auth: typos

src/modules/auth/auth.xml

@@ -252,11 +252,11 @@
         adjustment or when the current proxy is part of a cluster which is
         not time-synchronized, it's possible to receive a nonce with
         a creation time in the future. In this case if the difference is
-        greater then the value of <parameter>nonce_auth_max_drift</parameter>
+        greater than the value of <parameter>nonce_auth_max_drift</parameter>
         in seconds, the nonce is  considered stale and the request
         re-challenged. If this were not done, a dramatic time change
         backwards may lead to nonces having been generated before the
-        cange being valid for too long.
+        change being valid for too long.
       </para>
     </refsect2>
 
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@
         <literal>yes</literal>, the received <parameter>nc</parameter> value
         is remembered and checked against the value used in the previous
         digest response. For a successful authentication the received
-        <parameter>nc</parameter> must be greater then the previously
+        <parameter>nc</parameter> must be greater than the previously
         received one (See RFC 2617 for more details). This will	provide
         protection against replay attacks while still allowing credentials
         caching at the UA side.
@@ -306,21 +306,21 @@
         <serdoc:modparam module="auth">nc_array_order</serdoc:modparam>
         parameters. If this number is exceeded, older entries will be
         overwritten. As long as the maximum rate of challengeable messages
-        per average response time is lower then
+        per average response time is lower than
         <serdoc:modparam module="auth">nc_array_size</serdoc:modparam>,
         the nonce count check should work flawlessly. For optimal
         performance (maximum reuse of cache credentials)
         <serdoc:modparam module="auth">nc_array_size</serdoc:modparam>
         divided by
         <serdoc:modparam module="auth">nid_pool_no</serdoc:modparam>
-        should be lower then the message rate multiplied by the desired
+        should be lower than the message rate multiplied by the desired
         <serdoc:modparam module="auth">nonce_expire</serdoc:modparam>.
         <!-- XXX: Give an example with default nonce_expire and typical
                   RTT. -->
       </para>
       <para>
         The maximum accepted <parameter>nc</parameter> value is 255. If
-        <parameter>nc</parameter> becomes greater then this, the nonce will
+        <parameter>nc</parameter> becomes greater than this, the nonce will
         be considered stale and the UA will be re-challenged.
       </para>
       <para>
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@
         <serdoc:modparam module="auth">otn_in_flight_order</serdoc:modparam>
         parameters. If this number is exceeded, older entries will be
         overwritten. As long as the maximum rate of challengeable messages
-        per average response time is lower then
+        per average response time is lower than
         <serdoc:modparam module="auth">otn_in_flight_no</serdoc:modparam>,
         the one time nonce check should work flawlessly.
       </para>
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@
     <title>Additional Integrity Checks</title>
     <para>
       The auth module can perform additional integrity checks on the
-      authentication response inclued in a request by the client.
+      authentication response included in a request by the client.
     </para>
     <para>
       Without the extra checks, the nonce value will be used only to
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@
       MD5 hash over some selected parts of the message and another secret.
       This will be used to check if these parts of the message are the same
       when a UA retries the request with the authentication response, thus 
-      protecting from replay attacks or at least severly limiting their
+      protecting from replay attacks or at least severely limiting their
       possibility.
     </para>
     <para>

src/modules/auth/doc/auth_functions.xml

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ if (www_authenticate("realm", "subscriber")) {
     <section id="auth.f.has_credentials">
 	<title><function>has_credentials(realm)</function></title>
 	<para>
-		This function returns true of the request has Authorization or
+		This function returns true if the request has Authorization or
 		Proxy-Authorization header with provided realm. The parameter
 		can be string with pseudo-variables.
 	</para>

src/modules/auth/doc/auth_params.xml

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ modparam("auth", "qop", "auth")   # set qop=auth
 	<para>
 		If enabled the received <emphasis>nc</emphasis> value is remembered 
 		and checked against the older value (for a successful authentication
-		the received <emphasis>nc</emphasis> must be greater then the 
+		the received <emphasis>nc</emphasis> must be greater than the 
 		previously received one, see rfc2617 for more details). This will 
 		provide protection against replay attacks while still allowing
 		credentials caching at the UA side.
@@ -210,16 +210,16 @@ modparam("auth", "qop", "auth")   # set qop=auth
 		the <varname>nc_array_size</varname> or 
 		<varname>nc_array_order</varname> parameters. If this number is 
 		exceeded, older entries will be overwritten. As long as the maximum
-		rate of challengeable messages per average response time is lower then
+		rate of challengeable messages per average response time is lower than
 		<varname>nc_array_size</varname>, the <varname>nonce_count</varname>
 		checks should work flawlessly. For optimum performance (maximum reuse
 		of cache credentials) <varname>nc_array_size</varname> divided by
-		<varname>nid_pool_no</varname> should be lower then the message rate
+		<varname>nid_pool_no</varname> should be lower than the message rate
 		 multiplied by the desired <varname>nonce_expire</varname>.
 	</para>
 	<para>
 		The maximum accepted <emphasis>nc</emphasis> value is 255. If 
-		<emphasis>nc</emphasis> becomes greater then this, the nonce will be
+		<emphasis>nc</emphasis> becomes greater than this, the nonce will be
 		considered stale and the UA will be re-challenged.
 	</para>
 	<para>
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ route{
 		tracked nonces is set using the <varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname> or
 		<varname>otn_in_flight_order</varname> parameters. If this number is 
 		exceeded, older entries will be overwritten. As long as the maximum
-		rate of challengeable messages per average response time is lower then
+		rate of challengeable messages per average response time is lower than
 		<varname>otn_in_flight_no</varname>, the 
 		<varname>one_time_nonce</varname> checks should work flawlessly.
 	</para>
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ modparam("auth", "otn_in_flight_order", 23)   # 8 Mb (1Mb memory)
 	the client for authentication.</para>
 	<para>If you use multiple servers in your installation, and would like to
 	authenticate on the second server against the nonce generated at the
-	first one its necessary to explicitly set the secret to the same value
+	first one, it is necessary to explicitly set the secret to the same value
 	on all servers. However, as the use of a shared (and fixed) secret as
 	nonce is insecure, it is much better is to stay with the default. Any
 	clients should send the authenticated request to the server that 
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ modparam("auth", "nonce_expire", 600)   # Set nonce_expire to 600s
 		In some cases, like shortly after a system time backward adjustment 
 		or when the current proxy is part of a cluster which is not
 		time-synchronized, it's possible to receive a nonce with creation time
-		in the future. In this case if the difference is greater then
+		in the future. In this case if the difference is greater than
 		<varname>nonce_auth_max_drift</varname> seconds, consider the nonce
 		stale and re-challenge (otherwise after a dramatic time change
 		backwards, it might happen that some previously generated nonces will

