Performance evaluation of a new side-channel-resistant coordinate system for elliptic curves

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Abstract. Edwards recently introduced a new coordinate system for elliptic curves. This paper evaluates the cost of the new coordinate system for cryptographic applications. In particular, this paper sets a new speed record for side-channel-resistant multi-scalar multiplication on elliptic curves over fields of large characteristic. Each unified addition-ordoubling in the new coordinate system costs only 10 field multiplications and 1 field squaring, when curve parameters are chosen to be small. The previous record was the Hessian coordinate system, where each unified addition-or-doubling costs 12 field multiplications. This paper also sets some new speed records outside the side-channel context, for example for fixed-base-point single-scalar multiplication.

Keywords: elliptic curves, efficient implementation, side-channel countermeasures, unified addition formulas

1 Introduction

The core operations in elliptic-curve cryptography are single-scalar multiplication $(m, P \mapsto mP)$, double-scalar multiplication $(m, n, P, Q \mapsto mP + nQ)$, etc. This paper analyzes the performance of these operations using a recently suggested coordinate system for non-binary elliptic curves.

The new coordinate system turns out to be particularly attractive for cryptographic hardware and embedded systems requiring protection against side-channel attacks: the new coordinate system allows a smaller and faster unified addition-or-doubling operation than the Hessian coordinate system. The new coordinate system is also useful outside the unified context, especially for multiple scalars and for fixed base points.

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Background. Edwards pointed out in [14] that elliptic curves could be transformed to the shape $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + x^2y^2)$, with (0, c) as neutral element and with the surprisingly simple and symmetric addition law

$$(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2) \mapsto \left(\frac{x_1 y_2 + y_1 x_2}{c(1 + x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2)}, \frac{y_1 y_2 - x_1 x_2}{c(1 - x_1 x_2 y_1 y_2)}\right).$$

Section 2 of this paper explains in detail how to transform an elliptic curve from short Weierstrass form $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ to the slightly more general shape $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$, with the addition law

$$(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2) \mapsto \left(\frac{x_1y_2 + y_1x_2}{c(1 + dx_1x_2y_1y_2)}, \frac{y_1y_2 - x_1x_2}{c(1 - dx_1x_2y_1y_2)}\right).$$

Specifically, Section 2 explains how the curve parameters (c, d) are related to the Weierstrass parameters (a, b), and how (x, y) is related to (X, Y).

Of course, one does not need to start with Weierstrass form. One can simply choose c,d and consider the curve $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$ with the above addition law. Assume that $c\neq 0$, that $d\neq 0$, and that $e\neq 0$, where $e=1-dc^4$; the curve is then birationally equivalent to the elliptic curve $V^2=(U+e)(U^2+4U+4e)$ by the map $(x,y)\mapsto (U,V)=(-2ey/(y-c),-2ec(c^2dy^2-1)x/(y-c)^2)$. The addition law corresponds to the standard addition law on the elliptic curve.

Main results of this paper. How fast are elliptic-curve computations on the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$?

As usual we count the number of operations in the underlying field. We keep separate tallies of the number of

- general multiplications (each costing M),
- squarings (each costing S),
- multiplications by c (each costing \mathbf{c}),
- multiplications by d (each costing \mathbf{d}), and
- additions/subtractions (each costing **a**).

The costs $\mathbf{M}, \mathbf{S}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{a}$ depend on the choice of platform, on the choice of finite field, and on the choice of c and d. For example, d can always be chosen to be extremely small, making \mathbf{d} negligible.

This paper shows that

- one can perform an inversion-free doubling using $6\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$;
- one can perform a mixed addition (inversion-free with one input affine) using $9\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$;
- one can perform an inversion-free addition using 10M + 1S + 1c + 1d + 7a; and
- one can perform a unified inversion-free addition-or-doubling using 10M + 1S + 1c + 1d + 7a.

See Section 3 for details of these computations.

The rest of this introduction compares these results to previous results, first for the same four operations and then for five higher-level operations.

Comparison to previous addition speeds. In this comparison we assume for simplicity that $\mathbf{d} = \mathbf{a} = 0$: we ignore the costs of additions, subtractions, and multiplications by small constants. Consider, for example, the usual Jacobian-coordinate doubling algorithm in the case $a_4 = -3$: there are 4 squarings, 4 general multiplications, 5 additions and subtractions, and 5 multiplications by the constants 2, 3, 4, 8, 8. We summarize this cost as $4\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S}$. The improved algorithm in [3, page 16] involves 5 squarings, 3 general multiplications, 8 additions and subtractions, and 4 multiplications by small constants; we summarize this cost as $3\mathbf{M} + 5\mathbf{S}$. A similar multiplication-for-squaring tradeoff is possible for addition in Jacobian and Chudnovsky coordinates, according to [3, page 17], and is used in our operation counts without further comment.

We do not assume that $\mathbf{c} = 0$. Some applications can take advantage of multiplying by a constant c, and some applications can choose curves where c is small, but other applications cannot.

