1.XOR-Revenge

We are given a mask = $0x1da785fc480000001 = \{m0, m1, ...m63, m64\}$. Also, we have a state = $\{s0, s1, ..., s63\}$.

The recurrence relationship:

$$egin{cases} sk' = sk-1 \oplus (mk\,s63) & 1 \leq k \leq 63 \ sk' = s63 & k = 0 \end{cases}$$

Therefore, we know the matrix relationship (under modulo 2) would look like:

$$M \cdot S = egin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & m0 \ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & m1 \ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & m2 \ 0 & 0 & \dots & 0 & \dots \ 0 & 0 & \dots & 1 & m63 \end{bmatrix} egin{bmatrix} s0 \ s1 \ s2 \ \dots \ s63 \end{bmatrix} = egin{bmatrix} s0' \ s1' \ s2' \ \dots \ s63' \end{bmatrix} = S'$$

The output of 1 round(under modulo 2):

$$\begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \dots & 1 & m63 \end{bmatrix} egin{bmatrix} s0 \ s1 \ \dots \ s62 \ s63 \end{bmatrix} = s63$$

Therefore, we can calculate $\{M^{36}, M^{(36+37)}, M^{(36+37\cdot2)} \dots \}$, get the last row of these matrices and form a system of linear equations(under modulo 2). Output = $\{00, 02, \dots\}$

$$egin{bmatrix} M^{36}[63] \ M^{(36+37)}[63] \ M^{(36+37\cdot2)}[63] \ M^{(36+37\cdot3)}[63] \ \dots \end{bmatrix} egin{bmatrix} s0 \ s1 \ s2 \ \dots \ s63 \end{bmatrix} = egin{bmatrix} o0 \ o1 \ o2 \ \dots \ s63 \end{bmatrix}$$

Then, we can use sage to solve the system for the last 70 output bits, get the initial state, regenerate len(output) bits and get our flag.

Code:

```
0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0,
0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1,
1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1,
1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1,
1, 1, 0]
MASK = 0x1da785fc480000001
state = 0
print("output: ", output[-70:])
def create relation matrix(R, number):
   global MASK
   mask = MASK
   rows = []
   for i in range(64):
       v = [0 \text{ for i in } range(64)]
       v[63] = mask & 1
       mask >>= 1
       if i != 0:
          v[i-1] = 1
       rows.append(v)
   A = matrix(R, rows)
   I = matrix.identity(R, 64)
   for _ in range(number):
       I *= A
   return I
def get_last_row(M):
   return M[63]
def getbit():
   global state
   state <<= 1
   if state & (1 << 64):
       state ^= MASK
       return 1
   return 0
R = IntegerModRing(2)
M = matrix.identity(R, 64)
k = 0
rows = []
A = create_relation_matrix(R, 36)
M = A * M
v = get_last_row(M)
rows.append(v)
k += 1
A = create_relation_matrix(R, 37)
while k < len(output):</pre>
   M = A * M
   v = get_last_row(M)
   rows.append(v)
   k += 1
```

```
b = vector(R, output[-70:])
M = Matrix(R, rows[-70:])
seed = M.solve_right(b)
seed = list(seed)
for i in range(len(seed)):
   state += (int(seed[i]) << i)</pre>
out = []
for i in range(len(output)):
   for __ in range(36):
       getbit()
   a = getbit()
   out.append(a)
   output[i] ^= a
count = 0
flag_str = ""
for i in range(len(output)-70):
   val = output[i] << (7 - (i % 8))
   count += val
   if i % 8 == 7:
       flag_str += chr(count)
       count = 0
print("output: ", out[-70:])
print(flag_str)
```

Discussed with: b08901162

2.DH

Using factordb to factor p - 1, we can see that there are some small subgroups to exploit:

14299679064942095422216472867759219807100753053992282482112627127052320797011051556458400819572; Factorize!

