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The Integrity of the Yoga Darsana

A Reconsideration of Classical Yoga

Ian Whicher

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

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*In memory of my mother, Marjorie Whicher*

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## Abbreviations

### TEXTS

	<i>Brhadaranyaka Upanisad</i>
<i>BA Up</i>	<i>Bhagavadgita</i>
<i>BG</i>	<i>Chandogya Upanisad</i>
<i>Chand Up</i>	<i>Maitrayaniya Upanisad</i>
<i>Mait Up</i>	<i>Mahabharata</i>
<i>MBh</i>	<i>Moksadharma</i>
<i>MD</i>	<i>Mani-Prabha</i> of Ramananda Yati
<i>MP</i>	<i>Raja-Martanda</i> of Bhoja Raja
<i>RM</i>	<i>Rg Veda</i>
<i>RV</i>	<i>Satapatha Brahmana</i>
<i>SB</i>	<i>Samkhya-Karika</i> of Isvara Krsna
<i>SK</i>	<i>Samkhya-Pravacana-Bhasya</i> of Vijñana Bhiksu
<i>SPB</i>	<i>Samkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi</i> of Vacaspati Misra
<i>STK</i>	<i>Svetasvatara Upanisad</i>
<i>Svet Up</i>	<i>Taittiriya Upanisad</i>
<i>Tait Up</i>	<i>Tattva-Vaisaradi</i> of Vacaspati Misra
<i>TV</i>	<i>Yoga-Bhasya</i> of Vyasa
<i>YB</i>	<i>Yoga-Sutra</i> of Patañjali

YS	<i>Yoga-Sara-Samgraha</i> of Vijñana Bhikṣu
YSS	<i>Yoga-Varttika</i> of Vijñana Bhikṣu
YV	<i>Yoga-Yajñavalkya-Samhita</i>
YYS	

## JOURNALS

	<i>Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute</i>
ABORI	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
AJP	<i>Adyar Library Bulletin</i>
ALB	<i>Asian Philosophy</i>
AP	

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BSOAS	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i>
IJ	<i>Indo-Iranian Journal</i>
IPQ	<i>International Philosophical Quarterly</i>
JAAR	<i>Journal of the American Academy of Religion</i>
JAOS	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
JHR	<i>Journal of the History of Religions</i>
JIBS	<i>Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies</i>
JICPR	<i>Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research</i>
JIP	<i>Journal of Indian Philosophy</i>
JRAS	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
PEW	<i>Philosophy East and West</i>
WZKS	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens</i> (Südasiens) und <i>Archiv für indische Philosophie</i>
YQR	<i>Yoga Quarterly Review</i>

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## Introduction

This book centers on the thought of Patañjali (ca. second-third century CE), the great exponent of the authoritative and classical Yoga school (*darsana*) of Hinduism and the reputed author of the *Yoga-Sutra*. More specifically, the focus of this study is on Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (YS I.2), which states: "Yoga is the cessation of [the misidentification with] the modifications of the mind" (*yogas cittavrttinirodhah*). Our work is rooted in the conviction, implicitly expressed so it seems by Patañjali himself, that an in-depth examination of *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 is helpful, indeed, we suggest crucial, for: (i) elucidating a clear response to the question, "What is the meaning of Yoga?" and (ii) exploring the integral relationship between *theoria* and



*praxis* in the *Yoga-Sutra*. Although *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 is acknowledged by Yoga experts and scholars to be of great importance for our understanding of Yoga, a thoroughgoing and systematic inquiry into its meaning and practical relevance is noticeably lacking.

What is classical Yoga philosophy and how can it enrich our understanding of human nature? What is the relationship between self-understanding, knowledge, morality, and spiritual emancipation in Patañjali's thought? As a response to these questions I will argue that Patañjali's philosophical perspective has, far too often, been looked upon as excessively "spiritual" or isolationistic to the point of being a world-denying philosophy, indifferent

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to moral endeavor, neglecting the world of nature and culture, and overlooking the highest potentials for human reality, vitality, and creativity. Contrary to the arguments presented by many scholars, which associate Patañjali's Yoga exclusively with asceticism, mortification, denial, and the renunciation and abandonment of "material existence" (*prakṛti*) in favor of an elevated and isolated "spiritual state" (*puruṣa*) or disembodied state of spiritual liberation, I suggest that Patañjali's Yoga can be seen as a responsible engagement, in various ways, of "spirit" (*puruṣa* = Self, pure consciousness) and "matter" (*prakṛti* = the source of psychophysical being, which includes mind, body, nature), resulting in a highly developed, transformed, and participatory human nature and identity, an integrated and embodied state of liberated selfhood (*jīvanmukti*).

I have attempted a careful textual, historical, and interpretive study that, it is hoped, results in a plausible and innovative reading of the "intention" of the *Yoga-Sutra*, namely, that it does not advocate the abandonment of the world for the successful yogin, but supports a stance that enables the yogin to live more fully in the world without being enslaved by worldly identification. In doing so I have tried to present a sustained argument for the above on the basis of a close (and cumulative) textual study within the tradition of classical Yoga itself. In this study I have endeavored to clarify the thought of Vyasa (ca. fifth-sixth century CE), whose commentary on the *Yoga-Sutra* entitled, the *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, illuminates our understanding of Patañjali's thought.

Thus I challenge and attempt to correct conclusions about classical Yoga philosophy drawn by traditional and modern interpretations of Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra*. From a critical perspective, it is necessary to make efforts to integrate theories of reality and knowledge per se with hermeneutical reflection and human motivation within which the theories were devised. There is a crust of preconceived ideas surrounding Patañjali's Yoga and to unfreeze the *Yoga-Sutra* from the traditional reception that it has encountered in the Western world since the nineteenth century is no easy task. Millions of people today both in the East (i.e., in India) and the West practice some form or forms of Yoga influenced by or derived from Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra*. I have attempted to reinterpret a central feature of the *Yoga-Sutra*, namely, the objective of *cittavṛttinirodha* or the cessation of the misidentification with the modifications of the mind, and provide a fresh vision of the spiritual potential present in this seminal text, thereby contributing to our understanding and reception of Yoga thought and spirituality. In order to do this I have felt it necessary to develop a comprehensive epistemological perspective in which the relation of

identity and selfhood to the world is not severed

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due to a radical withdrawal from the world but is seen to be participatory in/with the world, allowing the yogin full access to the world through a mode of nonafflicted action. The interpretation of Patañjali's *Yoga darsana* presented in this study which involves walking the line between an historical and a hermeneutic-praxis (or one might say here a theological or "systematic") orientation counters the radically dualistic and ontologically oriented interpretations of Yoga presented by many scholars and suggests an open-ended, morally and epistemologically oriented hermeneutic that, I maintain, is more appropriate for arriving at a genuine assessment of Patañjali's system.

Chapter 1 presents a thematic portrayal of early forms of Hindu Yoga, showing how selected Hindu texts can be said to exemplify or emphasize different meanings of or approaches to the term "Yoga." No attempt has been made to analyze yogic disciplines within Jainism or Buddhism, although mention is made in chapters 1 and 2 (in the notes) of the parallels, association, or relationship between Buddhism, Jainism, and Hindu Yoga in particular the *Yoga-Sutra* of Patañjali. Admittedly, this is a very rich, diverse, and in many ways unexplored area of study, not least of which as it pertains to Jainism. However, it would require a necessary rigor and depth of analysis that, for want of space, lies outside the scope of this present study. While providing only a sketchbook account of Yoga that discloses a general view of Yoga within early Hinduism, the main purpose nevertheless of this background chapter is to act as a backdrop for the chapters that follow on Patañjali's Yoga. In fact, chapter 1 is perhaps most useful for those with little or no background in Yoga thought. It is not intended for scholarly experts in Yoga or for those who already have an adequate background in ancient and classical Hindu Yoga and its development.

The next two chapters deal with more theoretical issues in Patañjali's Yoga. Chapter 2 outlines Patañjali's basic philosophical stance and metaphysical schematic, while also referring to major similarities and differences between classical Yoga and classical Samkhya. Chapter 3 elaborates on Patañjali's epistemology by examining the nature, structure, and functioning (*vr̥tti*) of the mind (*citta*) through which the world and self-identity are experienced, perceived, and understood. The remaining chapters explore the notion of Yoga as a "theory-practice unification" by highlighting the transformative processes of the mind undergone by the yogin through the actual practice of Yoga. Chapter 4 presents a critical examination of the central term *nirodha* ("cessation") as used in *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 and then proceeds with an analysis of the bipolar nature of the yogic path of practice (*abhyasa*) and dispassion (*vairagya*), including as well an overview of the "eight-limbed" (*astanga*) Yoga outlined by Patañjali. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the

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meaning and practice of *samadhi* and show how the experiences and insight attained in the multileveled process of *samadhi* progressively lead to a disclosure of the soteriological goal of

Yoga, that is, "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).

Chapter 6 concludes with a section on "aloneness" and a consideration of the implications of Patañjali's Yoga for an embodied state of freedom. While I suggest that Patañjali adopts a practical and provisional dualistic metaphysics, there is no proof that his system stops at dualism or merely ends up in a radical dualistic closure in which *purusa* and *prakṛti* are incapable of "cooperating," establishing a "harmony," and achieving a "balance" together. Rather, as I argue, the *Yoga-Sutra* seeks to "unite" these two principles by correcting a misalignment between them, thereby properly aligning them, bringing them "together" through a purification and illumination of consciousness leading to the permanent realization of intrinsic being, that is, authentic identity. Moreover, this study suggests that Patañjali's Yoga *darsana* can be seen to embrace a maturation and full flowering of human nature and identity, a state of embodied liberationone that incorporates a clarity of awareness with the integrity of being and action.

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## Chapter One

### Selected Background Material on the Development of Yoga in Early Hindu Thought

This chapter will provide, within the context of early Hindu thought, an exposition of the term "Yoga," outlining some of the general and more specific meanings of "Yoga" as well as elaborating upon various Hindu spiritual disciplines that are intrinsic to, representative of, or related to yogic praxis. Thus we will review some of the earliest recorded scriptures within Hindu traditions of Yoga showing how selected primary, "revealed," canonical texts (*śruti*) as well as "remembered" texts (*smṛti*) exemplify different aspects of the development of ideas that lead into Patañjali's Yoga (ca. second-third century CE). The chapter will conclude with a look at Yoga in its pedagogical context, which functions as one of the foundations or crucial building blocks of Yoga philosophy and enriches our understanding of Yoga *theoria* and *praxis*. It is through the pedagogical dimension that ideas in Yoga are put into practice and authentically lived in daily life. While providing only a limited, sketchbook account revealing a panoramic view of Yoga within early Hindu thought, this background chapter, nevertheless, functions as an embedding matrix and contextual pointer for the study that follows on classical Yoga. In other words, this introductory chapter highlights and profiles certain key pointers that will come into their own over the full course of this study.

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## The Term "Yoga"

What is "Yoga"? As G. Feuerstein states, "the word *yoga* has a great many meanings which range from 'yoke' to 'mathematical calculus'." <sup>1</sup> If we accept a broad and very general definition of the term "Yoga," such as, according to M. Eliade, "any ascetic technique and any method of

meditation,"<sup>2</sup> then there are as many kinds of Yoga as there are spiritual disciplines in India, for example: *bhakti-yoga*, *raja-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga*, *hatha-yoga*, *karma-yoga*, *mantra-yoga*, and so forth. Moreover, numerous traditions can be easily cited both in India and elsewhere in which the term "Yoga" in the above broad sense can be employed, for example: Buddhist Yoga, Vedānta Yoga, Jaina Yoga, Sāṃkhya Yoga, Integral Yoga, Taoist Yoga, Tibetan Yoga (Vajrayāna Buddhism), Chinese Yoga (Ch'an), Japanese Yoga (Zen), and even Christian Yoga. Yoga is thus the generic term for various paths of "unification," Hindu or otherwise. The term "Yoga" can thus become, according to G. Larson,

indistinguishable from the general notion of spiritual *praxis* or *sādhana*, and in a secular environment *Yoga* may become any method of meditation for inhibiting heart disease, toning muscles, increasing concentration, fostering relaxation . . . *Yoga*, then, becomes what Patañjali, Sāṃkara, Bhakti Vedānta, Agehananda Bharati, Mahārsi Mahesh Yogi, Baba Ram Das, Yogi Bhaṅjan, Jack Lalane, the YMCA and the Roman Catholic Church all have in common. Admittedly the ecumenical possibilities are nearly endless<sup>3</sup>

In its proper historical and philosophical context, however, Yoga refers to South Asian Indian paths of spiritual emancipation, or self-transcendence, that bring about a transmutation of consciousness culminating in liberation from the confines of egoic identity or worldly existence. Feuerstein calls Yoga, "the psychospiritual technology specific to the great civilization of India."<sup>4</sup> Within the Hindu tradition, six major forms of Yoga have gained prominence: classical Yoga or *raja-yoga* (the "Royal Yoga" in later times often used to refer to Patañjali's school of Yoga in order to contrast it with *hatha-yoga*), *jñāna-yoga* (the Yoga of "knowledge" or "wisdom"), *hatha-yoga* (the "forceful Yoga" of the physical body), *bhakti-yoga* (the Yoga of "devotion"), *karma-yoga* (the Yoga of "action"), and *mantrayoga* (the Yoga of the "recitation of sound"). To this list can be added *laya-yoga* (the Yoga of "dissolution") and *kundalini-yoga* (a discipline with Tantric associations that involves the intentional arousal of the "serpent energy" or *kundalini-sakti*), which are closely associated with *hatha-yoga* but are often presented as constituting independent approaches.<sup>5</sup> Histori-

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cally speaking, the most significant of all the schools of Yoga is the system of classical Yoga as propounded by Patañjali. It is also known as *the* "perspective of Yoga" (*yoga-darsana*) and is classified among the so-called six *darsanas* or philosophical traditions of orthodox Brahmanical Hinduism, the other five being: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Purva Mīmāṃsa, and Vedānta (Uttara Mīmāṃsa).

The word "Yoga" is etymologically derived from the verbal root *yuj* meaning "to yoke or join or fasten or harness" <sup>6</sup> and can have several connotations including: "union," "conjunction of stars," "grammatical rule," "endeavor," "occupation," "team," "equipment," "means," "trick," "magic," "aggregate," and "sum."<sup>7</sup> In fact, the English word "yoke" is acknowledged by the Oxford English Dictionary to be cognate to *yuj*, as is the word "join."<sup>8</sup> *Yuj* has other significant meanings for the purposes of this study, which include: "to connect," "to unite," "to restrain," "to keep under control," "to concentrate or fix the mind in order to obtain union with the Universal Spirit," "to make ready, prepare," and "to be absorbed or deeply engaged in meditation."<sup>9</sup>

Yoga has developed over a period of several millennia. Mircea Eliade has appropriately referred to Yoga as "a living fossil."<sup>10</sup> The *Bhagavadgita* written perhaps around the beginning of the Common Era describes Yoga as being already ancient (*puratana*).<sup>11</sup> Studies by J. W. Hauer and Maryla Falk have provided convincing evidence that Yoga was not initially created by the adepts of the *Upanisads* (i.e., in the sixth or seventh century BCE) as had been assumed earlier by Indologists but had already arisen in the form of rudimentary ideas and practices going back to the time of the *Rg Veda* (ca. 1200 BCE)<sup>12</sup> or, as some would argue, as far back as the Indus Valley Civilization between about 2500 and 1800 BCE.<sup>13</sup>

K. S. Joshi<sup>14</sup> informs us that one interpretation of Yoga (which we have traced to being that of S. Dasgupta)<sup>15</sup> specifically explains the word "Yoga" as a noun form derived from the root *yujir* meaning "to unite" or "connect." The noun "Yoga" was thus originally used to designate a union or connection between things. For example, in the *Rg Veda* a Vedic "seer" inquires about the "Yoga" (i.e., "connection") between the words of a verse.<sup>16</sup> According to Joshi, perhaps the most common example of "union" in the Vedic period was "the union of bullocks or horses, and the fact that these animals were kept together by means of the yoke seems to have made an impact on the meaning of the word 'Yoga'." The word, in due course, began to denote the 'tool of the union' the yoke"<sup>17</sup> or, it must be added, the animals even. For example, the term *ratha-yoga* was used to designate the "animals for yoking to chariots."<sup>18</sup>

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There are numerous examples, however, where the word "*yuga*" has also been used instead to denote the "yoke,"<sup>19</sup> and we may understand the above usage of the term "Yoga" as only an intermediate step to a further shift of meaning that was more significant and lasting. This dramatic shift of meaning from referring to the yoking of external objects or things like hymns, the 'gods,' and the Vedic sacrifice (*yajña*, see below), animals and carts, and so forth, to an internal "joining" or "harnessing" (e.g., the union between the senses and with the mind) constitutes the most noteworthy change in the meaning of the term "Yoga" and is traceable to an apparent similarity between the human senses and horses: A well-controlled horse allows the rider to travel with ease; similarly, one can go through life more comfortably if one is not repeatedly and compulsively drawn to the objects of the senses, that is, if the senses are under "control," or are properly harnessed.

Hindu scripture often compares the human senses with horses.<sup>20</sup> It was thus that the term "Yoga" evolved to indicate the method by which the senses and, by implication, the mind could be controlled, mastered, and transcended. S. Dasgupta states: "The force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word 'Yoga' which was originally applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control of the senses."<sup>21</sup> The fact that the yoke was a tool used for bringing horses under control might have helped the meaning of the word "Yoga" to be shifted to the "tool," method of harnessing, or way of integration or union that can be utilized to bring the senses and the mind under control. It must be stressed, however, that the term "Yoga" as applied to the human senses and mind comes to refer to a philosophically sophisticated and highly technical meaning and presupposes the formation of a well-arranged program or system of practices capable of steadying the mind,

bringing it under "control," and thereby transcending the trammels of worldly existence including the human (egoic) barriers to spiritual freedom (*moksa*). Dasgupta explains that the techniques of controlling and steadying the mind were already developed and organized by the time of Panini (ca. 400-500 BCE). To indicate these, Panini thought it was necessary to derive the word "Yoga" from a root form different from *yuj-ir* (the original supposed root) and the root *yuj* was thus invented by him from the noun 'Yoga'.<sup>22</sup> Elsewhere, in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, Dasgupta writes: "In Panini's time the word *Yoga* had attained its technical meaning and he distinguished the root *yuj samadhau* (*yuj* in the sense of concentration) from *yujir yoge* (root *yuj* in the sense of connecting). *Yuj* in the first sense is seldom used as a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological derivation of the word 'Yoga'."<sup>23</sup>

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While the term "Yoga" was being used to denote simply a "union," the facts about controlling and steadying the mind were probably known. In the *Vedas* there are clear indications that the Vedic "seers" (*rsis*) were familiar with various methods that, upon being followed faithfully, were known to bring about a state of self-transcendence, a transformation of consciousness and self-identity beyond the limitations of the ego-personality, resulting in an exalted and expanded sense of identity and being. These methods or techniques were spoken of variously as *dhyana* (meditation), *diksa* (spiritual initiation), *tapas* (asceticism), and so on.<sup>24</sup> Joshi notes that

we find examples of Vedic seers aspiring to reach the heavens or even for attaining *Brahman*, through *dhyana*, *tapas*, etc. But, in all probability, these practices were in the beginning in a more or less fluid form, lacking elaborate classification and differentiation. Later on, they were organized into a system, and it was possibly then that the name "Yoga" came to be associated with it. The word "Yoga" is thus older than the discipline or system of philosophy which goes by that name.<sup>25</sup>

## Yoga in the Vedas

The notion of sacrifice (*yajña*) is one of the foundational premises upon which Hinduism has developed. Sacrificial rituals played an integral and crucial role in the early Vedic age. Through the performance of sacrifice, the followers of the Vedas<sup>26</sup> attempted to attract and maintain the favor of the deities (*deva*). Cosmic existence itself was seen to be molded on the principle of sacrifice. This is illustrated in *Rg Veda* X.90, where we are informed that the primordial Being (*purusa*) sacrificed "itself" in order to generate the cosmos. The transformative nature of cosmic existence, beginning with the creation and preservation of life in all its separate forms, inevitably leads to a dissolution of those forms. By analogy with the sacrifice of *purusa*, the dissolution of manifold existence is the way in which life continuously regenerates itself. In the celebrated hymn of the primeval sacrifice of the Cosmic Person, called the *Purusa Sukta*,<sup>27</sup> the spiritual essence is as if sacrificed so that from out of the undivided "Oneness" the diversity or multiplicity of life-forms may come into being. The Vedic gods are shown as performing a sacrificial rite by immolating *purusa*, the Cosmic Person, as a result of which the world as we know it is generated. The *Purusa Sukta* goes on to state that the various castes within society and the heavenly bodies such as the sun and the moon are all born



from the various parts of *purusa's* body. From the perspective of the seer or *rsi*, cosmic order (*rta*) with its regular movements and activities converging on the main purpose of upholding and sustaining life was all laid in "heaven" (*svarga*) from the very beginning of its manifestation.<sup>28</sup>

Of this great oblation the human ritual is understood to be the microscopic reflection. The original idea, as implied in the *Purusa Sukta*, simply expressed the offering, by the gods, of the divine life, the *purusa* as essence of all, the life-blood for the many (i.e., the spiritual essence that flows through all and animates all). It is split up into many forms but is one in essence. It both issues forth yet transcends its creation. The main word used for sacrifice *yajñais* is derived from the root *yaj* meaning "to worship," "to pay honour to." It is an act of relatedness linking one level to another, making use of the concentration of mental power that "yokes" the mind to the object of worship. The wise, thus, are said to "integrate the mind, integrate spiritual insight."<sup>29</sup> In the sacrifice the mind is harnessed to a vision of the subtler realities, or to one god or other, or to the conception of the cosmic order (*rta*);<sup>30</sup> hence the interrelatedness of all, the rite being a framework or the means whereby the mind is directed toward, and can likewise attain insight into, the transcendent realm. As is expressed by R. Panikkar, "Worship does not consist solely in prayer . . . it is action, an action by which duality is transcended and dissimilarity banished. This act contains within itself, essentially, a sacrificial aspect, a death and a becoming, a doing, *karman*."<sup>31</sup>

The prime function of the sacrifice is to generate heat within the body of the performer. This heat, called *tapas*, arises out of action<sup>32</sup> and is generated when the thoughts and intentions of the sacrificer are totally absorbed into that which is the object of the sacrifice. Through the performance of ritual action (*karman*) *tapas* is produced that allows the sacrificer to take on the qualities of the intended deity. For example, sacrifice performed to the god *Indra* may enable one to become a great warrior and achieve the desired goal. Through the application of *tapas*, creative intention (*kratu*) is cultivated that has the power to link the microscopic world of the sacrificer with the macrocosm, giving him or her the power to determine and alter circumstances, to bring forth new possibilities. This sacrifice has as its objective a "unification" of the sacrificer with the powers represented in what is sacrificed to. The performance of creative action generates a specific world symbolized by one of the various deities in the Vedic pantheon (e.g., *Indra*, *Agni*, *Varuna*, and so forth).<sup>33</sup> The deity to whom one sacrifices may change as one's needs and desires change. This sacrificial action, which is, according to Panikkar, "a death and a becom-

ing," is the creative act par excellence. Ritualized in the sacrifice, it is sacred work performed according to certain well-attested rules, hence its identification with *rta*. The *Rg Veda* declares that cosmic order is maintained by sacrificial order: *rta* is upheld by *rta*.<sup>34</sup>

Based on her innovative study, which takes into account the role of spiritual practice and insight in Vedic times, J. Miller argues that meditative discipline as the core focus of Yoga praxis can be traced back to the period of the *Rg Veda*: "The Vedic bards were *seers* who *saw* the *Veda* and sang what they saw. With them vision and sound, seership and singing are intimately connected and this linking of the two sense functions forms the basis of the Vedic prayer."<sup>35</sup> By means of the performance of prescribed ritualistic sacrifices (*yajña*), the *rsis* directed their vision (*dhih*) to the Divine.

In his work entitled *The Vision of the Vedic Poets*, Jan Gonda's examination of the Vedic word *dhih* and its derivative *dhitih*<sup>36</sup> has provided ample evidence that *dhih* is not just "thought" as it is usually translated, nor "hymn" or "devotion"; rather *dhih* refers to "visionary insight," "thought-provoking vision," a spiritual power that enabled the seer-poets to see in depth what they duly expressed as songs, hymns, or prayers, so that the word has often the meaning of insight leading to song, hymn, or prayer. The term *dhyana* (meditation), referring to a practice that is basic to Yoga, is derived from the root *dhyai* and is related to several Vedic terms derived from the root *dhi*.<sup>37</sup>

Miller understands meditative discipline in Vedic times as manifesting three distinct but overlapping aspects that she refers to as: mantric meditation, visual meditation, and absorption in heart and mind.<sup>38</sup> Mantric meditation corresponds with the absorption of the mind by means of sound or sacred utterance (*mantra*). Visual meditation is exemplified in the concept of *dhih* (which precedes the later related term *dhyana*), in which a specific deity is envisaged. The subtlest meditative stage, called absorption in mind and heart, involves enheightened experiences in which the seer, on the basis of what Miller refers to as a "seed-thought," explores the mysterious psychic and cosmic forces that gave rise to the composition of the Vedic hymns, such as the *Purusa Sukta* (mentioned above) and the *Nasadiya Sukta* ("hymn of creation," *Rg Veda* X.129). Successful meditation as disclosed in the Vedic hymns culminates in illumination wherein the seer perceives the "immortal light" (*jyotir amrtam*).<sup>39</sup> Thus, in this highest form of meditative insight, the ancient sage Atri is said to have "found the sun concealed by darkness."<sup>40</sup> This occurs, according to Miller, in the course of the fourth degree of "prayer," which she equates with *samadhi*<sup>41</sup> seen here as an ecstatic merging, as it were, with reality and the attainment of immortal knowledge. Miller

points out that although the word *samadhi* does not appear in the *Rg Veda*, it is, however,

almost certain that the *rsis* experienced *samadhi* but they did not analyze this in terms used in later ages as Patañjali was to do; its culmination meant for them contemplation of and perhaps mergence with the sun. 42

There is no direct statement that the beholding of the "golden one" becomes a blending of the beholder and the object perceived but the knowledge of immortality which is part of the experience of *samadhi* is clearly stated.<sup>43</sup>

Scholarship does not easily acknowledge that yogic forms of contemplative discipline were



known to the *rsis* of the early Vedic period thus failing to make a connection here with some of the core aspects of Yoga as expressed in its classical form, namely: concentration, meditation, and "unification." The integrating or harnessing of the mind (see n. 29 above) clearly points toward forms of yogic mental discipline insofar as it involves practices focusing on concentration, meditation, and the quest for a higher transcendent goal.

The very claim to seership entails the ability to see "within," which itself implies a contemplative perspective. That the overall aims of Yoga and of the Vedic seers may have been different is another question, the former purporting to lead to liberation from the limitations of worldly or cosmic existence, the latter emphasizing an expanded knowledge of the cosmos rather than freedom from its impediments. In view of the this-worldly, earthy nature of many of the Vedic hymns, it is easy to conclude that the Vedic prayers were only for material benefit<sup>44</sup> or selfish gain, and that forms of asceticism and contemplation that may have been intrinsic to the Vedic tradition were simply borrowed from the indigenous cultures. But to deny the Vedic Aryans any impetus for self-transcendence or capacity for metaphysical speculation could well prove to be an unwarranted position or oversight on the part of some scholars. As Miller's study indicates, the proto-Yoga of the Vedic *rsis* is an early form of sacrificial mysticism and contains many elements characteristic of later Yoga that include: concentration, meditative observation, ascetic forms of practice (*tapas*),<sup>45</sup> breath-control practiced in conjunction with the recitation of sacred hymns during the ritual, the notion of self-sacrifice, impeccably accurate recitation of sacred words (prefiguring *mantra-yoga*), mystical experience, and the engagement with a reality far greater than our psychophysical identity or ego.

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Although no form of Yoga is explicated in the Brahmanas (1000-800 BCE) exegetical works expounding and systematizing the Vedic sacrificial ritual and concerned with the significance of the *brahman*, the inner power of the sacrificial utterance we can see contained in their sacrificial ritualism<sup>46</sup> one of the key contributing elements of the later Yoga tradition. Thus the treatment of the ceremony of the "fire sacrifice of the breaths" (*prana-agni-hotra*) consisting of the oblation of food to the different kinds of breath, reveals a form of practice and thinking that helped to lay a foundation for the full-blown yogic study and discipline of breath control (*pranayama*). The *prana-agni-hotra*<sup>47</sup> is a symbolic replacement for the earlier Vedic fire ritual (*agni-hotra*), one of the most frequently performed and therefore most popular of all the rites. In the *prana-agni-hotra*, the more invisible, unobvious life-force or vital energy takes the place of the visible, obvious ritual fire. The *prana* is associated with the transcendent essence the *atman* or spiritual Self. The more esoteric emphasis given here, however, does not as yet constitute the more fully developed form of self- or "mental" sacrifice as is the case in yogic forms of meditation. It was enacted through one's body. Nevertheless, this important sacrifice was a major stepping-stone toward a most interesting phenomenon that has been referred to as the interiorization of sacrifice: the transformation or conversion or redirection of attention from externally oriented rites to internally oriented or mentally enacted rites.

Yoga in the Upanisads

The sages of the early Upanisads (800-500 BCE) presented a real challenge to the normal, formalized sacrificial cult of Vedic society by instigating what was to become an ideological one might even say a spiritual "revolution" by "internalizing" the ritualistic norms of the Vedas and Brahmins and establishing the path of intense thought, reflection, and meditation as the "inner sacrifice." Once it is understood that life perpetuates itself through its transformative or changing nature, that is, the creation, maintenance, and dissolution of separate life-forms, the only appropriate and spiritually mature response is to relate to existence as a continual sacrifice of the sense of separate selfhood or individuality. While the external rituals of orthodox Brahmanism were acknowledged as having a proper place in the social order, the Upanisadic adepts denied outright their soteriological efficacy. If the externalized forms of sacrifice involving a variety of rituals were the means to attain "heaven" for the Vedic people, then the sacrifice of the self,

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or egoic identity, is the means par excellence to liberation for the Upanisadic sage and, as we will see, the authentic Yoga practitioner. What is interesting to note is that the means of achieving both heaven (*svarga*)<sup>48</sup> and liberation (*moksa*) can be seen as converging on basic yogic-oriented practices such as concentration, meditation, absorption, and unification. The internalization of the Vedic ritual in the form of meditational praxis is well illustrated, for example, in the *Kausitaki Upanisad* (II.5) (ca. 800 BCE) which refers to the "inner fire sacrifice" (*antaram agni-hotram*).<sup>49</sup>

Like the Vedas, the Upanisads are looked upon as sacred revelation (*sruti*). Yet in contrast to the Vedas, the Upanisads are regarded as belonging to the "wisdom part" (*jñāna-kanda*) as opposed to the "ritual part" (*karma-kanda*) of the Vedic heritage. The knowledge that "behind" our ever-changing universe the reality of multiple forms and phenomena there abides an eternally unchanging and unfractured (single) Being was communicated already in Vedic times. For example, the *Rg Veda* (I.164.46) clearly discerns a unitary principle in which the personal gods to whom people sacrifice are seen as merely names for, or manifestations of, this unitary principle ("To that existence which is one [*ekam sat*] the sages give many a name."). However, the Upanisadic seekers disclosed, so it appears, a new or fresh insight: that the single transcendent Being is nothing more and nothing less than the essential core of one's own existence or Self. This finds clear expression, for example, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*, by one of the most profound thinkers of ancient India, Yajñavalkya (ca. 800 BCE).<sup>50</sup> Yajñavalkya was asked how that Self is to be conceived, to which he responded:

You cannot see the seer of seeing. You cannot hear the hearer of hearing. You cannot think the thinker of thinking. You cannot understand the understander of understanding. He is your Self, which is in everything. Everything else is irrelevant.<sup>51</sup>

This passage epitomizes one of the essential teachings from the Upanisads that was transmitted orally from an enlightened preceptor (*guru*) to disciple (*sisya*): the transcendent Source of the world is identical with the transcendent core of the human being; *brahman* and *atman* are one in identity.<sup>52</sup> There is no possible way to exhaustively describe or define that supreme Reality. One must simply realize it, and in this state of the fully awakened consciousness of Self (*atman*) or *brahman* one could doubtlessly declare, as did Yajñavalkya, "I am the Absolute (the Whole)."

This ultimate essence of life is described as being pure Selfhood, that is, the knower who is unknowable, the seer who cannot be seen, and so forth, as being the One-

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transcendent of all multiplicity as being pure consciousness, that is, consciousness that is free from any enslavement or limitation within the subject-object duality of ordinary experience.

How can the infinite, eternal, utterly free and real, and immeasurably blissful Self be realized? The Upanisadic sages emphasized the need for renunciation (*samnyasa*) and intensive meditation (*dhyana*), but the earliest Upanisads reveal very few practical instructions about the actual practice of meditation. It appears this was a matter to be settled between teacher and disciple. But the purpose of meditational praxis, as Patañjali was later to explain,<sup>53</sup> is to transcend samsaric existence and its afflicted modes of mistaken identity and spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) that ensconce one in the repeated drama of birth, life-span, and death and that merely result in pain, distress, and dissatisfaction, that is, suffering (*duhkha*). There being no real relief in this cycle (*samsara*), the Upanisadic sages taught the necessary means by which samsaric existence, that is, the world of change, unending rounds of rebirth and ignorance of one's true identity, could be transcended. Yajñavalkya urges one to see that the true Self (*atman*) is beyond all action (*karma*) and not to be deceived by ideas of what is ritually right and wrong, so that what one has done and what one has not done do not bind or affect one<sup>54</sup> as in the samsaric condition of selfhood. Through this attainment, having seen that the Self is "not this, not this" (*neti*), the Self is then seen in all things, in fact everywhere, making one free from evil, impurity, doubt, fear, and confusion.

Elsewhere in the same scripture, Yajñavalkya proclaims:

He who has found and awakened to the Self that has entered this perilous and inaccessible place [psychophysical being or body-mind], is the creator of the world, for he is the maker of the universe and of all. The world belongs to him. He is indeed the world.<sup>55</sup>

It should be seen as only one [i.e., as single], immeasurable, perpetual. The Self is taintless, unborn, great, perpetual, and beyond [the subtle element of] space.<sup>56</sup>

The realization of the unchanging, ever-pure Self (*atman*) an immortal state of existence is itself emancipation (*moksa*). This awakening coincides with the transcendence of the identifications with the limited sense of self or ego-personality and thus of conditional existence (*samsara*) itself. Moreover, Self-realization is the *telos* of human existence and the universe.<sup>57</sup> Being in truth all that there is, the Self, or *brahman*, cannot be an object of knowledge. Therefore, Yajñavalkya argues that, ultimately, all

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descriptions of the Absolute amount to being mere words, ideas, or concepts of reality.

Repeatedly he responds to all positive characterizations of the Self by exclaiming "not this, not this" (*neti neti*).<sup>58</sup> This famous method of approaching the undivided nature of Reality is an attempt to liberate the disciple from clinging to any erroneous predications about Reality and open the way to an unbound, unmodified state of existence and identity beyond all description. It is later adopted even in the nondualist schools of Yoga and Vedanta, where it is known as *apavada* ("refutation").<sup>59</sup> Yogins who embark on this more Vedantic approach to spirituality are asked to remind themselves constantly of the fact that all the states, functions or modes of our psychophysical existence are, in themselves, not the transcendent Reality. Neither the body, as it is ordinarily experienced, nor our thoughts and feelings as they normally present themselves are our true identity. The Self is no-thing or object that could be located in the external or experiential (empirical) finite world. This form of alert discrimination is called *viveka*. Through vigilant cultivation of *viveka* the yogin develops an inner watchfulness or attentiveness to what is of a changing nature, that is, what is within the realm of experience, as well as to the eternal Being or Source of all experiences, the unchanging identity or experiencer. By this form of practice the yogin cultivates a steadfast will to renounce all attachment to the changing, phenomenal world. Discrimination and renunciation (*samnyasa*) ultimately are said to lead to the discovery of the formless dimension of Self, the *atman*, beyond all conceptual understanding and imagery. Moreover, the true purpose of life and highest knowledge to be attained is not of the manifest sphere of existence, but rather is of the imperishable (*aksara*), the unknown, unreflective Self or knower (*avijñatam vijñatr*), which itself gives rise to the outer world of manifestations.<sup>60</sup> The seeker of truth and lasting fulfillment must be free of all attachment to the knowable (or seeable), must learn to sacrifice all egoic identification with what is experienced in order for authentic identity and, thus, liberation to arise.

The *Chandogya Upanisad* (ca. seventh or eighth century BCE) also gives us valuable insights into the early development of metaphysical ideas within Hinduism and the transformed nature of sacrifice (*yajña*) as articulated in the Upanisads. As we have seen, the external sacrificial ritual so prominent in early Vedic times was largely shunned by the Upanisadic sages who emphasized disciplines that brought about an interiorization of attention resulting in the internalization of the sacrificial ritual. This in turn opened the door for the development of Yoga within orthodox Brahmanism. In the *Chandogya*, Ghora Angirasa explains to Krsna that

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austerity (*tapas*), charity (*dana*), rectitude (*arjava*), nonviolence (*ahimsa*) and truthfulness (*satya*) are themselves the sacrificial gift (*daksina*),<sup>61</sup> thus implying that the inner attitudinal dimension as well as the way in which one lives one's life are the best recompense for what one has imbibed from one's teachers. The above idea clearly links up with an earlier notion presented in the same scripture: insofar as one is spiritually motivated, that person *is* a sacrifice.<sup>62</sup> This recognition led to the full-fledged perspective of the internalized or spiritualized sacrifice, which entails the dedication of one's life to an intrinsic, higher, transcendent purpose in contrast to the more extrinsically motivated ritual offerings of libations to the deities.

In an illuminating section in the *Chandogya Upanisad*, Prajapati instructs Indra as follows:

When the eye is directed toward space, that is the seeing witness (*caksusa purusa*); the

eye is but the instrument for sight . . .

The one who knows "Let me think this" that is the true self; the mind (*manas*) is the divine eye (*daiva caksu*). That one, with the divine eye, the mind, sees desires here, and experiences enjoyment.

Those gods who are in the Brahma world reverence the Self. Therefore all worlds and all desires have been appropriated by them. He obtains all worlds and all desires who has found out and who understands that Self (*atman*).<sup>63</sup>

While the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad* articulates the unspeakable or indescribable aspect of the Self (*atman*, *purusa*), the *Chandogya Upanisad* reveres the Self as the context for the unlimited obtainment of worlds, and the fulfillment of desires. In both instances, the Self is not found in what is seen, but in the one who seesthe seer: detachment from the objects of the senses is a prerequisite to the realization of the Self. These important insights, which point to a practice (*abhyasa*) involving a high-level form of discernment capable of distinguishing between the seer/knower and the seeable/knowable coupled with the need for dispassion (*vairagya*) toward worldly existence (*samsara*), are crucial in the context of Yoga philosophy

as will be seen in our examination of Patañjali's Yoga.

In the *Taittiriya Upanisad*,<sup>64</sup> another of the older Upanisads (but not as old as the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad* or the *Chandogya Upanisad*), one of the earliest technical references of the term Yoga is found, probably standing for the sage's mastery of the body and senses. However, the tradition of Yoga in its classical sense would not emerge and assume its place alongside other Hindu soteriological perspectives until several centuries

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later.<sup>65</sup> The *Katha Upanisad* (fifth century BCE) can perhaps be acknowledged as the oldest *Upanisad* that deals explicitly with Yoga. In the *Katha Upanisad* one of the key doctrines relating to Yoga is called *adhyatma-yoga*, the "Yoga of the inner self." The goal of this form of Yoga is the realization of the supreme Being, which is concealed within the "cave" of the heart. As this *Upanisad* states:

The wise one relinquishes joy and sorrow, realizing, by means of the Yoga of the inner self that primal God who is difficult to be seen, immanent, seated in the cave [of the heart] residing in the body.<sup>66</sup>

This Self cannot be attained by instruction, or by thought, or by much hearing. It is attained only by the one whom it chooses. To such a one the Self reveals its own nature.<sup>67</sup>

In the above, the author (anonymous) explains that the Self (*atman*) is not an object like other objects we can experience, speculate on, or analyze. As the transcendent essence in effect, the authentic nature, being and identity of everything there is nothing anyone can do to "acquire" or "obtain" the Self. For how can one "acquire" *that* which one already *is*? Thus the realization of

the Self must be a matter of the *atman* disclosing itself to itself. In religious terminology, this means that spiritual emancipation is dependent upon the element of "grace." The *atman*, as the *Kasha* surmises in the above passage, is attained by "one whom it chooses." This should not be misconstrued to imply that the spiritual practitioner should therefore relinquish all efforts for attaining salvation. On the contrary, the practitioner must undergo the necessary preparation for the reception of grace. Practice is valid as a means for someone who is progressing on the path to enlightenment. Until the "goal" of liberation is reached, efforts toward its attainment, including purification of mind and body, are not rendered invalid.

In chapter three of the *Katha Upanisad*, the *atman* is said to be at the summit of a hierarchy of levels of existence. By way of a metaphor, the instruction is given to: "Know the Self as lord of the chariot, and the body as the chariot. Know further that the intellect (*buddhi*) is the driver, whereas the mind-organ (*manas*) is the rein. The senses, they say, are the horses, and the sense-objects their arena."<sup>68</sup> By understanding spiritual practice as a return to the transcendent origin of being or retracing in consciousness, in reverse order, of the various stages of the evolutionary unfoldment of manifest existence only to "arrive" at the origin of all, the *Katha* distinguishes seven levels that comprise the hierarchy of existence: the senses (*indriya*);

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the sense-objects (*visaya*); the mind-organ (*manas*); the intellect (*buddhi*); the "great self" (*mahan atma*) or "great one" (*mahat*) the initial level of manifest existence; the unmanifest (*avyakta*) the transcendent source or unmanifest ground (*prakrti*) of all manifest existence (including nature/the cosmos and psychophysical being); and the Self (*purusa*) our intrinsic identity which is an immortal state of consciousness.<sup>69</sup> *Purusa* is eternally beyond the dynamics of *prakrti* in her manifest and unmanifest aspects. In the *Katha* one finds both the old Upanisadic notion of the Self (*atman*) together with the beginning of the Samkhya notion of *purusa*. The above ontological scheme is characteristic of the Samkhya tradition. In the context of the *Katha* it was probably never intended as mere metaphysical speculation, rather it served to provide contemplative directives, a "map" as it were, for the yogic processes of "interiorization" (i.e., the sacrifice of samsaric identity) involving the expansion or ascent of consciousness to subtler levels of identity, terminating with the ubiquitous/omnipresent Being, *purusa* itself. The disclosure of authentic identity as *purusa*, the transcendent Self, is the purpose of all efforts to transcend samsaric identity and the finite realm.