Inversion-free doubling in most previous coordinate systems is faster than inversion-free doubling in the new coordinate system:

System	Cost of doubling
Projective	6M + 5S + 1c; see [13, page 281]
This paper	$6\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c}$
Hessian	$6\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S}$; see [15, page 405, display 9]
Jacobi quartic	$1\mathbf{M} + 9\mathbf{S} + 3\mathbf{c}$; see [6, page 5, display 11]
Jacobian	$2\mathbf{M} + 7\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c}$
Jacobian/Chudnovsky if $a_4 = -3$	3M + 5S
Jacobi intersection	$ 4\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} $; see [20, page 397, long display]

But mixed addition (affine plus inversion-free producing inversion-free) in the new coordinate system is faster than mixed addition in previous systems if $\mathbf{c}/\mathbf{M} < 1 - \mathbf{S}/\mathbf{M}$:

System	Cost of mixed addition
Jacobi intersection	11M + 2S + 1c; see [20, page 396, long display]
Projective	9M + 2S; see [13, page 281]
Jacobi quartic	$8\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} + 3\mathbf{c}$; see [6, page 6, Figure 1]
Jacobian/Chudnovsky	[8M + 3S; see [13, page 284]]
Hessian	10M; see [15, Section 5, first paragraph]
This paper	$9\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c}$

Non-mixed addition in the new coordinate system is impressively fast—faster than all previous systems (disregarding the extreme case $\mathbf{c}/\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{S}/\mathbf{M} = 1$):

System	Cost of non-mixed addition
Jacobian	$11\mathbf{M} + 5\mathbf{S}$
Jacobi intersection	$13\mathbf{M} + 2\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c}$; see [20, page 396, long display]
Projective	12M + 2S; see [13, page 281]
Chudnovsky	$10\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S}$
Jacobi quartic	$10\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} + 3\mathbf{c}$; see [6, page 6, Figure 1]
Hessian	12 M ; see [15, page 407, Figure 1]
This paper	$10\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c}$

Similar comments apply to unified addition-or-doubling:

System	Cost of unified addition-or-doubling
Jacobian	11M + 6S + 1c; see [8, page 339, bottom]
Jacobian if $a_4 = -1$	13M + 3S; see [8, page 340, top]
Jacobi intersection	$13\mathbf{M} + 2\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c}$; see [20, page 396, long display]
Jacobi quartic	$10\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} + 3\mathbf{c}$; see [6, page 6, Figure 1]
Hessian	12 M ; see [15, page 408]
This paper	$10\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c}$

Comparison to previous speeds for multi-scalar multiplication. The general multi-scalar multiplication problem is to compute $\sum n_i P_i$ given integers n_i and curve points P_i . Specific problems are obtained by specifying the number of points, by specifying which points are known in advance, by specifying which integers are known in advance, etc.

The classic solutions to multi-scalar multiplication problems—see [2] and [12] for surveys—are obtained by combining doublings, additions, and mixed additions in a pattern that depends on the integers n_i .

For example, the popular JSF approach to computing $n_1P_1 + n_2P_2$, given b-bit integers n_1, n_2 and curve points $P_1, P_2, P_1 \pm P_2$ in affine coordinates, uses about b doublings and (for average n_1, n_2) about 0.5b mixed additions. So we tally the cost of 1 doubling and 0.5 mixed additions:

System	Cost of 1 doubling and 0.5 mixed additions
Projective	$10.5\mathbf{M} + 6\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 15.3\mathbf{M}$
This paper	$10.5\mathbf{M} + 4.5\mathbf{S} + 1.5\mathbf{c} \approx 14.1\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi quartic	$5\mathbf{M} + 10.5\mathbf{S} + 4.5\mathbf{c} \approx 13.4\mathbf{M}$
Hessian	$11\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} \approx 13.4\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian	$6\mathbf{M} + 8.5\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 12.8\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi intersection	$9.5\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S} + 0.5\mathbf{c} \approx 12.7\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian/Chudnovsky if $a_4 = -3$	$7M + 6.5S \approx 12.2M$

The approximations " \approx " in this table (and in the tables below) are based on the standard, although debatable, approximations $\mathbf{S} \approx 0.8\mathbf{M}$ and $\mathbf{c} \approx 0\mathbf{M}$.

As a general rule, more points—and more fixed points—produce larger ratios between the number of additions and the number of doublings. For example, the accelerated ECDSA verification method in [1, page 9] uses about b/3 doublings and about b/2 = 1.5(b/3) mixed additions. So we tally the cost of 1 doubling and 1.5 mixed additions:

System	Cost of 1 doubling and 1.5 mixed additions
Projective	$19.5\mathbf{M} + 8\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 25.9\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi intersection	$20.5\mathbf{M} + 6\mathbf{S} + 1.5\mathbf{c} \approx 25.3\mathbf{M}$
This paper	$19.5\mathbf{M} + 5.5\mathbf{S} + 2.5\mathbf{c} \approx 23.9\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi quartic	$13\mathbf{M} + 13.5\mathbf{S} + 7.5\mathbf{c} \approx 23.8\mathbf{M}$
Hessian	$21\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} \approx 23.4\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian	$14\mathbf{M} + 11.5\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 23.2\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian/Chudnovsky if $a_4 = -3$	$15\mathbf{M} + 9.5\mathbf{S} \approx 22.6\mathbf{M}$

One can save an initial inversion at the cost of changing about half of the mixed additions to non-mixed additions; this is worthwhile on platforms where inversion is extremely expensive, such as embedded systems equipped with typical multiplication coprocessors. So we tally the cost of 1 doubling, 0.75 non-mixed additions, and 0.75 mixed additions:

System	Cost of 1 doubling, 0.75 adds, 0.75 mixed adds
Projective	$21.75\mathbf{M} + 8\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 28.15\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi intersection	$22\mathbf{M} + 6\mathbf{S} + 1.5\mathbf{c} \approx 26.8\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian	$16.25\mathbf{M} + 13\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 26.65\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian if $a_4 = -3$	$17.25\mathbf{M} + 11\mathbf{S} \approx 26.05\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi quartic	$14.5\mathbf{M} + 13.5\mathbf{S} + 7.5\mathbf{c} \approx 25.3\mathbf{M}$
Hessian	$22.5\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} \approx 24.9\mathbf{M}$
Chudnovsky if $a_4 = -3$	$16.5\mathbf{M} + 10.25\mathbf{S} \approx 24.7\mathbf{M}$
This paper	$20.25\mathbf{M} + 5.5\mathbf{S} + 2.5\mathbf{c} \approx 24.65\mathbf{M}$

