

# A Simulator for Event-oriented Data in Flexible Assembly System Fault Prediction - DRAFT

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**Abstract—**

**Index Terms—**

## I. INTRODUCTION

This paper describes a method for simulating event-oriented data sources of a flexible assembly system including faults. Such simulator is required for creating representative corpuses of data for teaching automated learning algorithms for predictive maintenance and systemic fault detection.

Flexible assembly system was described by Donath and Graves [1] as a system consisting of a set of products each with a specified volume assembled on a workshop consisting of a fixed number of cells. In practise, a flexible assembly system contains parts and materials stored in an intermediate storage, a conveyor or crane system to move the parts, materials, intermediate assemblies and finished products between the cells, and the cells with work machines and necessary tooling to assemble and process intermediate assemblies and products. The cells might consist of for example manual assembly steps, robotic assembly cells, CNC lathes, or 3D printing.

As opposed to more specialized industrial production systems, flexible assembly systems are designed for smaller batches and greater flexibility so that the set of end products can vary more widely. For example, flexible assembly systems can be reconfigured more conveniently following the evolution of new versions of the end products. Flexibly assembly systems also allow for a wider range of customization between the different end product instances of the same product. The nature of fast evolution of configurations and workflows, and heterogeneous operating conditions make planning maintenance more challenging.

System downtime is a significant cost for flexible assembly systems. System downtime is reduced by preventive maintenance typically scheduled periodically. Recently Internet of Things and opening of the networked industrial system APIs have created new possibilities for predictive maintenance and systemic fault detection. Different sites with similar flexible automation systems have widely different environmental and workload conditions which has an impact on the wear and tear of the flexible automation system components. Taking different site environments and workloads into account when planning preventive maintenance cycles is non-trivial. There is a clear need to adapt maintenance based on actual conditions in the operation rather than by simply scheduling maintenance periodically. It is also important to indicate potential faults early to improve the response time of corrective action.

Going from preventive maintenance towards predictive maintenance optimizes and targets the maintenance related costs towards the activities that have best impact on improving the availability and operation of deployed flexible manufacturing systems. Predictive maintenance in flexible assembly systems benefits from automatic indicators for potential future faults. Current predictive maintenance systems concentrate on measuring device health for example by means of measuring temperature and vibration [?]. Less research effort is done in the context of event-oriented data sources (logs), and about systemic failures.

Evaluating novel automatic methods for fault prediction requires standard benchmarks to compare these methods against. Currently there are no standard benchmarks to test different anomaly detection methods and compare their performance against each other. Such standard benchmarks exist in other fields of machine learning, such as the MNIST handwritten digits benchmark [2]. Realistic simulations are often used [3] for domains where real data is hard to collect or where real data would be subject to business confidentiality. Training neural network and other learning systems often utilizes realistic simulations instead of real data. Real measured data is often limited in both state space and in volume, and often simulations give better results [4].

Fault-free simulations of flexible assembly systems are generally available [5] and have been studied for visualization and optimization purposes. These are not directly suitable for benchmarking fault detection methods.

## II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A standard benchmark should reflect a realistic task and it should have enough data to be useful.

Real data regarding flexible assembly system faults is not generally available, because fault data is generally subject to business confidentiality in flexible assembly industry. The generally available simulation models do not typically contain failure modes and are not typically designed to emit log structured events in a realistic fashion, but they can be used as a starting point in creating a flexible assembly system model.

To enable relevant research into anomaly detection in flexible assembly systems a realistic simulator for logged events is needed. All references to simulated faults and failure modes in the research described in this article are hypothetical and should not be considered to reflect actual characteristics of any specific existing systems. An effort is made to make the simulations contain the necessary features of generic and realistic failure modes to make the models useful for research, but for example the simulated fault frequencies and

the configuration of the flexible assembly system along with workflows and end products are arbitrary and hypothetical.

