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Re-instate fix for n900 keyboard. #5

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SimonIremonger
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Allows shift+fn+j/k and shift+fn+z/x and some other keys to work. Check is overzealous and counterproducive, at lesat given twl4030 on n900 which seems to be already internally-limited to be sensible with ghosted/multiple key-pressing.

Allows shift+fn+j/k and shift+fn+z/x and some other keys to work.  Check is overzealous and counterproducive, at lesat given twl4030 on n900 which seems to be already internally-limited to be sensible with ghosted/multiple key-pressing.
@MerlijnWajer
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@spinal84 - this is fine by me. What do you think?

@spinal84
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spinal84 commented Jan 28, 2020

This approach for branches in this package differs from all others we have.

  1. The branch "master" is for Linus upstream kernel.
    Our working branches are called:
    <DEV>/<KVERSION>-patch for commits/patches applied on top of upstream
    <DEV>/<KVERSION>-config for kernel config options
    <DEV>/<KVERSION>-build for debian packaging related commits

  2. The fix you are proposing is already applied. Check commit: f1df290

I'm going to upload updated kernel to our repositories soon.

BTW, your keymap is awesome.

@spinal84 spinal84 closed this Jan 28, 2020
parazyd pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2020
commit 3f93a4f upstream.

It is possible for an irq triggered by channel0 to be received later
after clks are disabled once firmware loaded during sdma probe. If
that happens then clearing them by writing to SDMA_H_INTR won't work
and the kernel will hang processing infinite interrupts. Actually,
don't need interrupt triggered on channel0 since it's pollling
SDMA_H_STATSTOP to know channel0 done rather than interrupt in
current code, just clear BD_INTR to disable channel0 interrupt to
avoid the above case.
This issue was brought by commit 1d069bf ("dmaengine: imx-sdma:
ack channel 0 IRQ in the interrupt handler") which didn't take care
the above case.

Fixes: 1d069bf ("dmaengine: imx-sdma: ack channel 0 IRQ in the interrupt handler")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #5.0+
Signed-off-by: Robin Gong <yibin.gong@nxp.com>
Reported-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sven Van Asbroeck <thesven73@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Olbrich <m.olbrich@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parazyd pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2020
commit c952b35 upstream.

bpf/btf write_* functions need ff->ph->env.

With this missing, pipe-mode (perf record -o -)  would crash like:

Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.

This patch assign proper ph value to ff.

Committer testing:

  (gdb) run record -o -
  Starting program: /root/bin/perf record -o -
  PERFILE2
  <SNIP start of perf.data headers>
  Thread 1 "perf" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  __do_write_buf (size=4, buf=0x160, ff=0x7fffffff8f80) at util/header.c:126
  126		memcpy(ff->buf + ff->offset, buf, size);
  (gdb) bt
  #0  __do_write_buf (size=4, buf=0x160, ff=0x7fffffff8f80) at util/header.c:126
  #1  do_write (ff=ff@entry=0x7fffffff8f80, buf=buf@entry=0x160, size=4) at util/header.c:137
  #2  0x00000000004eddba in write_bpf_prog_info (ff=0x7fffffff8f80, evlist=<optimized out>) at util/header.c:912
  #3  0x00000000004f69d7 in perf_event__synthesize_features (tool=tool@entry=0x97cc00 <record>, session=session@entry=0x7fffe9c6d010,
      evlist=0x7fffe9cae010, process=process@entry=0x4435d0 <process_synthesized_event>) at util/header.c:3695
  #4  0x0000000000443c79 in record__synthesize (tail=tail@entry=false, rec=0x97cc00 <record>) at builtin-record.c:1214
  #5  0x0000000000444ec9 in __cmd_record (rec=0x97cc00 <record>, argv=<optimized out>, argc=0) at builtin-record.c:1435
  torvalds#6  cmd_record (argc=0, argv=<optimized out>) at builtin-record.c:2450
  torvalds#7  0x00000000004ae3e9 in run_builtin (p=p@entry=0x98e058 <commands+216>, argc=argc@entry=3, argv=0x7fffffffd670) at perf.c:304
  torvalds#8  0x000000000042eded in handle_internal_command (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>) at perf.c:356
  torvalds#9  run_argv (argcp=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:400
  torvalds#10 main (argc=3, argv=<optimized out>) at perf.c:522
  (gdb)

After the patch the SEGSEGV is gone.

Reported-by: David Carrillo Cisneros <davidca@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel-team@fb.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Fixes: 606f972 ("perf bpf: Save bpf_prog_info information as headers to perf.data")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190620010453.4118689-1-songliubraving@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parazyd pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2020
…qno errors

commit b76becd upstream.

With a recent change to our send path for FSF commands we introduced a
possible use-after-free of request-objects, that might further lead to
zfcp crafting bad requests, which the FCP channel correctly complains
about with an error (FSF_PROT_SEQ_NUMB_ERROR). This error is then handled
by an adapter-wide recovery.