Doublings become even less important as the number of scalars increases. In particular, almost all doublings disappear in the context of fixed-point scalar multiplication. For example, a *b*-bit fixed-point single-scalar multiplication can be computed as a 24-scalar multiplication with about b/24 doublings and about 15b/64 = 5.625(b/24) mixed additions, using a fixed "comb" table containing 90 points:

System	Cost of 1 doubling, 5.625 mixed additions
Jacobi intersection	$65.875\mathbf{M} + 14.25\mathbf{S} + 5.625\mathbf{c} \approx 77.275\mathbf{M}$
Projective	$56.625\mathbf{M} + 16.25\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 69.625\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi quartic	$46\mathbf{M} + 25.875\mathbf{S} + 19.875\mathbf{c} \approx 66.7\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian	$47\mathbf{M} + 23.875\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} \approx 66.1\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian/Chudnovsky if $a_4 = -3$	$48\mathbf{M} + 21.875\mathbf{S} \approx 65.5\mathbf{M}$
Hessian	$62.25\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} \approx 64.65\mathbf{M}$
This paper	$56.625\mathbf{M} + 9.625\mathbf{S} + 6.625\mathbf{c} \approx 64.325\mathbf{M}$

Comparison to previous speeds with side-channel countermeasures.

The above approaches are often unacceptable for cryptographic hardware and embedded systems. Many secret bits of the integers n_i are leaked, through the pattern of doublings and mixed additions and non-mixed additions, to side-channel attacks such as simple power analysis.

One response—proposed by Liardet and Smart ([20], Jacobi intersection), Joye and Quisquater ([15], Hessian), Billet and Joye ([6], Jacobi quartic), and Brier and Joye ([8], Jacobian)—is to hide the pattern of doublings, mixed additions, and non-mixed additions by carrying out all of the operations with unified addition-or-doubling formulas. For example, b doublings and b/2 mixed additions would be converted into 3b/2 unified addition-or-doubling operations:

System	Cost of 1.5 unified addition-or-doubling operations
Jacobian	$16.5\mathbf{M} + 9\mathbf{S} + 1.5\mathbf{c} \approx 23.7\mathbf{M}$
Jacobian if $a_4 = -1$	$19.5\mathbf{M} + 4.5\mathbf{S} \approx 23.1\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi intersection	$19.5\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{S} + 1.5\mathbf{c} \approx 21.9\mathbf{M}$
Jacobi quartic	$15\mathbf{M} + 4.5\mathbf{S} + 4.5\mathbf{c} \approx 18.6\mathbf{M}$
Hessian	18M
This paper	$15\mathbf{M} + 1.5\mathbf{S} + 1.5\mathbf{c} \approx 16.2\mathbf{M}$

The Hamming weight in the single-scalar case, and the total number of operations in the general case, is still leaked but can be shielded at low cost in other ways. Of course, at a lower level, field operations must be individually shielded. In particular, an operation counted as **M** must be carried out by a multiplication unit whose time, power consumption, etc. do not depend on the inputs. Even if the inputs happen to be the same, and even if a faster squaring unit is available, the multiplication must not be carried out by the squaring unit. An operation counted as **S** can be carried out by a faster squaring unit whose time, power consumption, etc. do not depend on the input.

The new coordinate system can be combined with various countermeasures against differential power attacks:

- Randomized representations of scalars as addition-subtraction chains; see, e.g., [22] and [20, Section 4]. The coordinate system supports arbitrary additions and subtractions.
- Randomized scalars; see, e.g., [11, Section 5.1].
- Randomized representations of points; see, e.g., [11, Section 5.3]. Our point representation is inversion-free and can be scaled freely.
- Randomized points, for example computing nP as n(P+Q)-nQ; see, e.g., [11, Section 5.2].

We suggest using a combination of these countermeasures. In particular, point randomization appears to be vital to counteract Goubin-type attacks. We also comment that our formulas are unified without any dummy operations; dummy operations would allow easy fault attacks.

To finish our comparison we mention another approach to high-speed sidechannel-resistant multi-scalar multiplications, namely Montgomery coordinates. These coordinates do not support addition $P, Q \mapsto P + Q$, and therefore do not fit into our previous tables, but they nevertheless support fast computation of $P - Q, P, Q \mapsto P + Q$. Montgomery coordinates appear to be the fastest way to handle single-scalar variable-point multiplications. On the other hand, they do not seem to provide top performance for more scalars, despite recent improvements. For further discussion see [8, Section 4], [16], [4], and [9].

2 From Weierstrass coordinates to the new coordinate system

Given a large-characteristic elliptic curve E in Weierstrass form, one can transform group operations on E into group operations on the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$, for an appropriate choice of (c,d). This section presents the details of the transformation. Proofs appear in Appendix A.

To illustrate the transformation, we use an elliptic curve previously published for fast scalar multiplication using Montgomery coordinates, namely the elliptic curve $Y^2 = (X')^3 + 486662(X')^2 + (X')$ modulo $p = 2^{255} - 19$; see [5]. Group operations on this curve "Curve25519" can be transformed into group operations on the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 - 2x^2y^2)$ where

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c = 26923790352479969033134494549992980665882225819690684221603341630881131953763:
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this section explains how this c was calculated and how the transformation works. Applications that are free to choose curves can save time by choosing much smaller values of c.

Overview of the transformation. The transformation has three parts:

- Transform to short Weierstrass coordinates, i.e., to (X, Y) satisfying $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$.
- Transform to (U, V) satisfying $V^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$, where e is a root of the polynomial $4a^3(e-2)^2(e^2+32e-32)^2+27b^2(e^2-16e+16)^3$.
- Transform to (x, y) satisfying $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$, where c, d satisfy $e = 1 dc^4$.

