Would you mind add some aur packages? #9

specter119 · 2019-10-18T13:10:21Z

Thanks for your modifications and the pre-build kernel and headers in https://github.com/qzed/linux-surface/releases
It is obviously you already have the arch pkgbuild, how about push it to AUR?
Or, the aur helper will warn me that I have some "missing" aur packages.

qzed · 2019-10-18T13:15:52Z

For pre-built packages have a look at https://github.com/qzed/linux-surface/wiki/Package-Repositories#arch-linux-repository (you can simply add the repo as described there). AUR packages are generally for building from source, meaning you would have to build the kernel yourself. (Yes, there are AUR packages with pre-built binaries but they in turn rely on those binaries to be stored somewhere else, which is a bit difficult to achieve with the kernel.)

specter119 · 2019-10-19T06:11:27Z

@qzed I have tested your mirror, but it seems that the sever is slower than I directly download them from github.

Would you mind decompressing your pre-build packages and repack as linux-surface-$ver-qzed-bin, then I can sent it to https://www.archlinuxcn.org/ then. There is a build bot, it can track your release updates, and auto update pkgbuild and then rebuild pkg.

[ Upstream commit 76e43c8 ] When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 linux-surface#9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037 ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…perations [ Upstream commit 62fdaa5 ] [BUG] With crafted image, btrfs will panic at btree operations: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:3894! invalid opcode: 0000 [linux-surface#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 1138 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ linux-surface#9 RIP: 0010:__push_leaf_left+0x6b6/0x6e0 RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd4128b990 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa0a4ab8f0e38 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffa0a280000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a4b3814000 RBP: ffffc0bd4128ba38 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffc0bd4128b948 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000240 R13: ffffa0a4b556fb60 R14: ffffa0a4ab8f0af0 R15: ffffa0a4ab8f0af0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0a4b7a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2461c80020 CR3: 000000022b32a006 CR4: 00000000000206f0 Call Trace: ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50 push_leaf_left+0x179/0x190 btrfs_del_items+0x316/0x470 btrfs_del_csums+0x215/0x3a0 __btrfs_free_extent.isra.72+0x5a7/0xbe0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x539/0x1120 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xdb/0x1b0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x52/0x950 ? start_transaction+0x94/0x450 transaction_kthread+0x163/0x190 kthread+0x105/0x140 ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x560/0x560 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace c2425e6e89b5558f ]--- [CAUSE] The offending csum tree looks like this: checksum tree key (CSUM_TREE ROOT_ITEM 0) node 29741056 level 1 items 14 free 107 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE ... key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 85975040) block 29630464 gen 17 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 89911296) block 29642752 gen 17 <<< key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 92274688) block 29646848 gen 17 ... leaf 29630464 items 6 free space 1 generation 17 owner CSUM_TREE item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 85975040) itemoff 3987 itemsize 8 range start 85975040 end 85983232 length 8192 ... leaf 29642752 items 0 free space 3995 generation 17 owner 0 ^ empty leaf invalid owner ^ leaf 29646848 items 1 free space 602 generation 17 owner CSUM_TREE item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 92274688) itemoff 627 itemsize 3368 range start 92274688 end 95723520 length 3448832 So we have a corrupted csum tree where one tree leaf is completely empty, causing unbalanced btree, thus leading to unexpected btree balance error. [FIX] For this particular case, we handle it in two directions to catch it: - Check if the tree block is empty through btrfs_verify_level_key() So that invalid tree blocks won't be read out through btrfs_search_slot() and its variants. - Check 0 tree owner in tree checker NO tree is using 0 as its tree owner, detect it and reject at tree block read time. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202821 Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 76e43c8 upstream. When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 linux-surface#9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037 ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…perations [ Upstream commit 62fdaa5 ] [BUG] With crafted image, btrfs will panic at btree operations: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:3894! invalid opcode: 0000 [linux-surface#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 1138 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ linux-surface#9 RIP: 0010:__push_leaf_left+0x6b6/0x6e0 RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd4128b990 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa0a4ab8f0e38 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffa0a280000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a4b3814000 RBP: ffffc0bd4128ba38 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffc0bd4128b948 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000240 R13: ffffa0a4b556fb60 R14: ffffa0a4ab8f0af0 R15: ffffa0a4ab8f0af0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0a4b7a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2461c80020 CR3: 000000022b32a006 CR4: 00000000000206f0 Call Trace: ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50 push_leaf_left+0x179/0x190 btrfs_del_items+0x316/0x470 btrfs_del_csums+0x215/0x3a0 __btrfs_free_extent.isra.72+0x5a7/0xbe0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x539/0x1120 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xdb/0x1b0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x52/0x950 ? start_transaction+0x94/0x450 transaction_kthread+0x163/0x190 kthread+0x105/0x140 ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x560/0x560 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace c2425e6e89b5558f ]--- [CAUSE] The offending csum tree looks like this: checksum tree key (CSUM_TREE ROOT_ITEM 0) node 29741056 level 1 items 14 free 107 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE ... key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 85975040) block 29630464 gen 17 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 89911296) block 29642752 gen 17 <<< key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 92274688) block 29646848 gen 17 ... leaf 29630464 items 6 free space 1 generation 17 owner CSUM_TREE item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 85975040) itemoff 3987 itemsize 8 range start 85975040 end 85983232 length 8192 ... leaf 29642752 items 0 free space 3995 generation 17 owner 0 ^ empty leaf invalid owner ^ leaf 29646848 items 1 free space 602 generation 17 owner CSUM_TREE item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 92274688) itemoff 627 itemsize 3368 range start 92274688 end 95723520 length 3448832 So we have a corrupted csum tree where one tree leaf is completely empty, causing unbalanced btree, thus leading to unexpected btree balance error. [FIX] For this particular case, we handle it in two directions to catch it: - Check if the tree block is empty through btrfs_verify_level_key() So that invalid tree blocks won't be read out through btrfs_search_slot() and its variants. - Check 0 tree owner in tree checker NO tree is using 0 as its tree owner, detect it and reject at tree block read time. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202821 Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 76e43c8 upstream. When IOCB_CMD_POLL is used on the FUSE device, aio_poll() disables IRQs and takes kioctx::ctx_lock, then fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock. This may have to wait for fuse_iqueue::waitq.lock to be released by one of many places that take it with IRQs enabled. Since the IRQ handler may take kioctx::ctx_lock, lockdep reports that a deadlock is possible. Fix it by protecting the state of struct fuse_iqueue with a separate spinlock, and only accessing fuse_iqueue::waitq using the versions of the waitqueue functions which do IRQ-safe locking internally. Reproducer: #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/aio_abi.h> int main() { char opts[128]; int fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR); aio_context_t ctx = 0; struct iocb cb = { .aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_POLL, .aio_fildes = fd }; struct iocb *cbp = &cb; sprintf(opts, "fd=%d,rootmode=040000,user_id=0,group_id=0", fd); mkdir("mnt", 0700); mount("foo", "mnt", "fuse", 0, opts); syscall(__NR_io_setup, 1, &ctx); syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, 1, &cbp); } Beginning of lockdep output: ===================================================== WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 5.3.0-rc5 linux-surface#9 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz_fuse/135 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire: 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1751 [inline] 000000003590ceda (&fiq->waitq){+.+.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x203/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 and this task is already holding: 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: spin_lock_irq include/linux/spinlock.h:363 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: aio_poll fs/aio.c:1749 [inline] 0000000075037284 (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: __io_submit_one.constprop.0+0x1f4/0x5b0 fs/aio.c:1825 which would create a new lock dependency: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} -> (&fiq->waitq){+.+.} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&(&ctx->ctx_lock)->rlock){..-.} [...] Reported-by: syzbot+af05535bb79520f95431@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+d86c4426a01f60feddc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: bfe4037 ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.19+ Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

qzed · 2019-10-19T14:44:30Z

Sorry, packaging takes me long enough as is right now, and I'd like to focus on development rather than packaging. It is not feasible for me to accommodate every desired packaging format, but if you want to repackage it and upload it somewhere else, feel free to do so.

specter119 · 2019-10-20T01:12:42Z

@qzed Thanks in advacne for your work. I will build some pkgbuild scripts if I need.

Hayes Wang says: ==================== r8152: serial fixes v3: 1. Fix the typos for patch #5 and #6. 2. Modify the commit message of patch #9. v2: For patch #2, move declaring the variable "ocp_data". v1: These patches are used to fix some issues for RTL8153. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

