MANGO MESSENGER PROJECT

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


Table of contents

- 1. General idea and problematics
- 2. Backend application architecture
- 3. Authorization and authentication mechanism
- 4. End-to-end encryption
- 5. Project outcomes
- 6. References



Introduction



Unsurprisingly, messengers have become widely popular communication tools across the globe. Quick and convenient communication channel, some of which have originated via social networking sites, have developed into independent social platforms.

"Messaging is one of the few things that people do more than social networking." — Mark Zuckerberg, 2014



Our mission, vision and motto

Mission

"To create a safe and comfortable platform for communication and ability to share any feelings for people"

Vision


"To provide free and simple way of communication between people around the world."

Motto/Slogan

"Privacy and personal security come first."



To be Mango



Mango Messenger is a free instant messaging service. It provides end-to-end encryption and focus on the speed and security of communication.



MVP's on the market



WhatsApp > 2.0 bil



Tencent QQ > 591 mil



Viber > 800 mil



Messenger > 1.3 bil



WeChat > 1.2 bil



Snapchat > 538 mil



Our project proposes







Personal Usage




Objectives

- To analyze the security and user privacy vulnerabilities of the IMS.
- To provide the system requirements.
- To propose web service (API's) architecture and authorization mechanism.
- To implement E₂E encryption to the system.
- To implement Web service (API).
- To implement web, mobile and desktop clients.





Project structure





Web-service architecture



Implementing the instant messenger system, we consider applying a well- known N-tier Monolithic Architecture [Bucchiarone et al., 2018], which provides a time-proven model that allows software developers to create flexible and reusable applications.




Which architecture to choose?

Monolith



Microservices






Which architecture to choose?

"You shouldn't start a new project with microservices, even if you're sure your application will be big enough to make it worthwhile."

Martin Fowler [Fowler, 2015b]



Monolith vs Microservices




Relation between system complexity and architectures. Source:

[Fowler, 2015a].



Monolith concept diagram



Monolith concept diagram. Source: [Mango Messenger Figma, 2021].



Monolithic architecture: Pros and Cons

PROS:

- Simplicity
- Performance
- Easier development
- Easier debugging and testing

CONS:


- Tight Coupling
- Understanding
- Reliability to errors
- Updates
- Technology stack








Service entity concept diagram



Service entity concept diagram. Source: [Fowler, 2011].



CQRS Concept Diagram



CQRS concept diagram. Source: [Fowler, 2011].



Authorization

A JSON Web Token, or JWT is a standardized, in some cases signed and encrypted, data packaging format that is used to securely transfer information between two parties.





JWT Token

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6 IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjMONTY 30DkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9 1IiwiYWRtaW4iOnRydWV9.TJVA95 OrM7E2cBab30RMHrHDcEfxjoYZge FONFh7HgQ

```
HEADER:
   "alg": "HS256",
   "typ": "JWT"
PAYLOAD:
   "sub": "1234567890",
   "name": "John Doe",
   "admin": true
VERIFY SIGNATURE
 HMACSHA256(
   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
   base64UrlEncode(payload),
   secret
 ) □secret base64 encoded
```



Recommendation for JWT usage

• JWT should have a short lifetime, since it cannot be revoked.

However, extremely short lifetimes of the tokens would affect the overall performance of the system.

Therefore, we consider access token lifetime to be 5 minutes and refresh token to be 7 days.

JWT should be used in a single time, e.g. JWT per request.

For each request client preliminarily checks access token lifetime.

If access token it expired, client sends request for updating a pair of access-refresh tokens.

For more confidence, we can update tokens a few seconds earlier.



Encryption

Encryption – is a conversion of the original representation of the information, known as plaintext, into an alternative form known as ciphertext. The inverse operation is called Decryption.


Encryption may be both symmetric or asymmetric.





Symmetric cryptography

Symmetric encryption – is a type of encryption where only one secret key is used to both encrypt and decrypt electronic information.






Asymmetric cryptography

Asymmetric encryption – is an encryption such that a message is encrypted using public key, and decrypted using private key.

Asymmetric encryption uses computationally hard problems with a secret (private), and shared (public) key.


Asymmetric encryption is based on the concept of the one-way functions.





One-way functions


One-way function – is a function that is easy to compute on every input, but hard to invert given the image of a random input.





DH Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman key exchange – is a method of securely exchanging cryptographic keys over a public channel. Diffie-Hellman is based on the one-way function $A = G^a \mod P$.



Math behind the DH

Diffie-Hellman key exchange – is a method of securely exchanging cryptographic keys over a public channel. Diffie-Hellman is based on the one-way function $A = G^a \mod P$.

- 1. Given 2048 bits prime modulus P and generator G, such that G is primitive root modulo P.
- 2. Alice chooses her secret a.
- 3. Alice sends to Bob her public key $A = G^a \mod P$.
- 4. Bob chooses his secret b.
- 5. Bob sends to Alice his public key $B = G^b \mod P$.
- 6. Alice computes common secret $s = B^a \mod P$.
- 7. Bob computes common secret $s = A^b \mod P$.
- 8. Alice and Bob have arrived to the same value

$$A^b \mod P = G^{ab} \mod P$$

$$B^a \mod P = G^{ba} \mod P$$



End-to-end encryption

End-to-end encryption – is an asymmetric encryption such that the only communicating parties are able to decrypt the data.

End-to-end encryption may be implemented using

- Asymmetric encryption algorithm (ex. RSA)
- Asymmetric common secret exchange + symmetric encryption (ex. DH + AES)

In Mango Messenger E2E encryption is implemented via ECDH + AES256 symmetric encryption.

Choose public constants properly


In DH key exchange, it is important to properly choose public constants.

It is recommended

- Modulus P to be P = 2Q + 1 such that 2048 bits safe-prime because Q is also prime
- Generator G such that G is primitive root modulo P
- For elliptic curve cryptography it is enough to use 512 bit prime as P




Project outcomes



- Chatlist
- 2. Chat Searching
- 3. Creating Groups
- 4. Filtering Chats
- 5. Leaving or Sharing the Chat
- 6. Entering the Text
- 7. Adding Emoji
- 8. Adding Attachments
- 9. Replying to the Messages
- 10. Edit or Delete Messages
- 11. Send Message
- 12. Message Search
- 13. Navigation to the Main Page



Project outcomes




- 1. User's Contact List
- 2. Searching Users
- 3. Filtering Contacts
- 4. Start a Chat
- 5. Delete User from Contacts
- 6. Specified User Info

https://www.front.mangomessenger.company



Project outcomes



- 1. Log Out from current Device
- 2. Log Out from All Devices
- 3. User's Profile image
- 4. User's Information
- 5. Reset Updated Data
- 6. Save Updated Data
- Panel for Changing Personal Data



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