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SCRT_invalid_driver_hunt.md

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  • rule_id: 503
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1638350429925
  • modify_time: 1638350456574
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: Privesc cdpsgshims.dll
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION

  • Indicator

    • runOnCGO: False
    • investigationType: FILE_EVENT

  • Investigation

  • File_Event

  • Filter
  • And
  • Or
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 1
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 2
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 3
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 6
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_file_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: cdpsgshims.dll
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
  • indicator_md5: a5d8fbe26ddbd7f48f8b4f660ed52866
  • indicator_text: File action type = create, read, rename, write AND file name = cdpsgshims.dll
  • name: SCRT cdpsgshims.dll created to disk
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0004 - Privilege Escalation
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0004
  • mitre_technique_id: T1574.001

  • Btp_Rule

  • Agent_Os_Windows

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SCRT cdpsgshims.dll created to disk
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: SCRT cdpsgshims.dll created to disk
    • biocId: 503
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_503 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_503 (file_operation (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (file_name ?file_name &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_open) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq ?file_name "cdpsgshims.dll")))) (not (file_operation_503 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_503 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Mac

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SCRT cdpsgshims.dll created to disk
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: SCRT cdpsgshims.dll created to disk
    • biocId: 503
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_503 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_503 (file_operation (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (file_name ?file_name &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_open) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq ?file_name "cdpsgshims.dll")))) (not (file_operation_503 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_503 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Linux

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SCRT cdpsgshims.dll created to disk
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: SCRT cdpsgshims.dll created to disk
    • biocId: 503
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_503 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_503 (file_operation (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (file_name ?file_name &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_open) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq (lowcase ?file_name) "cdpsgshims.dll")))) (not (file_operation_503 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_503 (cid ?cid))))
  • btp_rule_name: file_operation_503
  • is_preventable: 1
  • supported_os: 7
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: None
  • is_xql: False
  • query_tables: None
  • rule_id: 502
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1638350268266
  • modify_time: 1638353935456
  • severity: SEV_040_HIGH
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: Created by F. Bussink SCRT
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: EXECUTION

  • Indicator

    • runOnCGO: True
    • investigationType: PROCESS_EXECUTION_EVENT

  • Investigation

  • Process_Execution_Event

  • Filter
  • And
    • SEARCH_FIELD: agent_os_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: NEQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 4
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: xdr_agent
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_process_signature_status
    • SEARCH_TYPE: COMPLEX_EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: {"COLLECTION_TYPE": "SIGNATURE_STATUS", "COLLECTION_VALUE": "SIGNATURE_SIGNED"}
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_process_signature_vendor
    • SEARCH_TYPE: REGEX
    • SEARCH_VALUE: Jetico.*
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
  • indicator_md5: ca1b0c73d6ed6af725f54b8f6165913f
  • indicator_text: Process action type = execution AND process execution signature = Signed AND process execution signer =~ Jetico.* Host host os != linux
  • name: SCRT JETICO Signed binary
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id:
  • mitre_technique_id:

  • Btp_Rule

  • Agent_Os_Windows

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SCRT JETICO Signed binary
  • Tactic_Id
  • Technique_Id
    • biocRuleName: SCRT JETICO Signed binary
    • biocId: 502
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate process_start_502 (slot cid)) (defrule process_start_502 (process_start (is_sign ?is_sign) (cid ?cid) (signer_name ?signer_name &: (and (eq ?is_sign ?signature_state_signed) (regex (lowcase ?signer_name) "jetico.*" 0)))) (not (process_start_502 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (process_start_502 (cid ?cid))))
  • btp_rule_name: process_start_502
  • is_preventable: 1
  • supported_os: 1
  • btp_validation_error: WINDOWS_SUPPORT_ONLY
  • xql: None
  • is_xql: False
  • query_tables: None
  • rule_id: 393
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1684854242506
  • modify_time: 1684854242506
  • severity: SEV_040_HIGH
  • source: frank.bussink@e-xpertsolutions.com
  • comment: This is trigguered when a TGS has been request for the canary account (in attempt to bruteforce the password)
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: 8b554c9ad93cfd962b8cfa237fc99914
  • indicator_text: dataset = xdr_data // Using the xdr dataset