For computational purposes it is of course most convenient if all of the objects here—the parameter e for the intermediate curve $V^2 = (U+e)(U^2+4U+4e)$, the parameters c,d for the final curve $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$, and the coefficients of the transformations between curves—are as small as possible. A multiplication by c in a field of size p^2 can be made faster if c is actually in a subfield of size p, for example, and can be made even faster if c is actually an integer much smaller than p. We have made no attempt to optimize our transformation from this perspective. We comment that the final curve $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$ has a point (0,-c) of order 2, so it cannot be defined over a prime field if the original elliptic curve has odd order over that field; in particular, we would not expect this coordinate system to provide good performance for the NIST curves. But

many other curves allow c, d, and the transformations to be defined over prime fields, as illustrated by the Curve25519 example.

Step 1: transform to (X, Y) on $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$. We assume that the original elliptic curve E is defined over a field k of characteristic different from 2 or 3; for example, a large prime field. Then E can be transformed to short Weierstrass form $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ for some $a, b \in k$ with $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$.

Curve25519 example: The substitution X = X' + 486662/3 transforms $Y^2 = (X')^3 + 486662(X')^2 + (X')$ into the elliptic curve $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ where a = -236839902241/3 and b = 230521961007359098/27.

Step 2: choose root e of $4a^3(e-2)^2(e^2+32e-32)^2+27b^2(e^2-16e+16)^3$. Extend k if necessary so that $4a^3(e-2)^2(e^2+32e-32)^2+27b^2(e^2-16e+16)^3$ has roots in k. Choose a root e of this polynomial. Appendix A shows that $e \neq 1$. Curve 25519 example, continued: The integer

e = 37095705934669439343138083508754565189542113879843219016388785533085940283556

is a root of the polynomial $4a^3(e-2)^2(e^2+32e-32)^2+27b^2(e^2-16e+16)^3$ modulo $2^{255}-19$ when a=-236839902241/3 and b=230521961007359098/27.

Step 3: choose t with $at^2 = -3(e^2 - 16e + 16)$ and $bt^3 = 2(e-2)(e^2 + 32e - 32)$. There are three cases here:

- For b = 0: Extend k if necessary so that $-3(e^2 16e + 16)/a$ has a square root t in k.
- For a = 0: Extend k if necessary so that $2(e-2)(e^2+32e-32)/b$ has a cube root t in k.
- For $ab \neq 0$: Define $t = -2a(e-2)(e^2 + 32e 32)/3b(e^2 16e + 16)$.

In all three cases, $at^2 = -3(e^2 - 16e + 16)$ and $bt^3 = 2(e - 2)(e^2 + 32e - 32)$. Appendix A shows that $t \neq 0$.

Curve25519 example, continued: The integer

t = 53391073185350220317628758021919741641991349306709375029437564595301256030719

satisfies $at^2 = -3(e^2 - 16e + 16)$ and $bt^3 = 2(e-2)(e^2 + 32e - 32)$ for the a, b, e shown above.

Step 4: choose s with $s^2 = (t/3)^3$. Extend k if necessary so that $(t/3)^3$ has a square root s in k. Note that $s \neq 0$.

Curve25519 example, continued: The integer

s=18649689278727228840354232979487548124034359932680984740981561174796302117467

is a square root of $(t/3)^3$ modulo $2^{255} - 19$ for the t shown above.

Step 5: transform to (U, V) on $V^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$. If (X, Y) satisfies $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ then (U, V) = ((tX - e - 4)/3, sY) satisfies $V^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$. See Appendix A.

Curve 25519 example, continued: If $X_1 = 7$ and

 $Y_1 = 19172526001133118116405784977723800924384594365247398516339237030405822788330$

then $Y_1^2 = X_1^3 + aX_1 + b \text{ modulo } 2^{255} - 19$. The integers

 $U_1 = 54317890835602603248302248377217254841497451422887186710162596874051052490542,$

 $V_1 = 27265453978268041840748490304217756379746991228816427167751352985036992860401$

are, respectively, $(tX_1 - e - 4)/3$ and sY_1 modulo $2^{255} - 19$, for the t, s shown above. As a double-check, V_1^2 is the same as $(U_1 + e)(U_1^2 + 4U_1 + 4e)$ modulo $2^{255} - 19$, for the e shown above.

Step 6: choose c and d with $e = 1 - dc^4$. Write e in the form $1 - dc^4$ by selecting $c \in k - \{0\}$ and defining $d = (1 - e)/c^4$. Alternatively, first choose d such that (1 - e)/d is a nonzero 4th power in k, and then choose c as a 4th root. If k is a finite field then at least 1/4 of the nonzero elements of k are 4th powers; this is why d can always be chosen to be extremely small.

Curve25519 example, continued: If d = -2 and

c = 26923790352479969033134494549992980665882225819690684221603341630881131953763

then $1 - dc^4$ modulo $2^{255} - 19$ is the same as the integer e shown above.

Applications that are free to choose curves can first choose small c, d, then compute $e = 1 - dc^4$, then write down the curve $V^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$.

Step 7: transform to (x, y) on $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$. If (U, V) satisfies $V^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$, and if U + 2e and $U^2 + 4U + 4e$ are nonzero, then $(x, y) = (2cV/(U^2 + 4U + 4e), cU/(U + 2e))$ satisfies $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$. See Appendix A.

To recap: We have transformed points (X,Y) on the curve $Y^2=X^3+aX+b$ into points (U,V) on the curve $V^2=(U+e)(U^2+4U+4e)$, and then—except for a few points where U+2e=0 or $U^2+4U+4e=0$ —into points $(x,y)=(2cV/(U^2+4U+4e),cU/(U+2e))$ on the curve $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$.