A clear definition of Yoga is given in *Katha Upanisad* II.3.11, which states: "This they consider to be Yoga: the steady holding of the senses. Then one becomes attentive (*apramatta*), for Yoga can come and go."<sup>70</sup> Here Yoga means the condition of inner steadfastness or equilibrium that depends on one's one-pointedness of attention. When the mind is undistracted and stabilized, then one can discover the "inner" or subtler dimensions of existence and consciousness that are revealed to the diligent aspirant. Ultimately, however, as we have seen, even this subtle exploration and disclosure of inner awareness and space does not result in liberation. It is merely a precondition for the reception of grace (see n. 67 above). Sheer determination (will power) and successful effort must be tempered with considerable patience and humility. The pedagogy of the *Katha Upanisad* represents an important breakthrough in the tradition of Hindu Yoga. Some



of the fundamental ideas underlying Yoga *theoria* and *praxis* are found. The *Katha* marks a definite transition between the esoteric, monistic trends of proto-Yoga as expressed in the early Upanisads and preclassical forms of Yoga as illustrated in later Upanisadic works such as the *Svetasvatara* and *Maitrayaniya* as well as the famous epic, the *Mahabharata* especially as revealed in the *Bhagavadgita* (see below for a discussion on these scriptures). Notwithstanding the obvious lack of any formal structure or systemization of Yoga, the recordings in the *Katha Upanisad* helped to mold together some of the crucial building blocks and central philosophical ideas so basic to the enterprise of Yoga. The consequence of this clear development of Yoga

was nothing less than Yoga becoming a recognizable tradition that could stand more or less on its own.

In the *Svetasvatara Upanisad* (ca. third century BCE), a form of Yoga is proclaimed that is indicative of the panentheistic teachings of the epic age. The Lord (*isa*, *isvara*) is portrayed as dwelling eternally beyond "His" own creation. This *Upanisad* states:

Following the Yoga of meditation, they perceived the inner power of God concealed by "its" own qualities. God is the one who presides over all the causes associated with time and the self. 71

By knowing God there is a dwindling of all fetters. When the afflictions are destroyed, there is cessation of birth and death [i.e., changing identity]. By meditating on "Him," there is a third state, universal lordship, upon separation from the body. Being alone, [the yogin's] desire is fulfilled. 72

The process of meditation recommended in this scripture involves the recitation of the sacred syllable *Om* (called the *pranava*). Meditation generates a necessary churning process by which the inner fire, likened to the Self, is rekindled. This in turn leads to the revelation of the intrinsic glory of the Self or God.<sup>73</sup> The disciplined practice of meditation (*dhyana*) can lead to a variety of inner experiences that, as the text cautions, must not be confused with liberation itself. The culminating realization is described as follows: "I know that supreme Self (*purusa*) effulgent like the sun beyond the darkness. Only by knowing 'Him' does one pass beyond death. There is no other way for passing [beyond *samsara*]." <sup>74</sup> Here, like the *Katha Upanisad*, the highest goal is the realization of the supreme, transcendent Self. Far from being portrayed as a colorless or dry ascetic, the yogin is placed in the role of a devotee (*bhakta*), that is, where devotion (*bhakti*: VI.23) to God and to one's spiritual teacher (*guru*) is an integral component of yogic practice. Spiritual growth and emancipation are seen not as a calculated or mechanistic enterprise stemming from self-effort alone, but rather the fruit of one's spiritual discipline is perceived to be enveloped in a mysterious process that is clearly dependent on some measure of "divine grace" as the sage-Svetasvatara himself comes to experience and speak about to others.<sup>75</sup>

The later *Maitrayaniya Upanisad* (ca. second century BCE)<sup>76</sup> presents a more concrete, formalized, and systematic portrayal of Yoga than had previously been developed. In the *Maitrayaniya* we can read about many intriguing ideas pertaining to Yoga which easily suggest a

further breakthrough in the development of Yoga. Included here are a series of practices that laid much groundwork for the classical formulations contained within the *Yoga-*

*Sutra* of Patañjali (see below). As this scripture discloses, the "elemental self" or *bhutatman* (referring to our psychophysical being or empirical self) is ineluctably entrenched within the samsaric world implying afflicted states of identity leading to struggle and conflict due to the "pairs of opposites" (*dvandva*) such as loss and gain, or pleasure and pain. As a result, our sense of self, irrevocably confined to the forces constituents or qualities (*gunas*) of nature and existence (*prakṛti*) as we normally know it to be, is constantly undergoing change<sup>77</sup> and sets itself up for inevitable pain and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*), which follows until it appears to disintegrate at death. The transcendent Self, however, always remains unaffected by these ongoing changes.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, the Self can be realized through knowledge (*vidya*), austerity (*tapas*), and deep contemplation (*cinta*).<sup>79</sup> The revered Sakayanya explains this realization in terms of a union (*sayujya*)<sup>80</sup> of the elemental (individual) self with the intrinsic Self, the "ruler" (*isana*), and later proclaims the "sixfold" Yoga (*sadanga-yoga*):

This is the rule for effecting this [oneness or union with the Self]: breath control (*pranayama*), withdrawal of the senses (*pratyahara*), meditation (*dhyana*), concentration (*dharana*), reflection (*tarka*) and unification (*samadhi*); [this is] said to be the sixfold Yoga. When the seer sees the brilliant Maker, the Lord, the Person, the Source of the Creator-God (*Brahma*), then, being a knower, shaking off good and evil, collapses everything into unity in the supreme Imperishable.<sup>81</sup>

The above list (excluding *tarka*) mentions five of the eight limbs (*angas*) of the later classical Yogathe philosophical system that has developed around Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra*<sup>82</sup> and its commentarial literature. Also some of the physiological theories of later Yoga begin to appear in the *Maitrayaniya Upanisad* (chapter VI) along with meditations on the mystical syllable *Om*.<sup>83</sup> S. Dasgupta writes, "The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier *Upanisads*, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of *pranayama* . . . of the *Yoga* system." He goes on to state that it is not until the *Maitrayaniya* "that we find the *Yoga* method had attained a systematic development."<sup>84</sup>

#### Yogic Themes in the *Bhagavadgita* and the *Moksadharma*

The *Bhagavadgita* (lit., "Song of the Lord") is the most popular and famous of all Yoga scriptures and forms part of the great Hindu epic, the *Mahabharata* (VI.13-40). The *Bhagavadgita* (like the *Mahabharata* as a

whole) is not formally a part of primary, revealed scripture (*sruti*, the canonical *Veda*) but belongs to the noncanonical sacred literature called "tradition" or *smṛti* (lit., "remembering" past



wisdom). Yet in its own context, in Sanskrit or in translation, the *Bhagavadgita* has for centuries functioned as revealed or primary scripture for a large number of Hindus. It was composed probably between 150 BCE and 250 CE. This widely acclaimed scripture has often been regarded as a self-contained text by a long line of Hindu thinkers and spiritual preceptors (*gurus*). The *Bhagavadgita* is a seminal text for much of Vaisnavism, the tradition centering on the worship of the Lord in the form of Visnu, specifically the descent by Visnu in the embodied form (i.e., *avatara*) of Krsna. Placing before us a rich and challenging body of moral, mystical and metaphysical teachings in the form of a dialogue between Krsna and his close friend, Arjuna, the *Bhagavadgita* on the whole recommends an approach to spiritual liberation that incorporates *karma-yoga*, *jñana-yoga*, and *bhakti-yoga*. Though not disposing of the kind of world-renouncing asceticism that characterizes much of the earlier Upanisadic literature, the *Bhagavadgita* nevertheless advocates the ideal of "actionless-action" (i.e., non-self-centered or ego-transcending action = *naiskarmya-karma*)<sup>85</sup> as being superior to the renunciation of all action. A central aspect of Krsna's teaching to Arjuna on *karma-yoga* is encapsulated in the following verse: "Steadfast in Yoga be active, relinquishing attachment and having attained equilibrium in success and failure, O winner of wealth. Yoga is called 'evenness' (*samatva*) [of mind]."<sup>86</sup> As Krsna affirms, in order to attain enlightenment and supreme peace it is unnecessary to abandon the world or one's responsibilities even when they summon one into battle, as in the case of Arjuna. To be sure, renunciation (*samnyasa*) of action is, in itself, a legitimate means. Krsna, however, declares a superior approach, that being the path of renunciation *while engaged in action* or "actionless-action," which results in freedom from the bondage of action (*naiskarmya*). In other words, *naiskarmya-karma* refers to a special "kind" or "quality" of action that comes into being through a particular inner attitude toward action, a mental form of activity that can be classified as a kind of action itself. Life in the world can be spiritualized; one's commitment to spiritual discipline and engagement in the world can be, indeed should be, cultivated simultaneously thereby establishing a basis for an integrated life through Yoga:

Not by abstention from actions does a person enjoy freedom from the bondage of action, nor by mere renunciation does one attain perfection.<sup>87</sup>

He who restrains his organs of action but continues to remember in his mind the objects of the senses is deluded and is called a hypocrite. But

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he excels, O Arjuna, who controlling the senses with the mind engages the organs of action in *karma-yoga*.<sup>88</sup>

Krsna points to his own activity as an enlightened example of *karmayoga*: "For Me, O Partha [Arjuna], there is nothing whatever to be done in the three worlds, nothing unobtained which is to be obtained and yet without fail I engage in action."<sup>89</sup> The secret to *karma-yoga* lies not in the action itself but rather in the state or quality of the human mind which gives rise to the action. If the mind is pure, that is, the yogin having sacrificed all selfish or inordinate desire (*trsnā*) and attachment (*rāga*) to the self-centered fruit of deeds, it cannot be defiled by actions even as they are engaged in daily life. What sets in motion the dynamic of *karma* through which a person is bound in *samsara* is not action itself, but, rather, attachment. The mind that remains "even"

yet alert, lucid and free of the stain of attachment<sup>90</sup> born of ignorance (*avidya*), allows for a mode of selfless or non-covetous action (*niskama karma*) through which salvation is attained. *Niskama karma* integrates *samatva* (evenness, serenity of mind) with the resolution to act with detachment. The perfected yogin enjoys a vision of the everywhere-ness (*sarvatra samadarsana*) of Self: all things are revealed as they truly are, that being of the Self (*atman*): "One whose self is disciplined by Yoga and who sees everywhere the same, sees the Self abiding in every being and every being in the Self."<sup>91</sup>

Acts must not only be carried out in the spirit of detachment or selflessness, they must also be ethically sound and reasonable, that is, have a high degree of moral content and value. For, as G. Feuerstein incisively states, "If action depended solely on one's frame of mind, it would be the best excuse for immoral behaviour. The [*Bhagavadgita*] does not propound such a crude subjectivism. For action to be wholesome [*kartsna*] it must have two essential ingredients: subjective purity (i.e., nonattachment) and objective morality (i.e., moral rightness)."<sup>92</sup> Krsna elaborates on the true nature of action as follows:

Indeed, one must understand not only action, but improper action (*vikarman*) and inaction (*akarman*). The way of action is impenetrable. He who sees action in inaction and inaction in action is a wise person performing whole actions in a disciplined way.<sup>93</sup>

Having relinquished the attachment to the fruit of action (*karma-phalasangam*), the yogin is freed from compulsive desire and abides in a state of constant satisfaction and without dependence on any object. Such a person is said to do nothing whatever (as a separate agent) even though

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engaged in action.<sup>94</sup> Sacrifice is cited as the model for proper action; the sacrifice of knowledge (*jñāna-yajña*) superior to the sacrifice of material things brings about the completion of action (i.e., all action culminates in knowledge).<sup>95</sup> The doctrine of *karma-yoga* states that one is no longer effected by the enslaving power of *karma* if action is done in the spirit of sacrifice. One is free to live as the Self (*atman*) rather than be bound to an egoic identity. Thus, *naiskarmya-karma* liberates the yogin from a misidentified, separate sense of self and is a special form of action in which the ego is transcended. As such it must not be confused with mere action (*karman*) or inaction (*akarman*).

The final vision or liberated state of Being that the *Bhagavadgita* acknowledges is union with the Lord. For Krsna, Yoga consists essentially in the complete alignment of one's practical, daily life to the divine Being, Krsna. In short, every aspect of the yogin's life must become engaged or "yoked" in Yoga.<sup>96</sup> By discarding all attachments in the form of personal volitions, intentions and expectations, and by seeing everywhere and in everything the Divine, the yogin's life is purified and illuminated. Krsna is revealed as the ultimate source of all including the unmanifest and the manifest existence in all its diversity. The ethical teachings of the *Bhagavadgita* basically stem from a panentheistic metaphysical understanding of reality: All is in God, while God transcends everything. Krsna embraces the indestructible nature of Being as well as "becoming" the ever-changing, destructible realm of existence. As Krsna professes:

This whole universe is pervaded by Me in my unmanifested form. Though all beings abide in Me, I do not subsist in them.

Yet beings do not abide in Me. Behold my lordly Yoga: Generating all beings, yet not being generated by them, My Self is the source of beings.<sup>97</sup>

Since the Lord is everywhere and in everything, the idea of renouncing or extricating the world in order to seek salvation or enlightenment ultimately becomes superfluous. What one needs to do is to cultivate a higher intelligence (*buddhi*),<sup>98</sup> the "eye of wisdom" (*jñāna-cakṣus*)<sup>99</sup> in order to discern the purity of Being, the knower, and thereby attain liberation.

Complementary to, and as some would argue, integral with, while yet even surpassing the insights and realizations attained through *karma-yoga* and *jñāna-yoga*, is the highly recommended "path" in the *Bhagavadgita* of the Yoga of "devotion" or *bhakti-yoga*. Interestingly, in chapter II Kṛṣṇa discusses a type of emancipation called *brahma-nirvāṇa* ("extinction in the

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Absolute") where the yogin transcends the realm of time and space and abides in "his" true nature as peace (*santi*).<sup>100</sup> In chapter VI we are told: "Thus continually disciplining himself, the yogin of restrained mind attains peace, the supreme extinction [of deluded identity], that which exists in Me."<sup>101</sup> Moreover, in chapter XVIII Kṛṣṇa appears to distinguish between two degrees of liberation: one in which devotion is absent, the other in which devotion is central. As Kṛṣṇa states, "Having become one with *Brahman*, and being tranquil in oneself, one neither grieves nor desires. Beholding the same [essence] in all beings, one attains supreme devotion to Me. Through this devotion, one comes to know Me in essence. Then having known Me, one forthwith enters into Me."<sup>102</sup>

Yet the high-level state of *brahma-nirvāṇa* of which Kṛṣṇa speaks appears to lack the full-blown devotional element of *bhakti*. A vital and personal connection with the divine personality of Kṛṣṇa, the all-encompassing suprapersonal (in contrast to impersonal) reality, does not appear to come into play or at least is not an essential component of this level of awakening. The supreme Person (*puruṣa-uttama*), who is said to surpass both the perishable (*ksara*) and the imperishable (*akṣara*),<sup>103</sup> is realized only in what is perhaps a higher form of emancipation, a higher devotion (*para-bhakti*), when the yogin fully awakens in the Lord. For, as Kṛṣṇa says: "One who standing in oneness and worships Me, abiding in all beings, dwells in Me in whatever state one exists."<sup>104</sup> Devotion (*bhakti*) is a major aspect of Kṛṣṇa's teaching, being the surest path by which the devotee-yogin approaches the supreme Person and thereby attains grace (*prasaḍa*). Thus Kṛṣṇa declares: "Of all yogins, one who worships Me full of faith and whose inner self abides in Me that one I consider to be nearest to my vision."<sup>105</sup> Thus the "path" of *bhakti-yoga* attained great status as one of the central teachings on Yoga in the *Bhagavadgita*, and indeed, in much of the Brahmanic devotional literature that followed.<sup>106</sup>

Other significant material that illuminates our understanding of the development of Yoga can be found in the *Mokṣadharma* (*MD*) section in the *Mahābhārata*, which comprises chapters 168-

353 of the twelfth book (*Santiparvan*). Important clues are given especially about Yoga and Samkhya in their "epic" forms prior to their classical systematizations by Patañjali and Isvara Krsna respectively. Notwithstanding obvious similarities between Samkhya and Yoga, a careful examination of the *Moksadharma* reveals that both of these traditions were already developing into distinct, independent "views" around the time of the final composition of the *Mahabharata*. Later in our study it will be noted where the contrast between these two perspectives is apparent.

One important yogic approach that is utilized in the *Moksadharma*, termed *nirodha-yoga* (the "Yoga of cessation"), is the progressive transcendence or de-identification with the contents of empirical consciousness from sensations, to thought, to even subtler experiences until the culminating realization of authentic identity (*purusa*) takes place. Here, sense-withdrawal, concentration, and meditative disciplines are considered the "inner core" or primary methods of Yoga. One can read, for example, that

the ascetic should fix the thought-organ (mind), closely united with study, on a single point, rolling together the group of the senses (in the thought-organ), sitting like a stick of wood (XII.188.5).

When he rolls together the senses and the thought-organ, this is described by me (Bhisma) as the first course of meditation (XII.188.10). 107

After describing a period wherein the thoughts of the yogin may become unsteady, the speaker, Bhisma a wise teacher and heroic warrior instructs the practitioner not to be discouraged and to persist in meditation: "Undespondent and undistressed, free from weariness and selfishness, the one who knows the discipline (Yoga) of meditation (*dhyana*) shall again concentrate his thought by meditation" (XII.188.14).<sup>108</sup> In the next verse several levels of meditation are distinguished that are close to Patañjali's classical terminology. Thus, Bhisma briefly mentions the meditative stages of *vitarka* ("cogitation," "discursive thought"), *vicara* ("subtle reflection"), and *viveka* ("discrimination") without explaining them further.<sup>109</sup> The yogin who is successful at meditation enters the state of complete inner peace and bliss: "Endowed with that bliss he will abide happily in the process of meditation. For thus possessors of Yoga go to that *nirvana* which is free from disease."<sup>110</sup>

It is not unreasonable to assume that the didactic passages of the *Mahabharata* epic, notably the *Moksadharma*, were probably composed between the third century BCE and the third century CE. The fact that teachings such as the above-mentioned "Yoga of meditation" (*dhyana*) as well as "breath control" (*pranayama*), concentration (*dharana*), and not least the cultivation of moral virtues (e.g., truthfulness, nonviolence, compassion) were incorporated in the *Mahabharata* clearly alludes to their importance and indeed popularity during this time. As can be seen from our brief look at Upanisadic and epic literature, Yoga developed into a strong and challenging presence within the Hindu fold thereby laying a solid foundation for what was to manifest as a coherent, successful and enduring formulation of

Yoga philosophy and practice, namely as contained in the *Yoga-Sutra* of Patañjali.

### Yoga And *Samadhi*

Yoga can refer to both the method that "joins" and the "harnessed" statesometimes referred to as "union." Viewed from another angle, Yoga can denote the process of becoming liberated as well as the final "goal" of liberation (*moksa*, *mukti*, *apavarga*) or Being itself. However, what are thus "joined together" in Yoga must be understood according to the specific context. G. Feuerstein writes:

In the *Rg-veda* the root *yuj* and its derivative *Yoga* are still predominately used in the sense of "yoking, harnessing." *Yoga* is the restraining of the senses for the purpose of magically attracting the numinous forces in the universe. However, the mythic form of *Yoga*, as we have known it since the time of the early *Upanisads* intends to be a path of return to the primordial source (*yonī*) by way of "re-linking" (*samyoga*) with the Origin.

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"Yoga" is frequently interpreted as the "union" of the individual self (*jivatman*) with the transcendent Self (*paramatman*), as can be seen in the nondualist tradition of Vedānta, a tradition which has influenced a large number of Yoga schools. Yājñavalkya<sup>112</sup> a Yoga adept who is often mentioned or quoted in the later *Upanisads* (and who may have been the author of the *Yoga-Yājñavalkya-Samhita*) tells us that Yoga is "the union of the *jivatman* with the *paramatman*."<sup>113</sup> In the *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra* ("Treatise on the Great Extinction"), dating from the eleventh century CE, Yoga has been defined as "the unity of the *jīva* with the transcendent Self (*atman*)."<sup>114</sup> Abhinavagupta's (tenth to eleventh century CE) *Tantrasāra* (702) states: "Yoga is undoubtedly the union of *jīva* (the transcendent pole representing the "possessor" of power) and *śakti* (the dynamic pole of creative power and energy)."<sup>115</sup> The idea of "union" is also highlighted in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (VI.7.31), where Yoga has been defined as the union of the purified mind with *brahman*.<sup>116</sup>

Not only the "joining" or "union" but also the methods and practices leading to the "joining" or "union" are called Yoga. If the methods are divided into the main and the subsidiary, then even the subsidiary methods are part of Yoga. In addition to the six main forms of Yoga previously mentioned (see p. 6 above), there are in the Sanskritic tradition of Hinduism various compound words that end in *-yoga*. On the whole these do not

represent autonomous schools of Yoga. In the above context, the term "yoga" refers to a specific form or method of "practice." For example, the compound *buddhi-yoga*<sup>117</sup> means the practice of discernment, and *saṃnyāsa-yoga*<sup>118</sup> denotes the practice of renunciation. Other examples include: *dhyāna-yoga*<sup>119</sup> (the practice of meditation), *kriya-yoga*<sup>120</sup> (the Yoga of ritual action), and *nāda-yoga*<sup>121</sup> (the Yoga of the inner sound).

Within the fold of Hinduism, all authentic forms of Yoga can be conceived as ways to an unchanging "center" of Being, the transcendent Reality of spirit or authentic identity (*atman*, *purusa*), which may be defined variously depending on the particular school of Yoga one is examining. The genuine practitioner (yogin) of Yoga is thus motivated by a recognition of the necessity for self-transcendence (i.e., the transcendence of ordinary human consciousness), also understood as the desire to realize one's true nature or intrinsic identity as an immortal state of being (i.e., the realization of the Self or "God"). Yoga cannot be reduced to any one *system* of thought and practice. There can be no totalization of Yoga for in all its rich diversity Yoga proper is not a uniform whole. Even just a cursory look at Yoga in its historical context reveals that methods/techniques/practices and philosophies of Yoga can vary from school to school and from preceptor to preceptor.

Yet despite the complex nature and diverse range of ideas in Yoga, it must be emphasized that the various branches and schools of Yoga do share an essential concern, that being with a state of consciousness and immeasurable identity that clearly transcends our normal boundaries of empirical identity or selfhood. This crucial orientation is evident in the definition of Yoga given by the great Yoga authority Vyasa (ca. fifth-sixth century CE) where, in his commentary on the *Yoga-Sutra*, the *Yoga-Bhasya*, he states: "Yoga is *samadhi*."<sup>122</sup> The word *samadhi*<sup>123</sup> literally means "placing, putting together." What is "put together" or "unified" is the sense of self or subject along with the object of contemplation. *Samadhi* is both the practice or "technique" of the unification of consciousness and the resulting state of "union" with the perceived object. Mircea Eliade suggested<sup>124</sup> that *samadhi* be appropriately rendered as "*enstasy*" rather than "*ecstasy*." Derived from Greek origin, the term "*ecstasy*" means to stand (*stasis*) outside (*ex*) the ordinary self or ego, whereas the term "*enstasy*" ultimately denotes one's standing in (*en*) the Self, the transcendent essence or source of contingent identity, that is, the ego-personality. Both interpretations, however, are entirely valid according to the degree or depth of *samadhi* being experienced. As we will see later in this study (chapters 4-6), there are forms of *samadhi* in Yoga that resemble more ecstasy than enstasy. We

can permanently abide in and as spirit or Self only when we transcend the barriers of empirical selfhood, the egoic claim to authentic being. Exactly how this unconditional identity is interpreted and what means are recommended for its realization again vary from school to school.

The definition of Yoga as "union" is popular among Vedanta and neo-Vedanta followers and, as we have seen, generally implies a union between the individual self and the supreme Self, an identity that can be equated with *brahman* (the underlying, transcendent Reality). According to some scholars, the notion of "union," while making sense within the context of Vedanta, is not representative of all forms of Yoga. It is valid in regard to earlier schools of Yoga, that is, as seen, for example, in the *Katha*, *Svetasvatara*, or *Maitrayaniya Upanisads*, and the *Bhagavadgita* and *Moksadharma* section of the *Mahabharata*, and it also generally applies to the later, postclassical schools of Yoga as given expression in the *Yoga Upanisads*, tantric forms of Yoga and *hatha-yoga*, all which basically subscribe to a form of Vedantic, nondualist, or



panentheistic philosophy. G. Feuerstein argues that the metaphor of "union" does not have any real place in the system of classical Yoga: "it is definitely inapplicable to Patañjali's [Yoga] . . . whose essence consists rather in a 'disunion,' namely the disjunction of the Self (*purusa*) and the world (*prakṛti*). There is no question of any union with the Divine."<sup>125</sup> Max Müller also observes that the aim and culmination of Patañjali's Yoga is not to unite, as is generally understood, but to disunite, to separate, to isolate the spirit or Self (*purusa*) from "matter" (*prakṛti*), thereby "returning" to the Self its essential and original purity.<sup>126</sup> This understanding of Yoga was expressed by Bhoja Raja (eleventh century CE), a Saivaite yogin and commentator on the *Yoga-Sutra*, who states that Yoga means "separation" (*viyoga*).<sup>127</sup> Bhoja Raja argued that the foundational technique or method utilized in Patañjali's classical Yoga is the "discrimination" (*viveka*) between the transcendent, spiritual Self (*purusa*) and the "nonself" (*anatman*) the realm of "matter" (*prakṛti*) that includes our psychophysical being.

Etymologically, the word *samadhi* can mean the "settling down" or one-pointedness of the intellect (*buddhi*) or mind (*citta*) on some object,<sup>128</sup> which in turn gives rise to a steady, peaceful state of mind. In this regard *samadhi* has very clear affinities with the meaning of Yoga. In the *Katha Upanisad* (II.3.11; see n. 70 above) Yoga has been described as "steadiness" or "attentiveness" (*apramatta*) of mind. The *Bhagavadgita* (II.48; see n. 86 above) defines Yoga as "equanimity" or "evenness" (*samatva*). This special state of mind allows the yogin to function in the world through a mode of activity described by Kṛṣṇa as "skill in action";<sup>129</sup> that is to say, the

yogin performs allotted actions without any attachment to the results, without being obsessively concerned with the fruits of the activity (*BG* IV.20). Thus it is not difficult to see how and why Yoga could be equated (as Vyasa has done) with *samadhi*, *samadhi* signifying a state of steadiness or evenness allowing for an alertness and lucidity of mind that culminates in the "unification" or identity of the subject or "seer" with the object or "seeable." This view is again reinforced in the *Bhagavadgita* where Yoga is said to be attained when the intellect is no longer distracted by what is heard and stands immovable and steady in a state of *samadhi*.<sup>130</sup>

According to Vyasa's definition ("Yoga is *samadhi*"), the word Yoga as Patañjali uses it in *Yoga-Sutra* I.1 is derived not from *yuj* meaning "yoking" or "joining," but from the verb whose meaning is similar to *samadhi*. The learned commentator Vacaspati Misra (ninth century CE) notes that the term Yoga should be derived from the root *yuja* (in the sense of "concentration") and not from *yujir* (in the sense of "conjunction").<sup>131</sup> Vacaspati may have been compelled to make this remark because in the nondualist tradition of Vedānta with which he was familiar the term *yoga* is frequently explained as the union (*samyoga*) between the individual self and the transcendent Self. This understanding of Yoga does not formally apply to Patañjali's classical school, which emphasizes the distinction between unchanging identity and the changing identity of empirical selfhood and, it is often argued, culminates in an absolute separation between pure consciousness or Self (*purusa*) and the realm of nature, psychophysical being and its source (*prakṛti*). One may ask, however, why it is generally acknowledged that the word *yoga* may be derived from the verb meaning "joining" or "yoking." This may be explained by the fact that the sages of the Upanisads experienced *samadhi* as a union of the individual and the universal Self,

thereby lending a secondary meaning to the same verb. The primary meaning was probably "concentration," as seen, for example, in the *Rg Veda* (V.81.1);<sup>132</sup> but elsewhere the Vedic and Upanisadic literature is replete with usage of the verbs meaning "concentration" (i.e., *samadhi*) in the sense of "uniting," and "joining," as well as "restraining" and "yoking."<sup>133</sup> A study of the ancient texts shows therefore that the forms are used interchangeably. Why the outstanding grammarian, Panini, chose to differentiate them so substantially can only be answered by hazarding the guess that perhaps by his time (ca. fourth-fifth century BCE) the conjugational forms of the verbs had settled into fixed meanings as recorded by him.

The oral tradition does not indulge in the artificial rules of grammar, but in his major work on grammar, the *Mahabhasya*, Patañjali<sup>134</sup> (ca. second century BCE) admits that grammarians only acknowledge the usage of words

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as found in the Vedas and voiced among the people. Therefore, it would appear that any conflicts between grammarians and philosophers need not arouse undue concern. Furthermore, since philosophy is central to this present study, it will be necessary to inquire into the meaning of Vyasa's statement that the word "Yoga" in the *Yoga-Sutra* means *samadhi*.<sup>135</sup>

Madhavacarya (fourteenth century CE) advocates in the "Patañjali-Darsanam" chapter of his *Sarva-Darsana Samgraha*, that Yoga is to be equated with *samddhi*.<sup>136</sup> It is generally the case, Madhavacarya explains, that the process leading to awakening in *samadhi* begins with restraining the senses and yoking the mind to the inner self; and that the experience of *samadhi* itself is joining the individual self and the supreme Self.<sup>137</sup> All of these various stages or levels of the endeavor and experience are, according to Madhavacarya, meant to be included in the process of Yoga. Since "restraining," "yoking," or "joining" used separately would have been incomplete, one could hypothesize that Vyasa chose to derive the word from the verb whose meaning is similar to *samadhi*. As U. Arya informs us, the above approach "falls within the convention of Indian logic known as *angangi-bhava*: that is to say, when a statement is made concerning a complete entity (*angin* 'one who owns *angas*, or parts'), each one of its parts (*angas*) is already included."<sup>138</sup> Madhavacarya asserts that the practice and experience of *samadhi* is inclusive of "restraining," "yoking," or "joining" since these are all contained within the eight *angas* (YS II.29) or "limbs" of Yoga as outlined by Patañjali.<sup>139</sup> If, in the above context, Bhoja Raja's definition of Yoga is also taken into consideration (see n. 127 above), then not only the dynamic of "joining," "harnessing" or a "union," but even a "separation" (*viyoga*) may be included among the "parts" that constitute the complete process of *samadhi*. But a further in-depth exploration into the meaning of *samadhi* will be reserved for the later chapters (4-6) on the classical Yoga of Patañjali.

The Pedagogical Dimension of Yoga: (i) The Practitioner (Yogin) and the Commitment to Practice

The practitioner of Yoga is designated by the term *yogin* (in the nominative: *yogi*), which, like the word *yoga*, is derived from the verbal root *yuj* (see n. 6 above). A yogin may be broadly classified as: (1) a novice or beginning student, (2) an advanced or mature student, or (3) an



enlightened adept (*guru*), implying one who has arrived at the highest level of spiritual awakening. A female practitioner is called a *yogini*. The masculine

noun *yogin*, however, can be generically applied to all spiritual practitioners of Yoga. Throughout our study the term *yogin* has been adopted as there is nothing inherent in the context of Yoga which asserts that *yogin* cannot refer to a male or a female practitioner.

The spiritual development of the *yogin* is often portrayed hierarchically in an attempt to distinguish between levels of commitment, growth (i.e., self-transcendence) and awareness. Vijñāna Bhikṣu (sixteenth century CE), a *yogin* and Vedantic philosopher, differentiates between the following levels in his *Yoga-Sara-Samgraha* ("Summary of the Essence of Yoga"): (1) *Aruruksu* referring to one who is desirous of a life based on Yoga; (2) *Yuñjanare* referring to one who is actually practicing; and (3) *Yogarudh* referring to one who is advanced or "ascended" in Yoga, also called *yukta* ("yoked one") or *sthita-prajña* ("one of firmly established wisdom").<sup>140</sup> The *Bhagavadgita* characterizes the latter two the aspirant-practitioner and the more accomplished adept in these words:

Action is stated to be the medium for the sage who desires to ascend to Yoga. For one who has already ascended to such Yoga, serenity is said to be the medium.<sup>141</sup>

When one does not cling to actions or to the sense-objects and has renounced all compulsive intention and expectation, then one is said to have ascended in Yoga.<sup>142</sup>

When one whose mind controlled abides in the Self alone and is freed from yearning, then one is said to be "yoked" (disciplined).<sup>143</sup>

In the second chapter of the *Bhagavadgita*, the *yogin* who is of firmly established wisdom (*sthita-prajña*, BG II.54), is described as follows: "One whose mind is not affected in the midst of sorrow and is free from desire in the midst of pleasure, and who is without attachment, fear and anger, is said to be a sage of steadied vision."<sup>144</sup>

An interesting fourfold division is presented in the *Yoga-Bhasya* of Vyasa, which describes the *yogin* at four different levels of accomplishment: (1) *Prathama-kalpika* the beginner or neophyte in the first stages of Yoga; (2) *Madhu-bhumika* one who has arrived at the "honeyed" or delightful stage; (3) *Prajña-jyoti* one who has attained the "light" of knowledge or illuminative insight; and (4) *Atikranta-bhavanīya* one who has gone beyond all that was to be cultivated.<sup>145</sup> Vyasa elaborates on these four stages of yogic attainment as follows:

The first is the practitioner for whom the light of knowledge has just begun to dawn. The second is one who has attained to "truth-bearing" insight. The third is one who has subjugated the elements and the sense-organs and has developed means for securing all

that has been and is yet to be cultivated [by that one] . . . While the fourth who has passed beyond that which may be cultivated has as one's sole aim the "resolution" of the mind [into its source the unmanifest *prakṛti*]. One's insight then attains to the seven final stages [YS II.27] 146 [whereupon the Self abides in its intrinsic purity or own form/identity].<sup>147</sup>

The last stage of transcendence leads to the culminating goal of classical Yoga the liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*). This is the realization of the Self (*purusa*), the eternal, spiritual essence of our human identity that transcends the ever-changing manifest or the unmanifest dimension of the cosmos (*prakṛti*). *Kaivalya* which will be examined in detail in chapter 6 is the state of spiritual liberation and the highest "attainment" in the life of the yogin who follows Patañjali's teachings on Yoga.

Once more, in his *Bhāṣya*, Vyasa explains that there is a ninefold classification of yogins, according to the intensity of their quest, which may be mild (*mṛdu*), moderate (*madhya*), or ardent (*adhimatra*).<sup>148</sup> Vacaspati Misra (ninth century CE) explains that the degree of intensity and momentum of progress depends on the yogin's accumulated impressions (*samskaras*) from past experiences, even lifetimes, as well as hidden karmic influences (*adrsta*).<sup>149</sup> The depth of one's attraction to the realization of authentic identity (*purusa*) is preconditioned by one's karmic past in that one's actions, volitions and intentions not only in the present lifetime but also in past lives determine one's future embodiments or states of being (i.e., one's genetic composition and psychophysical as well as social identity).<sup>150</sup> One's commitment to Yoga discipline or practice (*sadhana*) is not entirely under one's control, and especially in the beginning stages of practice the yogin must persist in self-discipline in the face of any adversities. One's rate of progress is dependent upon the intensity of one's method (*upaya*) and the degree of one's momentum, energy or intensity (*samvega*). For one whose rate of progress is fast whose practice is strongly intense with ardent energy Patañjali tells us that *samādhi* is very near.<sup>151</sup> Yogins at this level of practice soon attain *samādhi* and the fruit of *samādhi*,<sup>152</sup> which is "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).<sup>153</sup> This intense level of commitment, however, refers to those yogins who practice at the highest level of intensity, for as *Yoga-Sūtra* I.22 informs us, "Hence, even [among the ardent] there is a distinction of the mild, moderate and ardent."<sup>154</sup> The highest level of intensity spoken of does

not refer to "excessive asceticism or pathological mortification." Rather, it involves genuine "enthusiasm"<sup>155</sup> and a commitment that, as I later argue, is properly grounded in an integral approach to life.

#### The Pedagogical Dimension of Yoga: (ii) The Spiritual Guide or Preceptor (*Guru*)

In his well-known study of Yoga, M. Eliade rightly declares, "What characterizes Yoga is not only its practical side, but also its initiatory structure."<sup>156</sup> Yoga presupposes the guidance of a spiritual preceptor or adept who has direct experience of the insights and realizations as well as the distractions or obstacles that may arise on the path of Yoga. Ideally, the teacher or *guru* should be a "true teacher" (*sad-guru*), having attained the ultimate realization informing all yogic endeavor, which, in the language of different yogic schools, can be referred to as enlightenment (*bodha*), liberation (*moksa*), or "aloneness" (*kaivalya*). The *sad-guru* is looked

upon as an invaluable agent of grace (*anugraha, prasada*) and compassion (*karuna*). However, as the author of the *Siva Purana*<sup>157</sup> observes, if a preceptor is only nominal, so is the enlightenment thus bestowed on the disciple (*sisya*). Yoga does not conceal its criticisms of false teachers or *gurus* (see n. 172 below). Moreover, contrary to popular conceptions of Yoga adopted by many Westerners, authentic forms of Yoga are *never* a self-appropriating endeavor or "do-it-yourself" undertaking. As Eliade wisely remarked, "One does not learn *Yoga* by oneself."<sup>158</sup> Yoga entails a profound pedagogical commitment involving periods of study during which preceptors can communicate and transmit their wisdom to worthy disciples or devotees. This crucial pedagogical context is exemplified in the *Bhagavadgita* where Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna: "Know this [knowledge] by obeisance, by inquiry and by service to them. Those of wisdom, who themselves have seen the truth, will instruct you in this knowledge."<sup>159</sup> Mere conceptual knowledge, words or metaphysical speculation cannot contain or exhaust the knowledge (*jñāna*) spoken of by Kṛṣṇa. In a succinct description of the central role of the Hindu *guru*, J. D. Mlecko writes:

Primarily . . . the guru is the personal teacher of spirituality, that is, of the basic, ultimate values perceived within the Hindu tradition. Further, the guru possesses experiential knowledge, not only intellectual knowledge, of these values. In a word, the guru is indispensable for spiritual development. In early Hinduism he was a vital factor in imparting *Vedic* knowledge; in

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later thought the guru became the visible embodiment of truth and in some cases he was worshipped as an incarnate deity. 160

The "heavy" authority given to the *guru* or "weighty one" places the preceptor at the hub of the entire initiatory and pedagogical structure of Yoga. The Upanisads have preserved examples of some of the more profound teacher/disciple relationships, in which the pinnacle of spiritual wisdom, not merely intellectual knowledge, was pursued. Having experienced directly the scriptural revelation, the enlightened adept is thus deemed fit to prepare others for the same realization. Hence the *Siva-Samhita* declares: "[Only] knowledge imparted by way of the teacher's mouth is productive; otherwise it is fruitless, weak and leads to much suffering."<sup>161</sup>

Spiritual initiation (*dikṣa*)<sup>162</sup> is a crucially important notion in Yoga for it involves an essential transference of knowledge (*jñāna*) or spiritualized power (*śakti*) from the *guru* to the disciple (*sisya*) enabling the transforming processes of Yoga to come into their own. Through initiation, the disciple gains access to the *guru's* state of consciousness and even mysteriously becomes a part of the *guru's* line of transmission (*parampara*). The transmission of spiritual energy and awareness to the aspirant through the *guru's* "proximity" or "nearness" has been noted from ancient to modern times:

Education has been aptly defined as the transmission of life from life to life. This ideal seems to have been literally realized under . . . [the] ancient pedagogic system.<sup>163</sup>

Merely to be in this man's presence [his *guru's*] seemed to be enough to dissolve all

problems, to make them non-existent, like darkness in the presence of light.<sup>164</sup>

When one enters into right relationship with a Spiritual Master, changes happen in the literal physics of one's existence . . . The transforming process is . . . through that Living Company.<sup>165</sup>

The synonym for *diksa*, *abhiseka*, refers to the ritualistic "sprinkling" of consecrated water on the devotee in the form of baptism. By means of initiation the spiritual process is either activated or intensified in the practitioner. It is a direct empowerment in which the adept effects in the disciple a transformation or turnabout of consciousness, a metanoia.<sup>166</sup>

The initiatory teacher/disciple system dates back to the early Vedic period (ca. 1200-900 BCE) where a young boy would spend his youth and adolescence in the home of a teacher of the sacred canonical scriptures, a

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teacher whose authority represented the wisdom of the holy texts. Vedic knowledge was transmitted orally to the student by the teacher and had to be properly memorized. The interpersonal dimension of education was highly regarded. It was the teacher's responsibility to guide and counsel the disciple through study and understanding of the Vedas, and to attend to the disciple's welfare. In the *Rg Veda*<sup>167</sup> the *guru* is described as the source and inspirer of spiritual knowledge, or the essence of reality, for the seeker. In the *Yajur Veda*<sup>168</sup> the *guru* is described as the one who blesses and enhances the seeker's spiritual life. The formalized relationship between teacher and disciple is referred to as the *guru-kula* ("teacher's household") system. The following statement by R. K. Mookerji describes this original model of education:

The school . . . is the home of the teacher. It is a hermitage, amid sylvan surroundings, beyond the distractions of urban life, functioning in solitude and silence. The constant and intimate association between teacher and taught is vital to education as conceived in this system. The pupil is to imbibe the inward method of the teacher, the secrets of his efficiency, the spirit of his life, and these things are too subtle to be taught.<sup>169</sup>

Its rationale is given in the *Taittiriya Upanisad* as follows: "The teacher is the first form. The student is the latter form. Knowledge is their junction. Instruction is the connection."<sup>170</sup> The key role and necessity of a *guru* became more and more explicit throughout the Upanisads. As the *Chandogya Upanisad* puts it, only by knowledge received directly from the *guru* can one attain the purest, most beneficent and subtle truth.<sup>171</sup> In the *Katha Upanisad*, the *guru* is represented as being indispensable to the attainment of knowledge.<sup>172</sup> Study by oneself, perceived as an end in itself, is repeatedly disapproved of in the Upanisads for even exclusive self-study cannot give one liberating knowledge.