		Result:
status (?)	digits	number
CF *	309 (show)	$\underline{142996790600}_{<309>} = \underline{2^2} \cdot \underline{3} \cdot \underline{5^2} \cdot \underline{476655968841}_{<306>}$

Choose 5 as the order of the subgroup we want to generate. Find the generator for this subgroup using the following code:

```
p =
1429967906494209542221647286775921980710075305399228248211262712705232079701105155645840081957
2364212489989646384334342751080681312483067807598306066317019118732485403129404187538791649947
1130750967026466292812838422126149086627079858637978341343164315392615344366312548410846471761
199219711056362616042332301
factor = 5
g = 1
while g == 1 or g == (p-1):
    g = pow(getRandomInteger(1024), (p-1)//factor, p)
print(g)
```

We get the corresponding ciphertext after manually pasting our generator to terminal:

```
~/Uni/cs/hw1/DH

> nc edu-ctf.zoolab.org 10104

14299679064942095422216472867759219807100753053992282482112627127052320797011051

55645840081957236421248998964638433434275108068131248306780759830606631701911873

24854031294041875387916499471130750967026466292812838422126149086627079858637978

341343164315392615344366312548410846471761199219711056362616042332301

13404880262847890184021281690202767153260770172595834585245159935003641332026502

98524465229335682220403551915593759542739880570170393346962248400371163408241654

40664809623823038470661056872583825161764909755430814926778063276757100806160008

74569727389330553762575982028774810239876536279472660005131591591435

77381101387523994286940069716958537230563336806732441874515065714475696597084022
30338780563052870914898999354780208867266848429347980605789904878642459812165221
28563119849411414889124999495277998878213574417440870643966862735174167277271326

03173718639444208475162661987326052278422296472608169836570544474184
```

Then, we search the subgroup that g generates ($i = 0 \sim 4$), and try to retrieve the original flag by doing: flag = pow(g, -i, p)*ciphertext % p

```
from Crypto.Util.number import long to bytes
p =
1429967906494209542221647286775921980710075305399228248211262712705232079701105155645840
0819572364212489989646384334342751080681312483067807598306066317019118732485403129404187
5387916499471130750967026466292812838422126149086627079858637978341343164315392615344366
312548410846471761199219711056362616042332301
g =
1340488026284789018402128169020276715326077017259583458524515993500364133202650298524465
2293356822204035519155937595427398805701703933469622484003711634082416544066480962382303
8470661056872583825161764909755430814926778063276757100806160008745697273893305537625759
82028774810239876536279472660005131591591435
ciphertext =
7738110138752399428694006971695853723056333680673244187451506571447569659708402230338780
5630528709148989993547802088672668484293479806057899048786424598121652212856311984941141
4889124999495277998878213574417440870643966862735174167277271326031737186394442084751626
61987326052278422296472608169836570544474184
factor=5
for i in range(factor):
   shared key = pow(g, i, p)
   inv = pow(shared_key, -1, p)
   flag = (ciphertext * inv) % p
   flag = long_to_bytes(flag)
   print(flag)
```

```
~/Uni/cs/hw1/DH
                                                                                         cnsenv Py 17:44:39
b'n1\xc0\xab \xc0\x92N\x91\xa9z\\x03,\xb4\xe3G\xf0"r\x84\x8fq\x0f0\x9e\xf7p\x94z4\xbf\x07\xf9D\xd9\x86\xddr\xb0N\xbe
\xab\x8a+\x0b/\x18I\xb8\x12\xe5\x98\xfc\xc9\.xc9\.x8fK\xfd\xe4\xc7\xaf+\xc1\xdaW\x7f\xb1\x967\xf7\xcb\x01\xf0\xe6>\xf5\\\
xab\x9c3\xa1\x92\x8aDu\x0e\xea0\xe1/\xc9\xc5&).\x1f\x1f<"\xfd8\xb4\x0c>\xbb7i\x11\x8bp^NS\xcef\t\xa9\x95\xe4h%\xac\x88H'
b'FLAG{M4yBe_i_N33d_70_checK_7he_0rDEr_0F_G}'
b'\xa2-3\xd3\x8a\xa1\x8b\xde\xfa\xbe,\xd0]\xfc\x94\xf7H\'\x13\xf5\xd0\xfa"\xfb\x0c*\x84\x88\xc5\xc5\xc5\xc1\xc6\xd0\xbd\r\x1e
u\x98\xa286\x98\xca\xc5M\x1eu&\xf4\xd2\x89h\xfb2\x80PJ\x89hV0\x16\x8c\xd0\x8fB\x1e5D\xe8\x08\x1d\x12\xa9\xa3x\xa1\x19\x86
\x9b\xd0T^\x14\x93'
b"\xab\xd4;\xd9\xe3g:\xa3\xe7\x0eq(\x8e/\xa1\xc3D]+S\x87a\xd3\xb5Z\xeb-\xe2\xc9\xde\xa8\xe0.d\xdf\x98\xf5p\xd2bF\x83\
x88:\x13\xf8S\xc2\xcd\x0f\xbfb\xdd\xben\x9b\xbb\xa0\x07i\xec\xf3\\e\x87\xc9l\xc4\xe7kw\xc6<\xfb\x9c\xccqi[*\x1am\x1e\xa3\
xc5|\xadd\xbb\xdc\x11\\x1e;`'\xf1\xfdp\x9d\x13[#A\x06?\x10l[\xb2h\ry\xd3y\xab\x81x\xc7T\x02Y/5\xebc}"
b'\xa6\xb3\xdeV9\xc5;\x85\x08\x03\x8a5wq\xae\xb8-\xfd\x8du\x11&H\xc4\x17`$w\x80\xc3\x87rmA{\x96V\xb3<a}x\xf6\x94\xb5!\\x
c6\x92h\xbeM9\xeat\xf5p\xd4\xb0\xf6N\xd0\xd6\xa8\x16W\xd5:\x89\xd1%IJLJ-\xf6\xbfi\x9a\x0c2\xcb\xe0\x81\x91\xf8\xf2\xfb\x1
34,y\xb6g\xcaR\x08\xe2\xed\xc8$\xf9\xd1\xaa\x05\x02\x15\xaaR\xab\x13!\x12\x90\xcd\x02\xa4cH\xfe\x0b\xa0\xc4(\xf0\x99\xd2'
```

