A Higher-Order Approach to Explicit Contexts in LF

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There are two standard techniques for representing dependently typed calculi in the LF. The first is to re-use the LF contexts for the object contexts, which can lead to difficulties when the meaning of hypothetico-general judgement in the object language is stronger than in the LF; this is, for instance, the case in MLTT 1979, where non-trivial functionality obligations are incurred in the sequent judgement.

Another technique advanced by Crary is to represent contexts explicitly, and then define a sequent judgement over them; this can be used to resolve the problem described above (and several others), but it comes at the cost of verbosity, and introduces difficulties when used to encode *telescopes* in the LF, which are contexts where where each successive term has the previous bound variables free in it. In this paper, I demonstrate a higher-order encoding of telescopes which can be used to faithfully encode the functional sequent judgement for MLTT 1979.

Categories and Subject Descriptors: []:

General Terms: Logical Frameworks

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Contexts, telescopes

1. INTRODUCTION

To motivate this work, let us consider an encoding of a fragment of Martin-Löf's extensional, polymorphic type theory (MLTT 1979) in the logical framework (see [Martin-Löf 1982] for a full presentation). The syntax contains two sorts, val (for canonical forms) and exp (for non-canonical forms), and is defined in the following LF signature: ¹

Then, the language is accorded a simple big-step operational semantics via the $M\Rightarrow N$ judgement:

 $^{^1\}mathrm{LF}$ signatures are presented in the style of inference rules for clarity. Object judgement forms have a mode which expresses which arguments represent inputs, and which represent outputs; in our presentation, we color the inputs MidnightBlue, and the outputs Maroon. Proper assignment of modes may be used to construe a judgement as having algorithmic content.

$$\frac{M: \exp \quad N: \mathsf{val}}{M \Rightarrow N: \mathbf{type}}$$

$$\frac{L \Rightarrow \lambda[x]E(x) \quad E(M) \Rightarrow N}{\mathsf{ap}(L; M) \Rightarrow N} \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{ap}}$$

$$\frac{M \Rightarrow \mathsf{pair}(M_1; M_2) \quad M_1 \Rightarrow M_1'}{\mathsf{fst}(M) \Rightarrow M_1'} \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{fst}} \frac{M \Rightarrow \mathsf{pair}(M_1; M_2) \quad M_2 \Rightarrow M_2'}{\mathsf{snd}(M) \Rightarrow M_2'} \Rightarrow_{\mathsf{snd}}$$

2. THE NAÏVE HIGHER-ORDER APPROACH

Informally, there are four basic categorical judgements in MLTT 1979:

Form	Pronunciation
A set A = B set	A is a set A and B are equal sets
$M \in A$	M is a member of A
$M = N \in A$	M and N are equal members of A

The subjects of these judgements are terms of sort exp. However, implicit in Martin-Löf's presentation are four prior judgements which operate only on canonical forms (i.e. terms of sort val). We will therefore introduce the following LF signature to account for this:

Then, we will give the meanings of the judgements which deal with non-canonical forms first, anticipating the explanations of the canonical forms judgements.

$$\frac{A \Rightarrow A' \quad A' \quad set_{\mathsf{v}}}{A \quad set} \quad \frac{A \Rightarrow A'}{B \Rightarrow B'} \quad A' = B' \quad set_{\mathsf{v}}}{A = B \quad set}$$

$$\frac{M \Rightarrow M'}{A \Rightarrow A'} \quad M' \in_{\mathsf{v}} A' \quad \frac{M \Rightarrow M'}{N \Rightarrow N'} \quad M' = N' \in_{\mathsf{v}} A'$$

$$\frac{A \Rightarrow A'}{M \Rightarrow A'} \quad M' = N \in A$$

Following Martin-Löf, we give an extensional equality for all types (i.e. two types are equal when they have the same membership and equivalence relations); we could choose an intensional/structural equality for types, but this question is orthogonal to the technique being demonstrated.

$$\begin{array}{c} \forall \{M\}.\ M\in_{\mathbf{v}}A\to M\in_{\mathbf{v}}B\\ \forall \{M\}.\ M\in_{\mathbf{v}}B\to M\in_{\mathbf{v}}A\\ \forall \{M,N\}.\ M=N\in_{\mathbf{v}}A\to M=N\in_{\mathbf{v}}B\\ \underline{\forall \{M,N\}}.\ M=N\in_{\mathbf{v}}B\to M=N\in_{\mathbf{v}}A\\ \hline A=B\ set_{\mathbf{v}} \end{array}$$