…_clear_bit [ Upstream commit fadcbd2 ] We need to move "spin_lock_irq(&bitmap->counts.lock)" before unmap previous storage, otherwise panic like belows could happen as follows. [ 902.353802] sdl: detected capacity change from 1077936128 to 3221225472 [ 902.616948] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [snip] [ 902.618588] CPU: 12 PID: 33698 Comm: md0_raid1 Tainted: G O 4.14.144-1-pserver #4.14.144-1.1~deb10 [ 902.618870] Hardware name: Supermicro SBA-7142G-T4/BHQGE, BIOS 3.00 10/24/2012 [ 902.619120] task: ffff9ae1860fc600 task.stack: ffffb52e4c704000 [ 902.619301] RIP: 0010:bitmap_file_clear_bit+0x90/0xd0 [md_mod] [ 902.619464] RSP: 0018:ffffb52e4c707d28 EFLAGS: 00010087 [ 902.619626] RAX: ffe8008b0d061000 RBX: ffff9ad078c87300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 902.619792] RDX: ffff9ad986341868 RSI: 0000000000000803 RDI: ffff9ad078c87300 [ 902.619986] RBP: ffff9ad0ed7a8000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 902.620154] R10: ffffb52e4c707ec0 R11: ffff9ad987d1ed44 R12: ffff9ad0ed7a8360 [ 902.620320] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000060000 R15: 0000000000000800 [ 902.620487] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ad987d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 902.620738] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 902.620901] CR2: 000055ff12aecec0 CR3: 0000001005207000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 902.621068] Call Trace: [ 902.621256] bitmap_daemon_work+0x2dd/0x360 [md_mod] [ 902.621429] ? find_pers+0x70/0x70 [md_mod] [ 902.621597] md_check_recovery+0x51/0x540 [md_mod] [ 902.621762] raid1d+0x5c/0xeb0 [raid1] [ 902.621939] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x4d/0x80 [ 902.622102] ? del_timer_sync+0x35/0x40 [ 902.622265] ? schedule_timeout+0x177/0x360 [ 902.622453] ? call_timer_fn+0x130/0x130 [ 902.622623] ? find_pers+0x70/0x70 [md_mod] [ 902.622794] ? md_thread+0x94/0x150 [md_mod] [ 902.622959] md_thread+0x94/0x150 [md_mod] [ 902.623121] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 902.623280] kthread+0x119/0x130 [ 902.623437] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 [ 902.623600] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 [ 902.624225] RIP: bitmap_file_clear_bit+0x90/0xd0 [md_mod] RSP: ffffb52e4c707d28 Because mdadm was running on another cpu to do resize, so bitmap_resize was called to replace bitmap as below shows. PID: 38801 TASK: ffff9ad074a90e00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mdadm" [exception RIP: queued_spin_lock_slowpath+56] [snip] -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffffb52e60f17c58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9c0b27b8 #6 [ffffb52e60f17c58] bitmap_resize at ffffffffc0399877 [md_mod] #7 [ffffb52e60f17d30] raid1_resize at ffffffffc0285bf9 [raid1] #8 [ffffb52e60f17d50] update_size at ffffffffc038a31a [md_mod] #9 [ffffb52e60f17d70] md_ioctl at ffffffffc0395ca4 [md_mod] And the procedure to keep resize bitmap safe is allocate new storage space, then quiesce, copy bits, replace bitmap, and re-start. However the daemon (bitmap_daemon_work) could happen even the array is quiesced, which means when bitmap_file_clear_bit is triggered by raid1d, then it thinks it should be fine to access store->filemap since counts->lock is held, but resize could change the storage without the protection of the lock. Cc: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com> Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 5eed6f1 ] Commit 9b6f7e1 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") will result in fork failing if allocating a kernel stack for a task in dup_task_struct exceeds the kernel memory allowance for that cgroup. Unfortunately, it also results in a crash. This is due to the code jumping to free_stack and calling free_thread_stack when the memcg kernel stack charge fails, but without tsk->stack pointing at the freshly allocated stack. This in turn results in the vfree_atomic in free_thread_stack oopsing with a backtrace like this: #5 [ffffc900244efc88] die at ffffffff8101f0ab #6 [ffffc900244efcb8] do_general_protection at ffffffff8101cb86 #7 [ffffc900244efce0] general_protection at ffffffff818ff082 [exception RIP: llist_add_batch+7] RIP: ffffffff8150d487 RSP: ffffc900244efd98 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88085ef55980 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88085ef55980 RSI: 343834343531203a RDI: 343834343531203a RBP: ffffc900244efd98 R8: 0000000000000001 R9: ffff8808578c3600 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88029f6c21c0 R13: 0000000000000286 R14: ffff880147759b00 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffc900244efda0] vfree_atomic at ffffffff811df2c7 #9 [ffffc900244efdb8] copy_process at ffffffff81086e37 #10 [ffffc900244efe98] _do_fork at ffffffff810884e0 #11 [ffffc900244eff10] sys_vfork at ffffffff810887ff #12 [ffffc900244eff20] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002a43 RIP: 000000000049b948 RSP: 00007ffcdb307830 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000896030 RCX: 000000000049b948 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffcdb307790 RDI: 00000000005d7421 RBP: 000000000067370f R8: 00007ffcdb3077b0 R9: 000000000001ed00 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040 R13: 000000000000000f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000088d018 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003a CS: 0033 SS: 002b The simplest fix is to assign tsk->stack right where it is allocated. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181214231726.7ee4843c@imladris.surriel.com Fixes: 9b6f7e1 ("mm: rework memcg kernel stack accounting") Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…_clear_bit [ Upstream commit fadcbd2 ] We need to move "spin_lock_irq(&bitmap->counts.lock)" before unmap previous storage, otherwise panic like belows could happen as follows. [ 902.353802] sdl: detected capacity change from 1077936128 to 3221225472 [ 902.616948] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP [snip] [ 902.618588] CPU: 12 PID: 33698 Comm: md0_raid1 Tainted: G O 4.14.144-1-pserver #4.14.144-1.1~deb10 [ 902.618870] Hardware name: Supermicro SBA-7142G-T4/BHQGE, BIOS 3.00 10/24/2012 [ 902.619120] task: ffff9ae1860fc600 task.stack: ffffb52e4c704000 [ 902.619301] RIP: 0010:bitmap_file_clear_bit+0x90/0xd0 [md_mod] [ 902.619464] RSP: 0018:ffffb52e4c707d28 EFLAGS: 00010087 [ 902.619626] RAX: ffe8008b0d061000 RBX: ffff9ad078c87300 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 902.619792] RDX: ffff9ad986341868 RSI: 0000000000000803 RDI: ffff9ad078c87300 [ 902.619986] RBP: ffff9ad0ed7a8000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 902.620154] R10: ffffb52e4c707ec0 R11: ffff9ad987d1ed44 R12: ffff9ad0ed7a8360 [ 902.620320] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000060000 R15: 0000000000000800 [ 902.620487] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ad987d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 902.620738] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 902.620901] CR2: 000055ff12aecec0 CR3: 0000001005207000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [ 902.621068] Call Trace: [ 902.621256] bitmap_daemon_work+0x2dd/0x360 [md_mod] [ 902.621429] ? find_pers+0x70/0x70 [md_mod] [ 902.621597] md_check_recovery+0x51/0x540 [md_mod] [ 902.621762] raid1d+0x5c/0xeb0 [raid1] [ 902.621939] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x4d/0x80 [ 902.622102] ? del_timer_sync+0x35/0x40 [ 902.622265] ? schedule_timeout+0x177/0x360 [ 902.622453] ? call_timer_fn+0x130/0x130 [ 902.622623] ? find_pers+0x70/0x70 [md_mod] [ 902.622794] ? md_thread+0x94/0x150 [md_mod] [ 902.622959] md_thread+0x94/0x150 [md_mod] [ 902.623121] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [ 902.623280] kthread+0x119/0x130 [ 902.623437] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 [ 902.623600] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 [ 902.624225] RIP: bitmap_file_clear_bit+0x90/0xd0 [md_mod] RSP: ffffb52e4c707d28 Because mdadm was running on another cpu to do resize, so bitmap_resize was called to replace bitmap as below shows. PID: 38801 TASK: ffff9ad074a90e00 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "mdadm" [exception RIP: queued_spin_lock_slowpath+56] [snip] -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffffb52e60f17c58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9c0b27b8 #6 [ffffb52e60f17c58] bitmap_resize at ffffffffc0399877 [md_mod] #7 [ffffb52e60f17d30] raid1_resize at ffffffffc0285bf9 [raid1] #8 [ffffb52e60f17d50] update_size at ffffffffc038a31a [md_mod] #9 [ffffb52e60f17d70] md_ioctl at ffffffffc0395ca4 [md_mod] And the procedure to keep resize bitmap safe is allocate new storage space, then quiesce, copy bits, replace bitmap, and re-start. However the daemon (bitmap_daemon_work) could happen even the array is quiesced, which means when bitmap_file_clear_bit is triggered by raid1d, then it thinks it should be fine to access store->filemap since counts->lock is held, but resize could change the storage without the protection of the lock. Cc: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com> Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 32546a9 ] This patch moves the final part of the cifsFileInfo_put() logic where we need a write lock on lock_sem to be processed in a separate thread that holds no other locks. This is to prevent deadlocks like the one below: > there are 6 processes looping to while trying to down_write > cinode->lock_sem, 5 of them from _cifsFileInfo_put, and one from > cifs_new_fileinfo > > and there are 5 other processes which are blocked, several of them > waiting on either PG_writeback or PG_locked (which are both set), all > for the same page of the file > > 2 inode_lock() (inode->i_rwsem) for the file > 1 wait_on_page_writeback() for the page > 1 down_read(inode->i_rwsem) for the inode of the directory > 1 inode_lock()(inode->i_rwsem) for the inode of the directory > 1 __lock_page > > > so processes are blocked waiting on: > page flags PG_locked and PG_writeback for one specific page > inode->i_rwsem for the directory > inode->i_rwsem for the file > cifsInodeInflock_sem > > > > here are the more gory details (let me know if I need to provide > anything more/better): > > [0 00:48:22.765] [UN] PID: 8863 TASK: ffff8c691547c5c0 CPU: 3 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > #0 [ffff9965007e3ba8] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff9965007e3c38] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff9965007e3c48] rwsem_down_write_slowpath at ffffffff9af283d7 > #3 [ffff9965007e3cb8] legitimize_path at ffffffff9b0f975d > #4 [ffff9965007e3d08] path_openat at ffffffff9b0fe55d > #5 [ffff9965007e3dd8] do_filp_open at ffffffff9b100a33 > #6 [ffff9965007e3ee0] do_sys_open at ffffffff9b0eb2d6 > #7 [ffff9965007e3f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315 > * (I think legitimize_path is bogus) > > in path_openat > } else { > const char *s = path_init(nd, flags); > while (!(error = link_path_walk(s, nd)) && > (error = do_last(nd, file, op)) > 0) { <<<< > > do_last: > if (open_flag & O_CREAT) > inode_lock(dir->d_inode); <<<< > else > so it's trying to take inode->i_rwsem for the directory > > DENTRY INODE SUPERBLK TYPE PATH > ffff8c68bb8e79c0 ffff8c691158ef20 ffff8c6915bf9000 DIR /mnt/vm1_smb/ > inode.i_rwsem is ffff8c691158efc0 > > <struct rw_semaphore 0xffff8c691158efc0>: > owner: <struct task_struct 0xffff8c6914275d00> (UN - 8856 - > reopen_file), counter: 0x0000000000000003 > waitlist: 2 > 0xffff9965007e3c90 8863 reopen_file UN 0 1:29:22.926 > RWSEM_WAITING_FOR_WRITE > 0xffff996500393e00 9802 ls UN 0 1:17:26.700 > RWSEM_WAITING_FOR_READ > > > the owner of the inode.i_rwsem of the directory is: > > [0 00:00:00.109] [UN] PID: 8856 TASK: ffff8c6914275d00 CPU: 3 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > #0 [ffff99650065b828] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff99650065b8b8] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff99650065b8c8] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9b6e9f89 > #3 [ffff99650065b940] msleep at ffffffff9af573a9 > #4 [ffff99650065b948] _cifsFileInfo_put.cold.63 at ffffffffc0a42dd6 [cifs] > #5 [ffff99650065ba38] cifs_writepage_locked at ffffffffc0a0b8f3 [cifs] > #6 [ffff99650065bab0] cifs_launder_page at ffffffffc0a0bb72 [cifs] > #7 [ffff99650065bb30] invalidate_inode_pages2_range at ffffffff9b04d4bd > #8 [ffff99650065bcb8] cifs_invalidate_mapping at ffffffffc0a11339 [cifs] > #9 [ffff99650065bcd0] cifs_revalidate_mapping at ffffffffc0a1139a [cifs] > #10 [ffff99650065bcf0] cifs_d_revalidate at ffffffffc0a014f6 [cifs] > #11 [ffff99650065bd08] path_openat at ffffffff9b0fe7f7 > #12 [ffff99650065bdd8] do_filp_open at ffffffff9b100a33 > #13 [ffff99650065bee0] do_sys_open at ffffffff9b0eb2d6 > #14 [ffff99650065bf38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315 > > cifs_launder_page is for page 0xffffd1e2c07d2480 > > crash> page.index,mapping,flags 0xffffd1e2c07d2480 > index = 0x8 > mapping = 0xffff8c68f3cd0db0 > flags = 0xfffffc0008095 > > PAGE-FLAG BIT VALUE > PG_locked 0 0000001 > PG_uptodate 2 0000004 > PG_lru 4 0000010 > PG_waiters 7 0000080 > PG_writeback 15 0008000 > > > inode is ffff8c68f3cd0c40 > inode.i_rwsem is ffff8c68f3cd0ce0 > DENTRY INODE SUPERBLK TYPE PATH > ffff8c68a1f1b480 ffff8c68f3cd0c40 ffff8c6915bf9000 REG > /mnt/vm1_smb/testfile.8853 > > > this process holds the inode->i_rwsem for the parent directory, is > laundering a page attached to the inode of the file it's opening, and in > _cifsFileInfo_put is trying to down_write the cifsInodeInflock_sem > for the file itself. > > > <struct rw_semaphore 0xffff8c68f3cd0ce0>: > owner: <struct task_struct 0xffff8c6914272e80> (UN - 8854 - > reopen_file), counter: 0x0000000000000003 > waitlist: 1 > 0xffff9965005dfd80 8855 reopen_file UN 0 1:29:22.912 > RWSEM_WAITING_FOR_WRITE > > this is the inode.i_rwsem for the file > > the owner: > > [0 00:48:22.739] [UN] PID: 8854 TASK: ffff8c6914272e80 CPU: 2 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > #0 [ffff99650054fb38] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff99650054fbc8] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff99650054fbd8] io_schedule at ffffffff9b6e68e2 > #3 [ffff99650054fbe8] __lock_page at ffffffff9b03c56f > #4 [ffff99650054fc80] pagecache_get_page at ffffffff9b03dcdf > #5 [ffff99650054fcc0] grab_cache_page_write_begin at ffffffff9b03ef4c > #6 [ffff99650054fcd0] cifs_write_begin at ffffffffc0a064ec [cifs] > #7 [ffff99650054fd30] generic_perform_write at ffffffff9b03bba4 > #8 [ffff99650054fda8] __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff9b04060a > #9 [ffff99650054fdf0] cifs_strict_writev.cold.70 at ffffffffc0a4469b [cifs] > #10 [ffff99650054fe48] new_sync_write at ffffffff9b0ec1dd > #11 [ffff99650054fed0] vfs_write at ffffffff9b0eed35 > #12 [ffff99650054ff00] ksys_write at ffffffff9b0eefd9 > #13 [ffff99650054ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315 > > the process holds the inode->i_rwsem for the file to which it's writing, > and is trying to __lock_page for the same page as in the other processes > > > the other tasks: > [0 00:00:00.028] [UN] PID: 8859 TASK: ffff8c6915479740 CPU: 2 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > #0 [ffff9965007b39d8] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff9965007b3a68] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff9965007b3a78] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9b6e9f89 > #3 [ffff9965007b3af0] msleep at ffffffff9af573a9 > #4 [ffff9965007b3af8] cifs_new_fileinfo.cold.61 at ffffffffc0a42a07 [cifs] > #5 [ffff9965007b3b78] cifs_open at ffffffffc0a0709d [cifs] > #6 [ffff9965007b3cd8] do_dentry_open at ffffffff9b0e9b7a > #7 [ffff9965007b3d08] path_openat at ffffffff9b0fe34f > #8 [ffff9965007b3dd8] do_filp_open at ffffffff9b100a33 > #9 [ffff9965007b3ee0] do_sys_open at ffffffff9b0eb2d6 > #10 [ffff9965007b3f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315 > > this is opening the file, and is trying to down_write cinode->lock_sem > > > [0 00:00:00.041] [UN] PID: 8860 TASK: ffff8c691547ae80 CPU: 2 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > [0 00:00:00.057] [UN] PID: 8861 TASK: ffff8c6915478000 CPU: 3 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > [0 00:00:00.059] [UN] PID: 8858 TASK: ffff8c6914271740 CPU: 2 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > [0 00:00:00.109] [UN] PID: 8862 TASK: ffff8c691547dd00 CPU: 6 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > #0 [ffff9965007c3c78] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff9965007c3d08] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff9965007c3d18] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9b6e9f89 > #3 [ffff9965007c3d90] msleep at ffffffff9af573a9 > #4 [ffff9965007c3d98] _cifsFileInfo_put.cold.63 at ffffffffc0a42dd6 [cifs] > #5 [ffff9965007c3e88] cifs_close at ffffffffc0a07aaf [cifs] > #6 [ffff9965007c3ea0] __fput at ffffffff9b0efa6e > #7 [ffff9965007c3ee8] task_work_run at ffffffff9aef1614 > #8 [ffff9965007c3f20] exit_to_usermode_loop at ffffffff9ae03d6f > #9 [ffff9965007c3f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae0444c > > closing the file, and trying to down_write cifsi->lock_sem > > > [0 00:48:22.839] [UN] PID: 8857 TASK: ffff8c6914270000 CPU: 7 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > #0 [ffff9965006a7cc8] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff9965006a7d58] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff9965006a7d68] io_schedule at ffffffff9b6e68e2 > #3 [ffff9965006a7d78] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff9b03cac6 > #4 [ffff9965006a7e10] __filemap_fdatawait_range at ffffffff9b03b028 > #5 [ffff9965006a7ed8] filemap_write_and_wait at ffffffff9b040165 > #6 [ffff9965006a7ef0] cifs_flush at ffffffffc0a0c2fa [cifs] > #7 [ffff9965006a7f10] filp_close at ffffffff9b0e93f1 > #8 [ffff9965006a7f30] __x64_sys_close at ffffffff9b0e9a0e > #9 [ffff9965006a7f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315 > > in __filemap_fdatawait_range > wait_on_page_writeback(page); > for the same page of the file > > > > [0 00:48:22.718] [UN] PID: 8855 TASK: ffff8c69142745c0 CPU: 7 > COMMAND: "reopen_file" > #0 [ffff9965005dfc98] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff9965005dfd28] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff9965005dfd38] rwsem_down_write_slowpath at ffffffff9af283d7 > #3 [ffff9965005dfdf0] cifs_strict_writev at ffffffffc0a0c40a [cifs] > #4 [ffff9965005dfe48] new_sync_write at ffffffff9b0ec1dd > #5 [ffff9965005dfed0] vfs_write at ffffffff9b0eed35 > #6 [ffff9965005dff00] ksys_write at ffffffff9b0eefd9 > #7 [ffff9965005dff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315 > > inode_lock(inode); > > > and one 'ls' later on, to see whether the rest of the mount is available > (the test file is in the root, so we get blocked up on the directory > ->i_rwsem), so the entire mount is unavailable > > [0 00:36:26.473] [UN] PID: 9802 TASK: ffff8c691436ae80 CPU: 4 > COMMAND: "ls" > #0 [ffff996500393d28] __schedule at ffffffff9b6e6095 > #1 [ffff996500393db8] schedule at ffffffff9b6e64df > #2 [ffff996500393dc8] rwsem_down_read_slowpath at ffffffff9b6e9421 > #3 [ffff996500393e78] down_read_killable at ffffffff9b6e95e2 > #4 [ffff996500393e88] iterate_dir at ffffffff9b103c56 > #5 [ffff996500393ec8] ksys_getdents64 at ffffffff9b104b0c > #6 [ffff996500393f30] __x64_sys_getdents64 at ffffffff9b104bb6 > #7 [ffff996500393f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9ae04315 > > in iterate_dir: > if (shared) > res = down_read_killable(&inode->i_rwsem); <<<< > else > res = down_write_killable(&inode->i_rwsem); > Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 42ffb0b upstream. There exists a deadlock with range_cyclic that has existed forever. If we loop around with a bio already built we could deadlock with a writer who has the page locked that we're attempting to write but is waiting on a page in our bio to be written out. The task traces are as follows PID: 1329874 TASK: ffff889ebcdf3800 CPU: 33 COMMAND: "kworker/u113:5" #0 [ffffc900297bb658] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f #1 [ffffc900297bb6e0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3 #2 [ffffc900297bb6f8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42 #3 [ffffc900297bb708] __lock_page at ffffffff811f145b #4 [ffffc900297bb798] __process_pages_contig at ffffffff814bc502 #5 [ffffc900297bb8c8] lock_delalloc_pages at ffffffff814bc684 #6 [ffffc900297bb900] find_lock_delalloc_range at ffffffff814be9ff #7 [ffffc900297bb9a0] writepage_delalloc at ffffffff814bebd0 #8 [ffffc900297bba18] __extent_writepage at ffffffff814bfbf2 #9 [ffffc900297bba98] extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffff814bffbd PID: 2167901 TASK: ffff889dc6a59c00 CPU: 14 COMMAND: "aio-dio-invalid" #0 [ffffc9003b50bb18] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f #1 [ffffc9003b50bba0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3 #2 [ffffc9003b50bbb8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42 #3 [ffffc9003b50bbc8] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff811f24d6 #4 [ffffc9003b50bc60] prepare_pages at ffffffff814b05a7 #5 [ffffc9003b50bcd8] btrfs_buffered_write at ffffffff814b1359 #6 [ffffc9003b50bdb0] btrfs_file_write_iter at ffffffff814b5933 #7 [ffffc9003b50be38] new_sync_write at ffffffff8128f6a8 #8 [ffffc9003b50bec8] vfs_write at ffffffff81292b9d #9 [ffffc9003b50bf00] ksys_pwrite64 at ffffffff81293032 I used drgn to find the respective pages we were stuck on page_entry.page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 index 8148 bit 15 pid 2167901 page_entry.page 0xffffea00f9bb7400 index 7680 bit 0 pid 1329874 As you can see the kworker is waiting for bit 0 (PG_locked) on index 7680, and aio-dio-invalid is waiting for bit 15 (PG_writeback) on index 8148. aio-dio-invalid has 7680, and the kworker epd looks like the following crash> struct extent_page_data ffffc900297bbbb0 struct extent_page_data { bio = 0xffff889f747ed830, tree = 0xffff889eed6ba448, extent_locked = 0, sync_io = 0 } Probably worth mentioning as well that it waits for writeback of the page to complete while holding a lock on it (at prepare_pages()). Using drgn I walked the bio pages looking for page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 which is the one we're waiting for writeback on bio = Object(prog, 'struct bio', address=0xffff889f747ed830) for i in range(0, bio.bi_vcnt.value_()): bv = bio.bi_io_vec[i] if bv.bv_page.value_() == 0xffffea00fbfc7500: print("FOUND IT") which validated what I suspected. The fix for this is simple, flush the epd before we loop back around to the beginning of the file during writeout. Fixes: b293f02 ("Btrfs: Add writepages support") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 96bf313ecb33567af4cb53928b0c951254a02759 ] There exists a deadlock with range_cyclic that has existed forever. If we loop around with a bio already built we could deadlock with a writer who has the page locked that we're attempting to write but is waiting on a page in our bio to be written out. The task traces are as follows PID: 1329874 TASK: ffff889ebcdf3800 CPU: 33 COMMAND: "kworker/u113:5" #0 [ffffc900297bb658] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f #1 [ffffc900297bb6e0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3 #2 [ffffc900297bb6f8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42 #3 [ffffc900297bb708] __lock_page at ffffffff811f145b #4 [ffffc900297bb798] __process_pages_contig at ffffffff814bc502 #5 [ffffc900297bb8c8] lock_delalloc_pages at ffffffff814bc684 #6 [ffffc900297bb900] find_lock_delalloc_range at ffffffff814be9ff #7 [ffffc900297bb9a0] writepage_delalloc at ffffffff814bebd0 #8 [ffffc900297bba18] __extent_writepage at ffffffff814bfbf2 #9 [ffffc900297bba98] extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffff814bffbd PID: 2167901 TASK: ffff889dc6a59c00 CPU: 14 COMMAND: "aio-dio-invalid" #0 [ffffc9003b50bb18] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f #1 [ffffc9003b50bba0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3 #2 [ffffc9003b50bbb8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42 #3 [ffffc9003b50bbc8] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff811f24d6 #4 [ffffc9003b50bc60] prepare_pages at ffffffff814b05a7 #5 [ffffc9003b50bcd8] btrfs_buffered_write at ffffffff814b1359 #6 [ffffc9003b50bdb0] btrfs_file_write_iter at ffffffff814b5933 #7 [ffffc9003b50be38] new_sync_write at ffffffff8128f6a8 #8 [ffffc9003b50bec8] vfs_write at ffffffff81292b9d #9 [ffffc9003b50bf00] ksys_pwrite64 at ffffffff81293032 I used drgn to find the respective pages we were stuck on page_entry.page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 index 8148 bit 15 pid 2167901 page_entry.page 0xffffea00f9bb7400 index 7680 bit 0 pid 1329874 As you can see the kworker is waiting for bit 0 (PG_locked) on index 7680, and aio-dio-invalid is waiting for bit 15 (PG_writeback) on index 8148. aio-dio-invalid has 7680, and the kworker epd looks like the following crash> struct extent_page_data ffffc900297bbbb0 struct extent_page_data { bio = 0xffff889f747ed830, tree = 0xffff889eed6ba448, extent_locked = 0, sync_io = 0 } Probably worth mentioning as well that it waits for writeback of the page to complete while holding a lock on it (at prepare_pages()). Using drgn I walked the bio pages looking for page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 which is the one we're waiting for writeback on bio = Object(prog, 'struct bio', address=0xffff889f747ed830) for i in range(0, bio.bi_vcnt.value_()): bv = bio.bi_io_vec[i] if bv.bv_page.value_() == 0xffffea00fbfc7500: print("FOUND IT") which validated what I suspected. The fix for this is simple, flush the epd before we loop back around to the beginning of the file during writeout. Fixes: b293f02 ("Btrfs: Add writepages support") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