References: https://sasdf.github.io/ctf/tasks/2018/ais3Final/crypto/300-xorlnarmoni'akda/

3.Node

We find out that the curve is singular : $4a^3+27b^2=0$, with the type node. Therefore, we can transform the DLP to (Fp, x).

By checking p - 1 with factordb, we can see that it has a lot of small factors, meaning that it's a smooth curve. We can use the Pohlig Hellman method to solve the DLP by calling discrete log() in sage.

1439347494057702678080391095332416717831615681366794991423769071711253367841763357317828230 Factorize!

```
status digits number
      309 1439347494...00<sub><$309></sub> = 2\darksim \cdot \c
 from math import sqrt
from sage.all import *
 from collections import namedtuple
 from Crypto.Util.number import long to bytes
x, y =
 101806057140780850544714530443644783825785167075147195900696966628348944447492085252540090
 679241301721340985975519224144331425477628386574016040358648752353263802400527250163297781
 189749285392087154377684890287451078937692380556192126971669069015673662635561425735593795
 743852141232711066181542250670387203333,
 210708770610471404482239943378636153064994127432885248474058869292952127649993188722507718
 459666305388324601532051592215665909425735595882197577670726340725646459999590846534514050
 370793114900897670107649554189296242764912800345781503635840129133375880350805094211392297
 10578342261017441353044437092977119013
 fx =
 980154959329070768640962584079889620073763288498998102503220023256253597359229376865333594
 555703692919999004762976944455578453688028307880629767608154672396612831570944251853375405
 788428518434971777806024153227062264262655158466333792037445888294881760457946028588478644
 02137150751961826536524265308139934971
 fy =
 871661360542992726585345929824303616755203192060994999925292376639352466175619447164478311
 625616042775683976309200483763928060475584208919228134751247189678890743220617473417803689
 224253960614688514601858619644323924085617695884685241878681713865645783629237778242793966
 98093857550091931091983893092436864205
 143934749405770267808039109533241671783161568136679499142376907171125336784176335731782823
 029409453622696871327278373730914810500964540833790836471525295291332255885782612535793955
 727295077649715977839675098393245636668277194569964284391085500147264756136769461365057766
454689540925417898489465044267493955801
 # y**2 = (x - 1)**2 * (x + 2)
 a = 1
 b = -2
Point = namedtuple("Point", "x y")
0 = 'Origin'
def map_to_phi(P, a, b, p):
      upper = (P.y + Mod(a - b, p).sqrt()*(P.x - a))
      lower = P.y - Mod(a - b, p).sqrt()*(P.x - a)
      return (upper * inverse mod(lower, p)) % p
```

```
G = Point(x, y)
F = Point(fx, fy)

base = map_to_phi(G, a, b, p)
ciphertext = map_to_phi(F, a, b, p)
flag = discrete_log(ciphertext, base)
flag = long_to_bytes(flag)
print(flag)
```