Then, all we have to do is define the remaining canonical forms judgements with respect to our syntax. For the base types, this is trivial:

$$\overline{\text{void } set_{v}}$$
 $\overline{\text{unit } set_{v}}$ $\overline{\text{ax}} \in_{v} \text{unit}$ $\overline{\text{ax}} = \text{ax} \in_{v} \text{unit}$

But for terms which involve binding, the rules will become more complicated. Informally, Martin-Löf gives the following formation rule for Π using hypotheticogeneral judgement:

$$\frac{A \ set \quad B(x) \ set \ (x \in A)}{(\sqcap x \in A)B \ set_{\mathsf{v}}} \ *$$

So we might be tempted to do something similar in the LF, as follows:

$$\frac{A \ set \quad \forall \{x\}. \ x \in A \to B(x) \ set}{\operatorname{pi}(A; [x]B(x)) \ set_{\mathsf{v}}} \ *'$$

This encoding, however, is not adequate, since the meaning of hypotheticogeneral judgement in Martin-Löf's informal metalangauge is not captured by the above attempt. Recall that hypothetico-general judgement in type theory implicitly requires *functionality* of type and term families; therefore, in order for our definition to be correct, we would have to adjust the rule to include functionality:

$$\frac{A \ set \quad \forall \{x\}. \ x \in A \to B(x) \ set}{\forall \{x,y\}. \ x = y \in A \to B(x) = B(y) \ set}}{\operatorname{pi}(A;[x]B(x)) \ set_{\mathsf{v}}}$$

We have at least got closer, but even this is not really satisfactory; we were unable to factor out the functionality constraints, and must be careful to place them in all the right places in each and every rule. Contrast this with Martin-Löf's definition of hypothetico-general judgement, which includes functionality from the start, allowing the other judgements to use this "off the shelf".

3. EXPLICIT CONTEXTS À LA CRARY

In order to factor out functionality constraints, it will be necessary to consider the use of contexts in the encoding, and then recast the judgements above as being sequents, i.e. judgements with respect to a context. Crary's first-order encoding of explicit contexts in the LF is essentially the following:

$$\frac{X : \operatorname{exp} \quad I : \mathbb{N}}{\operatorname{isvar}(X;I) : \operatorname{type}} \quad \frac{X : \operatorname{exp} \quad Y : \operatorname{exp}}{\operatorname{precedes}(X;Y) : \operatorname{type}} \quad \frac{\operatorname{isvar}(X;I) \quad \operatorname{isvar}(Y;J) \quad I < J}{\operatorname{precedes}(X;Y)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma : \operatorname{ctx} \quad X : \operatorname{exp}}{\operatorname{bounded}(\Gamma;X) : \operatorname{type}} \quad \frac{\operatorname{isvar}(X;I)}{\operatorname{bounded}(\Gamma;X)} \quad \frac{\operatorname{precedes}(Y;X) \quad \operatorname{bounded}(G;Y)}{\operatorname{bounded}(\Gamma;X)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma : \operatorname{ctx}}{\operatorname{ordered}(\Gamma) : \operatorname{type}} \quad \frac{\operatorname{condered}(\Gamma;X)}{\operatorname{ordered}(\Gamma;X)} \quad \frac{\operatorname{bounded}(\Gamma;X)}{\operatorname{ordered}(\Gamma;X)}$$

Note that the well-formedness constraints above do not in practice protrude into the definitions of judgements which *use* explicit contexts; they are only used in metatheorems. This encoding is very practical for certain calculi, but it is concerning in our case for a few reasons:

- (1) The correctness of this encoding depends very strongly on its *use*: this only truly encodes contexts if in every case an LF-variable is used for X. Moreover, the various well-formedness constraints are a bit inelegant, as is the concept of mapping LF variables to De Bruijn indices.
- (2) It is not possible to construct such a context on its own as a syntactic object of (LF-)type ctx, where variables bound earlier in the context may appear free later in the context. This can be done otherwise by constructing an object of type ctx in an extended LF-context; the well-formedness of such a context is still an extrinsic property, though.
- (3) A straightforward higher-order encoding is preferable (if possible) when working in the LF.

