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validation.go
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validation.go
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package routeapihelpers
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/validation/field"
"k8s.io/client-go/util/cert"
routev1 "github.com/openshift/api/route/v1"
)
type blockVerifierFunc func(block *pem.Block) (*pem.Block, error)
func publicKeyBlockVerifier(block *pem.Block) (*pem.Block, error) {
key, err := x509.ParsePKIXPublicKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
block = &pem.Block{
Type: "PUBLIC KEY",
}
if block.Bytes, err = x509.MarshalPKIXPublicKey(key); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return block, nil
}
func certificateBlockVerifier(block *pem.Block) (*pem.Block, error) {
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
block = &pem.Block{
Type: "CERTIFICATE",
Bytes: cert.Raw,
}
return block, nil
}
func privateKeyBlockVerifier(block *pem.Block) (*pem.Block, error) {
key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
key, err = x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
key, err = x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("block %s is not valid", block.Type)
}
}
}
switch t := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
block = &pem.Block{
Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY",
Bytes: x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(t),
}
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
block = &pem.Block{
Type: "ECDSA PRIVATE KEY",
}
if block.Bytes, err = x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(t); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("block private key %T is not valid", key)
}
return block, nil
}
func ignoreBlockVerifier(block *pem.Block) (*pem.Block, error) {
return nil, nil
}
var knownBlockDecoders = map[string]blockVerifierFunc{
"RSA PRIVATE KEY": privateKeyBlockVerifier,
"ECDSA PRIVATE KEY": privateKeyBlockVerifier,
"PRIVATE KEY": privateKeyBlockVerifier,
"PUBLIC KEY": publicKeyBlockVerifier,
// Potential "in the wild" PEM encoded blocks that can be normalized
"RSA PUBLIC KEY": publicKeyBlockVerifier,
"DSA PUBLIC KEY": publicKeyBlockVerifier,
"ECDSA PUBLIC KEY": publicKeyBlockVerifier,
"CERTIFICATE": certificateBlockVerifier,
// Blocks that should be dropped
"EC PARAMETERS": ignoreBlockVerifier,
}
// sanitizePEM takes a block of data that should be encoded in PEM and returns only
// the parts of it that parse and serialize as valid recognized certs in valid PEM blocks.
// We perform this transformation to eliminate potentially incorrect / invalid PEM contents
// to prevent OpenSSL or other non Golang tools from receiving unsanitized input.
func sanitizePEM(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
var block *pem.Block
buf := &bytes.Buffer{}
for len(data) > 0 {
block, data = pem.Decode(data)
if block == nil {
return buf.Bytes(), nil
}
fn, ok := knownBlockDecoders[block.Type]
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unrecognized PEM block %s", block.Type)
}
newBlock, err := fn(block)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if newBlock == nil {
continue
}
if err := pem.Encode(buf, newBlock); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return buf.Bytes(), nil
}
// ExtendedValidateRoute performs an extended validation on the route
// including checking that the TLS config is valid. It also sanitizes
// the contents of valid certificates by removing any data that
// is not recognizable PEM blocks on the incoming route.
func ExtendedValidateRoute(route *routev1.Route) field.ErrorList {
tlsConfig := route.Spec.TLS
result := field.ErrorList{}
if tlsConfig == nil {
return result
}
tlsFieldPath := field.NewPath("spec").Child("tls")
if errs := validateTLS(route, tlsFieldPath); len(errs) != 0 {
result = append(result, errs...)
}
// TODO: Check if we can be stricter with validating the certificate
// is for the route hostname. Don't want existing routes to
// break, so disable the hostname validation for now.
// hostname := route.Spec.Host
hostname := ""
var verifyOptions *x509.VerifyOptions
if len(tlsConfig.CACertificate) > 0 {
certPool := x509.NewCertPool()
if certs, err := cert.ParseCertsPEM([]byte(tlsConfig.CACertificate)); err != nil {
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse CA certificate: %v", err)
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("caCertificate"), "redacted ca certificate data", errmsg))
} else {
for _, cert := range certs {
certPool.AddCert(cert)
}
if data, err := sanitizePEM([]byte(tlsConfig.CACertificate)); err != nil {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("caCertificate"), "redacted ca certificate data", err.Error()))
} else {
tlsConfig.CACertificate = string(data)
}
}
verifyOptions = &x509.VerifyOptions{
DNSName: hostname,
Intermediates: certPool,
Roots: certPool,
}
}
if len(tlsConfig.Certificate) > 0 {
if _, err := validateCertificatePEM(tlsConfig.Certificate, verifyOptions); err != nil {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("certificate"), "redacted certificate data", err.Error()))
} else {
if data, err := sanitizePEM([]byte(tlsConfig.Certificate)); err != nil {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("certificate"), "redacted certificate data", err.Error()))
} else {
tlsConfig.Certificate = string(data)
}
}
certKeyBytes := []byte{}
certKeyBytes = append(certKeyBytes, []byte(tlsConfig.Certificate)...)
if len(tlsConfig.Key) > 0 {
certKeyBytes = append(certKeyBytes, byte('\n'))
certKeyBytes = append(certKeyBytes, []byte(tlsConfig.Key)...)