When experimenting with bpf_send_signal() helper in our production environment (5.2 based), we experienced a deadlock in NMI mode: #5 [ffffc9002219f770] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8110be24 #6 [ffffc9002219f770] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff81a43012 #7 [ffffc9002219f780] try_to_wake_up at ffffffff810e7ecd #8 [ffffc9002219f7e0] signal_wake_up_state at ffffffff810c7b55 #9 [ffffc9002219f7f0] __send_signal at ffffffff810c8602 #10 [ffffc9002219f830] do_send_sig_info at ffffffff810ca31a #11 [ffffc9002219f868] bpf_send_signal at ffffffff8119d227 #12 [ffffc9002219f988] bpf_overflow_handler at ffffffff811d4140 #13 [ffffc9002219f9e0] __perf_event_overflow at ffffffff811d68cf #14 [ffffc9002219fa10] perf_swevent_overflow at ffffffff811d6a09 #15 [ffffc9002219fa38] ___perf_sw_event at ffffffff811e0f47 #16 [ffffc9002219fc30] __schedule at ffffffff81a3e04d #17 [ffffc9002219fc90] schedule at ffffffff81a3e219 #18 [ffffc9002219fca0] futex_wait_queue_me at ffffffff8113d1b9 #19 [ffffc9002219fcd8] futex_wait at ffffffff8113e529 #20 [ffffc9002219fdf0] do_futex at ffffffff8113ffbc #21 [ffffc9002219fec0] __x64_sys_futex at ffffffff81140d1c #22 [ffffc9002219ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002602 #23 [ffffc9002219ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81c00068 The above call stack is actually very similar to an issue reported by Commit eac9153 ("bpf/stackmap: Fix deadlock with rq_lock in bpf_get_stack()") by Song Liu. The only difference is bpf_send_signal() helper instead of bpf_get_stack() helper. The above deadlock is triggered with a perf_sw_event. Similar to Commit eac9153, the below almost identical reproducer used tracepoint point sched/sched_switch so the issue can be easily caught. /* stress_test.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define THREAD_COUNT 1000 char *filename; void *worker(void *p) { void *ptr; int fd; char *pptr; fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); if (fd < 0) return NULL; while (1) { struct timespec ts = {0, 1000 + rand() % 2000}; ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096 * 64, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); usleep(1); if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) { printf("failed to mmap\n"); break; } munmap(ptr, 4096 * 64); usleep(1); pptr = malloc(1); usleep(1); pptr[0] = 1; usleep(1); free(pptr); usleep(1); nanosleep(&ts, NULL); } close(fd); return NULL; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { void *ptr; int i; pthread_t threads[THREAD_COUNT]; if (argc < 2) return 0; filename = argv[1]; for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) { if (pthread_create(threads + i, NULL, worker, NULL)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error creating thread\n"); return 0; } } for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) pthread_join(threads[i], NULL); return 0; } and the following command: 1. run `stress_test /bin/ls` in one windown 2. hack bcc trace.py with the following change: --- a/tools/trace.py +++ b/tools/trace.py @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(%s); __data.tgid = __tgid; __data.pid = __pid; bpf_get_current_comm(&__data.comm, sizeof(__data.comm)); + bpf_send_signal(10); %s %s %s.perf_submit(%s, &__data, sizeof(__data)); 3. in a different window run ./trace.py -p $(pidof stress_test) t:sched:sched_switch The deadlock can be reproduced in our production system. Similar to Song's fix, the fix is to delay sending signal if irqs is disabled to avoid deadlocks involving with rq_lock. With this change, my above stress-test in our production system won't cause deadlock any more. I also implemented a scale-down version of reproducer in the selftest (a subsequent commit). With latest bpf-next, it complains for the following potential deadlock. [ 32.832450] -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}: [ 32.833100] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.833696] task_rq_lock+0x2c/0xa0 [ 32.834182] task_sched_runtime+0x59/0xd0 [ 32.834721] thread_group_cputime+0x250/0x270 [ 32.835304] thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x2e/0x70 [ 32.835959] do_task_stat+0x8a7/0xb80 [ 32.836461] proc_single_show+0x51/0xb0 ... [ 32.839512] -> #0 (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){....}: [ 32.840275] __lock_acquire+0x1358/0x1a20 [ 32.840826] lock_acquire+0xc7/0x1d0 [ 32.841309] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80 [ 32.841916] __lock_task_sighand+0x79/0x160 [ 32.842465] do_send_sig_info+0x35/0x90 [ 32.842977] bpf_send_signal+0xa/0x10 [ 32.843464] bpf_prog_bc13ed9e4d3163e3_send_signal_tp_sched+0x465/0x1000 [ 32.844301] trace_call_bpf+0x115/0x270 [ 32.844809] perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x4a/0xc0 [ 32.845411] perf_trace_sched_switch+0x10f/0x180 [ 32.846014] __schedule+0x45d/0x880 [ 32.846483] schedule+0x5f/0xd0 ... [ 32.853148] Chain exists of: [ 32.853148] &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock [ 32.853148] [ 32.854451] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 32.854451] [ 32.855173] CPU0 CPU1 [ 32.855745] ---- ---- [ 32.856278] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.856671] lock(&p->pi_lock); [ 32.857332] lock(&rq->lock); [ 32.857999] lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock); Deadlock happens on CPU0 when it tries to acquire &sighand->siglock but it has been held by CPU1 and CPU1 tries to grab &rq->lock and cannot get it. This is not exactly the callstack in our production environment, but sympotom is similar and both locks are using spin_lock_irqsave() to acquire the lock, and both involves rq_lock. The fix to delay sending signal when irq is disabled also fixed this issue. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200304191104.2796501-1-yhs@fb.com