4. ENCODING TELESCOPES IN HIGHER-ORDER ABSTRACT SYNTAX

More precisely, it seems that what we really need is an encoding of *telescopes*, in the sense of De Bruijn. A telescope is a sequence of type assignments, where variables bound earlier may appear free later; for instance:

$$\cdot, x_1 : A_1, x_2 : A_2(x_1), x_3 : A_3(x_1, x_2), \dots, x_n : A_n(x_1, \dots, x_{n-1})$$

To encode this in a straightforward, higher-order manner, we shall first stipulate that each variable in the telescope will be an LF-variable. Then, each type A_i in the telescope will be a term with i-n LF-bindings (i.e. it will be an i-ary λ -abstraction). We'll define by mutual induction a sort for telescopes tele, and a sort for open terms with respect to a telescope $[\Psi]$ exp:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\Psi: \mathsf{tele}}{\mathsf{tele}: \mathbf{type}} & \frac{\Psi: \mathsf{tele}}{[\Psi] \mathsf{exp}: \mathbf{type}} \\ \\ \frac{\Psi: \mathsf{tele}}{\Psi: A: \mathsf{tele}} & \frac{\Psi: \mathsf{tele}}{\Psi: A: \mathsf{tele}} \\ \\ \frac{M: \mathsf{exp}}{M: [\cdot] \mathsf{exp}} & \frac{M: \mathsf{exp} \to [\Psi] \mathsf{exp}}{@[x] M(x): [\Psi: A] \mathsf{exp}} \end{split}$$

Note that we do not put any well-typedness constraints on the arguments of the bound term constructors; we wish to separate object syntax from object judgements; this is particularly important for an object theory which does not have decidable type checking.

Closed expressions may be weakened by extraneous variables:

$$\begin{split} & \frac{\Psi: \mathsf{tele} \quad M: \mathsf{exp} \quad M': [\Psi] \mathsf{exp}}{\mathsf{wk}_{\Psi} \, M \leadsto M': \mathbf{type}} \\ & \frac{\mathsf{wk}_{\Psi} \, M \leadsto M'}{\mathsf{wk}_{\Psi} \, M \leadsto M'} \end{split}$$

A more general definition of weakening can be given, but the simple one above suffices for our use-case.

5. ENCODING FUNCTIONAL HYPOTHETICO-GENERAL JUDGEMENT

Henceforth I shall use the term "functional sequent judgement" to mean a hypotheticogeneral judgement which also requires functionality. First, before we get to the functional sequent judgement, we will need the concept of an "general categorical judgement"; this is a judgement which has variables from a telescope free in it.

5.1 Codes for General Judgements

We will define codes for such judgements and then interpret them into proper object judgements (LF-types) later.

$$\frac{\Psi:\mathsf{tele}}{[\Psi]\mathsf{judg}:\mathsf{type}}$$

$$\frac{A:[\Psi]\mathsf{exp}}{A`\mathit{set}:[\Psi]\mathsf{judg}} \quad \frac{A:[\Psi]\mathsf{exp}}{A=B`\mathit{set}:[\Psi]\mathsf{judg}}$$

$$\frac{M:[\Psi]\mathsf{exp}\quad A:[\Psi]\mathsf{exp}}{M`\in A:[\Psi]\mathsf{judg}} \quad \frac{M:[\Psi]\mathsf{exp}\quad N:[\Psi]\mathsf{exp}\quad A:[\Psi]\mathsf{exp}}{M=N`\in A:[\Psi]\mathsf{judg}}$$

5.2 Sploosion and Refraction

The next thing to do is to specify how each of these judgement(-codes) behaves operationally (i.e. by substituting its outermost variable); we will do so by extending

the LF signature with a new algorithmic judgement $\mathcal{J} \triangleright \mathcal{J}'$ (" \mathcal{J} sploots into \mathcal{J}' ") and making it evident on all inputs:

$$\frac{\mathcal{J}: [\Psi,A]\mathsf{judg} \quad \mathcal{J}': \mathsf{exp} \to [\Psi]\mathsf{judg}}{\mathcal{J} \rhd [x] \mathcal{J}'(x): \mathbf{type}}$$

$$\boxed{@[x]A(x) `set \rhd [x] \ A(x) `set}$$

$$\boxed{@[x]A(x) = @[x]B(x) `set \rhd [x] \ A(x) = B(x) `set}$$

$$\boxed{@[x]M(x) `\in @[x]A(x) \rhd [x] \ M(x) `\in A(x)}$$

$$\boxed{@[x]M(x) = @[x]N(x) `\in @[x]A(x) \rhd [x] \ M(x) = N(x) `\in A(x)}$$

Next, we will do something similar in order to show how each of these judgement(codes) behaves extensionally, by introducing another algorithmic judgement $\mathcal{J} \ltimes \mathcal{J}^{=}$ (" \mathcal{J} refracts into $\mathcal{J}^{=}$ "). Intuitively, this judgement describes how what happens when you substitute two purportedly equal expressions in for the judgement-code's outermost variable.