| filter event_type = ENUM.EVENT_LOG and action_evtlog_event_id = 4769

| alter ServiceName = json_extract(action_evtlog_data_fields,"$.ServiceName")

| alter ServiceName = trim(ServiceName,""")

| alter TicketEncryptionType = json_extract(action_evtlog_data_fields,"$.TicketEncryptionType")

| alter TicketOptions= json_extract(action_evtlog_data_fields,"$.TicketOptions")

| alter TargetUserName= json_extract(action_evtlog_data_fields,"$.TargetUserName")

| alter IpAddress= json_extract(action_evtlog_data_fields,"$.IpAddress")

| alter TicketEncryptionTypeName = ""

| alter TicketEncryptionTypeName = if(TicketEncryptionType CONTAINS "0x1", "DES-CBC-CRC", TicketEncryptionTypeName)

| alter TicketEncryptionTypeName = if(TicketEncryptionType CONTAINS "0x3", "DES-CBC-MD5", TicketEncryptionTypeName )

| alter TicketEncryptionTypeName = if(TicketEncryptionType CONTAINS "0x11", "AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96", TicketEncryptionTypeName)

| alter TicketEncryptionTypeName = if(TicketEncryptionType CONTAINS "0x12", "AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96", TicketEncryptionTypeName)

| alter TicketEncryptionTypeName = if(TicketEncryptionType CONTAINS "0x17", "RC4-HMAC", TicketEncryptionTypeName)

| alter TicketEncryptionTypeName = if(TicketEncryptionType CONTAINS "0x18", "RC4-HMAC-EXP", TicketEncryptionTypeName)

| alter TicketOptionsName = ""

| alter TicketOptionsName = if(TicketOptions CONTAINS "0x40810010", "Forwardable, Renewable, Canonicalize, Renewable-ok", TicketOptionsName)

| alter TicketOptionsName = if(TicketOptions CONTAINS "0x40810000", "Forwardable, Renewable, Canonicalize", TicketOptionsName)

| alter TicketOptionsName = if(TicketOptions CONTAINS "0x60810010", "Forwardable, Forwarded, Renewable, Canonicalize, Renewable-ok", TicketOptionsName)

| filter (ServiceName = "sqlsvc")

  • name: BIOC-Kerberoasting Canary account
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1003 - OS Credential Dumping
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0006 - Credential Access
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0006
  • mitre_technique_id: T1003
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: None
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: {"tables": ["xdr_data"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"AND": [{"LEFT": "$event_type", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$ENUM.EVENT_LOG", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}, {"LEFT": "$action_evtlog_event_id", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 4769, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "ServiceName", "source": {"function": "json_extract", "parameters": ["$action_evtlog_data_fields", "$.ServiceName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "ServiceName", "source": {"function": "string_trim", "parameters": ["$ServiceName", """]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionType", "source": {"function": "json_extract", "parameters": ["$action_evtlog_data_fields", "$.TicketEncryptionType"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketOptions", "source": {"function": "json_extract", "parameters": ["$action_evtlog_data_fields", "$.TicketOptions"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TargetUserName", "source": {"function": "json_extract", "parameters": ["$action_evtlog_data_fields", "$.TargetUserName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "IpAddress", "source": {"function": "json_extract", "parameters": ["$action_evtlog_data_fields", "$.IpAddress"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionTypeName", "source": ""}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionTypeName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketEncryptionType", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x1", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "DES-CBC-CRC"]], "$TicketEncryptionTypeName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionTypeName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketEncryptionType", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x3", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "DES-CBC-MD5"]], "$TicketEncryptionTypeName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionTypeName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketEncryptionType", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x11", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96"]], "$TicketEncryptionTypeName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionTypeName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketEncryptionType", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x12", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96"]], "$TicketEncryptionTypeName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionTypeName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketEncryptionType", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x17", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "RC4-HMAC"]], "$TicketEncryptionTypeName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketEncryptionTypeName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketEncryptionType", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x18", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "RC4-HMAC-EXP"]], "$TicketEncryptionTypeName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketOptionsName", "source": ""}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketOptionsName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketOptions", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x40810010", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "Forwardable, Renewable, Canonicalize, Renewable-ok"]], "$TicketOptionsName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketOptionsName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketOptions", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x40810000", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "Forwardable, Renewable, Canonicalize"]], "$TicketOptionsName"]}}]}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "TicketOptionsName", "source": {"function": "switch_case", "parameters": [[[{"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$TicketOptions", "OPERATOR": "CONTAINS", "RIGHT": "0x60810010", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}, "Forwardable, Forwarded, Renewable, Canonicalize, Renewable-ok"]], "$TicketOptionsName"]}}]}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$ServiceName", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "sqlsvc", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1684854242506
  • rule_id: 388
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1683118061196
  • modify_time: 1694168591898
  • severity: SEV_040_HIGH
  • source: frank.bussink@e-xpertsolutions.com
  • comment: SCRT BIOC to detect MS-EFSR RPC calls
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: f6473e3c9013984ff967251d17884890
  • indicator_text: dataset = xdr_data