Composed of the verbal root *sad* ("to sit") prefixed with *upa* and *ni* (together meaning "near"),<sup>173</sup> the term *upanisad* thus conveys the idea of "sitting down near" the teacher, who instructs the disciple. The Upanisadic dialogues involving the teacher or *guru* figure are clearly didactic (such as the dialogue in the *Katha Upanisad* between the *sisya*, Naciketas, and the *guru*, Yama). They reveal little about the actual character of the *gurus*. However, the methods espoused by the *gurus*

are clear and varied and they all have a soteriological goal. For example, in the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*, the teacher Yajñavalkya, instructing his wife Maitreyi, used the *neti neti* ("not this, not this") method through which it is revealed that all positive descriptions of the Self (*atman*) can only act as pointers to that Reality

which transcends all thought. All affirmations about Reality are not ultimately true. When all attachment to ideas is eliminated, the unmodified and ineffable Self alone remains.<sup>174</sup> In the *Taittiriya Upanisad*,<sup>175</sup> Varunathe guardian of cosmic order and overseer of moral actionurges his disciple (*sisya*) (and son), Bhrgu, to perform asceticism (*tapas*), to strive for, discover, and directly experience the truth of *brahman*. On the other hand, in the *Chandogya Upanisad* the *guru*, Uddalaka, made use of analogies to enable his students to gain insight into the nature of *atman* as the invisible essence of life, and then concluded with the famous expression to his son Svetaketu, "*tat tvam asi*" or "That thou art."<sup>176</sup>

The formal method of teaching included a dialectical approach whereby the student asked questions and the teacher discoursed upon them. There was, however, more to the method than simply asking and listening. There was the insistence, as the *sisya* advanced, on contemplating ultimate reality and realizing or actualizing it in one's own life. The responsibility of spiritual growth ultimately devolved on the *sisya* and not on the *guru*. R. K. Mookerji relates the following:

The [*Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*] clearly states that education in the highest knowledge depends upon three processes following one another. . . [*Sravaṇa*] is listening to what is taught by the teacher . . . *Manana* is defined as constant contemplation of the One Reality in accordance with the ways of reasoning aiding in its apprehension. *Nididhyasana* is concentrated contemplation of the truth so as to realize it.<sup>177</sup>

The *sisya* must be seriously engaged in the above three disciplines, all of which demand a great deal of focus and commitment.

Many of the yogic practices within Tantrism (ca. fifth century CE) necessitate the guidance of an accomplished preceptor. Shashibhusan Dasgupta observes, "Because of their stringent nature these practices have repeatedly been declared in all the *Tantras* as the secret of all secrets . . . and, therefore there is no other way of being initiated into this method of yoga save the practical help of the *guru*."<sup>178</sup> There are many functional types of *gurus*, and the Yoga scholar M. P. Pandit, in his translation of the *Kularnava Tantra* (a medieval text), mentions no fewer than twelve.<sup>179</sup> Eventually, the *guru's* presence, energy and personality affect the whole spiritual life of the yogin as the passage cited below seems to imply: "The form of the guru is the root of *dhyana*, the lotus feet of the guru is the root of *pūja*, the word of the guru is the root of *mantra*, and the grace of the guru is the root of *siddhi* [supernatural power]."<sup>180</sup> The tantric *guru* is not just a learned person but in the eyes of the disciples has attained, embodies and *is* the highest Reality.<sup>181</sup>

Moreover, within the Hindu fold in general, it is the perfected *guru*, the fully liberated preceptor, the true "dispeller of darkness [i.e., ignorance]," <sup>182</sup> who is extolled in the yogic scriptures above all others; and it is the qualified disciple (*adhikarin* or *sadhaka*) competent and worthy of instruction who is eligible for formal spiritual initiation. By empowering the initiation process, the *guru* undertakes his/her responsibility to function as a catalyst in order to undermine the disciple's ignorance (*avidya*) of authentic identity (*atman*, *purusa*) and awaken the disciple to spiritual freedom. Thus the pedagogical dynamic embodied in the *guru*-disciple relation constitutes one of the essential building blocks of the Yoga tradition and is itself an integral component of Yoga theory and practice. The soteriological and practical orientation in Yoga is inseparable from the pedagogical context in which it has arisen.

### Concluding Remarks

As can be seen from the above preliminary, background, albeit sketchbook look at Yoga, it is important to acknowledge that the classical formulation of Yoga within Hinduism as given shape in the *Yoga-Sutra* did not appear in a vacuum but rather was preceded by many centuries of ingenuity and profound investigation into the possibilities for self-transcendence and ultimate freedom (*moksa*). The early development of Yoga within Hinduism as, for example, given expression in the Upanisads, pointed to the necessity for direct experience of Reality or rather permanent abiding as the Self (*atman*, *purusa*), an all-pervading, omniscient identity in which the normal, conventional, and empirical boundaries confining our sense of self to the conditional, samsaric realm were transcended. Thus, through the transformation and illumination of consciousness involving a sacrifice of mistaken identity or egoity, a radical identity shift or change in perspective from that of the mortal ego-personality to that of the immortal Self could take place.

Notwithstanding the above overall emphasis given to Yoga, that is, of self-transcendence, a study of Yoga's richly textured history, its traditional goals and purposes, reveals that Yoga cannot be properly conceived as a monolithic system but rather as a tradition that has been burgeoning since its incipience in ancient times. In its long complex evolution Yoga can be seen as a vast tradition (or, rather, as several traditions within a tradition) that has incorporated a diverse and rich body of teachings within Hinduism and indeed other religious traditions<sup>183</sup> over a period of many centuries. What does become clear is that Yoga achieved a philosophical maturity in

the classical period (ca. 150-800 CE) when the appearance of the *Yoga-Sutra* of Patañjali (ca. second-third century CE) provided a foundational text on the formal philosophical system of Yoga (*yoga-darsana*).

The purpose of our broadly based exposition has not been to provide a detailed exploration into the complexity of Yoga as a multifaceted phenomenon that embraces a number of spiritual paths



and orientations "with contrasting theoretical frameworks and occasionally incompatible goals."<sup>184</sup> Nor has it been the concern of this brief introduction on Yoga to conduct an exhaustive review of the history, literature, and branches of even the early (pre-classical) Hindu tradition of Yoga: its metaphysical ideas, related practices, and soteriological perspectives. Rather, this chapter has focused and elaborated on a select range of ideas, texts, and disciplines that can enhance our understanding and appreciation of early forms of Yoga as they have evolved mostly within a Hindu context. The material presented profiles some of the simple, basic contributing ideas on Yoga and is meant to act as a backdrop and an embedding matrix by highlighting certain relevant pointers that will come into their own over the course of the study on Patañjali's Yoga, to which we will now turn.

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## Chapter Two

### The *Yoga-Sutra*: Introduction and Metaphysical Perspective

#### Introduction to Patañjali and the *Yoga-Sutra*

Few scholars, if any, would disagree that a precise analysis of the human condition from the perspective of the sophisticated *darsana* known as *Patañjala Yoga* remains a desideratum in Indological studies. In the Western world few things are more confused about Indian thought than the understanding of the term "Yoga," which as one scholar succinctly states, "is a Sanskrit word which everybody knows, but in spite of *hatha-yoga* classes and widespread curiosity about oriental mysticism, there is little sound information available about the main authority on *Yoga* the *Yoga-Sutra* of Patañjali." <sup>1</sup> What can generally be acknowledged as a Western misconstrual of Yoga is also true for India, the motherland of Yoga. K. S. Joshi writes: "It is an amazing fact that even in the land of *Yoga*, superstitious and fanciful notions of the subject seem to have wide currency. The philosophy of *Yoga* is perhaps one of the least known of its aspects."<sup>2</sup> After giving a brief introduction to Patañjali and the *Yoga-Sutra*, our discussion will focus on the basic philosophical stance of Patañjali's Yoga, highlighting some of the major differences as well as similarities between classical Yoga and classical Samkhya, and outlining Patañjali's metaphysical schematic.

The classical formulation of the Yoga *darsana* by Patañjali (ca. second-third century CE) the reputed author of the *Yoga-Sutras* truly a climactic

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event in the long development of yogic practice and philosophy (see previous chapter). Out of all the various yogic schools in existence around the time of the composition of the *Yoga-Sutra*, it was Patañjali's that was to become recognized as *the* authoritative perspective (*darsana*) of the

Brahmanic Yoga tradition. The *Yoga-Sutra* represents an attempt to provide succinct and soteriologically effective definitions, explanations and descriptions of key concepts and terms relating to *theoria* and *praxis* in Yoga, thereby providing Yoga with a systematic, comprehensive, and foundational grounding and formulation that led to its legitimization as one of the six *darsanas* or philosophical schools within Brahmanical Hinduism. As can be gathered from numerous sources including the extensive commentarial literature on the *Yoga-Sutra* and references of both a praiseworthy and critical nature to the *Yoga-Sutra* in the literature of orthodox and nonorthodox Hindu schools, this text had early on gained considerable influence and was recognized as the source text (*prasthanavakya*) that established Yoga as an independent perspective within the arena of Hindu soteriological thought.<sup>3</sup>

Historically, little if anything of certainty is known about Patañjali, and scholars have been unable to ascertain whether he is the same or different from the Patañjali who is the celebrated author of the *Mahabhasya* (ca. second century BCE), the great commentary on Panini's grammar. Scholars such as R. Garbe<sup>4</sup> and S. N. Dasgupta<sup>5</sup> maintain that the grammarian and the Yoga writer are identical. The traditional identification of Patañjali with his namesake the grammarian was first made by Bhoja Raja (eleventh century CE) in his *Raja-Martanda*.<sup>6</sup> Following along the lines of S. N. Dasgupta, T. S. Rukmani states that the date "can be accepted as between the second century BC and the first century AD,"<sup>7</sup> thereby allowing for the possibility of the composer of the *Yoga-Sutra* and the grammarian of the same name being identical. Scholarly opinion, however, seems to have arrived at a consensus that renders the above possible identification unlikely. The historicity, contents and the terminology of the *Yoga-Sutra* suggest the period between 150-500 CE as a probable time-frame for Patañjali, although the traditions from which its author draws are undoubtedly older<sup>8</sup> (see introductory chapter and below). Dates within this time period have been argued for by scholars such as: Jacobi,<sup>9</sup> Keith,<sup>10</sup> Woods,<sup>11</sup> Hauer,<sup>12</sup> Frauwallner,<sup>13</sup> von Glassenapp,<sup>14</sup> Winternitz,<sup>15</sup> Larson,<sup>16</sup> and Feuerstein.<sup>17</sup> Based on the evidence at hand, it would appear that the *Yoga-Sutra* is a product of the second<sup>18</sup> or third century CE.

Again, according to Hindu tradition, Patañjali was an incarnation of Ananta or Sesa, the "thousand-headed" leader of the serpent race. Ananta, desiring to teach Yoga on earth, is said to have fallen (*pat*) from "heaven"

onto the palm (*añjali*) of a noble woman called Gonika. Ananta is often depicted in iconography as the couch on which Lord Visnu takes repose. The numerous heads of the Lord of Serpents are said to symbolize infinity (*ananta*) or omnipresence.<sup>19</sup> The name, Sesa ("Remainder"), is explained by the fact that Sesa remains after the destruction of the cosmos. Feuerstein informs us that: "Legend . . . knows of him [Patañjali] as the incarnation of the serpent-king Ananta, a manifestation of god Visnu, who is believed to encircle the earth. This identification is at least of symbolic interest. For the serpent race over which Ananta or Sesa presides is associated, in mythology, with the guarding of the esoteric lore and Yoga is . . . the secret tradition *par excellence*."<sup>20</sup> To this day, many yogins bow to an image of Ananta before they begin their daily round of yogic exercises.



It is reasonable to assume that Patañjali, as head of a school of Yoga, was an active preceptor or *guru* and, judging from the *Yoga-Sutra*, a great authority on Yoga whose approach was sympathetic toward philosophical inquiry and exposition. It would not seem unlikely that Patañjali taught a community of disciples (*sisyas*) devoted to the study and practice of Yoga. Thus, it would follow that there must have been adherents to Patañjali's school who carried on the tradition in the formal context of a particular teaching lineage (*parampara*).<sup>21</sup> Adopting basically a classical format written in *sutra* style, Patañjali composed the *Yoga-Sutra* at a time of intense debate and ongoing philosophical speculation in India. As such, "he supplied Yoga with a reasonably homogenous framework that could stand up against the many rival traditions," including Nyaya, Vedanta, and Buddhism.<sup>22</sup>

The *sutra* style of writing is employed in the source books (*prasthanavakyas*) of the so-called six orthodox systems (*sad-darsanas*) of philosophy within Hinduism. The word *sutra* has the literal meaning of "thread" (from the root *siv*, to sew). In the above context a *sutra* means a more or less short thread of sounds (consisting of as little as one word) conveying meaning in a condensed form. A *sutra* composition is a work comprised of mostly simple, pithy aphoristic statements that taken altogether provide one with a "thread" linking together all the noteworthy ideas representative of that traditional perspective. It attests to the fact that Hindu wisdom schools have traditionally been transmitted by word of mouth thus facilitating such transmission. Moreover, the *sutra* style within Brahmanic traditions points to an important pedagogical concern: that wisdom was on the whole safeguarded and was not, therefore, to be indiscriminately transmitted. Within the tradition of classical Yoga, a *sutra* contained within the *Yoga-Sutra* functions as a mnemonic device for the purpose of recalling

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and investigating into specific and sometimes complex yogic doctrine and practices, the detailed explanation and instruction being supplied orally by the teacher.<sup>23</sup> Often unintelligible by itself, a *sutra* requires elucidation by means of an exposition or commentary (see below). However, it should be noted that a *sutra* functions not only as a mnemonic device because it is taught in an oral tradition. It is both an inspired utterance and a mnemonic formula in need of much background information. Such crucial information was imparted to mature disciples within the tradition in daily study and often in the company of the *guru* special gathering referred to as *sat-sanga* ("contact/company with the Real/Truth"). In order to shed light on the meaning and perhaps relevance of the theory and practice contained in the *Yoga-Sutra*, later adepts, practitioners and/or scholars of Yoga, from Vyasa (fifth century CE) onward, wrote extensive commentaries, some of which such as those by Vacaspati Misra (ninth century CE) and Vijñāna Bhikṣu (sixteenth century CE) were commentaries on Vyasa's own composition.<sup>24</sup>

Turning to Patañjali's work itself, the text of the *Yoga-Sutra* consists of 195 *sutras* distributed over four chapters:

1. *Samadhi-Pada*, the chapter on ecstasy/enstasy comprised of 51 *sutras*;
2. *Sadhana-Pada*, the chapter on the "path" or "practice" of Yoga made up of 55 *sutras*;

3. *Vibhūti-Pada*, the chapter on the "powers" in Yoga also totaling 55 *sūtras*;

4. *Kaivalya-Pada*, the chapter on the liberated state of "aloneness" and consisting of 34 *sūtras*.

Scholars have, for some time now, questioned the unity of the work, viewing the above division of chapters as somewhat arbitrary and as appearing to be the result of an inadequate reediting of the text. The conclusion reached by some is that in its present form the *Yoga-Sūtra* cannot possibly be considered as unitary.<sup>25</sup> Thus there have been scholarly attempts to reconstruct the original by dissecting the available text into subtexts of presumably independent sources.<sup>26</sup> These efforts, as Feuerstein argues, "have not been very successful, because they leave us with inconclusive fragments."<sup>27</sup> Their approach is justifiably criticized by C. Pensa, who writes:

In contrast to the approach adopted by many Orientalists who *a priori* tend to deny the unity of the text under examination, fragmenting it into so many parts or heterogeneous strata until nothing remains, Feuerstein

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rightly asks in his methodological study whether this compulsive search for incongruencies and textual corruptions is not the expression of an ethnocentric rationalising mentality which inclines to project everywhere its own need for abstract and absolute logic, and hence is particularly prone to misinterpret paradoxical expressions so common in eastern thought which has a *penchant* for transcending dualism and therefore in part also rational language as such. 28

The present study takes the overall position that the *Yoga-Sūtra* is a coherent text and that it need not warrant the supposition of multiple authorship or composition over several segments of time. Therefore, the approach that I have adopted accepts the text on its own authority as a complete whole.<sup>29</sup> Many scholars fail to comprehend the inner connections or "threading links" among the *sūtras*, as well as their relationship with the steps of a guided practice.<sup>30</sup> There is, I submit, an internal coherence or continuity running throughout the text where the meanings of key yogic terms are seen to be interdependent and interrelate with each other. It is preferable, therefore, to take a more sympathetic view of Patañjali's work and acknowledge the possibility that it is far more self-contained and integrated than some scholars have tended to assume.<sup>31</sup> There are different understandings of what constitutes the unity of a text, and without going further into the question I shall treat the *Yoga-Sūtra* as a "unity" for purposes of analysis, suggesting further reasons for an appreciation of its "unity." Even just a cursory reading of the *Yoga-Sūtra* reveals that Patañjali outlines and summarizes a plurality of practices more than twenty different techniques are specified<sup>32</sup> and, some would argue, a concatenation of philosophical perspectives or distinct schools of Yoga (e.g., *nirodhayoga*, *samādhi-yoga*, *kriya-yoga*, *astanga-yoga*) that provide us with seemingly contrasting descriptions and characteristics of Yoga.<sup>33</sup> Frauwallner has stated that the *Yoga-Sūtra* "is composed of different constituents or elements which, in no way, give a homogeneous picture."<sup>34</sup>

Yet, throughout its long history Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra* has proved to be a successful work, and to this day the text remains a highly influential and authoritative spiritual guide in schools of Yoga

and Hinduism in general. As C. Chapple rightly argues, the various and extensive methods of practice, perspectives, and attainments explained by Patañjali although all endeavoring to bring about yogic experience are meant to "stand in juxtaposition and in complementarity"<sup>35</sup> rather than to compete with each other. It should also be emphasized even at the risk of disabusing some that the practice-orientation so prominent in Yoga does not warrant the reduction of Yoga to a purely technical (and somewhat mechanical) enterprise, and we

must guard against the tendency, so prevalent today, in which Yoga is perceived merely as a series of "practices." This more modern and popular misconception of Yoga can often result in an overemphasis on "technique" at the expense of developing a sound philosophical understanding of Yoga. In order for it to be properly engaged, Yoga demands our available energy and attention, which includes a high level of study. Patañjali's Yoga is not about the glorification of "technique," which by virtue of bypassing the processes of reflection enables the yogin to supersede or override philosophical investigation. Nor does Yoga attempt to demarcate or separate out theory from practice, taking one and discarding the other. Rather, Patañjali's whole approach unites theory and practice, bridging and healing any rifts between thinking and acting, metaphysics and ethics, transcendence and immanence. This study intends to show that the text of the *Yoga-Sutra* strives for and achieves a basic unity of conception, including a theory-practice unification, founded in direct yogic experience and given expression in Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (YS I.2).

The conciseness and condensed nature of the *sutra* style of writing used by Patañjali is illustrated in the opening aphorisms of the *Yoga-Sutra*. In the first four *sutras* of the first chapter (*Samadhi-Pada*) the subject matter of the *Yoga-Sutra* is mentioned, defined, and characterized. The *sutras* run as follows:

*Yoga-Sutra*

I.1: "Now [begins] the discipline of Yoga."

*Yoga-Sutra*

I.2: "Yoga is the cessation of [the misidentification with] the modifications of the mind."

*Yoga-Sutra* "Then [when that cessation has taken place] there is abiding in the Seer's own form (i.e.,

I.3: *purusa* or intrinsic identity)."

*Yoga-Sutra* "Otherwise [there is] conformity to (i.e., misidentification with) the modifications [of the

I.4: mind]." <sup>36</sup>

The first four *sutras* lay the foundation for the entire system. Having introduced and defined the subject matter, Yoga, the *sutras* continue to explain a number of technical terms. The third *sutra* states what is philosophically most important in the system: One who succeeds in "bringing about" the cessation (*nirodha*) of the misidentification with the modifications (*vrttis*) of the mind (*citta*) is liberated from any mistaken identity of self and abides as the real Seer or spiritual Self, that is, is established in the true nature and identity of pure, immortal consciousness (*purusa*). The fourth *sutra* supplements this by declaring that one who is not established in the

true form or nature of authentic selfhood (*purusa*) "fails to see" or "forgets" intrinsic being by misidentifying with the modifications of the mind, thereby, in effect, conforming to an extrinsic, deluded, and confused self-identity changing, empirical, and mortal (perishable, material) sense of selfhood.

The opening *sutra*, "Now [begins] the discipline of Yoga," states the subject matter and nature of Patañjali's treatise. The two great commentators on Vyasa's *Bhāṣya*, Vacaspati Misra and Vijñāna Bhikṣu, consider Patañjali to be not the founder of the Yoga tradition but, according to S. Dasgupta, "an editor."<sup>37</sup> Dasgupta goes on to state that the *Yoga-Sutra* does "not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions."<sup>38</sup> Although Patañjali presents his compilation of Yoga as an "exposition" of existing materials<sup>39</sup> that, in effect, constitutes a discipline (*ānūsāna*) of Yoga, his work nevertheless does not lack originality. To be sure, much of the philosophical and praxis-orientation presented in the *Yoga-Sutra* has its roots in the Upanisadic-Brahmanic tradition of early Hinduism, reflecting ideas and practices from, for example, the *Katha*, *Maitrayaniya*, and *Svetasvatara Upanisads* and the *Mahabharata*. In addition, as some scholars have been keen to point out, the *Yoga-Sutra* does incorporate techniques/practices that around the time of Patañjali were undoubtedly an integral part of Buddhist and Jain discipline.<sup>40</sup> In his effort to clarify and formalize the yogic tradition, Patañjali compiled and systematized existing knowledge within the Yoga tradition elaborating upon Yoga theory and practice. In his own voice, Patañjali presented major yogic themes, concepts, and terms largely consistent throughout the text in a clear and convincing manner, whereby Yoga became recognized as one of the leading schools or classical philosophical systems of India. However, it is not correct to regard Patañjali as the "father of Yoga." There must have been both prior to and during Patañjali's time more nonsystematic Yogas and other yogic compositions that disappeared over time and are now lost. What is clear, however, is that Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra* has superseded all earlier *sutra* works within the Yoga tradition and that this is probably due to the overall comprehensive and systematic nature of Patañjali's presentation of Yoga. In a clear response to those who suggest that Patañjali has made no specific philosophical contribution in his presentation of Yoga, C. Chapple, likening Patañjali's method to the multiplicity of liberating perspectives and practices employed in the *Bhagavadgita*, writes, "[Patañjali's] is a masterful contribution communicated through nonjudgmentally presenting diverse practices, a methodology deeply rooted in the culture and traditions of

India."<sup>41</sup> Further discussion on the issue of Patañjali's philosophical contribution will be reserved for a later chapter.

Considering that Hiranyagarbha<sup>42</sup> is acknowledged as the original teacher of Yoga, why is so much importance given to Patañjali? Why does Patañjali present himself as such a figure of authority? The questions may be responded to in two ways:

1. At the beginning of some manuscripts of Vyasa's commentary (*YB* I.1), the text says that

Patañjali is the same who incarnates again and again to teach the knowledge of Yoga, even though he may bear different names from one lifetime to another. The authenticity of the opening verse of Vyasa's commentary is controversial because some manuscripts include it<sup>43</sup> and others do not. Most begin with a prayer verse to Ahisa who is the Lord of Serpents.<sup>44</sup>

2. The other way lies in examining the meaning of the word *anusasana*, which has been translated as "discipline."<sup>45</sup>

The word *anusasana* (YS I.1) is derived from the prefix *anu* and the verb root *sas*. The prefix *anu* denotes that something is subsequent, a follow-up to something else that has formerly occurred or existed.<sup>46</sup> The verb *sas* means "to teach, instruct, inform"<sup>47</sup> and the noun *sasana* denotes "teaching, instruction, discipline, doctrine."<sup>48</sup> A teaching without an attendant discipline would not be properly expressed by the word *anusasana*. From the verb *sas* is derived the word for a disciple (*sisya*), one who is instructed with and within a discipline. The prefix *anu* can be understood as having two main connotations in the context of *anusasana*: (1) The discipline of Yoga is being imparted only after the student has demonstrated a necessary degree of "fitness," that is, through observances of self-discipline, and is fit or prepared for advancing along the "path" of Yoga; and (2) *anusasana* means to teach that which has been taught before within an existing tradition, not claiming that anything new has been created by the author.

Vyasa (YS I.1) states that *atha*, meaning "now," has the purpose of indicating *adhikra*.<sup>49</sup> *Adhikara* means "authority," "qualification," "entitlement." Since *atha* has other meanings such as "afterwards," "questioning," and "auspiciousness," Vyasa specifically mentions that in the context of *Yoga-Sutra* I.1 *atha* is used in the sense of *adhikara*. Considering Vyasa's statement, *atha* can be understood as an implicit recognition of Patañjali's authority and a declaration of Patañjali's teaching. By using the prefix *anu*, Patañjali issues a disclaimer to his own authorship of the teaching even

though by the word *atha* he has stated his authority to teach it. Implied here, however, are the two essential factors that contribute to the authentic *guru-sisya* relationship as applied to Yoga: (i) there is a desire to know (*jijñasa*),<sup>50</sup> through critical inquiry and meditative discipline, on the part of the student, and (ii) Patañjali possesses the authoritative "knowledge" of Yoga and wishes to convey it. The "knowledge" is open to one who has the necessary desire (*mumuksu*) for spiritual liberation and, who being sufficiently qualified to progress on the "path" of Yoga, can therefore be referred to as an *adhikarin*. Such a text taught within a tradition and with a discipline is called a *sastra*; hence the entire "science" or body of knowledge is known as *yoga-sastra*.

It may be argued that, unlike the schools of Vedanta (Uttara Mimamsa), Purva Mimamsa, and Nyaya, the Samkhya and Yoga systems have no continuing traditional schools where the in-school knowledge may be imparted. Whatever may be the case with Samkhya, Yoga is a living tradition and *gurus* to this day continue to teach the *Yoga-Sutra* in the *asramas*, homes, and monasteries in an unbroken lineage and primarily as an experiential discipline because Yoga philosophy exists on the basis of its practices. As many of the categories of Samkhya philosophy



are so closely allied to the Yoga system, the Samkhya tradition has survived as a supportive school in association with Yoga. The Yoga school of philosophy is often referred to as *Samkhya-Yoga*,<sup>51</sup> but a note of caution must be maintained in doing so. Not all the categories of Samkhya are used in Yoga, as even a cursory look at the *Samkhya-Karika* (*SK*) and the *Yoga-Sutra* will show. The categories of Samkhya are employed practically by all the schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy. Patañjali may well have prefigured or integrated ideas appropriated by the Samkhya tradition as he understood it, Samkhya later being refined and systematized into its classical form in the *Samkhya-Karika* of Isvara Kṛṣṇa (ca. fourth century CE). Samkhya philosophy proper (i.e., in its classical form outlined in the *Samkhya-Kārikā*) does not refer to much of the practical systems of Yoga and cannot return the compliment by calling itself *Samkhya-Yoga*. Classical Yoga philosophy, as formulated by Patañjali in the *Yoga-Sutra* and later expounded on by Vyasa, does depend on parts of the Samkhyan system and, it must be emphasized, even gives it a new interpretation. Yoga does not thereby lose its independent status as an autonomous philosophical school (*darsana*). Thus, in the above context, Vyasa's commentary can be understood as *Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya*: "An Exposition that Enunciates Samkhya." *Samkhya-pravacana*<sup>52</sup> ("Enunciation of Samkhya") is an alternative title of the *Yoga-Sutra*.

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It is not, therefore, that "Vyasa . . . often foist[s] on *Yoga* the philosophy of *Samkhya*,"<sup>53</sup> or that one needs to "combat the overpowering influence exercised by Vyasa's scholium,"<sup>54</sup> but rather that Vyasa, having studied and mastered both the Yoga and Samkhya systems, clarifies Patañjali's work within its proper context of Yoga. It must be remembered that both Patañjali and Vyasa are regarded by Hindu tradition as "seers" (*ṛṣis*), their words equally authentic. In the lineage of Yoga philosophy the two names have been inseparably linked together so that in spite of the existence of later independent commentaries the word "*Yoga-Sutra*" evokes the name of Vyasa. Yet, perhaps two or even three centuries separate the two Yoga authorities, and as such it would be inappropriate to accept the *Yoga-Bhasya* at face value and without some degree of caution. Vyasa is often more reflective and systematic than Patañjali and elaborates sometimes at great length.<sup>55</sup> Suffice it to say, however, that like much of the Yoga tradition in India this study regards the *Yoga-Sutra* and the *Yoga-Bhasya* as a single composite whole, the two parts of which complement each other and on which alone rests the authority of all other *vṛttis* and *tikas* because it is thus that the Yoga tradition would have it. Moreover, it is not in any way apparent that scholars have fathomed the depth of Vyasa's commentary.<sup>56</sup> The purpose of our examination of Vyasa's work is not to offer a critical analysis of the *Yoga-Bhasya* that would try to determine the extent to which Vyasa correctly explains the *Yoga-Sutra*. Rather, our study is an attempt to draw upon and clarify the wealth of philosophical knowledge and experiential authenticity that the *Yoga-Bhasya* offers in order to aid and deepen our understanding of Patañjali's thought.

#### Distinguishing Samkhya and Yoga, and the Transition to the *Yoga-Sutra*

Preclassical<sup>57</sup> developments of Samkhya<sup>58</sup> (e.g., in the *Mahabharata*, and Upanisadic texts such as the *Katha*, *Svetasvatara*, and *Maitrayaniya*, ca. 500-200 BCE) show a close association with the tradition of Yoga, to the extent that both are mentioned together as *Samkhya-Yoga* (see below). Samkhyan cosmological speculations are often combined with elaborate descriptions of



yogic experience.<sup>59</sup> In contrast to methods of spiritual discipline that emphasize yogic-oriented practices as in the *Svetasvatara Upanisad* (II.8-10)<sup>60</sup> (i.e., posture, breath control, a favorable place for practice, asceticism [*tapas*]), Sāmkhya tends to adopt an intellectual or reasoning method: "The follower of Samkhya is one who reasons or discriminates properly,

one whose spiritual discipline is reasoning." <sup>61</sup> This is probably the sense of the term *samkhya* in, for example, *Svetasvatara Upanisad* VI.13, where the compound *samkhya-yoga-adhigamya*<sup>62</sup> ("to be understood by proper reasoning and spiritual discipline") is used. The enumeration of basic principles (*tattva*) of existence in a hierarchical order<sup>63</sup> is a fundamental aspect of the Samkhyan methodology of salvation by reasoning. On occasion the highest principle is the old Upanisadic *brahman* or *atman*, or it may be "God" (*isvara*). In varying contexts the Samkhyan methodology implies a monistic, theistic, or dualistic perspective. Early references to Samkhya seem to indicate that *pre-Karika* Samkhya (prior to the *Samkhya-Karika*) acknowledged *brahman* as the universal Self and regarded it to be the goal of life. In *Mahabharata* XII.211, the teacher Asuri, while addressing an assemblage of his followers, is said to have explained *brahman* as one immutable being assuming diverse forms. Asvaghosa and Caraka mention *brahman* as the ultimate goal in their brief expositions of the Samkhya (*Buddhacarita* XV.65 and Caraka on *Sarira* I.99). In the list of sixty different topics of the *Sastitantra* (attributed to either Kapila or Pāñcasikha, ca. 100 BCE-200 CE) given by the *Ahirbudhnya Samhita* (XII.20), the first topic is stated to be *brahman*. It is mentioned in the *Mahabharata* (XII.212) that Pāñcasikha held the view that liberation is the union of the individual being with *brahman*.<sup>64</sup> Some Samkhyan passages such as *Mahabharata* XII.290 (3) and elsewhere throughout the *Bhagavadgita* are clearly theistic.

In the formative period of the *Bhagavadgita*, and later epic literature such as the *Moksadharma*, Yoga was very closely allied with Samkhya. This fact is reflected in the *Mahabharata*, which utilizes the compound *samkhya-yoga* (chapter II of the *Bhagavadgita* is entitled "*Samkhya-Yoga*") and also asserts that Samkhya and Yoga can be looked upon as being identical (*Mahabharata* XII.293.30 and *Bhagavadgita* V.5)<sup>65</sup> or as being "one" because they have the same practical result (*MBh* XII.304.24-26)<sup>66</sup> liberation (*moksa*). The epic schools of Samkhya and Yoga gave rise in part to the Samkhya-Yoga syncretism. However, both traditions were likewise asserted as being already distinct and independent developments at the time of the final composition of the *Mahabharata*. This is epitomized in the following statement: "The method of the yogins is immediate [mystic] perception, [whereas] of the Samkhyas it is scriptural [accepted] tradition" (XII.189.7). "These [two approaches] are not the same,"<sup>67</sup> as we are informed two stanzas later. The important distinction made at this point in the *Mahabharata* epic is between the experiential and pragmatic approach of the yogins, and the reliance on traditional doctrine in conjunction with a rational form of inquiry into the nature of reality and human existence

that characterizes the adherents of Samkhya. Elsewhere, in the *Mahabharata* (XII.289.3), Samkhya is rejected by the followers of Yoga because the former does not believe in a saving Lord (*isvara*).<sup>68</sup>

In several key passages from the *Moksadharma* (XII.189) Samkhya is presented thus: as being nontheistic and as relying on accepted teaching as a means of knowledge, and rational knowledge (*Vijñana*)<sup>69</sup> is given as the means of salvation. Yoga, however, is presented as being theistic, as relying primarily on immediate perception as a means of knowledge, and as emphasizing strength<sup>70</sup> (or power, *Mahabharata* XII.304.2) resulting from practical psychophysical disciplines (i.e., meditation, breathing exercises, posture). In the *Bhagavadgita* (V.4), Yoga is equated with *karma-yoga* (the Yoga of action) and Samkhya with the path of renunciation (*samnyasa*),<sup>71</sup> though in the next stanza (V.5) their essential unity is stressed. However, we are then informed (*Bhagavadgita* V.6) that renunciation is difficult to attain without Yoga and that one who is earnest in Yoga (i.e., the path of action) soon attains the supreme spiritual being (*brahman*).<sup>72</sup>

In subsequent times, Yoga and Samkhya<sup>73</sup> developed into their separate philosophical and classical schools founded by Patañjali and Isvara Kṛṣṇa respectively. In their metaphysical ideas Samkhya and Yoga are closely akin. Dasgupta asserts that it was Patañjali who collected the different forms of Yoga practices, gleaned the diverse ideas that were or could be associated with Yoga, and "grafted them all on the Samkhya metaphysics."<sup>74</sup> In the above sense, Samkhya is often characterized as the theoretical aspect of Yoga praxis, but this is inaccurate.<sup>75</sup> Nor is Yoga simply a borrowed form of Samkhya. G. Feuerstein<sup>76</sup> has convincingly shown that "there can be no justification whatever for deriving Classical Yoga from Classical Samkhya."<sup>77</sup> Despite the seemingly radical nature of Feuerstein's arguments to challenge the idea that Samkhya and Yoga are two sides of the same coin, his overall claim is not as strong as it sounds. When we examine his arguments closely, he is not asserting that the two systems have virtually nothing in common, but merely that some scholars have gone too far in their claims that Yoga is a subschool of Samkhya. In this he is correct and Hindu tradition obviously agrees with him since it classes Samkhya and Yoga as two philosophical schools (*darsana*), not one. As we have seen in connection with the *Mahabharata* (notably the *Moksadharma* section), it was in this earlier period (200 BCE-200 CE) that Yoga and Samkhya assumed separate identities from their more or less common Vedantic (Upanisadic) base. Moreover, the *Yoga-Sutra* (ca. second-third century CE) is probably older than the *Samkhya-Karika* (ca. 400 CE), and if any borrowing has occurred it is more likely to be on the part of Isvara Kṛṣṇa.<sup>78</sup>

In spite of the similarity between these schools in their approach to the basic structure of reality, they in fact present different systems of thought, holding divergent views on important areas of doctrinal structure such as theology, ontology, psychology, and ethics, as well as differences pertaining to terminology. The numerous philosophical differences between classical Yoga and classical Samkhya derive, however, from the different methodologies adopted by the two schools of thought. Samkhya relies primarily on the exercise of the discernment (*viveka*) of *purusa* (spirit, pure consciousness) from *prakṛti* (matter, nature, psychophysical being and its

source) on the basis of prefabricated categories of differentiation, stressing a theoretical/intellectual analysis in order to bring out the nature of final emancipation. This emancipation is often understood as an "isolation" (*kaivalya*) of *purusa* from *prakṛti*, *purusa* conceived as the uninvolved (*madhyasthya*), inactive (*akārtrbhava*) witness (*saksin*) of the evolutions of *prakṛti*.<sup>79</sup> However, Samkhya's overt conceptual means of discrimination (*vijñāna*) is not sufficient enough for the aspiring yogin. The ontological categorization of what represents the "nonself" (*prakṛti*) must become the object of direct experience and perception. Without praxis and its experiential and perceptual dimension, philosophy would have no meaning in Yoga. Yoga is a practical spiritual discipline for mastering the modifications of the mind (YS I.2) and abiding as the changeless identity of the Self (*purusa*). In Yoga, immortality is realized through consistent practice and self-discipline, and is not something to be demonstrated through inference, analysis, and reasoning. Classical Yoga emphasizes the necessity of personal experimentation and practical meditational techniques for the cultivation of *samādhi* (YS I.17-18) in which insight (*prajñā*), disclosed within the deeper levels of the mind, progressively leads to a clearer understanding and realization of one's intrinsic identity as *purusa*.

Even just a cursory look at the *Yoga-Sutra* reveals that Patañjali makes no attempt, as does Iśvara Kṛṣṇa, to speculate upon a metaphysical explanation of the nature of reality. In the first chapter of the *Yoga-Sutra* (*Samādhi-Pada*), no formal ontological schematic is given by Patañjali. It is not until the second chapter on the "means" or "path" of Yoga (*Sādhana-Pada*) that a more formalized ontological scheme is explicitly outlined.<sup>80</sup> Assuming the text to be unitary, we can, however, conceive of an implicit metaphysics in chapter I, which can be explained by the fact that Patañjali falls back on a world view that he does not need to make explicit. Patañjali's overriding concern, however, is to show *how* to bring about the realization, freedom, and glory of an immortal state of consciousness and being as one's own identity or Self (*purusa*), a state that can be described in terms of

freedom from suffering (*duḥkha*).<sup>81</sup> This "showing how" culminates in "clear seeing," which in turn reveals our true identity as *purusa*. Patañjali begins the discipline of Yoga by addressing his listeners where they "are" from a yogic perspective, that is, as human beings desirous of freedom, yet who are subject to a mistaken identity, ensconced within the subject-object duality of empirical existence (*prakṛti*), and who conceive of themselves and the world from the limited perspective of ego-consciousness.

For Yoga, as well as other soteriological traditions of India, the ultimate concern of a human being is not understood to be separate from humanity itself. That is to say, the highest goal to which a human being can and ought to aspire does not lie in some separate realm or "outer," extrinsic world, but is, rather, "within" oneself, as one's "core" intrinsic being. Yoga tries to express this concern in a truly human way beginning with the psychophysical nature and experience of our humanness with its weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and virtues, and describes the human condition by incorporating our multileveled understandings and concepts of self-identity (*cittavṛtti*). Through a process of transformation of the mind, or *metanoia*, termed *nirodha* (YS I.2), Yoga expands, purifies, and illuminates our understanding of self and world. By grasping

the nature of our personal experiences: *how* we think, feel, act, understand, and *why* we have assumed ourselves to be finite, temporal beings when, according to Yoga our authentic nature is infinite and unchanging, we can more easily discern how Yoga philosophy applies to our own perception and to our day-to-day existence.

Classical Yoga informs us of the fundamental defining characteristic of empirical selfhood as essentially being a misidentification with or conformity to (*sarupya*, YS I.4) the mental processes or modifications (*vrttis*) of the mind (*citta*). Yet, the process of identification (and misidentification which is a form of identification) with thought and personality takes place for the purpose (*artha*) of experience (*bhoga*) and spiritual emancipation (*apavarga*), that is, for the purpose of realizing the *purusa* (YS II.21). As a cross-reference to assess the aspirant's standard of awareness, and to enable one to grow and develop, classical Yoga also offers the ideal of the *jivanmukta*, one established in the true nature of *purusa* (YS I.3) and who embodies that enlightened perspective. Vyasa's reference<sup>82</sup> to the enlightened being, the yogin free while yet living, places before us the ultimate "human" potentiality for the transformation of consciousness and identity of all aspirants of Patañjali's Yoga.

One of the problems confronting any study of the *Yoga-Sutra* is that there is no obvious reference (excluding the *Yoga-Bhasya*) from which to

base an analysis of Patañjali's thought. Some of the fundamental philosophical concepts of the Samkhyan system of Isvara Krsna can provide a useful backdrop or cross-reference point from which to facilitate understanding and a greater appreciation of Patañjali's metaphysical and soteriological perspective. Vyasa's *Bhasya*, which was probably written after the *Samkhya-Karika* (and other major Samkhyan works) has unhesitatingly drawn upon Samkhyan doctrine for the purpose of expounding yogic principles taught by Patañjali.

Following from our previous discussion on Samkhya and Yoga, we will now highlight some of the basic similarities and differences between classical Samkhya and the Yoga of Patañjali. It is often said that, like classical Samkhya, Patañjali's Yoga is a dualistic system, understood in terms of *purusa* and *prakrti*. Yet, I submit, Yoga scholarship has not clarified what "dualistic" means or why Yoga had to be "dualistic." Even in avowedly nondualistic systems of thought such as Advaita Vedanta we can find numerous examples of basically dualistic modes of description and explanation.<sup>83</sup> It does not seem inappropriate to suggest the possibility of Patañjali having asserted a provisional, descriptive, and "practical" metaphysics, that is, in the *Yoga-Sutra* the metaphysical schematic is abstracted from yogic experience, whereas in classical Samkhya "experiences" are fitted into a metaphysical structure. This approach would allow the *Yoga-Sutra* to be interpreted along more open-ended, epistemologically oriented lines without being held captive by the radical, dualistic metaphysics of Samkhya. Despite intentions to render the experiential dimension of Yoga, purged as far as possible from abstract metaphysical knowledge, many scholars have fallen prey to reading the *Yoga-Sutra* from the most abstract level of the dualism of *purusa* and *prakrti* down to an understanding of the practices advocated. Then they proceed to impute an experiential foundation to the whole scheme informed not from mystical insight or yogic experience, but from the effort to form a consistent (dualistic)

worldview, a view that culminates in a radical dualistic finality<sup>84</sup> or closure due to its hierarchically structured tendency toward abstractive reduction.

It should be noted that the contrast, suggested above, between the philosophical perspectives of Isvara Kṛṣṇa and Patañjali is of crucial importance. Nevertheless, the theoretical connections and parallels between the *Yoga-Sutra* and Samkhya remain significant. Patañjali's philosophy, however, is not based upon mere theoretical or speculative knowledge. It elicits a practical, pragmatic, experiential/perceptual (not merely inferential/theoretical) approach that Patañjali deems essential in order to deal effectively with our total human situation and provide real freedom, not

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just a theory of liberation or a metaphysical explanation of life. To this end Patañjali outlined, among other practices, an "eight-limbed" path of Yoga (*astanga-yoga*, *Yoga-Sutra* II.29) dealing with the physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of the yogin. Yoga is not content with knowledge (*jñāna*) perceived as a state that abstracts away from the world removing us from our human embodiment and activity in the world. Rather, Yoga emphasizes knowledge in the integrity of being and action and as serving the integration of the "person" as a "whole." Edgerton concluded in a study dedicated to the meaning of Yoga that: "Yoga is not a 'system' of belief or of metaphysics. It is always a way, a method of getting something, usually salvation." <sup>85</sup> But this does not say enough, does not fully take into account what might be called the *integrity* of Patañjali's Yoga. As a major philosophical *darsana* within Hinduism, Yoga derives its real strength and value through an integration of theory and practice, implying a philosophy of "life" incorporating both *purusa* and *prakṛti* grounded in the direct experience of "life."

