq_device snd_pcm snd_timer lpc_ich snd mfd_core soundcore binfmt_misc i915 video i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm r8169 ata_generic serio_raw pata_acpi mii i2c_core [last unloaded: videobuf2_memops] [ 2382.270013] CPU: 0 PID: 4899 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 4.5.0-rc1+ #4 [ 2382.270013] Hardware name: PCCHIPS P17G/P17G, BIOS 080012 05/14/2008 [ 2382.270013] task: ffff880039c38000 ti: ffff88003c764000 task.ti: ffff88003c764000 [ 2382.270013] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01fe616>] [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd] [ 2382.270013] RSP: 0018:ffff88003c767ea0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 2382.270013] RAX: ffff88003c767eb8 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000006260 [ 2382.270013] RDX: ffffffffa020a060 RSI: ffffffffa0206de1 RDI: ffff88003c767eb0 [ 2382.270013] RBP: ffff88003c767ed8 R08: 0000000000019960 R09: ffffffff811a5412 [ 2382.270013] R10: ffffea0000d7c200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003c767ea8 [ 2382.270013] R13: 00007ffe760617f7 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000557625d7f1e0 [ 2382.270013] FS: 00007f80bb1c0700(0000) GS:ffff88003f400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2382.270013] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b [ 2382.270013] CR2: 0000000000000540 CR3: 000000003c00f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 2382.270013] Stack: [ 2382.270013] 000000003c767ed8 ffffffff00000000 ffff880000000000 ffff88003c767eb8 [ 2382.270013] ffff88003c767eb8 ffffffffa049a890 00007ffe76060060 ffff88003c767ef0 [ 2382.270013] ffffffffa049889d ffffffffa049a500 ffff88003c767f48 ffffffff8111079c [ 2382.270013] Call Trace: [ 2382.270013] [<ffffffffa049889d>] saa7134_alsa_exit+0x1d/0x780 [saa7134_alsa] [ 2382.270013] [<ffffffff8111079c>] SyS_delete_module+0x19c/0x1f0 [ 2382.270013] [<ffffffff8170fc2e>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71 [ 2382.270013] Code: 20 a0 48 c7 c6 e1 6d 20 a0 48 89 e5 41 54 53 4c 8d 65 d0 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 28 c7 45 d0 00 00 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 08 e8 7a 55 ed e0 <4c> 89 a3 40 05 00 00 48 89 df e8 eb fd ff ff 85 c0 75 1a 48 8d [ 2382.270013] RIP [<ffffffffa01fe616>] snd_card_free+0x36/0x70 [snd] [ 2382.270013] RSP <ffff88003c767ea0> [ 2382.270013] CR2: 0000000000000540 Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 63e41ebc6630f39422d87f8a4bade1e793f37a01 upstream. We miss to take the crypto_alg_sem semaphore when traversing the crypto_alg_list for CRYPTO_MSG_GETALG dumps. This allows a race with crypto_unregister_alg() removing algorithms from the list while we're still traversing it, thereby leading to a use-after-free as show below: [ 3482.071639] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 3482.075639] Modules linked in: aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw ablk_helper cryptd gf128mul ipv6 pcspkr serio_raw virtio_net microcode virtio_pci virtio_ring virtio sr_mod cdrom [last unloaded: aesni_intel] [ 3482.075639] CPU: 1 PID: 11065 Comm: crconf Not tainted 4.3.4-grsec+ #126 [ 3482.075639] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014 [ 3482.075639] task: ffff88001cd41a40 ti: ffff88001cd422c8 task.ti: ffff88001cd422c8 [ 3482.075639] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff93722bd3>] [<ffffffff93722bd3>] strncpy+0x13/0x30 [ 3482.075639] RSP: 0018:ffff88001f713b60 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 3482.075639] RAX: ffff88001f6c4430 RBX: ffff88001f6c43a0 RCX: ffff88001f6c4430 [ 3482.075639] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: fefefefefefeff16 RDI: ffff88001f6c4430 [ 3482.075639] RBP: ffff88001f713b60 R08: ffff88001f6c4470 R09: ffff88001f6c4480 [ 3482.075639] R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffff88001ce2aa28 [ 3482.075639] R13: ffff880000093700 R14: ffff88001f5e4bf8 R15: 0000000000003b20 [ 3482.075639] FS: 0000033826fa2700(0000) GS:ffff88001e900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3482.075639] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3482.075639] CR2: ffffffffff600400 CR3: 00000000139ec000 CR4: 00000000001606f0 [ 3482.075639] Stack: [ 3482.075639] ffff88001f713bd8 ffffffff936ccd00 ffff88001e5c4200 ffff880000093700 [ 3482.075639] ffff88001f713bd0 ffffffff938ef4bf 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20 [ 3482.075639] ffff88001f5e4bf8 ffff88001f5e4848 0000000000000000 0000000000003b20 [ 3482.075639] Call Trace: [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936ccd00>] crypto_report_alg+0xc0/0x3e0 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff938ef4bf>] ? __alloc_skb+0x16f/0x300 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cd08a>] crypto_dump_report+0x6a/0x90 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93935707>] netlink_dump+0x147/0x2e0 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93935f99>] __netlink_dump_start+0x159/0x190 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936ccb13>] crypto_user_rcv_msg+0xc3/0x130 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cd020>] ? crypto_report_alg+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cc4b0>] ? alg_test_crc32c+0x120/0x120 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93933145>] ? __netlink_lookup+0xd5/0x120 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cca50>] ? crypto_add_alg+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93938141>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe1/0x130 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff936cc4f8>] crypto_netlink_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff939375a8>] netlink_unicast+0x108/0x180 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93937c21>] netlink_sendmsg+0x541/0x770 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff938e31e1>] sock_sendmsg+0x21/0x40 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff938e4763>] SyS_sendto+0xf3/0x130 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93444203>] ? bad_area_nosemaphore+0x13/0x20 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff93444470>] ? __do_page_fault+0x80/0x3a0 [ 3482.075639] [<ffffffff939d80cb>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6e [ 3482.075639] Code: 88 4a ff 75 ed 5d 48 0f ba 2c 24 3f c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 85 d2 48 89 f8 48 89 f9 4c 8d 04 17 48 89 e5 74 15 <0f> b6 16 80 fa 01 88 11 48 83 de ff 48 83 c1 01 4c 39 c1 75 eb [ 3482.075639] RIP [<ffffffff93722bd3>] strncpy+0x13/0x30 To trigger the race run the following loops simultaneously for a while: $ while : ; do modprobe aesni-intel; rmmod aesni-intel; done $ while : ; do crconf show all > /dev/null; done Fix the race by taking the crypto_alg_sem read lock, thereby preventing crypto_unregister_alg() from modifying the algorithm list during the dump. This bug has been detected by the PaX memory sanitize feature. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Sep 22, 2016
commit 0c0fe3b0fa45082cd752553fdb3a4b42503a118e upstream. While doing some tests I ran into an hang on an extent buffer's rwlock that produced the following trace: [39389.800012] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#15 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32166] [39389.800016] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#14 stuck for 22s! [fdm-stress:32165] [39389.800016] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [39389.800016] irq event stamp: 0 [39389.800016] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800016] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800016] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800016] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800016] CPU: 14 PID: 32165 Comm: fdm-stress Not tainted 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [39389.800016] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [39389.800016] task: ffff880175b1ca40 ti: ffff8800a185c000 task.ti: ffff8800a185c000 [39389.800016] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810902af>] [<ffffffff810902af>] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x57/0x158 [39389.800016] RSP: 0018:ffff8800a185fb80 EFLAGS: 00000202 [39389.800016] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e9c RCX: 0000000000000101 [39389.800016] RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 [39389.800016] RBP: ffff8800a185fb98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [39389.800016] R10: ffff8800a185fb68 R11: 6db6db6db6db6db7 R12: ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800016] R13: ffff880175b1ca40 R14: ffff8800a185fc10 R15: ffff880175b1ca40 [39389.800016] FS: 00007f6d37fff700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [39389.800016] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [39389.800016] CR2: 00007f6d300019b8 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [39389.800016] Stack: [39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880175b1ca40 ffff8800a185fbb0 [39389.800016] ffffffff81091e11 ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbc8 ffffffff81091895 [39389.800016] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff8800a185fbe8 ffffffff81486c5c ffffffffa067288c [39389.800016] Call Trace: [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091e11>] queued_read_lock_slowpath+0x46/0x60 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81091895>] do_raw_read_lock+0x3e/0x41 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81486c5c>] _raw_read_lock+0x3d/0x44 [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] ? btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa067288c>] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x54/0x125 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0622ced>] ? btrfs_find_item+0xa7/0xd2 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa069363f>] btrfs_ref_to_path+0xd6/0x174 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693730>] inode_to_path+0x53/0xa2 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0693e2e>] paths_from_inode+0x117/0x2ec [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffffa0670cff>] btrfs_ioctl+0xd5b/0x2793 [btrfs] [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800016] [<ffffffff81276727>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x15 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d [39389.800016] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [39389.800016] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [39389.800016] Code: b9 01 01 00 00 f7 c6 00 ff ff ff 75 32 83 fe 01 89 ca 89 f0 0f 45 d7 f0 0f b1 13 39 f0 74 04 89 c6 eb e2 ff ca 0f 84 fa 00 00 00 <8b> 03 84 c0 74 04 f3 90 eb f6 66 c7 03 01 00 e9 e6 00 00 00 e8 [39389.800012] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_mod ppdev xor sha256_generic hmac raid6_pq drbg ansi_cprng aesni_intel i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq aes_x86_64 ablk_helper tpm_tis parport_pc i2c_core sg cryptd evdev psmouse lrw tpm parport gf128mul serio_raw pcspkr glue_helper processor button loop autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod sr_mod cdrom ata_generic virtio_scsi ata_piix libata virtio_pci virtio_ring crc32c_intel scsi_mod e1000 virtio floppy [last unloaded: btrfs] [39389.800012] irq event stamp: 0 [39389.800012] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800012] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800012] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff8104e58d>] copy_process+0x638/0x1a35 [39389.800012] softirqs last disabled at (0): [< (null)>] (null) [39389.800012] CPU: 15 PID: 32166 Comm: fdm-stress Tainted: G L 4.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-18+ #1 [39389.800012] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [39389.800012] task: ffff880179294380 ti: ffff880034a60000 task.ti: ffff880034a60000 [39389.800012] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81091e8d>] [<ffffffff81091e8d>] queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x62/0x72 [39389.800012] RSP: 0018:ffff880034a639f0 EFLAGS: 00000206 [39389.800012] RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff8801710c4e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 [39389.800012] RDX: 00000000000000ff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8801710c4e9c [39389.800012] RBP: ffff880034a639f8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [39389.800012] R10: ffff880034a639b0 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800012] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff880172cbc000 R15: ffff8801710c4e00 [39389.800012] FS: 00007f6d377fe700(0000) GS:ffff8802be9e0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [39389.800012] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [39389.800012] CR2: 00007f6d3d3c1000 CR3: 0000000037c93000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 [39389.800012] Stack: [39389.800012] ffff8801710c4e98 ffff880034a63a10 ffffffff81091963 ffff8801710c4e98 [39389.800012] ffff880034a63a30 ffffffff81486f1b ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00 [39389.800012] ffff880034a63a78 ffffffffa0672cb3 ffff8801710c4e00 ffff880034a63a58 [39389.800012] Call Trace: [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81091963>] do_raw_write_lock+0x72/0x8c [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486f1b>] _raw_write_lock+0x3a/0x41 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] ? btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0672cb3>] btrfs_tree_lock+0x119/0x251 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061aeba>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x5b/0x5d [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce13>] ? btrfs_root_node+0xda/0xe6 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa061ce83>] btrfs_lock_root_node+0x22/0x42 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa062046b>] btrfs_search_slot+0x1b8/0x758 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff810fc6b0>] ? time_hardirqs_on+0x15/0x28 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa06365db>] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x31/0x95 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108d62f>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8148482b>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x397/0x3bc [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068821b>] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x59/0x1c0 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa068858e>] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x194/0x5aa [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81486ab7>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x31/0x44 [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688a48>] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0xa4/0x15c [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0688d62>] btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x11/0x13 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa064048e>] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x234/0x96e [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0618d10>] btrfs_sync_fs+0x145/0x1ad [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffffa0671176>] btrfs_ioctl+0x11d2/0x2793 [btrfs] [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff81140261>] ? __might_fault+0x4c/0xa7 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8108a8b0>] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x9/0xc [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b3d4>] ? rcu_read_unlock+0x3e/0x5d [39389.800012] [<ffffffff811822f8>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x42b/0x4ea [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118b4f3>] ? __fget_light+0x62/0x71 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff8118240e>] SyS_ioctl+0x57/0x79 [39389.800012] [<ffffffff814872d7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f [39389.800012] Code: f0 0f b1 13 85 c0 75 ef eb 2a f3 90 8a 03 84 c0 75 f8 f0 0f b0 13 84 c0 75 f0 ba ff 00 00 00 eb 0a f0 0f b1 13 ff c8 74 0b f3 90 <8b> 03 83 f8 01 75 f7 eb ed c6 43 04 00 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 This happens because in the code path executed by the inode_paths ioctl we end up nesting two calls to read lock a leaf's rwlock when after the first call to read_lock() and before the second call to read_lock(), another task (running the delayed items as part of a transaction commit) has already called write_lock() against the leaf's rwlock. This situation is illustrated by the following diagram: Task A Task B btrfs_ref_to_path() btrfs_commit_transaction() read_lock(&eb->lock); btrfs_run_delayed_items() __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items() __btrfs_update_delayed_inode() btrfs_lookup_inode() write_lock(&eb->lock); --> task waits for lock read_lock(&eb->lock); --> makes this task hang forever (and task B too of course) So fix this by avoiding doing the nested read lock, which is easily avoidable. This issue does not happen if task B calls write_lock() after task A does the second call to read_lock(), however there does not seem to exist anything in the documentation that mentions what is the expected behaviour for recursive locking of rwlocks (leaving the idea that doing so is not a good usage of rwlocks). Also, as a side effect necessary for this fix, make sure we do not needlessly read lock extent buffers when the input path has skip_locking set (used when called from send). Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 90a88d6ef88edcfc4f644dddc7eef4ea41bccf8b upstream. This softlockup is currently happening: [ 444.088002] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [kworker/1:1:29] [ 444.088002] Modules linked in: lpfc(-) qla2x00tgt(O) qla2xxx_scst(O) scst_vdisk(O) scsi_transport_fc libcrc32c scst(O) dlm configfs nfsd lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrpc ed d snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss snd_seq snd_seq_device dm_mod iTCO_wdt snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic gpio_ich iTCO_vendor_support ppdev snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hda _core snd_hwdep tg3 snd_pcm snd_timer libphy lpc_ich parport_pc ptp acpi_cpufreq snd pps_core fjes parport i2c_i801 ehci_pci tpm_tis tpm sr_mod cdrom soundcore floppy hwmon sg 8250_ fintek pcspkr i915 drm_kms_helper uhci_hcd ehci_hcd drm fb_sys_fops sysimgblt sysfillrect syscopyarea i2c_algo_bit usbcore button video usb_common fan ata_generic ata_piix libata th ermal [ 444.088002] CPU: 1 PID: 29 Comm: kworker/1:1 Tainted: G O 4.4.0-rc5-2.g1e923a3-default #1 [ 444.088002] Hardware name: FUJITSU SIEMENS ESPRIMO E /D2164-A1, BIOS 5.00 R1.10.2164.A1 05/08/2006 [ 444.088002] Workqueue: fc_wq_4 fc_rport_final_delete [scsi_transport_fc] [ 444.088002] task: f6266ec0 ti: f6268000 task.ti: f6268000 [ 444.088002] EIP: 0060:[<c07e7044>] EFLAGS: 00000286 CPU: 1 [ 444.088002] EIP is at _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x14/0x20 [ 444.088002] EAX: 00000286 EBX: f20d3800 ECX: 00000002 EDX: 00000286 [ 444.088002] ESI: f50ba800 EDI: f2146848 EBP: f6269ec8 ESP: f6269ec8 [ 444.088002] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [ 444.088002] CR0: 8005003b CR2: 08f96600 CR3: 363ae000 CR4: 000006d0 [ 444.088002] Stack: [ 444.088002] f6269eec c066b0f7 00000286 f2146848 f50ba808 f50ba800 f50ba800 f2146a90 [ 444.088002] f2146848 f6269f08 f8f0a4ed f3141000 f2146800 f2146a90 f619fa00 00000040 [ 444.088002] f6269f40 c026cb25 00000001 166c6392 00000061 f6757140 f6136340 00000004 [ 444.088002] Call Trace: [ 444.088002] [<c066b0f7>] scsi_remove_target+0x167/0x1c0 [ 444.088002] [<f8f0a4ed>] fc_rport_final_delete+0x9d/0x1e0 [scsi_transport_fc] [ 444.088002] [<c026cb25>] process_one_work+0x155/0x3e0 [ 444.088002] [<c026cde7>] worker_thread+0x37/0x490 [ 444.088002] [<c027214b>] kthread+0x9b/0xb0 [ 444.088002] [<c07e72c1>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x21/0x40 What appears to be happening is that something has pinned the target so it can't go into STARGET_DEL via final release and the loop in scsi_remove_target spins endlessly until that happens. The fix for this soft lockup is to not keep looping over a device that we've called remove on but which hasn't gone into DEL state. This patch will retain a simplistic memory of the last target and not keep looping over it. Reported-by: Sebastian Herbszt <herbszt@gmx.de> Tested-by: Sebastian Herbszt <herbszt@gmx.de> Fixes: 4099819 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 361cad3c89070aeb37560860ea8bfc092d545adc upstream. We've seen this in a packet capture - I've intermixed what I think was going on. The fix here is to grab the so_lock sooner. 1964379 -> #1 open (for write) reply seqid=1 1964393 -> #2 open (for read) reply seqid=2 __nfs4_close(), state->n_wronly-- nfs4_state_set_mode_locked(), changes state->state = [R] state->flags is [RW] state->state is [R], state->n_wronly == 0, state->n_rdonly == 1 1964398 -> #3 open (for write) call -> because close is already running 1964399 -> downgrade (to read) call seqid=2 (close of #1) 1964402 -> #3 open (for write) reply seqid=3 __update_open_stateid() nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(), changes state->flags state->flags is [RW] state->state is [R], state->n_wronly == 0, state->n_rdonly == 1 new sequence number is exposed now via nfs4_stateid_copy() next step would be update_open_stateflags(), pending so_lock 1964403 -> downgrade reply seqid=2, fails with OLD_STATEID (close of #1) nfs4_close_prepare() gets so_lock and recalcs flags -> send close 1964405 -> downgrade (to read) call seqid=3 (close of #1 retry) __update_open_stateid() gets so_lock * update_open_stateflags() updates state->n_wronly. nfs4_state_set_mode_locked() updates state->state state->flags is [RW] state->state is [RW], state->n_wronly == 1, state->n_rdonly == 1 * should have suppressed the preceding nfs4_close_prepare() from sending open_downgrade 1964406 -> write call 1964408 -> downgrade (to read) reply seqid=4 (close of #1 retry) nfs_clear_open_stateid_locked() state->flags is [R] state->state is [RW], state->n_wronly == 1, state->n_rdonly == 1 1964409 -> write reply (fails, openmode) Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d96b339f453997f2f08c52da3f41423be48c978f upstream. I saw the following BUG_ON triggered in a testcase where a process calls madvise(MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE) on thps, along with a background process that calls migratepages command repeatedly (doing ping-pong among different NUMA nodes) for the first process: Soft offlining page 0x60000 at 0x700000600000 __get_any_page: 0x60000 free buddy page page:ffffea0001800000 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping: (null) index:0x1 flags: 0x1fffc0000000000() page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(atomic_read(&page->_count) == 0) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /src/linux-dev/include/linux/mm.h:342! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: cfg80211 rfkill crc32c_intel serio_raw virtio_balloon i2c_piix4 virtio_blk virtio_net ata_generic pata_acpi CPU: 3 PID: 3035 Comm: test_alloc_gene Tainted: G O 4.4.0-rc8-v4.4-rc8-160107-1501-00000-rc8+ #74 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88007c63d5c0 ti: ffff88007c210000 task.ti: ffff88007c210000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8118998c>] [<ffffffff8118998c>] put_page+0x5c/0x60 RSP: 0018:ffff88007c213e00 EFLAGS: 00010246 Call Trace: put_hwpoison_page+0x4e/0x80 soft_offline_page+0x501/0x520 SyS_madvise+0x6bc/0x6f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a Code: 8b fc ff ff 5b 5d c3 48 89 df e8 b0 fa ff ff 48 89 df 31 f6 e8 c6 7d ff ff 5b 5d c3 48 c7 c6 08 54 a2 81 48 89 df e8 a4 c5 01 00 <0f> 0b 66 90 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 41 55 41 54 53 48 8b 47 RIP [<ffffffff8118998c>] put_page+0x5c/0x60 RSP <ffff88007c213e00> The root cause resides in get_any_page() which retries to get a refcount of the page to be soft-offlined. This function calls put_hwpoison_page(), expecting that the target page is putback to LRU list. But it can be also freed to buddy. So the second check need to care about such case. Fixes: af8fae7 ("mm/memory-failure.c: clean up soft_offline_page()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Steve Capper <steve.capper@linaro.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7f98ca4 upstream. We apparantly get a hotplug irq before we've initialised modesetting, [drm] Loading R100 Microcode BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<c125f56f>] __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x23/0x91 *pde = 00000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] Modules linked in: radeon(+) drm_kms_helper ttm drm i2c_algo_bit backlight pcspkr psmouse evdev sr_mod input_leds led_class cdrom sg parport_pc parport floppy intel_agp intel_gtt lpc_ich acpi_cpufreq processor button mfd_core agpgart uhci_hcd ehci_hcd rng_core snd_intel8x0 snd_ac97_codec ac97_bus snd_pcm usbcore usb_common i2c_i801 i2c_core snd_timer snd soundcore thermal_sys CPU: 0 PID: 15 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.2.0-rc7-00015-gbf67402 #111 Hardware name: MicroLink /D850MV , BIOS MV85010A.86A.0067.P24.0304081124 04/08/2003 Workqueue: events radeon_hotplug_work_func [radeon] task: f6ca5900 ti: f6d3e000 task.ti: f6d3e000 EIP: 0060:[<c125f56f>] EFLAGS: 00010282 CPU: 0 EIP is at __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x23/0x91 EAX: 00000000 EBX: f5e900fc ECX: 00000000 EDX: fffffffe ESI: f6ca5900 EDI: f5e90100 EBP: f5e90000 ESP: f6d3ff0c DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 CR0: 8005003b CR2: 00000000 CR3: 36f61000 CR4: 000006d0 Stack: f5e90100 00000000 c103c4c1 f6d2a5a0 f5e900fc f6df394c c125f162 f8b0faca f6d2a5a0 c138ca00 f6df394c f7395600 c1034741 00d40000 00000000 f6d2a5a0 c138ca00 f6d2a5b8 c138ca10 c1034b58 00000001 f6d40000 f6ca5900 f6d0c940 Call Trace: [<c103c4c1>] ? dequeue_task_fair+0xa4/0xb7 [<c125f162>] ? mutex_lock+0x9/0xa [<f8b0faca>] ? radeon_hotplug_work_func+0x17/0x57 [radeon] [<c1034741>] ? process_one_work+0xfc/0x194 [<c1034b58>] ? worker_thread+0x18d/0x218 [<c10349cb>] ? rescuer_thread+0x1d5/0x1d5 [<c103742a>] ? kthread+0x7b/0x80 [<c12601c0>] ? ret_from_kernel_thread+0x20/0x30 [<c10373af>] ? init_completion+0x18/0x18 Code: 42 08 e8 8e a6 dd ff c3 57 56 53 83 ec 0c 8b 35 48 f7 37 c1 8b 10 4a 74 1a 89 c3 8d 78 04 8b 40 08 89 63 Reported-and-Tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9f2dfda2f2f1c6181c3732c16b85c59ab2d195e0 upstream. An inverted return value check in hostfs_mknod() caused the function to return success after handling it as an error (and cleaning up). It resulted in the following segfault when trying to bind() a named unix socket: Pid: 198, comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc4 RIP: 0033:[<0000000061077df6>] RSP: 00000000daae5d60 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000006092a460 RCX: 00000000dfc54208 RDX: 0000000061073ef1 RSI: 0000000000000070 RDI: 00000000e027d600 RBP: 00000000daae5de0 R08: 00000000da980ac0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 00007fb1ae08f72a R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000006092a460 R14: 00000000daaa97c0 R15: 00000000daaa9a88 Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel mode fault at addr 0x40, ip 0x61077df6 CPU: 0 PID: 198 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc4 #1 Stack: e027d620 dfc54208 0000006f da981398 61bee000 0000c1ed daae5de0 0000006e e027d620 dfcd4208 00000005 6092a460 Call Trace: [<60dedc67>] SyS_bind+0xf7/0x110 [<600587be>] handle_syscall+0x7e/0x80 [<60066ad7>] userspace+0x3e7/0x4e0 [<6006321f>] ? save_registers+0x1f/0x40 [<6006c88e>] ? arch_prctl+0x1be/0x1f0 [<60054985>] fork_handler+0x85/0x90 Let's also get rid of the "cosmic ray protection" while we're at it. Fixes: e919305 "hostfs: fix races in dentry_name() and inode_name()" Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Jun 16, 2017