| filter EVENT_TYPE = RPC_CALL

| filter event_rpc_interface_uuid = "{C681D488-D850-11D0-8C52-00C04FD90F7E}"

| filter ((action_rpc_func_opnum = 0) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 4) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 5) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 6) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 7) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 8) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 9) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 12) or (action_rpc_func_opnum = 13) or(action_rpc_func_opnum = 15))

  • name: BIOC-PetitPotam-Authentication-Coercer
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1003 - OS Credential Dumping
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0006 - Credential Access
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0006
  • mitre_technique_id: T1003
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: 0
  • btp_validation_error: UNSUPPORTED_XQL
  • xql: {"tables": ["xdr_data"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$EVENT_TYPE", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$RPC_CALL", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$event_rpc_interface_uuid", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "{C681D488-D850-11D0-8C52-00C04FD90F7E}", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"OR": [{"OR": [{"OR": [{"OR": [{"OR": [{"OR": [{"OR": [{"OR": [{"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 0, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 4, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 5, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 6, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 7, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 8, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 9, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 12, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 13, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}, {"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 15, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1694168591976
  • status_changed_by: None
  • status_changed_at: None
  • last_status_change_reason: None
  • rule_id: 397
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1694169318013
  • modify_time: 1694169318013
  • severity: SEV_040_HIGH
  • source: frank.bussink@e-xpertsolutions.com
  • comment: E-XpertSolutions BIOC to detect Coerce project
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: 584883bf13f35adb2d803c0525401140
  • indicator_text: dataset = xdr_data

| filter EVENT_TYPE = RPC_CALL

| filter event_rpc_interface_uuid = "{82273FDC-E32A-18C3-3F78-827929DC23EA}"

| filter (action_rpc_func_opnum = 9)

  • name: BIOC-PetitPotam-EventLog-ElfrOpenBELW
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1003 - OS Credential Dumping
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0006 - Credential Access
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0006
  • mitre_technique_id: T1003
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: None
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: {"tables": ["xdr_data"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$EVENT_TYPE", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$RPC_CALL", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$event_rpc_interface_uuid", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "{82273FDC-E32A-18C3-3F78-827929DC23EA}", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 9, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1694169318013
  • status_changed_by: None
  • status_changed_at: None
  • last_status_change_reason: None
  • rule_id: 537
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1658410759398
  • modify_time: 1658410759398
  • severity: SEV_020_LOW
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: SCRT rule to detect Authentication Coerce PetitPotam on MS-DFSNM Op 12 or Op 13
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: a8d61ecc099487a2152fe07ca680bf06
  • indicator_text: dataset = xdr_data

| filter event_type = ENUM.RPC_CALL

| filter (event_rpc_interface_uuid = "{4FC742E0-4A10-11CF-8273-00AA004AE673}" )

| filter ((event_rpc_func_opnum = 12) or (event_rpc_func_opnum = 13))

