

LIN JING

School of Social Science | Nanyang Technological University

Email: jing0014@e.ntu.edu.sg

Homepage: lin-jing.netlify.app

Mobile: (86) 178 - 6815 - 5778 / (65) 80382519

EDUCATION

Nanyang Technological University

Expected July 2022

Ph.D. in Economics

Shandong University

July 2012

M.Phil. in Economics

Xi'an Jiaotong University

July 2009

B.S. in Mathematics

RESEARCH INTERESTS

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

INFORMATION ECONOMICS

GAME THEORY

PUBLICATION

Jing, L., & Cheo, R. (2013). House money effects, risk preferences and the public goods game. *Economics Letters*, 120(2), 310–313.

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Certainty and Severity of Punishment in Crime and Corruption Deterrence: An Experimental Study” *with Yohenas Eko Riyanto*

- In a principal-agent model, we introduce two policy regimes: \mathcal{HP} (with high certainty and low severity of punishment) and \mathcal{LP} (the opposite) while controlling the deterrence power the same.
- Theoretically it should be equivalent between increasing certainty and severity of punishment irrespective of either regime.
- We show experimentally that, in regime \mathcal{HP} , both increasing certainty and increasing severity have significant deterrent effect against crime and corruption, while neither works in regime \mathcal{LP} .
- In regime \mathcal{HP} , increasing certainty of punishment deters crime and corruption immediately while increasing severity of punishment takes time to take effect.
- In regime \mathcal{LP} , we observe a Cobra Effect when we try to deter corruption by increasing the wage of the officials.

WORKING PAPERS

“Selection of Leadership: Effectiveness in Promoting Cooperation and Coordination under Asymmetric Information” *with Yohenas Eko Riyanto*

- We show experimentally that the leaders are more effective in promoting cooperation and coordination when they are elected than when they are randomly selected.
- Compared against other leader selection mechanism, when the leader is elected by group members, the leader tends to be less manipulative and the group members tend to be more compliant.

“Information Structure and Collective Decision” *with Yohenas Eko Riyanto*

- We study three information structures in a threshold public goods game: Complete & Symmetric (CS), Incomplete & Symmetric (IS), and Incomplete & Asymmetric (IA).
- Theory show that the IS should perform better than the other two. However, our experimental results show that IS delivers the worst result.
- Both IA and CS are significantly better than IS, and IA performs slightly better than CS.

“Information Structure, Endogenous Goal Setting, and Productivity” *with Jubo Yan*

- We experimentally show that providing information on the goals set by others encourages participants to set higher goals.
- Higher goals can also deliver higher productivity among male participants since higher goals also result in a higher failure rate among females.
- Participants respond more to negative gaps (i.e. failure) while participants respond more to positive gaps (i.e. success) in the public information treatments

RESEARCH EXPERIENCES

Research assistant at Nanyang Techological University.	<i>2019</i>
Research assistant at City University of Hong Kong.	<i>Spring, 2017</i>
Research fellow at Max-Plank-Institute for Research on Collective Goods.	<i>2013~2015</i>
Research assistant at Shandong University.	<i>2012~2013.</i>

TEACHING EXPERIENCES

LECTURER	Prep.Course on statistics, <i>Fall 2020, Fall 2021.</i>
TA	HE 9091 Principles of Economics, <i>Fall 2018, Spring 2019, Fall 2020.</i>

REFERENCES

Yohanes Eko Riyanto Nanyang Technological University School of Social Science yeriyanto@ntu.edu.sg	Jubo Yan Nanyang Technological University School of Social Science yanjubo@ntu.edu.sg
Te Bao Nanyang Technological University School of Social Science baot@ntu.edu.sg	