Curve25519 example, continued: The integers

 $x_1 = 38449057356254576649503480194105044252465313685119321805170194941589028170479$,

 $y_1 = 15703921733006088416774302803525630526894002882819000026831678189383841685889$

are, respectively, $2cV_1/(U_1^2+4U_1+4e)$ and $cU_1/(U_1+2e)$ modulo $2^{255}-19$ for the integers c, e, U_1, V_1 shown above. As a double-check, $x_1^2+y_1^2$ is the same as $c^2(1+dx_1^2y_1^2)$ modulo $2^{255}-19$, where d=-2 as above.

Step 8: perform group operations on $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$. If (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) are points on $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$, and if $dx_1x_2y_1y_2 \notin \{-1, 1\}$, then

$$(x_3, y_3) = \left(\frac{x_1 y_2 + y_1 x_2}{c(1 + dx_1 x_2 y_1 y_2)}, \frac{y_1 y_2 - x_1 x_2}{c(1 - dx_1 x_2 y_1 y_2)}\right)$$

is also a point on $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$. This operation $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2) \mapsto (x_3, y_3)$ is consistent with the standard addition law on the elliptic curve $V^2 = (U+e)(U^2+4U+4e)$, and therefore with the addition law on the original elliptic curve E. See Appendix A.

We emphasize that this addition law for the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$ does not need any modification for the doubling case $(x_1, y_1) = (x_2, y_2)$. The only failure cases of the addition law are the cases $dx_1x_2y_1y_2 = \pm 1$, which for doubling means $dx_1^2y_1^2 = \pm 1$, occurring for only a few points on the curve. If d is not a square in k then there are no failure cases for addition; see Appendix A.

Curve25519 example, continued: The integers

 $x_3 = 44070118552736708090129770544946991295910146229981336346215991426600634526292$,

 $y_3 = 49211788949231821853202700980531119200569440922762704174632595798780438797193$

are, respectively, $2x_1y_1/c(1+dx_1^2y_1^2)$ and $(y_1^2-x_1^2)/c(1-dx_1^2y_1^2)$ modulo $2^{255}-19$, for the integers c,d,x_1,y_1 shown above. As a double-check, $x_3^2+y_3^2$ is the same as $c^2(1+dx_3^2y_3^2)$ modulo $2^{255}-19$.

Step 9: transform back to (U, V) on $V^2 = (U+e)(U^2+4U+4e)$. After a sequence of group operations produces a point (x, y) on $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$, solve the equations $(x, y)=(2cV/(U^2+4U+4e), cU/(U+2e))$ to find the corresponding point (U, V) on $V^2=(U+e)(U^2+4U+4e)$. In other words, define U=-2ey/(y-c) and $V=-2ec(c^2dy^2-1)x/(y-c)^2$.

Curve25519 example, continued: The integers

 $U_3 = 19353927226809319800023215682473111991996239556853927784590583590843827970744,$

 $V_3=15914012472049123343512503873797345822611472250094411327637863525569550289727$

are, respectively, $-2ey_3/(y_3-c)$ and $-2ec(c^2dy_3^2-1)x_3/(y_3-c)^2$ modulo $2^{255}-19$, for the integers c,d,e,x_3,y_3 shown above. As a double-check, V_3^2 is the same as $(U_3+e)(U_3^2+4U_3+4e)$ modulo $2^{255}-19$.

Step 10: transform back to (X,Y) on $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$. Finally, solve the equations (U,V) = ((tX - e - 4)/3, sY) to find the corresponding point (X,Y) on $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$. In other words, define X = (3U + e + 4)/t and Y = V/s.

Curve25519 example, continued: The integers

 $X_3 = 44177973078763452834055410435474786018253753500561242948153168022378284829263,$

 $Y_3 = 34723047021396797201571638306466206286938174048238133551788788106595160363933$

are, respectively, $(3U_3 + e + 4)/t$ and V_3/s modulo $2^{255} - 19$, for the integers e, s, t, U_3, V_3 shown above. This point (X_3, Y_3) is the same as the output of the standard doubling law on $Y^2 = X^3 + aX + b$ when the input is the point (X_1, Y_1) shown above: (X_3, Y_3) is the same as $(\lambda^2 - 2X_1, \lambda(X_1 - X_3) - Y_1)$ modulo $2^{255} - 19$ where $\lambda = (3X_1^2 + a)/2Y_1$.

Of course, one does not need to transform results back and forth after each group operation. One can transform points to the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$

and carry out many group operations on that curve before transforming the results back.

Notes regarding exceptional points. The point at infinity on the elliptic curve $V^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$ corresponds to the point (0, c) on the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$. The addition law does not need any modification to handle (0, c) as an input or output: for each point $P = (x_1, y_1)$ on the curve, (0, c) is the sum of P and $P = (-x_1, y_1)$, and P is the sum of (0, c) and P.

If d is a square in k then there are additional points to worry about. The points with U+2e=0 are $(-2e,\pm 4c^2\sqrt{d}e)$; both of these points correspond to (0:1:0), a singular point at infinity on the curve $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$. The points with $U^2+4U+4e=0$ are $(-2\pm 2c^2\sqrt{d},0)$; both of these points correspond to (1:0:0), another singular point at infinity on the curve $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$. The addition law for $x^2+y^2=c^2(1+dx^2y^2)$ is not defined for the singular points. One can, in many applications, rely on randomization to avoid the singular points, or one can fall back on group operations in $V^2=(U+e)(U^2+4U+4e)$ if singular points occur.

If d is not a square in k then these points do not occur and there is nothing to worry about. The affine points on $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$ form a group under the addition law; there are no failure cases. See Appendix A. The Curve25519 example is in this situation: d = -2 is not a square modulo $2^{255} - 19$.