src/modules/auth/nc.c

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int init_nonce_count()
 		return -1;
 	}else if (size*sizeof(nc_t) >= max_mem/2){
 		LM_WARN("the currently configured nc_array_size (%ld)  "
-				"would use more then 50%% of the available shared"
+				"would use more than 50%% of the available shared"
 				" memory(%ld bytes)\n", size, max_mem);
 	}
 	nc_array_size=size;
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ nid_t nc_new(nid_t id, unsigned char p)
 	unsigned int v, new_v;
 
 	n=get_nc_array_raw_idx(id, p); /* n-th nc_t */
-	i=get_nc_array_uint_idx(n);  /* aray index i, corresponding to n */
+	i=get_nc_array_uint_idx(n);  /* array index i, corresponding to n */
 	r=get_nc_int_pos(n);  /* byte/short inside the uint corresponding to n */
 	/* reset corresponding value to 0 */
 	do{
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ enum nc_check_ret nc_check_val(nid_t id, unsigned pool, unsigned int nc, int upd
 	if (unlikely(nc>=(1U<<(sizeof(nc_t)*8))))
 		return NC_TOO_BIG;
 	n=get_nc_array_raw_idx(id, pool); /* n-th nc_t */
-	i=get_nc_array_uint_idx(n);  /* aray index i, corresponding to n */
+	i=get_nc_array_uint_idx(n);  /* array index i, corresponding to n */
 	r=get_nc_int_pos(n); /* byte/short inside the uint corresponding to n */
 	do{
 		v=atomic_get_int(&nc_array[i]);

src/modules/auth/nid.h

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ extern unsigned nid_pool_no; /* number of index pools */
 
 /* id incremenet, to avoid cacheline ping-pong and cover all the
  * array locations it should be a number prime with the array size and
- * bigger then the cacheline. Since this is used also for onetime nonces
+ * bigger than the cacheline. Since this is used also for onetime nonces
  * => NID_INC/8 > CACHELINE
  * This number also limits the maximum pool/partition size, since the
  * id overflow check checks if crt_id - nonce_id >= partition_size*NID_INC
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ extern unsigned nid_pool_no; /* number of index pools */
 #define DEFAULT_NID_POOL_SIZE 1
 #define MAX_NID_POOL_SIZE    64 /* max. 6 bits used for the pool no*/
 
-#define CACHELINE_SIZE 256 /* more then most real-word cachelines */
+#define CACHELINE_SIZE 256 /* more than most real-word cachelines */
 
 /* if larger tables are needed (see NID_INC comments above), consider
  * switching to unsigned long long */

src/modules/auth/ot_nonce.c

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int init_ot_nonce()
 		return -1;
 	}else if (size/8 >= max_mem/2){
 		LM_WARN("the currently configured otn_in_flight_no (%ld)  "
-				"would use more then 50%% of the available shared"
+				"would use more than 50%% of the available shared"
 				" memory(%ld bytes)\n", size, max_mem);
 	}
 	otn_in_flight_no=size;
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ nid_t otn_new(nid_t id, unsigned char p)
 	unsigned  n, b;
 
 	n=get_otn_array_bit_idx(id, p); /* n-th bit */
-	i=get_otn_array_cell_idx(n);    /* aray index i, corresponding to n */
+	i=get_otn_array_cell_idx(n);    /* array index i, corresponding to n */
 	b=get_otn_cell_bit(n);          /* bit pos corresponding to n */
 	/* new_value = old_value with the corresponding bit zeroed */
 #ifdef OTN_CELL_T_LONG
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ enum otn_check_ret otn_check_id(nid_t id, unsigned pool)
 	if (unlikely(otn_id_check_overflow(id, pool)))
 		return OTN_ID_OVERFLOW;
 	n=get_otn_array_bit_idx(id, pool); /* n-th bit */
-	i=get_otn_array_cell_idx(n);    /* aray index i, corresponding to n */
+	i=get_otn_array_cell_idx(n);    /* array index i, corresponding to n */
 	b=get_otn_cell_bit(n);          /* bit pos corresponding to n */
 	b_mask= (otn_cell_t)1<<b;