commit 73d2c6678e6c3af7e7a42b1e78cd0211782ade32 upstream. Andrey reported a kernel crash: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ #124 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000 RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline] RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837 RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2 RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0 R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check. Fixes: c319b4d ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 2bd624b4611ffee36422782d16e1c944d1351e98 upstream. Commit 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a netdev"), unfortunately, introduced the following issues. 1. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) (fanout_release()) from inside rcu_read-side critical section. rcu_read_lock disables preemption, most often, which prohibits calling sleeping functions. [ ] include/linux/rcupdate.h:560 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ ] [ ] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ ] 4 locks held by ovs-vswitchd/1969: [ ] #0: (cb_lock){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8158a6c9>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 [ ] #1: (ovs_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa04878ca>] ovs_vport_cmd_del+0x4a/0x100 [openvswitch] [ ] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81564157>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 [ ] #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff81614165>] packet_notifier+0x5/0x3f0 [ ] [ ] Call Trace: [ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [ ] [<ffffffff810c9077>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x107/0x110 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2da7>] ___might_sleep+0x57/0x210 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90 [ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0 [ ] [<ffffffff810de93f>] ? vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [ ] [<ffffffff81186e88>] ? printk+0x4d/0x4f [ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0 [ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0 2. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) inside spin_lock(&po->bind_lock). "sleeping function called from invalid context" [ ] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620 [ ] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1969, name: ovs-vswitchd [ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ ] Call Trace: [ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2f52>] ___might_sleep+0x202/0x210 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90 [ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0 [ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0 [ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0 3. calling dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook), from inside spin_lock(&po->bind_lock) or rcu_read-side critical-section. dev_remove_pack() -> synchronize_net(), which might sleep. [ ] BUG: scheduling while atomic: ovs-vswitchd/1969/0x00000002 [ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ ] Call Trace: [ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [ ] [<ffffffff81186274>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x73 [ ] [<ffffffff8162b8cb>] __schedule+0x6b/0xd10 [ ] [<ffffffff8162c5db>] schedule+0x6b/0x80 [ ] [<ffffffff81630b1d>] schedule_timeout+0x38d/0x410 [ ] [<ffffffff810ea3fd>] synchronize_sched_expedited+0x53d/0x810 [ ] [<ffffffff810ea6de>] synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe/0x10 [ ] [<ffffffff8154eab5>] synchronize_net+0x35/0x50 [ ] [<ffffffff8154eae3>] dev_remove_pack+0x13/0x20 [ ] [<ffffffff8161077e>] fanout_release+0xbe/0xe0 [ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0 4. fanout_release() races with calls from different CPU. To fix the above problems, remove the call to fanout_release() under rcu_read_lock(). Instead, call __dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook) and netdev_run_todo will be happy that &dev->ptype_specific list is empty. In order to achieve this, I moved dev_{add,remove}_pack() out of fanout_{add,release} to __fanout_{link,unlink}. So, call to {,__}unregister_prot_hook() will make sure fanout->prot_hook is removed as well. [js] no rollover in 3.12 Fixes: 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a netdev") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Anoob Soman <anoob.soman@citrix.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Jun 18, 2017
commit af309226db916e2c6e08d3eba3fa5c34225200c4 upstream. If a block device is closed while iterate_bdevs() is handling it, the following NULL pointer dereference occurs because bdev->b_disk is NULL in bdev_get_queue(), which is called from blk_get_backing_dev_info() (in turn called by the mapping_cap_writeback_dirty() call in __filemap_fdatawrite_range()): BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000508 IP: [<ffffffff81314790>] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20 PGD 9e62067 PUD 9ee8067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 2422 Comm: sync Not tainted 4.5.0-rc7+ #400 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) task: ffff880009f4d700 ti: ffff880009f5c000 task.ti: ffff880009f5c000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81314790>] [<ffffffff81314790>] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20 RSP: 0018:ffff880009f5fe68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000ec17a38 RCX: ffffffff81a4e940 RDX: 7fffffffffffffff RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000ec176c0 RBP: ffff880009f5fe68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88000ec17860 R13: ffffffff811b25c0 R14: ffff88000ec178e0 R15: ffff88000ec17a38 FS: 00007faee505d700(0000) GS:ffff88000fb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 0000000000000508 CR3: 0000000009e8a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880009f5feb8 ffffffff8112e7f5 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 7fffffffffffffff 0000000000000001 ffff88000ec178e0 ffff88000ec17860 ffff880009f5fec8 ffffffff8112e81f Call Trace: [<ffffffff8112e7f5>] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x85/0x90 [<ffffffff8112e81f>] filemap_fdatawrite+0x1f/0x30 [<ffffffff811b25d6>] fdatawrite_one_bdev+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff811bc402>] iterate_bdevs+0xf2/0x130 [<ffffffff811b2763>] sys_sync+0x63/0x90 [<ffffffff815d4272>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Code: 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 f0 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 <48> 8b 80 08 05 00 00 5d RIP [<ffffffff81314790>] blk_get_backing_dev_info+0x10/0x20 RSP <ffff880009f5fe68> CR2: 0000000000000508 ---[ end trace 2487336ceb3de62d ]--- The crash is easily reproducible by running the following command, if an msleep(100) is inserted before the call to func() in iterate_devs(): while :; do head -c1 /dev/nullb0; done > /dev/null & while :; do sync; done Fix it by holding the bd_mutex across the func() call and only calling func() if the bdev is opened. Fixes: 5c0d6b6 ("vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices") Reported-and-tested-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit dac37e15b7d511e026a9313c8c46794c144103cd upstream. When SCSI EH invokes zFCP's callbacks for eh_device_reset_handler() and eh_target_reset_handler(), it expects us to relent the ownership over the given scsi_cmnd and all other scsi_cmnds within the same scope - LUN or target - when returning with SUCCESS from the callback ('release' them). SCSI EH can then reuse those commands. We did not follow this rule to release commands upon SUCCESS; and if later a reply arrived for one of those supposed to be released commands, we would still make use of the scsi_cmnd in our ingress tasklet. This will at least result in undefined behavior or a kernel panic because of a wrong kernel pointer dereference. To fix this, we NULLify all pointers to scsi_cmnds (struct zfcp_fsf_req *)->data in the matching scope if a TMF was successful. This is done under the locks (struct zfcp_adapter *)->abort_lock and (struct zfcp_reqlist *)->lock to prevent the requests from being removed from the request-hashtable, and the ingress tasklet from making use of the scsi_cmnd-pointer in zfcp_fsf_fcp_cmnd_handler(). For cases where a reply arrives during SCSI EH, but before we get a chance to NULLify the pointer - but before we return from the callback -, we assume that the code is protected from races via the CAS operation in blk_complete_request() that is called in scsi_done(). The following stacktrace shows an example for a crash resulting from the previous behavior: Unable to handle kernel pointer dereference at virtual kernel address fffffee17a672000 Oops: 0038 [#1] SMP CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Not tainted task: 00000003f7ff5be0 ti: 00000003f3d38000 task.ti: 00000003f3d38000 Krnl PSW : 0404d00180000000 00000000001156b0 (smp_vcpu_scheduled+0x18/0x40) R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:1 PM:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 000000200000007e 0000000000000000 fffffee17a671fd8 0000000300000015 ffffffff80000000 00000000005dfde8 07000003f7f80e00 000000004fa4e800 000000036ce8d8f8 000000036ce8d9c0 00000003ece8fe00 ffffffff969c9e93 00000003fffffffd 000000036ce8da10 00000000003bf134 00000003f3b07918 Krnl Code: 00000000001156a2: a7190000 lghi %r1,0 00000000001156a6: a7380015 lhi %r3,21 #00000000001156aa: e32050000008 ag %r2,0(%r5) >00000000001156b0: 482022b0 lh %r2,688(%r2) 00000000001156b4: ae123000 sigp %r1,%r2,0(%r3) 00000000001156b8: b2220020 ipm %r2 00000000001156bc: 8820001c srl %r2,28 00000000001156c0: c02700000001 xilf %r2,1 Call Trace: ([<0000000000000000>] 0x0) [<000003ff807bdb8e>] zfcp_fsf_fcp_cmnd_handler+0x3de/0x490 [zfcp] [<000003ff807be30a>] zfcp_fsf_req_complete+0x252/0x800 [zfcp] [<000003ff807c0a48>] zfcp_fsf_reqid_check+0xe8/0x190 [zfcp] [<000003ff807c194e>] zfcp_qdio_int_resp+0x66/0x188 [zfcp] [<000003ff80440c64>] qdio_kick_handler+0xdc/0x310 [qdio] [<000003ff804463d0>] __tiqdio_inbound_processing+0xf8/0xcd8 [qdio] [<0000000000141fd4>] tasklet_action+0x9c/0x170 [<0000000000141550>] __do_softirq+0xe8/0x258 [<000000000010ce0a>] do_softirq+0xba/0xc0 [<000000000014187c>] irq_exit+0xc4/0xe8 [<000000000046b526>] do_IRQ+0x146/0x1d8 [<00000000005d6a3c>] io_return+0x0/0x8 [<00000000005d6422>] vtime_stop_cpu+0x4a/0xa0 ([<0000000000000000>] 0x0) [<0000000000103d8a>] arch_cpu_idle+0xa2/0xb0 [<0000000000197f94>] cpu_startup_entry+0x13c/0x1f8 [<0000000000114782>] smp_start_secondary+0xda/0xe8 [<00000000005d6efe>] restart_int_handler+0x56/0x6c [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<00000000003bf12e>] arch_spin_lock_wait+0x56/0xb0 Suggested-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: ea127f9754 ("[PATCH] s390 (7/7): zfcp host adapter.") (tglx/history.git) Signed-off-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 034dd34ff4916ec1f8f74e39ca3efb04eab2f791 upstream. Olga Kornievskaia says: "I ran into this oops in the nfsd (below) (4.10-rc3 kernel). To trigger this I had a client (unsuccessfully) try to mount the server with krb5 where the server doesn't have the rpcsec_gss_krb5 module built." The problem is that rsci.cred is copied from a svc_cred structure that gss_proxy didn't properly initialize. Fix that. [120408.542387] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP ... [120408.565724] CPU: 0 PID: 3601 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3+ #16 [120408.567037] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual = Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 07/02/2015 [120408.569225] task: ffff8800776f95c0 task.stack: ffffc90003d58000 [120408.570483] RIP: 0010:gss_mech_put+0xb/0x20 [auth_rpcgss] ... [120408.584946] ? rsc_free+0x55/0x90 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.585901] gss_proxy_save_rsc+0xb2/0x2a0 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.587017] svcauth_gss_proxy_init+0x3cc/0x520 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.588257] ? __enqueue_entity+0x6c/0x70 [120408.589101] svcauth_gss_accept+0x391/0xb90 [auth_rpcgss] [120408.590212] ? try_to_wake_up+0x4a/0x360 [120408.591036] ? wake_up_process+0x15/0x20 [120408.592093] ? svc_xprt_do_enqueue+0x12e/0x2d0 [sunrpc] [120408.593177] svc_authenticate+0xe1/0x100 [sunrpc] [120408.594168] svc_process_common+0x203/0x710 [sunrpc] [120408.595220] svc_process+0x105/0x1c0 [sunrpc] [120408.596278] nfsd+0xe9/0x160 [nfsd] [120408.597060] kthread+0x101/0x140 [120408.597734] ? nfsd_destroy+0x60/0x60 [nfsd] [120408.598626] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [120408.599448] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Fixes: 1d65833 "SUNRPC: Add RPC based upcall mechanism for RPCGSS auth" Cc: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Tested-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 5fa8bbda38c668e56b0c6cdecced2eac2fe36dec upstream. Dmitry reported a warning [1] showing that we were calling net_disable_timestamp() -> static_key_slow_dec() from a non process context. Grabbing a mutex while holding a spinlock or rcu_read_lock() is not allowed. As Cong suggested, we now use a work queue. It is possible netstamp_clear() exits while netstamp_needed_deferred is not zero, but it is probably not worth trying to do better than that. netstamp_needed_deferred atomic tracks the exact number of deferred decrements. [1] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0-rc5+ #192 Not tainted ------------------------------- ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:561 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 2 locks held by syz-executor14/23111: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83a35c35>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1454 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff83a35c35>] rawv6_sendmsg+0x1e65/0x3ec0 net/ipv6/raw.c:919 #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83ae2678>] nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:201 [inline] #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83ae2678>] __ip6_local_out+0x258/0x840 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 23111 Comm: syz-executor14 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc5+ #192 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x139/0x180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4452 rcu_preempt_sleep_check include/linux/rcupdate.h:560 [inline] ___might_sleep+0x560/0x650 kernel/sched/core.c:7748 __might_sleep+0x95/0x1a0 kernel/sched/core.c:7739 mutex_lock_nested+0x24f/0x1730 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x119/0x160 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1060 __static_key_slow_dec+0x7a/0x1e0 kernel/jump_label.c:149 static_key_slow_dec+0x51/0x90 kernel/jump_label.c:174 net_disable_timestamp+0x3b/0x50 net/core/dev.c:1728 sock_disable_timestamp+0x98/0xc0 net/core/sock.c:403 __sk_destruct+0x27d/0x6b0 net/core/sock.c:1441 