[ Upstream commit 5737cfe ] Phy for slot 0 and 1 is shared and handled properly in slot 0. If there is only one port in use,(slot 0) we shall not call the 'phy_power_off' function with an invalid slot because kernel will crash with an unaligned access fault like the following: mt7621-pci 1e140000.pcie: Error applying setting, reverse things back mt7621-pci-phy 1e149000.pcie-phy: PHY for 0xbe149000 (dual port = 1) mt7621-pci-phy 1e14a000.pcie-phy: PHY for 0xbe14a000 (dual port = 0) mt7621-pci-phy 1e149000.pcie-phy: Xtal is 40MHz mt7621-pci-phy 1e14a000.pcie-phy: Xtal is 40MHz mt7621-pci 1e140000.pcie: pcie1 no card, disable it (RST & CLK) Unhandled kernel unaligned access[#1]: CPU: 3 PID: 111 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-00347-g825c6f470c62-dirty #9 Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func $ 0 : 00000000 00000001 5f60d043 8fe1ba80 $ 4 : 0000010d 01eb9000 00000000 00000000 $ 8 : 294b4c00 80940000 00000008 000000ce $12 : 2e303030 00000000 00000000 65696370 $16 : ffffffed 0000010d 8e373cd0 8214c1e0 $20 : 00000000 82144c80 82144680 8214c250 $24 : 00000018 803ef8f4 $28 : 8e372000 8e373c60 8214c080 803940e8 Hi : 00000125 Lo : 122f2000 epc : 807b3328 mutex_lock+0x8/0x44 ra : 803940e8 phy_power_off+0x28/0xb0 Status: 1100fc03 KERNEL EXL IE Cause : 00800010 (ExcCode 04) BadVA : 0000010d PrId : 0001992f (MIPS 1004Kc) Modules linked in: Process kworker/3:2 (pid: 111, threadinfo=(ptrval), task=(ptrval), tls=00000000) Stack : 8e373cd0 803fe4f4 8e372000 8e373c90 8214c080 804fde1c 8e373c98 808d62f4 8e373c78 00000000 8214c254 804fe648 1e160000 804f27b8 00000001 808d62f4 00000000 00000001 8214c228 808d62f4 80930000 809a0000 8fd47e10 808d63d4 808d62d4 8fd47e10 808d0000 808d0000 8e373cd0 8e373cd0 809e2a74 809db510 809db510 00000006 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 01000000 1e1440ff ... Call Trace: [<807b3328>] mutex_lock+0x8/0x44 [<803940e8>] phy_power_off+0x28/0xb0 [<804fe648>] mt7621_pci_probe+0xc20/0xd18 [<80402ab8>] platform_drv_probe+0x40/0x94 [<80400a74>] really_probe+0x104/0x364 [<803feb74>] bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xdc [<80400924>] __device_attach+0xdc/0x120 [<803ffb5c>] bus_probe_device+0xa0/0xbc [<80400124>] deferred_probe_work_func+0x7c/0xbc [<800420e8>] process_one_work+0x230/0x450 [<80042638>] worker_thread+0x330/0x5fc [<80048eb0>] kthread+0x12c/0x134 [<80007438>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x14/0x1c Code: 24050002 27bdfff8 8f830000 <c0850000> 14a00005 00000000 00600825 e0810000 1020fffa Fixes: bf516f4 ("staging: mt7621-pci: use only two phys from device tree") Signed-off-by: Sergio Paracuellos <sergio.paracuellos@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200320153837.20415-1-sergio.paracuellos@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit e79b033 upstream. Fix tcon use-after-free and NULL ptr deref. Customer system crashes with the following kernel log: [462233.169868] CIFS VFS: Cancelling wait for mid 4894753 cmd: 14 => a QUERY DIR [462233.228045] CIFS VFS: cifs_put_smb_ses: Session Logoff failure rc=-4 [462233.305922] CIFS VFS: cifs_put_smb_ses: Session Logoff failure rc=-4 [462233.306205] CIFS VFS: cifs_put_smb_ses: Session Logoff failure rc=-4 [462233.347060] CIFS VFS: cifs_put_smb_ses: Session Logoff failure rc=-4 [462233.347107] CIFS VFS: Close unmatched open [462233.347113] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000038 ... [exception RIP: cifs_put_tcon+0xa0] (this is doing tcon->ses->server) #6 [...] smb2_cancelled_close_fid at ... [cifs] #7 [...] process_one_work at ... #8 [...] worker_thread at ... #9 [...] kthread at ... The most likely explanation we have is: * When we put the last reference of a tcon (refcount=0), we close the cached share root handle. * If closing a handle is interrupted, SMB2_close() will queue a SMB2_close() in a work thread. * The queued object keeps a tcon ref so we bump the tcon refcount, jumping from 0 to 1. * We reach the end of cifs_put_tcon(), we free the tcon object despite it now having a refcount of 1. * The queued work now runs, but the tcon, ses & server was freed in the meantime resulting in a crash. THREAD 1 ======== cifs_put_tcon => tcon refcount reach 0 SMB2_tdis close_shroot_lease close_shroot_lease_locked => if cached root has lease && refcount = 0 smb2_close_cached_fid => if cached root valid SMB2_close => retry close in a thread if interrupted smb2_handle_cancelled_close __smb2_handle_cancelled_close => !! tcon refcount bump 0 => 1 !! INIT_WORK(&cancelled->work, smb2_cancelled_close_fid); queue_work(cifsiod_wq, &cancelled->work) => queue work tconInfoFree(tcon); ==> freed! cifs_put_smb_ses(ses); ==> freed! THREAD 2 (workqueue) ======== smb2_cancelled_close_fid SMB2_close(0, cancelled->tcon, ...); => use-after-free of tcon cifs_put_tcon(cancelled->tcon); => tcon refcount reach 0 second time *CRASH* Fixes: d919131 ("CIFS: Close cached root handle only if it has a lease") Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This BUG halt was reported a while back, but the patch somehow got missed: PID: 2879 TASK: c16adaa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "sctpn" #0 [f418dd28] crash_kexec at c04a7d8c #1 [f418dd7c] oops_end at c0863e02 #2 [f418dd90] do_invalid_op at c040aaca #3 [f418de28] error_code (via invalid_op) at c08631a5 EAX: f34baac0 EBX: 00000090 ECX: f418deb0 EDX: f5542950 EBP: 00000000 DS: 007b ESI: f34ba800 ES: 007b EDI: f418dea0 GS: 00e0 CS: 0060 EIP: c046fa5e ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010286 #4 [f418de5c] add_timer at c046fa5e #5 [f418de68] sctp_do_sm at f8db8c77 [sctp] #6 [f418df30] sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN at f8dcc1b5 [sctp] #7 [f418df48] inet_shutdown at c080baf9 #8 [f418df5c] sys_shutdown at c079eedf #9 [f418df70] sys_socketcall at c079fe88 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 0000000d ECX: bfceea90 EDX: 0937af98 DS: 007b ESI: 0000000c ES: 007b EDI: b7150ae4 SS: 007b ESP: bfceea7c EBP: bfceeaa8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: b775c424 ERR: 00000066 EFLAGS: 00000282 It appears that the side effect that starts the shutdown timer was processed multiple times, which can happen as multiple paths can trigger it. This of course leads to the BUG halt in add_timer getting called. Fix seems pretty straightforward, just check before the timer is added if its already been started. If it has mod the timer instead to min(current expiration, new expiration) Its been tested but not confirmed to fix the problem, as the issue has only occured in production environments where test kernels are enjoined from being installed. It appears to be a sane fix to me though. Also, recentely, Jere found a reproducer posted on list to confirm that this resolves the issues Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: jere.leppanen@nokia.com CC: marcelo.leitner@gmail.com CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

[ Upstream commit 20a785a ] This BUG halt was reported a while back, but the patch somehow got missed: PID: 2879 TASK: c16adaa0 CPU: 1 COMMAND: "sctpn" #0 [f418dd28] crash_kexec at c04a7d8c #1 [f418dd7c] oops_end at c0863e02 #2 [f418dd90] do_invalid_op at c040aaca #3 [f418de28] error_code (via invalid_op) at c08631a5 EAX: f34baac0 EBX: 00000090 ECX: f418deb0 EDX: f5542950 EBP: 00000000 DS: 007b ESI: f34ba800 ES: 007b EDI: f418dea0 GS: 00e0 CS: 0060 EIP: c046fa5e ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010286 #4 [f418de5c] add_timer at c046fa5e #5 [f418de68] sctp_do_sm at f8db8c77 [sctp] #6 [f418df30] sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN at f8dcc1b5 [sctp] #7 [f418df48] inet_shutdown at c080baf9 #8 [f418df5c] sys_shutdown at c079eedf #9 [f418df70] sys_socketcall at c079fe88 EAX: ffffffda EBX: 0000000d ECX: bfceea90 EDX: 0937af98 DS: 007b ESI: 0000000c ES: 007b EDI: b7150ae4 SS: 007b ESP: bfceea7c EBP: bfceeaa8 GS: 0033 CS: 0073 EIP: b775c424 ERR: 00000066 EFLAGS: 00000282 It appears that the side effect that starts the shutdown timer was processed multiple times, which can happen as multiple paths can trigger it. This of course leads to the BUG halt in add_timer getting called. Fix seems pretty straightforward, just check before the timer is added if its already been started. If it has mod the timer instead to min(current expiration, new expiration) Its been tested but not confirmed to fix the problem, as the issue has only occured in production environments where test kernels are enjoined from being installed. It appears to be a sane fix to me though. Also, recentely, Jere found a reproducer posted on list to confirm that this resolves the issues Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: jere.leppanen@nokia.com CC: marcelo.leitner@gmail.com CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