A simulation for benchmarking anomaly and fault detection methods should not be fully deterministic to reflect the real world dynamics. The simulation should also include realistic faults with possible early indicators such as variations in delays in the steps of the process. The focus of the simulator is on faults without pre-existing diagnostic fault codes, such as unexpected faults and degradation of the assembly modules and conveyors, and on systemic faults. Systemic faults in this paper mean faults and degradation of output where each of the component modules of the Flexible Assembly System are seemingly operating without faults.

### III. MODES OF FAILURES IN FLEXIBLE ASSEMBLY SYSTEMS

Flexible assembly system failures are typically component failures where a failure of a single module or a component will lead to the part of the system becoming inoperational. Since the flexible assembly systems are dynamic systems with numerous moving parts, the wear and tear of the components and tools are a significant source of faults.

In addition to the component failures, certain critical systemic failures can cause downtime, such as power loss and network communication failures. The critical systemic failures mentioned don't typically show any indication before they happen so predictive maintenance has little potential to be applied there. In addition to these critical system failures, the whole system can exhibit modes of failure and degradation which are not directly attributable to single component degradation or failure. Some of these might be caused by external factors, such as accidents and human errors, but also for example by timing issues in the whole process causing unexpected queues or traffic jams.

Tool wear and tear depends on the workload. Typically tools that wear out fast, for example multiple times for one unit of work in a cell, receive much attention and such tools are generally well maintained. Tools that have wear and tear but have longer life spans are more susceptible to being overlooked by operators and might have some indicators of degrading before a failure. Cranes, hatches and conveyors have relatively long life spans and are primarily maintained in periodic preventive maintenance. If we could get indicators for impending failure for these components, the periodical maintenance could be scheduled earlier to prevent downtime.

In addition to these physical faults the flexible assembly system can suffer from human errors. Human operator can inadvertently misconfigure the flexible assembly system so that its operating mode changes unexpectedly, for example by disabling a cell which can lead to the system stopping without a proper failure. In addition to configuration errors, human operators might fail in manual assembly steps for example by pressing the button to mark the step as completed too quickly. The flexible assembly system might also get in incompatible materials, parts or replacement tools and fail when trying to use them.

There has lately been an increase of computer crime against industrial networks as the devices and systems become more

connected. Nation states execute industrial espionage and even sabotage against each other [6]. An electronic sabotage attack might present itself much like a human misconfiguration error, and would be potentially detected in a similar fashion even if the attack itself would not be directly visible in the logs as anomalous activity.

Modelling the failure events can be based on Process Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA, PFMEA) [7] methodology which produces lists of failure modes of components in an assembly and machining process, and the respective effects of failures. For the purposes of learning systems it is not required that these failure modes and their frequencies are perfectly realistic. However, the simulated failure modes should be expected to reasonably reflect the potentially detectable and anomalous failure modes of the process. Ultimately, the learning system should model the correct operation of the system and detect deviances, rather than to learn specific failure modes.

For the purposes of describing the fault types we divide system components into slowly and quickly degrading tools and auxilliary components. Tools are the components such as drill bits which are directly used to assemble or machine the product. The auxilliary components are components with less expected wear and tear which are used to transport the products, inspect the intermediate assemblies or dispense assembly components.

The fault types and distribution depend on the assembly system and on the products being assembled. For one specific assembly line [8] the common fault types were feeder errors, robot insertion errors, robot grip errors, unqualified parts, fixture position errors, emergency stops, robot gripper collision, grip sensor line break, and inspection equipment failures. The root causes for these are wear and tear, and incompatible parts.

For useful anomaly detection systems we need to concentrate on faults that are unexpected without pre-existing diagnostic error codes, and that potentially have early indications in collected event-based logs. Early indication in this context means that the error can be detected in the system logs before the failure becomes otherwise evident. The table I summarizes the classes of faults.