  • name: SCRT_PetitPotam_MS_DFSNM_Authentication_Coerce
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1003 - OS Credential Dumping
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0006 - Credential Access
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0006
  • mitre_technique_id: T1003
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: None
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: {"tables": ["xdr_data"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$event_type", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$ENUM.RPC_CALL", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$event_rpc_interface_uuid", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "{4FC742E0-4A10-11CF-8273-00AA004AE673}", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$event_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 12, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}, {"LEFT": "$event_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 13, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1658410759398
  • rule_id: 535
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1658397007681
  • modify_time: 1658410787888
  • severity: SEV_020_LOW
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: SCRT BIOC to detect MS-RPRN RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: 2b19fe216d6e1efff594f0453f07dc67
  • indicator_text: dataset = xdr_data

| filter EVENT_TYPE = RPC_CALL

| filter event_rpc_interface_uuid = "{12345678-1234-ABCD-EF00-0123456789AB}"

| filter ((action_rpc_func_opnum = 65) )

  • name: SCRT-PetitPotam-Spoolss-Authentication-Coercer
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id:
  • mitre_technique_id:
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: 0
  • btp_validation_error: UNSUPPORTED_XQL
  • xql: {"tables": ["xdr_data"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$EVENT_TYPE", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$RPC_CALL", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$event_rpc_interface_uuid", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "{12345678-1234-ABCD-EF00-0123456789AB}", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$action_rpc_func_opnum", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 65, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1658404769097
  • rule_id: 395
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1643316022296
  • modify_time: 1643316022296
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: Possible RBCD Attack. A computer account creates another Computer account. https://www.bussink.net/rbcd-webclient-attack/
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: a446f0072748b2bb6dadc13136560211
  • indicator_text: dataset = xdr_data

| filter event_type = ENUM.EVENT_LOG and action_evtlog_event_id = 4741

| filter action_evtlog_message ~= ".A computer account was created."

| alter AccountName = arrayindex(regextract(action_evtlog_message, ".Account Name:.?(\w.*)\r\n"),0)

| filter AccountName ~= ".$."

  • name: SCRT-RBCD-Attack
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id:
  • mitre_technique_id:
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: None
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: {"tables": ["xdr_data"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"AND": [{"LEFT": "$event_type", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$ENUM.EVENT_LOG", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}, {"LEFT": "$action_evtlog_event_id", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": 4741, "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$action_evtlog_message", "OPERATOR": "REGEX", "RIGHT": ".A computer account was created.", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"ADD_FIELDS": {"fields": [{"name": "AccountName", "source": {"function": "array_item", "parameters": [{"function": "regexp_extract_all", "parameters": ["$action_evtlog_message", ".Account Name:.?(\w.)\r\n"]}, 0]}}]}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$AccountName", "OPERATOR": "REGEX", "RIGHT": ".\$.*", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_id: 395
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1687879280170
  • modify_time: 1687879288067
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@e-xpertsolutions.com
  • comment: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rdrleakdiag/ No known legit usage
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS

  • Indicator

    • runOnCGO: True
    • investigationType: PROCESS_EXECUTION_EVENT

  • Investigation

  • Process_Execution_Event

  • Filter
  • And
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_process_image_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: REGEX
    • SEARCH_VALUE: rdrleakdiag
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_process_image_command_line
    • SEARCH_TYPE: REGEX
    • SEARCH_VALUE: .rdrleakdiag./fullmemdmp.*
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
  • indicator_md5: 7a67171bb15f69cb9e42881b5e49c089
  • indicator_text: Process action type = execution AND target process cmd =~ .rdrleakdiag./fullmemdmp.* AND target process name =~ rdrleakdiag
  • name: BIOC-Rdrleakdiag-lolbas-command
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1003.001 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0006 - Credential Access
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0006
  • mitre_technique_id: T1003.001

  • Btp_Rule

  • Agent_Os_Windows

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: BIOC-Rdrleakdiag-lolbas-command
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0006
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1003.001
    • biocRuleName: BIOC-Rdrleakdiag-lolbas-command
    • biocId: 395
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate process_start_395 (slot cid)) (defrule process_start_395 (process_start (process_image_name ?process_image_name) (cid ?cid) (command_line ?command_line &: (and (regex ?process_image_name "rdrleakdiag" 0) (regex ?command_line ".rdrleakdiag.\/fullmemdmp.*" 0)))) (not (process_start_395 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (process_start_395 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Mac