Patañjali's Yoga derives its insights from a process of introspection into the nature of *prakṛti* not unlike that of Samkhya. According to Samkhya and Yoga our "inner" world of thought, feeling, imagination, and so forth, parallels the structure of the cosmos itself. It is made up of the same fundamental layers of existence (i.e., *prakṛti*, *traiguna*) that compose the hierarchy of the external world. Therefore the so-called "maps"<sup>86</sup> utilized by Patañjali and Isvara Kṛṣṇa are guides to both the "inner" and the "outer" dimensions of existence, and also function certainly in the case of Yoga as heuristic devices in the form of contemplative directives for facilitating understanding and meditative insight. Their principle purpose, thus, is to point beyond the levels and limitations of psyche and cosmos reminding us that the true nature and identity of human being the spiritual component of our person is a transcendent yet immanent reality, pure consciousness (*purusa*), sometimes referred to as the witness (*saksin*) behind all content of consciousness. Patañjali's Yoga philosophy incorporates the Samkhyan idea of a multi-layered or hierarchical cosmos where *prakṛti* is seen to encompass: (1) on the one hand, the grosser levels of manifestation and actualization resulting in the material forms of manifest reality (*vyakta*), and (2) on the other hand, the transcendent ground of *prakṛti* herself. Beyond *prakṛti*'s realm of existence is the unmodified dimension of pure identity/consciousness, the formless *purusa-principle*. As we will soon discover, the ontological categories outlined in the *Yoga-Sutra* provide one with a provisional "map" consisting of contemplative directives that enable the



(*bhoga*) culminating in emancipation (*apavarga*) whereupon one transcends the binding influence or effects of *prakṛti* altogether.

The psychocosmological "map" structure put forward by Patañjali is, in the true sense of yogic experimentation that results in first-hand evidence (*pratyakṣa*) or experiential verification, no doubt profoundly informed by the territory he discovered in the course of his own explorations of human consciousness or mind (*citta*) levels of consciousness, self-understanding, and identity that can be correlated to the dimensions of *prakṛti*. Iśvara Kṛṣṇa's sketched account or "map" of reality appears to be shaped by more formalistic, rationalistic, and theoretical considerations interwoven no doubt with Sāṃkhya's long history (i.e., several centuries) of metaphysical speculation. I shall be alluding to this and other philosophical differences or points of divergence between the two systems throughout our study (see, for example, n. 87 below). Both "maps," of course, are intended to guide the practitioner to the realization of *puruṣa* and are thus ultimately derived for *soteriological* purposes. The above intention notwithstanding, scholars have often questioned the efficacy of the classical Sāṃkhyan "means" for attaining freedom (*mokṣa*, *kaivalya*) especially in comparison to yogic methods.<sup>87</sup>

Within the context of Yoga, hierarchical "maps" of reality served a very practical, psychological, pedagogical, and soteriological purpose.<sup>88</sup> G. Feuerstein states: "The ontogenetic models were originally and primarily maps for meditative introspection intended to guide the yogin in his exploration of the *terra incognita* of the mind . . . [and] are records of internal experiences rather than purely theoretical constructions. They are descriptive rather than explanatory."<sup>89</sup> C. Pensas rightly describes the approach of Yoga as an "homologisation between cosmological and psychological structures."<sup>90</sup> To be sure, the categories used in Yoga are both descriptions and contemplative directives for the ways in which the mind, identity, and world are actually experienced through meditative awareness and insight.

If one is to grasp how Yoga philosophy can be lived on a practical level, one must understand how *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* relate to one in practical, experiential, and personal terms. To this end Patañjali translated a "universal," macrocosmic perspective into subjective, microcosmic terms. Yoga philosophy, being historically rooted in a pedagogical context, functions in part as a teaching method skillfully aimed at transforming, purifying, and illuminating human consciousness (i.e., the mind or *citta*, which can be described as a grasping, intentional, and volitional consciousness) and thus our perception and experience of reality. The metaphysics is

united to the teaching tradition of spiritual preceptor (*guru*) and disciple (*śiṣya*) and is soteriological as well as practical in nature and purpose. The distinction between the two major categories in Yoga: *puruṣa* or *draṣṭṛ* (the "seer"), and *prakṛti* or *dṛśya* (the "seeable"), may not



have been intended by Patañjali as a metaphysical theory of truth. Moreover, despite the fact that Patañjali initially adopts a Samkhyan metaphysical orientation, there is no proof in the *Yoga-Sutra* that his system stops at dualism (i.e., the dualism may be said to be open to the criterion of falsifiability playing only a provisional role in his system), or merely ends up, as many scholars have concluded, with a radical dualism in which *purusa* and *prakrti*, absolutely disjoined, are unable to "cooperate," establish a "harmony" and achieve a "balance" together. In this sense the *Yoga-Sutra* can be understood not so much as contradicting Samkhya but more so as accommodating and subsuming the philosophical stance in the *Samkhya-Karika* by extending the meaning of purification and illumination of human identity to incorporate an enlightened mode of action as well as being. As such, Yoga philosophy helps to resolve some of the tensions inherent in a radically dualistic perspective as is exemplified in interpretations of classical Samkhya wherein *purusa* and *prakrti* are utterly separate and incapable of "uniting" through an integration of being and activity, that is, as an embodied state of freedom, consciousness and being.

### *Prakrti as Viewed in the Yoga-Sutra*

In Patañjali's Yoga, as in classical Samkhya, *prakrti* refers to both the primordial ground (*mulaprakrti*) of the innumerable manifest forms and those forms themselves. Also termed *pradhana* (or *avyakta*), which denotes the transcendent matrix of *prakrti* as apart from the consciousness principle (*purusa*), *prakrti* is defined by Vacaspati Misra as that by which the multiplicity of evolutes (*vikara*) is brought forth (*pradhiyate*).<sup>91</sup> It is the primordial, undifferentiated continuum that contains in potential the entire cosmos in all its levels and categories of being.

*Prakrti* is frequently defined in Samkhya as the state of balance or equilibrium of the three *gunas* (*tri-guna-samyavastha*).<sup>92</sup> When this state of balance is disturbed or disrupted by the presence of pure consciousness (*purusa*), the process of the "creation" or manifestation of the ordinary world takes place. The theory of homogeneous equilibrium (*samyavastha*) formulated by later Samkhyan thinkers proceeded more from speculation concerning the drive for liberation; it flowed only indirectly from an analysis

of the phenomenon of observation. The perfectly balanced substrata of *prakrti* ("matter") was an unevolved and unmanifest state wherein the three *gunas* the basic strands or qualities of *prakrti* ("matter," see below) were thought to revolve in "palpitating"<sup>93</sup> balanced movement within unmanifest *prakrti* while yet being completely separated from the light of *purusa*. This theory, which does not appear to be upheld in the *Yoga-Sutra* or the *Yoga-Bhasya*, is not without its difficulties. Can the *gunas* in the undifferentiated state of *prakrti* really be described as "moving"? Do the *gunas* of unmanifest potentiality possess the reality of the actual, manifest observable world of experience that the Samkhyan claims to analyze? If the *gunas* are only unevolved potentiality, then what can claim the attribute of movement or dynamism and manifestation? The above questions hint at only a few of the unresolved issues that arise for those who wish to hypothesize a theoretical state of perfect, unmanifest equilibrium in contrast

to the imbalanced and disharmonious state of manifest existence, that is, the world we normally perceive and experience. An even more serious problem for such speculators would be to explain how such a hypothetical state of equilibrium actually becomes unbalanced.<sup>94</sup> Is imbalance or disequilibrium an intrinsic characteristic of the reality of manifestation, actualization, and the "evolution" of the universe in all its diversity? Is the suffering (*duhkha*, YS II.16), misidentification, and confusion that should be overcome or discarded in order for authentic identity to arise an intrinsic aspect of any "movement" within *prakṛti* herself? If suffering is an inherent aspect of manifest existence, would spiritual liberation necessitate a return to the original unmanifest ground dissolving away or withdrawing from our human, manifest nature and identity? Or, is the state of human conflict and sorrow (YS II.15; see n. 121 below) that Yoga seeks to remove the result of a malfunctioning factor within *prakṛti* including the various phenomena of mind (*citta*) or consciousness through which we perceive and experience reality? If the latter be the case, it would then follow that the cause of this malfunction or distortion operating within *prakṛti* and leading to sorrow would need to be uprooted and discarded. Is *prakṛti*'s two-tiered existence consisting of: (1) an unmanifest potentiality that is in itself a state of homogeneous equilibrium, and (2) manifest existence implying disharmony and imbalance, meant to be understood with an ontological emphasis, that is, as an ontological description of reality? Can the homogeneous equilibrium, referred to as *samyavastha*, as well as the processes of "disequilibrium" resulting from its actualization and manifestation be more appropriately rendered with an epistemological emphasis? Much of the remainder of our study will be addressing these as well as other related questions not

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from a purely Samkhyan orientation but rather from within the context of Patañjali's Yoga philosophy.

Patañjali subscribes to the Samkhyan theory of "evolution" or manifestation, called *satkāryavāda*, according to which an effect (*kārya*) is preexistent (*sat*) in its cause (*karana*); and also *prakṛti-parināma-vāda*, which signifies that the effect is a real transformation (*parināma*) of *prakṛti*, not merely an appearance or illusory change as is thought in the idealist schools of Vedānta<sup>95</sup> and, some would argue, Mahāyāna Buddhism. The *satkārya* doctrine maintains that whatever comes into manifestation is not a completely new reality or production<sup>96</sup> thereby rejecting the notion of creation *ex nihilo*. Yoga holds that what is nonexistent can never be produced; what is existent can never perish.<sup>97</sup> The causes must be of the same fundamental substance as the effects.<sup>98</sup> The effects are thus already latent in the material causes and manifest as transformations resulting from, as Patañjali states, the outflow or implementation of their material causes (*prakṛtyāpura*).<sup>99</sup> The disappearance of a previous transformation and the rise of a subsequent one takes place as a result of the integrating pervasion of the constituent parts of the material cause.<sup>100</sup> In Yoga, differentiation and actualization (or what may be referred to as "creation") is always only the manifestation (*avirbhava*) of latent possibilities. The ultimate material cause is thought to be *prakṛti*. All unmanifest and manifest forms are simply developments, transformations, or actualizations (*parināma*, *vikāra*, *vikṛti*) of that primal "substance" or *prakṛti*. Moreover, the disappearance of an existing object does not mean its total annihilation, but merely its becoming latent again (*tirobhava*). "Destruction" is nothing but

"dissolution" into the unmanifest, a withdrawal from manifestness or return to the "origin." This theory may well have been derived from the kind of metaphysical speculation found, for example, in the *Bhagavadgita* (II.16-17), where Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna as follows:

Of the nonexistent there is no coming to be. Of the existent there is no ceasing to be.  
Also, the final truth of these is known by the seers of Truth. Yet, know as indestructible  
that by which all this is pervaded. Nothing is able to accomplish the destruction of that  
which is imperishable.<sup>101</sup>

Like *purusa*, the transcendent core of *prakṛti-pradhana*, *avyakta*, or what Patañjali calls *alinga*<sup>102</sup> is also indestructible. Yet it has the capacity to undergo modification and it does so in the process of actualization or manifestation during which it gives birth to the multidimensional universe. In Sāṃkhya (*SK* 20-21) the ubiquitous presence of *purusa* as unchanging,

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contentless, and pure (that is, unaffected by the changes within *prakṛti*) consciousness, "solicits" this process. According to Patañjali (*YS* III.13),<sup>103</sup> the transformation and development (*parinama*) of *prakṛti*, denoting serial change, is of three basic types: (1) *dharma-parinama*, the change or development in the form of a substance; (2) *lakṣana-parinama*, or the change of characteristic implicit in the fact that time (*kala*) consists of past, present and future; and (3) *avastha-parinama*, the state or stage of development or the qualitative change or condition due to the effects of time (i.e., aging), as when an earthen vessel breaks and turns to dust. Patañjali seeks to apply these insights to the mind (*citta*) the locus of empirical consciousness and personality and its transmutation through the practice of Yoga. The above three types of change are universally applicable to the phenomena of consciousness as well as to material objects, the elements, and the senses. While recognizing the changelessness of pure spirit or awareness (*purusa*), Yoga (unlike Sāṃkhya) explicitly allows for fluctuation between potentiality or pure power (*śakti*) and actuality (*abhivyakti*) within the mind, such modification or transition within the phenomena or content of consciousness referring to the transformation from an unconscious "nonviewed" (*aparidrsta*) state to a conscious "viewed" (*paridrsta*) one.<sup>104</sup>

In *Yoga-Sūtra* (III.13) Patañjali employs the term *dharma* in the technical sense of "form," which is of changing nature. This he contrasts (*YS* III.14) with the concept of "*dharma*-holder" (*dharmin*), the underlying essential nature or unchanging "substance" (as opposed to the changeable form).<sup>105</sup> *Prakṛti* is the permanent "substance" (*dharmin*) and its series of manifestations are the forms (*dharma*). Applying the *satkāryavada* doctrine, which states that change affects only the form of an object, not its underlying substance, Patañjali distinguishes between three forms or states of an object: its "subsided" (*santa*) or past aspect, its "arisen" (*udita*) or present aspect, and its "undetermined" (*avyapadesya*) or future aspect.<sup>106</sup> All three are related to the same "substance" or "*dharma*-holder," which is permanently present in, yet cannot be contained by (and therefore is different from) its forms or modifications, that is, it assumes many changes but is not wholly defined or consumed by these changes. Vyāsa explicitly contrasts this view with the Buddhist doctrine of *anatman*, no-self or inessentiality, according to which there is a multiplicity of changing forms but no underlying being or substance.<sup>107</sup> In contrast to the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, for example, classical Yoga does not attempt to

reduce "being" to "being experienced." Yet classical Yoga "tends to ascribe a more constitutive role to awareness or experience than the Samkhya and to interpret it as an efficient factor of manifestation and actualization."<sup>108</sup> The

above three kinds of transformation can be understood as different ways of looking at the change affecting a single substance.

To illustrate the concept of *parinama* (as used in YS III.13), Vyasa describes the three modalities (*dharma*, *laksana*, *avastha*) in the following manner: a lump of clay is made into a water jar, thus undergoing a change in external property or form (*dharma*); in its present condition as water jar it is thus able to hold water (*laksana*); finally, the jar gradually becomes "old," thus undergoing "stages of development" (*avastha*).<sup>109</sup> Vyasa, furthermore, associates the notions of actuality and potentiality, manifest (*vyakta*) and subtle (*sukhma*), with time and temporality: Present phenomena are manifest or actual; past and future phenomena are considered subtle or in potential form.<sup>110</sup> Thus, there is an attempt in Yoga to clarify the nature of time in the light of the concepts of actuality and potentiality and as it applies to the structure and functioning of the mind. The reality of time and its three "paths" (*adhvan*) past, present, and future is the reality of the ever-changing nature and forms arising from the unmanifest ground of *prakṛti*.<sup>111</sup>

Patañjali's philosophy of the change and development of *prakṛti* as applied to empirical consciousness (*citta*) disallows intrinsic stability or permanency to the phenomena of the mind and the empirical sense of self. Only *purusa* is able to enjoy the status of immutability (*aparīṇamitva*),<sup>112</sup> meaning that its authentic, immortal identity is never really "lost" throughout all the changes and identifications that take place in the mind and the perceived world. Yoga reminds us that even though our psychophysical being is an apparent composite of the forces of *prakṛti* and is merely a temporary modification, it is also associated with an eternal, transcendent, yet immanent and essentially unaffected aspect, the *purusa* or spiritual Self.

Patañjali makes use of the *guna* theory, one of the most original contributions of the Samkhya tradition. The three *gunas* the basic "constituents" of *prakṛti* compose all cosmological as well as physical and psychological principles. Without the manifestation of the *gunas* there would be nothing to be experienced. The most common denotation for the tripartite process (*traiguna*) of *prakṛti* given in the *Yoga-Sutra* is the term *drśya*, the "seeable" (YS II.17, 18, 21, and IV.23), which includes the unmanifest, nondifferentiated potentiality as well as the manifest, differentiated universe or diverse aspects of *prakṛti*. This concept has a strong epistemological resonance to it and signifies anything that is capable of becoming an object of the *purusa*, meaning here anything that pertains to *prakṛti* in her diverse modes including the causal source (*pradhana*, *alinga*)

itself. Descriptions of the *gunas* (cf. Samkhya) point to an interpretation that would stress that

their psychological and even moral components are both indispensable for the definition and existence of individual entities or persons within the world. The *gunas* encompass the entire personality structure including the affective and cognitive dimensions involving various qualities and states such as pleasure, pain, intelligence, passion, dullness, and so on.<sup>113</sup> The *gunas* also function like cosmological proto-elements (cf. *MBh* XII.187<sup>114</sup> and *SK* 15-16), as generative/creative factors involved in and responsible for the evolution of life-forms. Patañjali employs the term *drsya* in the above possible ways where he delineates its main characteristics in *Yoga-Sutra* (II.18).<sup>115</sup> Here, he mentions the three characters or dispositions of the "seeable" in a clear reference to the interdependent nature of the three *gunas*: namely, *prakasa* or "luminosity"/"brilliance" (pertaining to *sattva*), *kriya* or "activity" (belonging to *rajas*), and *sthiti* or "fixity"/"inertia" (connected with *tamas*). The "seeable" has the nature of the elements (*bhuta*) and the senses (*indriya*) and serves the dual purpose of experience (*bhoga*) and emancipation (*apavarga*).<sup>116</sup>

Patañjali appears to conceive of the *gunas* as three types of psychophysical force, "matter," or energy whose existence can be deduced from the "behavior" patterns of *prakṛti*. Vyasa provides us with a lucid commentary on the tripartite process where he describes the *gunas* in the following manner:

*Sattva* tends towards luminosity; *rajas* towards action; *tamas* towards fixity. Though distinct, these *gunas* mutually affect each other. They change, they have the properties of conjunction and disjunction, they assume forms created by their mutual co-operation. Distinct from each other, they are identifiable even when their powers are conjoined. They deploy their respective powers, whether of similar or dissimilar kind. When one is predominant, the presence (of the others) is inferred as existing within the predominant one from the very fact of its operation as a *guna*. They are effective as engaged in carrying out the purpose of the *purusa*.<sup>117</sup>

G. Koelman notes: "The *guna*'s nature is throughout expressed in terms of functional qualities, kinetic dispositions and causal urges."<sup>118</sup> To summarize the above, we can say that the *gunas* underlie all physical, material, cosmological, psychological, and moral realities.<sup>119</sup> From the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (II.18 above) we are informed that: (1) although the *gunas* are to be distinguished according to their qualities, (2) they are nevertheless interdependent and (3) in combination generate cosmic existence/the phenomenal universe, where-

upon (4) everything must be regarded as a "synergization"<sup>120</sup> of these three factors. Constituting the realm of the "seeable" (*drsya*), the *gunas* exist for the purpose of *purusa* (i.e., for experience [*bhoga*] and emancipation [*apavarga*]), which suggests that from a yogic perspective the *gunic* processes do not ultimately result in delusive forms of self-identity, worldly identification, conflict, destruction, and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). Rather, they can function as a vehicle for liberating self-identity from the bondage of worldly existence.

In *Yoga-Sutra* II.15 Patañjali portrays these three types of fundamental *prakṛtic* forces as being in continual conflict with each other: "Because of the dissatisfaction and sufferings due to



change and anxieties and the latent impressions, and from the conflict of the modifications of the *gunas*, for the discerning one, all is sorrow alone."<sup>121</sup> As a result of this inherent tension between them, and due to their dynamic, energetic nature associated with "transformation" (*parinama*), the *gunas* are said to form the different ontological levels (*parvan*) of prakrtic reality.<sup>122</sup> From the perspective of the discerning yogin (*vivekin*) human identity contained within the phenomenal world of the three *gunas* amounts to nothing more than sorrow and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*).<sup>123</sup> The declared goal of classical Yoga is to overcome all suffering (*duhkha*, YS II.16) by bringing about an inverse movement or counterflow (*pratiprasava*)<sup>124</sup> understood as a "return to the origin"<sup>125</sup> or "process-of-involution"<sup>126</sup> of the *gunas*, a kind of reabsorption into the transcendent purity of being itself. What does this "process-of-involution" variously referred to as "return to the origin," "dissolution into the source,"<sup>127</sup> or "withdrawal from manifestation" actually mean? Is it a definitive ending to the perceived world of the yogin comprised of change and transformation, forms and phenomena? Ontologically conceived, *prasava* signifies the "flowing forth" of the primary constituents or qualities of *prakrti* into the multiple forms of the universe in all its dimensions, that is, all the evolutionary process or "creation" (*sarga*, *prasarga*). *Pratiprasava*, on the other hand, denotes the process of "dissolution into the source" or "withdrawal from manifestation" of those forms relative to the personal, microcosmic level of the yogin who is about to attain freedom (*apavarga*).

Does a "return to the origin" culminate in a state of freedom in which one is stripped of all human identity and void of any association with the world including one's practical livelihood? The ontological emphasis usually given to the meaning of *pratiprasava* implying for the yogin a literal dissolution of *prakrti*'s manifestation would seem to support a view, one that is prominent in Yoga scholarship, of spiritual liberation denoting an

existence wholly transcendent (and therefore stripped or deprived) of all manifestation including the human relational sphere. Is this the kind of spiritually emancipated state that Patañjali had in mind? At this rather early stage in our study it suffices to say that in *Yoga-Sutra* II.3-17 which sets the stage for the remainder of the chapter on yogic practice (*sadhana*) Patañjali describes *prakrti*, the "seeable" (including our personhood), in the context of the various afflictions (*klesas*) that give rise to an afflicted and mistaken identity of self. Afflicted identity, as we shall see later on (see chapters 3 and 4), is constructed out of and held captive by the root affliction of ignorance (*avidya*) and its various forms of karmic bondage. Yet, despite the clear association of *prakrti* with the bondage of ignorance (*avidya*), there are no real grounds for purporting that *prakrti* herself is to be equated with or subsumed under affliction itself. To equate *prakrti* with affliction itself implies that as a product of spiritual ignorance, *prakrti*, along with the afflictions, is conceived as a reality which the yogin should ultimately avoid or discard completely. Patañjali leaves much room for understanding "dissolution" or "return to the source," with an epistemological emphasis thereby allowing the whole system of Yoga *darsana* to be interpreted along more open-ended lines. In other words, what actually "dissolves" or is ended in Yoga is the yogin's *misidentification* with *prakrti*, a mistaken identity of self that contrary to our true identity as *purusa* can be nothing more than a product of the three *gunas* under the influence of spiritual ignorance. Understood as such, *pratiprasava* need not denote the definitive ontological



dissolution of manifest *prakṛti* for the yogin, but rather means the eradication of misidentification the incorrect world view born of *avidyā* or incapacity of the yogin to "see" from the yogic perspective of the seer (*drastr*), our true identity as *purusa*. However, in order to appreciate this line of argument, which gives an epistemological emphasis to the meaning of key yogic terms, it is necessary to outline in greater detail Patañjali's metaphysical schematic.

Within *prakṛti*'s domain, Patañjali recognizes four hierarchic yet interrelated levels of existence whose characteristics and qualities are determined by the relative predominance of any of the three *gunas*. The levels are, according to *Yoga-Sūtra* II.19: <sup>128</sup>

1. The "Unmanifest" (*alinga*)
2. The "Designator" (*linga-matra*)
3. The "Unparticularized" (*avisesa*)
4. The "Particularized" (*visesa*)

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The following excerpt from the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* (II.19) shows Vyāsa's correlations of Patañjali's four-level model with the more familiar (Sāṃkhya) series of principles of existence (*tattvas*):

Of these [four divisions], space, air, fire, water and earth are the gross elements which are the particularizations of the unparticularized subtle elements (*tanmatras*): sound, touch, form-precept, taste and smell. Ears, skin, eyes, tongue and nose are the sense-organs, and mouth, hands, feet, organs of evacuation and generation are the five action organs. The eleventh organ, the mind-organ (*manas*), is multi-objective. These are the particularizations of the unparticularized I-am-ness. This is the sixteen-fold transformation of the *gunas* into particulars (*visesa*). The unparticularized (*avisesa*) are six. They are the subtle elements of hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling, distinguished (respectively) by one, two, three, four and all five, beginning with hearing. The sixth unparticularized is mere I-am-ness (*asmita-matra*). These are the six unparticularized transformations of the great principle (*mahat-tattva*), whose nature is mere being (*satta-matra*) which is bare form (*linga-matra*). Beyond the unparticularized is that great (self) which is mere being; supported in it these fulfil their development to the limit. And in the reverse process they are supported in that great (self) which is mere being and go back to that *pradhana*, the formless (*alinga*) which is neither being-non-being, nor yet existent-non-existent. <sup>129</sup>

In classical Yoga, *alinga* (the "signless," "formless") is the most subtle level because of its utter unmanifest nature of the hierarchical levels of *prakṛti*. It is the state of undifferentiated existence and corresponds with the Sāṃkhya concept of *avyakta* or the "unmanifest" (also termed *mulaprakṛti*). Vacaspati Miśra defines it (*alinga*) as the equilibrium (*samyavastha*) of the three primary constituents (*gunas*) of *prakṛti*.<sup>130</sup> Being the transcendent core of *prakṛti*, which is pure potentiality, it is without any "mark" or "sign." Only a small part of *prakṛti* is at any time undergoing manifestation and actualization. The rest remains in unmanifest existence.

From out of the "unmanifest" emerges the "(mere) designator," or *linga-matra*, as the first cosmic principle or level of manifest existence. This is the level of cosmic manifestation prior to the emergence of specific objects. Vyasa identifies it as the "great principle" (*mahat-tattva*), whose nature is "mere being" (*satta-matra*).<sup>131</sup> Vacaspati Misra also refers to *linga-matra* as the "great principle" (*mahat-tattva*).<sup>132</sup> *Mahat* is the most sattvic, finest, and purest production of *prakṛti*. On the one hand, it is that first manifestation of *guṇas* in which no other form or shape yet emerges. As the "designator" *mahat* is also the *buddhi*, the faculty of discernment that serves as a vehicle of *puruṣa's* (reflected) consciousness.<sup>133</sup> Because it is the

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most subtle and sattvic modification, it is fit to serve as a medium between *puruṣa* and the phenomena of *prakṛti*. In Samkhya (*SK* 22, 23) a "spark" of the universal *mahat* is also the individual or personal aspect of *buddhi*, the faculty of intelligence and discernment in a sentient entity, and the highest power in the process of sensation.

Following from *linga-matra* is the "unparticularized" (*aviseśa*) composed of six categories, namely, the five subtle elements or potentials (*tanmatras*, lit., "that only") and the principle of individuation (*asmita-matra*) or mere I-am-ness.<sup>134</sup> The last level of gūṇic manifestation is the "particularized," which, according to Vyasa, is composed of the five elements (*bhūtas*), the ten senses (*indriyas*), and the mind-organ (*manas*), and is a product of the unparticularized I-am-ness.<sup>135</sup>

Whereas, in a cosmological context, *linga-matra* is a category of which nothing can be predicated except that it exists the first sign that *prakṛti* gives of her presence *asmita-matra*, in the words of G. Koelman, "differentiates and pluralizes the indetermined and universal principle of being (*satta-matra*) into so many different centres of reference, so many sources of initiative."<sup>136</sup> Koelman continues: "These centres of reference constitute, so to say, distinct nucleations within the one *prakṛti*, in such a way that there arise different suppositions or subjectivations or numerically distinct units of centralisation adapted to the needs of each particularised Self. This supposition is sufficiently stable to be called a substantial entity, a *tattva* or a *dravya*."<sup>137</sup> *Asmita-matra* is the principle and agency that splits the primary substratum into subjects vis-à-vis objects in the form of a bifurcate line of development and transformation. It corresponds with Iśvara Kṛṣṇa's notion of *ahamkāra* ("I-maker" or sense of self; see below). The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (on *SK* 4) wrongly maintains that Patañjali does not know *ahamkāra* as a separate principle but includes it in *mahat*.<sup>138</sup> As is the case with the Samkhyan principle of *ahamkāra*, *asmita-matra* brings forth the subjective sensorial world and the objective sensed world. It is the generic pool of all individualized empirical selves that according to the Samkhyan system is the cosmic differentiator of subject and object; *ahamkāra* is a self-awareness (*abhimāna*) giving rise to the human sense "I am."<sup>139</sup>

We must guard against generalized statements such as that made by S. Radhakrishnan who asserts that Yoga "does not recognize *ahamkāra* and *manas* as separate from *buddhi*."<sup>140</sup> Prior to his commentary on *Yoga-Sūtra* II.19 (see above), Vyasa already refers to the sixth unparticularized principle as *ahamkāra*, which strongly suggests that *ahamkāra* is the equivalent

of *asmita-matra*: "Subtler than these [the *tanmatras*] is the *ahamkara*, and subtler than that is the great principle (*linga-matra*)."<sup>141</sup>

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Patañjali's vocabulary, while not being a mere replica of Samkhyan terminology, can be seen as accommodating the Samkhyan metaphysical schematic. Much of this hinges on how we understand Patañjali's important concept of *asmita* ("I-am-ness") which, being one of the five afflictions (*klesas*) in Yoga, is defined in *Yoga-Sutra* II.6 as follows: "I-am-ness is when the two powers of seer and view [i.e., what is viewed] as if (appear) as one self."<sup>142</sup> Vyasa's commentary states:

*Purusa* is the power of the seer; mind (*buddhi*)<sup>143</sup> is [understood here to be] the power of seeing. The taking on of a single nature, as it were, by these two, is called the affliction of I-am-ness. When there comes about a failure, as it were, to distinguish between the experiencer and what is experienced, which are utterly distinct and have nothing to do with each other, that is the condition for experience. But when the true nature of the two is recognized, that is aloneness. Then how could there be experience? So it has been said: 'Not seeing *purusa* beyond the mind and distinct from it in such things as form, disposition and knowledge, one will make there a mental self out of delusion.'<sup>144</sup>

In *Yoga-Sutra* III.35 Patañjali defines experience (*bhoga*) as "an idea (i.e., intention or cognition) that does not distinguish between *sattva* and *purusa*, though they are absolutely unmixed."<sup>145</sup> Vyasa has clearly understood *asmita* as taking place, or finding its primal locus of identification in the *buddhi* (i.e., *linga-matra*), which in Samkhya is also called *mahat*. To facilitate an understanding of the practical processes leading to meditational praxis, Patañjali employs terminology a little differently from that of Samkhya. For example, the *Samkhya-Karika* discusses *mahat* but not *asmita*. In the *Yoga-Sutra* it is in *asmita* that the impression of a "union" (*samyoga*, YS II.17) between *purusa* and *prakrti*, between consciousness and insentience, first occurs. *Asmita* is that process in which *mahat* or *buddhi*, being the purest and most sattvic evolute of *prakrti*, becomes a recipient of a "reflection" of pure consciousness. This reflected state of consciousness (which will be explained in chapter 3), masquerading in the garb of *asmita*, assumes itself to be *Self/purusa*. It is, by analogy, like the union of a crystal mirror with a reflection of the sun. *Purusa*, like the distant sun in the sky, remains unaffected by the union of its "reflection" in the mirror, but at the interface between *purusa* and *prakrti* all the processes of the composite personality begin. Consciousness and life flow through this *asmita*, which lends to the ego-principle (*asmita-matra*, *ahamkara*) and to the mind (*citta*) a semblance of awareness. This reflected awareness generates a deluded sense of selfhood and must be understood

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as arising from a mistaken identity, that is the misidentification of *prakrti* with *purusa* (authentic identity), beginning with *mahat*. The *purusa-principle* in Samkhya and Yoga is not a supreme

creator and does not reappear in the cosmos as a personal world-soul. Our empirical sense of self misidentifies with the prakrtic, "created" world thereby veiling *purusa*, resulting in a failure "to distinguish between the experiencer and what is experienced" (YB II.6; see n. 144 above). Thus, what is seen as real cosmogony in the Upanisads (for example, *Katha Up* III.2), is described in the *Yoga-Sutra* (II.3-5) as a process taking place under the influence of spiritual ignorance (*avidya*). This does not mean to imply that the cosmogony of Yoga is itself an illusory process. *Prakrti* does, in full reality, transform herself into the created essences, headed by *mahat/buddhi*. The *seeming* aspect of this "flowing forth" (*prasava*) or "creation" (*sarga*) refers to *purusa's* *seeming* bondage within *prakrti*. The cosmos itself is experienced as if pervaded by consciousness. Patañjali describes *prakrti* in terms of how the world is experienced by one who is ensconced in the condition of ignorance. When one falsely identifies or misidentifies with the principles of "matter" or any of *prakrti's* modifications, those *tattvas* and mental processes (*vyrttis*) are experienced as pervaded by an "I-am" consciousness (i.e., "I am *buddhi*," "I am *ahamkara*") that is wholly identified within *prakrti* thereby masking or excluding *purusa*. *Purusa* does not *do* anything in this process. *Asmita* thus is an afflicted state of consciousness and identity that permeates and sustains our notions or sense of authentic identity (*purusa*) as a bound "entity" under the sway of prakrtic existence.

*Asmita-matra*, the sixth category of the level of the "unparticularized" (*avisesa*), is a product of the "designator" (*linga-matra*) and can have no "direct contact" (as does *mahat* or *buddhi*) with *purusa's* reflection of consciousness that produces the "I-am-ness" located in *buddhi* (YB II.6). H. Aranya correctly addresses the meaning of *asmita-matra* as used in Vyasa's commentary (II.19) as follows: "Here it means ego [*ahamkara*]. It has been said before (YS II.6) that identity of the instrument of reception with ... consciousness is *asmita*. From that point of view *buddhi* is pure *asmita* or final form of egoism. In every case, however, *asmita-matra* is not *mahat* [*buddhi*]" <sup>146</sup>

Patañjali uses the term *asmita-matra* once (in YS IV.4), where it is described as that principle from which the multiple individualized or fabricated minds (*nirmana-cittas*)<sup>147</sup> are projected. Patañjali merely asserts that the individualized minds arise from the unparticularized I-am-ness.<sup>148</sup> *Asmita-matra* is an ontological concept, and is ontologically real. In contrast, *asmita* is an afflicted state of self-identity of our having mistaken

*prakrti* (or prakrtic identity) for *purusa* and is a psychological concept (as given in YS II.3, 6 and III.47) whose meaning can be rendered with an epistemological emphasis.

In disagreement with S. Dasgupta,<sup>149</sup> our study maintains that *mahat* or *buddhi* is a synonym of *satta-matra* (YB II.19), not *asmita-matra*. Both Koelman<sup>150</sup> and Feuerstein<sup>151</sup> understand I-am-ness (*asmita*) as a psychological experience of "I-am" rooted in *asmita-matra*. However, in doing so it appears that both of the above scholars have restricted the meaning of *asmita* to the notion of an individualized subject with a particular *buddhi*.<sup>152</sup> This study understands *asmita* as taking root in *mahat*, the cosmic, pre-individual (or, from another perspective, trans-individual) aspect of *buddhi*. As in Samkhya, the intellect (*buddhi*) has a dual role to play, individual and pre-individual or cosmic (which can also be designated as trans-individual). While *asmita-matra*

is the cosmic (ontological) principle of individuation that produces both the psychomental and physical realities of the individual self, *asmita* (egoity, I-am-ness) as an afflicted psychological functioning of the mind (*citta*) is also responsible for the root or pre-individual identification of self-identity with *mahat* (cosmic knowing). When *purusa* seemingly "comes into" relationship with insentient *prakrti* in the form of *prakrti*'s first created essence, *buddhi* (*mahat*), that essence becomes "as it were" (*iva*, YS II.6), conscious as cosmic "I-am-ness."<sup>153</sup> The "insentient" cosmic knowing (transcending individual cognition) a reflected consciousness or semblance of *purusa*'s awareness is experienced as the location of self: "I am *mahat/buddhi*." This misidentification results in a transformation (*parinama*) of cosmic knowing into personal volitional knowing; it makes cosmic *buddhi* (*mahat*) into "my intellect" (which is the usual definition of the term). Cosmic knowing is experienced as my intellect when I identify with it as myself.

From *asmita-matra* ("individuation"), which follows from *mahat*, issues forth the subjective and objective world (cf. SK 24). *Asmita-matra* is that principle which differentiates unified cosmic knowing (*mahat* or *buddhi*, where the affliction of *asmita* originates) into ascertaining subject and the ascertained object. *Mahat* is the cosmic principle of unification, of pure cosmic being (*satta-matra*). S. Chennakesavan observes: "The *mahat* [great one or *buddhi* is the last limit, in an ascending order, up to which the subjective and objective are differentiated. Or, in other words, at this stage of evolution [creation] the subject and object aspects of experience had not yet emerged."<sup>154</sup> However, by misidentifying with *asmita-matra* we wrongly consider the subjective to be *purusa* or true identity itself: "I am this 'myself' of which I am aware." "This myself is me." Mistaken identity of *purusa*

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transforms cosmic subjectivity/objectivity into individual self-awareness. *Asmita-matra* (*ahamkara*) is experienced as my ego, personal individualized fabricated consciousness (*nirmana-citta*), when I am identified with it as myself. This modified yet contracted and egoistic sense of self can be dissolved or purified through Yoga into its cosmic source, *mahat*, whereby one's understanding of selfhood is transformed and expanded into cosmic "I-am-ness"<sup>155</sup> which is still first personal but not egoistic as is *ahamkara*. Based on our analysis above it would appear that Feuerstein's assertion<sup>156</sup> that the Samkhyan term *ahamkara* is probably replaced in the *Yoga-Sutra* by *asmita* is inaccurate. We must bear in mind that *asmita* is an affliction (*klesa*) that arising out of spiritual ignorance permeates the entire realm of our seeing or *prakrtic* consciousness, individual and cosmic. As such, it along with its root cause (ignorance) must be discarded in order for the *purusa* or pure seer to shine in its true light.

The notion of mistaken identity or misidentification with *buddhi* and *ahamkara* makes it easy to understand how these *tattvas* can be depicted as both cosmic and psychological, for it is the very false identification that turns the cosmic into the psychological. It would be a grave mistake to assert, as does S. Dasgupta,<sup>157</sup> that the cosmic and individual *buddhi* for example, have the same ontological status. *Mahat* or cosmic knowing is the first created essence of *prakrti*, as real as *prakrti* herself. *Mahat* brings forth the rest of *prakrti*'s essences not personal intellects. Personal intellects are not generated from *prakrti* in the real causal process but are "created" when the *prakrtic* sense of self "imagines" or conceives *mahat* to be the locus of authentic identity. The



identification with "I am *mahat*" (uttered by the sattvic component of *prakṛti*), not the ontological causal process in itself, creates a personal or self-appropriated intellect. Personal intellect, egoity, and so forth, have no ontological reality, only psychological. Thus, the psychological terminology used in Yoga results from an apparent ("as if") identification of *purusa* with *buddhi*, *ahamkara*, and so on. *Purusa* and *prakṛti* seemingly "come together" in the prakṛtic "condition" of misconception or ignorance (*avidyā*). Through discerning knowledge (*viveka-khyati*) Yoga brings about a retrieval of our true identity as *purusa*.

Although Vyasa does not state in *Yoga-Bhāṣya* II.19 that the subtle elements arise out of *asmita-matra*, it can be inferred from *Yoga-Bhāṣya* I.45 that this is the case; that is, Vyasa states that *ahamkara* is subtler than the *tanmatras*, implying that the subtle elements arise out of the I-principle.<sup>158</sup> It seems reasonable to assume then that *asmita-matra* (as is the case for *ahamkara* in the *SK*) also acts as the source of the *tanmatras* (assuming that they are a part of Patañjali's ontology), and the elements (*bhūtas*) and

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the senses (*indriyas*). Koelman, taking his cue from Vacaspati Misra, asserts that "Yoga . . . maintains that the objective universals [*tan-matras*] are derived directly from the 'function-of-consciousness' [*buddhi*]." <sup>159</sup> Vacaspati Misra places *asmita-matra* and the *tanmatras* on the same ontological level in as much as he regards both as evolutes of *buddhi* (*linga-matra*).<sup>160</sup> However, there is no reason not to follow the basic Samkhyan scheme<sup>161</sup> in this regard. Thus, H. Aranya writes:

The commentator (Vyasa) says that Mahat undergoes six undiversified modifications in the shape of Tanmatra and ego. Samkhya says that from Mahat arises ego and from ego come the Tanmatras. Some say that this is a point of difference between Samkhya and Yoga philosophies. There is, however, no real difference . . . In the commentaries on Sutra I.45 the author of the Bhāṣya has said that the ego is the cause of the Tanmatras, and the cause of the ego is the Mahat principle . . . Therefore it is not quite right to say that the six Aviseśas have arisen straight out of Mahat. The commentator also does not mean it. From Mahan Atma (the great self) or Mahat to ego, from ego to the five Tanmatras and from Tanmatras to the five Bhūtas, this is the correct order of succession.<sup>162</sup>

It is important to note that, like Samkhya, Yoga distinguishes between the material (*upādāna*) and the efficient or instrumental (*nimitta*) cause. New categories of existence and other species or forms of life must all necessarily be developments, transformations (*parinama*), or differentiations (*vikāra*, *vikṛti*) of the same fundamental substance (*prakṛti*). Moreover, as Vyasa informs us: "The change of body and senses into another life, when they are transformed into the other life, is implemented by their *prakṛti-natures*. With the disappearance of the earlier transformation, the corresponding rise of the later transformation comes about by an integrating pervasion of the new parts."<sup>163</sup> The material or substrative cause does not produce its effects without the aid of motivating causes known as efficient causes (*nimitta*).<sup>164</sup> Every effect requires for its actualization an appropriate combination of the material cause along with efficient causes such as place, time, and form (i.e., virtue).<sup>165</sup> Thus a particular place aids in the production of a



particular effect. For instance, Kashmir produces (Kashmiri) saffron, which will not be produced at other places in the world even though other causes of its growth may be present at those other places. Likewise, in certain regions of the world, rain may not fall at appropriate times thereby impeding the growth of certain crops later on. Similarly, an elephant cannot give birth to a human being, as the form of an elephant cannot give birth to a form different from its own. In the same way, a nonvirtuous person does not experience any kind of pleasure in the

absence of the motivating cause of virtue. Owing to the operation of place, time, and form and motivating causes, the essential nature of things do not become manifest all at once.<sup>166</sup>

According to the tradition, *Yoga-Sutra* IV.2-3 concerns the way in which the virtues or merits (*dharma*) of the yogin cause that yogin to enter another body, that is, by rebirth or even yogic powers.<sup>167</sup> In *Yoga-Sutra* IV.3 the term *prakṛti* is used in the plural (in its two other occurrences in the *Yoga-Sutra* I.19 and IV.2 its number is unmarked since it is the first member of a compound). This plural use is common in earlier texts such as the *Bhagavadgita* (VII.4-5) and the *Buddhacarita* (XII.18). The *Samkhya-Karika* uses the term *prakṛti* in both the singular and plural, speaking of *mulaprakṛti* (in the sense of an ultimate first principle) and of the various *prakṛtis* and *vikṛtis*, that is, the various primary and secondary evolutes and differentiations of primordial *prakṛti* (*SK* 3). The plural use in the *Samkhya-Karika* refers to the first eight "creative" *tattvas*, namely, *avyakta*, *buddhi*, *ahamkara*, and the five *tanmatras*, while *prakṛti* in the single (*mulaprakṛti*) refers to the eight collectively.<sup>168</sup> Patañjali seems to apply the use of the term *prakṛti* in a similar twofold way. According to Vacaspati Misra<sup>169</sup> the term *prakṛti* as used in *Yoga-Sutra* IV.2 refers to the five elements that are the *prakṛti* of the body, and the "I-ness" that is the *prakṛti* of the senses. These are thought to continue from one embodiment to the next, thus corresponding to what the *Samkhya-Karika* calls the *linga-sarira* (*SK* 39). The compound *prakṛtyapura* in *Yoga-Sutra* IV.2 (see n. 99 above): "implemented by [the] *prakṛti*[s]," refers to the process whereby the *prakṛtis* of the yogin's previous body "fill" a new body. Vacaspati explains<sup>170</sup> that the *prakṛtis* of the first body "fill" the parts of the new body, while the *prakṛti* of the first set of faculties (*asmita*) fills the new faculties. The *prakṛtis* in the form of mental impressions (*samskaras*) that remain cause future experiences to take place. *Prakṛti* as material cause is not, however, the sole cause; it operates according to certain efficient causes (*nimitta*) such as the yogin's merit (*dharma*). Vacaspati tells us that the process is analogous to the passage of a body through childhood, growth, and old age (where the body follows a predetermined pattern of change, but only at certain times), or the growth of a banyan seed into a banyan tree (which can only happen if it is in the earth and suitably watered), or the way a spark dropped on a heap of grass suddenly rises to the sky.<sup>171</sup> In each case the tendency inherent in the material cause is only manifested when an efficient cause arises.