3 Computations in the new coordinate system

This section justifies the speeds announced in Section 1 for addition of points on the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$: most importantly, $10\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$ for addition, with no penalty for unification. Some operations are saved in mixed addition and in doubling if unification is not required, reducing the costs to $9\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$ for mixed addition and $6\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$ for doubling.

Addition. To avoid the inversions in the original addition formulas

$$(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2) \mapsto \left(\frac{x_1y_2 + y_1x_2}{c(1 + dx_1x_2y_1y_2)}, \frac{y_1y_2 - x_1x_2}{c(1 - dx_1x_2y_1y_2)}\right),$$

we homogenize the curve equation to $(X^2+Y^2)Z^2 = c^2(Z^4+dX^2Y^2)$, where the projective point $(X_1:Y_1:Z_1)$ corresponds to the affine point $(X_1/Z_1,Y_1/Z_1)$. The neutral element is (0:c:1) in projective coordinates, and the inverse of $(X_1:Y_1:Z_1)$ is $(-X_1:Y_1:Z_1)$.

The following formulas, given $(X_1:Y_1:Z_1)$ and $(X_2:Y_2:Z_2)$, compute the sum $(X_3:Y_3:Z_3)=(X_1:Y_1:Z_1)+(X_2:Y_2:Z_2)$:

$$A = Z_1 \cdot Z_2; \ B = A^2; \ C = X_1 \cdot X_2; \ D = Y_1 \cdot Y_2;$$

$$E = (X_1 + Y_1) \cdot (X_2 + Y_2) - C - D; \ F = d \cdot C \cdot D;$$

$$X_3 = A \cdot E \cdot (B - F); \ Y_3 = A \cdot (D - C) \cdot (B + F);$$

$$Z_3 = c \cdot (B - F) \cdot (B + F).$$

One readily counts 10M + 1S + 1c + 1d + 7a, as stated in Section 1.

The following specific sequence of operations starts with registers R_1, R_2, R_3 containing X_1, Y_1, Z_1 and registers R_4, R_5, R_6 containing X_2, Y_2, Z_2 , uses just two temporary registers R_7, R_8 and constants c, d, ends with registers R_1, R_2, R_3 containing X_3, Y_3, Z_3 and untouched registers R_4, R_5, R_6 containing X_2, Y_2, Z_2 , and uses $10\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$:

$$R_3 \leftarrow R_3 \cdot R_6; \ R_7 \leftarrow R_1 + R_2; \ R_8 \leftarrow R_4 + R_5; \ R_1 \leftarrow R_1 \cdot R_4; \ R_2 \leftarrow R_2 \cdot R_5; \ R_7 \leftarrow R_7 \cdot R_8; \ R_7 \leftarrow R_7 - R_1; \ R_7 \leftarrow R_7 - R_2; \ R_7 \leftarrow R_7 \cdot R_3; \ R_8 \leftarrow R_1 \cdot R_2; \ R_8 \leftarrow d \cdot R_8; \ R_2 \leftarrow R_2 - R_1; \ R_2 \leftarrow R_2 \cdot R_3; \ R_3 \leftarrow R_3^2; \ R_1 \leftarrow R_3 - R_8; \ R_3 \leftarrow R_3 + R_8; \ R_2 \leftarrow R_2 \cdot R_3; \ R_3 \leftarrow R_3 \cdot R_1; \ R_1 \leftarrow R_1 \cdot R_7; \ R_3 \leftarrow c \cdot R_3.$$

We emphasize that these formulas work whether or not $(X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1) = (X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2)$. There is no need to go to extra effort to unify the addition formulas with separate doubling formulas; the addition formulas are already unified. See Section 2 for further discussion of the scope of validity of the addition formulas; in particular, we repeat the fact that the addition law works for *all* pairs of input points if d is not a square.

Mixed addition. "Mixed addition" refers to the case that Z_2 is known to be 1. In this case the multiplication $A = Z_1 \cdot Z_2$ can be eliminated, reducing the total costs to $9\mathbf{M} + 1\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$:

$$B = Z_1^2; \ C = X_1 \cdot X_2; \ D = Y_1 \cdot Y_2;$$

$$E = (X_1 + Y_1) \cdot (X_2 + Y_2) - C - D; \ F = d \cdot C \cdot D;$$

$$X_3 = Z_1 \cdot E \cdot (B - F); \ Y_3 = Z_1 \cdot (D - C) \cdot (B + F);$$

$$Z_3 = c \cdot (B - F) \cdot (B + F).$$

Doubling. "Doubling" refers to the case that $(X_1 : Y_1 : Z_1)$ and $(X_2 : Y_2 : Z_2)$ are known to be equal. In this case one can use the following formulas to speed up the computation to $6\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$:

$$A = Z_1^2; B = A^2; C = X_1 \cdot Y_1; D = C^2; E = d \cdot D;$$

$$F = (Y_1 - X_1) \cdot (Y_1 + X_1); G = (A + C)^2 - B - D;$$

$$X_3 = G \cdot (B - E); Y_3 = A \cdot F \cdot (B + E);$$

$$Z_3 = c \cdot (B - E) \cdot (B + E).$$

The following specific sequence of operations, starting with registers R_1, R_2, R_3 containing X_1, Y_1, Z_1 , changes registers R_1, R_2, R_3 to contain X_3, Y_3, Z_3 , using