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: BIOC-Rdrleakdiag-lolbas-command
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0006
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1003.001
    • biocRuleName: BIOC-Rdrleakdiag-lolbas-command
    • biocId: 395
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate process_start_395 (slot cid)) (defrule process_start_395 (process_start (process_image_name ?process_image_name) (cid ?cid) (command_line ?command_line &: (and (regex ?process_image_name "rdrleakdiag" 0) (regex ?command_line ".rdrleakdiag.\/fullmemdmp.*" 0)))) (not (process_start_395 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (process_start_395 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Linux

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: BIOC-Rdrleakdiag-lolbas-command
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0006
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1003.001
    • biocRuleName: BIOC-Rdrleakdiag-lolbas-command
    • biocId: 395
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate process_start_395 (slot cid)) (defrule process_start_395 (process_start (process_image_name ?process_image_name) (cid ?cid) (command_line ?command_line &: (and (regex (lowcase ?process_image_name) "rdrleakdiag" 0) (regex (lowcase ?command_line) ".rdrleakdiag.\/fullmemdmp.*" 0)))) (not (process_start_395 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (process_start_395 (cid ?cid))))
  • btp_rule_name: process_start_395
  • is_preventable: 1
  • supported_os: 7
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: None
  • is_xql: False
  • query_tables: None
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1687879280170
  • status_changed_by: None
  • status_changed_at: None
  • last_status_change_reason: None
  • rule_id: 520
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1650371481298
  • modify_time: 1650371613163
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: SCRT switzerland - k4nfr3 - 19/04/2022 Following Mr D0x research : https://mrd0x.com/cortex-xdr-analysis-and-bypass/ it requires privilege and a reboot. This is until PAN will provide real signature
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: EVASION

  • Indicator

    • runOnCGO: True
    • investigationType: REGISTRY_EVENT

  • Investigation

  • Registry_Event

  • Filter
  • And
    • SEARCH_FIELD: agent_os_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 1
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: xdr_agent
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 4
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_registry_value_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: ServiceDll
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_registry_data
    • SEARCH_TYPE: REGEX_NOT
    • SEARCH_VALUE: cryptsvc.dll
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_registry_key_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: REGEX
    • SEARCH_VALUE: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet\d\d\d\Services\CryptSvc\Parameters
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
  • indicator_md5: 0186f58365c1a1c03da6e6ec2d052093
  • indicator_text: Registry registry data !=~ cryptsvc.dll AND registry key name =~ HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet\d\d\d\Services\CryptSvc\Parameters AND registry value name = ServiceDll AND action type = set_registry_value Host host os = windows
  • name: SCRT-Mr-D0x-XDR-Disable-chg-registry-value
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id:
  • mitre_technique_id: T1562.001

  • Btp_Rule

  • Agent_Os_Windows

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SCRT-Mr-D0x-XDR-Disable-chg-registry-value
  • Tactic_Id
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1562.001
    • biocRuleName: SCRT-Mr-D0x-XDR-Disable-chg-registry-value
    • biocId: 520
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate registry_operation_520 (slot cid)) (defrule registry_operation_520 (registry_operation (hive ?hive) (sub_type ?sub_type) (key_name ?key_name) (value ?value) (cid ?cid) (value_name ?value_name &: (and (eq ?sub_type ?reg_set_value) (eq ?value_name "servicedll") (not (regex ?value "cryptsvc.dll" 0)) (and (regex ?key_name "\system\\controlset\d\d\d\\services\\cryptsvc\\parameters" 0) (eq ?hive ?hklm))))) (not (registry_operation_520 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (registry_operation_520 (cid ?cid))))
  • btp_rule_name: registry_operation_520
  • is_preventable: 1
  • supported_os: 1
  • btp_validation_error: WINDOWS_SUPPORT_ONLY
  • xql: None
  • is_xql: False
  • query_tables: None
  • rule_id: 387
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1683118009481
  • modify_time: 1683797390193
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@e-xpertsolutions.com
  • comment: The StorSvc.dll!SvcRebootToFlashingMode RPC method, calls StorSvc.dll!InitResetPhone which also calls StorSvc.dll!ResetPhoneWorkerCallback, that tries to load SprintCSP.dll. As a result, the creation of this file may be indicative of Local Privilege escalation by DLL hijacking as the StorSvc process runs under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION

  • Indicator

    • runOnCGO: False
    • investigationType: FILE_EVENT

  • Investigation

  • File_Event

  • Filter
  • And
  • Or
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 1
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 3
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 6
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_file_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: SprintCSP.dll
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
  • indicator_md5: f8103c0bb88607a5d23e9c7d1d9adc30
  • indicator_text: File action type = create, rename, write AND file name = SprintCSP.dll
  • name: SprintCSP.dll created to disk (StorSvc LPE)
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0004 - Privilege Escalation
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0004
  • mitre_technique_id: T1574.001

  • Btp_Rule

  • Agent_Os_Windows

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SprintCSP.dll created to disk (StorSvc LPE)
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: SprintCSP.dll created to disk (StorSvc LPE)
    • biocId: 387
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_387 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_387 (file_operation (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (file_name ?file_name &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq ?file_name "sprintcsp.dll")))) (not (file_operation_387 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_387 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Mac

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SprintCSP.dll created to disk (StorSvc LPE)
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: SprintCSP.dll created to disk (StorSvc LPE)
    • biocId: 387
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_387 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_387 (file_operation (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (file_name ?file_name &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq ?file_name "sprintcsp.dll")))) (not (file_operation_387 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_387 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Linux

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: SprintCSP.dll created to disk (StorSvc LPE)
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: SprintCSP.dll created to disk (StorSvc LPE)
    • biocId: 387
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_387 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_387 (file_operation (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (file_name ?file_name &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq (lowcase ?file_name) "sprintcsp.dll")))) (not (file_operation_387 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_387 (cid ?cid))))
  • btp_rule_name: file_operation_387
  • is_preventable: 1
  • supported_os: 7
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: None
  • is_xql: False
  • query_tables: None
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1683118009481
  • rule_id: 402
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1699031533674
  • modify_time: 1699031601221
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@swissexpertgroup.com
  • comment:
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: 11dc07e8da51f64c7d0581cc08c7d588
  • indicator_text: dataset = xdr_data

| filter event_type = ENUM.PROCESS

| filter causality_actor_process_signature_vendor CONTAINS "microsoft" // Only keep cmd.exe or powershell etc...

| alter cmd= action_process_image_command_line // use small length var name

| filter cmd CONTAINS "C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit" or cmd CONTAINS "C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM" or cmd CONTAINS "C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM"

  • name: BIOC-suspicious-command-line to Critical registry and NTDS file
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1003 - OS Credential Dumping
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0006 - Credential Access
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0006
  • mitre_technique_id: T1003
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: 0
  • btp_validation_error: UNSUPPORTED_XQL
  • xql: {"stages":[{"FILTER":{"filter":{"OR":[{"LEFT":"$event_type","OPERATOR":"EQ","RIGHT":"$ENUM.PROCESS","FILTER_DIALECT":"EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}},{"FILTER":{"filter":{"OR":[{"LEFT":"$causality_actor_process_signature_vendor","OPERATOR":"CONTAINS","RIGHT":"microsoft","FILTER_DIALECT":"EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}},{"ADD_FIELDS":{"fields":[{"name":"cmd","source":"$action_process_image_command_line"}]}},{"FILTER":{"filter":{"OR":[{"OR":[{"LEFT":"$cmd","OPERATOR":"CONTAINS","RIGHT":"C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit","FILTER_DIALECT":"EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"},{"LEFT":"$cmd","OPERATOR":"CONTAINS","RIGHT":"C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM","FILTER_DIALECT":"EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]},{"LEFT":"$cmd","OPERATOR":"CONTAINS","RIGHT":"C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM","FILTER_DIALECT":"EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}],"original_query":null,"tables":["xdr_data"]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1699031533674
  • status_changed_by: None
  • status_changed_at: None
  • last_status_change_reason: None
  • rule_id: 392
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1684329642854
  • modify_time: 1684329724525
  • severity: SEV_040_HIGH
  • source: frank.bussink@e-xpertsolutions.com
  • comment: Tttracer is a Windows tool which can trace memory on any process. Here it was injected into LSASS, which is highly suspicious except in case of troubleshooting with Microsoft
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: CREDENTIAL_ACCESS
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: 794b6fd75a9fce80e01417d11131152f
  • indicator_text: preset = xdr_injection

| filter (action_remote_process_image_name = "lsass.exe")

| filter (actor_process_image_name = "ttdinject.exe")