In *Yoga-Sutra* IV.3 Patañjali tells us how the implementation of *prakṛti* takes place: "The efficient cause does not actuate the *prakṛtis*, but removes obstacles from them like a farmer [for irrigation]."<sup>172</sup> The various pathways

of manifestation are determined by impressions (*samskaras*) already in motion. From the implementation of *prakṛti* comes transformation into other births. According to Yoga, an efficient cause does not set the material cause into action nor, as in *Nyaya-Vaisesika*, does it make the effect a different existence from the cause (*anyathakarana*). It is not that the cause produces something new as it is held by the Vaisesikas.<sup>173</sup> In Samkhya and Yoga the efficient cause removes the barriers or obstacles (*varana*) to the manifestation of the effect latent in its material cause. The analogy of the farmer in *Yoga-Sutra* IV.3 refers to the practice of irrigation, as Vyasa explains:

The farmer, in order to irrigate a terraced field by flooding it with water from another (higher) field, does not take the water in his hands, but makes a breach in its retaining barrier, after which the water pours into the lower field of itself. Similarly, virtue breaches nonvirtue, the retaining barrier of the *prakṛtis*. When it is breached the *prakṛtis* flow out into the respective effects or differentiations.<sup>174</sup>

As an alternative explanation of the analogy one could say that the farmer cannot himself force the nourishment from the water or earth into the roots of his crop, but permits it to penetrate the roots by removing the weeds.<sup>175</sup> Efficient causes can obstruct or aid the manifestations of the material causes.<sup>176</sup> The fact that for instance a potter, the efficient cause, turns the potter's wheel does not detract from the inherent capacity of the wheel to help shape the pot. In the psychological context of the mind and its functioning (see chapter 3), it will be seen that the *prakṛtis* in the form of *samskaras* the deep-rooted impressions that mysteriously shape our lives are canalized by our good or evil actions.

While admitting the subtlety of both the unmanifest (*alinga*) or undifferentiated *prakṛti* and pure consciousness (*purusa*), Vyasa points out the considerable difference between these two in that *purusa* is not a subtle cause of the great principle (*mahat*, *linga-matra*) in the same way that *alinga* (*pradhana*) is. Not being the material cause of *linga-matra*, *purusa* is however considered to be a final cause of prakṛtic reality.<sup>177</sup> Moreover, in his commentary on *Yoga-Sutra* II.19, Vyasa informs us that "the unmanifest (*alinga*) is not caused by any purposefulness of *purusa*; no purpose of *purusa* brings it about, nor is there any purpose of *purusa* in it. Hence it is classed as eternal. But purposefulness of *purusa* is a cause of the three differentiated states. This purpose being their final (and efficient) cause, they are classed as non-eternal."<sup>178</sup>

The *gunas* are the material cause of everything prakṛtic and they also act as efficient causes to actualize or manifest their latent determinations.

On this issue, Koelman writes: "*Prakṛti* is the universal cause of all genetic realities, a root-cause both substrative in nature and efficient . . . All other causes have only an assisting causality."<sup>179</sup> The purposefulness of *purusa* is evidently a cause. Vacaspati's comments are worth noting here. He argues that

it cannot be supposed that it is the purpose of *purusa* that sets all in motion. It is only the Lord (*isvara*) who does this with this purpose in view. For the purpose of *purusa* is described as setting all in motion in the sense that it is the final end. While this purpose of the *purusa* is yet to be realized, it is correct that the unmanifest *prakṛti* should be the cause of stability (of things) . . . In the case of the Lord, we must understand that his functional activity is limited to the removal of obstacles with a view to securing a basis for the manifestation of forms.<sup>180</sup>

While virtue is an efficient cause for removing unvirtue (see n. 174 above), it is not, however, the cause which sets the material cause in motion. In the same sense, there is a view in Yoga that the Lord (*isvara*) favors the yogin through the yogin's special devotion (YS I.23). All barriers themselves are causes in the sense that they block the manifestation of another form. Thus place, time, form, and other factors are required for the manifestation of some change of modality.<sup>181</sup>

In the condition of misidentification (YS I.4), human identity is ensconced in the ever-changing samsaric world of the three *gunas*. Vyasa tells us that virtue and nonvirtue, pleasure and pain, attachment and aversion are the causes of the six-spoked "wheel" (*cakra*) of *samsara*. Ignorance, the root cause of all affliction, is said to be the driver of this "wheel."<sup>182</sup> Everything within the purview of samsaric experience is thus reduced to different functional dispositions of the three *gunas*.

According to the commentaries (see, for example, Vacaspati Misra on YS IV.3) the *Yoga-Sutra* reconciles the idea of *karman*<sup>183</sup> ("action" in a moral context as determiner of future embodiments) with that of a self-operating *prakṛti* (or set of *prakṛtis*). The topic is discussed in the context of the yogin's power to change or multiply his body, but there is no reason for not assuming that the same principles apply elsewhere, as Vacaspati has shown by the examples of the maturing and aging of the body, and so forth. The *sūtras* (IV.2-3) are not primarily concerned with cosmology; the term *prakṛti* refers here to the makeup of the empirical self rather than to the primary "stuff" of the cosmos. This is a clear indication of Yoga's practical, psychological, and integrative approach, or what J. W. Hauer appropriately termed "experienced metaphysics."<sup>184</sup> In the chapters that

follow we will see how this integrative or wholistic approach displayed by Yoga finds congenial expression in Patañjali's conception of mind (*citta*).

The above metaphor of a "wheel" (used by Vyasa) seems an apt description of samsaric self-identity and existence. The term *duḥkha* (i.e., suffering, dissatisfaction, pain, sorrow) is comprised of *duḥ* meaning: difficult, bad, doing wrong,<sup>185</sup> plus *kha* meaning: axle hole, cavity, cave, space<sup>186</sup> and can literally mean "having a bad axle-hole." Such a wheel is unable to function properly or smoothly leading to an unsteady ride or journey in life, perhaps even disabling completely the vehicle (the body-mind) it is helping to propel. With spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) "driving" the wheel of self-identity, consisting of the mind and its perceptions, concepts, memories, and so on, human consciousness (the mind) is molded into, shaped by a mistaken identity of self that has become this wheel of *samsara* and its future

sorrow/dissatisfaction. This "wheel of samsaric life" or "bad/afflicted space" manifesting as self-identity in the form of the mental makeup of the mind (i.e., of impressions [*samskaras*], habit patterns [*vasanas*] and mental modifications [*vrttis*]) including egoity (*asmita*) with its self-appropriated virtues and nonvirtues, attachments and aversions, pleasures and pain, is the product of a malfunctioning of consciousness in the mind. Can this malfunctioning of the "wheel" of the mind and its mental processes be corrected? Or is it necessary for this wheel of life in the form of the mind, personal identity, morality, likes and dislikes to be utterly removed, dissolved, negated, or snuffed out of the yogin's life? Are our embodied, sensorial, thinking apparatus and empirical existence as well as relationships and participation in society an inherently or ultimately dissatisfying, sorrowful state of affairs? Are the *gunas*, by definition, a reality of dis-ease, disharmony? Is the "wheel of *samsara*" a limitation, distortion, or contracted form of human life in the world?

The discerning yogin sees (YS II.15) that this world or cycle of samsaric identity is itself dissatisfaction (*duhkha*). But we must ask, what exactly is the problem being addressed in Yoga? What is at issue in Yoga philosophy? Is our ontological status as a human being involved in day-to-day existence forever in doubt, in fact in need of being negated, dissolved in order for authentic identity (*purusa*), an immortal consciousness, finally to dawn? Having overcome all ignorance (*avidya*, the "driver" of the wheel and cause of all afflicted identity), is it possible for a human being to live in the world and no longer be in conflict with oneself and the world? Can the *gunas* cease to function in a state of ignorance and conflict in the mind? Must the gunic constitution of the human mind and the whole of prakrtic existence disappear, dissolve for the yogin? Can the ways of spiritual ignorance be replaced

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by an aware, conscious, nonafflicted identity and activity that transcends the conflict and confusion of ordinary, samsaric life? Can we live, according to Patañjali's Yoga, an embodied state of freedom?

The following chart (see below) constitutes a summary of the different ontological levels comprising *prakrti*. On the left-hand side is the general scheme outlined in the system of classical Samkhya (i.e., the SK), and on the right-hand side are the alternative explanatory titles given in the *Yoga-Sutra* (II.19) and as explained by Vyasa (YB II.19):

Classical Samkhya	Classical Yoga
1 <i>prakrti</i> ( <i>avyakta</i> )	<i>alinga</i> , the unmanifest
2 <i>mahat</i> ( <i>buddhi</i> )	<i>linga-matra</i> . the designator: <i>satta-matra</i> or <i>mahat/buddhi</i>
3-8 <i>ahamkara</i> ("I-maker") 5 <i>tanmatras</i> (subtle senses)	6 <i>avisesas</i> , the unparticularized: <i>asmita-matra</i> and 5 <i>tanmatras</i>
9- <i>manas</i> and: 5 cognitive senses and 5 conative senses (=10	<i>visesas</i> , the particularized: the final 16
24 <i>indriyas</i> ) 5 <i>bhutas</i> (gross elements)	products as in Samkhya

We note that in classical Yoga *asmita-matra* can be understood as fulfilling a similar function as *ahamkara* in classical Samkhya, that is, its sattvic illuminative nature giving rise to *manas* (the mind-

organ), the five cognitive senses (*buddhindriyas*), and the five senses of action (*karmendriyas*); and its tamasic "inert" nature as generating the five subtle elements (*tanmatras*) and the five gross elements (*bhutas*).<sup>187</sup>

The twenty-three evolutes or manifestations of which the cosmos is constituted and which also form our psychophysical being/personality are all *prakṛti*, matter-energy or "nonself" (i.e., extrinsic identity or *anatman*), as is *alinga*, the unmanifest. The whole of the guṇic realm (including all the evolutes) does not constitute intrinsic identity (*purusa*) and is therefore classified as "nonself." In order of subtlety, intelligence or the faculty of discernment (*buddhi*), sense of self (*ahamkāra*) and the mind-organ (*manas*), including all the things or content of the mind such as cognitions, volitions, inclinations, emotions, and so forth, all the senses (*indriyas*) as well as their objects, the components as well as the states of the physical body they are all "nonself" (i.e., are not to be mistaken for *purusa*). This realization or discriminative discernment is the key to the eradication of ignorance, misidentification, and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*) and it ushers one into a state of freedom termed *kaivalya*: the "aloneness of seeing"<sup>188</sup> or *purusa* established in its true nature or form (*svarupa*).

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### The *Purusa*-Principle in the *Yoga-Sutra*

As in Samkhya, Patañjali's Yoga regards *purusa* as the witness (*saksin*) of *prakṛti*, that is, the three *guṇas*. More specifically, *purusa* is affirmed as being the "seer" (*drastr*) of all mental content or psychomental experiences,<sup>189</sup> and the "knower" of all the mental processes or modifications (*vṛtti*) of the mind (*citta*).<sup>190</sup> The most common term used by Patañjali to designate *purusa* authentic Selfhood is the "seer," as can be observed in *Yoga-Sutra* I.3 and II.17 as well as II.20 and IV.23. In the *Yoga-Sutra* the gender of *purusa* must be seen merely as a linguistic or grammatical convenience. This masculine word meaning the "seer" or Self (i.e., pure consciousness) is used interchangeably with the feminine words: *sakti*<sup>191</sup> (power, energy, force), *citi*<sup>192</sup> (consciousness), *citisakti*<sup>193</sup> (power of consciousness), and *drśi*<sup>194</sup> (sight, seeing). Also termed the "power of seer" (*drs-sakti*),<sup>195</sup> *purusa* is described as being absolutely unmixed with<sup>196</sup> or distinct from<sup>197</sup> even the finest, most subtle aspect of *prakṛti* the *sattva* of consciousness or mind which can still allow the yogin to misidentify with prakṛtic existence, the "seeable" (*drśya*). The "seeable" is, in itself, insentient and lacks all consciousness or self-luminosity.<sup>198</sup>

Yet what we call worldly existence including our ordinary human identity is due to the conjunction (*samyoga*) between the "seer" (*purusa*) and the "seeable" (*drśya*, *prakṛti*).<sup>199</sup> That conjunction, which is the cause of suffering and dissatisfaction (*YS* II.16-17), is to be undermined through yogic praxis until the *purusa* shines forth in its original and untainted glory. It is the *purusa* that the yogin seeks to realize and thereby liberate identity from any "entanglement" or "concealment" within "matter." *Purusa* is often described as being totally opposite to manifest or unmanifest *prakṛti* (*vyaktavyakta*) and as such is unaffected by *prakṛti*'s intricate web or network of traces or strands of materiality. Due to its "otherness," *purusa* the principle of consciousness is not to be confused with the transactions of human awareness (intellect, memory, and so on) as it transcends all object (worldly) orientation; and unlike

*prakṛti*, *puruṣa* is said to be uncharacterizable, conscious, and nonproductive.<sup>200</sup> As witness, and possessing freedom and the quality of clear vision or "seeing," *puruṣa* can be conceived (i.e., from *prakṛti*'s perspective) as being indifferent and inactive,<sup>201</sup> thus laying emphasis on an existence whose nature appears wholly transcendent, uninvolved, and invariably aloof from *prakṛti*'s realm. Whereas change characterizes all "matter" including our psychophysical being, changelessness is the very essence of *puruṣa*. Dasgupta writes:

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Puruṣa is the constant seer of the mind when it has an object, as in ordinary forms of phenomenal knowledge, or when it has no object as in the state of *nirodha* or cessation. Puruṣa is unchanging. It is the light which remains unchanged amidst all the changing modifications of the mind . . . Its knowing is manifested in our consciousness as the ever-persistent notion of the self, which is always a constant factor in all the phenomena of consciousness. Thus *puruṣa* always appears in our consciousness as the knowing agent.

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Since such a *puruṣa*, as contentless consciousness, could not be fully at home within the world of evolved matter, its ideal state is conceived of as being separate and apart from its apparent entanglement by the bonds of *prakṛti*.

In the Sāṃkhyan ontological duality of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, which Patañjali at least on a provisional basis utilizes, it appears to be the case that the former category comprises countless *puruṣas* (cf. *SK* 18) that are omnipotent, omniscient, and passive spectators of the cosmos. The *Mahābhārata* (XII.338.2)<sup>203</sup> states that both Yoga and Sāṃkhya proclaim the existence of multiple *puruṣas* in the world but that these many *puruṣas* all have their origin in the one Self (*ātman*), which is eternal, immutable, and incommensurable. That Self is described in the same section as being *both* the "seer" (*drastr*) and the "seeable" (*drastavya*). While this view is generally characteristic of the schools of preclassical Yoga it is not on the whole the acknowledged scholarly understanding of classical Yoga. According to Vyāsa, Yoga does admit many liberated beings (*kevalins*)<sup>204</sup> although it is not stated in the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* whether a plurality of *puruṣas* is ontologically intended or is not derived from a single *ātman* or the *puruṣa-principle* as spiritual essence.

What is the metaphysical status of *puruṣa*? Being eternal and omnipresent (*YS* III.54) a *puruṣa* has no particular locus but is ubiquitous, pervading everywhere. However, that a *puruṣa* is all-pervading leads to problems for both Sāṃkhya and Yoga (unlike, for example, Vedānta) since there is supposedly an infinity (or at least a very large number) of completely distinct, unrelated *puruṣas*. How can they all occupy the same infinite space without affecting each other in some way? Transcending all objectification, how can *puruṣa* be conceived as an entitative being? Given that, as pure consciousness, *puruṣas* are devoid of any attributes, how are they to be distinguished from each other? Furthermore, each liberated *puruṣa*, being ubiquitous, must coexist with all of *prakṛti* yet remain unaffected by her realm. Vacaspati Miśra (*TV* I.41) emphasizes that there is

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no distinction between these many Selves.<sup>205</sup> But is the doctrine of a plurality of *purusas* really a part of Patañjali's system of thought?

Following the cues provided in Vyasa's *Yoga-Bhāṣya* and especially Vacaspati Miśra's *Tattva-Vaiśaradī*, S. Dasgupta<sup>206</sup> argues on the basis of *Yoga-Sūtra* II.22 that Patañjali recognized a plurality of *purusas*. The text of *Yoga-Sūtra* II.22 runs as follows: *kṛtārtham prati nastamapyanastam tadanyasadharanatvat*, "For one whose purpose is accomplished, it [the nature of the seeable/extrinsic identity] has ceased, but not for others [i.e., the deluded, empirical selves], due to it being common."<sup>207</sup> In agreement with Feuerstein,<sup>208</sup> I submit that it cannot be conclusively demonstrated based on the above *sūtra* that Patañjali subscribed to the doctrine of plurality as, for example, is more explicitly set out in classical Sāṃkhya (*SK* 18). In fact, I cannot locate any clear reference to the effect that there is a multiplicity of *purusas*. There is no reason why *Yoga-Sūtra* II.22 could not be read in the same light of the preclassical tradition, where the term *kṛta-artha* also signifies the enlightened person who has attained *purusa*-realization thereby recovering authentic identity of Self beyond all plurality.<sup>209</sup>

The Sanskrit commentaries on the *Yoga-Sūtra* do imply that *purusas* are somehow countable entities and, if such is the case, then it must be admitted that the ancient Yoga masters or *gurus* allowed themselves to fall into ineluctable difficulty. According to G. Larson's reading of classical Sāṃkhya, there may be as many disclosures of pure consciousness (*purusa*) as there are intellects (*buddhi*) capable of reflective discernment (*adhyavasāya*), that is, the intellects are following various life "paths" and are functioning at various times and under varying circumstances in accordance with the various manifestations of the *gunas*.<sup>210</sup> In classical Sāṃkhya pure contentless consciousness in its immanence accompanies every intellect (unlike the cosmic *ātman* of the Upaniṣads), and thus it is stressed that

the awareness of consciousness is an achievement of the intellect and is a negative discernment of what the intellect is not. The Sāṃkhya arguments for a plurality of pure consciousness . . . appear to be directed at epistemological concerns rather than ontological matters. Because contentless consciousness can never be a content and cannot be characterized as are materiality or the tripartite process, it is hardly likely that the Sāṃkhya teachers were thinking of the plurality of consciousness as a set of knowable entities to be counted. They were thinking, rather, of the plurality of intellects through which the disclosure of contentless consciousness occurs.<sup>211</sup>

The only Sāṃkhya textual support for the above view is given by Viṇṇāna Bhikṣu in his commentary (entitled the *Samkhya-Pravacana-*

*Bhāṣya*) on *Samkhyasūtra* I.154. Viṇṇāna Bhikṣu raises a similar issue in his *Yoga-Vartika* (II.22), which seems to suggest that for him the intention in Yoga with its so-called plurality of *purusas* is also largely epistemological. Bhikṣu understands the meaning of the expression

"*krtartha*" in *Yoga-Sutra* II.22 as referring to "one whose object or purpose is supplied by the intellect," <sup>212</sup> which can imply a plurality of intellects leading to the existential sense of there being multiple individualized selves or persons (because each individual self has a particular mind) through which pure consciousness discloses itself. Bhikṣu suggests that the Sāṃkhya notion of a plurality of *puruṣas* does not contradict the evidence of the Veda that there is only one Self (*paramatman*) or essential identity. Bhikṣu makes the arguable claim that in the Veda oneness or uniformity refers to the essential nature (*svārūpa*) of selfhood in terms of genus (*jāti*) and therefore Vedic references to oneness or selfhood need not be construed as implying singularity. <sup>213</sup> Bhikṣu further maintains that many passages in the Veda (i.e., *śruti*) show that selfhood presents itself under limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) and as such there is no contradiction between Vedic testimony and the Sāṃkhyan notion of the plurality of *puruṣas*. <sup>214</sup>

One way, therefore, to approach the notion of the "plurality" of *puruṣas* is to adopt a somewhat suspicious attitude toward Yoga interpreters (in both the extant native textual tradition and in modern scholarship) and approach the issue (as mentioned above by Larson) by laying emphasis on the epistemology of the intellect (*buddhi*) or mind (*citta*) rather than the ontology of the *puruṣas*. *Puruṣa*, by definition being ever-free, ever-wise, unchanging, and so on, could never be in actual bondage, and its intrinsic nature is therefore quite unaffected by any apparent loss of true identity or by any form of limitation. Vyāsa (*YB* II.18) reveals that: "These two, experience and emancipation, are created by the mind (i.e., *buddhi*) and function only in the mind . . . In the mind alone are bondage, which is the failure to fulfill the purpose of *puruṣa*, and emancipation, which is completion of that purpose." <sup>215</sup> Metaphysically speaking, the universe has meaning only insofar as it serves the purpose of *puruṣa*, that is, for experience and liberation. <sup>216</sup> According to Vyāsa's statement (n. 215 above), it would make more sense to understand spiritual emancipation as referring to a liberated state of mind (i.e., the mind including the individual consciousness and personality is liberated from its former condition of spiritual ignorance) and not literally as referring to a *puruṣa*, which is by definition already free and therefore has no intrinsic need to be liberated from the fetters of worldly existence. One of the implications of multiple *puruṣas* for Patañjali's system would be to underscore the uniqueness of

each individual's perspective or consciousness. Whether or not Patañjali actually adhered to the notion of a plurality of *puruṣas* appears to be an open question.

Any consideration of Patañjali's "metaphysics" would be incomplete without reference to the third major "principle" of his ontology, the concept of *isvara* or "Lord" (God). The term *isvara* is found as early as the *Brhadaranyaka Upaniṣad* (e.g. I.4.8). <sup>217</sup> In some Vedānta-inspired schools of Yoga, *isvara* refers to the Supreme Being as it rules over the cosmos and individuated beings. This idea is illustrated in the *Bhagavadgītā* (XVIII.61): "The Lord abides in the heart of all beings, Arjuna, by his power (*māyā*) causing all beings to revolve [as if they were] mounted on a wheel." <sup>218</sup>

In the Hiraṇyagarbha "school" of Yoga outlined in XII.296 of the *Mahābhārata* epic, <sup>219</sup> the noteworthy distinction is made between the Self that is recovering or awakening to its innate enlightenment, that is, the *budhyamāna*, and the ever-enlightened *buddha* ("awakened one") or

*prabuddha*.<sup>220</sup> The later principle, *buddha*, is considered the twenty-sixth principle (*tattva*) and is also referred to as "Lord," *isvara*.<sup>221</sup> The *budhyamana* is the twenty-fifth principle (*tattva*) the principle of conscious existence. When it fully "awakens" and realizes its intrinsic nature as being already enlightened, it becomes the Absolute.<sup>222</sup> There does not appear to be, however, any clear and simple identification of the twenty-fifth principle (*budhyamana*) with the twenty-sixth principle the supremely enlightened state (*buddha* or *isvara*). The *budhyamana* partakes, as it were, in the realm of the twenty-sixth principle without necessarily attaining an identity *as* it. Maintaining a constant state of transcendence, *isvara* "never becomes involved with the lower *tattvas*. Thus emancipation can be said to be a condition of the [*budhyamana*] *qua* the [*budhyamana*] in the 'company' (*samiti*) of the lord."<sup>223</sup>

In the above we have seen that the epic yogins allowed twenty-six fundamental categories of existence (*tattvas*), *prakṛti* and its modes comprising the first twenty-four principles. Many passages in the *Mokṣadharmā* section of the *Mahābhārata* that assert a twenty-sixth principle do not necessarily imply the classical Yoga notion of a "Lord" (*isvara*). Such passages could simply refer to the *puruṣa* (or *kṣetrajñā*) in its intrinsically enlightened state.<sup>224</sup> However, it is obvious from examining sections of the *Mahābhārata*, especially the twelfth *parvan*, that the conceptualization of *isvara* in Patañjali's Yoga has its epic antecedents. In his pioneering study, P. M. Modi rightly points out, "The idea of God in the Yoga System was not arrived at by superimposing it on an atheistic Sāṃkhya System with

twenty-five principles but by distinguishing the Jiva [individuated self] from God on practical grounds." <sup>225</sup>

While classical Sāṃkhya is said to be *nir-isvara* or "nontheistic," classical Yoga appears to incorporate a *sa-isvara* or theistic stance. However, it is simply not appropriate to label the *Sāṃkhya-Kārika* as being nontheistic. *Isvara* Kṛṣṇa, rather like the Buddha, chooses not to mention or make any statement about God at all. According to the *Sāṃkhya-Kārika*, if there be a God (there being no positive denial of God's existence in the *Sāṃkhya-Kārika*), then such a Being has little or nothing to do with the actual path of salvation as propounded by *Isvara* Kṛṣṇa.<sup>226</sup>

According to several scholars, the theistic stance of Yoga is clearly acknowledged by Patañjali.<sup>227</sup> The "Lord" (*isvara*) is not a creator (i.e., an anthropomorphic deity) like the Judeo-Christian God. Neither Patañjali nor Vyasa mention *isvara*'s role (i.e., as a material cause) in the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world, implying thus an absence of a creator God in Yoga. *Isvara* is also not the kind of universal Absolute taught in the Upaniṣads and envisaged by many thinkers within the tradition of Vedānta. Nor is *isvara* intended as a type of enlightened superbeing such as the transcendent *bodhisattvas* of Mahāyāna Buddhism. *Isvara* is defined by Patañjali as a Self (*puruṣa*) *sui generis*, whose distinctiveness from the "ordinary" *puruṣa* is explained largely in negative terms. *Yoga-Sūtra* I.24 states: "*Isvara* is a distinct Self (*puruṣa*) untouched by the afflictions, actions or their fruition or their latent residue [in the mind]."<sup>228</sup> The distinctness or specialness of *isvara* consists in that at no time can *isvara* become embroiled in the domain of *prakṛti*, whereas all other "*puruṣas*" at one time or another will have been

entrenched in the illusion of being a misidentified entity within *prakṛti* and thus enslaved to prakṛtic existence. *Iśvara* does not abandon "His" perfect condition of transcendence as pure consciousness and infinite existence. The Lord's freedom is eternal.<sup>229</sup> This view has led to theological difficulties since Patañjali also regards *iśvara* as being of positive relevance for humankind in that *iśvara* is: (1) that Being in whom "the seed of omniscience is unsurpassed";<sup>230</sup> (2) the first teacher (*guru*) of all former yogins because not limited by time;<sup>231</sup> (3) whose expression is *praṇava* [*Om*];<sup>232</sup> and (4) following from the recitation of *praṇava* and realization of its meaning,<sup>233</sup> one realizes the "inner consciousness" (*pratyak-cetana*) and obstacles no longer arise.<sup>234</sup> The above statements (*YS* I.25-29) are meant to be understood in conjunction with the concept of *iśvara-praṇidhāna* or "devotion to *iśvara*."<sup>235</sup>

One might ask: How is it possible that a wholly transcendent *puruṣa* can intervene in the spatial, temporal world? In his commentary (*YB* I.24) Vyasa

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elaborates on this issue explaining *iśvara*'s teaching role in terms of the 'Lord's' appropriation of a perfect medium, which Vyasa terms *sattva* ("beingness").<sup>236</sup> Vacaspati Misra reasons that out of compassion for the individuated selves the 'Lord', as it were, reaches "down" and "touches" the pure *sattva* of *prakṛti*, the power of *sattva* excelling beyond the reach of *rajas* and *tamas*. *Iśvara* "touches" this *sattva* as it prevails in the mind (*citta*), thus asserting a definite proprietorship (i.e., lordship: from the root *is*: "to own, be master of" and *vara*: "choicest") over this aspect of *prakṛti*.<sup>237</sup> But unlike the empirical selves, *iśvara* does not become subject to spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) and bondage. This is comparable to the role played by an actor/actress who, while identifying with the part nevertheless remains aware that he or she is not identical with the character of his or her role. The 'Lord', unlike the individuated selves, does not identify with *avidyā* on the "stage" of a *sattva*-dominated mind.<sup>238</sup> This is made possible because the 'Lord's' unblemished *sattva* is devoid of any contamination of *rajas* and *tamas*.<sup>239</sup> All *puruṣas* (assuming there are a plurality of *puruṣas*) are of course intrinsically free but only the 'Lord' has been forever aware of this truth. According to *Tattva-Vaiśaradi* I.24 *iśvara*'s power of knowledge and "action"<sup>240</sup> continues to bestow "favor" to the mind of the devoted yogin all for the purpose of liberation. *Iśvara* therefore "acts" non-samsarically, in the spirit of what the *Bhagavadgītā* calls "ego-transcending" or "trans-action" (*naiskarmya*) actionacting without attachment to the fruits of action whereby no binding, karmic fruition (*vipakā*) could ever accrue, nor could any afflictions ever arise. Vyasa declares that *iśvara* appropriated such an untainted vehicle of *sattva* in order "to confer favor to living beings,"<sup>241</sup> and also insists that the proof for this conviction is located in the sacred scriptures, which are manifestations of *iśvara*'s perfect *sattva*.<sup>242</sup>

*Iśvara* was undoubtedly more than a mere concept to Patañjali and the yogins of his time. It makes sense to assume that *iśvara* corresponded to an "experience" they shared. Considering the distinctly pragmatic orientation of his Yoga, it is doubtful that Patañjali would adopt the concept *iśvara* for merely historical reasons or simply in order to make his philosophy acceptable to orthodox Hinduism. The idea of "grace" or divine recompense (*anugraha*, *prasāda*)<sup>243</sup> has been an integral element of Yoga since the rise of the theistic traditions as seen in the Pāñcarātra

tradition for example, as epitomized in the *Bhagavadgita*.

If one were to classify Yoga as being a radical dualistic perspective thereby focusing on the purely transcendent nature of *isvara*, that is, *isvara's* role as a teacher being viewed as entirely passive and disengaged from any relation to the mechanism of *prakṛti*, it is possible to see *isvara's*

role as *guru* in purely metaphorical terms. The practical significance of the 'Lord', which the classical exegetes see in terms of *isvara's* related existence to empirical selves entangled in the prakṛtic realm, can also be understood passively, namely as the utter formless transcendent teacher, the archetypal yogin who "guides" by "His" mere presence or sheer being.<sup>244</sup> Mircea Eliade speaks of this as a "metaphysical sympathy"<sup>245</sup> between *isvara* and the aspiring yogin made possible by the ontological co-essentiality of *isvara* and the spiritual essence of a human being (*purusa*). To view *isvara* as something not absolutely identical with *purusa* is of intrinsic value. Not only does it enable yogins of a more devotional disposition to advance along the "path" by way of *pranidhana* or "devotion," but also warns those with a more intellectual outlook not to think of themselves in terms too autonomous, thus falling prey to dangerous pride (*abhimana*), a quality of the ego-consciousness. It should not be overlooked that *isvara* might have met primarily psychological and pedagogical needs rather than providing a purely ontological category. In other words, the term *isvara* was used by Patañjali largely to account for certain yogic experiences (e.g., *YS* II.44 acknowledges the possibility of making contact with one's "chosen deity" *ista-devata* as a result of personal, scriptural study *svadhyaya*).

If there are many transcendent *purusas*, then how exactly are they related to one another and to *isvara*, singly and collectively? For the purpose of this study it suffices to say that the status and relationship of *isvara* to the *purusas* and the *purusas* one to another is an open question. Empirically, however, the relation of *isvara* to the yogin can be described as "a one-way affair in which the believing yogin emulates *isvara's* condition, which is co-essential with the condition of his inmost Self."<sup>246</sup> However, there can be no question of the intrinsic nature of the transcendent Self whether *isvara* or not ever being affected in the literal sense by the afflictions (*avidya*, *asmita*, etc.) or any other samsaric phenomena. Notwithstanding some of the problems inherent in Patañjali's concept of *isvara*, this term is of considerable importance for Patañjali's Yoga. Indeed, original Yoga within Hinduism always was *sa-isvara* or "with God" (cf. *MBh* XII.300.3). However narrow and even unacceptable to some the conception of "God" in classical Yoga may appear, the devotional element in it cannot be ignored or denied. Even though Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra* appears to designate "devotion to the Lord" as an alternative "path," or only one of several ways that combine together to achieve a liberating transformation of consciousness, there can be no question of *isvara's* integral role in Patañjali's system.

It is of interest to note that neither Vyasa nor Vacaspati tackle the issue of whether *isvara* is an additional principle (implying a twenty-sixth



*tattva*) of Patañjali's Yoga. It is entirely possible that being a particular kind of *purusa*, *isvara* is not intended to be an additional principle. If this be the case, it can further be speculated that although *isvara* and the so-called innumerable *purusas* (or *purusa*) are formally differentiated as a numerical multiplicity, one can assume that at the absolute level of existence *isvara* coincides with the *purusa(s)*. It might then be possible that at the transcendent level *isvara* and the "liberated" *purusa(s)* (the twenty-fifth principle) merge ontologically as one Being, that is, are qualitatively one in eternity; or even can be said to "intersect" as separate Self-monads whereupon they enter into a state of pure intersubjectivity. But speculation at this highly abstract level, however difficult it may be, does not seem to represent the spirit of the Yoga school, which is much more practical and experiential in character. The nature of *isvara* as experienced in the liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) is not a topic in the *Yoga-Sutra*. What seems crucially important, however, is for the yogin to know that the existence of *isvara* is clearly admitted. Unlike any other conscious "being" or "principle," *isvara* can function as a transformative catalyst or "guide" for aiding the yogin on the "path" to spiritual emancipation. Thus, whether one asserts that Patañjali's descriptions of *isvara* constitute a theistic stance or not, the concept of *isvara* must be taken seriously as an authentic and dynamic aspect of Patañjali's philosophical platform.<sup>247</sup>

Paradoxically it appears that *purusa* is both aware of its transcendent nature as the "seer" (YS I.3) and yet is *seemingly* and mysteriously "entrapped" in *prakṛti* whereby human identity experiences itself to be a finite entity through a process of "conformity" (*sarupya*, YS I.4) to the nature of the modifications (*vṛtti*) of the mind (*citta*). What we normally call the mind or ordinary consciousness is due to the conjunction (*samyoga*)<sup>248</sup> between the "seer" and the "seeable" that is, between pure consciousness and the complex of the body and personality. *Purusa* is, however, distinct from phenomenal consciousness (*citta*) and therefore is not to be confused with empirical selfhood and its turbulence or "whirls" of thoughts and emotions,<sup>249</sup> these all being a form and product of the three *gunas*. The *purusa's* proximity to the highly evolved human organism "solicits" the phenomenon of consciousness.<sup>250</sup> The connection between *purusa* and *prakṛti* is made possible because at the finest, most subtle level of *prakṛti* is found a predominance of the *sattva* component (*guna*) wherein *prakṛti*, in the form of the mind (*citta*), is transparent enough to "reflect" the "light" of consciousness (of *purusa*) and create the appearance of sentience as well as an autonomous sense of intelligence in its evolutes or manifestations.

Patañjali effectively draws on the key yogic concept of "mind" (*citta*) in order to articulate the human "predicament" of mistaken identity. In the chapter that follows we will be exploring how Patañjali and his main commentator, Vyasa, make use of the Samkhyan *triguna* doctrine and present a study of the mind's nature, structure, and functioning (*vṛtti*) that is ineluctably and integrally linked to Yoga epistemology.



## Chapter Three

### The Mind (*Citta*): Its Nature, Structure, and Functioning

This chapter will focus on Yoga epistemology and psychology by examining the nature, structure, and functioning of the mind (*citta*), the mind being the locus of consciousness through which we "know" and "experience" ourselves and the world. Yoga offers an acute analysis of the role played by the mind in the act of cognition and accounts for the decisive influence that the psyche exerts over human perception, cognition, and behavior, ethical or otherwise. Following from some of the questions raised in the last chapter regarding Yoga metaphysics and issues of an ontological nature, this chapter attempts to lay a foundation for understanding definitions and explanations of key terms in the *Yoga-Sutra* with an epistemological emphasis rather than the ontological emphasis normally given to them.

In Yoga, the purpose of the human mind is not limited simply to the production of concepts that "correspond" to or are distinct representations of a presupposed external reality, as in the Western Cartesian model of understanding. Neither is the mind, according to Yoga, restricted to the role of imposing its own order on the world, as is the case, for example, in the Kantian epistemology, which states that all human knowledge of the world is in some sense determined by subjective principles. As we will see, in Yoga both of the above epistemological dualisms themselves the product of

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spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) are understood and transcended in a larger and subtler understanding of the human mind. The truth of the world is realized within and through the human mind.

Samkhya posits an analysis of human awareness (*buddhi*, *vrtti*) or mental processes that Yoga more or less incorporates and that involves the principles (*tattvas*) of *prakrti*. Human awareness functions through the "inner instrumentality" (*antahkarana*) comprised of the following three principles:

1. The mind-organ (*manas*), which assimilates and synthesizes sense impressions acting as a conveyor of information and bringing the awareness in contact with external objects;
2. The "I-maker" (*ahamkara*) or principle of individuation, which acts as a locus of self-identity; and
3. The intellect (*buddhi*), the finest or most subtle aspect of human awareness, the faculty of judgment or decision that determines overall perspective and intentionality and makes understanding possible.<sup>1</sup>

*Purusa* provides the "frame" for the above mental processes,<sup>2</sup> and though omnipresent, *purusa*

remains "unseen" and transcendent of *prakṛti*'s activities.

In the consensus reality of egoic states of identity, *puruṣa* is as if "covered over,"<sup>3</sup> "veiled," or eclipsed by the dominance of the mental functions of the mind. Such states of mind define one's normal perception of reality and perpetuate in the individual the sense that the existence of an objective world is a presupposed or given static "entity" in opposition to one's notion of self. The unbridgeable gap between the individual subject or atomistic ego and object or world presupposed in the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm, a polarization that is itself part of the afflicted condition described in Yoga, can be effectively "bridged," "remedied," or "healed" according to Yoga. To be sure, Patañjali's Yoga is by no means a "Cartesian dichotomy":<sup>4</sup> it does not articulate the experience of an autonomous subjective self as being fundamentally distinct and separate from an objective external world of nature that it seeks to understand and achieve a mastery over. The Samkhyan dualism that Yoga utilizes is quite distinct from the Cartesian dualism that bifurcates reality into mental and material aspects. Samkhya's dualistic perspective comprised of pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) and *prakṛti* as everything else including the mental and the material asserts that psyche and the external world are not ultimately different. Both are forms of insentient or nonconscious *prakṛti* termed the "seeable"

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(*drśya*) in Yoga. In order to place Yoga (or Samkhya) within the context of Cartesian duality, *puruṣa* would then have to be reduced to the level of Descartes' "cogito," which in yogic terms is equivalent to the *asmita-matṛa* (i.e., *ahamkāra*)-*manas* level of *prakṛti* and in fact totally alienates human being from intrinsic self-identity (*puruṣa*). Such a Cartesian-like subject is, from Yoga's perspective, a delusion or incorrect understanding of ourselves, an underlying misconception that is the very source of our suffering and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*).

In ancient and classical Hindu models of reality, the human mind takes on a more participatory and creative dimension. The Hindu view of the mind's highest potentialities is expressed in both the early and later Upanisads<sup>5</sup> where, far from advancing "an unsophisticated idealism," the emphasis is on the crucial role of the mind in gaining access to the world, thereby "exposing a complementarity between the perceived and the means of perception. Without the mind no world could be known nor could any action be accomplished."<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the mind becomes the instrument through which either enslavement to worldly existence, or spiritual freedom is cultivated.<sup>7</sup>

Patañjali's Yoga deals first and foremost with the human mind. In the *Yoga-Sūtra* the relationship between *puruṣa* (*drastr*, the "seer") and *prakṛti* (*drśya*, the "seeable") can be viewed as a dynamic interplay manifesting itself through the instrument of the human mind. The mind as is the case in the Upanisads and Samkhyas is thus of great significance for determining how the world and self are "experienced" and "known," and finally, for "attaining" liberation from the samsaric enterprise of misidentification and ignorance. The pivot of the predicament of *puruṣa*'s "entanglement" with *prakṛti* is, I suggest, epistemological and it is here that we should look for an opening into the meaning of Patañjali's Yoga.