$$\frac{\mathcal{J}: [\Psi,A]\mathsf{judg} \quad \mathcal{J}': \mathsf{exp} \to \mathsf{exp} \to [\Psi]\mathsf{judg}}{\mathcal{J} \ltimes [x][y]\mathcal{J}'(x)(y): \mathbf{type}}$$

$$\overline{@[x]A(x) \; `\mathsf{set} \ltimes [x][y] \; A(x) = A(y) \; `\mathsf{set}}$$

$$\overline{@[x]A(x) = @[x]B(x) \; `\mathsf{set} \ltimes [x][y] \; A(x) = B(y) \; `\mathsf{set}}$$

$$\overline{@[x]M(x) \; `\in @[x]A(x) \ltimes [x][y] \; M(x) = M(y) \; `\in A(x)}$$

$$\overline{@[x]M(x) = @[x]N(x) \; `\in @[x]A(x) \ltimes [x][y] \; M(x) = N(y) \; `\in A(x)}$$

5.3 The Functional Sequent Judgement

We finally have built up enough machinery to give an immediate and elegant encoding to Martin-Löf's functional sequent judgement $\mathcal{J}(\Psi)$; we will notate it $\Psi \gg \mathcal{J}$, or $\gg \mathcal{J}$ when Ψ is the empty telescope. First we will define it, and then we'll go back and show some corresponding examples between our system and the informal rules of MLTT 1979.

$$\frac{\Psi:\mathsf{tele}\quad \mathcal{J}:[\Psi]\mathsf{judg}}{\Psi\gg\mathcal{J}:\mathsf{type}}\quad \frac{}{\gg\mathcal{J}\equiv\cdot\gg\mathcal{J}:\mathsf{type}}$$

The interpretations of the judgement codes in the empty context are trivial:

$$\frac{A \ set}{\gg |A \ 'set} \quad \frac{A = B \ set}{\gg |A = |B \ 'set}$$

$$\frac{M \in A}{\gg |M \ '\in |A} \quad \frac{M = N \in A}{\gg |M = |N \ '\in |A}$$

The interpretations in open contexts may be done in one fell swoop using the machinery that we have built up so far:

$$\begin{array}{c} \mathcal{J} \rhd [x] \mathcal{J}'(x) \\ \mathcal{J} \ltimes [x] [y] \mathcal{J}^=(x)(y) \\ \forall \{x,x'\}. \ \mathsf{wk}_\Psi \, x \leadsto x' \to \Psi \gg x' \ `\in A \to \Psi \gg \mathcal{J}'(x) \\ \underline{\forall \{x,x',y,y'\}}. \ \mathsf{wk}_\Psi \, x \leadsto x' \to \mathsf{wk}_\Psi \, y \leadsto y' \to \Psi \gg x' = y' \ `\in A \to \Psi \gg \mathcal{J}^=(x)(y) \\ \hline \Psi, A \gg \mathcal{J} \end{array}$$

THE DEFINITIONS OF THE TYPES

It is now possible to give the definitions of the types; recall that we will only be causing judgements of the following forms to become evident: A set_v , $M \in_{\mathsf{v}} A$, $M = N \in_{\mathsf{v}} A$; all other forms of judgement have been fully explained. The "spirit" of Martin-Löf's type theory lies in the concept of evaluation of closed terms to canonical form, and as such, defining a type means only describing how its canonical verifications behave.

