Importance of the response plan in outbreak events

Use of transmission models to simulate the spread of livestock diseases

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Acknowledgement/Funding











PANAFTOSA Centro Panamericano de Fiebre Aftosa v Salud Pública Veterinaria

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Their plan comprised of three phases

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
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
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 - · Vehicles, tools, equipment, pigs, food, and feed from the ASF risk areas.

The past



At present



- 1. Restricting the movement of vehicles, supplies, equipment and visitors at the entry zone X
- 2. Implementing quarantine measures in the buffer zone
- 3. Creating the clean zone 1 Risk zone 2 Buffer zone and 3 Clean zone
- 4. Enhancing hygiene and awareness of the farm workers

Why to prepare against FADs?

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- Provide science- and risk-based approaches to facilitate continuity of business.
 - Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, regions, and industries to resume normal production as rapidly as possible.

The objective is to allow the country/compartment/zone to <u>regain disease-free</u> <u>status</u> without the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the disease outbreak itself.

Preparation is not one, standalone FAD plan.

· Disease Response Plans & Strategies.

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- · etc.

Responding to a FAD event—large or small—may be complex and difficult, challenging all stakeholders involved.

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- Resources.
- Personnel.
- Pre-defined the best countermeasures.

Examples of FAD preparation

Secure Food Supply Plans are all about Continuity of Business.

- Secure Poultry.
- Secure Pork.
- Secure Sheep and Wool.
- Secure Milk Supply.
- Secure Beef Supply.



SECURE FOOD SUPPLY

What makes an SPS plan?

A completed Secure Pork Supply plan for a single site will display all 169 biosecurity features + map.

Written plan

Pirate Pork Farm Enhanced Biosecurity Plan for FAD Prevention in North Carolina

Date Created: 3/5/2021

This Biosecurity Plan is based off of the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors, [August 2017] and was developed using ouidance from the SPS Information Manual for Enhanced Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors. All documents are available at www.securepork.org. In the Plan below, all items have been implemented except those indicated which will be implemented prior to requesting an animal movement permit.

Scope of Biosecurity Plan

- National Premises Identification Number (PIN): 00XYZ12 Nursery
 - Premises Address: 2468 Go Bulls Rd Durham, NC 28341
 - Premises GPS Coordinates: 32.127481, -64.931797
 - Animals* on primary premises: Swine and 2800 Other business operations on premises? Yes
 - If yes, what? Hay
- Secondary premises** locations:
 - Will be provided to Responsible Regulatory Officials if this premises is located in an FAD Control Area
 - o *Work with your State Animal Health Official to determine if separate PINs are needed for all of your associated premises.


*Animals that are suscentible to FMD include cattle, pios, sheep, goats, and elk. For biosecurity guidance for dairy cattle and beef cattle, see www.securemilksupply.org and www.securebeef.org. **Work with your State Animal Health Official to determine if senarate PINs are needed for all of your associated premises. When a premises becomes infected all premises with the same PIN number will be considered to be infected.

Map view of the site



Standardized map view

RABapp™



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Disease transmission models as FAD preparation tool.

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Movement controls

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- For North America, movement restrictions are typically put in place at state level.
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- One solution is to develop transmission model to simulate epidemics and the best control plan.
- Do you know any other solutions?

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
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


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Calibration models when we have past/current epidemic data



Simulation models, when we do not have any real data



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 - Section Late in the epidemic (can one wait)?
- No published FMD transmission models for Latin America (MHASpread).

- Many countries rely heavily on mathematical simulation to make and update their policies. [2, 3]
 - · New Zealand (InterSpread Plus).
 - · U.S (InterSpread Plus and NAADSM).
 - · U.K. (Exodis).
 - The Netherlands (The Netherlands model).
 - Denmark (DTU-DADS).
 - · Australia (AADIS).
 - · Brazil (MHASpread).
- Most of the cited models either are missing relevant data and realism (e.g. closed populations, single species, homogeneous mixing) or compromising complexity for speed (e.g time step in a week).

Thanks for listening

Questions?





References

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- [3] SE Roche et al. "Evaluating vaccination strategies to control foot-and-mouth disease: a model comparison study". In: *Epidemiology & Infection* 143.6 (2015), pp. 1256–1275.

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