sk_destruct+0x47/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1460 __sk_free+0x57/0x230 net/core/sock.c:1468 sock_wfree+0xae/0x120 net/core/sock.c:1645 skb_release_head_state+0xfc/0x200 net/core/skbuff.c:655 skb_release_all+0x15/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668 __kfree_skb+0x15/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:684 kfree_skb+0x16e/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:705 inet_frag_destroy+0x121/0x290 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:304 inet_frag_put include/net/inet_frag.h:133 [inline] nf_ct_frag6_gather+0x1106/0x3840 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:617 ipv6_defrag+0x1be/0x2b0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:102 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x290 net/netfilter/core.c:310 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:212 [inline] __ip6_local_out+0x489/0x840 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160 ip6_local_out+0x2d/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:170 ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1722 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1742 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:613 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2d1a/0x3ec0 net/ipv6/raw.c:927 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 sock_write_iter+0x326/0x600 net/socket.c:848 do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e3/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:695 do_readv_writev+0x42c/0x9b0 fs/read_write.c:872 vfs_writev+0x87/0xc0 fs/read_write.c:911 do_writev+0x110/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:944 SYSC_writev fs/read_write.c:1017 [inline] SyS_writev+0x27/0x30 fs/read_write.c:1014 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x445559 RSP: 002b:00007f6f46fceb58 EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000014 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000005 RCX: 0000000000445559 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020f1eff0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000006e19c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000700000 R13: 0000000020f59000 R14: 0000000000000015 R15: 0000000000020400 BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 23111, name: syz-executor14 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 2 PID: 23111 Comm: syz-executor14 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc5+ #192 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:51 ___might_sleep+0x47e/0x650 kernel/sched/core.c:7780 __might_sleep+0x95/0x1a0 kernel/sched/core.c:7739 mutex_lock_nested+0x24f/0x1730 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock+0x119/0x160 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1060 __static_key_slow_dec+0x7a/0x1e0 kernel/jump_label.c:149 static_key_slow_dec+0x51/0x90 kernel/jump_label.c:174 net_disable_timestamp+0x3b/0x50 net/core/dev.c:1728 sock_disable_timestamp+0x98/0xc0 net/core/sock.c:403 __sk_destruct+0x27d/0x6b0 net/core/sock.c:1441 sk_destruct+0x47/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1460 __sk_free+0x57/0x230 net/core/sock.c:1468 sock_wfree+0xae/0x120 net/core/sock.c:1645 skb_release_head_state+0xfc/0x200 net/core/skbuff.c:655 skb_release_all+0x15/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:668 __kfree_skb+0x15/0x20 net/core/skbuff.c:684 kfree_skb+0x16e/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:705 inet_frag_destroy+0x121/0x290 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c:304 inet_frag_put include/net/inet_frag.h:133 [inline] nf_ct_frag6_gather+0x1106/0x3840 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_conntrack_reasm.c:617 ipv6_defrag+0x1be/0x2b0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_defrag_ipv6_hooks.c:68 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:102 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xc3/0x290 net/netfilter/core.c:310 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:212 [inline] __ip6_local_out+0x489/0x840 net/ipv6/output_core.c:160 ip6_local_out+0x2d/0x170 net/ipv6/output_core.c:170 ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x340 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1722 ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1742 rawv6_push_pending_frames net/ipv6/raw.c:613 [inline] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2d1a/0x3ec0 net/ipv6/raw.c:927 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 sock_write_iter+0x326/0x600 net/socket.c:848 do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e3/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:695 do_readv_writev+0x42c/0x9b0 fs/read_write.c:872 vfs_writev+0x87/0xc0 fs/read_write.c:911 do_writev+0x110/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:944 SYSC_writev fs/read_write.c:1017 [inline] SyS_writev+0x27/0x30 fs/read_write.c:1014 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 RIP: 0033:0x445559 Fixes: b90e579 ("net: dont call jump_label_dec from irq context") Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 73d2c6678e6c3af7e7a42b1e78cd0211782ade32 upstream. Andrey reported a kernel crash: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ #124 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000 RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline] RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837 RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2 RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0 R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645 SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check. Fixes: c319b4d ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 2bd624b4611ffee36422782d16e1c944d1351e98 upstream. Commit 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a netdev"), unfortunately, introduced the following issues. 1. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) (fanout_release()) from inside rcu_read-side critical section. rcu_read_lock disables preemption, most often, which prohibits calling sleeping functions. [ ] include/linux/rcupdate.h:560 Illegal context switch in RCU read-side critical section! [ ] [ ] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0 [ ] 4 locks held by ovs-vswitchd/1969: [ ] #0: (cb_lock){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff8158a6c9>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 [ ] #1: (ovs_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa04878ca>] ovs_vport_cmd_del+0x4a/0x100 [openvswitch] [ ] #2: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81564157>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20 [ ] #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff81614165>] packet_notifier+0x5/0x3f0 [ ] [ ] Call Trace: [ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [ ] [<ffffffff810c9077>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x107/0x110 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2da7>] ___might_sleep+0x57/0x210 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90 [ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0 [ ] [<ffffffff810de93f>] ? vprintk_default+0x1f/0x30 [ ] [<ffffffff81186e88>] ? printk+0x4d/0x4f [ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0 [ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0 2. calling mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex) inside spin_lock(&po->bind_lock). "sleeping function called from invalid context" [ ] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620 [ ] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1969, name: ovs-vswitchd [ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ ] Call Trace: [ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2f52>] ___might_sleep+0x202/0x210 [ ] [<ffffffff810a2fd0>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x90 [ ] [<ffffffff8162e80c>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3c/0x3a0 [ ] [<ffffffff816106dd>] fanout_release+0x1d/0xe0 [ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0 3. calling dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook), from inside spin_lock(&po->bind_lock) or rcu_read-side critical-section. dev_remove_pack() -> synchronize_net(), which might sleep. [ ] BUG: scheduling while atomic: ovs-vswitchd/1969/0x00000002 [ ] INFO: lockdep is turned off. [ ] Call Trace: [ ] [<ffffffff813770c1>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [ ] [<ffffffff81186274>] __schedule_bug+0x64/0x73 [ ] [<ffffffff8162b8cb>] __schedule+0x6b/0xd10 [ ] [<ffffffff8162c5db>] schedule+0x6b/0x80 [ ] [<ffffffff81630b1d>] schedule_timeout+0x38d/0x410 [ ] [<ffffffff810ea3fd>] synchronize_sched_expedited+0x53d/0x810 [ ] [<ffffffff810ea6de>] synchronize_rcu_expedited+0xe/0x10 [ ] [<ffffffff8154eab5>] synchronize_net+0x35/0x50 [ ] [<ffffffff8154eae3>] dev_remove_pack+0x13/0x20 [ ] [<ffffffff8161077e>] fanout_release+0xbe/0xe0 [ ] [<ffffffff81614459>] packet_notifier+0x2f9/0x3f0 4. fanout_release() races with calls from different CPU. To fix the above problems, remove the call to fanout_release() under rcu_read_lock(). Instead, call __dev_remove_pack(&fanout->prot_hook) and netdev_run_todo will be happy that &dev->ptype_specific list is empty. In order to achieve this, I moved dev_{add,remove}_pack() out of fanout_{add,release} to __fanout_{link,unlink}. So, call to {,__}unregister_prot_hook() will make sure fanout->prot_hook is removed as well. [js] no rollover in 3.12 Fixes: 6664498280cf ("packet: call fanout_release, while UNREGISTERING a netdev") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Anoob Soman <anoob.soman@citrix.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit e7ee2c089e94067d68475990bdeed211c8852917 upstream. The crash happens rather often when we reset some cluster nodes while nodes contend fiercely to do truncate and append. The crash backtrace is below: dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover_grant 1 locks on 971 resources dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover 9 generation 5 done: 4 ms ocfs2: Begin replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18) ocfs2: End replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18) ocfs2: Beginning quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2 ocfs2: Finishing quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2 (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: bug expression: le64_to_cpu(fe->i_size) != i_size_read(inode) (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: Inode 290321, inode i_size = 732 != di i_size = 937, i_flags = 0x1 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux/fs/ocfs2/file.c:470! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ocfs2_stack_user(OEN) ocfs2(OEN) ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue(OEN) quota_tree dlm(OEN) configfs fuse sd_mod iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs softdog xfs libcrc32c ppdev parport_pc pcspkr parport joydev virtio_balloon virtio_net i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq button processor ext4 crc16 jbd2 mbcache ata_generic cirrus virtio_blk ata_piix drm_kms_helper ahci syscopyarea libahci sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm floppy libata drm virtio_pci virtio_ring uhci_hcd virtio ehci_hcd usbcore serio_raw usb_common sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4 Supported: No, Unsupported modules are loaded CPU: 1 PID: 30154 Comm: truncate Tainted: G OE N 4.4.21-69-default #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20151112_172657-sheep25 04/01/2014 task: ffff88004ff6d240 ti: ffff880074e68000 task.ti: ffff880074e68000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05c8c30>] [<ffffffffa05c8c30>] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2] RSP: 0018:ffff880074e6bd50 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000074 RBX: 000000000000029e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff880074e6bda8 R08: 000000003675dc7a R09: ffffffff82013414 R10: 0000000000034c50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003aab3448 R13: 00000000000002dc R14: 0000000000046e11 R15: 0000000000000020 FS: 00007f839f965700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00007f839f97e000 CR3: 0000000036723000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: ocfs2_setattr+0x698/0xa90 [ocfs2] notify_change+0x1ae/0x380 do_truncate+0x5e/0x90 do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.11+0x108/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6d Code: 24 28 ba d6 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 30 43 62 a0 8b 41 2c 89 44 24 08 48 8b 41 20 48 c7 c1 78 a3 62 a0 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 a0 97 f9 ff <0f> 0b 3d 00 fe ff ff 0f 84 ab fd ff ff 83 f8 fc 0f 84 a2 fd ff RIP [<ffffffffa05c8c30>] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2] It's because ocfs2_inode_lock() get us stale LVB in which the i_size is not equal to the disk i_size. We mistakenly trust the LVB because the underlaying fsdlm dlm_lock() doesn't set lkb_sbflags with DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID properly for us. But, why? The current code tries to downconvert lock without DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag to tell o2cb don't update RSB's LVB if it's a PR->NULL conversion, even if the lock resource type needs LVB. This is not the right way for fsdlm. The fsdlm plugin behaves different on DLM_LKF_VALBLK, it depends on DLM_LKF_VALBLK to decide if we care about the LVB in the LKB. If DLM_LKF_VALBLK is not set, fsdlm will skip recovering RSB's LVB from this lkb and set the right DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID appropriately when node failure happens. The following diagram briefly illustrates how this crash happens: RSB1 is inode metadata lock resource with LOCK_TYPE_USES_LVB; The 1st round: Node1 Node2 RSB1: PR RSB1(master): NULL->EX ocfs2_downconvert_lock(PR->NULL, set_lvb==0) ocfs2_dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK) convert_lock(overwrite lkb->lkb_exflags with no DLM_LKF_VALBLK) RSB1: NULL RSB1: EX reset Node2 dlm_recover_rsbs() recover_lvb() /* The LVB is not trustable if the node with EX fails and * no lock >= PR is left. We should set RSB_VALNOTVALID for RSB1. */ if(!