### IV. FLEXIBLE ASSEMBLY SYSTEM MODEL

The simulation consists of a realistic model of a flexible assembly system with a class of faults randomly injected into the process. The simulation will not be fully deterministic and contains soft faults which do not affect operation in addition to hard faults which result in immediate downtime. Flexible Assembly System scheduling and production optimization is an active research field. Different scheduling models can be implemented into the simulation, but the provided initial example is a simple sequence of mostly independent steps, as it roughly matches the studied Chrysler transmission assembly line.

The simulator is implemented in Python and it generates a JSON file which models the logs from the system. The log message fields are defined in Table ?? and an example message is shown in ??.

TABLE I  
TABLE OF RECOGNIZED FAULT TYPES IN FLEXIBLE ASSEMBLY SYSTEMS

| Fault type   | Unexpected faults | Potentially has an early indication | Useful target for anomaly detection |
|--|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Auxilliary component wear and tear   | X                 | X                                   | X                                   |
| Cell operation failures (feeder error, insertion error, grip error, fixture position errors) |                   |                                     |                                     |
| Critical systemic failures (power, network, emergency stop)                                  | X                 |                                     |                                     |
| Human error, failed manual step  | X                 | X                                   | X                                   |
| Incompatible parts, materials or replacement tools   | X                 |                                     |                                     |
| Systemic failures (e.g. accidents and cyberattacks)  | X                 | X                                   | X                                   |
| Tool wear and tear for quickly degrading tools (e.g. drill bits)                             |                   | X                                   |                                     |
| Tool wear and tear for slowly degrading tools (e.g. screwdriver)                             | X                 | X                                   | X                                   |

The simulation framework consists of a scheduler that takes the next event from the event queue and applies it to the respective module. The simulated modules execute when events are applied to them and generate new events and immediate log entries with timestamps and other metadata. The simulated modules have optional active failure modes that affect the simulated operation of the component through generated log messages or the subsequent generated events. Failure modes are set up to the simulated modules in a separate failure module. The overall framework sets up the simulation, that is the configuration of the process, bootstrap events and optional failures.

#### A. Normal Operation of the Simulated System

The simulated hypothetical system assembles and tools a car transmission block loosely inspired by a Youtube video of Chrysler transmission assembly [9]. The workflow consists of several manual assembly steps in separate cells and transporting the subassemblies between the cells by the means of cranes and conveyors. Multiple transmission blocks are being assembled simultaneously in separate, independent cells.

The transmission component consists of four subassemblies. The main sequence starts from the frame of the transmission block and continues through several manual steps done in separate cells. The steps of the main sequence are given in the Tables II and III. Each step can contain a separate sequence of events and associated log messages. The mean durations for manual steps can vary in normal operation  $\pm$  thirty percent. The mean durations for automatic steps can vary  $\pm$  five percent.

TABLE II  
TABLE OF THE STEPS 1-16 IN THE MAIN ASSEMBLY PROCESS

| Step | Description                  | Duration | Log messages                                  | Potential failures |
|------|------------------------------|----------|---|--------------------|
| 1    | Crane                        | 30 s     | Going forward, stopping, going back, stopping | Wear & tear        |
| 2    | Manual inspection            | 37 s     | OK pressed                                    | Failed manual step |
| 3    | Conveyor                     | 30 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell                   | Wear & tear        |
| 4    | Bowl feeder gives components | 5 s      | Given   | Wear & tear        |
| 5    | Add components               | 21 s     | OK pressed                                    | Failed manual step |
| 6    | Conveyor                     | 30 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell                   | Wear & tear        |
| 7    | Bowl feeder gives components | 10 s     | Given   | Wear & tear        |
| 8    | Add components               | 34 s     | OK pressed                                    | Failed manual step |
| 9    | Conveyor                     | 30 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell                   | Wear & tear        |
| 10   | Crane with sub-assembly A    | 10 s     | Going forward, stopping, going back, stopping | Wear & tear        |
| 11   | Combine with subassembly A   | 34 s     | OK pressed                                    | Failed manual step |
| 12   | Conveyor                     | 30 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell                   | Wear & tear        |
| 13   | Conveyor with subassembly B  | 10 s     | To cell, stop                                 | Wear & tear        |
| 14   | Combine with subassembly B   | 35 s     | OK pressed                                    | Failed manual step |
| 15   | Conveyor                     | 30 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell                   | Wear & tear        |
| 16   | Bowl feeder gives components | 5 s      | Given   | Wear & tear        |