 $6\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 7\mathbf{a}$ and using just two temporary registers R_4, R_5 :

$$R_{3} \leftarrow R_{3}^{2}; \ R_{4} \leftarrow R_{1} \cdot R_{2}; \ R_{5} \leftarrow R_{2} - R_{1}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} + R_{2};$$

$$R_{2} \leftarrow R_{1} \cdot R_{5}; \ R_{2} \leftarrow R_{2} \cdot R_{3}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{3} + R_{4}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1}^{2};$$

$$R_{3} \leftarrow R_{3}^{2}; \ R_{4} \leftarrow R_{4}^{2}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} - R_{3}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} - R_{4};$$

$$R_{4} \leftarrow d \cdot R_{4}; \ R_{5} \leftarrow R_{3} - R_{4}; \ R_{4} \leftarrow R_{4} + R_{3};$$

$$R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} \cdot R_{5}; \ R_{2} \leftarrow R_{2} \cdot R_{4}; \ R_{3} \leftarrow R_{4} \cdot R_{5}; \ R_{3} \leftarrow c \cdot R_{3}.$$

The following alternate sequence of operations uses two more additions, totalling $6\mathbf{M} + 4\mathbf{S} + 1\mathbf{c} + 1\mathbf{d} + 9\mathbf{a}$, but uses just one additional register R_4 :

$$R_{3} \leftarrow R_{3}^{2}; \ R_{4} \leftarrow R_{1} \cdot R_{2}; \ R_{2} \leftarrow R_{2} - R_{1}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow 2R_{1}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} + R_{2};$$

 $R_{2} \leftarrow R_{1} \cdot R_{2}; \ R_{2} \leftarrow R_{2} \cdot R_{3}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{3} + R_{4}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1}^{2};$
 $R_{3} \leftarrow R_{3}^{2}; \ R_{4} \leftarrow R_{4}^{2}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} - R_{3}; \ R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} - R_{4};$
 $R_{4} \leftarrow d \cdot R_{4}; \ R_{3} \leftarrow R_{3} - R_{4}; \ R_{4} \leftarrow 2R_{4}; \ R_{4} \leftarrow R_{4} + R_{3};$
 $R_{1} \leftarrow R_{1} \cdot R_{3}; \ R_{2} \leftarrow R_{2} \cdot R_{4}; \ R_{3} \leftarrow R_{3} \cdot R_{4}; \ R_{3} \leftarrow c \cdot R_{3}.$

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A Appendix: Proofs

Proof that $e \neq 1$. If e = 1 then $0 = 4a^3(-1)^2(1^2)^2 + 27b^2(1^2)^3 = 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$, contradiction.

Proof that $t \neq 0$. Observe that $(39e - 582)(2(e - 2)(e^2 + 32e - 32)) - (26e^2 + 808e - 1624)(3(e^2 - 16e + 16)) = 2^73^3$. If t = 0 then $-3(e^2 - 16e + 16) = at^2 = 0$ and $2(e - 2)(e^2 + 32e - 32) = bt^3 = 0$ so $2^73^3 = 0$ so k has characteristic 2 or 3, contradiction.

Proof that (U, V) = ((tX - e - 4)/3, sY) satisfies $V^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$. $V^2 = (sY)^2 = (t/3)^3Y^2 = (tX)^3/27 + at^2(tX)/27 + bt^3/27 = (3U + e + 4)^3/27 + at^2(3U + e + 4)/27 + bt^3/27 = (3U + e + 4)^3/27 - 3(e^2 - 16e + 16)(3U + e + 4)/27 + 2(e - 2)(e^2 + 32e - 32)/27 = U^3 + (e + 4)U^2 + 8eU + 4e^2 = (U + e)(U^2 + 4U + 4e)$.

Proof that $(x, y) = (2cV/(U^2 + 4U + 4e), cU/(U + 2e))$ satisfies $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$. The difference $1 + dx^2y^2 - (x^2 + y^2)/c^2$, times the nonzero quantity $(U^2 + 4U + 4e)^2(U + 2e)^2$, is $(U^2 + 4U + 4e)^2(U + 2e)^2 + 4dc^4V^2U^2 - 4dc^4V^2U^2 + 4dc^4V^2U^2 +$

```
4V^{2}(U+2e)^{2} - U^{2}(U^{2}+4U+4e)^{2} = (4dc^{4}U^{2}-4(U+2e)^{2})V^{2} + (U^{2}+4U+4e)^{2}((U+2e)^{2}-U^{2}) = (4(1-e)U^{2}-4(U+2e)^{2})(U+e)(U^{2}+4U+4e) + (U^{2}+4U+4e)^{2}((U+2e)^{2}-U^{2}) = 0.
```

Proof that (x_3, y_3) is a point on the curve. Subtract the equation $(x_2^2 + y_2^2)dx_1^2y_1^2 = c^2(1 + dx_2^2y_2^2)dx_1^2y_1^2$ from the equation $x_1^2 + y_1^2 = c^2(1 + dx_1^2y_1^2)$ to see that $x_1^2 + y_1^2 - (x_2^2 + y_2^2)dx_1^2y_1^2 = c^2(1 - d^2x_1^2x_2^2y_1^2y_2^2)$. Similarly $x_2^2 + y_2^2 - (x_1^2 + y_1^2)dx_2^2y_2^2 = c^2(1 - d^2x_1^2x_2^2y_1^2y_2^2)$. The difference $c^2(1 + dx_3^2y_3^2) - x_3^2 - y_3^2$, times the nonzero quantity $c^2(1 + dx_1x_2y_1y_2)^2(1 - dx_1x_2y_1y_2)^2$, is $c^4(1 + dx_1x_2y_1y_2)^2(1 - dx_1x_2y_1y_2)^2 + d(x_1y_2 + y_1x_2)^2(y_1y_2 - x_1x_2)^2 - (x_1y_2 + y_1x_2)^2(1 - dx_1x_2y_1y_2)^2 - (y_1y_2 - x_1x_2)^2(1 + dx_1x_2y_1y_2)^2 = c^4(1 - d^2x_1^2x_2^2y_1^2y_2^2)^2 - (x_1^2 + y_1^2 - (x_2^2 + y_2^2)dx_1^2y_1^2)(x_2^2 + y_2^2 - (x_1^2 + y_1^2)dx_2^2y_2^2) = c^4(1 - d^2x_1^2x_2^2y_1^2y_2^2)^2 - c^2(1 - d^2x_1^2x_2^2y_1^2y_2^2)c^2(1 - d^2x_1^2x_2^2y_1^2y_2^2) = 0$.