(kb_exflags & DLM_LKF_VALBLK)) /* This means we miss the chance to return; * to invalid the LVB here. */ The 2nd round: Node 1 Node2 RSB1(become master from recovery) ocfs2_setattr() ocfs2_inode_lock(NULL->EX) /* dlm_lock() return the stale lvb without setting DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID */ ocfs2_meta_lvb_is_trustable() return 1 /* so we don't refresh inode from disk */ ocfs2_truncate_file() mlog_bug_on_msg(disk isize != i_size_read(inode)) /* crash! */ The fix is quite straightforward. We keep to set DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag for dlm_lock() if the lock resource type needs LVB and the fsdlm plugin is uesed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481275846-6604-1-git-send-email-zren@suse.com Signed-off-by: Eric Ren <zren@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 3d46a44 upstream. PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Orabug: 20189959 Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b6b1b81b3afba922505b57f4c812bba022f7c4a9 upstream. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727 The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08 IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc] CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011 task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>] [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08 RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0 R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830 FS: 00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c 0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80 [<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190 [<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530 [<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300 [<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130 [<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit d5afb6f9b6bb2c57bd0c05e76e12489dc0d037d9 upstream. The code where sk_clone() came from created a new socket and locked it, but then, on the error path didn't unlock it. This problem stayed there for a long while, till b0691c8 ("net: Unlock sock before calling sk_free()") fixed it, but unfortunately the callers of sk_clone() (now sk_clone_locked()) were not audited and the one in dccp_create_openreq_child() remained. Now in the age of the syskaller fuzzer, this was finally uncovered, as reported by Dmitry: ---- 8< ---- I've got the following report while running syzkaller fuzzer on 86292b33d4b7 ("Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)") [ BUG: held lock freed! ] 4.10.0+ #234 Not tainted ------------------------- syz-executor6/6898 is freeing memory ffff88006286cac0-ffff88006286d3b7, with a lock still held there! (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504 5 locks held by syz-executor6/6898: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] inet_stream_connect+0x44/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:681 #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83bc1c2a>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x12a/0x5d0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:126 #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1767 [inline] #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1783 [inline] #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] process_backlog+0x264/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4835 #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83aeb5c0>] ip6_input_finish+0x0/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:59 #4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504 Fix it just like was done by b0691c8 ("net: Unlock sock before calling sk_free()"). Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170301153510.GE15145@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 6207119444595d287b1e9e83a2066c17209698f3 upstream. With this reproducer: struct sockaddr_alg alg = { .salg_family = 0x26, .salg_type = "hash", .salg_feat = 0xf, .salg_mask = 0x5, .salg_name = "digest_null", }; int sock, sock2; sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&alg, sizeof(alg)); sock2 = accept(sock, NULL, NULL); setsockopt(sock, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, "\x9b\xca", 2); accept(sock2, NULL, NULL); ==== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ==== one can immediatelly see an UBSAN warning: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/algif_hash.c:187:7 variable length array bound value 0 <= 0 CPU: 0 PID: 15949 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G E 4.4.30-0-default #1 ... Call Trace: ... [<ffffffff81d598fd>] ? __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive+0x13d/0x188 [<ffffffff81d597c0>] ? __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x1bc/0x1bc [<ffffffffa0e2204d>] ? hash_accept+0x5bd/0x7d0 [algif_hash] [<ffffffffa0e2293f>] ? hash_accept_nokey+0x3f/0x51 [algif_hash] [<ffffffffa0e206b0>] ? hash_accept_parent_nokey+0x4a0/0x4a0 [algif_hash] [<ffffffff8235c42b>] ? SyS_accept+0x2b/0x40 It is a correct warning, as hash state is propagated to accept as zero, but creating a zero-length variable array is not allowed in C. Fix this as proposed by Herbert -- do "?: 1" on that site. No sizeof or similar happens in the code there, so we just allocate one byte even though we do not use the array. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> (maintainer:CRYPTO API) Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 723b929ca0f79c0796f160c2eeda4597ee98d2b8 upstream. Andrey Konovalov reported a BUG caused by the ip6mr code which is caused because we call unregister_netdevice_many for a device that is already being destroyed. In IPv4's ipmr that has been resolved by two commits long time ago by introducing the "notify" parameter to the delete function and avoiding the unregister when called from a notifier, so let's do the same for ip6mr. The trace from Andrey: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6813! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1165 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc7+ #251 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net task: ffff880069208000 task.stack: ffff8800692d8000 RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6813 RSP: 0018:ffff8800692de7f0 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: ffff880069208000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88006af90569 RBP: ffff8800692de9f0 R08: ffff8800692dec60 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88006af90070 R13: ffff8800692debf0 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88006af90000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006cb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe7e897d870 CR3: 00000000657e7000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881 unregister_netdevice_many+0xc8/0x120 net/core/dev.c:7880 ip6mr_device_event+0x362/0x3f0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1346 notifier_call_chain+0x145/0x2f0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x51/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1647 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1663 rollback_registered_many+0x919/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6841 unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:7880 default_device_exit_batch+0x4fa/0x640 net/core/dev.c:8333 ops_exit_list.isra.4+0x100/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:144 cleanup_net+0x5a8/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:463 process_one_work+0xc04/0x1c10 kernel/workqueue.c:2097 worker_thread+0x223/0x19c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2231 kthread+0x35e/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:231 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:430 Code: 3c 32 00 0f 85 70 0b 00 00 48 b8 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 49 89 47 78 e9 93 fe ff ff 49 8d 57 70 49 8d 5f 78 eb 9e e8 88 7a 14 fe <0f> 0b 48 8b 9d 28 fe ff ff e8 7a 7a 14 fe 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 RIP: rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 RSP: ffff8800692de7f0 ---[ end trace e0b29c57e9b3292c ]--- Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit fc98c3c8c9dcafd67adcce69e6ce3191d5306c9c upstream. Use rcuidle console tracepoint because, apparently, it may be issued from an idle CPU: hw-breakpoint: Failed to enable monitor mode on CPU 0. hw-breakpoint: CPU 0 failed to disable vector catch =============================== [ ERR: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0-rc8-next-20170215+ #119 Not tainted ------------------------------- ./include/trace/events/printk.h:32 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from idle CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! 2 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: (cpu_pm_notifier_lock){......}, at: [<c0237e2c>] cpu_pm_exit+0x10/0x54 #1: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c01ab350>] vprintk_emit+0x264/0x474 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc8-next-20170215+ #119 Hardware name: Generic OMAP4 (Flattened Device Tree) console_unlock vprintk_emit vprintk_default printk reset_ctrl_regs dbg_cpu_pm_notify notifier_call_chain cpu_pm_exit omap_enter_idle_coupled cpuidle_enter_state cpuidle_enter_state_coupled do_idle cpu_startup_entry start_kernel This RCU warning, however, is suppressed by lockdep_off() in printk(). lockdep_off() increments the ->lockdep_recursion counter and thus disables RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() and debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled(), which want lockdep to be enabled "current->lockdep_recursion == 0". Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170217015932.11898-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reported-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [wt: changes are in kernel/printk.c in 3.10] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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"err" needs to be left set to -EFAULT if split_huge_page succeeds. Otherwise if "err" gets clobbered with zero and write_protect_page fails, try_to_merge_one_page() will succeed instead of returning -EFAULT and then try_to_merge_with_ksm_page() will continue thinking kpage is a PageKsm when in fact it's still an anonymous page. Eventually it'll crash in page_add_anon_rmap. This has been reproduced on Fedora25 kernel but I can reproduce with upstream too. The bug was introduced in commit f765f540598a ("ksm: prepare to new THP semantics") introduced in v4.5. page:fffff67546ce1cc0 count:4 mapcount:2 mapping:ffffa094551e36e1 index:0x7f0f46673 flags: 0x2ffffc0004007c(referenced|uptodate|dirty|lru|active|swapbacked) page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page)) page->mem_cgroup:ffffa09674bf0000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1222! CPU: 1 PID: 76 Comm: ksmd Not tainted 4.9.3-200.fc25.x86_64 #1 RIP: do_page_add_anon_rmap+0x1c4/0x240 Call Trace: page_add_anon_rmap+0x18/0x20 try_to_merge_with_ksm_page+0x50b/0x780 ksm_scan_thread+0x1211/0x1410 ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x100/0x100 ? try_to_merge_with_ksm_page+0x780/0x780 kthread+0xd9/0xf0 ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 Fixes: f765f54059 ("ksm: prepare to new THP semantics") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170513131040.21732-1-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Reported-by: Federico Simoncelli <fsimonce@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Jul 7, 2017
commit e7ee2c089e94067d68475990bdeed211c8852917 upstream. The crash happens rather often when we reset some cluster nodes while nodes contend fiercely to do truncate and append. The crash backtrace is below: dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover_grant 1 locks on 971 resources dlm: C21CBDA5E0774F4BA5A9D4F317717495: dlm_recover 9 generation 5 done: 4 ms ocfs2: Begin replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18) ocfs2: End replay journal (node 318952601, slot 2) on device (253,18) ocfs2: Beginning quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2 ocfs2: Finishing quota recovery on device (253,18) for slot 2 (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: bug expression: le64_to_cpu(fe->i_size) != i_size_read(inode) (truncate,30154,1):ocfs2_truncate_file:470 ERROR: Inode 290321, inode i_size = 732 != di i_size = 937, i_flags = 0x1 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at /usr/src/linux/fs/ocfs2/file.c:470! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: ocfs2_stack_user(OEN) ocfs2(OEN) ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue(OEN) quota_tree dlm(OEN) configfs fuse sd_mod iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet iscsi_ibft iscsi_boot_sysfs softdog xfs libcrc32c ppdev parport_pc pcspkr parport joydev virtio_balloon virtio_net i2c_piix4 acpi_cpufreq button processor ext4 crc16 jbd2 mbcache ata_generic cirrus virtio_blk ata_piix drm_kms_helper ahci syscopyarea libahci sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm floppy libata drm virtio_pci virtio_ring uhci_hcd virtio ehci_hcd usbcore serio_raw usb_common sg dm_multipath dm_mod scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua scsi_mod autofs4 Supported: No, Unsupported modules are loaded CPU: 1 PID: 30154 Comm: truncate Tainted: G OE N 4.4.21-69-default #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.1-0-g4adadbd-20151112_172657-sheep25 04/01/2014 task: ffff88004ff6d240 ti: ffff880074e68000 task.ti: ffff880074e68000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa05c8c30>] [<ffffffffa05c8c30>] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2] RSP: 0018:ffff880074e6bd50 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000074 RBX: 000000000000029e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff880074e6bda8 R08: 000000003675dc7a R09: ffffffff82013414 R10: 0000000000034c50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88003aab3448 R13: 00000000000002dc R14: 0000000000046e11 R15: 0000000000000020 FS: 00007f839f965700(0000) GS:ffff88007fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00007f839f97e000 CR3: 0000000036723000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: ocfs2_setattr+0x698/0xa90 [ocfs2] notify_change+0x1ae/0x380 do_truncate+0x5e/0x90 do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.11+0x108/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6d Code: 24 28 ba d6 01 00 00 48 c7 c6 30 43 62 a0 8b 41 2c 89 44 24 08 48 8b 41 20 48 c7 c1 78 a3 62 a0 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 a0 97 f9 ff <0f> 0b 3d 00 fe ff ff 0f 84 ab fd ff ff 83 f8 fc 0f 84 a2 fd ff RIP [<ffffffffa05c8c30>] ocfs2_truncate_file+0x640/0x6c0 [ocfs2] It's because ocfs2_inode_lock() get us stale LVB in which the i_size is not equal to the disk i_size. We mistakenly trust the LVB because the underlaying fsdlm dlm_lock() doesn't set lkb_sbflags with DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID properly for us. But, why? The current code tries to downconvert lock without DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag to tell o2cb don't update RSB's LVB if it's a PR->NULL conversion, even if the lock resource type needs LVB. This is not the right way for fsdlm. The fsdlm plugin behaves different on DLM_LKF_VALBLK, it depends on DLM_LKF_VALBLK to decide if we care about the LVB in the LKB. If DLM_LKF_VALBLK is not set, fsdlm will skip recovering RSB's LVB from this lkb and set the right DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID appropriately when node failure happens. The following diagram briefly illustrates how this crash happens: RSB1 is inode metadata lock resource with LOCK_TYPE_USES_LVB; The 1st round: Node1 Node2 RSB1: PR RSB1(master): NULL->EX ocfs2_downconvert_lock(PR->NULL, set_lvb==0) ocfs2_dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - dlm_lock(no DLM_LKF_VALBLK) convert_lock(overwrite lkb->lkb_exflags with no DLM_LKF_VALBLK) RSB1: NULL RSB1: EX reset Node2 dlm_recover_rsbs() recover_lvb() /* The LVB is not trustable if the node with EX fails and * no lock >= PR is left. We should set RSB_VALNOTVALID for RSB1. */ if(!