The production frequency of the transmission blocks depends on the slowest step as in this case there is only one cell for one step and no parallel work is possible within one cell. The slowest step takes about 76 seconds. In this hypothetical assembly plant, new transmission block frames are added every 100 seconds and the final transmission blocks are being produced roughly in the same interval. This means that there will be at maximum roughly seven transmission blocks in different stages being produced at the same time.

#### B. Simulated Failure Modes

It is regrettable that real data on fault modes in real flexible assembly systems is not publicly available, but in any case it is possible to make reasonable models based on existing data from other analogous sources such as [10] and [11]. Specialized simulations designed to reflect specific assembly

TABLE III  
TABLE OF THE STEPS 17-31 IN THE MAIN ASSEMBLY PROCESS

| Step | Description                  | Duration | Log messages                | Potential failures |
|------|------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------|--------------------|
| 17   | Conveyor with cover          | 10 s     | To cell, stop               | Wear & tear        |
| 18   | Add cover and bolts          | 76 s     | OK pressed                  | Failed manual step |
| 19   | Conveyor                     | 30 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell | Wear & tear        |
| 20   | Tighten the bolts            | 28 s     | OK pressed                  | Failed manual step |
| 21   | Conveyor                     | 30 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell | Wear & tear        |
| 22   | Conveyor with subassembly C  | 10 s     | To cell, stop               | Wear & tear        |
| 23   | Combine with subassembly C   | 60 s     | OK pressed                  | Failed manual step |
| 24   | Conveyor                     | 21 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell | Wear & tear        |
| 25   | Tighten the bolts            | 16 s     | OK pressed                  | Failed manual step |
| 26   | Conveyor                     | 21 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell | Wear & tear        |
| 27   | Bowl feeder gives components | 5 s      | Given                       | Wear & tear        |
| 28   | Add components               | 11 s     | OK pressed                  | Failed manual step |
| 29   | Conveyor                     | 21 s     | To cell, stop, to next cell | Wear & tear        |
| 30   | Tighten the bolts            | 32 s     | OK pressed                  | Failed manual step |
| 31   | Conveyor                     | 21 s     | To output gate              | Wear & tear        |

line conditions can be based on process FMEA reports. In the example described in this article, the fault modes are arbitrary, but can be reasonably expected to roughly reflect real conditions.

The previous subsection describes the normal operation of the system. The failure modes of the manual steps include human errors by pressing an OK button signifying a completed manual assembly step prematurely without properly executing the step. This leads to the next manual step failing and returning the block back to the previous step or removing it from the assembly line altogether. Misconfiguration can cause different kinds of results, but here we assume some work step is skipped so that it is not noticed and doesn't directly prevent other steps from being executed. Failed manual steps also include wear and tear on the tools which gradually increases the duration of the work before causing a fault. The human operator can also tire and lose concentration when doing lots of repetitive steps. There are studies showing how speed performance degrades in general in a linear fashion in humans under fatigue and boredom, for example [12]. Switching human operators during the day might change the effective performance slightly.

The automatic steps wear and tear cause gradually increasing durations for the step also until at some point the step stops functioning and intermediate assemblies start piling up

TABLE IV  
TABLE OF THE SIMULATED SYSTEMIC FAILURES

| Failure     | Description  | Effect   |
|-------------|--|--|
| Accident    | A human assembly worker becomes incapacitated for a medical reason | Combine with subassembly B step stops  |
| Cyberattack | An attacker disables a crane by flooding it with commands          | The Crane with subassembly A is repeatedly moving to end position without transporting the subassembly A |

until a fault is signalled because of exceeding the limits of intermediate storage space.