Let us recall Martin-Löf's informal rules and we will show how they are encoded in the logical framework. First, the cartesian product of a family of sets is defined by the following rules in [Martin-Löf 1982]:

$$\frac{A \ set \quad B(x) \ set \ (x \in A)}{(\sqcap x \in A)B \ set} \quad \frac{b \in B \ (x \in A)}{(\lambda x)b \in (\sqcap x \in A)B} \quad \frac{b = d \in B \ (x \in A)}{(\lambda x)b = (\lambda x)d \in (\sqcap x \in A)B}$$

These rules are adequately encoded in our system as follows:

$$\frac{A \ set \quad \cdot, A \gg @B \ `set}{\operatorname{pi}(A;B) \ set_{\mathsf{v}}} \quad \frac{\cdot, A \gg @E \ `\in @B}{\lambda \ E \in_{\mathsf{v}} \operatorname{pi}(A;B)} \quad \frac{\cdot, A \gg @E = @E' \in_{\mathsf{v}} @B}{\lambda \ E = \lambda \ E' \in_{\mathsf{v}} \operatorname{pi}(A;B)}$$

The disjoint union of a family of sets is also easily encoded; first Martin-Löf's rules:

$$\frac{A \ set \quad B(x) \ set \ (x \in A)}{(\Sigma x \in A)B \ set} \quad \frac{a \in A \quad b \in [a/x]B}{(a,b) \in (\Sigma x \in A)B} \quad \frac{a = c \in a \quad b = d \in [a/x]B}{(a,b) = (c,d) \in (\Sigma x \in A)B}$$

and their encoding:

$$\frac{A \ set \quad \cdot, A \gg @B \ `set}{\operatorname{sg}(A;B) \ set_{\mathbf{v}}} \quad \frac{M \in A \quad N \in B(M)}{\operatorname{pair}(M,N) \in_{\mathbf{v}} \operatorname{sg}(A;B)} \quad \frac{M = M' \in A \quad N = N' \in B(M)}{\operatorname{pair}(M;N) = \operatorname{pair}(M';N') \in_{\mathbf{v}} \operatorname{pi}(A;B)}$$

And what of the elimination rules? The entire point of the verificationist meaning explanations which pervade [Martin-Löf 1982] is that the elimination rules will not be part of the definitions of the types, but rather rules which are admissible, justified by the meanings of the judgements and the definitions of the types. So, only after

having propounded the definitions above may we entertain *proving* the elimination rules in the logical framework.

6.1 Admissible Rules

THEOREM 6.1. The standard application rule for the cartesian product of a family of sets is admissible:

$$\frac{\mathcal{D}}{M \in \uparrow \operatorname{pi}(A;B)} \quad \frac{\mathcal{E}}{N \in A} \\ \frac{a \operatorname{p}(M;N) \in B(N)}{\operatorname{pi}_E}$$

PROOF. By induction on the derivation \mathcal{D} , which must have the following canonical form:

$$\mathcal{D}''$$

$$\forall \{x\}.\ x \in A \to E(x) \in B(x)$$

$$\forall \{x,x'\}.\ \text{wk.}\ x \sim x' \to \cdot \gg x' ' \in A \to \cdot \gg !E(x) ' \in !B(x) \quad \dots$$

$$\mathcal{D}'$$

$$M \Rightarrow \lambda E$$

$$M \in \uparrow \operatorname{pi}(A;B)$$

$$\mathcal{D}'$$

$$M \in \uparrow \operatorname{pi}(A;B)$$

Admissibility follows from \mathcal{D}' , \mathcal{D}'' , \mathcal{E} ; the derivation $\mathcal{D}''(N)(\mathcal{E})$ must have a canonical form as follows:

$$\frac{\mathcal{F}}{E(N)\Rightarrow \mathbf{X}} \quad \begin{array}{ccc} \mathcal{F}' & \mathcal{F}'' \\ B(N)\Rightarrow \mathbf{C} & X\in_{\mathbf{v}} C \\ \hline E(N)\in B(N) \end{array}$$

Whence we may construct the goal:

$$\frac{\overline{M \Rightarrow \lambda \, E} \ \, \mathcal{D}' \quad \overline{E(N) \Rightarrow X} \ \, \mathcal{F}}{\underbrace{\frac{\operatorname{ap}(M;N) \Rightarrow X}{\operatorname{ap}(M;N) \in B(N)}} \, \, \mathcal{F}' \quad \overline{X \in_{\mathbf{v}} C} \ \, \mathcal{F}''}$$

THEOREM 6.2. The two standard elimination rules for the disjoint union of a family of sets are admissible:

$$\frac{M \in \uparrow \operatorname{sg}(A;[x]B(x))}{\operatorname{fst}(M) \in A} \quad \operatorname{sg}_{E_1} \quad \frac{M \in \uparrow \operatorname{sg}(A;[x]B(x))}{\operatorname{snd}(M) \in B(\operatorname{fst}(M))} \quad \operatorname{sg}_{E_2}$$

Proof. □

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