…perations commit 62fdaa5 upstream. [BUG] With crafted image, btrfs will panic at btree operations: kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:3894! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 1138 Comm: btrfs-transacti Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8+ #9 RIP: 0010:__push_leaf_left+0x6b6/0x6e0 RSP: 0018:ffffc0bd4128b990 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffa0a4ab8f0e38 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffa0a280000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a4b3814000 RBP: ffffc0bd4128ba38 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffc0bd4128b948 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000240 R13: ffffa0a4b556fb60 R14: ffffa0a4ab8f0af0 R15: ffffa0a4ab8f0af0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0a4b7a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f2461c80020 CR3: 000000022b32a006 CR4: 00000000000206f0 Call Trace: ? _cond_resched+0x1a/0x50 push_leaf_left+0x179/0x190 btrfs_del_items+0x316/0x470 btrfs_del_csums+0x215/0x3a0 __btrfs_free_extent.isra.72+0x5a7/0xbe0 __btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x539/0x1120 btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0xdb/0x1b0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x52/0x950 ? start_transaction+0x94/0x450 transaction_kthread+0x163/0x190 kthread+0x105/0x140 ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x560/0x560 ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace c2425e6e89b5558f ]--- [CAUSE] The offending csum tree looks like this: checksum tree key (CSUM_TREE ROOT_ITEM 0) node 29741056 level 1 items 14 free 107 generation 19 owner CSUM_TREE ... key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 85975040) block 29630464 gen 17 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 89911296) block 29642752 gen 17 <<< key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 92274688) block 29646848 gen 17 ... leaf 29630464 items 6 free space 1 generation 17 owner CSUM_TREE item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 85975040) itemoff 3987 itemsize 8 range start 85975040 end 85983232 length 8192 ... leaf 29642752 items 0 free space 3995 generation 17 owner 0 ^ empty leaf invalid owner ^ leaf 29646848 items 1 free space 602 generation 17 owner CSUM_TREE item 0 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 92274688) itemoff 627 itemsize 3368 range start 92274688 end 95723520 length 3448832 So we have a corrupted csum tree where one tree leaf is completely empty, causing unbalanced btree, thus leading to unexpected btree balance error. [FIX] For this particular case, we handle it in two directions to catch it: - Check if the tree block is empty through btrfs_verify_level_key() So that invalid tree blocks won't be read out through btrfs_search_slot() and its variants. - Check 0 tree owner in tree checker NO tree is using 0 as its tree owner, detect it and reject at tree block read time. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202821 Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Vikash Bansal <bvikas@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function: Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2) The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function. Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak. Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon <pduplessis@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/20200730150236.5392-1-pduplessis@efficios.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Function that converts orientation string into orientation value. BUG=b:153109152 TEST=All below tests were successful 1. Boot with DP (using DingDong) 2. Boot with HooToo hub connected with HDMI display behind the hub 3. Connect both #1 and #2 on both ports and boot 4. Swap the port in #3 5. Hotplug DP(DingDong) 6. Hotplug HooToo hub with HDMI behind 7. Boot with USB3 device 8. Hotplug USB3 device 9. Boot with USB3 device on port #1 and HooToo hub with HDMI connected on port#0 10. Boot with USB3 device on port #1 and DP(DingDong) connected on port#0 11. Swap ports on linux-surface#9 12. Swap port on linux-surface#10 13. Boot with Dell TBT Dock connected with DP behind it 14. Boot with Dell TBT dock connected with DP behind it on port#1 and HooToo with HDMI behind on port #0 15. Hotplug DP behing Dell TBT dock 16. Boot up with USB4 dock 17. Boot up with DP connected behind USB4 dock 18. Hotplug DP behind USB4 device 19. Hotplug TBT hard drive behind USB4 20. Hotplug Lenovo TBT dock and the hotplug TBT hard drive behind it Signed-off-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200507150900.12102-2-heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 8c49c9e) Change-Id: I6135241357af2b484c5d1e51e72352cd2d054179 Signed-off-by: Azhar Shaikh <azhar.shaikh@intel.com> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2324233 Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Prashant Malani <pmalani@chromium.org>

…orientation The SBU and HSL orientation may be fixed/static from the mux PoW. Apparently the retimer may take care of the orientation of these lines. Handling the static SBU (AUX) and HSL orientation with device properties. If the SBU orientation is static, a device property "sbu-orintation" can be used. When the property exists, the driver always sets the SBU orientation according to the property value, and when it's not set, the driver uses the cable plug orientation with SBU. And with static HSL orientation, "hsl-orientation" device property can be used in the same way. BUG=b:153109152 TEST=All below tests were successful 1. Boot with DP (using DingDong) 2. Boot with HooToo hub connected with HDMI display behind the hub 3. Connect both #1 and #2 on both ports and boot 4. Swap the port in #3 5. Hotplug DP(DingDong) 6. Hotplug HooToo hub with HDMI behind 7. Boot with USB3 device 8. Hotplug USB3 device 9. Boot with USB3 device on port #1 and HooToo hub with HDMI connected on port#0 10. Boot with USB3 device on port #1 and DP(DingDong) connected on port#0 11. Swap ports on linux-surface#9 12. Swap port on linux-surface#10 13. Boot with Dell TBT Dock connected with DP behind it 14. Boot with Dell TBT dock connected with DP behind it on port#1 and HooToo with HDMI behind on port #0 15. Hotplug DP behing Dell TBT dock 16. Boot up with USB4 dock 17. Boot up with DP connected behind USB4 dock 18. Hotplug DP behind USB4 device 19. Hotplug TBT hard drive behind USB4 20. Hotplug Lenovo TBT dock and the hotplug TBT hard drive behind it Signed-off-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200507150900.12102-3-heikki.krogerus@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> (cherry picked from commit ff4a30d) Change-Id: I8f64d95f2c0a705fe3c72a1513ce5c74ce9945ee Signed-off-by: Azhar Shaikh <azhar.shaikh@intel.com> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromiumos/third_party/kernel/+/2324234 Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <seanpaul@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Prashant Malani <pmalani@chromium.org>