Duration increases before a fault are non-deterministic and for some faults they don't actually happen before the fault. The profile of the duration increase depends on the type of device used for the step. Generally mechanical wear and tear effect on machine health profile follows an accelerating curve downwards [13], [14]. For the purposes of simulation I assume machine health has an approximately linear effect on machine performance measured in delays and success rates in applicable types of faults.

Simulated wear and tear causes two types of delay profiles. First, a continuous wear and tear typically causes no measurable delays at first, but when the degradation accumulates the delay increases following a roughly exponential curve ???. Second, for certain steps, such as taking bolts from the bowl feeder a human operator might fail to grab a bolt from time to time. Typically human operator tries again and succeeds. The frequency of the failure increases slowly and roughly following an exponential curve until the failure rate becomes apparent and causes the operator to take corrective action, typically causing downtime. These failures cause a random delay if they happen. This characteristic delay profile is depicted in ??.

While the directly visible fault modes are easier to model and characterise, complex flexible assembly systems also have warnings and trace messages which are signalled into logs, but are not signalled to operators in real time because most of the time these messages are not a cause for concern. An example of such a signal could be for example a health warning of a device that happens spuriously once every now and then for normal operation, but increases in frequency when the device actually starts to fail. There can also be log messages for example for electrical switches turning on and off when the working step is active, but never while the step is not active. Anomalies in such messages are an indicator of potential future fault.

In addition to unexpected component failures, we have to simulate systemic failures. The simulated systemic failures and their effects are listed in the table IV. To have a meaningful simulation of a system under systemic faults we only need to simulate some representative fault conditions.

When there are human operators or assembly line workers

in the assembly process, there are always human errors and accidents. For the purposes of this simulation we assume a specific assembly worker has become incapacitated for a medical reason. This is a good target for anomaly detection, because sometimes there is no specific fault code triggered if the human operator stops performing the assembly step.

Cyberattacks are becoming more frequent in the industrial domain. Both Stuxnet and BlackEnergy have been developed to specifically target SCADA industrial control systems. These malware frameworks are modular with switchable components for different vectors, different targets and different functions. In practice, these have been used for industrial espionage and sabotage. For the purposes of this article, only sabotage is considered.

There are at least two methods for how these kinds of malware can affect the industrial operations after successfully penetrating such facilities. One, the control computer systems are destroyed by wiping the disks and shutting them down. BlackEnergy malware successfully shutdown an Ukrainian Prykarpattyoblenego electric utility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblask with this mechanism in 2015 December 23th. Two, a tailored attack is implemented, so that specific physical vulnerabilities are abused in the plant systems. Stuxnet allegedly used a special function to affect Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges in a subtle way to causing the centrifuges to tear themselves apart.

This kind of sabotage is a good target for anomaly detection, because the effects and failures they cause are unexpected and it is possible that the primary control systems have been disabled so they are incapable of handling faults in the normal way. For this example simulation, we disable the Crane with subassembly A by flooding it with commands to repeatedly transport it to the other end position. The hypothetical attacker assumes this causes the system to jam up as the products are not being transported to the next assembly cells. The attacker also assumes that this does not trigger a fault code as the crane is technically functioning perfectly.

## V. IMPLEMENTATION

The FAS Simulator [15] is implemented in Python as a discrete event simulator. Each step of the assembly process is an actor which receives and generates delayed events in model time. Each step of the assembly process manages its own internal state, and possible failure modes.

The example simulation consists of stereotypical models of the steps of the process with input signals and configurable output signals. For example, simulating the operation of a crane an instance of a module named Crane is configured and added to the respective position in the process in relation to other module instances. The Crane module maintains an internal queue of items to transport, and generates delayed output events for each of the input event in sequence, so that only one item is transported at a time. This is in contrast to conveyor module instances which don't have an internal queue, as the conveyors transport the items independently and in parallel.

