

LIN JING

School of Social Science | Nanyang Technological University

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EDUCATION

Nanyang Technological University Ph.D. in Economics	<i>2017 ~ 2022 (Expected)</i>
Shandong University M.Phil. in Economics	<i>July 2012</i>
Xi'an Jiaotong University B.S. in Mathematics	<i>July 2009</i>

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Experimental Economics	Information Economics
Behavioral Economics	Game Theory

PUBLICATION

Jing, L., & Cheo, R. (2013). House money effects, risk preferences and the public goods game. *Economics Letters*, 120(2), 310–313.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCES

Research assistant at Nanyang Technological University.	<i>2019</i>
Research assistant at City University of Hong Kong.	<i>Spring, 2017</i>
Research fellow at Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods.	<i>2013~2015</i>
Research assistant at Shandong University.	<i>2012~2013.</i>

TEACHING EXPERIENCES

Lecturer	Prep.Course on statistics, <i>Online course with over 200 students.</i>	<i>Fall 2020, Fall 2021.</i>
TA	HE 9091 Principles of Economics, <i>over 10 classes and each with 20 ~ 32 students.</i>	<i>Fall 2018, Spring 2019, Fall 2019.</i>

AWARDS

NTU Research Scholarship at Nanyang Technological University	<i>2017 ~ 2021</i>
Excellent Research Award (¥30,000) at Shandong University.	<i>2013</i>
Excellent Dissertation Award at Shandong University	<i>2012</i>

REFERENCES

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CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

The ESEM European Summer Meeting	<i>Accepted Aug. 2022</i>
The Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society in Tokyo, Japan	<i>Accepted Aug. 2022</i>
The Australasian Meeting of the Econometric Society in Australia	<i>Accepted Jul. 2022</i>
The Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in Shenzhen, China	<i>Accepted Jun. 2022</i>
China Economics Annual Conference	<i>Dec. 2021</i>
2 nd China Meeting of the Econometric Society	<i>Apr. 2014</i>
The Ronald Coase Institute Beijing Workshop on Institutional Analysis	<i>May 2012</i>
Singapore Economic Review Conference	<i>Aug. 2011</i>

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Certainty and Severity of Punishment in Crime and Corruption Deterrence: An Experimental Study” *with Yohanes Eko Riyanto*

- In a principal-monitor-agent framework, we introduce two policy regimes: HP (with high probability and low severity of punishment) and LP (low probability and high severity) while controlling the deterrence power the same.
- Theoretically increasing certainty and increasing severity of punishment should be equivalent irrespective of the regime.
- We show experimentally that, in HP, both increasing certainty and increasing severity have significant deterrent effect against crime and corruption, while neither works in LP.
- In HP, increasing certainty of punishment deters crime and corruption immediately while increasing severity of punishment takes time to take effect.
- In LP, we observe a Cobra Effect when we try to deter corruption by increasing the wage of the officials.

WORKING PAPERS

“On The Effectiveness of Leading-by-Signalling and Leader Selection Procedures: An Experimental Study” *with Yohanes Eko Riyanto*

- We show that leading-by-signaling is effective in promoting cooperation and coordination in a threshold public goods game.
- We show experimentally that the leaders are more effective in promoting cooperation and coordination when they are elected than when they are randomly selected.
- Compared with other leader selection mechanisms, when the leader is elected by group members, the leader tends to be less manipulative and the group members tend to be more compliant.

“Information Structure and Collective Decision” *with Yohanes Eko Riyanto*

- We theoretically and experimentally study three information structures in a threshold public goods game: Complete & Symmetric (CS), Incomplete & Symmetric (IS), Incomplete & Asymmetric (IA), as well as IA with a Signaling mechanism (IAS).
- The theory predicts that IA should perform the worst among them and our results confirm this prediction.
- The theory shows that IS should perform the best, however, our experimental results show that IS performs similarly as IA which is the worst.
- The theory shows that IAS should perform exactly the same as IA, however, our results show that IAS performs significantly better than both IA and IS. IAS even performs slightly better than CS although it's not statistically significant.

WORKING IN PROGRESS

“Information Structure, Endogenous Goal Setting, and Productivity” *with Jubo Yan*

- We show theoretically and experimentally that providing information on the goals set by others encourages participants to set higher goals.
- Higher goals also deliver higher productivity but only among male participants since higher goals also result in a higher failure rate among females.
- Participants respond more to negative gaps (i.e. failure) in private information treatment while participants respond more to positive gaps (i.e. success) in public information treatments.

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

R, STATA, L^AT_EX, zTree, oTree, Python.