*Citta*

*Citta*, which will be translated as "mind," is the perfect past participle of the verbal root *cit*, meaning: "to observe," "perceive," "to appear," "to shine," "to be conscious of," "to understand," "to know," "to attend to."<sup>8</sup> The term *cit* is widely employed in Yoga and Vedanta scriptures to denote the transcendent consciousness or pure awareness of the Self (*atman*). The term *citta* can mean: "thinking," "reflecting," "imagining," "thought," "intention," "wish," "the heart," "mind," "intelligence," "reason."<sup>9</sup> *Citta* is used in the *Rg Veda* and the *Atharva Veda*<sup>10</sup> besides the more frequently

employed terms *asu* ("life" or "vital force") and *manas* (variously translated as "mind-organ" or "lower mind"), and it appears occasionally in the Upanisads<sup>11</sup> often translated as "thought." Feuerstein writes: "It is applied wherever psycho-mental phenomena connected with conscious activity are to be expressed."<sup>12</sup>

By the time of the *Mahabharata* the word *citta* gained more popular usage as can be seen in the *Bhagavadgita*.<sup>13</sup> Unlike *manas* (which is used by most other orthodox schools to denote the concept "mind" in the loose sense mentioned earlier) the technical term *citta* is more specifically at home in Yoga and refers to phenomenal consciousness including both the ordinary level of awareness involving the conscious processes of the mind and the deeper level of the unconscious mind or psyche. The *citta* itself is not sentient.<sup>14</sup> Only *purusa* or pure consciousness is Self-luminous and "shines forth" unalloyed and unabated. Its "light" can be understood as being "reflected" or "mirrored" in insentient *prakrti* (i.e., in the human mind), creating various self-reflective stages of the mind. This imagery is used by Vacaspati Misra, who, in his gloss on *Yoga-Sutra* II.20, states concisely: "The casting of the *purusa's* reflection into the mirror of *buddhi* [*citta*] is the way in which *purusa* can know the *buddhi*."<sup>15</sup> When the higher transcendent consciousness (*citi*) assumes the form of the mind, the experience of one's own intellect (and therefore of ideas, cognition, intention, and volition) becomes possible (YS IV.22).<sup>16</sup> Thus the mind becomes "consciousness-of" or is "conscious of" objects and can know all purposes (i.e., the purpose of objects is to provide experience and liberation for each being) and perceive all objects. The mind is in a way a function of *purusa* and *prakrti* combined.<sup>17</sup> *Citta's* consciousness<sup>18</sup> functions in the form of various modifications (*vr̥ttis*)<sup>19</sup> or "whirls" of consciousness often construed as cognitive conditions or mental processes that are constantly undergoing transformation and development (*parinama*). Ordinary human consciousness is therefore an impermanent, fleeting or "whirling" state of consciousness. Therefore it is possible to decipher clearly between two radically different modes of consciousness as used in the *Yoga-Sutra*: (1) pure, immortal consciousness, our intrinsic identity as *purusa* (Self); and (2) empirical consciousness or mind (*citta*) including mental activity (*vr̥tti*) through which our perceptions and experiences inform and build a sense of person and self-identity. The latter is figuratively called "consciousness" because it is pure consciousness reflected in, or conditioned by, the mind.

In *Samkhya-Karika* 33 the so-called synonym for *cittaantahkarana* ("inner instrument") is found, which is understood to be made up of *huddhi*, *ahamkara*, and *manas*. In the *Yoga-Sutra* the term *citta* can refer

to these three manifest principles (*tattvas*) of *prakṛti*, namely: the intellect, sense of self, and mind-organ respectively. *Citta* can be viewed as the aggregate of the cognitive, volitional, affective activities, processes, and functions of human consciousness, that is, it consists of a grasping, intentional, and volitional consciousness, and functions as the locus of empirical selfhood. Outside the purview of classical Yoga *citta* is generally employed in a less technically precise sense and mostly refers to mind in general. This tendency is present in the commentarial literature on the *Yoga-Sutra* where *citta* is often equated with *buddhi* or *manas*, these terms being used interchangeably.<sup>20</sup>

A variety of translations has been suggested for *citta* such as: "mind,"<sup>21</sup> "mind-stuff,"<sup>22</sup> "mind-complex,"<sup>23</sup> "consciousness,"<sup>24</sup> "awareness,"<sup>25</sup> "die innere Welt,"<sup>26</sup> "psyche,"<sup>27</sup> "psychic nature,"<sup>28</sup> "thinking principle,"<sup>29</sup> and "internal organ."<sup>30</sup> Even though the term is not defined explicitly by Patañjali, its meaning can be ascertained from its occurrences in the *Yoga-Sutra*. S. Dasgupta states that the *citta* stands for "all that is psychical in man."<sup>31</sup> Koelman asserts that *citta* is "surely not a separate prakṛtic evolute,"<sup>32</sup> meaning that it is not distinguishable from its component factors, those being *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas*, whose emergence from primordial *prakṛti* is the theme of the Sāṃkhya ontological scheme. Feuerstein calls *citta* "an umbrella term comprising all the functionings of the mind."<sup>33</sup> The sixteenth-century commentator Viṇṇāna Bhikṣu supports the notion that *citta* comprises all of the above three prakṛtic principles and their internal functioning (including a volitional, grasping, and intentional nature) by explaining that the word *citta* does not signify only one of the above faculties but the entire *antahkarana*.<sup>34</sup>

Whereas Isvara Kṛṣṇa appears mostly concerned with showing the various components of the "inner world" of the psyche separately and in their evolutionary dependence, Patañjali, by his concept of *citta*, emphasizes the homogeneity or integral psychological constitution of the human personality as well as the processes (e.g., cognitive, affective, etc.) of empirical consciousness. Patañjali is only secondarily interested in an analytical categorization of the inner states. *Citta*, which is used a total of twenty-two times<sup>35</sup> in the *Yoga-Sutra*, is a comprehensive concept that can be seen as embracing the various functionings of the ontological categories of *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas*, and yet as reflected consciousness in total it is a nonstructural or ahierarchical concept and cannot be equated or reduced to any one or more of the above evolutes in themselves.

The term *manas* ("lower mind" or "mind-organ") occurs only three times in the *Yoga-Sutra*. *Yoga-Sutra* I.35 and II.53 make use of the more

traditional Hindu association of *manas* with the sense capacities that are to be controlled through sense withdrawal (*pratyahara*) and concentration (*dharana*).<sup>36</sup> *Yoga-Sutra* III.48<sup>37</sup> speaks of the speediness (*javitva*) of the *manas* that arises from the "conquest of the senses" (*indriya-jaya*, *YS*

III.47). The consistent use by Patañjali of *manas* in conjunction with the senses is no accident and certainly reflects preclassical usage. Whereas Samkhya asserts that *manas* is the size of the body, Yoga asserts that *manas* is all-pervasive.<sup>38</sup> In Vyasa's exposition the word *manas* almost always is associated with some external activity such as speaking, shaking, the breathing process, and even sleep.<sup>39</sup> The term *buddhi* (intellect) is used only twice in the *Yoga-Sutra* (IV.21 and 22)<sup>40</sup> and appears to be given a cognitive emphasis, although the dimension of *citta* as "will" so crucial in Yoga (and as if absent in Samkhya) is included as an aspect of *buddhi*.

Hindu philosophical schools quite often distinguish two aspects of mental life called *manas* and *buddhi*. While *manas* assimilates and synthesizes sense impressions and brings the sense of self into contact with the external objects, it still, however, lacks discrimination furnishing the empirical sense of self (*ahamkara*) only with precepts that must in turn be transformed and acted upon by a higher mental function, the intellect (*buddhi*). The intellect can forget its inherent discerning power by either attending to *manas* and reifying or absolutizing its sense interpretations, or it can become free-functioning as a vehicle of liberation by attaining knowledge (*jñāna*), which is in fact its own finest and most subtle nature as *sattva*.

Neither of Isvara Kṛṣṇa's terms: *linga* "the essential core" (SK 40) a prerequisite for experience and comprising the thirteen evolutes (i.e., *buddhi*, *ahamkara*, *manas*, and the ten *indriyas*), or the "set of eighteen" (*lingasarira* or *sukśmasarira* [SK 39], the subtle body comprising the above thirteen evolutes plus the five subtle senses), are able to convey the essentially dynamic interaction among the psychic structures or functional unity that the term *citta* connotes. In classical Yoga (see below), the Sanskrit commentators argue that because the *citta* is all-pervasive, the postulation of a subtle body is unnecessary.

Although *citta* is not treated as a separate ontological category (*tattva*), it is nevertheless a part of insentient *prakṛti* and thus consists of the three *guṇas*.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, *Yoga-Sutra* IV.23 states: "[Due to] the mind being colored by the seer and the seeable, [it can, therefore, know] all purposes."<sup>42</sup> *Citta* is in a sense the product of the transcendent consciousness or seer and the perceived object, the seeable, inasmuch as it is said to be "colored" or tinted by both; however, it does not appear to be a derivation of either. It

can be characterized as a function of the mysterious relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and plays a crucial epistemological role in Patañjali's Yoga as *Yoga-Sutra* IV.22 (see n. 16 above) and IV.23 (see n. 17 and n. 42 above) clearly illustrate. Rather than being viewed as "substance" per se, *citta* can be seen as a heuristic device for understanding the dynamic interplay between pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) the seer (*draṣṭṛ*) and *prakṛti* the seeable (*dṛśya*) in the form of a reflected state of consciousness.

The philosophy of classical Yoga, in contrast to that of Samkhya, recognizes the cosmic or root *citta*; it is the "one mind" that impels the many individualized minds. The root *citta*, becoming operative in a single personality, appears individual. This important point can be clarified as follows. In *Yoga-Sutra* IV.4 the numerous fabricated, individualized minds (*nirmana-cittas*) are said to arise from *asmita-matṛ* the ontological principle denoting the exclusive sense of I-am-

ness.<sup>43</sup> According to Vyasa, *Yoga-Sutra* IV.4 is alleged to have been composed in reply to the question: "(Opponent:) Well, when a yogin projects several bodies, do they have one mind between them or a mind each?"<sup>44</sup> The question arose from the treatment of powers (*siddhis*) mentioned in *Yoga-Sutra* IV.1<sup>45</sup> as to whether the multiple bodies that the yogin can produce at will are also endowed with a distinct consciousness. Vyasa's answer to the above question is that the artificially created bodies do each have a mind.<sup>46</sup> Yet how could the activities of several minds wait on the purposes of a single mind?<sup>47</sup> The answer is given in *Yoga-Sutra* IV.5: "[Although the multiple individualized minds are involved] in distinct activities, it is the one mind of [this] many that is the initiator."<sup>48</sup>

At this point in our analysis we take issue with Feuerstein's understanding when he states that, "the 'one consciousness' [mind in *YS* IV.5] is none other than the primary I-am-ness (*asmita-matra*) of aphorism IV.4."<sup>49</sup> Elsewhere Feuerstein has suggested<sup>50</sup> that *asmita-matra* is equivalent to the Samkhyan term *ahamkara*, an equation with which our study agrees. However, Feuerstein then goes on to equate the "one mind" (*cittam-ekam*) of *Yoga-Sutra* IV.5 with *asmita-matra*, thereby reducing *citta* to a separate prakrtic evolute and contradicting all that he has previously said about *citta* (i.e., that *citta* is an "umbrella term" and is "distinct from its component factors" such as *buddhi*, *ahamkara*, etc.).<sup>51</sup> If the "one mind" of *Yoga-Sutra* IV.5 were the equivalent of *asmita-matra* (*YS* IV.4), then Patañjali could have repeated the term *asmita-matra* in *Yoga-Sutra* IV.5. Would it not be more accurate, and in keeping with Patañjali's consistent vocabulary, to assert that the "one mind" gives birth to individual minds (i.e., distinct personalities) through the medium of the bare

I-am-ness (*asmita-matra*)? *Asmita-matra* in turn would give rise to the individual, subjective sense of self or ego; this it does in conjunction with the reflected consciousness of the *purusa* located in the *citta*. The root *citta* illuminates *asmita-matra* with the reflected consciousness that it has "borrowed" from *purusa*. Here the "one mind" can be conceived ontologically as *linga-matra* or *mahat* (in Samkhya), and epistemologically as *buddhi* or intellect in its purest and subtlest form of *sattva* or knowledge (*jñāna*). In Yoga, the discriminating discernment (*vivekakhyati*, *YS* II.26) between *purusa* and the *sattva* takes place in the *sattva* of the mind. Being comprised of the three *gunas*, the mind is in some sense active but in its subtlest state the "one mind" is said to be like *purusa*, for at this finest degree of subtlety the mind has reached a state of purity analogous to that of the *purusa*. The coexistence of the purity of both *purusa* and *prakrti* (as the mind) is associated in Yoga with the liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).<sup>52</sup> However, under the influence of spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) the reflected consciousness, misidentified as *purusa*, appears as the affliction (*klesa*) of "I-am-ness" (*asmita*), which permeates the prakrtic or empirical realm of selfhood and can include both the cosmic (*mahat* or *mahan atma*) and individual sense of self (*ahamkara*). Both levels of "I-am-ness" are, in the above, to be understood as being permeated by the reflected consciousness of *purusa* under the influence of ignorance or misidentification.

Patañjali does acknowledge that there exists a multitude of individuated minds and personalities (not to be confused with *purusas*) and appears to reject the pure idealist view that the objects of



experience are merely products of the mind and having no existence in themselves. This idealist perspective tends ultimately to negate the reality of the manifest world. In *Yoga-Sutra* IV.14 Patañjali states: "From the homogeneity in the transformation [of the *gunas*] there is the "thatness" of an object,"<sup>53</sup> implying, it seems, a refutation of the idealist view that objects are merely projections or imaginings of the mind and thus are deprived of having ontological status in themselves. Patañjali continues: "Since there is difference of minds, while the object is the same, the two must be distinct levels [of existence]." "It [the object] does not depend on one mind; this is unprovable: then what could it [i.e., such an object] be?"<sup>54</sup> An external object, or any object for that matter, is composed of the three constituents (*gunas*) of *prakṛti* and has a real existence; therefore, it is not simply the product of a single mind.<sup>55</sup> Vyasa interprets Patañjali as refuting the Buddhist school of Yogacara,<sup>56</sup> which has often been understood (or misunderstood) as pure subjective idealism, implying a sheer negation of the external world.

### An Introduction to *Karma*, *Samskara*, and *Vasana*

A key philosophical doctrine outlined in the *Yoga-Sutra* is that of *karman* (*karma*). The word *karman* denotes action in general. The *Bhagavadgita* (XVIII.23-25), for example, distinguishes three fundamental types of acts, depending on the agent's inner disposition:

1. *Sattvika-karman*, which stands for actions that are prescribed by tradition, performed without attachment by a person who is nonobsessed or no longer egoistically consumed by the results or "fruit" (*phala*) of action; it is said to be of the nature of "purity" or "benevolence";
2. *Rajasa-karman*, which is generated out of a self-centered mentality or ego-sense (*ahamkara*) in order to experience self-gratification or pleasure; it is said to be of the nature of "desire" or "passion";
3. *Tamasa-karman*, which is performed out of a confused or deluded mentality in which one is unconcerned about the moral or spiritual consequences of his or her actions; it is said to be of the nature of "evil" or "dullness."<sup>57</sup>

Karman also means "ritual act."<sup>58</sup> But more specifically *karman* (or *karma*) refers to the moral dynamic behind one's intentions, volitions, thoughts, and behavior. In this sense, *karma* often corresponds to deterministic forces or fate as determined by the quality of one's being, including past lives and one's present embodiment. One's accumulated *karma* is often pictured as a "bank" or "store" consisting of good and bad stock that combine to mature in particular and unpredictable ways in one's life. In Hindu tradition, one's karmic "storehouse" has been distinguished generally as consisting of three types of *karma*: (1) *samcita-karma*, or the already accumulated "stock" of karmic residue or deposits (*asaya*) that is not being activated and is therefore awaiting fruition; (2) *prarabdha-karma*, which has begun to mature in this life (e.g., related to our sex and genetic makeup); (3) *agamin-karma*, which is *karma* acquired during the present lifetime, that is, *karma* in the making, the fresh storage of merit or demerit that will bear fruit in the future.<sup>59</sup> *Karma* is often thought to stand for a mechanism that maintains worldly existence (*samsara*) rooted in spiritual ignorance of the intrinsic, immortal nature of Self,

implicating us as confused, egoic identities in a beginningless cycle of birth and death leading to suffering and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*). Yet, however negatively portrayed the doctrine of *karma* may be, there is clearly room within Hindu tradition for a more nondeterministic, creative, and emancipatory dimension to the doctrine of

*karma* that, from an ethical and soteriological perspective, takes into account the crucial role played by free will as either positively or negatively effecting one's life. Moreover, as we have seen in the *Bhagavadgita*, the process of *samsara*, conceived of as an inherently egoistic and therefore selfishly binding state of affairs, can be remedied brought to a halt through a form of nonegoistically motivated action sometimes called *nis-kama* ("desireless" or "noncovetous"). Action, freed from all "attachment" to its results, need no longer bind one by generating further *karma*. Later on I will argue that, from Patañjali's standpoint, the yogin does not succumb to fatalism, but exercises the will to be free from the binding effects of all action. *Yoga-Sutra* III.22 distinguishes between *karma* that is "in motion" (*sa-upakrama*) and "not in motion" / "deferred" (*nirupakrama*).<sup>60</sup> Vyasa imaginatively likens *karma* that is "in motion" or activated to a wet cloth that is spread out to dry quickly, and the later type to a wet cloth rolled into a ball, which only dries very slowly.<sup>61</sup>

In the *Yoga-Sutra* the mind is the receptacle for the effects of *karma*. *Yoga-Sutra* II.12-14 deal with the basic dynamics of *karma* and its fruits within the context of samsaric notions of self and activity. The central premise in these *sutras* is that insofar as *karma* is under the grip of spiritual ignorance (*avidya*), it is associated with affliction (*klesa*), including a misidentified or egoic sense of self. The five afflictions as outlined in *Yoga-Sutra* II.3, namely: spiritual ignorance (*avidya*), "I-am-ness" or egoity (*asmita*), "attachment" (*raga*), "aversion" (*dvesa*), and "desire for continuity" (*abhinivesa*),<sup>62</sup> provide the cognitive and motivational framework for the ordinary person enmeshed in conditional existence (*samsara*) and unaware of *purusa*. As *Yoga-Sutra* II.12 states, these *klesas* are the root of the residue of *karma*, the "action-deposit" (*karma-asaya*) in the subconscious mind. The effects are felt not only in one's "seen" existence or present life, but they also determine the quality of one's "unseen" existence or future lives.<sup>63</sup> Rooted in ignorance (*avidya*), afflicted action causes the repeated fruition (*vipaka*) of situations or births (*jati*) and life span (*ayus*), furthering samsaric experience (*bhoga*).<sup>64</sup> Depending on whether acts are meritorious (*punya*) or demeritorious (*apunya*), *karma* produces joyful (*hlada*) or painful/distressful (*paritapa*) results.<sup>65</sup> Vyasa notes that under the influence of the afflictions experiences of pleasure are pervaded with attachment (*raga*), resulting in the latent residue of actions (*karma-asaya*) due to that attachment; thus one can easily dwell on, or become obsessed by, pleasure and its objects.<sup>66</sup> When upon aversion to pain and its causes, one is unable to overcome painful experiences, one thus accumulates a residue of actions due to aversion (*dvesa*).<sup>67</sup> When one desires pleasure and upon acting on

this desire for pleasure causes favor to some and harm to others, thereby accumulating both merit and demerit, the latent deposit generated is said to be due to greed (*lobha*) and delusion (*moha*).<sup>68</sup> Attachment and aversion, it is to be noted, are conceived in the context of a selfish or self-centered mentality, the basis of which is a misidentified sense of self (*cittavrtti*) caused by ignorance.

Every action (*karman*) leaves an impression (*samskara*) in the deeper structure of the mind, where it awaits its fruition in the form of volitional activity. The most general meaning of *samskara* is "ritual" or "forming well, . . . making ready, preparation";<sup>69</sup> but in addition it also conveys the idea of "embellishment," "purification," "making sacred," "any purificatory ceremony."<sup>70</sup> The root *sams-kr* means to cleanse and perfect.<sup>71</sup> In Hindu tradition *samskaras* can refer to the rites of passage such as birth rites (*jatakarma*), marriage rites (*vivaha*), and death rites (*antyesti*), rites that are all intended to purify and transform the individual at specific phases in life. In the context of the *Yoga-Sutra*, however, the most significant translation that can be extracted from Monier-Williams' list of meanings on the term *samskara* is "mental impression or recollection, impression on the mind of acts done in a former state of existence."<sup>72</sup> In earlier scholarly works on Yoga, *samskara* has often been translated as "impression"<sup>73</sup> and in more recent scholarship as "karmic impulse,"<sup>74</sup> "subliminal impression,"<sup>75</sup> "habitual potency,"<sup>76</sup> and "subliminal activator."<sup>77</sup> In this study, I have translated the term *samskara* as "impression."

*Yoga-Sutra* IV.9 tells us: "Because memory and impressions have a sameness of form, there is a causal relation even among births, places, and times that are undisclosed."<sup>78</sup> The various impressions have a "sameness of form" or "uniformity" (*eka-rupatva*) with the "depth-memory" of a particular person. Even though we may not remember our past karmic involvements, they nevertheless continue to affect our present actions. Vyasa states: "Memories (*smṛti*) are from *samskaras*, distanced as to birth, place, and time. From memory again there are *samskaras*, so that these memories and *samskaras* are manifested in a concentration of power from the going-into-operation of the karmic residue."<sup>79</sup> Under the influence of the afflictions (*klesas*), the impressions and memories of a person then form a "subset" of *samskaras* known as the karmic deposit or residue (*karmasaya*), which in turn becomes operative.<sup>80</sup> It is because of the uniformity of the impressions and memory pertaining to a specific individual that one person does not experience the fruition of the *karma* of another person. Patañjali explains that the mind is suffused with beginningless latent impressions (*YS* IV.10)<sup>81</sup> left by action that form or combine into a great store of habit

patterns, traits, or subtle traces (*vasanas*)<sup>82</sup> that dictate personality: how one perceives and reacts or morally responds to the world. In a helpful passage, G. Larson suggests that "the 'causal' or 'active' *samskara*-s of one's present embodiment are one's *karmasaya* . . . which will largely determine one's future new experiences and memory experiences in this present embodiment and the next embodiment yet to come, whereas one's *vasana*-s or subtle traces . . . are the 'effect' or 'passive' *samskara*-s from all of one's previous embodiments . . . not only of our prior embodiments in the human species but in numerous other species as well."<sup>83</sup>

Pertaining to the individual person, *samskaras* are responsible for the production of various

psychomental phenomena, in particular the five types of modifications (*vrttis*) of the mind that are described in the first chapter of the *Yoga-Sutra*.<sup>84</sup> The functioning of the mind (*citta*) takes place through these *vrttis*, which give form to perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and so forth. The *vrttis* are empowered to produce *samskaras* and vice versa. Vyasa states: "The modifications (*vrttis*) produce their own kind of impressions; and in turn, the impressions produce corresponding modifications. Thus the wheel of modifications and impressions revolves."<sup>85</sup> The wheel to which Vyasa refers can be taken as being none other than the "six-spoked wheel" of *samsara*, the cycle of "suffering" and "misidentification" referred to earlier.<sup>86</sup>

In Patañjali's Yoga, *samskara* has an obvious psychological significance and "stands for the indelible imprints in the subconscious left behind by our daily experiences, whether conscious or unconscious, internal or external, desirable or undesirable. The term *samskara* suggests that these impressions are not merely passive vestiges of a person's actions and volitions but are highly dynamic forces in his or her psychic life. They constantly propel consciousness into action."<sup>87</sup> The *Yoga-Sutra* (III.9) distinguishes between two varieties of *samskaras*. The first variety refers to those that lead to the externalization (*vyutthana*) or emergence ("centrifugalization") of empirical consciousness which prevents the realization of *purusa*; this set of impressions generates or sustains an extrinsic and afflicted sense of self-identity based on reified and fabricated notions of selfhood. The second variety of *samskaras* refers to those impressions that cause the centripetalization or cessation (*nirodha*) of the *vyutthana* processes of the mind and lead to the realization of intrinsic identity as *purusa* and therefore spiritual emancipation. Patañjali states: "[Regarding] the impressions of emergence and cessation, when that of emergence [i.e., extrinsic self-identity] is overpowered, there follows a moment of [the condition of] cessation in the mind. This is the transformation [termed] cessation."<sup>88</sup> "From the impression (*samskara*) of this [moment of cessation] there is a

calm flow [in the mind]." <sup>89</sup> *Samskara* has not only psychological significance but also has a soteriological role in Yoga. The yogin must cultivate the *nirodha* type of *samskaras* in order to achieve a calm flow or tranquility of mind wherein *samadhi* can arise and prevent the renewed generation of impressions of a *vyutthana* nature. As we will see, the process of *nirodha* cultivates within the mind the condition of liberating knowledge (*jñāna*) or insight (*prajñā*) that counteracts the former condition of affliction and allows for the "aloneness" of the *purusa* to take place.

The fact that *samskaras* are impressions of previous mental activity can be inferred from *Yoga-Sutra* III.18,<sup>90</sup> which announces that by means of the direct perception (*saksat-karana*) of the impressions (*samskaras*) the yogin can acquire knowledge of former (past life) embodiments. Moreover, whatever *samskaras* remain at the end of one's present life will determine future experiences in a subsequent embodiment. *Samskara* is thus "an active residuum of experience."<sup>91</sup> The concept of *samskara* is illustrated in the notion of *bija* or "seed" as used in *Yoga-Sutra* III.50 (as *dosa-bija*).<sup>92</sup> In classical Yoga, *bija* can denote the afflictions (*klesas*), also called "seeds of impediments," which refer as well to the impressions (*samskaras*) based on misconceptions of authentic identity (*purusa*) and manifesting in the form of afflicted action. Those impressions

must become, in one of Vyasa's favorite metaphors, "like burned seeds of rice."<sup>93</sup>

Thus, the impressions have internal currents or a "flow" of their own, currents that clearly influence or effect a person's intentional and volitional nature. When certain impressions, through the repeated practice of certain actions or by constant addition of like-impressions, become strong enough, the propensities they create impel a person in a certain direction. The choices or decisions that one makes produce pain leading to aversion (*dvesa*), or pleasure leading to attachment (*raga*), in the process of transmigration: "Attachment is clinging to pleasant [experiences]."<sup>94</sup> "Aversion is clinging to sorrowful [experiences]."<sup>95</sup> Vyasa writes: "What is the painfulness of *samskara*? From experience of pleasure there is a samskaric residue of pleasure; from experience of pain a samskaric residue of pain. So the maturing of *karma* is experienced as pleasure or pain, and it again lays down an action-deposit or karmic residue."<sup>96</sup> To the discerning yogin the samsaric enterprise of afflicted identity and its *samskaras* is ultimately suffused with dissatisfaction and suffering (*YS II.15*). The substratum of this process within the mind is called the *karmasaya* or residue of *karma*. Vacaspati Misra elaborates on how, in the present lifetime, experiences arise appropriate to each person's individual condition:

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The result of the karmic residue is pleasure and pain, and, insofar as both birth and life span have the same purpose (viz., pleasure and pain) and are a necessary consequence of this (pleasure and pain), birth and life span too are propagated. Moreover, pleasure and pain correspond to attachment and aversion. And these are the necessary conditions (for pleasure and pain), since pleasure and pain are not possible in the absence of these (attachment and aversion). So this soil of the self sprinkled with the water of the afflictions becomes a field for the propagation of the fruits of the determined actions. 97

*Vasanas* are the various subtle traces in the form of personality traits or habit patterns that the strength of *samskaras* produces.<sup>98</sup> In *Yoga-Sutra* IV.8 the origination of these habit patterns is to be linked up with the fruition (*vipaka*) of one's activity.<sup>99</sup> Feuerstein writes: "We can either say that a given volitional activity leaves behind a . . . trait [*vasana*] which, in conjunction with other similar . . . traits, will (given time) have certain consequences for the individual, or we can say that by a given volitional activity the individual accumulates merit or demerit."<sup>100</sup> Vyasa tells us that, "The corresponding habit patterns [to the fruition of *karma*] are from the residue of action."<sup>101</sup> The *vasanas* lie dormant in the mind until the fruition of *karma*. The impressions (*samskaras*), that combine into habit patterns (*vasanas*), are thus the very substance of the karmic residue. The action one performs proceeds according to the residue of past actions. The presence of a *samskara* begins to produce certain mental tendencies, attitudes, thoughts, desires, images, and so forth even before the fruition of *karma*. Thus *samskaras* provide a certain momentum toward the external decisions one makes. These decisions which appear to be conscious, but are in fact propelled by the dominant and unconscious residue of action expose one to situations that are then credited with or blamed for one's fortune or misfortune, merit or demerit. Past actions stored in the residue of *karma* continue to affect present actions even if those past actions are not remembered.<sup>102</sup> Within the *vasanas* inhere the qualities of past action and of the fruits that are to ripen in due time, that is, in the present or a future life. In the



following simile Vyasa portrays the samsaric mind as a kind of "crystallization" or cemented network of *vasanas*, "like a fishing net with its knots." He explains: "Propelled by experiences of afflicted actions and their fruition [which form] habit patterns, this mind has been crystallized from time without beginning, as it were variegated, spread out in all directions like a fishing net with its knots. These *vasanas* have many lives behind them."<sup>103</sup>

*Yoga-Sutra* II.12<sup>104</sup> points out that the notion of reincarnation or repeated births is one of the axioms of Patañjali's philosophy. The dynamics of samsaric re-embodiment is thought to operate on the simplest formula that meritorious action results in impressions (*samskaras*) of a positive quality leading to pleasant experiences in life, whereas demeritorious action produces impressions of a negative or painful sort that have adverse effects in a person's life.<sup>105</sup> The ongoing life-cycle of our conditioned self as person can be understood as beginning with the afflictions that color our action as world-experience, creating impressions which form the residue of action and out of which various personal traits or habit patterns are "cemented" in the mind. *Karma* thus conceived is the mechanism by which samsaric existence (i.e., egoic identity) maintains itself. For the ordinary person rooted in afflicted action and its residue or latent deposit, life is an unending accumulation and fruition of actions caused by craving, dissatisfaction, and ignorance. The yogin, on the other hand, recognizing the inherent suffering involved, does not succumb to this seemingly fatalistic state of affairs. Patañjali offers a way to transcend the nexus of "suffering" and its causes. Through the study and practice of Yoga, the *samskaras* of action as dictated by the afflictions of human weaknesses are lessened to the point where the yogin, yet active, can enjoy an established state of internal calm<sup>106</sup> no longer enslaved by what otherwise appears to be worldly existence (*samsara*).

Patañjali asserts: "The action of a yogin is neither 'black' nor 'white'; of others it is of three kinds."<sup>107</sup> While the activity of the adept yogin is stated to be neither "white" (*sukla*) nor "black" (*kṛṣṇa*), that of the average person is threefold. Ordinarily, every action causing its fruition can be classified as either impure/demeritorious, pure/meritorious<sup>108</sup> or "mixed." Patañjali's fourfold classification of *karma* is explained by Vyasa as follows:

There are four classes of *karma*. [*Karma* may be] black, white and black, white, or neither-black-nor-white. The white and black category is effected through external means so that the karmic residue is strengthened by way of harming or benefiting others. The white belongs to those who practice ascetic [internalized] endeavor (*tapas*), study (*svadhyaya*), and meditation (*dhyana*). For these, being a matter of the mind alone, are not concerned with outer means, nor do they harm others. The neither-black-nor-white *karma* is that of the renouncer (*samnyasin*), whose afflictions have dwindled away, whose misidentification with the body is overcome. In that case, because of renouncing the fruits of action the not white belongs only to the *yogi*; it is not black because there is no cause for that. But all other living beings have the three kinds, as explained previously.<sup>109</sup>



In order to become disengaged from the binding effects of *karma* and all attachment to mundane existence one has to transcend the very empirical consciousness that generates afflicted mental and physical actions and modes of being. In other words, one must go beyond the boundaries of ego-personality and its self-centered mentality: the mistaken identity of one being essentially an empirical agent (*kartr*). In contradiction to the three ordinary types of *karma* outlined above, the yogin, whose mind has become increasingly purified through *samadhi*,<sup>110</sup> does not generate any action that could be thus typified. Action here, noting that the yogin still "acts" at this finer level of awareness, is said to be "neither-black-nor-white" because the yogin has transcended the relative field of action insofar as it no longer wholly defines the yogin's self-identity, and thus the yogin is freed from any tendency to misidentify with prakrtic existence (the "seeable" or *triguna* process) and its effects/affects. At this advanced stage, the yogin remains established in the true nature and identity of the *purusa* and has ceased to be attached to any empirical identity as authentic selfhood. Through a progressive purification of the body, mind and indeed all karmic influences, the yogin's action culminates in a state of "renunciation" meaning nonegoistic or noncovetous (*nis-kama*) action<sup>111</sup> that does not produce further *karma* (i.e., karmic bondage). The yogin is no longer motivated, for example, by the merit (*punya*) or demerit (*apunya*) generated by the good and bad observance of traditional ritualistic religion including meditative practices that are performed for sheer personal gain or self-gratification and that merely result in pride and self-righteous attitudes.<sup>112</sup>

In *Yoga-Sutra* IV.24 the mind (*citta*) is declared to be ultimately geared toward the liberation of human beings: "From action having been done conjointly for the purpose of another, it [the mind] is speckled with innumerable habit patterns."<sup>113</sup> The mind, like all manifestations of *prakrti*, exists for the purpose of the *purusa*.<sup>114</sup> Not being self-illuminating because it is itself something perceived (YS IV.19), the mind and its modifications are known by the unchanging *purusa* (YS IV.18), that is, the mind is composed of the three *gunas* and due to its changing nature has an "object-character." Patañjali asserts that the mind is a composite process; it does not exist for its own sake (nor does the sense of self: *ahamkara*) but must necessarily serve "another's purpose." Vyasa writes: "With its commitment still unfulfilled, the mind is the repository of the habit patterns and personality traits (*vasanas*). For when the mind has fulfilled its commitment, the *vasanas* have no repository and cannot maintain themselves."<sup>115</sup> He later adds: "The mind, being a conjoint activity, (what it effects) is done for itself. For a happy mind is not for the purpose of knowledge. Both are

for the purposes of another. That other, which has as its purposes experience and liberation, is *purusa* alone . . . "<sup>116</sup>

The teleology of the mind and its contents all have a purpose beyond themselves, namely the twofold purpose of world-experience and liberation. In fact, it is the *raison d'être* of the conjunction (*samyoga*) between the seer and the seeable, *purusa* and *prakrti*, to be of assistance in the liberating process of the awakening of selfhood to its true identity.<sup>117</sup> The subservient role

given to *prakṛti* is often understood in Samkhya and Yoga scholarship as signifying an asymmetry of relationship between spirit and matter: all that is prakṛtic ultimately exists in the service of *puruṣa*, in the service of soteriology. As a counteractive to spiritual ignorance and bondage in the form of misidentification and suffering, *prakṛti* does indeed serve the purposes of *puruṣa*. What, however, is *prakṛti*'s status in the context of the enlightened state of *puruṣa*? Does *prakṛti* merely cease to exist for the liberated yogin? Can *prakṛti* be understood to play a more integral role here, implying, in the final analysis, an engagement of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in the "aloneness of seeing"? These and other questions relating to the meaning and place of *prakṛti* in the liberated yogin's life will be dealt with in a later chapter. For now, it suffices to say that the level of instrumentation of the mind (*citta*) is explicitly acknowledged by Patañjali in the above *sūtra* (YS IV.24), which asserts that even though the *citta* may be colored by innumerable *vasanas* it still, however, retains its fundamental characteristic of serving the purpose of *puruṣa* (i.e., experience and liberation).<sup>118</sup>

The Sanskrit commentators on Yoga discuss at great length whether the mind corresponds to the size of the body (which is the Samkhyan view) or whether it is all-pervasive (*vibhu*). They settle for the latter alternative. Vyasa reiterates the Samkhyan perspective, according to which the mind contracts or expands, and follows with the view offered by the teachers (*acarya*) of Yoga: "Others hold that the mind, like the light of a lamp, contracting when put in a jar and expanding when placed in a palace, assumes the size of the body; and that transmigration becomes possible because of an intermediate state. Only then is it possible to explain its absence in between (the time of dissolution) and its worldly existence. But the teacher (Patañjali) says that it is only the modifications of this all-pervading mind which contract and expand."<sup>119</sup> Vyasa proclaims that Yoga holds it is only the modifications of the mind the mental processes or *vr̥tti* aspect of consciousness that can be said to contract and expand, depending on efficient causes such as virtue.<sup>120</sup> The authorities in Samkhya, however, admit of an intermediate stage (of a subtle body) in order to explain how transmigration takes place. In Yoga the mind is understood

to be all-pervasive (*vibhu*) so there can be no question of the need for a subtle body (*suksmasarira*, see SK 39). Vacaspati explains that there is no proof for the existence of a subtle body as posited in Samkhya. The mind is neither atomic nor of medium size nor of the size of the body; the mind has the same entitative extension as prakṛtic existence itself.<sup>121</sup> The all-pervasive *citta* contracts or expands only in its manifestation or actualization as modifications or mental activity (*vr̥tti*). "There is, therefore, no need in Yoga for a migratory subtle body."<sup>122</sup> Perhaps one other way to understand the above issue is that Patañjali saw no real pedagogical usefulness in talking about a subtle body. Patañjali's practical and pragmatic orientation emphasizes that spiritual emancipation can take place in this very lifetime and can be understood as an embodied state of freedom. Therefore, the need to posit a subtle body which is itself a further limitation of identity seems superfluous.

G. Koelman offers the following helpful explanation regarding the aspatial dimension of *citta*: "Since it is non-spatial and without extension, its contraction and expansion should not be conceived as spatial. Its expansion would mean rather its intentional extension to its object,

which can be situated at any point of space. The mind also can shift in a moment from one object to another that is at the other extreme of space. Mind is, therefore, something immaterial and subtle, remaining however prakrtic and undergoing change."<sup>123</sup> Defining mind more epistemologically, H. Aranya tells us: "Mind is not all-pervading like the sky, because the sky is only external space. Mind . . . is only power of knowing without any extent in space. Its connection with external things is always existing and they may become clearly knowable when properly brought to the mind, that is why it is everywhere as the faculty of knowing and is limitless. Only the modifications of the mind contract and expand. That is why the mind appears as limited."<sup>124</sup> As mentioned earlier, rather than being conceived as "substance" per se, *citta* can be viewed as a heuristic device for understanding the nature and functioning of consciousness in Patañjali's system.

The Yoga school formulated a doctrine of an all-pervasive mind to explain the very possibility of knowledge of all things or omniscience (*sarva-jñitrtva*) and sovereignty over all states of being (*adhithatrtva*). Both of the above-mentioned yogic abilities or powers are made available and credited to the yogin who has attained the discriminative discernment between *purusa* and the rarefied *sattva* of the mind, the finest quality or constituent of *prakrti*.<sup>125</sup> Vacaspati Misra introduced the distinction between "causal consciousness" (*karana-citta*) and "effected consciousness" (*karya-citta*), arguing that the former is infinite (all-pervasive), which can

be understood to approximate Patañjali's concept of the cosmic or root *citta* (YS IV.5).<sup>126</sup>

### Introduction to Yoga Epistemology

One of the special features of Patañjali's Yoga system is that it elaborates a primary response to the epistemological problem of the subject-object relationan issue that is fundamental to any metaphysical system and is especially crucial for any philosophy that purports to explain the state of spiritual enlightenment. In the *Yoga-Sutra*, liberation (*apavarga*) or "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) implies a complete sundering of the subject-object or self-world relation as it is ordinarily known, that is, as a fragmentation or bifurcation within prakrtic existence. Our normal experience and everyday relations function as a polarization within *prakrti*: the self as subject or experiencer that as an empirical identity lays claim to experience; and the objective world as it is perceived and experienced through the "eyes" of this empirical self. The conjunction (*samyoga*) between *purusa* and *prakrti* gives birth to phenomenal (empirical) selfhood or identity and its content of consciousness. However, this process, which is largely enmeshed in ignorance (*avidya*) and egoity (*asmita*) or affliction, actually entails utterly mistaken notions of who we are as our authentic being. What is needed, according to Yoga, is a total purification of the subject-object relation so that the spiritual nature of selfhood can be fully disclosed and the yogin, established in the true form and identity of *purusa*, no longer becomes misidentified with prakrtic existence. Yet despite an overwhelming adherence to what normally amounts to being a mental array of confused human identity and its concomitant "suffering" (*duhkha*), Yoga philosophy tells us that *purusa*, our true identity, is necessarily "present" to ordinary human experience in that without *purusa* all experience and knowledge would not be possible.<sup>127</sup> Based

on this perspective that *purusa* is simultaneously transcendent and immanent Patañjali formulated a practical and transformative "path" of Yoga in which knowledge (*jñāna*), as an integral aspect of Yoga theory and practice, can have profound implications for human life in this world.

Despite Samkhya's unique distinction between pure consciousness and human awareness, which allowed it to preserve its fundamental dualism in the face of monistic arguments and thereby avoid the metaphysical problems attending monistic views it could not avoid one fundamental philosophical question: What is it to say that *prakṛti* is dynamic because of the

presence of *purusa*? To say that *prakṛti* reflects the presence of *purusa*, or that *purusa* is reflected in *prakṛti* preserves a rigid distinction between the two, for neither an object reflected in a mirror nor the mirror is affected by one another. In Samkhya, liberation is the result of discernment (*viveka*), the highest knowledge. The process of attaining it suggests either an intention on the part of *purusa* which, some would argue, is impossible considering that *purusa*, as pure consciousness, is contentless and nonintentional or a response on the part of *prakṛti*, if not both. How then can *purusa* be said to have no relation, including no passive relation to *prakṛti*? Even Isvara Kṛṣṇa's enchanting metaphor (*SK* 59) of the dancer before the host of spectators does not answer the question, for there is a significant relationship between performer and audience. In an effort to elucidate a proper response to the above questions from the perspective of Yoga, the remainder of this chapter will address among other related topics: (1) how cognition and knowledge take place in Patañjali's system; and (2) how cognition and knowledge inform our understanding of the relationship between *purusa* the pure seer or knower and *prakṛti* the seeable or knowable.

In order to grasp how Yoga philosophy can be lived on a practical level, one must: (1) understand how *purusa* and *prakṛti* "relate" to one personally and in pragmatic terms, and (2) see that these two principles "spirit" and "matter" are not merely understood in the abstract thereby overemphasizing their metaphysical and impersonal dimensions. With the above consideration in mind, Patañjali translated what appears to be a universal macrocosmic philosophy heralding some of the main ideas of Samkhya into microcosmic, subject-oriented, and practical terms that apply to human life, such as, for example: perception, cognition, and ethical sensibilities. The necessity of *purusa*'s presence to human experience notwithstanding (see above), it must also be emphasized that without the manifestation of psychophysical being that includes our personhood the material source and cause of which in classical Samkhya is said to be *prakṛti* liberation would not "take place" in Yoga. Without *prakṛti*, *purusa*-realization would not be possible and the yogin could not "become" liberated. As *Yoga-Sutra* II.23 spells out, it is by virtue of the conjunction (*samyoga*) between *purusa* and *prakṛti* that the essential nature of the "seer" (*purusa*) and the "seeable" (*prakṛtic* identity) can eventually be grasped.<sup>128</sup>

Throughout the *Yoga-Sutra*, Patañjali's main contention is that *purusa* pure, immortal consciousness is our true nature and being and therefore the real foundation or ground of authentic identity and livelihood. However, due to spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) human awareness mistakes the Self or

"seer" (*purusa*) for the "seeable." In this state of misplaced identity brought about by the conjunction (*samyoga*) of *purusa* and *prakrti*, and defined by Patañjali (*YS* I.2) as the misidentification with the modifications of the mind, the cognitive error of mistaking extrinsic (material) identity for intrinsic (spiritual) identity is continually reinforced. With the above "teaching" having been properly considered and through an appropriate form of pedagogy, Yoga seeks to establish our identity as the seer, and in the process to "dismantle" the mechanism of misidentification (*sarupya*, *YS* I.4) due to which we remain deluded, confused, and dissatisfied.