The simulation is set up by first defining the topology of the process by instantiating the respective modules and

configuring their bindings to other modules. The actual simulation is done simply by triggering the global process inputs as required, causing sequences of events being generated accordingly.

The events are logged in JSON with a timestamp and an event type, resembling logs in a real Flexible Assembly System. The logs are not exported to Mining eXtensible Markup Language (MXML) format, because MXML requires that separate process instances are identified.

The simulator in principle allows defining different kinds of discrete event simulators. Several specific types of simulations are pre-defined for the purposes of benchmarking different modelling approaches. These pre-defined simulations vary in complexity and length from trivial one item at a time sequences to complex multiple items at once simulations. Each type of simulation can also be configured to fail in specific ways to test different failure detection approaches. All the simulations are based on the Flexible Assembly System defined in this article and the simulations are stochastic in respect to delays between steps.

## VI. MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION

Mathematically, the FAS Simulator can be described as a set of independent sequences each describing a successful assembly of one product instance shuffled, or interleaved together. For simplicity we consider only sequences where the assembly line is run successfully from empty start state to empty end state without modelling delays and queues. A formal language that accepts such sequences is called shuffled language [16]. These languages are context-sensitive, so modelling methods relating to regular and context-free languages are inadequate. For example Langer et al. [17] showed that Angluin learner was able to learn small toy examples very well, but didn't work very well for a real world example of a stream of events recorded from a CAN bus of the powertrain network of an electric vehicle.

FMS processes are often modelled as colored Petri nets [18], which require that the process instances are known for log messages. In practice, the process instances for log messages can only be known in the process if the process is at least implicitly known in advance. For the general case we do not know which events correspond to which process instances, and some systemic events in fact might affect multiple process instances at once. As in this case process instances are not known, and all events are interleaved together for each process instance running concurrently, the most appropriate formal model would be a Petri Net.

Automatic deinterleaving the logs and deducing the process instances for the log messages would simplify the model generators and models required for evaluating the allowed sequences. For example, if the log events contained the identifier of the product item under the assembly step, anomaly detection would be much easier but such detection algorithms would not generalize as well to new environments where such information is not available.

## VII. PRACTICAL EVALUATION

The FAS Simulator is evaluated by testing several methods for inferring the hidden process behind the event sequences and existing methods of fault detection for the event sequences. The simulation is considered useful if it can be reasonably expected to mirror the real world contingencies and patterns, and if it is not completely trivial to learn or infer by existing methods. If the simulator creates event sequences that are challenging to learn by existing methods, then it is useful as a benchmark in relation to improving those methods and in creating new ones.

For the purposes of this article, we will only consider methods which are not trained based on known error conditions beforehand. Thus, the failure prediction challenge becomes a challenge of learning the correct operation of the system and flagging any inconsistencies and anomalies.

For evaluation purposes, we will use a generated fault-free event sequence with first one complete sequence for one item only, then for 20 items simultaneously going through the system, and finally 50 items being assembled in the system simultaneously in the same log file. This results in a log file with a sequence of 2627 ( $= 37 \cdot 31$ ) events of 35 different event types. A depiction of the simulated event sequence is shown in the Figure 1. The first item goes through the process alone, so the events on the left side of the graph are in perfect, deterministic order from the bottom to the top. However, for multiple parallel items being processed it becomes evident that the previous event doesn't in itself completely determine the next event. This indeterminate order of sequential events is shown in a zoomed portion of the graph in the Figure 2. Some queue effects are also visible in the later parts of the sequences.

For evaluating whether there is enough information in the sequence to determine some structure in the model, the sequence was visualized as colored pixels [3]. If human eye can make out some structure in the sequence, then in principle it is possible for the automated algorithms to do so also. To assist the eye, the pixel colors are chosen from an ordered color map, and the states are indexed in the order they are met in the log.