  • name: BIOC-TTTracer on LSASS
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1003.001 - OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0006 - Credential Access
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0006
  • mitre_technique_id: T1003.001
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: 0
  • btp_validation_error: UNSUPPORTED_XQL
  • xql: {"presets": ["xdr_injection"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$action_remote_process_image_name", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "lsass.exe", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$actor_process_image_name", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "ttdinject.exe", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1684329642854
  • rule_id: 396
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1689000053662
  • modify_time: 1689000053662
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@e-xpertsolutions.com
  • comment: Netman service has a reference to wlanapi.dll. This can lead to LPE on 2008R2 and 2019 Servcer. As a result, the creation of this file may be indicative of Local Privilege escalation by DLL hijacking as the svchost process runs under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. More info here : https://itm4n.github.io/windows-server-netman-dll-hijacking/
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION

  • Indicator

    • runOnCGO: False
    • investigationType: FILE_EVENT

  • Investigation

  • File_Event

  • Filter
  • And
  • Or
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 1
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 3
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: event_sub_type
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 6
    • isExtended: False
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_file_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: wlanapi.dll
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_file_previous_file_path
    • SEARCH_TYPE: REGEX_NOT
    • SEARCH_VALUE: C:\Windows\.*
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
  • indicator_md5: 6947ad0f538332d518b71e8e83821d8e
  • indicator_text: File action type = create, rename, write AND file name = wlanapi.dll AND file previous path !=~ C:\Windows\.*
  • name: BIOC-wlanapi.dll created to disk (Netman LPE)
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1574.001 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name: TA0004 - Privilege Escalation
  • mitre_tactic_id: TA0004
  • mitre_technique_id: T1574.001

  • Btp_Rule

  • Agent_Os_Windows

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: BIOC-wlanapi.dll created to disk (Netman LPE)
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: BIOC-wlanapi.dll created to disk (Netman LPE)
    • biocId: 396
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_396 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_396 (file_operation (file_name ?file_name) (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (old_file_path ?old_file_path &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq ?file_name "wlanapi.dll") (not (regex ?old_file_path "c:\\windows\\.*" 0))))) (not (file_operation_396 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_396 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Mac

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: BIOC-wlanapi.dll created to disk (Netman LPE)
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: BIOC-wlanapi.dll created to disk (Netman LPE)
    • biocId: 396
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_396 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_396 (file_operation (file_name ?file_name) (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (old_file_path ?old_file_path &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq ?file_name "wlanapi.dll") (not (regex ?old_file_path "c:\\windows\\.*" 0))))) (not (file_operation_396 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_396 (cid ?cid))))

  • Agent_Os_Linux

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: BIOC-wlanapi.dll created to disk (Netman LPE)
  • Tactic_Id
    • 0: TA0004
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1574.001
    • biocRuleName: BIOC-wlanapi.dll created to disk (Netman LPE)
    • biocId: 396
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate file_operation_396 (slot cid)) (defrule file_operation_396 (file_operation (file_name ?file_name) (sub_type ?sub_type) (cid ?cid) (old_file_path ?old_file_path &: (and (or (eq ?sub_type ?file_create_new) (eq ?sub_type ?file_rename) (eq ?sub_type ?file_write)) (eq (lowcase ?file_name) "wlanapi.dll") (not (regex (lowcase ?old_file_path) "c:\\windows\\.*" 0))))) (not (file_operation_396 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (file_operation_396 (cid ?cid))))
  • btp_rule_name: file_operation_396
  • is_preventable: 1
  • supported_os: 7
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: None
  • is_xql: False
  • query_tables: None
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1689000053662
  • status_changed_by: None
  • status_changed_at: None
  • last_status_change_reason: None
  • rule_id: 542
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1670590326287
  • modify_time: 1670591050090
  • severity: SEV_030_MEDIUM
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: Probably PingCastle
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: RECONNAISSANCE