### *Vrtti*

One of the most important terms used in the *Yoga-Sutra* is *vrtti*. The word *vrtti* stems from the root *vrt*: "to turn, revolve, roll, proceed."<sup>129</sup> *Vrtti* can mean: "mode of life or conduct," "behavior (esp. moral conduct)," "mode of being," "disposition," "activity," "function," "livelihood," "mood (of the mind)," "nature," "character," "addition to," and "occupation with."<sup>130</sup> In the context of *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 (*yogas cittavrttinirodhah*) *vrtti* has been translated as: "fluctuations,"<sup>131</sup> "modifications,"<sup>132</sup> "acts' and 'functions',"<sup>133</sup> "Bewegungen,"<sup>134</sup> "activities,"<sup>135</sup> "processes,"<sup>136</sup> "transformations,"<sup>137</sup> and "mode."<sup>138</sup> I have adopted the general term "modification" for *vrtti*. The functioning of the mind takes place through various modifications (*vrttis*) that give form to our perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and so forth.

Like all other aspects of "insentient" *prakrti*, the mind undergoes continual change, and from the viewpoint of Yoga its most noteworthy modifications are of five kinds outlined by Patañjali as follows: the means of knowing or valid cognition (*pramana*), error (*viparyaya*), conceptualization (*vikalpa*), sleep (*nidra*), and memory (*smrti*).<sup>139</sup> These *vrttis* must be clearly understood and witnessed in order for finer states of awareness to arise. The five kinds of modifications listed above are described in the first chapter of the *Yoga-Sutra*.<sup>140</sup> The first, the means of knowing or valid cognition (*pramana*), allows for the understanding of something that is fully manifested and is verified through one of the three avenues: perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), and valid testimony (*agama*).<sup>141</sup> The experience of objects such as: people, animals, plants, buildings, and so forth, whether by direct perception, inference, or reliable testimony belongs to the modification called *pramana*. I will be saying more on *pramana* especially in its form of perception (*pratyaksa*) in the last section of the present chapter.

The remaining four types of *vrttis* explain other ways in which the mind operates. The second is "error" (*viparyaya*), that is, when one's understanding or a thought does not correspond with reality<sup>142</sup> and one apprehends something as other than what it is. Vyasa (*YB* I.8) treats *viparyaya* as a synonym for the term *avidya* (ignorance), *avidya* being the principal among the five afflictions (*klesa*).<sup>143</sup> The *vrtti* of *viparyaya* is the fundamental error due to which we misinterpret or misconceive existence itself! Vyasa writes of *viparyaya*:



Why is this not valid cognition? Because it is sublated by valid cognition. The object of valid cognition is a thing as it is, and the fact of not being valid cognition is shown by the fact that valid cognition cancels it. For example, seeing the moon as double is refuted by seeing that it is in fact a single moon.

This ignorance is fivefold, namely, the afflictions (*klesa*): ignorance, I-am-ness, attachment, aversion, desire for continuity. These very five bear their technical names: darkness (*tamas*), delusion (*moha*), extreme delusion (*mahamoha*), gloom (*tamisra*) and utter darkness (*andhatamisra*).<sup>144</sup>

For Patañjali the conjunction (*samyoga*) of the seer and the seeable, *purusa* and *prakṛti*, is the cause of all suffering and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*)<sup>145</sup> because it gives rise to the incorrect understanding that one's identity is defined within the limits of the individuated psychophysical being or personality complex and not according to the unbounded nature of the *purusa* or spiritual Self. The conjunction is caused by spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*),<sup>146</sup> the primary affliction that is the origin<sup>147</sup> of all other afflictions including our mistaken identity as a finite, egoic self or "I-am-ness" (*asmita*). *Asmita* constitutes the major affliction that permeates the principle of individuation, thus leading to the ongoing misidentification of selfhood with the modifications of the mind. Ignorance is also at the root of three other afflictions: attachment (*raga*), aversion (*dveṣa*), and the desire for continuity or the instinctive fear of death (*abhiniveśa*).<sup>148</sup> In attachment and aversion the emotive core of the concept of affliction (*klesa*) comes into play, thereby signifying an obvious affective dimension to *vr̥tti*. The impressions (*samskāras*) centered around the experiences of pleasure are operative in and supportive of *raga* or attachment/attraction. The modifications are said to take the form of *gārdha*, *tr̥ṣṇā*, and *lobha*, which may be translated as longing, thirst, and greed respectively.<sup>149</sup> Metaphorically speaking, the seeds (*bija*) of *sukha-samskāras* or impressions of pleasurable experiences germinate and will give rise to a state of attachment leading to effort directed toward the attainment of the object of pleasure

or desire. In a seeming opposition to attachment, the emotive core of the phenomenon of aversion (*dveṣa*) or revulsion is provoked by the seed recollection of pain. The states that arise are said to be those of retaliation (*pratigha*), malice (*manya*), revenge (*jighamsa*), and anger (*krodha*).<sup>150</sup> Thus, attachment and aversion dwell upon the *samskāras* of pleasure and pain. In general terms the mind is not repelled by that which is pleasurable, nor does it desire that which is painful.

The description by Vyasa that the *klesas* are prime examples of erroneous cognitions is especially noteworthy as it cuts through the stereotyped opposition between the emotive/affective and the rational/cognitive. This brings forth an integral view of the mind (*citta*). It is in this frame in which a picture emerges that samsaric identity (and its reified notions of self and world, i.e., worldly existence) is not possible without I-am-ness, attachment, aversion, and the desire for continuity or fear of extinction, and that these afflictions govern the mind of the individual and perpetuate the wheel of *samsara*. The compulsive forces of attachment, aversion, and desire or fear cannot be uprooted and discarded unless *asmita* is



subdued, weakened. Thus the attenuation and ultimate transcendence of all the afflictions is the objective of Yoga praxis. The importance of the theory of the five afflictions has been emphasized by I. K. Taimni, who correctly notes that this theory is the foundation of the system of Yoga outlined by Patañjali.<sup>151</sup>

The function of Yoga is to oblige the yogin to "awaken" to the true status of *purusa* through progressive stages of removing any misidentification with the forms of *prakṛti*, of uprooting and eradicating ignorance (*avidyā*), the primary affliction defined in *Yoga-Sūtra* II.5. Here, Patañjali states: "Ignorance is seeing the noneternal as eternal, the impure as pure, dissatisfaction as happiness, and the nonself as self."<sup>152</sup> Interestingly, Patañjali seems to be admitting in the above that there is a special kind of happiness (*sukha*) that is intrinsic to freedom ("aloneness") in Yoga and that, far from resulting in a lonely or aloof nature or association with the world, implies that one of the fruits of Yoga can be experienced as an exalted sense of well-being that embraces our emotional/affective as well as our cognitive dimension.

Vyasa correlates the five afflictions outlined by Patañjali (see n. 144 above) with the five categories of fundamental misconception or error (*viparyaya*) of classical Samkhya.<sup>153</sup> The correlation of the five *viparyayas* with the five *klesas* of Yoga is also made by Vacaspati Misra<sup>154</sup> and Vijñāna Bhikṣu.<sup>155</sup> Ignorance is said to fall within the category of *viparyaya* and is a factor common to all the afflictions. Therefore, the other four afflictions are considered its segments.<sup>156</sup> Vijñāna Bhikṣu calls the *vr̥tti* normally termed "error" (the fivefold *avidyā*) the seed of the calamity called *samsara*; it is a

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special kind of misapprehension in which there is a superimposition of cognition in the object. Doubt (*samsaya*) is also included under this *vr̥tti*.<sup>157</sup> It is, thus, the *klesas* manifesting in the form of the *vr̥tti* of error or misconception (*viparyaya*) that control the network or web of samsaric existence. Vyasa describes the domination of the *klesas* over empirical identity: "The word 'afflictions' means the five errors (*viparyaya*). When active they confirm the involvement with the *gunas*, impose change, bring about the flow or current in the body and senses by mutually reinforcing each other, and bring on fruition of *karma*."<sup>158</sup> The divisions of ignorance (*avidyā*) which Vyasa equates with the *vr̥tti* of error (*viparyaya*) can be explained<sup>159</sup> as follows:

1. *Avidyā* (YS II.5) means spiritual ignorance itself, sometimes called *tamas* ("darkness"), and is described as being eightfold: the error of mistaking as Self or *purusa* (*atman*) the eight *tattvas* that are: (i) *avyakta*: unmanifest *prakṛti*, (ii) *mahat* or *buddhi* (intellect), (iii) *ahamkāra*: sense of self, (iv-viii) the *tanmatras*: the five subtle senses. Spiritual ignorance (*avidyā*) is sometimes defined as "darkness" in that it veils liberating knowledge (*jñāna*). It includes the error of misidentifying the physical body and psyche with *purusa* because body, and so on, are the products of the eight *tattvas* listed above. *Viparyaya* such as mistaking a seashell for silver are not included in this category. *Samkhya-Karika* 44 says that bondage (*bandha*) is caused by *viparyaya*. Hence *avidyā*, the major cause of bondage, is included here and not the other four "delusions."<sup>160</sup>

2. *Asmitā* means I-am-ness/egoity (YS II.6) or "delusion" (*moha*) and is eightfold: the error of

considering the eight powers or accomplishments (*siddhis*, YS III.45) as though they were something benevolent and belonging to, or an essential property of, the Self (*atmiya*).<sup>161</sup> This preoccupation with one's prakrtic identity occurs when finite beings seek to overcome their limitations by pursuing the eight well-known omnipotent or supernatural powers. According to Vyasa these powers include: *anima*, the power of becoming minute; *laghima*, the power to become light; *mahima*, the power to become enlarged or greatly expanded; *prapti*, the power to reach or touch the most distant things (e.g., the moon); *prakamya*, the power of an irresistible will to accomplish its tasks; *vasitva*, mastery over all elements and elementals (their nature) not impeded by any; *isirtva*, sovereignty, the ability to will the production, absorption, and disposition of the elements and the elementals; *kamavasayitva*, implying that whatever one's purposive idea is becomes true for that person.<sup>162</sup> I-am-ness/

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egoity and self-possession are synonomous<sup>163</sup> and therefore the above divisions apply; the *siddhis*, misunderstood as an end in themselves, are a form of possessive or obsessive power in that the attachment to their pursuit only furthers egoic states (i.e., pride, greed, fear, etc.).

3. *Raga* means attachment (YS II.7) or "extreme delusion" (*mahamoha*) and is classified as being tenfold: one becomes attached to the five subtle elements (e.g., sound, sight) and the five gross elements. The attraction is for the attainment of the eightfold *siddhis* through Yoga, thereby becoming a powerful or "perfected" being (*siddha*) and gaining sovereignty over nature. Thus it is thought that the yogin will enjoy the objects of the senses.<sup>164</sup>

4. *Dvesa* means aversion (YS II.8) or "gloom" (*tamisra*) and is said to be eighteenfold: when one is fixed upon the above pursuits [i.e., in (2) and (3)] and some impediment prevents the attainment of *asmita* (the eight *siddhis*) and *raga* (the ten enjoyments of the senses), then the anger arising with regard to that failure and toward its cause is gloom (*tamisra*) or aversion (*dvesa*).<sup>165</sup>

5. *Abhinivesa* means desire for continuity (YS II.9), a mode of clinging-to-life or instinctive fear of death. This state is referred to as "utter darkness" (*andhatamisra*) and is eighteenfold: *asmita* and *raga* have been attained, yet there comes the realization that this attainment will one day perish as, for example, at the end of a cycle of creation (*kalpa*). This fear is said to be the fear of death or "utter darkness" and the "darkness" or "night" refers to the period of dissolution in a single cycle of creation.<sup>166</sup>

In the above order of five, each succeeding affliction (*klesa*) is considered from the perspective of Yoga pedagogy to be more undesirable and of an inferior "grade" than its predecessor, indicating progressively deluded or impure levels of attainment. It is interesting to note that the above definitions seem to be of concern only to the so-called advancing yogin whose attainment of powers, ironically, can equally result in an inflated sense of ego rather than liberation from the ego. The general definitions of the afflictions as provided under *Yoga-Sutra* II.5-9 are wider and are applicable to the worldly-minded who are living more conventional states of awareness. U. Arya<sup>167</sup> has conceived the following scheme (see below), which shows *viparyaya* from (a) the "common view" or ordinary (worldly) person's viewpoint as compared with (b) the novice and

"imperfect" yogin's viewpoint. While the yogin's consciousness is said to be more refined and subtle, it is clear from the scheme outlined below that the yogin, not yet

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having reached the fully liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*), can still be prone to a selfish mentality where attachment to the attainment of power diverts the yogin away from the true spiritual "goal" of Yoga:

<i>Klesa</i>	Common View	Imperfect Yogin's View
<i>avidya</i>	I am the body, male or female, with resultant pleasures and attachments.	I am <i>prakrti</i> and its evolutes.
<i>asmita</i>	I have an identity dependent on possessing the objects of experience. I desire worldly success, power and wealth.	I desire powers ( <i>siddhis</i> ).
<i>raga</i> 168	I desire the objects of my immediate pleasure.	I will appropriate my power to obtain refined pleasures.
<i>dvesa</i> 169	I have an aversion to specific objects, persons or situations that have caused me pain.	I am angry at causes, persons or situations that have prevented my fulfillment of <i>siddhis</i> and resulting enjoyment.
<i>abhinivesa</i> 170	I fear my death, that is the death of this body that I am.	I fear that all my powers and resulting pleasures and enjoyments of <i>prakrti</i> will cease.

The above scale may be understood as constituting the range of misidentifications in the context of phenomenal selfhood. Under the dominating and delusive power of *viparyaya*, the yogin is in need of the guidance of a spiritual preceptor or *guru*: one who has transcended the compulsive need to identify with prakrtic existence. In the *guru*, or "accomplished one," has awakened the "knowledge born of discernment" (*vivekajam jñāna*) that, endowed with the power of liberating (*taraka*),<sup>171</sup> enables one to "cross over" the limitations of samsaric identity. As the yogin progresses on the journey toward authentic identity, the influence of the afflictions progressively lessens. Vyasa makes it clear that it is the *vr̥tti* of misconception or error (*viparyaya*) that underlies our mistaken notions of selfhood and their attendant dissatisfactions and sorrows (*duhkha*). According to Vyasa (*YB* I.8), *viparyaya* encompasses the source-affliction of ignorance (*avidya*) in which the karmic residue (*karmasaya*) of *samskaras* and *vasanas*, and the resultant fruition (*vipaka*) of afflicted action, are generated and sustained. In short, our afflicted identity rooted in spiritual ignorance functions through *viparyaya*. Curiously, this important insight, which can be attributed to Vyasa, has not been clearly noted by scholars.<sup>172</sup>

The Samkhya and Yoga systems hold divergent views on the nature of *avidya*. The Samkhya system proper uses the term *a-viveka*, "an absence

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of discerning knowledge" of the nature of *purusa*, which the teachers of formal logic place under the category of "nonapprehension" (*a-khyati*). It appears that the Yoga system differs in this regard. Yoga considers ignorance to be a misapprehension (*anyatha-khyati*),<sup>173</sup> the definition of ignorance being: mistaking the noneternal and the "nonself" for the eternal and the Self, and so forth, as in *Yoga-Sutra* II.5.<sup>174</sup> Vyasa states that although *avidya* is a negative compound, it should be known as a positive existent, like the compound *amitra*, which signifies not the absence of a friend (*mitra*) but the contrary of friend, namely an enemy. Likewise, *avidya* is neither valid cognition nor the absence of valid cognition, but is a cognition of a different kind, contrary to both of them.<sup>175</sup> In Yoga, therefore, *avidya* is not *akhyati*, that is, the nonapprehension of the nature of *purusa* as in Samkhya, but *anyathakhyati*, that is, a particular kind of cognition that mistakes *purusa* for prakrtic existence. As the Samkhyans (*SK* 44) hold that bondage is due to "the opposite of *jñāna*" (*viparyaya*), liberation occurs through the central expedient of discriminating knowledge (referred to in *SK* 2 as *vijñāna*). In the philosophy of classical Yoga, *avidya* is a type of cognition, however invalid, that can be remedied by various methods such as the cultivation of faith (*sraddha*), energy (*virya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), cognitive *samādhi*, and clear insight (*prajñā*) all outlined in *Yoga-Sutra* I.20 or devotion to the Lord (*isvara-pranidhana*, *YS* I.23). *Avidya* can be completely overcome only through the realization of *purusa* "attainment" that takes place in the high-level state of *samādhi* termed *asamprajñata* (*YB* I.18).

The third type of *vṛtti*, conceptualization (*vikalpa*), is defined by Patañjali (*YS* I.9) as the apprehensions arising out of verbal knowledge only but whose referents are words and ideas but not things.<sup>176</sup> *Vikalpa* involves a notion, not necessarily an error, that does not correspond to an object or thing, but that may in fact serve as a useful function as in a metaphor or simile. A *vikalpa* can be an imaginary cognition. The term *vikalpa* has been understood in the sense of "fancy"<sup>177</sup> or "hallucination,"<sup>178</sup> but these are insufficient meanings. In states of meditation, the engagement of *vikalpa* is considered important in strengthening and focusing the mind.

*Vikalpa* is that modification (*vṛtti*) of the mind that follows language, knowledge of words, and the knowledge provided by words, and is productive of the same where no actual thing is its referent. Yet, being verbal knowledge, why could it not be included under valid testimony (*agama pramana*, *YS* I.7)? According to Vyasa (*YB* I.7), there has to be an actual object (*artha*) that is corroborated by an accomplished teacher (*apta*) in order to qualify under *agama*.<sup>179</sup> *Vikalpa* relates to no "objects" as such.

Nor is the *vṛtti* of conceptualization formally included under error (*viparyaya*) because in the latter (*YS* I.8) there is an "object" that is at first wrongly cognized, but when the error is corrected, the true form of the "object" such as the moon, to use Vyasa's example is seen clearly. There is no succession of error and refutation, and one word does not replace another (e.g., the word "seashell" replacing "silver" in the case of an oyster). In *vikalpa* there is no real external object at all, the referent being language itself rather than things.

Paraphrasing Vyasa, conceptualization does not amount to valid cognition or to error. As there can exist a certain satisfaction or sense of exaltation about the use of language and knowledge of

words, people bring words into usage even when there is no actual substance or object signified or designated by the words and their definitions. For example, the statement, "Consciousness (*caitanya*) is the nature of *purusa*," is ultimately meaningless or fallacious. When the actual position of Yoga philosophy is that consciousness itself *is* the *purusa*, what consciousness, other than the very *purusa*, could be designated as the nature of that *purusa*? Otherwise, as Vyasa tells us, it is as though one were talking of a cow belonging to a person called Caitra, whoas the owneris other than his possession. Similarly, to assert that, "*Purusa* being inactive is a denial that it has the attribute of a thing," is making no positive statement about any object. Only the attributes of *prakrti* as pertaining to *purusa* are denied.<sup>180</sup> The adjective "inactive" (*niskriya*), denying any possible activity in the case of *purusa*, expresses no qualification. The negative (pseudo) adjective is false, has no substance and is a mere verbal expression of the *vrtti* called *vikalpa*. It is an absence, conceptualized as though a positive state, then attached to *purusa* as though it is its attribute, yet it expresses no attribute of *purusa*. However, the modification of *vikalpa* is by no means worthless and can serve a practical and pedagogical purpose. *Vikalpa* has, for example, a greater practical value than has *viparyaya*: "For unless we have a concept of a 'higher Self' or a 'path,' we cannot exercise our will to overcome the limitations of conceptual thinking and to break through to the level of the . . . Self."<sup>181</sup>

The fourth modification or *vrtti* is sleep (*nidra*) and is defined as: "the modification based upon the apprehension of non-becoming/absence."<sup>182</sup> It is a kind of rudimentary awareness, the awareness of "absence" (*abhava*). That sleep is not simply the "absence" of experience, cognition, or apprehension is, according to Vyasa, demonstrated by the fact that when one wakes up one can recollect that one has slept well or badly.<sup>183</sup> *Yoga-Sutra* I.38 states that attending to the knowledge derived from sleep (or dreams) can help to bring about clarification of the mind.<sup>184</sup>

The last modification is memory (*smrti*) defined thus: "Memory is the recollection of contents (conditions/objects) experienced."<sup>185</sup> Memory operates exclusively on the level of the inner organ (*antahkarana*), wherein the contents of a previous experience are returned to consciousness (i.e., remembered) via thought, although there are no longer any corresponding objects (on the gross level). Although not a means of knowledge (*pramana*) in Yoga, memory nevertheless does play an important role in cognition and in determining the nature and range of cognition. Regarding *smrti*, Vyasa asks: "Does the mind remember the process of apprehension of an object (e.g., a vessel) or, rather, the form of the object experienced?"<sup>186</sup> To which he then replies: "The cognition, colored by the experience of the object known, shines forth in the forms both of the knowledge (or content or the object) and the cognition itself, and generates a latent impression that conforms to the above process."<sup>187</sup> A cognition (*pratyaya*) is "colored" (*uparakta*)<sup>188</sup> or influenced by the object experienced. Therefore a cognition carries the form (*rupa*) or representation of the object as well as the representation of the process or the fact of that apprehension. It contains both the representations of the *grahya* (the object of experience) and the form or representation of the *grahana* (the instrument and the process and the fact of the experience), that is, it resembles the various features and natures of both of these and manifests them.



The cognition then generates a *samskara* in which both features are represented: (1) the fact that the person cognizes the content or object, has gained experience through the process of apprehension of the object, and (2) the content or object as it actually is. Memory does not arise by itself. An experience first becomes a *samskara*, an impression in the stored karmic stock (*asaya*) in the mind. From the impression the memory arises again as a mental function or modification (*vr̥tti*). The object itself therefore ceases to be present, but the impression produces the memory. Vyasa further states, "That impression, being activated when similar or cognate cognitions occur, brings forth the memory experience. This memory also consists of the representation of the content or of the process of cognition."<sup>189</sup> The cause of the *samskara*'s activation is the original cognition. When it reproduces the experience in the form of memory, the memory also is "identical" to: (a) the *samskara*, as it manifests, shows itself to be "identical" with the original experience, and (b) the experience itself that was the manifesting cause of the *samskara* (although the memory has now been triggered by some other manifesting cause, such as a similar cognition or an appropriate time).<sup>190</sup> The memory, just like the original cognition and the *samskara* it had formed, consists both of the representation of the object apprehended and the knowing

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experience or process of cognition. The chain of causation is as follows: (a) the experience, from which is produced (b) the *samskara*, which generates (c) the memory, each with the twofold process: (1) the process of cognition that makes possible the awareness that "I know the object," and (2) the cognition of the nature of the object itself. Obviously, unless the mind "knows that it knows," it cannot reproduce as memory the experience of the original object. In this process the faculty of determination or ascertainment (*buddhi*) plays its part. Vyasa tells us that the representation of the process of cognition relates primarily to the *buddhi*.<sup>191</sup> The expression "I know the vessel" is a particular type of apprehension (*anuvyavasaya*):<sup>192</sup> the awareness the intellect (*buddhi*) has that it cognizes or experiences. It is an important part of the process of memory in which the other part of the cognition is the object, the vessel. However, when one sees the vessel a second time and says, "This is that vessel," this is not, in Yoga, technically included under the *vr̥tti* of memory. In the cognition "I know the vessel," one apprehension of "the vessel" is the subject matter (*visaya*) of the other apprehension "I know." "Knowing," here, is the primary feature. Vyāsa adds: "Memory has primarily the representation of the content or object known."<sup>193</sup> Even though the type of apprehension termed *anuvyavasaya* is an important part of the process of memory, the memory proper is a single apprehension: "the vessel." Here, the awareness "I know" is secondary.

In the list of five *vr̥ttis* (YS I.7-11), memory has been placed last because, in Vyasa's words, "All those memories arise from the experiences or apprehensions that come forth from [the other *vr̥ttis* of the mind, i.e.] the means of knowing, error, conceptualization, sleep, or of other memories."<sup>194</sup> "Experience" in the above refers to the *buddhi*'s (*citta*'s) first ascertainment of or involvement with the remembered object;<sup>195</sup> thereafter it becomes the awareness of the cognition that *buddhi* has (*anuvyavasaya*) as explained earlier. It is also clear from Vyasa's passage that a memory may be remembered, as the first-time experience of that memory. Thus there may occur



the memory of a memory. As cognition (in the process of apprehension) generates impressions (*samskaras*), so do the impressions serve to activate the memory experience by assisting the process of knowing and providing the content of the memory experience.<sup>196</sup> Insofar as the *samskaras* and resulting memories are said to ensue under the influence of the afflictions, an afflicted latent deposit or karmic residue is formed and becomes operative. Thus the link between the *vrttis*, *karma*, and samsaric identity is established.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu informs us that *buddhi* is the "raw material" from which all *vrttis* are shaped, as images are shaped from gold. The *vrttis* are the specific transformations (*parinamas*) arising from the intellect or *bud-*

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*dhi*,<sup>197</sup> which, as we have seen, is located in the mind (*citta*). Because *buddhi* is a form of *prakṛti*, which consists of the three *gunas*, Vyasa says: "Also, all these modifications (*vrttis*) are characterized by pleasure, dissatisfaction (pain) and delusion and are to be understood as being under the sway of the afflictions."<sup>198</sup> The afflictions which correlate with pleasure, dissatisfaction (pain) and delusion are attachment (*raga*), aversion (*dvesa*), and ignorance (*avidya*) respectively.<sup>199</sup>

Obviously, the above five categories of *vrtti* do not offer a comprehensive list of all psychomental states. By classifying the *vrttis* into five categories, the totality of innumerable modifications that can actually take place can be seen generally as derivatives of these five. However, in the context of yogic praxis the five types of *vrttis* are all significant in that they contribute to the mechanism of our karmic identity and its "entanglement" within *prakṛti* and, as we will soon see, our spiritual liberation as well. It is therefore quite natural why those modifications that keep the yogin bound in misidentification and are of an afflicted (*klista*) nature, and those modifications that are conducive to liberation and are of a nonafflicted (*aklista*) nature,<sup>200</sup> should be a topic of great concern in Yoga. We must keep in mind that according to Yoga, "knowledge" is not simply the ratiocinative process or reasoning, but correlates with the all-pervasive principle of *mahat* (*linga-matra*) the first principle of manifestation in *prakṛti* out of which everything else manifests and is activated.

The five types of *vrtti* comprise the normal range of human functioning, encompassing three modes of everyday transactions, including things (as registered in *pramana*), mental content or objects whether remembered (*smṛti*), conceptualized (*vikalpa*), or erroneous (*viparyaya*), and sleep (*nidra*). Each of these states is related directly to a sense of self or subject who appropriates and lays claim to the experience. The experiences of discrete objects or mental content or thought are filtered through and referenced to an afflicted identity of self that permeates the mind. When this happens, *purusa*, the pure witness or knower of *vrtti*, is forgotten or veiled/concealed; the ego-sense possesses the experience, thinking it to be its own. *Purusa* (seemingly) becomes as if reduced to the finite realm, of limitation, of the "me" and "mine" of worldly, empirical existence. As described by Patañjali (YS II.6), the unseen seer (*purusa*) becomes as if "mixed" with the seeable (*drśya*) in the process of *samyoga*, the congenital conflation of *purusa* and *prakṛti*. The result of this "mixture" or "conjunction" of "spirit" and "matter" is the emergence of reified notions of the world and self (egoity) rooted in ignorance,

attachment, aversion, and fear and functioning in the mind in the form of *vrtti* (i.e., *cittavrtti*).

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The *vrttis* may be described as being cognitive, conative, and affective considering the nature that Patañjali and Vyasa attribute to them. As its general translation of "modification" indicates, *vrtti* incorporates both a mental content as well as an activity, a function, an act of mind. Vijñāna Bhikṣu provides a helpful definition of *vrtti*: "A *vrtti* of the intellect, like the flame of a candle, is the foremost point of the mind whereby the mind's one-pointedness is experienced. This foremost point, contacting external objects through the senses, is transformed into replicas of objects like melted copper in a crucible."<sup>201</sup> The author of the *Samkhya-Pravacana-Sutra* (V.107) states: "The *vrtti* is a principle different from a member or a quality; it reaches out to make a connection and glides forth [among objects, senses and the mind]."<sup>202</sup> In his commentary on the above text, Vijñāna Bhikṣu explains that the mind naturally forms *vrttis* that are real "psychic" transformations taking place through mental processes.<sup>203</sup> *Vrtti* is not specifically defined by Vyasa. Vacaspati Misra understands the five modifications as "change into the form of an object."<sup>204</sup> Bhoja Raja states: "The *vrttis* are forms of modification which are parts of the whole [the mind]";<sup>205</sup> and elsewhere he says, "the *vrttis* are particular modifications of the mind."<sup>206</sup> Even the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*)<sup>207</sup> that takes place in the *sattva* of the mind, as well as the five afflictions understood as parts of the *vrtti* of error (*viparyaya*)<sup>208</sup> can all be classified under the category of *vrtti*. *Vrtti* is employed by Patañjali in a more general sense as "function" or "movement" or "mode of being,"<sup>209</sup> and as a technical term implying any mental content that falls into the five categories of *vrttis* (YS I.5; II.11; IV.18). In the latter sense it is often used in the plural.

By rendering *vrtti* as "modifications," our study means to include the cognitive conditions, mental, emotive, and affective content, processes and activities, in fact any act or content of consciousness, self-identity, or mode of consciousness operating in the mind itself. Unlike the term *parinama* (transformation, development), which implies serial change (of *prakṛti*), *vrtti* in Yoga is an "occurrence," which implies a more local human (temporal) activity inextricably linked to self-identity.<sup>210</sup> A secondary meaning of *vrtti* is "means of livelihood," as in "*vrttis* are the means for the mind (empirical selfhood) to attain its livelihood." As appropriated by limited self-consciousness, the *vrttis* are like individuated "whirlpools" metaphorically signifying "whirls" of consciousness or an existence that appears separate from the water (but is not really); the *purusa* "as if" conforms to an identity extrinsic to itself and takes on the appearance of a changing, finite, psychophysical being, rather than abiding in its true nature as pure consciousness.

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We have seen that in the realm of empirical selfhood the law of *karma* operates if and only if the modifications of the mind are rooted in afflictions (YS II.12). Vyasa (YB IV.11) likens this bound state of affairs to the wheel of *samsara*, which turns due to the power of ignorance with its six

spokes, namely, virtue (*dharma*) and nonvirtue (*adharma*), pleasure (*sukha*) and pain/dissatisfaction (*duhkha*), as well as attachment (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesa*).<sup>211</sup> The five afflictions (*klesas*) provide the dynamic framework through which mistaken identity of Self is maintained urging the psychophysical organism to emerge into activity, to feel, to think, to desire, and so forth. As the basic emotional and motivational forces, they lie at the root of all delusion, dissatisfaction, or pain. In Yoga, misidentification *is* suffering. As long as we live out of a deluded understanding of authentic identity, we remain subject to sorrow and conflict. Hence, Vyasa labels the afflictions as "errors" or "misconceptions" (*viparyaya*). Thus the normal human situation can be characterized as the product of a cognitive error, a positive misconstruction of reality and an apparent loss or concealment of intrinsic identity. The correction of this error or misunderstanding of the world and the true nature of selfhood is contingent upon the full recovery or realization of *purusa*. What role, if any, does *vrtti* actually play in the "recovery" process through which the disclosure of our authentic identity as *purusa*, the seer, takes place?

*Klista*-and *Aklista*-*Vrtti* Patañjali understands the five types of *vrttis* as being either "afflicted" (*klista*) or "nonafflicted" (*aklista*).<sup>212</sup> Vyasa explains:

The afflicted [*vrttis*] are caused by the five afflictions and are causes of the afflictions (*klesa-hetuka*); they become the seed-bed for the growth of the accumulated residue of *karma*. The others [nonafflicted] have discernment (*khyati*) as their object and oppose the sway of the *gunas*.<sup>213</sup>

The compound word *klesa-hetuka* used in the above by Vyasa to explain *klista* may be translated as "caused by the *klesas*" and "causes of the *klesas*." Vacaspati states that the *klesas* such as *asmita* (egoity) are the causes that bring about the advent of (afflicted) *vrttis*. Or, as Vacaspati adds, it may be said that as *prakṛti* serves *purusa*, only its rajasic and tamasic *vrttis* are the cause of *klesa*.<sup>214</sup> According to Vijñana Bhikṣu, the word *hetu* (cause) can also mean a purpose as well as referring to the effects of the *vrttis*. Bhikṣu states that *klesa* should be taken mainly to mean

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suffering/dissatisfaction (*duhkha*), which is the effect (e.g., greed) produced by the *vrttis* that take the form of objects experienced; hence it is said to be *klista* ("afflicted").<sup>215</sup>

Feuerstein understands Vyasa's explanation (see above) of *klista* as making little sense in that "*aklista* would consequently have to be understood as 'not caused by the *klesas*,' which is absurd, since all mental activity is *ex hypothesi* engendered by the *klesas*."<sup>216</sup> Feuerstein's claim in the above amounts to a tautological and reductionistic explanation of *all* mental activity as being engendered by the afflictions; it fails to take into account the soteriological purpose of *vrtti* in the form of subtler mental processes leading to liberating knowledge (*jñāna*, *YS* II.28) or what I will refer to as the "sattvification" of the mind and its *vrtti*-processes. The process of sattvification takes place in the *sattva* of consciousness, the most refined aspect of the mind (*citta*), and its effect is such that it opposes the afflictions by purifying and illuminating the yogin's consciousness thereby dissolving the barriers to spiritual liberation.

Bhikṣu interprets Vyasa's exposition on *aklista* by paraphrasing it thus, "resulting in *aklesa*,"<sup>217</sup> meaning that *aklista-vṛttis* do not result in afflictions. Through cognitive error or misconception, the *klesas* both generate and arise from the activity and changes of the *gunas* in the samsaric condition of self-identity, a condition that continues up to the discernment (*khyati*) of *purusa* and *prakṛti*.<sup>218</sup> According to Vacaspati Miśra, *khyati* (used by Vyasa in the sense of discriminative discernment or *viveka-khyati*) means "clarity of insight" (*prajñā-prasada*) and occurs when the sattvic component of *buddhi* (intellect), having been cleansed of the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas*, flows tranquilly.<sup>219</sup> Any yogic "methods" that lead to the discernment of *purusa* and the mind (i.e., *sattva*) can be included under the clause "have discernment as their object."<sup>220</sup> Soteriologically, the unafflicted *vṛttis* are helpful in bringing about discernment and reducing the power of the *gunas* (i.e., in the form of ignorance) over the yogin until the *gunas* (the seeable) have finally fulfilled their purposes, that is, of providing experience (*bhoga*) and facilitating liberation (*apavarga*). They do so by opposing or blocking the activation of ignorance in the form of egoity, its desires and attendant actions (*karma*).<sup>221</sup> In his commentary on Vyasa (*Mani-Prabha*), Ramananda Yati (sixteenth century CE) states that the result of *klista-vṛttis* is bondage (*bandha-phala*), whereas the result of *aklista-vṛttis* is liberation (*mukti-phala*);<sup>222</sup> but this is technically incorrect. *Aklista-vṛttis* only lead up to and include discernment (a quality of the *sattva* of the mind), which in turn must be transcended in higher *samādhi* (*asamprajñata*).<sup>223</sup> Only then

can final liberation (*kaivalya*) from misidentification with *all vṛttis* and their effects/affects take place.

Bhoja Raja interprets *klista* and *aklista* as "with *klesas*" (in the technical sense: ignorance, etc.) and "without *klesas*" (in the technical sense), or as "affected by *klesas*" and "nonaffected by *klesas*" (both in the above technical sense).<sup>224</sup> Hauer<sup>225</sup> agrees with Bhoja's interpretation. Many scholars understand *klista* as "with *klesas*" (in the general sense) as in "painful," and *aklista* as "without *klesas*" (in the general sense) as in "not painful."<sup>226</sup> *Yoga-Sutra* I.5 also appears in the *Samkhya-Sutras* (II.33) attributed to Kapila. In his commentary *Samkhya-Pravacana-Bhasya ad locum*, Viṣṇu Bhikṣu interprets *klista* as the *vṛttis* that are proper to samsaric existence and produce suffering, and *aklista* as the *vṛttis* that arise through the practice of Yoga and are contrary to the *klista-vṛttis*.<sup>227</sup> In his commentary on the same work, Aniruddha (fifteenth century) explains *klista* as being united to the *klesas* and composed of *rajas* and *tamas*, and *aklista* as being made of *sattva* wherein the *klesas* have been destroyed.<sup>228</sup>

Based on the above analysis, and for the sake of clarification, I am suggesting that *klista-vṛtti* refers to mental activity that helps to maintain the power and influence of the *klesas*; and *aklista* refers to mental activity that facilitates the process of the dissolution of the *klesas*. The "afflicted" modes of the mind refer to the ordinary intentional consciousness of everyday life. Referring earlier to Bhikṣu's (*YV* I.5) understanding of *aklista* as "resulting in *aklesa*," it does not seem inappropriate to designate *aklesa* as that condition in which the grip of the afflictions on the mind is partially or completely checked. Evidently, according to the commentators (and to counter Feuerstein), not "all mental activity is . . . engendered by the *klesas*." *Klista-vṛttis* are

brought about by the afflictions, but this is not necessarily the case for the *aklista-vrttis*. By reducing all mental activity to being a product of the *klesas*, Feuerstein has failed to differentiate between two radically different causes in Yoga: (1) *avidya*, which is responsible for the misidentification of self or egoity (*asmita*) leading to further affliction, and (2) the purposefulness of *purusa*, which is the final cause of the three differentiated states of *prakrti*<sup>229</sup> and for which the mind ultimately serves the purpose of liberation.<sup>230</sup> *Vrttis* of the nonafflicted (*aklista*) variety are engendered by the purposefulness of *purusa* and cannot be reduced to being a product of the *klesas*.

The task of the yogin lies in the gradual overcoming of the impressions (*samskaras*) of "emergence" (*vyutthana*) that generate an extrinsic self-identity or the externalization of selfhood in its worldly attached modes

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"away" from the *purusa*, and the simultaneous cultivation of the impressions of "cessation" (*nirodha*)<sup>231</sup> and the eventual establishment of selfhood in its intrinsic spiritual nature. Based on our discussion of *samskara* and *vrtti*, it can be inferred that: (1) From *samskaras* of a *vyutthana-nature* arise *vyutthana-vrttis*, afflicted *vrttis* that generate or support a deluded understanding of reality. (2) From *samskaras* of a *nirodha-nature* arise *vrttis* that are conducive to the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*), and that, being of the *aklista* type, aid in removing the *klesas* and their effects, thus leading to an enlightened understanding of self and world. These two "directions," which imply radically different understandings of selfhood based on *samskara* and *vrtti*, can be correlated to the gunic dispositions of the mind, as the following statement by Vyasa makes clear:

The mind always tends towards three dispositions: illumination, activity or stasis, which leads to the inference that the mind is constituted of the three *gunas*. The nature of *mind-sattva* is illumination. Mingled with *rajas* and *tamas* the mind is drawn toward power and possessions. The same mind when pervaded by *tamas* becomes subject to nonvirtue, ignorance, attachment and impotence. Again, when the covering of delusion (*moha*) [correlated with *tamas*] has diminished from the mind, it [the mind] shines in its fullness; when this is pervaded by a measure of *rajas*, it turns toward virtue, knowledge, dispassion and power. When the last vestige of the impurity of *rajas* has been eliminated, the mind is established in its own nature, becoming simply the discernment (*khyati*) of the distinction of the *sattva* and the *purusa*.<sup>232</sup>

The presence of *sattva*, the purest *guna*, draws one toward *dharma* (merit, virtue), *jñana* (knowledge that arises from Yoga), *vairagya*<sup>233</sup> (dispassion/detachment), and *aisvarya* (supremacy, possession of power, sovereignty).<sup>234</sup> These four qualities, according to *Samkhya-Karika* 23,<sup>235</sup> are the natural aspects of a *sattvic* "mind," that is, intellect or *buddhi*. For example, sovereignty implies an unthwarted sense of will power or determination whereas the loss of sovereignty denotes that one's will is weakened or thwarted by many impediments. The word *aisvarya* is an abstract noun formed from *isvara* ("master," "lord"), used here not in the sense of God, but rather as an exalted human sense of power, of lordship, a commanding presence, the ability to be effective, to be "in control." According to Yoga philosophy, one cannot be "in



control of things" or in harmony with one's objective world without first being in control of one's mental faculties or "subjective world," personality traits, and so on. The word *isvara* is derived from the root *is*, meaning "to command, rule, reign,"<sup>236</sup> "to be the master of." The presence of *sattva* gives one the clear-sightedness

so as to exercise such autonomy and effectiveness in a morally responsible way. One in whom *sattva* is predominant can easily and readily become engaged in Yoga and lead an increasingly purified, virtuous and cognitively illuminated existence with a preponderance of *aklista-vrttis*.

The "absence" of *sattva* and dominance of *tamas* robs the mind of clarity, and, consequently, effectiveness in wielding power in a morally responsible way is lost. This does not mean that one who wields power in a manipulative egoic fashion, or in a nondiscerning way, is also endowed with *sattva*. Nonvirtue, ignorance, and attachment are all symptoms of the predominance of *tamas*, whereas only "meritorious" effectiveness in wielding power would mark the presence of *sattva*. When *sattva* is eclipsed by *tamas* one becomes weakened, overly dependent, no longer a "sovereign" person. One in whom *tamas* predominates (mis)identifies with *klista-vrttis* and is ensnared in the network of afflicted consciousness and identity.