(kb_exflags & DLM_LKF_VALBLK)) /* This means we miss the chance to return; * to invalid the LVB here. */ The 2nd round: Node 1 Node2 RSB1(become master from recovery) ocfs2_setattr() ocfs2_inode_lock(NULL->EX) /* dlm_lock() return the stale lvb without setting DLM_SBF_VALNOTVALID */ ocfs2_meta_lvb_is_trustable() return 1 /* so we don't refresh inode from disk */ ocfs2_truncate_file() mlog_bug_on_msg(disk isize != i_size_read(inode)) /* crash! */ The fix is quite straightforward. We keep to set DLM_LKF_VALBLK flag for dlm_lock() if the lock resource type needs LVB and the fsdlm plugin is uesed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481275846-6604-1-git-send-email-zren@suse.com Signed-off-by: Eric Ren <zren@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 3d46a44 upstream. PID: 614 TASK: ffff882a739da580 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "ocfs2dc" #0 [ffff882ecc3759b0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103b35d #1 [ffff882ecc375a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b95b5 #2 [ffff882ecc375af0] oops_end at ffffffff815091d8 #3 [ffff882ecc375b20] die at ffffffff8101868b #4 [ffff882ecc375b50] do_trap at ffffffff81508bb0 #5 [ffff882ecc375ba0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff810165e5 #6 [ffff882ecc375c40] invalid_op at ffffffff815116fb [exception RIP: ocfs2_ci_checkpointed+208] RIP: ffffffffa0a7e940 RSP: ffff882ecc375cf0 RFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 000000000000654b RCX: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDX: 00000000000017d9 RSI: ffff8812dc83f1f8 RDI: ffffffffa0b2c318 RBP: ffff882ecc375d20 R8: ffff882ef6ecfa60 R9: ffff88301f272200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffff8812dc83f4f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8812dc83f1f8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffff882ecc375d28] ocfs2_check_meta_downconvert at ffffffffa0a7edbd [ocfs2] #8 [ffff882ecc375d38] ocfs2_unblock_lock at ffffffffa0a84af8 [ocfs2] #9 [ffff882ecc375dc8] ocfs2_process_blocked_lock at ffffffffa0a85285 [ocfs2] assert is tripped because the tran is not checkpointed and the lock level is PR. Some time ago, chmod command had been executed. As result, the following call chain left the inode cluster lock in PR state, latter on causing the assert. system_call_fastpath -> my_chmod -> sys_chmod -> sys_fchmodat -> notify_change -> ocfs2_setattr -> posix_acl_chmod -> ocfs2_iop_set_acl -> ocfs2_set_acl -> ocfs2_acl_set_mode Here is how. 1119 int ocfs2_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) 1120 { 1247 ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1); <<< WRONG thing to do. .. 1258 if (!status && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) { 1259 status = posix_acl_chmod(inode, inode->i_mode); 519 posix_acl_chmod(struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) 520 { .. 539 ret = inode->i_op->set_acl(inode, acl, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); 287 int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, ... 288 { 289 return ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, NULL, type, acl, NULL, NULL); 224 int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle, 225 struct inode *inode, ... 231 { .. 252 ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh, 253 handle, mode); 168 static int ocfs2_acl_set_mode(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head ... 170 { 183 if (handle == NULL) { >>> BUG: inode lock not held in ex at this point <<< 184 handle = ocfs2_start_trans(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), 185 OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS); ocfs2_setattr.#1247 we unlock and at #1259 call posix_acl_chmod. When we reach ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#181 and do trans, the inode cluster lock is not held in EX mode (it should be). How this could have happended? We are the lock master, were holding lock EX and have released it in ocfs2_setattr.#1247. Note that there are no holders of this lock at this point. Another node needs the lock in PR, and we downconvert from EX to PR. So the inode lock is PR when do the trans in ocfs2_acl_set_mode.#184. The trans stays in core (not flushed to disc). Now another node want the lock in EX, downconvert thread gets kicked (the one that tripped assert abovt), finds an unflushed trans but the lock is not EX (it is PR). If the lock was at EX, it would have flushed the trans ocfs2_ci_checkpointed -> ocfs2_start_checkpoint before downconverting (to NULL) for the request. ocfs2_setattr must not drop inode lock ex in this code path. If it does, takes it again before the trans, say in ocfs2_set_acl, another cluster node can get in between, execute another setattr, overwriting the one in progress on this node, resulting in a mode acl size combo that is a mix of the two. Orabug: 20189959 Signed-off-by: Tariq Saeed <tariq.x.saeed@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit b6b1b81b3afba922505b57f4c812bba022f7c4a9 upstream. BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1268727 The task field in the lsm_audit struct needs to be initialized if a change_hat fails, otherwise the following oops will occur BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000002fbead7d08 IP: [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 PGD 1e3f35067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: pppox crc_ccitt p8023 p8022 psnap llc ax25 btrfs raid6_pq xor xfs libcrc32c dm_multipath scsi_dh kvm_amd dcdbas kvm microcode amd64_edac_mod joydev edac_core psmouse edac_mce_amd serio_raw k10temp sp5100_tco i2c_piix4 ipmi_si ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter mac_hid lp parport hid_generic usbhid hid pata_acpi mpt2sas ahci raid_class pata_atiixp bnx2 libahci scsi_transport_sas [last unloaded: tipc] CPU: 2 PID: 699 Comm: changehat_twice Tainted: GF O 3.13.0-7-generic #25-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R415/08WNM9, BIOS 1.8.6 12/06/2011 task: ffff8802135c6000 ti: ffff880212986000 task.ti: ffff880212986000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8171153e>] [<ffffffff8171153e>] _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff880212987b68 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: 0000000000020000 RBX: 0000002fbead7500 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000292 RSI: ffff880212987ba8 RDI: 0000002fbead7d08 RBP: ffff880212987b68 R08: 0000000000000246 R09: ffff880216e572a0 R10: ffffffff815fd677 R11: ffffea0008469580 R12: ffffffff8130966f R13: ffff880212987ba8 R14: 0000002fbead7d08 R15: ffff8800d8c6b830 FS: 00002b5e6c84e7c0(0000) GS:ffff880216e40000(0000) knlGS:0000000055731700 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000002fbead7d08 CR3: 000000021270f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Stack: ffff880212987b98 ffffffff81075f17 ffffffff8130966f 0000000000000009 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff880212987bd0 ffffffff81075f7c 0000000000000292 ffff880212987c08 ffff8800d8c6b800 0000000000000026 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81075f17>] __lock_task_sighand+0x47/0x80 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81075f7c>] do_send_sig_info+0x2c/0x80 [<ffffffff81075fee>] send_sig_info+0x1e/0x30 [<ffffffff8130242d>] aa_audit+0x13d/0x190 [<ffffffff8130c1dc>] aa_audit_file+0xbc/0x130 [<ffffffff8130966f>] ? apparmor_cred_prepare+0x2f/0x50 [<ffffffff81304cc2>] aa_change_hat+0x202/0x530 [<ffffffff81308fc6>] aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x116/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8130a11d>] apparmor_setprocattr+0x25d/0x300 [<ffffffff812cee56>] security_setprocattr+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8121fc87>] proc_pid_attr_write+0x107/0x130 [<ffffffff811b7604>] vfs_write+0xb4/0x1f0 [<ffffffff811b8039>] SyS_write+0x49/0xa0 [<ffffffff8171a1bf>] tracesys+0xe1/0xe6 Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit d5afb6f9b6bb2c57bd0c05e76e12489dc0d037d9 upstream. The code where sk_clone() came from created a new socket and locked it, but then, on the error path didn't unlock it. This problem stayed there for a long while, till b0691c8 ("net: Unlock sock before calling sk_free()") fixed it, but unfortunately the callers of sk_clone() (now sk_clone_locked()) were not audited and the one in dccp_create_openreq_child() remained. Now in the age of the syskaller fuzzer, this was finally uncovered, as reported by Dmitry: ---- 8< ---- I've got the following report while running syzkaller fuzzer on 86292b33d4b7 ("Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)") [ BUG: held lock freed! ] 4.10.0+ #234 Not tainted ------------------------- syz-executor6/6898 is freeing memory ffff88006286cac0-ffff88006286d3b7, with a lock still held there! (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504 5 locks held by syz-executor6/6898: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] inet_stream_connect+0x44/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:681 #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83bc1c2a>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x12a/0x5d0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:126 #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1767 [inline] #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1783 [inline] #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] process_backlog+0x264/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4835 #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83aeb5c0>] ip6_input_finish+0x0/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:59 #4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504 Fix it just like was done by b0691c8 ("net: Unlock sock before calling sk_free()"). Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170301153510.GE15145@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 6207119444595d287b1e9e83a2066c17209698f3 upstream. With this reproducer: struct sockaddr_alg alg = { .salg_family = 0x26, .salg_type = "hash", .salg_feat = 0xf, .salg_mask = 0x5, .salg_name = "digest_null", }; int sock, sock2; sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&alg, sizeof(alg)); sock2 = accept(sock, NULL, NULL); setsockopt(sock, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, "\x9b\xca", 2); accept(sock2, NULL, NULL); ==== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ======== 8< ==== one can immediatelly see an UBSAN warning: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in crypto/algif_hash.c:187:7 variable length array bound value 0 <= 0 CPU: 0 PID: 15949 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G E 4.4.30-0-default #1 ... Call Trace: ... [<ffffffff81d598fd>] ? __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive+0x13d/0x188 [<ffffffff81d597c0>] ? __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x1bc/0x1bc [<ffffffffa0e2204d>] ? hash_accept+0x5bd/0x7d0 [algif_hash] [<ffffffffa0e2293f>] ? hash_accept_nokey+0x3f/0x51 [algif_hash] [<ffffffffa0e206b0>] ? hash_accept_parent_nokey+0x4a0/0x4a0 [algif_hash] [<ffffffff8235c42b>] ? SyS_accept+0x2b/0x40 It is a correct warning, as hash state is propagated to accept as zero, but creating a zero-length variable array is not allowed in C. Fix this as proposed by Herbert -- do "?: 1" on that site. No sizeof or similar happens in the code there, so we just allocate one byte even though we do not use the array. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> (maintainer:CRYPTO API) Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit 723b929ca0f79c0796f160c2eeda4597ee98d2b8 upstream. Andrey Konovalov reported a BUG caused by the ip6mr code which is caused because we call unregister_netdevice_many for a device that is already being destroyed. In IPv4's ipmr that has been resolved by two commits long time ago by introducing the "notify" parameter to the delete function and avoiding the unregister when called from a notifier, so let's do the same for ip6mr. The trace from Andrey: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6813! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1165 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 4.11.0-rc7+ #251 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net task: ffff880069208000 task.stack: ffff8800692d8000 RIP: 0010:rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6813 RSP: 0018:ffff8800692de7f0 EFLAGS: 00010297 RAX: ffff880069208000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88006af90569 RBP: ffff8800692de9f0 R08: ffff8800692dec60 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88006af90070 R13: ffff8800692debf0 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88006af90000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006cb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fe7e897d870 CR3: 00000000657e7000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881 unregister_netdevice_many+0xc8/0x120 net/core/dev.c:7880 ip6mr_device_event+0x362/0x3f0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1346 notifier_call_chain+0x145/0x2f0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x51/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1647 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1663 rollback_registered_many+0x919/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:6841 unregister_netdevice_many.part.105+0x87/0x440 net/core/dev.c:7881 unregister_netdevice_many net/core/dev.c:7880 default_device_exit_batch+0x4fa/0x640 net/core/dev.c:8333 ops_exit_list.isra.4+0x100/0x150 net/core/net_namespace.c:144 cleanup_net+0x5a8/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:463 process_one_work+0xc04/0x1c10 kernel/workqueue.c:2097 worker_thread+0x223/0x19c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2231 kthread+0x35e/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:231 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:430 Code: 3c 32 00 0f 85 70 0b 00 00 48 b8 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de 49 89 47 78 e9 93 fe ff ff 49 8d 57 70 49 8d 5f 78 eb 9e e8 88 7a 14 fe <0f> 0b 48 8b 9d 28 fe ff ff e8 7a 7a 14 fe 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 RIP: rollback_registered_many+0x348/0xeb0 RSP: ffff8800692de7f0 ---[ end trace e0b29c57e9b3292c ]--- Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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commit fc98c3c8c9dcafd67adcce69e6ce3191d5306c9c upstream. Use rcuidle console tracepoint because, apparently, it may be issued from an idle CPU: hw-breakpoint: Failed to enable monitor mode on CPU 0. hw-breakpoint: CPU 0 failed to disable vector catch =============================== [ ERR: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0-rc8-next-20170215+ #119 Not tainted ------------------------------- ./include/trace/events/printk.h:32 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: RCU used illegally from idle CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 RCU used illegally from extended quiescent state! 2 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: (cpu_pm_notifier_lock){......}, at: [<c0237e2c>] cpu_pm_exit+0x10/0x54 #1: (console_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<c01ab350>] vprintk_emit+0x264/0x474 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc8-next-20170215+ #119 Hardware name: Generic OMAP4 (Flattened Device Tree) console_unlock vprintk_emit vprintk_default printk reset_ctrl_regs dbg_cpu_pm_notify notifier_call_chain cpu_pm_exit omap_enter_idle_coupled cpuidle_enter_state cpuidle_enter_state_coupled do_idle cpu_startup_entry start_kernel This RCU warning, however, is suppressed by lockdep_off() in printk(). lockdep_off() increments the ->lockdep_recursion counter and thus disables RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() and debug_lockdep_rcu_enabled(), which want lockdep to be enabled "current->lockdep_recursion == 0". Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170217015932.11898-1-sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reported-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [wt: changes are in kernel/printk.c in 3.10] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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"err" needs to be left set to -EFAULT if split_huge_page succeeds. Otherwise if "err" gets clobbered with zero and write_protect_page fails, try_to_merge_one_page() will succeed instead of returning -EFAULT and then try_to_merge_with_ksm_page() will continue thinking kpage is a PageKsm when in fact it's still an anonymous page. Eventually it'll crash in page_add_anon_rmap. This has been reproduced on Fedora25 kernel but I can reproduce with upstream too. The bug was introduced in commit f765f540598a ("ksm: prepare to new THP semantics") introduced in v4.5. page:fffff67546ce1cc0 count:4 mapcount:2 mapping:ffffa094551e36e1 index:0x7f0f46673 flags: 0x2ffffc0004007c(referenced|uptodate|dirty|lru|active|swapbacked) page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page)) page->mem_cgroup:ffffa09674bf0000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1222! CPU: 1 PID: 76 Comm: ksmd Not tainted 4.9.3-200.fc25.x86_64 #1 RIP: do_page_add_anon_rmap+0x1c4/0x240 Call Trace: page_add_anon_rmap+0x18/0x20 try_to_merge_with_ksm_page+0x50b/0x780 ksm_scan_thread+0x1211/0x1410 ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x100/0x100 ? try_to_merge_with_ksm_page+0x780/0x780 kthread+0xd9/0xf0 ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 Fixes: f765f54059 ("ksm: prepare to new THP semantics") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170513131040.21732-1-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Reported-by: Federico Simoncelli <fsimonce@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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"err" needs to be left set to -EFAULT if split_huge_page succeeds. Otherwise if "err" gets clobbered with zero and write_protect_page fails, try_to_merge_one_page() will succeed instead of returning -EFAULT and then try_to_merge_with_ksm_page() will continue thinking kpage is a PageKsm when in fact it's still an anonymous page. Eventually it'll crash in page_add_anon_rmap. This has been reproduced on Fedora25 kernel but I can reproduce with upstream too. The bug was introduced in commit f765f540598a ("ksm: prepare to new THP semantics") introduced in v4.5. page:fffff67546ce1cc0 count:4 mapcount:2 mapping:ffffa094551e36e1 index:0x7f0f46673 flags: 0x2ffffc0004007c(referenced|uptodate|dirty|lru|active|swapbacked) page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page)) page->mem_cgroup:ffffa09674bf0000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1222! CPU: 1 PID: 76 Comm: ksmd Not tainted 4.9.3-200.fc25.x86_64 #1 RIP: do_page_add_anon_rmap+0x1c4/0x240 Call Trace: page_add_anon_rmap+0x18/0x20 try_to_merge_with_ksm_page+0x50b/0x780 ksm_scan_thread+0x1211/0x1410 ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x100/0x100 ? try_to_merge_with_ksm_page+0x780/0x780 kthread+0xd9/0xf0 ? kthread_park+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 Fixes: f765f54059 ("ksm: prepare to new THP semantics") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170513131040.21732-1-aarcange@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Reported-by: Federico Simoncelli <fsimonce@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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generic/361 reports below warning, this is because: once, there is someone entering into critical region of sbi.cp_lock, if write_end_io. f2fs_stop_checkpoint is invoked from an triggered IRQ, we will encounter deadlock. So this patch changes to use spin_{,un}lock_irq{save,restore} to create critical region without IRQ enabled to avoid potential deadlock. irq event stamp: 83391573 loop: Write error at byte offset 438729728, length 1024. hardirqs last enabled at (83391573): [<c1809752>] restore_all+0xf/0x65 hardirqs last disabled at (83391572): [<c1809eac>] reschedule_interrupt+0x30/0x3c loop: Write error at byte offset 438860288, length 1536. softirqs last enabled at (83389244): [<c180cc4e>] __do_softirq+0x1ae/0x476 softirqs last disabled at (83389237): [<c101ca7c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2c/0x40 loop: Write error at byte offset 438990848, length 2048. ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 4.12.0-rc2+ #30 Tainted: G O -------------------------------- inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage. xfs_io/7959 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: (&(&sbi->cp_lock)->rlock){?.+...}, at: [<f96f96cc>] f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] {HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: __lock_acquire+0x527/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 _raw_spin_lock+0x42/0x50 do_checkpoint+0x165/0x9e0 [f2fs] write_checkpoint+0x33f/0x740 [f2fs] __f2fs_sync_fs+0x92/0x1f0 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x12/0x20 [f2fs] sync_filesystem+0x67/0x80 generic_shutdown_super+0x27/0x100 kill_block_super+0x22/0x50 kill_f2fs_super+0x3a/0x40 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 task_work_run+0x69/0x80 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x57/0x85 do_fast_syscall_32+0x18c/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b irq event stamp: 1957420 hardirqs last enabled at (1957419): [<c1808f37>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50 hardirqs last disabled at (1957420): [<c1809f9c>] call_function_single_interrupt+0x30/0x3c softirqs last enabled at (1953784): [<c180cc4e>] __do_softirq+0x1ae/0x476 softirqs last disabled at (1953773): [<c101ca7c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2c/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&sbi->cp_lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&sbi->cp_lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by xfs_io/7959: #0: (sb_writers#13){.+.+.+}, at: [<c11fd7ca>] vfs_write+0x16a/0x190 #1: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16){+.+.+.}, at: [<f96e33f5>] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x25/0x140 [f2fs] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 7959 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G O 4.12.0-rc2+ #30 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5f/0x92 print_usage_bug+0x1d3/0x1dd ? check_usage_backwards+0xe0/0xe0 mark_lock+0x23d/0x280 __lock_acquire+0x699/0x7b0 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20 ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x91/0xe0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 ? f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] _raw_spin_lock+0x42/0x50 ? f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] f2fs_write_end_io+0x147/0x150 [f2fs] bio_endio+0x7a/0x1e0 blk_update_request+0xad/0x410 blk_mq_end_request+0x16/0x60 lo_complete_rq+0x3c/0x70 __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x11/0x20 flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x6d/0x120 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x12/0x20 generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x12/0x30 smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x25/0x40 call_function_single_interrupt+0x37/0x3c EIP: _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2d/0x50 EFLAGS: 00000296 CPU: 2 EAX: 00000001 EBX: d2ccc51c ECX: 00000001 EDX: c1aacebd ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: c96c9d1c ESP: c96c9d18 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 ? inherit_task_group.isra.98.part.99+0x6b/0xb0 __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x1d4/0x290 add_to_page_cache_lru+0x38/0xb0 pagecache_get_page+0x8e/0x200 f2fs_write_begin+0x96/0xf00 [f2fs] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xdd/0x1c0 ? current_time+0x17/0x50 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0x10 generic_perform_write+0xa9/0x170 __generic_file_write_iter+0x1a2/0x1f0 ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x137/0x160 [f2fs] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x6e/0x140 [f2fs] ? __lock_acquire+0x429/0x7b0 __vfs_write+0xc1/0x140 vfs_write+0x9b/0x190 SyS_pwrite64+0x63/0xa0 do_fast_syscall_32+0xa1/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b EIP: 0xb7786c61 EFLAGS: 00000293 CPU: 2 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 00000003 ECX: 08416000 EDX: 00001000 ESI: 18b24000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000003 ESP: bf9b36b0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b Fixes: aaec2b1d1879 ("f2fs: introduce cp_lock to protect updating of ckpt_flags") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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generic/361 reports below warning, this is because: once, there is someone entering into critical region of sbi.cp_lock, if write_end_io. f2fs_stop_checkpoint is invoked from an triggered IRQ, we will encounter deadlock. So this patch changes to use spin_{,un}lock_irq{save,restore} to create critical region without IRQ enabled to avoid potential deadlock. irq event stamp: 83391573 loop: Write error at byte offset 438729728, length 1024. hardirqs last enabled at (83391573): [<c1809752>] restore_all+0xf/0x65 hardirqs last disabled at (83391572): [<c1809eac>] reschedule_interrupt+0x30/0x3c loop: Write error at byte offset 438860288, length 1536. softirqs last enabled at (83389244): [<c180cc4e>] __do_softirq+0x1ae/0x476 softirqs last disabled at (83389237): [<c101ca7c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2c/0x40 loop: Write error at byte offset 438990848, length 2048. ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 4.12.0-rc2+ #30 Tainted: G O -------------------------------- inconsistent {HARDIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-HARDIRQ-W} usage. xfs_io/7959 [HC1[1]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: (&(&sbi->cp_lock)->rlock){?.+...}, at: [<f96f96cc>] f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] {HARDIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: __lock_acquire+0x527/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 _raw_spin_lock+0x42/0x50 do_checkpoint+0x165/0x9e0 [f2fs] write_checkpoint+0x33f/0x740 [f2fs] __f2fs_sync_fs+0x92/0x1f0 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x12/0x20 [f2fs] sync_filesystem+0x67/0x80 generic_shutdown_super+0x27/0x100 kill_block_super+0x22/0x50 kill_f2fs_super+0x3a/0x40 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 task_work_run+0x69/0x80 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x57/0x85 do_fast_syscall_32+0x18c/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b irq event stamp: 1957420 hardirqs last enabled at (1957419): [<c1808f37>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x50 hardirqs last disabled at (1957420): [<c1809f9c>] call_function_single_interrupt+0x30/0x3c softirqs last enabled at (1953784): [<c180cc4e>] __do_softirq+0x1ae/0x476 softirqs last disabled at (1953773): [<c101ca7c>] do_softirq_own_stack+0x2c/0x40 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&(&sbi->cp_lock)->rlock); <Interrupt> lock(&(&sbi->cp_lock)->rlock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by xfs_io/7959: #0: (sb_writers#13){.