4.LSB

Take the first 3 LSBs for example:

```
To get x0: m=3x1+x0 send: c=m^e(mod\,n) return: r1=x0

To get x1: 3^{-1}m=3x2+x1+3^{-1}x0 send: 3^{-e}c=\left(3^{-1}m\right)^e(mod\,n) return: r2-3^{-1}x0=x1

To get x2: 3^{-2}m=3x3+x2+3^{-1}x1+3^{-2}x0 send: 3^{-2e}c=\left(3^{-2}m\right)^e(mod\,n) return: r3-\left(3^{-1}x1+3^{-2}x0\right)=x2
```

It is also important to remember to mod n or mod 3 accordingly when implementing the algorithm.

Code:

```
from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes, getPrime
import math

r = remote('edu-ctf.zoolab.org', 10102)

n = int(r.recvline().decode().strip())
e = int(r.recvline().decode().strip())
c = int(r.recvline().decode().strip())

found_bits = []

count = int(math.log(n, 3))

for i in range(0, count):
    cipher = (c * pow(3, -e*i, n)) % n
    r.sendline(str(cipher).encode())
    lsb = int(r.recvline().decode().strip())
```

```
subtract = 0
for j in range(1, len(found_bits)+1):
        subtract += ((pow(3, -1*j, n) * found_bits[j-1]) % n)
subtract %= n
subtract %= 3
lsb = (lsb - subtract) % 3
found_bits = [lsb] + found_bits

found_bits.reverse()
m = 0
for i in range(len(found_bits)):
    m += pow(3, i) * found_bits[i]
    m %= n

flag = long_to_bytes(m)
print(flag)

#FLAG{LE4ST_519Nific4N7_Bu7_m057_1MporT4Nt}
```

