

# Middlebox Cooperation Protocol

## Technical Considerations

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measurement and architecture for a middleboxed internet

**measurement**

**architecture**

**experimentation**



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# **PARENTAL ADVISORY EXPLICIT COOPERATION**




# Explicit Cooperation

- “Implicit cooperation” between endpoints and middleboxes **already widespread in the Internet**,
  - where “cooperation” may be the wrong term: some hacks and workarounds are quite hostile.
- **Explicit cooperation** under **endpoint control** may be a way to reduce tension in this tussle
  - Declarative, advisory signaling with no trust required between endpoint and path.
- **Encrypt everything devices on path don’t need to see** (including transport headers), to prevent future unauthorized “implicit cooperation”.



# Introducing the Path Layer


- Network: hop-by-hop, no data-plane state.
- Transport: end-to-end, stateful.
- Implicit layer in between where all the state in the network lives.
- MCP makes this explicit.






# Three and a half mechanisms to make the path layer explicit

- Sender – Path Signaling
- Path – Receiver Signaling
  - with encrypted feedback to sender
- Direct Path – Sender Signaling






# Sender to Path (sender-side)






# Sender to Path (on-path)






# Sender to Path (receiver-side)








# Sender to Path Transport State Signaling






# Path to Receiver (sender-side)






# Path to Receiver (on-path)






# Path to Receiver (receiver-side)






# Receiver Feedback






# Path Direct to Sender (sender-side)






# Path Direct to Sender (on-path)






# Path Direct to Sender (feedback)







# Anatomy of the Path Layer



- UDP encapsulation
  - userspace implementation
  - ports for NAT
  - ~95% deployable today
- encoding for signaling mechanisms
- crypto to protect transport headers and above



# Layering Security for Diverse Trust and Authentication Models

- “Core MCP” provides:
  - Signaling as above
  - Integrity protection of sender-provided data
  - Integrity protection of permission for path-provided data
  - Confidentiality and integrity for receiver-feedback data
- Sender-provided data can be encrypted for selected path elements.
- Path-provided data can be encrypted and MAC'd for sender/receiver
- Key negotiation, path element ID, and multiparty crypto protocols can run in-line over “core MCP”