}
if _, err := tls.X509KeyPair(certKeyBytes, certKeyBytes); err != nil {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("key"), "redacted key data", err.Error()))
}
}
if len(tlsConfig.Key) > 0 {
if data, err := sanitizePEM([]byte(tlsConfig.Key)); err != nil {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("key"), "redacted key data", err.Error()))
} else {
tlsConfig.Key = string(data)
}
}
if len(tlsConfig.DestinationCACertificate) > 0 {
if _, err := cert.ParseCertsPEM([]byte(tlsConfig.DestinationCACertificate)); err != nil {
errmsg := fmt.Sprintf("failed to parse destination CA certificate: %v", err)
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("destinationCACertificate"), "redacted destination ca certificate data", errmsg))
} else {
if data, err := sanitizePEM([]byte(tlsConfig.DestinationCACertificate)); err != nil {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(tlsFieldPath.Child("destinationCACertificate"), "redacted destination ca certificate data", err.Error()))
} else {
tlsConfig.DestinationCACertificate = string(data)
}
}
}
return result
}
// validateTLS tests fields for different types of TLS combinations are set. Called
// by ValidateRoute.
func validateTLS(route *routev1.Route, fldPath *field.Path) field.ErrorList {
result := field.ErrorList{}
tls := route.Spec.TLS
// no tls config present, no need for validation
if tls == nil {
return nil
}
switch tls.Termination {
// reencrypt may specify destination ca cert
// cert, key, cacert may not be specified because the route may be a wildcard
case routev1.TLSTerminationReencrypt:
//passthrough term should not specify any cert
case routev1.TLSTerminationPassthrough:
if len(tls.Certificate) > 0 {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(fldPath.Child("certificate"), "redacted certificate data", "passthrough termination does not support certificates"))
}
if len(tls.Key) > 0 {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(fldPath.Child("key"), "redacted key data", "passthrough termination does not support certificates"))
}
if len(tls.CACertificate) > 0 {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(fldPath.Child("caCertificate"), "redacted ca certificate data", "passthrough termination does not support certificates"))
}
if len(tls.DestinationCACertificate) > 0 {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(fldPath.Child("destinationCACertificate"), "redacted destination ca certificate data", "passthrough termination does not support certificates"))
}
// edge cert should only specify cert, key, and cacert but those certs
// may not be specified if the route is a wildcard route
case routev1.TLSTerminationEdge:
if len(tls.DestinationCACertificate) > 0 {
result = append(result, field.Invalid(fldPath.Child("destinationCACertificate"), "redacted destination ca certificate data", "edge termination does not support destination certificates"))
}
default:
validValues := []string{string(routev1.TLSTerminationEdge), string(routev1.TLSTerminationPassthrough), string(routev1.TLSTerminationReencrypt)}
result = append(result, field.NotSupported(fldPath.Child("termination"), tls.Termination, validValues))
}
if err := validateInsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy(tls, fldPath.Child("insecureEdgeTerminationPolicy")); err != nil {
result = append(result, err)
}
return result
}
// validateInsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy tests fields for different types of
// insecure options. Called by validateTLS.
func validateInsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy(tls *routev1.TLSConfig, fldPath *field.Path) *field.Error {
// Check insecure option value if specified (empty is ok).
if len(tls.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy) == 0 {
return nil
}
// It is an edge-terminated or reencrypt route, check insecure option value is
// one of None(for disable), Allow or Redirect.
allowedValues := map[routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyType]struct{}{
routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyNone: {},
routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyAllow: {},
routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyRedirect: {},
}
switch tls.Termination {
case routev1.TLSTerminationReencrypt:
fallthrough
case routev1.TLSTerminationEdge:
if _, ok := allowedValues[tls.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy]; !ok {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("invalid value for InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy option, acceptable values are %s, %s, %s, or empty", routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyNone, routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyAllow, routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyRedirect)
return field.Invalid(fldPath, tls.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy, msg)
}
case routev1.TLSTerminationPassthrough:
if routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyNone != tls.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy && routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyRedirect != tls.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy {
msg := fmt.Sprintf("invalid value for InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy option, acceptable values are %s, %s, or empty", routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyNone, routev1.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicyRedirect)
return field.Invalid(fldPath, tls.InsecureEdgeTerminationPolicy, msg)
}
}
return nil
}
// validateCertificatePEM checks if a certificate PEM is valid and
// optionally verifies the certificate using the options.
func validateCertificatePEM(certPEM string, options *x509.VerifyOptions) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
certs, err := cert.ParseCertsPEM([]byte(certPEM))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(certs) < 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid/empty certificate data")
}
if options != nil {
// Ensure we don't report errors for expired certs or if
// the validity is in the future.
// Not that this can be for the actual certificate or any
// intermediates in the CA chain. This allows the router to
// still serve an expired/valid-in-the-future certificate
// and lets the client to control if it can tolerate that
// (just like for self-signed certs).
_, err = certs[0].Verify(*options)
if err != nil {
if invalidErr, ok := err.(x509.CertificateInvalidError); !ok || invalidErr.Reason != x509.Expired {
return certs, fmt.Errorf("error verifying certificate: %s", err.Error())
}
}
}
return certs, nil
}