Proof that $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2) \mapsto (x_3, y_3)$ corresponds to elliptic-curve addition. The hypotheses here are that

```
• V_1^2 = U_1^3 + (e+4)U_1^2 + 8eU_1 + 4e^2, V_2^2 = U_2^3 + (e+4)U_2^2 + 8eU_2 + 4e^2, and V_3^2 = U_3^3 + (e+4)U_3^2 + 8eU_3 + 4e^2;
```

- $(U_3, V_3) = (U_1, V_1) + (U_2, V_2)$ under the standard addition law;
- $(x_1, y_1) = (2cV_1/(U_1^2 + 4U_1 + 4e), cU_1/(U_1 + 2e));$
- $(x_2, y_2) = (2cV_2/(U_2^2 + 4U_2 + 4e), cU_2/(U_2 + 2e))$; and
- $dx_1x_2y_1y_2 \notin \{1, -1\}.$

The goal is to prove that $(x_3, y_3) = (2cV_3/(U_3^2 + 4U_3 + 4e), cU_3/(U_3 + 2e)).$

The standard addition law says that $U_3 = \lambda^2 - (e+4) - U_1 - U_2$ and $V_3 = \lambda(U_1 - U_3) - V_1$. Here $\lambda = (3U_1^2 + 2(e+4)U_1 + 8e)/2V_1$ in the doubling case $(U_1, V_1) = (U_2, V_2)$, and $\lambda = (V_2 - V_1)/(U_2 - U_1)$ otherwise. Note that other cases in the standard addition law, such as $(U_2, V_2) = -(U_1, V_1)$, are ruled out by the hypothesis that $(U_1, V_1) + (U_2, V_2) = (U_3, V_3)$.

We fed the following commands to the Magma computer-algebra system to check the equation $(x_3, y_3) = (2cV_3/(U_3^2 + 4U_3 + 4e), cU_3/(U_3 + 2e))$ in the doubling case:

```
K<c,d,u1>:=FieldOfFractions(PolynomialRing(Rationals(),3));
e:=1-d*c^4; R<v1>:=PolynomialRing(K,1);
S:=quo<R|u1^3+(e+4)*u1^2+8*e*u1+4*e^2-v1^2>;
lam:=(3*u1^2+2*(e+4)*u1+8*e)/(2*v1); u2:=u1; v2:=v1;
u3:=lam^2-(e+4)-u1-u2; v3:=lam*(u1-u3)-v1;
x1:=2*c*v1/(u1^2+4*u1+4*e); y1:=c*u1/(u1+2*e);
x2:=2*c*v2/(u2^2+4*u2+4*e); y2:=c*u2/(u2+2*e);
x3:=(x1*y2+y1*x2)/(c*(1+d*x1*x2*y1*y2));
y3:=(y1*y2-x1*x2)/(c*(1-d*x1*x2*y1*y2));
S!(x3-2*c*v3/(u3^2+4*u3+4*e)); S!(y3-c*u3/(u3+2*e));
```

We then used similar commands to check the non-doubling case:

```
K<c,d,u1,u2>:=FieldOfFractions(PolynomialRing(Rationals(),4));
e:=1-d*c^4; R<v1,v2>:=PolynomialRing(K,2);
```

Proof that the addition law works for all pairs of points if d is not a square. Assume that (x_1, y_1) and (x_2, y_2) are points on the curve; i.e., that $x_1^2 + y_1^2 = c^2(1 + dx_1^2y_1^2)$ and $x_2^2 + y_2^2 = c^2(1 + dx_2^2y_2^2)$. Write $\epsilon = dx_1x_2y_1y_2$.

Suppose that $\epsilon \in \{-1, 1\}$. Then $dx_1^2y_1^2(x_2^2 + y_2^2) = c^2(dx_1^2y_1^2 + d^2x_1^2y_1^2x_2^2y_2^2) = c^2(dx_1^2y_1^2 + \epsilon^2) = c^2(1 + dx_1^2y_1^2) = x_1^2 + y_1^2$, so $(x_1 + \epsilon y_1)^2 = x_1^2 + y_1^2 + 2\epsilon x_1y_1 = dx_1^2y_1^2(x_2^2 + y_2^2) + 2x_1y_1dx_1x_2y_1y_2 = dx_1^2y_1^2(x_2^2 + 2x_2y_2 + y_2^2) = dx_1^2y_1^2(x_2 + y_2)^2$. If $x_2 + y_2 \neq 0$ then $d = ((x_1 + \epsilon y_1)/x_1y_1(x_2 + y_2))^2$, contradiction. Similarly, if $x_2 - y_2 \neq 0$ then $d = ((x_1 - \epsilon y_1)/x_1y_1(x_2 - y_2))^2$, contradiction. If both $x_2 + y_2$ and $x_2 - y_2$ are 0 then $x_2 = 0$ and $x_2 = 0$, so $x_2 = 0$, contradiction.

Thus $\epsilon \neq 1$ and $\epsilon \neq -1$; i.e., $1 - dx_1x_2y_1y_2 \neq 0$ and $1 + dx_1x_2y_1y_2 \neq 0$.

The reader might wonder why [7, Theorem 1] ("The smallest cardinality of a complete system of addition laws on E equals two") does not force exceptional cases in the addition law for the curve $x^2 + y^2 = c^2(1 + dx^2y^2)$. The simplest answer is that [7, Theorem 1] is concerned with exceptional cases in the algebraic closure of k, whereas we are concerned with exceptional cases in k itself.