The following sequence illustrates the possible use-after-free:

    Send Path:

        int zfcp_fsf_open_port(struct zfcp_erp_action *erp_action)
        {
                struct zfcp_fsf_req *req;
                ...
                spin_lock_irq(&qdio->req_q_lock);
        //                     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //                     protects QDIO queue during sending
                ...
                req = zfcp_fsf_req_create(qdio,
                                          FSF_QTCB_OPEN_PORT_WITH_DID,
                                          SBAL_SFLAGS0_TYPE_READ,
                                          qdio->adapter->pool.erp_req);
        //            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //            allocation of the request-object
                ...
                retval = zfcp_fsf_req_send(req);
                ...
                spin_unlock_irq(&qdio->req_q_lock);
                return retval;
        }

        static int zfcp_fsf_req_send(struct zfcp_fsf_req *req)
        {
                struct zfcp_adapter *adapter = req->adapter;
                struct zfcp_qdio *qdio = adapter->qdio;
                ...
                zfcp_reqlist_add(adapter->req_list, req);
        //      ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //      add request to our driver-internal hash-table for tracking
        //      (protected by separate lock req_list->lock)
                ...
                if (zfcp_qdio_send(qdio, &req->qdio_req)) {
        //          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //          hand-off the request to FCP channel;
        //          the request can complete at any point now
                        ...
                }

                /* Don't increase for unsolicited status */
                if (!zfcp_fsf_req_is_status_read_buffer(req))
        //           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //           possible use-after-free
                        adapter->fsf_req_seq_no++;
        //                       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //                       because of the use-after-free we might
        //                       miss this accounting, and as follow-up
        //                       this results in the FCP channel error
        //                       FSF_PROT_SEQ_NUMB_ERROR
                adapter->req_no++;

                return 0;
        }

        static inline bool
        zfcp_fsf_req_is_status_read_buffer(struct zfcp_fsf_req *req)
        {
                return req->qtcb == NULL;
        //             ^^^^^^^^^
        //             possible use-after-free
        }

    Response Path:

        void zfcp_fsf_reqid_check(struct zfcp_qdio *qdio, int sbal_idx)
        {
                ...
                struct zfcp_fsf_req *fsf_req;
                ...
                for (idx = 0; idx < QDIO_MAX_ELEMENTS_PER_BUFFER; idx++) {
                        ...
                        fsf_req = zfcp_reqlist_find_rm(adapter->req_list,
                                                       req_id);
        //                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //                        remove request from our driver-internal
        //                        hash-table (lock req_list->lock)
                        ...
                        zfcp_fsf_req_complete(fsf_req);
                }
        }

        static void zfcp_fsf_req_complete(struct zfcp_fsf_req *req)
        {
                ...
                if (likely(req->status & ZFCP_STATUS_FSFREQ_CLEANUP))
                        zfcp_fsf_req_free(req);
        //              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        //              free memory for request-object
                else
                        complete(&req->completion);
        //              ^^^^^^^^
        //              completion notification for code-paths that wait
        //              synchronous for the completion of the request; in
        //              those the memory is freed separately
        }

The result of the use-after-free only affects the send path, and can not
lead to any data corruption. In case we miss the sequence-number
accounting, because the memory was already re-purposed, the next FSF
command will fail with said FCP channel error, and we will recover the
whole adapter. This causes no additional errors, but it slows down
traffic.  There is a slight chance of the same thing happen again
recursively after the adapter recovery, but so far this has not been seen.

This was seen under z/VM, where the send path might run on a virtual CPU
that gets scheduled away by z/VM, while the return path might still run,
and so create the necessary timing. Running with KASAN can also slow down
the kernel sufficiently to run into this user-after-free, and then see the
report by KASAN.

To fix this, simply pull the test for the sequence-number accounting in
front of the hand-off to the FCP channel (this information doesn't change
during hand-off), but leave the sequence-number accounting itself where it
is.

To make future regressions of the same kind less likely, add comments to
all closely related code-paths.

Signed-off-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: f9eca02 ("scsi: zfcp: drop duplicate fsf_command from zfcp_fsf_req which is also in QTCB header")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.0+
Reviewed-by: Steffen Maier <maier@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parazyd pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2020
commit 7545b6c upstream.

Clear the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP flag when the chacha20poly1305
operation is being continued from an async completion callback, since
sleeping may not be allowed in that context.

This is basically the same bug that was recently fixed in the xts and
lrw templates.  But, it's always been broken in chacha20poly1305 too.
This was found using syzkaller in combination with the updated crypto
self-tests which actually test the MAY_SLEEP flag now.

Reproducer:

    python -c 'import socket; socket.socket(socket.AF_ALG, 5, 0).bind(
    	       ("aead", "rfc7539(cryptd(chacha20-generic),poly1305-generic)"))'

Kernel output:

    BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/crypto/algapi.h:426
    in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1001, name: kworker/2:2
    [...]
    CPU: 2 PID: 1001 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc2 #5
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-20181126_142135-anatol 04/01/2014
    Workqueue: crypto cryptd_queue_worker
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
     dump_stack+0x4d/0x6a lib/dump_stack.c:113
     ___might_sleep kernel/sched/core.c:6138 [inline]
     ___might_sleep.cold.19+0x8e/0x9f kernel/sched/core.c:6095
     crypto_yield include/crypto/algapi.h:426 [inline]
     crypto_hash_walk_done+0xd6/0x100 crypto/ahash.c:113
     shash_ahash_update+0x41/0x60 crypto/shash.c:251
     shash_async_update+0xd/0x10 crypto/shash.c:260
     crypto_ahash_update include/crypto/hash.h:539 [inline]
     poly_setkey+0xf6/0x130 crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:337
     poly_init+0x51/0x60 crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:364
     async_done_continue crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:78 [inline]
     poly_genkey_done+0x15/0x30 crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:369
     cryptd_skcipher_complete+0x29/0x70 crypto/cryptd.c:279
     cryptd_skcipher_decrypt+0xcd/0x110 crypto/cryptd.c:339
     cryptd_queue_worker+0x70/0xa0 crypto/cryptd.c:184
     process_one_work+0x1ed/0x420 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
     worker_thread+0x3e/0x3a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
     kthread+0x11f/0x140 kernel/kthread.c:255
     ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352

Fixes: 71ebc4d ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Add a ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction, RFC7539")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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