There is also a sonification [?] of the event log generated with timestamps and delays taken into account [19]. Delays bring new features into the model, and we can immediately note that certain events happen practically simultaneously (as multiple log lines are generated at the same event). Also, slower tempo tells us that less is going on in the assembly line, and this could in principle give us a baseline for decomposing the canon-like interleaving of separate process instances from the whole. If a human test subject can discern between the proper operation of the assembly line from random, or anomalous operation by the event log sounds, then a machine could in principle be able to learn to do so also from the raw logs.

We know that material balance requires that each log event strictly associated to a later part of process requires the number of requisite steps before it can be executed, and therefore the associated log events must be present. Analogously this relates




Fig. 1. A representative log of event types graphed against time




Fig. 2. A detail of the graphed log of events. The lines connect the events in sequence, showing the indeterministic order

to the principles of stoichiometry and material balance used in chemistry and industrial processes.

**TODO:** Compare with real logs, salient details.

In process mining there are several approaches in automatically extracting such models such as Alpha algorithm and its variants, genetic process mining, heuristic process mining, multi phase mining, and region-based process mining. Alpha algorithm only work well for simple processes, and in general these algorithms work with log messages labelled with the process instance. These algorithms are not very robust against noise in the logs. Flexible Manufacturing Systems are reconfigured often for different workloads and manually reconfiguring the anomaly detection process model each time would be costly.

In addition, the basic business process mining algorithms cannot discover controlled choices where previous process states determine the future transitions more than one step ahead. This makes it impossible to detect deviances in such cases. Process sequences with common intermediate states are very common in automatic systems because certain generic events often occur between events which are more strictly bound to specific process states. Some Alpha algorithm vari-




Fig. 3. The event sequence as color pixels from left to right, top to bottom, padded in the end with zeros.




Fig. 4. A trivial DFA interpreting the events as both the states and the transitions

ants, such as  $\alpha^{++}$  [20] can discover some simple cases of controlled choice, but is not applicable for logs not labeled with process instances.

### VIII. RESULTS

A trivial DFA model from interpreting all the observed events as both transitions and states is depicted in the Figure 4. This DFA accepts any sequence consisting of transitions between any two events observed in the training data. The trivial DFA cannot be minimized by Moore minimization, as there are no two states with exactly the same outwards transitions at least in the training sequence tested. It is evident that because of parallel processing of multiple items in the FAS System, almost any state transition is in practice possible even in fault-free sequences, but some didn't happen in the training data. The trivial DFA model is incapable of inferring higher level patterns from the sequences, and would simultaneously make a great number of false positive and false negative errors. This result is in line with regular language automatas being inadequate in modelling shuffled languages.

### IX. CONCLUSION

This study presents a benchmark model for validating anomaly detection methods for flexible assembly systems using log structured data. Existing systems for predictive maintenance concentrate on measuring health of a separate devices based on typical degradation characteristics for such devices. They also concentrate on continuous measurement data instead of log entries.

The diagnostic data for flexible assembly systems is a closely guarded secret for business reasons, but it is possible to make reasonable models of faults based on other analogous sources.

The flexible assembly system simulator, FAS Simulator, is published in GitHub [15] as open source. This kind of simulator would have little realism, and in fact little use unless it was continuously developed in dialogue with real flexible assembly systems. While the simulation approach adds an indirection between real data and developed methods, it is necessary to veil the business critical real fault and diagnostic data of the fast assembly systems and to make the different methods comparable. The simulator also provides means to incorporate new types of failures and test anomaly detection methods in a quick iteration.

Additional research is needed to improve this benchmark simulation by using experiences from real flexible manufacturing systems and their modes of failure and respective future fault indicators. For example, continuous measurement values from temperature, acoustic and vibration sensors would be good targets to simulate.

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