[ Upstream commit b684c09 ] ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states. Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer. When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because of mismatch between r1 and NIP. GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace. GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch: --------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>, newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 #2 0x0000000000000063 in ?? () #3 0xc000000003579320 in ?? () --------- Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because "ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs. GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel: -------- (gdb) bt #0 0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69 #1 __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974 #2 0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n") at kernel/panic.c:358 #3 0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155 #4 0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602 #5 0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163 #6 0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340 #7 proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352 #8 0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00, buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582 #9 0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2) at fs/read_write.c:637 #10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>) at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171 #11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common () at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192 -------- Nick adds: So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire. Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()") Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230615091047.90433-1-adityag@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…nel range [ Upstream commit e2ceb1d ] Because of what seems to be a typo, a 6Ghz-only phy for which the BDF does not allow the 7115Mhz channel will fail to register: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 106 at net/wireless/core.c:907 wiphy_register+0x914/0x954 Modules linked in: ath11k_pci sbsa_gwdt CPU: 2 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-next-20230418-00549-g1e096a17625a-dirty #9 Hardware name: Freebox V7R Board (DT) Workqueue: ath11k_qmi_driver_event ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : wiphy_register+0x914/0x954 lr : ieee80211_register_hw+0x67c/0xc10 sp : ffffff800b123aa0 x29: ffffff800b123aa0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000006 x24: ffffffc008d51418 x23: ffffffc008cb0838 x22: ffffff80176c2460 x21: 0000000000000168 x20: ffffff80176c0000 x19: ffffff80176c03e0 x18: 0000000000000014 x17: 00000000cbef338c x16: 00000000d2a26f21 x15: 00000000ad6bb85f x14: 0000000000000020 x13: 0000000000000020 x12: 00000000ffffffbd x11: 0000000000000208 x10: 00000000fffffdf7 x9 : ffffffc009394718 x8 : ffffff80176c0528 x7 : 000000007fffffff x6 : 0000000000000006 x5 : 0000000000000005 x4 : ffffff800b304284 x3 : ffffff800b304284 x2 : ffffff800b304d98 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: wiphy_register+0x914/0x954 ieee80211_register_hw+0x67c/0xc10 ath11k_mac_register+0x7c4/0xe10 ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready+0x1f4/0x570 ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0x198/0x590 process_one_work+0x1b8/0x328 worker_thread+0x6c/0x414 kthread+0x100/0x104 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: ieee80211 registration failed: -22 ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: failed register the radio with mac80211: -22 ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: failed to create pdev core: -22 Signed-off-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <quic_kvalo@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230421145445.2612280-1-mbizon@freebox.fr Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 93a3319 ] The cited commit holds encap tbl lock unconditionally when setting up dests. But it may cause the following deadlock: PID: 1063722 TASK: ffffa062ca5d0000 CPU: 13 COMMAND: "handler8" #0 [ffffb14de05b7368] __schedule at ffffffffa1d5aa91 #1 [ffffb14de05b7410] schedule at ffffffffa1d5afdb #2 [ffffb14de05b7430] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa1d5b528 #3 [ffffb14de05b7440] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa1d5d6cb #4 [ffffb14de05b74e8] mutex_lock_nested at ffffffffa1d5ddeb #5 [ffffb14de05b74f8] mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_dests_set at ffffffffc12f2096 [mlx5_core] #6 [ffffb14de05b7568] post_process_attr at ffffffffc12d9fc5 [mlx5_core] #7 [ffffb14de05b75a0] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12de877 [mlx5_core] #8 [ffffb14de05b75f0] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow at ffffffffc12e0eef [mlx5_core] #9 [ffffb14de05b7660] mlx5e_tc_add_flow at ffffffffc12e12f7 [mlx5_core] #10 [ffffb14de05b76b8] mlx5e_configure_flower at ffffffffc12e1686 [mlx5_core] #11 [ffffb14de05b7720] mlx5e_rep_indr_offload at ffffffffc12e3817 [mlx5_core] #12 [ffffb14de05b7730] mlx5e_rep_indr_setup_tc_cb at ffffffffc12e388a [mlx5_core] #13 [ffffb14de05b7740] tc_setup_cb_add at ffffffffa1ab2ba8 #14 [ffffb14de05b77a0] fl_hw_replace_filter at ffffffffc0bdec2f [cls_flower] #15 [ffffb14de05b7868] fl_change at ffffffffc0be6caa [cls_flower] #16 [ffffb14de05b7908] tc_new_tfilter at ffffffffa1ab71f0 [1031218.028143] wait_for_completion+0x24/0x30 [1031218.028589] mlx5e_update_route_decap_flows+0x9a/0x1e0 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029256] mlx5e_tc_fib_event_work+0x1ad/0x300 [mlx5_core] [1031218.029885] process_one_work+0x24e/0x510 Actually no need to hold encap tbl lock if there is no encap action. Fix it by checking if encap action exists or not before holding encap tbl lock. Fixes: 37c3b9f ("net/mlx5e: Prevent encap offload when neigh update is running") Signed-off-by: Chris Mi <cmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…nel range [ Upstream commit e2ceb1d ] Because of what seems to be a typo, a 6Ghz-only phy for which the BDF does not allow the 7115Mhz channel will fail to register: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 106 at net/wireless/core.c:907 wiphy_register+0x914/0x954 Modules linked in: ath11k_pci sbsa_gwdt CPU: 2 PID: 106 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-next-20230418-00549-g1e096a17625a-dirty #9 Hardware name: Freebox V7R Board (DT) Workqueue: ath11k_qmi_driver_event ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : wiphy_register+0x914/0x954 lr : ieee80211_register_hw+0x67c/0xc10 sp : ffffff800b123aa0 x29: ffffff800b123aa0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000006 x24: ffffffc008d51418 x23: ffffffc008cb0838 x22: ffffff80176c2460 x21: 0000000000000168 x20: ffffff80176c0000 x19: ffffff80176c03e0 x18: 0000000000000014 x17: 00000000cbef338c x16: 00000000d2a26f21 x15: 00000000ad6bb85f x14: 0000000000000020 x13: 0000000000000020 x12: 00000000ffffffbd x11: 0000000000000208 x10: 00000000fffffdf7 x9 : ffffffc009394718 x8 : ffffff80176c0528 x7 : 000000007fffffff x6 : 0000000000000006 x5 : 0000000000000005 x4 : ffffff800b304284 x3 : ffffff800b304284 x2 : ffffff800b304d98 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 Call trace: wiphy_register+0x914/0x954 ieee80211_register_hw+0x67c/0xc10 ath11k_mac_register+0x7c4/0xe10 ath11k_core_qmi_firmware_ready+0x1f4/0x570 ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0x198/0x590 process_one_work+0x1b8/0x328 worker_thread+0x6c/0x414 kthread+0x100/0x104 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: ieee80211 registration failed: -22 ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: failed register the radio with mac80211: -22 ath11k_pci 0002:01:00.0: failed to create pdev core: -22 Signed-off-by: Maxime Bizon <mbizon@freebox.fr> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <quic_kvalo@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230421145445.2612280-1-mbizon@freebox.fr Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 7962ef1 ] In 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") it only was freeing if strcmp(evsel->tp_format->system, "syscalls") returned zero, while the corresponding initialization of evsel->priv was being performed if it was _not_ zero, i.e. if the tp system wasn't 'syscalls'. Just stop looking for that and free it if evsel->priv was set, which should be equivalent. Also use the pre-existing evsel_trace__delete() function. This resolves these leaks, detected with: $ make EXTRA_CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address" BUILD_BPF_SKEL=1 CORESIGHT=1 O=/tmp/build/perf-tools-next -C tools/perf install-bin ================================================================= ==481565==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540e8b in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3212 #7 0x540e8b in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540e8b in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f7343cba097 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.8+0xba097) #1 0x987966 in zalloc (/home/acme/bin/perf+0x987966) #2 0x52f9b9 in evsel_trace__new /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:307 #3 0x52f9b9 in evsel__syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:333 #4 0x52f9b9 in evsel__init_raw_syscall_tp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:458 #5 0x52f9b9 in perf_evsel__raw_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:480 #6 0x540dd1 in trace__add_syscall_newtp /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3205 #7 0x540dd1 in trace__run /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3891 #8 0x540dd1 in cmd_trace /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5156 #9 0x5ef262 in run_builtin /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:323 #10 0x4196da in handle_internal_command /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:377 #11 0x4196da in run_argv /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:421 #12 0x4196da in main /home/acme/git/perf-tools-next/tools/perf/perf.c:537 #13 0x7f7342c4a50f in __libc_start_call_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x2750f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 80 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). [root@quaco ~]# With this we plug all leaks with "perf trace sleep 1". Fixes: 3cb4d5e ("perf trace: Free syscall tp fields in evsel->priv") Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230719202951.534582-5-acme@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a154f5f ] The following call trace shows a deadlock issue due to recursive locking of mutex "device_mutex". First lock acquire is in target_for_each_device() and second in target_free_device(). PID: 148266 TASK: ffff8be21ffb5d00 CPU: 10 COMMAND: "iscsi_ttx" #0 [ffffa2bfc9ec3b18] __schedule at ffffffffa8060e7f #1 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ba0] schedule at ffffffffa8061224 #2 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bb8] schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa80615ee #3 [ffffa2bfc9ec3bc8] __mutex_lock at ffffffffa8062fd7 #4 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c40] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffffa80631d3 #5 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c50] mutex_lock at ffffffffa806320c #6 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c68] target_free_device at ffffffffc0935998 [target_core_mod] #7 [ffffa2bfc9ec3c90] target_core_dev_release at ffffffffc092f975 [target_core_mod] #8 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ca0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d250f #9 [ffffa2bfc9ec3cd0] config_item_put at ffffffffa79d2583 #10 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ce0] target_devices_idr_iter at ffffffffc0933f3a [target_core_mod] #11 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d00] idr_for_each at ffffffffa803f6fc #12 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d60] target_for_each_device at ffffffffc0935670 [target_core_mod] #13 [ffffa2bfc9ec3d98] transport_deregister_session at ffffffffc0946408 [target_core_mod] #14 [ffffa2bfc9ec3dc8] iscsit_close_session at ffffffffc09a44a6 [iscsi_target_mod] #15 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df0] iscsit_close_connection at ffffffffc09a4a88 [iscsi_target_mod] #16 [ffffa2bfc9ec3df8] finish_task_switch at ffffffffa76e5d07 #17 [ffffa2bfc9ec3e78] iscsit_take_action_for_connection_exit at ffffffffc0991c23 [iscsi_target_mod] #18 [ffffa2bfc9ec3ea0] iscsi_target_tx_thread at ffffffffc09a403b [iscsi_target_mod] #19 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f08] kthread at ffffffffa76d8080 #20 [ffffa2bfc9ec3f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffffa8200364 Fixes: 36d4cb4 ("scsi: target: Avoid that EXTENDED COPY commands trigger lock inversion") Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230918225848.66463-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 #7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 #8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 #9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 #10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 #11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 #12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ede72dc ] Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory leak with an address sanitizer build: ``` $ perf stat -e '*:o/' true event syntax error: '*:o/' \___ parser error Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>] -e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events ================================================================= ==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49 #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338 #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464 #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822 #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094 #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279 #7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251 #8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351 #9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539 #10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654 #11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501 #12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322 #13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375 #14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419 #15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). ``` Fix by adding the missing destructor. Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a84fbf2 ] Generating metrics llc_code_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_data_read_mpi_demand_plus_prefetch, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_read, llc_miss_local_memory_bandwidth_write, nllc_miss_remote_memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_read, memory_bandwidth_write, uncore_frequency, upi_data_transmit_bw, C2_Pkg_Residency, C3_Core_Residency, C3_Pkg_Residency, C6_Core_Residency, C6_Pkg_Residency, C7_Core_Residency, C7_Pkg_Residency, UNCORE_FREQ and tma_info_system_socket_clks would trigger an address sanitizer heap-buffer-overflows on a SkylakeX. ``` ==2567752==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x5020003ed098 at pc 0x5621a816654e bp 0x7fffb55d4da0 sp 0x7fffb55d4d98 READ of size 4 at 0x5020003eee78 thread T0 #0 0x558265d6654d in aggr_cpu_id__is_empty tools/perf/util/cpumap.c:694:12 #1 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_aggr tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1490:6 #2 0x558265c914da in perf_stat__get_global_cached tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1530:9 #3 0x558265e53290 in should_skip_zero_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:947:31 #4 0x558265e53290 in print_counter_aggrdata tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:985:18 #5 0x558265e51931 in print_counter tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1110:3 #6 0x558265e51931 in evlist__print_counters tools/perf/util/stat-display.c:1571:5 #7 0x558265c8ec87 in print_counters tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:981:2 #8 0x558265c8cc71 in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2837:3 #9 0x558265bb9bd4 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:323:11 #10 0x558265bb98eb in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:377:8 #11 0x558265bb9389 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:421:2 #12 0x558265bb9389 in main tools/perf/perf.c:537:3 ``` The issue was the use of testing a cpumap with NULL rather than using empty, as a map containing the dummy value isn't NULL and the -1 results in an empty aggr map being allocated which legitimately overflows when any member is accessed. Fixes: 8a96f45 ("perf stat: Avoid SEGV if core.cpus isn't set") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230906003912.3317462-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit ede72dc ] Fuzzing found that an invalid tracepoint name would create a memory leak with an address sanitizer build: ``` $ perf stat -e '*:o/' true event syntax error: '*:o/' \___ parser error Run 'perf list' for a list of valid events Usage: perf stat [<options>] [<command>] -e, --event <event> event selector. use 'perf list' to list available events ================================================================= ==59380==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f38ac07077b in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x55f2f41be73b in str util/parse-events.l:49 #2 0x55f2f41d08e8 in parse_events_lex util/parse-events.l:338 #3 0x55f2f41dc3b1 in parse_events_parse util/parse-events-bison.c:1464 #4 0x55f2f410b8b3 in parse_events__scanner util/parse-events.c:1822 #5 0x55f2f410d1b9 in __parse_events util/parse-events.c:2094 #6 0x55f2f410e57f in parse_events_option util/parse-events.c:2279 #7 0x55f2f4427b56 in get_value tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:251 #8 0x55f2f4428d98 in parse_short_opt tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:351 #9 0x55f2f4429d80 in parse_options_step tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:539 #10 0x55f2f442acb9 in parse_options_subcommand tools/lib/subcmd/parse-options.c:654 #11 0x55f2f3ec99fc in cmd_stat tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2501 #12 0x55f2f4093289 in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:322 #13 0x55f2f40937f5 in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:375 #14 0x55f2f4093bbd in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:419 #15 0x55f2f409412b in main tools/perf/perf.c:535 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s). ``` Fix by adding the missing destructor. Fixes: 865582c ("perf tools: Adds the tracepoint name parsing support") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230914164028.363220-1-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit d8b90d6 upstream. When scanning namespaces, it is possible to get valid data from the first call to nvme_identify_ns() in nvme_alloc_ns(), but not from the second call in nvme_update_ns_info_block(). In particular, if the NSID becomes inactive between the two commands, a storage device may return a buffer filled with zero as per 4.1.5.1. In this case, we can get a kernel crash due to a divide-by-zero in blk_stack_limits() because ns->lba_shift will be set to zero. PID: 326 TASK: ffff95fec3cd8000 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "kworker/u98:10" #0 [ffffad8f8702f9e0] machine_kexec at ffffffff91c76ec7 #1 [ffffad8f8702fa38] __crash_kexec at ffffffff91dea4fa #2 [ffffad8f8702faf8] crash_kexec at ffffffff91deb788 #3 [ffffad8f8702fb00] oops_end at ffffffff91c2e4bb #4 [ffffad8f8702fb20] do_trap at ffffffff91c2a4ce #5 [ffffad8f8702fb70] do_error_trap at ffffffff91c2a595 #6 [ffffad8f8702fbb0] exc_divide_error at ffffffff928506e6 #7 [ffffad8f8702fbd0] asm_exc_divide_error at ffffffff92a00926 [exception RIP: blk_stack_limits+434] RIP: ffffffff92191872 RSP: ffffad8f8702fc80 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff95efa0c91800 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00000000ffffffff R8: ffff95fec7df35a8 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff95fed33c09a8 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffad8f8702fce0] nvme_update_ns_info_block at ffffffffc06d3533 [nvme_core] #9 [ffffad8f8702fd18] nvme_scan_ns at ffffffffc06d6fa7 [nvme_core] This happened when the check for valid data was moved out of nvme_identify_ns() into one of the callers. Fix this by checking in both callers. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218186 Fixes: 0dd6fff ("nvme: bring back auto-removal of deleted namespaces during sequential scan") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit e3e82fc ] When creating ceq_0 during probing irdma, cqp.sc_cqp will be sent as a cqp_request to cqp->sc_cqp.sq_ring. If the request is pending when removing the irdma driver or unplugging its aux device, cqp.sc_cqp will be dereferenced as wrong struct in irdma_free_pending_cqp_request(). PID: 3669 TASK: ffff88aef892c000 CPU: 28 COMMAND: "kworker/28:0" #0 [fffffe0000549e38] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff810e3a34 #1 [fffffe0000549e40] nmi_handle at ffffffff810788b2 #2 [fffffe0000549ea0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8107938f #3 [fffffe0000549eb8] do_nmi at ffffffff81079582 #4 [fffffe0000549ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff82e016b4 [exception RIP: native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+1291] RIP: ffffffff8127e72b RSP: ffff88aa841ef778 RFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88b01f849700 RCX: ffffffff8127e47e RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff83857ec0 RBP: ffff88afe3e4efc8 R8: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R9: ffffed15fc7c9dfa R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed15fc7c9df9 R12: 0000000000740000 R13: ffff88b01f849708 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: ffffed1603f092e1 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0000 -- <NMI exception stack> -- #5 [ffff88aa841ef778] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8127e72b #6 [ffff88aa841ef7b0] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff82c22aa4 #7 [ffff88aa841ef7c8] __wake_up_common_lock at ffffffff81257363 #8 [ffff88aa841ef888] irdma_free_pending_cqp_request at ffffffffa0ba12cc [irdma] #9 [ffff88aa841ef958] irdma_cleanup_pending_cqp_op at ffffffffa0ba1469 [irdma] #10 [ffff88aa841ef9c0] irdma_ctrl_deinit_hw at ffffffffa0b2989f [irdma] #11 [ffff88aa841efa28] irdma_remove at ffffffffa0b252df [irdma] #12 [ffff88aa841efae8] auxiliary_bus_remove at ffffffff8219afdb #13 [ffff88aa841efb00] device_release_driver_internal at ffffffff821882e6 #14 [ffff88aa841efb38] bus_remove_device at ffffffff82184278 #15 [ffff88aa841efb88] device_del at ffffffff82179d23 #16 [ffff88aa841efc48] ice_unplug_aux_dev at ffffffffa0eb1c14 [ice] #17 [ffff88aa841efc68] ice_service_task at ffffffffa0d88201 [ice] #18 [ffff88aa841efde8] process_one_work at ffffffff811c589a #19 [ffff88aa841efe60] worker_thread at ffffffff811c71ff #20 [ffff88aa841eff10] kthread at ffffffff811d87a0 #21 [ffff88aa841eff50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff82e0022f Fixes: 44d9e52 ("RDMA/irdma: Implement device initialization definitions") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130081415.891006-1-lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn Suggested-by: "Ismail, Mustafa" <mustafa.ismail@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Shifeng Li <lishifeng@sangfor.com.cn> Reviewed-by: Shiraz Saleem <shiraz.saleem@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