+.+.+}, at: [<c11fd7ca>] vfs_write+0x16a/0x190 #1: (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#16){+.+.+.}, at: [<f96e33f5>] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x25/0x140 [f2fs] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 7959 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G O 4.12.0-rc2+ #30 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5f/0x92 print_usage_bug+0x1d3/0x1dd ? check_usage_backwards+0xe0/0xe0 mark_lock+0x23d/0x280 __lock_acquire+0x699/0x7b0 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20 ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x91/0xe0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 ? f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] _raw_spin_lock+0x42/0x50 ? f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x1c/0x50 [f2fs] f2fs_write_end_io+0x147/0x150 [f2fs] bio_endio+0x7a/0x1e0 blk_update_request+0xad/0x410 blk_mq_end_request+0x16/0x60 lo_complete_rq+0x3c/0x70 __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x11/0x20 flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x6d/0x120 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x12/0x20 generic_smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x12/0x30 smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x25/0x40 call_function_single_interrupt+0x37/0x3c EIP: _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2d/0x50 EFLAGS: 00000296 CPU: 2 EAX: 00000001 EBX: d2ccc51c ECX: 00000001 EDX: c1aacebd ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: c96c9d1c ESP: c96c9d18 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 ? inherit_task_group.isra.98.part.99+0x6b/0xb0 __add_to_page_cache_locked+0x1d4/0x290 add_to_page_cache_lru+0x38/0xb0 pagecache_get_page+0x8e/0x200 f2fs_write_begin+0x96/0xf00 [f2fs] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xdd/0x1c0 ? current_time+0x17/0x50 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xb/0x10 generic_perform_write+0xa9/0x170 __generic_file_write_iter+0x1a2/0x1f0 ? f2fs_preallocate_blocks+0x137/0x160 [f2fs] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x6e/0x140 [f2fs] ? __lock_acquire+0x429/0x7b0 __vfs_write+0xc1/0x140 vfs_write+0x9b/0x190 SyS_pwrite64+0x63/0xa0 do_fast_syscall_32+0xa1/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b EIP: 0xb7786c61 EFLAGS: 00000293 CPU: 2 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 00000003 ECX: 08416000 EDX: 00001000 ESI: 18b24000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000003 ESP: bf9b36b0 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 007b Fixes: aaec2b1d1879 ("f2fs: introduce cp_lock to protect updating of ckpt_flags") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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When ->freeze_fs is called from lvm for doing snapshot, it needs to make sure there will be no more changes in filesystem's data, however, previously, background threads like GC thread wasn't aware of freezing, so in environment with active background threads, data of snapshot becomes unstable. This patch fixes this issue by adding sb_{start,end}_intwrite in below background threads: - GC thread - flush thread - discard thread Note that, don't use sb_start_intwrite() in gc_thread_func() due to: generic/241 reports below bug: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.13.0-rc1+ #32 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ f2fs_gc-250:0/22186 is trying to acquire lock: (&sbi->gc_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<f8fa7f0b>] f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] but task is already holding lock: (sb_internal#2){++++.-}, at: [<f8fb5609>] gc_thread_func+0x159/0x4a0 [f2fs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (sb_internal#2){++++.-}: __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 __sb_start_write+0x11d/0x1f0 f2fs_evict_inode+0x2d6/0x4e0 [f2fs] evict+0xa8/0x170 iput+0x1fb/0x2c0 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x3f/0xf0 [f2fs] write_checkpoint+0x1b1/0x750 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x85/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_do_sync_file.isra.24+0x137/0xa30 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_file+0x34/0x40 [f2fs] vfs_fsync_range+0x4a/0xa0 do_fsync+0x3c/0x60 SyS_fdatasync+0x15/0x20 do_fast_syscall_32+0xa1/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b -> #1 (&sbi->cp_mutex){+.+...}: __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x4f/0x830 mutex_lock_nested+0x25/0x30 write_checkpoint+0x2f/0x750 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x85/0x1b0 [f2fs] sync_filesystem+0x67/0x80 generic_shutdown_super+0x27/0x100 kill_block_super+0x22/0x50 kill_f2fs_super+0x3a/0x40 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 task_work_run+0x69/0x80 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x57/0x92 do_fast_syscall_32+0x18c/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b -> #0 (&sbi->gc_mutex){+.+...}: validate_chain.isra.36+0xc50/0xdb0 __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x4f/0x830 mutex_lock_nested+0x25/0x30 f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0xb9/0x200 [f2fs] gc_thread_func+0x302/0x4a0 [f2fs] kthread+0xe9/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &sbi->gc_mutex --> &sbi->cp_mutex --> sb_internal#2 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_internal#2); lock(&sbi->cp_mutex); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(&sbi->gc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by f2fs_gc-250:0/22186: #0: (sb_internal#2){++++.-}, at: [<f8fb5609>] gc_thread_func+0x159/0x4a0 [f2fs] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 22186 Comm: f2fs_gc-250:0 Tainted: G O 4.13.0-rc1+ #32 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5f/0x92 print_circular_bug+0x1b3/0x1bd validate_chain.isra.36+0xc50/0xdb0 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 ? f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] __mutex_lock+0x4f/0x830 ? f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] mutex_lock_nested+0x25/0x30 ? f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0xb9/0x200 [f2fs] gc_thread_func+0x302/0x4a0 [f2fs] ? preempt_schedule_common+0x2f/0x4d ? f2fs_gc+0x540/0x540 [f2fs] kthread+0xe9/0x120 ? f2fs_gc+0x540/0x540 [f2fs] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x30/0x30 ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24 The deadlock occurs in below condition: GC Thread Thread B - sb_start_intwrite - f2fs_sync_file - f2fs_sync_fs - mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex) - write_checkpoint - block_operations - f2fs_sync_inode_meta - iput - sb_start_intwrite - mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex) Fix this by altering sb_start_intwrite to sb_start_write_trylock. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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Oct 6, 2017
When ->freeze_fs is called from lvm for doing snapshot, it needs to make sure there will be no more changes in filesystem's data, however, previously, background threads like GC thread wasn't aware of freezing, so in environment with active background threads, data of snapshot becomes unstable. This patch fixes this issue by adding sb_{start,end}_intwrite in below background threads: - GC thread - flush thread - discard thread Note that, don't use sb_start_intwrite() in gc_thread_func() due to: generic/241 reports below bug: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.13.0-rc1+ #32 Tainted: G O ------------------------------------------------------ f2fs_gc-250:0/22186 is trying to acquire lock: (&sbi->gc_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<f8fa7f0b>] f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] but task is already holding lock: (sb_internal#2){++++.-}, at: [<f8fb5609>] gc_thread_func+0x159/0x4a0 [f2fs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (sb_internal#2){++++.-}: __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 __sb_start_write+0x11d/0x1f0 f2fs_evict_inode+0x2d6/0x4e0 [f2fs] evict+0xa8/0x170 iput+0x1fb/0x2c0 f2fs_sync_inode_meta+0x3f/0xf0 [f2fs] write_checkpoint+0x1b1/0x750 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x85/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_do_sync_file.isra.24+0x137/0xa30 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_file+0x34/0x40 [f2fs] vfs_fsync_range+0x4a/0xa0 do_fsync+0x3c/0x60 SyS_fdatasync+0x15/0x20 do_fast_syscall_32+0xa1/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b -> #1 (&sbi->cp_mutex){+.+...}: __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x4f/0x830 mutex_lock_nested+0x25/0x30 write_checkpoint+0x2f/0x750 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x85/0x1b0 [f2fs] sync_filesystem+0x67/0x80 generic_shutdown_super+0x27/0x100 kill_block_super+0x22/0x50 kill_f2fs_super+0x3a/0x40 [f2fs] deactivate_locked_super+0x3d/0x70 deactivate_super+0x40/0x60 cleanup_mnt+0x39/0x70 __cleanup_mnt+0x10/0x20 task_work_run+0x69/0x80 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x57/0x92 do_fast_syscall_32+0x18c/0x1b0 entry_SYSENTER_32+0x4c/0x7b -> #0 (&sbi->gc_mutex){+.+...}: validate_chain.isra.36+0xc50/0xdb0 __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x4f/0x830 mutex_lock_nested+0x25/0x30 f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0xb9/0x200 [f2fs] gc_thread_func+0x302/0x4a0 [f2fs] kthread+0xe9/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &sbi->gc_mutex --> &sbi->cp_mutex --> sb_internal#2 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_internal#2); lock(&sbi->cp_mutex); lock(sb_internal#2); lock(&sbi->gc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by f2fs_gc-250:0/22186: #0: (sb_internal#2){++++.-}, at: [<f8fb5609>] gc_thread_func+0x159/0x4a0 [f2fs] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 22186 Comm: f2fs_gc-250:0 Tainted: G O 4.13.0-rc1+ #32 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5f/0x92 print_circular_bug+0x1b3/0x1bd validate_chain.isra.36+0xc50/0xdb0 ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0xf/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x405/0x7b0 lock_acquire+0xae/0x220 ? f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] __mutex_lock+0x4f/0x830 ? f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] mutex_lock_nested+0x25/0x30 ? f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_sync_fs+0x7b/0x1b0 [f2fs] f2fs_balance_fs_bg+0xb9/0x200 [f2fs] gc_thread_func+0x302/0x4a0 [f2fs] ? preempt_schedule_common+0x2f/0x4d ? f2fs_gc+0x540/0x540 [f2fs] kthread+0xe9/0x120 ? f2fs_gc+0x540/0x540 [f2fs] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x30/0x30 ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24 The deadlock occurs in below condition: GC Thread Thread B - sb_start_intwrite - f2fs_sync_file - f2fs_sync_fs - mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex) - write_checkpoint - block_operations - f2fs_sync_inode_meta - iput - sb_start_intwrite - mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex) Fix this by altering sb_start_intwrite to sb_start_write_trylock. Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
jollaman999
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Oct 25, 2018
The logic in __ip6_append_data() assumes that the MTU is at least large enough for the headers. A device's MTU may be adjusted after being added while sendmsg() is processing data, resulting in __ip6_append_data() seeing any MTU. For an mtu smaller than the size of the fragmentation header, the math results in a negative 'maxfraglen', which causes problems when refragmenting any previous skb in the skb_write_queue, leaving it possibly malformed. Instead sendmsg returns EINVAL when the mtu is calculated to be less than IPV6_MIN_MTU. Found by syzkaller: kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2064! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 14216 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801d0b68580 task.stack: ffff8801ac6b8000 RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline] RIP: 0010:__ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617 RSP: 0018:ffff8801ac6bf570 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000028 RCX: ffffc90003cce000 RDX: 00000000000001b8 RSI: ffffffff839df06f RDI: ffff8801d9478ca0 RBP: ffff8801ac6bf780 R08: ffff8801cc3f1dbc R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8801ac6bf7a0 R11: 43cb4b7b1948a9e7 R12: ffff8801cc3f1dc8 R13: ffff8801cc3f1d40 R14: 0000000000001036 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f43d740c700(0000) GS:ffff8801dc100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f7834984000 CR3: 00000001d79b9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ip6_finish_skb include/net/ipv6.h:911 [inline] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x255/0x390 net/ipv6/udp.c:1093 udpv6_sendmsg+0x280d/0x31a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1363 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x352/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007f43d740bc08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000007180a8 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020d08000 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 00000000209c1000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000040800 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b9c69 R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 00000000202c2000 Code: 9e 01 fe e9 c5 e8 ff ff e8 7f 9e 01 fe e9 4a ea ff ff 48 89 f7 e8 52 9e 01 fe e9 aa eb ff ff e8 a8 b6 cf fd 0f 0b e8 a1 b6 cf fd <0f> 0b 49 8d 45 78 4d 8d 45 7c 48 89 85 78 fe ff ff 49 8d 85 ba RIP: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline] RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570 RIP: __ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617 RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 749439bfac6e1a2932c582e2699f91d329658196) Bug: 65023306 Change-Id: I3b713621c749b7fd3a070116be8996ae2e2dd6e8 Signed-off-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
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after flashing the kernel, there is no such a function.
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