5.AES

The given plaintexts and traces are in stm32f0_aes.json. We use CPA(Correlation power analysis) attack, as in the course slides to get back the key. We use SBOX(plaintext ^ key) as the intermediate value and Hamming Weight(number of 1s) as our power model. Code:

```
import json
import numpy as np
POWER TRACE = "./stm32f0 aes.json"
sbox = [
  0x63, 0x7c, 0x77, 0x7b, 0xf2, 0x6b, 0x6f, 0xc5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xfe, 0xd7,
0xab, 0x76,
  0xca, 0x82, 0xc9, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x47, 0xf0, 0xad, 0xd4, 0xa2, 0xaf, 0x9c, 0xa4,
0x72, 0xc0,
  0xb7, 0xfd, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3f, 0xf7, 0xcc, 0x34, 0xa5, 0xe5, 0xf1, 0x71, 0xd8,
0x31, 0x15,
  0x04, 0xc7, 0x23, 0xc3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9a, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xe2, 0xeb, 0x27,
0xb2, 0x75,
  0x09, 0x83, 0x2c, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x6e, 0x5a, 0xa0, 0x52, 0x3b, 0xd6, 0xb3, 0x29, 0xe3,
0x2f, 0x84,
  0x53, 0xd1, 0x00, 0xed, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xb1, 0x5b, 0x6a, 0xcb, 0xbe, 0x39, 0x4a, 0x4c,
0x58, 0xcf,
  0xd0, 0xef, 0xaa, 0xfb, 0x43, 0x4d, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xf9, 0x02, 0x7f, 0x50, 0x3c,
0x9f, 0xa8,
  0x51, 0xa3, 0x40, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xf5, 0xbc, 0xb6, 0xda, 0x21, 0x10, 0xff,
0xf3, 0xd2,
  0xcd, 0x0c, 0x13, 0xec, 0x5f, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0x7e, 0x3d, 0x64, 0x5d,
0x19, 0x73,
   0x60, 0x81, 0x4f, 0xdc, 0x22, 0x2a, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xee, 0xb8, 0x14, 0xde, 0x5e,
0x0b, 0xdb,
  0xe0, 0x32, 0x3a, 0x0a, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xac, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95,
0xe4, 0x79,
  0xe7, 0xc8, 0x37, 0x6d, 0x8d, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xa9, 0x6c, 0x56, 0xf4, 0xea, 0x65, 0x7a,
0xae, 0x08,
```

```
0xba, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2e, 0x1c, 0xa6, 0xb4, 0xc6, 0xe8, 0xdd, 0x74, 0x1f, 0x4b, 0xbd,
0x8b, 0x8a,
  0x70, 0x3e, 0xb5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xf6, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xb9, 0x86, 0xc1,
0x1d, 0x9e,
  0xe1, 0xf8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xd9, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x87, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x55,
0x28, 0xdf,
  0x8c, 0xa1, 0x89, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0xe6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2d, 0x0f, 0xb0, 0x54,
0xbb, 0x16
1
def getSboxValue(num):
   global sbox
   return sbox[num]
def HW(num):
   # hamming weight
   return bin(num).count("1")
def powerModel(M):
   # get the power model of our intermediate value matrix
   for i in range(len(M)):
       for j in range(len(M[i])):
          M[i][j] = HW(M[i][j])
   return M
def getIntermediate(k, plaintext):
   # get the intermediate value matrix for the kth byte
   M = []
   for i in range(50):
      V = []
       for j in range(256):
           byte = getSboxValue(plaintext[k][i] ^ j)
           v.append(byte)
       M.append(v)
   return M
def correlation_analysis(power_model, trace):
   power_model = np.array(power_model) # 50 * 256
   trace = np.array(trace) # 50 * 1806
   power model = np.flip(np.rot90(power model), 0)
   trace = np.flip(np.rot90(trace), 0)
   corr = []
   for i in range(256):
       v = power_model[i]
        x = []
       for j in range(1806):
           c = np.abs(np.corrcoef(v, trace[j])[0][1])
           x.append(c)
       corr.append(x)
   corr = np.array(corr)
   return corr
def getmaxindex(M):
   # get the index with the largest correlation coefficient
   max = 0
```

```
mi = 0
   mj = 0
   for i in range(len(M)):
       for j in range(len(M[i])):
           if M[i][j] > max:
               max = M[i][j]
               mi = i
               mj = j
   return (mi, mj)
# parse real traces
json_file = open(POWER_TRACE, 'r')
power_trace = json.load(json_file)
plaintext = []
powermodel = []
for i in range(len(power_trace)):
   plaintext.append(power_trace[i]['pt'])
   powermodel.append(power_trace[i]['pm'])
plaintext = np.rot90(np.array(plaintext))
plaintext = np.flip(plaintext, 0)
key = [i for i in range(256)]
cipherkey = []
for k in range(16):
   M = getIntermediate(k, plaintext)
   pm = powerModel(M)
   corr = correlation_analysis(pm, powermodel)
   mi, mj = getmaxindex(corr)
   print(mi, mj)
   cipherkey.append(mi)
flag = "FLAG{"
for i in range(len(cipherkey)):
   flag += chr(cipherkey[i])
flag += "}"
print(flag)
```