@smb

commit b35858b upstream. Validate @smb->WordCount to avoid reading off the end of @smb and thus causing the following KASAN splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c024ec5 by task cifsd/1328 CPU: 1 PID: 1328 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5 #9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 print_report+0xcf/0x650 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 kasan_report+0xd8/0x110 ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] checkSMB+0x162/0x370 [cifs] ? __pfx_checkSMB+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_handle_standard+0xbc/0x2f0 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xed1/0x1360 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kthread_parkme+0xce/0xf0 ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] kthread+0x18d/0x1d0 ? kthread+0xdb/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> This fixes CVE-2023-6606. Reported-by: j51569436@gmail.com Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218218 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

@smb

commit b35858b upstream. Validate @smb->WordCount to avoid reading off the end of @smb and thus causing the following KASAN splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c024ec5 by task cifsd/1328 CPU: 1 PID: 1328 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.7.0-rc5 #9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80 print_report+0xcf/0x650 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 kasan_report+0xd8/0x110 ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] ? smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 smbCalcSize+0x32/0x40 [cifs] checkSMB+0x162/0x370 [cifs] ? __pfx_checkSMB+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_handle_standard+0xbc/0x2f0 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0xed1/0x1360 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x210 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kthread_parkme+0xce/0xf0 ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] kthread+0x18d/0x1d0 ? kthread+0xdb/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> This fixes CVE-2023-6606. Reported-by: j51569436@gmail.com Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218218 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

A recent change in acp_irq_thread() was meant to address a potential race condition while trying to acquire the hardware semaphore responsible for the synchronization between firmware and host IPC interrupts. This resulted in an improper use of the IPC spinlock, causing normal kernel memory allocations (which may sleep) inside atomic contexts: 1707255557.133976 kernel: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:315 ... 1707255557.134757 kernel: sof_ipc3_rx_msg+0x70/0x130 [snd_sof] 1707255557.134793 kernel: acp_sof_ipc_irq_thread+0x1e0/0x550 [snd_sof_amd_acp] 1707255557.134855 kernel: acp_irq_thread+0xa3/0x130 [snd_sof_amd_acp] 1707255557.134904 kernel: ? irq_thread+0xb5/0x1e0 1707255557.134947 kernel: ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10 1707255557.134985 kernel: irq_thread_fn+0x23/0x60 Moreover, there are attempts to lock a mutex from the same atomic context: 1707255557.136357 kernel: ============================= 1707255557.136393 kernel: [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] 1707255557.136413 kernel: 6.8.0-rc3-next-20240206-audio-next linux-surface#9 Tainted: G W 1707255557.136432 kernel: ----------------------------- 1707255557.136451 kernel: irq/66-AudioDSP/502 is trying to lock: 1707255557.136470 kernel: ffff965152f26af8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: start_creating.part.0+0x5f/0x180 ... 1707255557.137429 kernel: start_creating.part.0+0x5f/0x180 1707255557.137457 kernel: __debugfs_create_file+0x61/0x210 1707255557.137475 kernel: snd_sof_debugfs_io_item+0x75/0xc0 [snd_sof] 1707255557.137494 kernel: sof_ipc3_do_rx_work+0x7cf/0x9f0 [snd_sof] 1707255557.137513 kernel: sof_ipc3_rx_msg+0xb3/0x130 [snd_sof] 1707255557.137532 kernel: acp_sof_ipc_irq_thread+0x1e0/0x550 [snd_sof_amd_acp] 1707255557.137551 kernel: acp_irq_thread+0xa3/0x130 [snd_sof_amd_acp] Fix the issues by reducing the lock scope in acp_irq_thread(), so that it guards only the hardware semaphore acquiring attempt. Additionally, restore the initial locking in acp_sof_ipc_irq_thread() to synchronize the handling of immediate replies from DSP core. Fixes: 802134c ("ASoC: SOF: amd: Refactor spinlock_irq(&sdev->ipc_lock) sequence in irq_handler") Signed-off-by: Cristian Ciocaltea <cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240208234315.2182048-1-cristian.ciocaltea@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

…lblished(). syzkaller reported a warning [0] in inet_csk_destroy_sock() with no repro. WARN_ON(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash); However, the syzkaller's log hinted that connect() failed just before the warning due to FAULT_INJECTION. [1] When connect() is called for an unbound socket, we search for an available ephemeral port. If a bhash bucket exists for the port, we call __inet_check_established() or __inet6_check_established() to check if the bucket is reusable. If reusable, we add the socket into ehash and set inet_sk(sk)->inet_num. Later, we look up the corresponding bhash2 bucket and try to allocate it if it does not exist. Although it rarely occurs in real use, if the allocation fails, we must revert the changes by check_established(). Otherwise, an unconnected socket could illegally occupy an ehash entry. Note that we do not put tw back into ehash because sk might have already responded to a packet for tw and it would be better to free tw earlier under such memory presure. [0]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 350830 at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193 inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Modules linked in: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 2d 4a 3d fd e8 28 4a 3d fd 48 89 ef e8 f0 cd 7d ff 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 13 4a 3d fd e8 0e 4a 3d fd <0f> 0b e9 61 fe ff ff e8 02 4a 3d fd 4c 89 e7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 05 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b21fd38 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000009e78 RCX: ffffffff840bae40 RDX: ffff88806e46c600 RSI: ffffffff840bb012 RDI: ffff88811755cca8 RBP: ffff88811755c880 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000009e78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88811755c8e0 R13: ffff88811755c892 R14: ffff88811755c918 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f03e5243800(0000) GS:ffff88811ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b32f21000 CR3: 0000000112ffe001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) dccp_close (net/dccp/proto.c:1078) inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:434) __sock_release (net/socket.c:660) sock_close (net/socket.c:1423) __fput (fs/file_table.c:377) __fput_sync (fs/file_table.c:462) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1557 fs/open.c:1539 fs/open.c:1539) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7f03e53852bb Code: 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 43 c9 f5 ff 8b 7c 24 0c 41 89 c0 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 a1 c9 f5 ff 8b 44 RSP: 002b:00000000005dfba0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f03e53852bb RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000167c R10: 0000000008a79680 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f03e4e43000 R13: 00007f03e4e43170 R14: 00007f03e4e43178 R15: 00007f03e4e43170 </TASK> [1]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 0 PID: 350833 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.7.0-12272-g2121c43f88f5 linux-surface#9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1)) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3748) kmem_cache_alloc (mm/slub.c:3763 mm/slub.c:3842 mm/slub.c:3867) inet_bind2_bucket_create (net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:135) __inet_hash_connect (net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:1100) dccp_v4_connect (net/dccp/ipv4.c:116) __inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:676) inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:747) __sys_connect_file (net/socket.c:2048 (discriminator 2)) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2065) __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2072) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7f03e5284e5d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f03e4641cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f03e5284e5d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f03e52e5530 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: 28044fc ("net: Add a bhash2 table hashed by port and address") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

(1 << idx) of int is not desired when setting bits in unsigned long overflowed_ctrs, use BIT() instead. This panic happens when running 'perf record -e branches' on sophgo sg2042. [ 273.311852] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098 [ 273.320851] Oops [linux-surface#1] [ 273.323179] Modules linked in: [ 273.326303] CPU: 0 PID: 1475 Comm: perf Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3+ linux-surface#9 [ 273.332521] Hardware name: Sophgo Mango (DT) [ 273.336878] epc : riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62 [ 273.342291] ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x2e0/0x34e [ 273.347091] epc : ffffffff80aecd98 ra : ffffffff80aee056 sp : fffffff6e36928b0 [ 273.354454] gp : ffffffff821f82d0 tp : ffffffd90c353200 t0 : 0000002ade4f9978 [ 273.361815] t1 : 0000000000504d55 t2 : ffffffff8016cd8c s0 : fffffff6e3692a70 [ 273.369180] s1 : 0000000000000020 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : 00001a8e81800000 [ 273.376540] a2 : 0000003c00070198 a3 : 0000003c00db75a4 a4 : 0000000000000015 [ 273.383901] a5 : ffffffd7ff8804b0 a6 : 0000000000000015 a7 : 000000000000002a [ 273.391327] s2 : 000000000000ffff s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : ffffffd7ff8803b0 [ 273.398773] s5 : 0000000000504d55 s6 : ffffffd905069800 s7 : ffffffff821fe210 [ 273.406139] s8 : 000000007fffffff s9 : ffffffd7ff8803b0 s10: ffffffd903f29098 [ 273.413660] s11: 0000000080000000 t3 : 0000000000000003 t4 : ffffffff8017a0ca [ 273.421022] t5 : ffffffff8023cfc2 t6 : ffffffd9040780e8 [ 273.426437] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000098 cause: 000000000000000d [ 273.434512] [<ffffffff80aecd98>] riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask+0x8/0x62 [ 273.441169] [<ffffffff80076bd8>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x98/0x1ee [ 273.447562] [<ffffffff80071158>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [ 273.454151] [<ffffffff8047a99a>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e [ 273.459659] [<ffffffff80c944de>] handle_riscv_irq+0x4a/0x74 [ 273.465442] [<ffffffff80c94c48>] do_irq+0x62/0x92 [ 273.470360] Code: 0420 60a2 6402 5529 0141 8082 0013 0000 0013 0000 (6d5c) b783 [ 273.477921] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 273.482630] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Fei Wu <fei2.wu@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240228115425.2613856-1-fei2.wu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>