  • Indicator

    • runOnCGO: True
    • investigationType: WINDOWS_EVENT_LOG

  • Investigation

  • Windows_Event_Log

  • Filter
  • And
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_evtlog_data_fields
    • SEARCH_TYPE: REGEX
    • SEARCH_VALUE: certificateTemplates
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
    • node: attributes
  • Or
    • SEARCH_FIELD: actor_process_image_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe
  • Extra_Fields
    • 0: causality_actor_process_image_name
    • 1: os_actor_process_image_name
    • isExtended: False
    • node: xdr_actor
    • SEARCH_FIELD: causality_actor_process_image_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe
    • isExtended: True
    • node: xdr_actor
    • SEARCH_FIELD: os_actor_process_image_name
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe
    • isExtended: True
    • node: xdr_actor
    • SEARCH_FIELD: action_evtlog_event_id
    • SEARCH_TYPE: EQ
    • SEARCH_VALUE: 30
  • Extra_Fields
    • isExtended: False
  • indicator_md5: 725628dc77b3f1e3f9788d48ebfbb532
  • indicator_text: Event Log event log raw data =~ certificateTemplates AND event log id = 30 Process initiated by = Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe, cgo name = Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe, os parent name = Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.WebServices.exe
  • name: ADCS querying information via ADWS (PingCastle ?)
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1018 - Remote System Discovery
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id:
  • mitre_technique_id: T1018

  • Btp_Rule

  • Agent_Os_Windows

  • Signatureconfiguration

  • Default
  • Settings
    • action: block
    • friendlyName: ADCS querying information via ADWS (PingCastle ?)
  • Tactic_Id
  • Technique_Id
    • 0: T1018
    • biocRuleName: ADCS querying information via ADWS (PingCastle ?)
    • biocId: 542
    • additionalData: {}
    • rule_data: (deftemplate log_event_542 (slot cid)) (defrule log_event_542 (process_start (cid ?cid) (instance_id ?parent_instance_id) (process_image_name ?act_process_image_name &: (eq ?act_process_image_name "microsoft.activedirectory.webservices.exe"))) (log_event (raw_data_fields ?raw_data_fields) (instance_id ?os_act_parent_instance_id) (actor_instance_id ?act_parent_instance_id) (cid ?cid) (log_event_id ?log_event_id &: (and (regex ?raw_data_fields "certificatetemplates" 0) (and (eq ?act_process_image_name "microsoft.activedirectory.webservices.exe") (eq ?act_parent_instance_id ?parent_instance_id)) (eq ?log_event_id 30)))) (not (log_event_542 (cid ?cid))) => (assert (log_event_542 (cid ?cid))))
  • btp_rule_name: log_event_542
  • is_preventable: 1
  • supported_os: 1
  • btp_validation_error: WINDOWS_SUPPORT_ONLY
  • xql: None
  • is_xql: False
  • query_tables: None
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1670591024402
  • rule_id: 542
  • global_rule_id: NO_ID
  • mssp_global_rule_id: None
  • insert_time: 1669279818847
  • modify_time: 1669279818847
  • severity: SEV_020_LOW
  • source: frank.bussink@scrt.ch
  • comment: Might be prone to False Positives. It's just an information
  • status: ENABLED
  • category: TAMPERING
  • indicator: None
  • indicator_md5: 4d55807a2ddb8dba6626e2bd329c94ea
  • indicator_text: preset = xdr_image_load

| filter action_module_path ~= ".*.sys$"

| filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE

| filter (actor_process_signature_status = SIGNED_INVALID)

  • name: SCRT Hunt for invalid driver signature
  • mitre_technique_id_and_name: T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
  • mitre_tactic_id_and_name:
  • mitre_tactic_id:
  • mitre_technique_id: T1068
  • btp_rule: None
  • btp_rule_name: None
  • is_preventable: 0
  • supported_os: None
  • btp_validation_error: None
  • xql: {"presets": ["xdr_image_load"], "stages": [{"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$action_module_path", "OPERATOR": "REGEX", "RIGHT": ".*\.sys$", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$event_type", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}, {"FILTER": {"filter": {"OR": [{"LEFT": "$actor_process_signature_status", "OPERATOR": "EQ", "RIGHT": "$SIGNED_INVALID", "FILTER_DIALECT": "EXTENDED_FILTER_OBJ"}]}}}]}
  • is_xql: True
  • query_tables: ["xdr_data"]
  • rule_indicator_last_modified_ts: 1669279818847