[ Upstream commit fc3a553 ] An issue occurred while reading an ELF file in libbpf.c during fuzzing: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 4206 in libbpf.c (gdb) bt #0 0x0000000000958e97 in bpf_object.collect_prog_relos () at libbpf.c:4206 #1 0x000000000094f9d6 in bpf_object.collect_relos () at libbpf.c:6706 #2 0x000000000092bef3 in bpf_object_open () at libbpf.c:7437 #3 0x000000000092c046 in bpf_object.open_mem () at libbpf.c:7497 #4 0x0000000000924afa in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput () at fuzz/bpf-object-fuzzer.c:16 #5 0x000000000060be11 in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::Fuzzer::run_one () #6 0x000000000087ad92 in tracing::span::Span::in_scope () #7 0x00000000006078aa in testblitz_engine::fuzzer::util::walkdir () #8 0x00000000005f3217 in testblitz_engine::entrypoint::main::{{closure}} () #9 0x00000000005f2601 in main () (gdb) scn_data was null at this code(tools/lib/bpf/src/libbpf.c): if (rel->r_offset % BPF_INSN_SZ || rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size) { The scn_data is derived from the code above: scn = elf_sec_by_idx(obj, sec_idx); scn_data = elf_sec_data(obj, scn); relo_sec_name = elf_sec_str(obj, shdr->sh_name); sec_name = elf_sec_name(obj, scn); if (!relo_sec_name || !sec_name)// don't check whether scn_data is NULL return -EINVAL; In certain special scenarios, such as reading a malformed ELF file, it is possible that scn_data may be a null pointer Signed-off-by: Mingyi Zhang <zhangmingyi5@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Liu <liuxin350@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Changye Wu <wuchangye@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231221033947.154564-1-liuxin350@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…lblished(). [ Upstream commit 66b60b0 ] syzkaller reported a warning [0] in inet_csk_destroy_sock() with no repro. WARN_ON(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && !inet_csk(sk)->icsk_bind_hash); However, the syzkaller's log hinted that connect() failed just before the warning due to FAULT_INJECTION. [1] When connect() is called for an unbound socket, we search for an available ephemeral port. If a bhash bucket exists for the port, we call __inet_check_established() or __inet6_check_established() to check if the bucket is reusable. If reusable, we add the socket into ehash and set inet_sk(sk)->inet_num. Later, we look up the corresponding bhash2 bucket and try to allocate it if it does not exist. Although it rarely occurs in real use, if the allocation fails, we must revert the changes by check_established(). Otherwise, an unconnected socket could illegally occupy an ehash entry. Note that we do not put tw back into ehash because sk might have already responded to a packet for tw and it would be better to free tw earlier under such memory presure. [0]: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 350830 at net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193 inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Modules linked in: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) Code: 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 2d 4a 3d fd e8 28 4a 3d fd 48 89 ef e8 f0 cd 7d ff 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e e9 13 4a 3d fd e8 0e 4a 3d fd <0f> 0b e9 61 fe ff ff e8 02 4a 3d fd 4c 89 e7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 05 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b21fd38 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000009e78 RCX: ffffffff840bae40 RDX: ffff88806e46c600 RSI: ffffffff840bb012 RDI: ffff88811755cca8 RBP: ffff88811755c880 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000009e78 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88811755c8e0 R13: ffff88811755c892 R14: ffff88811755c918 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f03e5243800(0000) GS:ffff88811ae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b32f21000 CR3: 0000000112ffe001 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? inet_csk_destroy_sock (net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1193) dccp_close (net/dccp/proto.c:1078) inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:434) __sock_release (net/socket.c:660) sock_close (net/socket.c:1423) __fput (fs/file_table.c:377) __fput_sync (fs/file_table.c:462) __x64_sys_close (fs/open.c:1557 fs/open.c:1539 fs/open.c:1539) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7f03e53852bb Code: 03 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 41 c3 48 83 ec 18 89 7c 24 0c e8 43 c9 f5 ff 8b 7c 24 0c 41 89 c0 b8 03 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 89 44 24 0c e8 a1 c9 f5 ff 8b 44 RSP: 002b:00000000005dfba0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007f03e53852bb RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000167c R10: 0000000008a79680 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007f03e4e43000 R13: 00007f03e4e43170 R14: 00007f03e4e43178 R15: 00007f03e4e43170 </TASK> [1]: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 CPU: 0 PID: 350833 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.7.0-12272-g2121c43f88f5 #9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 1)) should_fail_ex (lib/fault-inject.c:52 lib/fault-inject.c:153) should_failslab (mm/slub.c:3748) kmem_cache_alloc (mm/slub.c:3763 mm/slub.c:3842 mm/slub.c:3867) inet_bind2_bucket_create (net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:135) __inet_hash_connect (net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:1100) dccp_v4_connect (net/dccp/ipv4.c:116) __inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:676) inet_stream_connect (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:747) __sys_connect_file (net/socket.c:2048 (discriminator 2)) __sys_connect (net/socket.c:2065) __x64_sys_connect (net/socket.c:2072) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:129) RIP: 0033:0x7f03e5284e5d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f03e4641cc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bbf80 RCX: 00007f03e5284e5d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000004bbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f03e52e5530 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Fixes: 28044fc ("net: Add a bhash2 table hashed by port and address") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

Passing a maximum attribute type to nlmsg_parse() that is larger than the size of the passed policy will result in an out-of-bounds access [1] when the attribute type is used as an index into the policy array. Fix by setting the maximum attribute type according to the policy size, as is already done for RTM_NEWNEXTHOP messages. Add a test case that triggers the bug. No regressions in fib nexthops tests: # ./fib_nexthops.sh [...] Tests passed: 236 Tests failed: 0 [1] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in __nla_validate_parse+0x1e53/0x2940 Read of size 1 at addr ffffffff99ab4d20 by task ip/610 CPU: 3 PID: 610 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-custom-gd435d6e3e161 linux-surface#9 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-1.fc38 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x8f/0xe0 print_report+0xcf/0x670 kasan_report+0xd8/0x110 __nla_validate_parse+0x1e53/0x2940 __nla_parse+0x40/0x50 rtm_del_nexthop+0x1bd/0x400 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf20 netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 netlink_sendmsg+0x8d3/0xdb0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31f/0xa60 ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0 __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b [...] The buggy address belongs to the variable: rtm_nh_policy_del+0x20/0x40 Fixes: 2118f93 ("net: nexthop: Adjust netlink policy parsing for a new attribute") Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89i+UNcG0PJMW5X7gOMunF38ryMh=L1aeZUKH3kL4UdUqag@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+65bb09a7208ce3d4a633@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/00000000000088981b06133bc07b@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311162307.545385-4-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

commit 4be9075 upstream. The driver creates /sys/kernel/debug/dri/0/mob_ttm even when the corresponding ttm_resource_manager is not allocated. This leads to a crash when trying to read from this file. Add a check to create mob_ttm, system_mob_ttm, and gmr_ttm debug file only when the corresponding ttm_resource_manager is allocated. crash> bt PID: 3133409 TASK: ffff8fe4834a5000 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "grep" #0 [ffffb954506b3b20] machine_kexec at ffffffffb2a6bec3 #1 [ffffb954506b3b78] __crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb598a #2 [ffffb954506b3c38] crash_kexec at ffffffffb2bb68c1 #3 [ffffb954506b3c50] oops_end at ffffffffb2a2a9b1 #4 [ffffb954506b3c70] no_context at ffffffffb2a7e913 #5 [ffffb954506b3cc8] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffffb2a7ec8c #6 [ffffb954506b3d10] do_page_fault at ffffffffb2a7f887 #7 [ffffb954506b3d40] page_fault at ffffffffb360116e [exception RIP: ttm_resource_manager_debug+0x11] RIP: ffffffffc04afd11 RSP: ffffb954506b3df0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff8fe41a6d1200 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000940 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffc04b4338 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffb954506b3e08 R8: ffff8fee3ffad000 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8fe41a76a000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8fe5bb6f3900 R15: ffff8fe41a6d1200 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffffb954506b3e00] ttm_resource_manager_show at ffffffffc04afde7 [ttm] #9 [ffffb954506b3e30] seq_read at ffffffffb2d8f9f3 RIP: 00007f4c4eda8985 RSP: 00007ffdbba9e9f8 RFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000037e000 RCX: 00007f4c4eda8985 RDX: 000000000037e000 RSI: 00007f4c41573000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000037e000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 000000000037fe30 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4c41573000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f4c41572010 R15: 0000000000000003 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Signed-off-by: Jocelyn Falempe <jfalempe@redhat.com> Fixes: af4a25b ("drm/vmwgfx: Add debugfs entries for various ttm resource managers") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin@broadcom.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240312093551.196609-1-jfalempe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ] vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents. When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump packet and soft lockup will be detected. net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate. PID: 33036 TASK: ffff949da6f20000 CPU: 23 COMMAND: "vhost-32980" #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663 [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20] RIP: ffffffff89792594 RSP: ffffa655314979e8 RFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: ffffffff89792500 RBX: ffffffff8af428a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000000003fd RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffffff8af428a0 RBP: 0000000000002710 R8: 0000000000000004 R9: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff8acbf64f R12: 0000000000000020 R13: ffffffff8acbf698 R14: 0000000000000058 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun] #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun] #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net] #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost] #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors") Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 769e6a1e15bdbbaf2b0d2f37c24f2c53268bd21f ] ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated memory in hist_browser__run(). Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string. Committer notes: Further explanation from Ian Rogers: My command line using tui is: $ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report' I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan error (from the log file): ``` ==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address 0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180 65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10 READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0 #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461 #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251) #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9) #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60 #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266 #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288 #6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206 #7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458 #8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412 #9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527 #10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613 #11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661 #12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671 #13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141 #14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805 #15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374 #16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516 #17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350 #18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403 #19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447 #20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561 #21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId: 84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93) Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746 This frame has 1 object(s): [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is inside this variable HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork ``` hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit. There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade anyway. Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'") Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com> Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev> Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com> Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn> Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…PLES event" commit 5b3cde198878b2f3269d5e7efbc0d514899b1fd8 upstream. This reverts commit 7d1405c. This causes segfaults in some cases, as reported by Milian: ``` sudo /usr/bin/perf record -z --call-graph dwarf -e cycles -e raw_syscalls:sys_enter ls ... [ perf record: Woken up 3 times to write data ] malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Aborted ``` Backtrace with GDB + debuginfod: ``` malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted) Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 Downloading source file /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/nptl/pthread_kill.c 44 return INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERROR_P (ret) ? INTERNAL_SYSCALL_ERRNO (ret) : 0; (gdb) bt #0 __pthread_kill_implementation (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=signo@entry=6, no_tid=no_tid@entry=0) at pthread_kill.c:44 #1 0x00007ffff6ea8eb3 in __pthread_kill_internal (threadid=<optimized out>, signo=6) at pthread_kill.c:78 #2 0x00007ffff6e50a30 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../sysdeps/posix/ raise.c:26 #3 0x00007ffff6e384c3 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:79 #4 0x00007ffff6e39354 in __libc_message_impl (fmt=fmt@entry=0x7ffff6fc22ea "%s\n") at ../sysdeps/posix/libc_fatal.c:132 #5 0x00007ffff6eb3085 in malloc_printerr (str=str@entry=0x7ffff6fc5850 "malloc(): invalid next size (unsorted)") at malloc.c:5772 #6 0x00007ffff6eb657c in _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7ffff6ff6ac0 <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=368) at malloc.c:4081 #7 0x00007ffff6eb877e in __libc_calloc (n=<optimized out>, elem_size=<optimized out>) at malloc.c:3754 #8 0x000055555569bdb6 in perf_session.do_write_header () #9 0x00005555555a373a in __cmd_record.constprop.0 () #10 0x00005555555a6846 in cmd_record () #11 0x000055555564db7f in run_builtin () #12 0x000055555558ed77 in main () ``` Valgrind memcheck: ``` ==45136== Invalid write of size 8 ==45136== at 0x2B38A5: perf_event__synthesize_id_sample (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x157069: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ==45136== Syscall param write(buf) points to unaddressable byte(s) ==45136== at 0x575953D: __libc_write (write.c:26) ==45136== by 0x575953D: write (write.c:24) ==45136== by 0x35761F: ion (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x357778: writen (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1548F7: record__write (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15708A: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== Address 0x6a866a8 is 0 bytes after a block of size 40 alloc'd ==45136== at 0x4849BF3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) ==45136== by 0x3574AB: zalloc (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x1570E0: __cmd_record.constprop.0 (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x15A845: cmd_record (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x201B7E: run_builtin (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== by 0x142D76: main (in /usr/bin/perf) ==45136== ----- Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/23879991.0LEYPuXRzz@milian-workstation/ Reported-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Tested-by: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org # 6.8+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zl9ksOlHJHnKM70p@x1 Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9d274c19a71b3a276949933859610721a453946b upstream. We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in btrfs_set_item_key_safe(): BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs] With the following stack trace: #0 btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4) #1 btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4) #2 log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9) #3 btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9) #4 btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9) #5 btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8) #6 btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8) #7 btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8) #8 vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9) #9 vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9) #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9) #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9) #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1) #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14) #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7) #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree, triggering the BUG(). This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py) to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us: >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"]) leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610 leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44) otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16) item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192 item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 ... So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5 (8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and item 5 starts at i_size. Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash: >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0)) >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0]) leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5 leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000 fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677 chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da ... item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160 generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288 block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0 sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC) atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43) item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13 index 195 namelen 3 name: 193 item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37 location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6 name: user.a data a item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 1 (regular) extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288 extent compression 0 (none) item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53 generation 9 type 2 (prealloc) prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288 prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096 Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree, but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in the leaf. btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies the prealloc extent items to the log tree. If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent item that was already copied to the log tree. This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario, including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync, overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash is triggered by the following sequence of events: - Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is the last item in its B-tree leaf. - The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items to the log tree. - An xattr is set on the file, which sets the BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag. - The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight. - The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(). - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf(). - btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path. - The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part from 8k-12k. - btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent 8k-12k. - btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync. - fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k extent that was written. - This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to 8k. - btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG(). Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

qzed closed this as completed Oct 18, 2019

qzed added C: question Category: Some information is requested Z: wontfix This will not be worked on labels Dec 2, 2019

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Would you mind add some aur packages? #9

Would you mind add some aur packages? #9

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Would you mind add some aur packages? #9

Would you mind add some aur packages? #9

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