In Vyasa's statement that "the mind always tends to illumination (*sattva*), activity (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*)" as a result of the presence of the three *gunas*, it must be understood that the above list of qualities of the *gunas* is far from being an exhaustive one. *Sattva* in its form of moral and mental activity implies other luminous qualities such as clarity of mind, serenity, insight, kindness and compassion, benevolence, forgiveness, pleasantness of character, and so on. In the case of rajasic qualities, not only energy and will (volition leading to action), but passionate moral and mental activity, anguish, anger, and pleasure and pain of different kinds (joy, anxiety, dissatisfaction, conflict) are to be understood. The word "inertia" (*sthiti*) or "stasis," used to express the attribute of *tamas*, means both "stability" and "stagnation," and refers as well to other tamasic qualities such as dullness, confusion, stupidity, indolence, dejection, heaviness, sloth, and so forth. All forms of *prakrti* carry within themselves all three *gunas*,<sup>237</sup> and nothing within *prakrti* exists that does not include all the three *gunas* together. Variances in the nature of all phenomena, entities, attributes, self-identifications, tendencies and inclinations, personalities, choices, relationships, and acts depend on the dominance and preponderance of the *gunas*. In fact, the *gunas* are used to characterize almost all aspects of life including the nature of faith, knowledge, action, agency, intellect, and foodstuffs.<sup>238</sup>

Upon further analysis of the *gunas* it would appear to be the case that the mind can undertake an initiative only because of *rajas*. Through *tamas* it can be drawn to "negative" or irresponsible states such as malevolence toward others. *Sattva* brings to the mind serenity, clarity, pleasantness, and lucidity. What impels the mind to move in the direction of virtue? It is the presence of *rajas*. The mind, being a composition of the tripartite process,



can never be without *rajas* and *tamas*. It is not, therefore, that in Yoga *rajas* and *tamas* are to be negated or abolished; rather, they are to be purified so that their presence as well as their effects (and affects) no longer obstruct the natural illuminating power intrinsic to *sattva*. In their natural state, *rajas* and *tamas* are essential and their measure is ideally sufficient to fulfill the purpose of *sattva*. When present within the limit of this measure, *rajas* initiates virtue, and so forth, and *tamas* imparts stability. What is initially intended by the discipline of Yoga is simply purification of mind so that *rajas* and *tamas* may be brought under the power of *sattva*. As such, *sattva* is then no longer dominated by the moral and mental processes of *rajas* and *tamas*. Vyasa shows (YB I.2) the subtlety and the superiority of the *sattva* of consciousness, which functions as a "bridge" on the "path" to the untainted consciousness of *purusa*. The way and journey in Yoga from a tamasic or rajasic disposition to a sufficiently sattvified one thus involves a highly moral process; it is not, as one scholar puts it, an "*a-moral* process."<sup>239</sup> Yoga does not succumb to an antinomian perspective but seeks to integrate, through an embodiment of being, an enlightened consciousness with an affectively and morally matured sense of identity and personhood.

It is clear from the above analysis that tamasic *vr̥ttis* are afflicted modifications of the mind and sattvic *vr̥ttis* are nonafflicted ones. Vijñāna Bhikṣu regards rajasic *vr̥ttis*<sup>240</sup> as mixed, both *aklista* and *klista*. In classical Sāṃkhya the function of *rajas* is always to impel both *sattva* and *tamas*.<sup>241</sup> Without the initial impelling force of *rajas* the other two *guṇas* are ineffective and inefficacious. In this sense the rajasic element may be considered to be mixed with either *sattva* or *tamas*, whichever is dominant, and therefore *sattva* or *tamas* is served or supported by *rajas*. The progress of the mind toward pure *sattva* is not possible without the operational capacity of *rajas*.

How do the different qualities of *vr̥tti* interrelate in the system, that is, in the mind? Given our prevalent habit patterns of thought and misidentification and their proneness for generating and sustaining turbulence, affliction, and conflict both within ourselves and in the world how do nonafflicted states of mind survive in the midst of ignorance and suffering? One could, as does Vacaspati Miśra, pose an argument as follows: It is understood that all beings, with the exception of liberated embodiments (i.e., a "descent" [*avatara*] or a *jīvanmukta*), bear afflicted *vr̥ttis* and have various attachments, aversions, fears, and so forth. It would be rare if nonafflicted *vr̥ttis* were to arise in the constant stream or "whirling" of such afflicted mental and emotional content. Moreover, even if nonafflicted *vr̥ttis* were to arise among the afflicted ones, they would be powerless, having

fallen among innumerable powerful opponents. Therefore, it could be deemed illogical that afflicted *vr̥ttis* could be overcome through nonafflicted ones, and that even by cultivating dispassion (*vairāgya*) toward any manner or type of *vr̥tti*, however sattvic,<sup>242</sup> the afflicted patterns of *vr̥tti*-identification would in the end prove to be insurmountable. To counter this kind of pessimism, Vyasa assuredly and optimistically replies: "They [nonafflicted *vr̥ttis*] remain nonafflicted even if they occur in a stream of afflicted ones. In intervals between afflicted ones, there are nonafflicted ones; in intervals between nonafflicted ones are located afflicted ones."<sup>243</sup> In Yoga, practice (*abhyāsa*) and dispassion (*vairāgya*) can arise from *aklista-vr̥ttis*, for example,

from *agama*: reliable testimony one of the means of knowledge or valid cognition (*pramana*); or from *anumana*: inference, which is another *pramana* and through which can take place spiritual upliftment or inspiration, or perhaps the instruction of a teacher resulting in contemplation and greater understanding.<sup>244</sup> When practice and dispassion cause a break in the flow or movement of afflicted patterns of thought, the *vr̥ttis* leading to a "higher good" or "purpose" (*paramartha*) arise.<sup>245</sup> Even though, as Vyasa states, these latter *vr̥ttis* arise in the stream of afflictions and afflicted *vr̥ttis*, they nevertheless remain untouched by them and are not corrupted. The same applies to nonafflicted *vr̥ttis* that appear in intervals between afflicted *vr̥ttis*. Similarly, when nonafflicted *vr̥ttis* are generated or activated, their stream is often interrupted by afflicted *vr̥ttis*. However, these impure *vr̥ttis* have no power to alter the purer ones; rather, as the purer *vr̥ttis* grow in strength through repeated practice, their *samskaras* gradually mature, and the impure *vr̥ttis* and *samskaras* lose their hold over the mind. Attention then need no longer be monopolized by afflicted states of identity. The mind and its modifications become progressively infused in the nature of *sattva*, the *guna* that predominates in the makeup of *aklista-vr̥ttis* and *samskaras* of "cessation" (*nirodha*). The yogin's identity becomes increasingly sattvified. As dispassion (*vairagya*) toward forms of misidentification (*sarupya*) matures into higher dispassion (*para-vairagya*), even the dependency on sattvic *vr̥ttis* previously so necessary for the yogin's growth and spiritual development falls away. The soteriological point to be made here is that any attachment to *vr̥tti*, whether that *vr̥tti* is afflicted or nonafflicted, must be transcended in Yoga. By fostering the *aklista-vr̥ttis*, one masters the *klista-vr̥ttis*, and then, in turn, one dissolves any attachment to the *aklista-vr̥ttis* through higher dispassion.<sup>246</sup>

Examples of the "nonafflicted" type of *vr̥ttis* can be alluded to. A valid cognition of the *pratyaksa* type can be deemed nonafflicted when it leads to higher perception of the true nature of both *prakṛti* and *purusa*. A

conceptualization (*vikalpa*) is beneficial when one conceives of, or imagines, greater states of yogic awareness. For example, after having read the "great sayings" (*mahavakyas*) of the Upanisads such as *tat tvam asi* "That [the all-pervasive Self] you are" (*Chand Up* VI.12.3.) one can be left with a purificatory impression in the mind even if the sayings have not been fully understood. *Nidra* (sleep) can be of value when a particular image in a dream acts as a catalyst for meditation (*YS* I.38). A memory (*smṛti*) is helpful when, for example, upon viewing "objects" in the world of nature such as a blue sky, one is reminded of the all-pervading nature of *purusa* or of descriptions of appearances of one's favorite "descent" (*avatara*) or embodiment of the deity (e.g., Kṛṣṇa, Rama, Siva, etc.).<sup>247</sup>

*Yoga-Sutra* I.33 states: "The mind is made pure and clear from the cultivation of friendliness, compassion, happiness and equanimity in conditions (or toward objects) of joy, sorrow, merit or demerit respectively."<sup>248</sup> Thus the sattvic *vr̥ttis* or attitudes of friendliness (*maitri*), compassion (*karuṇa*), happiness (*mudita*) and equanimity (*upekṣa*) replace the rajasic and tamasic ones based on more self-centered orientations or egoic modes of being and relating in the world. This is done in the spirit, as it were, of dispassion toward the moral and mental states of others. Vyasa writes on the above *sutra*: "Such devoted cultivation produces *dharma*, and thereby the mind is

made pure and clear. When it is clear it attains the state of one-pointed stability."<sup>249</sup> Obviously, not the entire emotive and affective dimension of human nature can be subsumed under the traits of afflicted identity as the above attitudes make clear. The sattvic qualities that adhere within our emotive/affective dimension can be understood as positive (i.e., nonafflicted) aids on the yogin's journey.

Once an aspirant has begun to practice is success in Yoga definitely assured? Do the *vrttis* associated with affliction (*klesa*) then cease to have power over the aspirant? The above questions may be answered in two ways: (1) Vyasa (YB I.1) rejects those with distracted (*viksipta*) minds as being unworthy of consideration as serious yogins<sup>250</sup> and is, therefore, not talking about them. (2) The wording of the Sanskrit commentators (e.g., Vacaspati Misra, H. Aranya) suggests that nonafflicted *vrttis* have to be strengthened through practice and dispassion until they cease to be intermittent and thus create a flow (*pravaha*) in the yogin's consciousness. As a result, afflicted *vrttis* arising intermittently lose their power over the yogin and are therefore mastered. The yogin is no longer enslaved by the afflicted modes of thinking and acting. This is the essence of what Vyasa says: "It is only by the modifications (*vrttis*) that the impressions (*samskaras*) corresponding to them are generated, and by the impressions are generated

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new *vrttis*. Thus the wheel of *vrttis* and *samskaras* revolves."<sup>251</sup> The *vrttis* both generate and strengthen the *samskaras*, the latter in turn facilitating the rise of the former. There is no conception of mind as *tabula rasa* to be found here. The only way the samsaric wheel of *samskaras* and *vrttis* can cease, implying an end to mistaken identity and the experience of suffering, is through the process or practice of "cessation" (*nirodha*) itself.

Epistemologically, *vrtti* refers to any mental "whirl," "wave," or modification. It is, thus, the medium through which a human being understands and experiences: whatever we know is based on the functioning of *vrtti*. Our total apprehension of a conscious self/person is only by way of observing and recognizing the *vrttis*, intentions, ideas (*pratyaya*), and thought-constructs that arise in the mind. In other words, in ordinary human experience the existence of consciousness without an object in the mind is not suspected. *Citta* may be described as a network of functions that allows for the relay of information to the uninvolved experiencer (*purusa*). These functions include the inner organ (*antahkarana*) composed of *buddhi*, *ahamkara* and *manas*, in conjunction with sense and motor organs (*buddhindriyas* and *karmendriyas*) and their objects. The *citta* is regarded as the vehicle for perception (wherein the contents of experience take form for presentation to the *purusa*) as well as the receptacle for the effects of *karma*. The *citta* takes on a karmic shape or mentality due to the arising of each *vrtti* that pervades it in the form of various perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and so on, and as referenced to a prakrtic sense of self. In ordinary experience, *citta* is thus experienced as a series of particular mental states. However, according to Yoga, the *citta* is not capable of functioning by itself; it derives its semblance of consciousness through the proximity of *purusa* (YS IV.19 and 22-23) in a manner analogous to that in which the moon is illuminated by the light of the sun. As the sun shines on the moon, so the *purusa* "shines" its "light" upon the *citta* and thereby knows all that passes in the mind by observing *vrttis*, thoughts, and emotions as a witness (YS II.20; IV.18). Hence *purusa* is the true

experiencer (*bhoktr*, YB II.6) and knower. However, the capacity to witness or observe the ongoings of the mind is not available to the empirical selves bound as they are to the identity of the body, mind, and its modifications, that is, psychophysical being.

Human consciousness, due to misidentification, experiences selfhood according to the changing modes (*gunas*) of *prakrti*. All our "knowledge" as misidentified selves is structured in the prakrtic realm of *cittavrtti* and functions as a masquerading consciousness of phenomenal selfhood. In *Yoga-Sutra* I.3<sup>252</sup> the seer (*purusa*) is said to be established in its true form, that is, in its unchanging, ever-wise, ever-pure nature. In the next *sutra* (YS

I.4)<sup>253</sup> *purusa* appears to be misidentified with *prakrti* (*cittavrtti*), our self-identity having conformed to the changing nature of *vrtti*. Does *purusa* have two natures? The total and permanent incorruptibility and unchangeability of *purusa* is the fundamental tenet of Yoga philosophy. If any of the "attributes" of *purusa* were to increase or decrease, the entire tenet would have to be rejected. In that case *purusa* would not be transcendent, pure, or free at all because it would be subject to factors outside of itself, namely, alteration, delusion, and suffering. There would simply be no point in pursuing Yoga because it would only lead to a series of temporary states of change and development (*parinama*) rooted in egoity, attachment, aversion, fear, confusion, and conflict, and that ineluctably fuel further afflicted identity. But how and why does conformity (*sarupya*) of self-identity with *vrttis* take place?

### *Samyoga*

The existence of empirical identity or self enveloped in spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) does not mean that *purusa* deviates from its essential intrinsic nature of unconditioned freedom and purity. The starting point of the search for liberation in Yoga must be an inquiry into the nature of the "conjunction" (*samyoga*) between the seer (*drastr*) and the seeable (*drsya*),<sup>254</sup> that is, of the congenitally conflated realms of *purusa* and *prakrti*. Although the Yoga system has no qualms about expressing the shortcomings of mundane existence, to the discerning one (*vivekin*, YS II.15)<sup>255</sup> all identity contained within the samsaric realm is seen to involve dissatisfaction and suffering. Yet Yoga does not conclude on a note of existential despair by seeking, for example, to negate mundane existence or take flight from the world. From Patañjali's perspective, *samyoga* provides an experiential basis from which the yogin can then go on to apprehend the natures of *purusa* and *prakrti* (YS II.23)<sup>256</sup> through a rigorous spiritual discipline for overcoming attachment to the modifications of the mind and thereby abiding in one's true identity or "own form" (*svarupe'vasthanam*, *Yoga-Sutra* I.3). Patañjali maintains that in the condition of *samyoga* the "contact" between the seer and the seeable is merely an apparent junction, since both the seer (intrinsic identity) and the seeable (extrinsic identity) are held to be utterly distinct.<sup>257</sup> He does not explicitly analyze this epistemological problem further. This has led to a great deal of speculation in the commentarial literature on the *Yoga-Sutra*.

To explain the cognitive processes, Vyasa resorts to various metaphors and analogies comparing, for instance, the mind to a magnet<sup>258</sup> that attracts

the objects, and elsewhere (*YB I.41* and *IV.23*)<sup>259</sup> compares it to a crystal that reflects the color of the object near it. Through the "contact" (explained below)<sup>260</sup> with *purusa*, the mind takes on a semblance of awareness and cognizes the objects just as a crystal receives the form of an object and appears identical with that form:

Mind is colored by an object cognizable to the mind, and by the fact of being an object, it is bound up with the subject, *purusa*, by a mental function of belonging to it. It is this very mind alone that is colored by the seer and the seeable. It assumes the appearance of object and subject, the insentient ("nonconscious") becoming sentient ("conscious"). The mind, being insentient, essentially an objectconscious as it were, on the analogy of the crystalis said to comprehend everything.<sup>261</sup>

Due to the association of the mind with *purusa*, *purusa* then appears to be an empirical state when knowledge and experience are attributed to it. Drawing on the philosophical teachings of both Patañjali and Samkhya (*SK 20*), Vyasa contends that it is through the conjunction of *purusa* and *prakṛti* (i.e., the mind) that consciousness "takes on" the role of an empirical identity or knower. He understands the "contact" to be in the form of mere proximity (*samnidhi*).<sup>262</sup> Yet how can there be "proximity" between these two eternal all-pervasive principles (that is, *purusa* and *prakṛti*)? The proximity, however, does not mean proximity in time and space because both *purusa* and unmanifest *prakṛti* (*pradhana*) are beyond time and space, engaged as it were, in a beginningless relationship (*anadih sambandha*).<sup>263</sup>

Finite categories of time and space would thus seem particularly inappropriate in any description of this "union." However, *samyoga* is an effective relation through which *prakṛti* is influenced by the presence of *purusa*, understood here as a transcendent influence.<sup>264</sup> This means that *prakṛti* can neither *be* nor *be understood* without reference to *purusa*, the realm of the *gunas* ultimately serving the purpose or "goal" of spiritual emancipation (*purusa*-realization). It is paradoxical that *prakṛti* manifests and is activated because of the transcendent influence of *purusa*, and yet *purusa* is revealed as being intrinsically free by nature never really lost, forgotten, or acquired by observing or "contemplating" *prakṛti*. Consciousness learns, from experiencing the manifestations of *prakṛti*, that it (*purusa*) is not contained within *prakṛti*. It is even more of a paradox to observe that both *purusa* and *prakṛti* are realized and recognized as what they truly are only after they have appeared to be what they are not: the mind itself appears conscious and *purusa* appears as if to be the empirical agent of activity (cf. *SK 20*). Vacaspati sees the nonspatial and nontemporal connection between

*purusa* and *prakṛti* as a kind of "preestablished harmony." He speaks of their enigmatic relationship in terms of a special "fitness" or "capacity" (*yogyata*) and explains the "proximity" (*samnidhi*) between the two principles as a "capacity" or juxtaposition of two complementary powers. The "proximity" of *purusa* and *prakṛti*, consisting of this "capacity" (*yogyata*), is



qualified by Vacaspati as the "power of being experienceable" (*bhogyasakti*) belonging to *prakṛti* and the "power of being the experiencer" (*bhoktrāsakti*) belonging to *purusa*.<sup>265</sup> *Purusa* thus has the capability of being the "experiencer" and *citta* has the capacity of being an object of experience. What is, therefore, the mysterious "union," termed *samyoga*, between *purusa* the "seer" (*drastr*) and *prakṛti* (*citta*) the "seeable" (*dorsa*)? Vyasa considers the "union" to be a projection or superimposition (*adhyaropa*)<sup>266</sup> of the contents of consciousness we are aware of as given real existence with respect to *purusa*, that is, they reflect *purusa*'s existence. They appear real because of the reality of *purusa*. As Vyasa explains, this superimposition results in a confusion of identity between *purusa* and the mental processes wherein *purusa* is not distinguishable from the process of the emergence or extraversion (*vyutthana*) of consciousness that generates an extrinsic sense of self-identity,<sup>267</sup> that is, mistaken identity or misidentification.

In *Yoga-Sutra* II.23<sup>268</sup> the terms "possessor"/"owner" (*svamin*) and "possessed"/"owned" (*sva*), referring to the seer and the seeable respectively, epitomize well the nature of the conjunction between *purusa* and *prakṛti*. *Purusa* is the possessor who is "joined" to its own seen object for the purpose of apprehending or seeing. A *felix culpa*, a confusing temporary misidentification, appears almost a necessary prelude to the realization of yogic wisdom and true identity. Why should there be this apparent "loss" or "fall" of self-identity (*purusa*) from its pristine and unencumbered existence into a state of change and enslavement to the prakṛtic realm, only then to be followed by strenuous efforts for liberation? Patañjali's reply seems to be that the conjunction (*samyoga*) takes place so that the essential nature of the seer and the seeable can be grasped and discernment arises. Awareness of the seeable object arising from that conjunction is worldly experience (*bhoga*). Awareness of the nature of the seer, however, is liberation (*apavarga*).<sup>269</sup> Vyasa explains:

Insofar as the conjunction comes to an end and there is seeing (*darsana*) and its result, seeing is said to be the cause of disjunction, and failure-to-see as the opposite of seeing is said to be the cause of the conjunction . . . Seeing, namely knowledge (*jñāna*), is said to bring about aloneness (*kaivalya*) only in the sense that in the presence of seeing there is annihilation-

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lation of the failure-to-see which is the cause of bondage. What then is this failure-to-see (*adarsana*)? 270

Vyasa's commentary on *Yoga-Sutra* II.23 becomes an exposition of various definitions of the "failure-to-see" (*adarsana*) or ignorance (*avidyā*). He lists several alternatives for understanding the ignorance that lies at the root of a person's sense of worldly involvement and selfhood.<sup>271</sup> According to Vyasa the present conjunction (*samyoga*) is caused by *avidyā* producing a mentality or "mind" of its own kind.<sup>272</sup> Patañjali states in *Yoga-Sutra* II.24: "The cause of it [i.e., *samyoga*] is ignorance."<sup>273</sup> Vyasa's commentary makes it clear that it is *avidyā*, understood as the subliminal traits or habit patterns (*vasanas*) rooted in erroneous knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*),<sup>274</sup> that is the cause of "contact" and the resulting bondage of self-identity. This is the theory of the nature of *avidyā* as favored by the Yoga school. Throughout his commentary (*YB* II.23), Vyasa uses the word *adarsana* as a synonym for *avidyā*. The other terms commonly used for *avidyā* in



the Yoga system are *viparyaya* (YS I.8 and YB I.8) and *mithyajñana* (YS I.8). Vyasa stresses that it is the particular conjunction of *avidya* in relation to the inward individual consciousness (*pratyak-cetana*) and not simply the impersonal, abstract conjunction of *purusa* with *gunas* metaphysically conceived (which is the same for all beings) that is specifically being pointed to here.<sup>275</sup> This is in line with Yoga's more psychological and epistemological approach to reality in contrast to a metaphysical (ontological) approach. It would be misleading to impute to ignorance a cosmogonic function that would be more appropriate in the context of Advaita Vedanta. One scholar, for example, states: "In the Yogasutra the reason given for the emergence or the evolution of the manifest world is *avidya* ('ignorance')." <sup>276</sup> This appears to be a misunderstanding of the precise viewpoint of Patañjali and Vyasa.

Vyasa asserts that through the proximity (*samnidhi*) of spirit and psychophysical being (matter) the mind becomes the property of *purusa*, that is, is "owned" by *purusa*: "The mind is like a magnet, serving by mere proximity, by the fact of being seen. It is the property of its owner, *purusa*. There is a beginningless connection and this is the cause of *purusa's* cognition of the mental processes."<sup>277</sup> *Samnidhi* (proximity) is a technical term used to describe the immanent association between *purusa* and the mind by virtue of which it is possible for the unchanging *purusa* to perceive the cognitions of the changing, finite mind. The service that the mind performs for *purusa* is to be of the nature of the "seeable" (*drsya*) so that cognition may occur and consequently *purusa's* capacity to be the "owner" or "master" (*svamin*) of the "owned" (*sva, prakrti*) may be developed and actual-

ized. To serve as the "seeable" means to be *purusa's* object of experience when the mind registers the forms of the objects it encounters within the "objective" world. For example, a sight or sound presented to the mind is refined into a *vrtti*. In the process of cognition, this *vrtti* "commingles" with the reflected light of *purusa* in the mind and serves *purusa* by its proximity without actually affecting it. However, as Vyasa clarifies, just as victory and defeat encountered by the soldiers are attributed to the ruler (because the ruler experiences the effects of them), so bondage and freedom happening in the mind alone are attributed to *purusa* because their effects are experienced.<sup>278</sup> That is to say, one experiences sorrow or dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) in the case of bondage, and liberating knowledge (*jñana*) in the case of freedom. However, any "change" in the *purusa* is only apparent.

*Purusa* has always been the "owner" or "possessor" and *prakrti* has always been *purusa's* possession (*sva*). Their relationship is beginningless and natural. No other relationship between them is possible because of their respective natures. Referring to the relationship of *purusa* and *prakrti*, Koelman writes: "the two terms, which *de facto* are in relation, are permanent; yet the relation itself, though without beginning, is not permanent. Hence the relation must be rooted in something over and above, in something additional to the very essence of *prakrti*."<sup>279</sup> The afflictions experienced by each individual are present as modifications in *prakrti* yet do not wholly belong to the *prakrtic* essence. Furthermore, as Vacaspati Misra informs us: "insofar as the originating of (i.e., the conjunction) is concerned, ignorance is its cause, but insofar as its stability (i.e., its continued existence and activity) is concerned, the purpose of the Self is the

cause, since the stability of that (conjunction) is due to this (purpose) of the Self."<sup>280</sup> But how is ignorance the cause of the origination of the conjunction *samyoga*? Patañjali's answer is: by considering empirical selfhood to be the true experiencer and by mistaking the Self to be the active agent however effected or altered in the process of cognition and experience. Egoity is neither the pure root-cause, nor *purusa*, but rather is the distorted reflection of *purusa* in the form of ignorance as the root-cause.

*Prakṛti* does not plan for either deceptive or liberating knowledge, for *prakṛti* does not intrinsically possess the necessary capacity to be conscious (*cetana*) in herself. Any act of cognition will have a binding effect/affect if the mind is governed by the afflictions (*klesas*) and afflicted (*klista*-) *vṛttis*, or a liberating effect/affect if the nature of the experience is predominately of the nonafflicted (*aklista-vṛtti*) type leading one to the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*). *Prakṛti* has only to show herself as she is, as the dancing girl image in the *Samkhya-Karika* (59) illustrates. *Prakṛti's*

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essentially ambivalent nature can lend its activity to both alternatives, can serve both purposes, but has only the capacity to collaborate according to the degree of understanding or misunderstanding which, located in the mind, informs our decisions,<sup>281</sup> intentions, volitions, and therefore how we experience the world and others.

### Theory of Reflected Consciousness in Yoga

The samsaric condition of self is the result of the failure to distinguish between the pure experiencer or seer (*purusa*) and the seeable or "experienced," thereby making "a mental self out of delusion."<sup>282</sup> The "mental self" referred to by Vyasa is simply a *vṛtti*-accumulated sense of being and identity, the result of an afflicted condition or deluding process of selfhood called *asmita*. Any attempts to claim the power of consciousness by way of identifying *purusa* within *prakṛti* amount to no more than reified notions or concepts of self and, from Patañjali's perspective, are clearly misguided; for the Self, not being an object of experience, can never be seen, can never be turned into a thing or entity to be experienced, can never be "thing-ified." Yet, to whatever extent the "coverings" or "veils" of *vṛtti*-identification (*sarupya*) eclipse our identity as *purusa*, *purusa's* power as the pure experiencer remains constant, for

the power of the experiencer (*purusa*) does not change. Unmoving it has as it were passed into the changing object, conforming to its function. The assumption of its form of borrowed consciousness by mere resemblance to the mental process, and not distinguished from it, is what is called the [normal] mental process of knowing.<sup>283</sup>

In the above, Vyasa is describing how the immutable *purusa*, without essentially undergoing modification, appears to conform to the mental state that has assumed the form of an object or content of consciousness and experiences that object or content through a self-reflexive activity.<sup>284</sup> By definition the *purusa* is not the prakṛtic agent of activity and experience, yet it appears to be; although free from ignorance it appears to possess ignorance; and even though as pure awareness *purusa* is said to be transcendent of both the mind and the need to discern itself

from the mind (which takes place in the *sattva* of the mind), nevertheless it appears to be dependent upon and illuminated by the mind. Vyasa further explains (repeating the above analogy of the magnet in n. 277 above) that the qualities of the mind become attributed to *purusa* because of the condition of their

conjunction or *samyoga*, just as the qualities of the magnet are induced in a piece of iron placed close to it.<sup>285</sup> When not properly discerned from *purusa*, the mental processes are said to be "the secret cave in which is hidden the eternal *brahman*."<sup>286</sup> Misidentification with the form and nature of *vr̥tti* conceals our true identity; removing our misidentification reveals our true identity. Thus, a thorough understanding and insight into the mental processes located in the "secret cave" of the mind may be, in Yoga, the key to revealing the knowledge of our true nature and identity.

One of the central theories in Yoga philosophy that attempts to illuminate our understanding of how cognition and perception function in the mind is that of the theory of the "reflection" of consciousness. The notion of "reflection" (*pratibimba*, *bimba*) is a technical term in the epistemology of classical Yoga especially as interpreted by Vacaspati Misra. I will now examine this key notion and see how it correlates with an analogical understanding of consciousness in Yoga. Later I will clarify the analogy of "reflection." "Reflection" denotes the "reflection" of the transcendent Self-awareness (*caitanya*) in the most lucid aspect of the mind, namely the *sattva* or *buddhi*, that is, the faculty of decision making and discerning. Vacaspati Misra (*TV I.7*)<sup>287</sup> speaks of the mind as a mirror (*darpana*) in which *purusa*'s awareness is reflected. While the *Yoga-Sutra* itself makes no direct reference to a theory of "reflection," Vyasa mentions the term *pratibimba* twice (*YB IV.23*) and understands it as the "reflection" of the object in the mind. Vyasa uses the simile of the reflected image to explain the "tinging" of the mind by the object. Vacaspati, writing several hundred years after Vyasa, makes a distinction (*TV II.17*) between *bimba*, or the mirroring of the object in the mind, and *pratibimba*, or the reflection of that content of consciousness back to the Self (*purusa*). However, Vacaspati frequently uses both terms interchangeably and the simile of the reflected image "becomes almost a philosophical explanation and is applied chiefly to the imaging of the [*purusa*] in the [*buddhi*], while the tinging of the mind by the external things is generally rendered by the expression 'configuration' (*akara*)."<sup>288</sup>

The "reflection" theory is also referred to by Vacaspati as the "shadow of transcendent consciousness" (*citi-chaya*) and seeks to explain how knowledge is possible given the fact that the mind (including the *buddhi* aspect) is an evolute of insentient *prakṛti*. Vacaspati subscribes to the *cicchayapattivada*, which can be described as knowledge taking place due to the reflection of *purusa* in the intellect.<sup>289</sup> The *buddhi* coupled with the sense of self or *ahamkara* becomes as it were an agent of knowledge due to the reflection of *purusa* in it. *Purusa* seemingly becomes "possessed" of knowledge, pleasure, and so on, knowledge taking the form of an object through the in-

telligized *buddhi*. The result is the apparent identity of the two: *purusa* which comes to be erroneously associated or mixed with experience and knowledge <sup>290</sup> with an empirical agent or sense of self that lays claim to or (mis)appropriates that experience and knowledge.

Reflected consciousness is a borrowed state of consciousness, borrowed as it were from *purusa*. Moreover, reflected consciousness becomes the locus of selfhood as an empirical identity. It is simultaneously: (1) not real, because it is merely a "reflected" state, of extrinsic value, and in spite of it being derived from the sustaining power and presence of the unchanging transcendent spirit, appears to reduce *purusa* to prakrtic existence; and yet, can be said to be (2) real, because it is actually experienced as human awareness although it is understood that, for all but enlightened persons, this state of reflected consciousness constitutes a more or less confused or deluded and dissatisfying sense of self-identity. In Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (YS I.2 states: *yogas cittavrttinirodhah*), *cittavrtti* can refer to an analogical understanding of consciousness in that the consciousness reflecting in the mind, and functioning in the form of the modifications of the mind (*cittavrtti*), is analogous to the consciousness of *purusa*. As has already been established (see n. 198 in chapter 2 on YS IV.19), *cittavrtti* has no self-luminosity because of its nature being that of the "seeable." Yet *purusa* (as if) becomes like the mind, as the locus of the congenital conflation of *purusa* and *prakrti*. *Samyoga*, the cause of suffering or dissatisfaction, is a false "union" of sorts and refers to the pure Self as if becoming something other than itself. *Samyoga* is the state of the misidentification of the "seeable" (*cittavrtti*, empirical selfhood) with *purusa*; and the misperceived identity of Self with the psychophysical being or ego in *samyoga* is merely a construct of the mind, a product of *vrtti* and *samskara*, which, unlike *purusa*, is not the authentic "center," "core" or spiritual "essence" of being. The above analogy is alluded to in *Yoga-Sutra* II.20, where Patañjali describes the nature of the seer as follows: "The seer is seeing only; though pure, it appears in the form of a cognition (idea, apprehension)."<sup>291</sup> Vyasa explains:

"Seeing only" means the power of the seer alone, untouched by any qualification. This *purusa* is the witness of the mind. It is not like the mind, and not absolutely unlike it. To some extent it is not like the mind. In what way? Because mind is changeable in that an object is [sometimes] known to it and [sometimes] unknown. Its object, whether [for example] a cow or a jar, is known to it and also unknown, which shows its changeability. But the fact that the object of *purusa* is always known shows clearly the unchangeability of *purusa*. Why so? Because mind, which is by definition the

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object of *purusa*, could not be [sometimes] known and [sometimes] unknown to it; hence the unchangeability of *purusa* is established in that its object is always known to it. 292

However, *purusa* is not absolutely unlike the mind, "Because though pure, it [*purusa*] appears in the form of a cognition (i.e., is intentional in the form of an idea, mental construct, apprehension). Looking on, it appears as if it were of the mind's nature, though it is not."<sup>293</sup> *Purusa*'s intrinsic, unchanging nature as the pure seer has an innate capacity to witness the

thoughts, ideas, and apprehensions in the mind without any binding identification with or misappropriation of them; that is, *purusa* is the unaffected seer, not enslaved to the "things" of the mind. However, due to ignorance *purusa* appears to take on an extrinsic, changing nature of selfhood characterized by a binding identification with the mind: *purusa* appears to waver from its unchanging nature. There are, it seems, two very distinct possibilities resulting from the transcendent connection (*sambandha*) between *purusa* and *prakṛti*: (1) Due to epistemological distortion *prakṛti* takes on a "false" identity or misidentification with *purusa* in *samyoga*; the reflected consciousness of the mind takes on a confused, deluded nature of selfhood in the process of *vyutthana*. (2) Through Yoga the yogin's identity is established in the ever-free, ever-pure nature of *purusa*, the reflected consciousness of mind having been purified through the enlightened disposition of knowledge leading to discriminative discernment (*jñāna-diptir a vivekakhyateh*, *Yoga-Sutra* II.28) in the process of *nirodha*. Patañjali does not go into a metaphysical explanation of the beginningless connection between *purusa* and *prakṛti*. His emphasis is on epistemological and psychological concerns relating to consciousness in the system.

The mind's changing nature consists of the three *gunas*, which, tending to illumination, activity, and inertia (stasis), are said to produce ideas of basically three kinds: peaceful (*santa*), violent (*ghora*), and deluded (*mudha*).<sup>294</sup> Each *guna*, when predominant in operation and manifesting as an apprehension (*pratyaya*), cognition, or idea, clashes with the predominance of the others; but when unmanifest, they cooperate with the predominant one.<sup>295</sup> Thus, the three *gunas* "come to form ideas of happiness, dissatisfaction and delusion respectively, through the support of the other two, each one having the form of all. However, the distinction is made between them according to which *guna* is then in the principal place. The seed (*bija*) which produces this great mass of suffering is ignorance."<sup>296</sup> The idea of happiness (*sukha*) is formed in the *sattva* through the support of *rajas* and *tamas*; in the state of *rajas* is formed the idea of dissatisfaction or frustration through the support of *sattva* and *tamas*; *tamas* comes to its

deluded ideas through the support of *sattva* and *rajas*. The various human dispositions will depend on whichever *guna* is predominant, the other two being subsidiary and subservient. *santa* (peaceful), *ghora* (violent), and *mudha* (deluded) are the three major personality dispositions, depending on the "weight" being accorded to each *guna* and the quality of the intentions, inclinations, thoughts, words, and acts of each person. Any appearance of these attributes "in" *purusa* is a temporary condition of appearance (*aupadhika*) arising from a superimposed condition (*upadhi*).<sup>297</sup>

Vacaspati takes recourse to the analogical theory of reflection in order to elucidate the nature of empirical experience illustrating it by the similes of the crystal and the moon. Using the analogy of a crystal and a hibiscus flower, Vacaspati explains that on account of the conjunction of the seer with the mind, we ascribe our mental states to the *purusa* by reflecting, "I am peaceful," "I am violent," "I am deluded." The pure consciousness of *purusa*, understood analogically as empirical selfhood, takes the function of the mind as its own just as there is redness reflecting in the clear crystal due to the proximity of the hibiscus flower.<sup>298</sup> It is like a man thinking his face



is dirty when looking into an unclean mirror.<sup>299</sup> Vacaspati takes as another example the reflection of the moon in the water. The reflected form of the moon in the water appears as a shining object. Similarly, the intellect (*buddhi*) acts as an agent of cognition with the "light" of pure consciousness reflected in it. The movement of the water around the reflected light of the moon is superimposed upon the moon. Just as the full moon, although "stationary" and round, appears to be moving and ruffled without any activity on its part due to its reflection in the clear water, so *purusa*, without any activity or attachment on its part, appears to possess activity or attachment on account of its reflection in the mind.<sup>300</sup> In this way, *purusa* is erroneously understood to be the locus of the functions of the *buddhi*. The transcendent *purusa*, however, is only indirectly related to the process of knowledge as an onlooker or witness and does not experience or know as would the prakrtic agent in the process of experience.

While Vyasa consistently describes the locus of knowledge as *purusa* since the intellect (*buddhi*) or mind is the property of *purusa* (see, for example, n. 277 above), in the *cicchayapatti* theory adopted by Vacaspati, the locus of knowledge is shifted to the intellect. Vacaspati makes it very clear that there is knowledge only because of the reflection of *purusa* in the mind (i.e., intellect) and the empirical consciousness (*cittavrtti*) is not an object of *purusa* as in the empirical or phenomenal subject-object relation.<sup>301</sup>

We can say that the *sattva* aspect of the mind contains a reflection of *purusa* that, under the influence of ignorance, then yields the illusions,

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misconceptions, or errors (*viparyaya*) of the empirical consciousness (*cittavrtti*). As Vyasa implies, the empirical consciousness, wrongly understood as constituting intrinsic selfhood, is *viparyaya*. Vyasa is thus describing the mechanisms of the *gunas* in the context of an analogical theory of consciousness, that is, as applied to thought-constructs, ideas, or relative states of self-understanding and their different levels or degrees of confused or deluded identity resulting in reified notions of self/personality and as appropriating action. In this regard, the *gunas* are modifications of consciousness of the mind and are governed by ignorance; they come to form ideas or concepts of reality based on the fundamental error of mistaking *purusa* for what amounts to being an afflicted sense of self-identity (*asmita*) that permeates human consciousness. In other words, the *gunas* are being understood with an epistemological (and moral) emphasis, the various combinations of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* forming ideas pertaining to a deluded (in which *tamas* is predominant), violent/aggressive (in which *rajas* is predominant), or happy (in which *sattva* is predominant) nature. The predominance of *sattva* signifies more illuminated degrees of self-understanding that more "closely" resemble the true nature of *purusa*. Unlike classical Samkhya, in Yoga the *gunas* do not appear to be given an ontological emphasis (i.e., as relating to categories of existence). We see, therefore, that in Yoga our psychosomatic organism involving thoughts, ideas, relationship, and so on, is primarily an integral part of the prakrtic world as consciousness, albeit a reflected and changing consciousness. The *gunas* therefore apply to the world of phenomenal consciousness and (self-) understanding as much as to the world of things or categories of existence.

While Vijñāna Bhikṣu agrees with Vacaspati that the presentation of the object of cognition to



an unchanging Self is not possible except in the form of a reflection, he states that cognition arises through the reflection in the spiritual Self of the mental state that has assumed the form of the object. Bhikṣu speaks of a "mutual reflection" (*anyonya-pratibimba*)<sup>302</sup> and offers a different hypothesis called the "double reflection theory" (*bimbapratibimbavada*).<sup>303</sup> He maintains that not only does the *purusa* reflect in *buddhi* (as in Vacaspati's theory), but a second reflection of *buddhi* into *purusa* takes place. Having the reflection of both the *purusa* and the object, the *buddhi* is then reflected "into" *purusa*. Bhikṣu states: "This conformity with the objects is in the intellect in the form of an alteration . . . and is also 'in' the *purusa* in the form of a reflection."<sup>304</sup>

According to Bhikṣu, the first reflection intelligizes the content of the mind (*buddhi*) and the second reflection makes *purusa* the agent of the particular knowledge.<sup>305</sup> Bhikṣu brushes aside the objection that this would

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make *purusa* subject to change by arguing that a reflection is merely an appearance of change, as in the case with the reflection of the red flower reflected in a crystal, and is not a substantial change.<sup>306</sup> He justifies his "double reflection" as the correct view and points to the mutual reflection of each in the other as expressed in the *Samkhya-Karika* (20) by the use of the two "*iva-s*." In the *Samkhya-Karika* (20), Iśvara Kṛṣṇa states that through the conjunction (*samyoga*) of *purusa* and *prakṛti*, the nonconscious intellect appears *as if* conscious, and *purusa* appears *as if* it is the performer of action, that is, the *prakṛtic* agent of activity. Vacaspati Miśra's interpretation is perhaps "cleaner" in the sense that all transactions of experience occur only in the intellect after it has been "intelligized" by *purusa*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu's interpretation has the merit of ascribing experience to *purusa* (because the contents of intellect-awareness are reflected back on *purusa*).<sup>307</sup>

Bhikṣu's hypothesis, if understood literally, makes *purusa* changeable and subject to development or alteration (*parinama-rupa*) through the proximity or influence of psychophysical factors (including satisfaction, suffering, confusion, knowledge, etc.) or limited adjuncts (*upadhi*) outside of itself. This goes against the tenets of Yoga philosophy and destroys the very foundation of the doctrine of the eternal purity of *purusa*. Probably Bhikṣu hoped to avert a literal interpretation of his theory by citing the analogy of the crystal and using phrases like "semblance of mutability" and "*as if purusa* were undergoing a change, but *in reality* remaining unchanged like the crystal." Of course, Bhikṣu can be understood to be speaking analogically: The reflection of a red flower in a crystal does not mean to imply a change in the crystal nor in the substance of the crystal; rather, any change occurs merely in the (distorted?) "eye of the beholder" of the crystal.

As a result of the process of reflection, *purusa* and *prakṛti* appear *as if* united. They "appear" "one" in *samyoga* (YS II.17 and 23) as congenitally conflated realms even though they are distinct. One is not converted into the other though their proximity causes them to seem as one. How is it possible that the formless *purusa* reflects in the *citta*, which, though composed of the "material" of *prakṛti*, is so subtle as to appear formless? The analogy of reflection needs to be clarified. It does not mean an *actual* reflection like that of the sun into a pool of water. In ordinary perception, the reflection can be seen as being twofold: (1) through the proximity of

*purusa* some natural change or alteration occurs in the mind enabling it to cognize; and (2) a certain other modification occurs in the mind upon the proximity of an object or content whereby the mind takes on the very form of the object or content perceived. That change is called a *vr̥tti*.

*Vr̥tti* serves the purpose of causing a connection between the mind and the object or content of perception.<sup>308</sup> *Vr̥tti* gives to the mind a power of knowledge, a "consciousness-of" objects, content, persons, and so on. *Vr̥tti* is meant to "ooze out" the knowledge of any object or experience, but its function is not to provide a direct realization or identification as *purusa*, for as the true "subject" or experiencer *purusa* can never be the object of any experience, can never be known or experienced as can *prakṛti* and her manifestations.<sup>309</sup> The active agent in the process of the rise of knowledge is *citta*—the locus of the affliction *asmita*, the false I-am-ness. The role of *purusa*, insofar as *purusa* is concealed throughout this process of masquerading consciousness, is said to be that of a passive witness through its mere presence. Thus Yoga emphasizes practices that can help to disclose the presence of *purusa* through the *sattva* of the mind. The immutability (YS IV.18) and unaffected nature of *purusa* is retained throughout the modifications occurring in the mind regardless of any misidentification taking place.

The crux of the problem of *purusa*'s appearance of changeability lies in the explanation of the *citta-purusa* relation. I suggest the following summary as a clarification of Patañjali's position on this matter. It is against the intent of Patañjali to consider *purusa*'s intrinsic nature, pure immutable consciousness, *as though* impure, changeable and therefore subject to suffering/dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). It is not *as though purusa* mimics the *vr̥ttis* of the *citta* and exclaims "I am impure." *Purusa*'s luminosity must remain constant and unaffected. It is the *citta* (and its modes) that, after having been activated by the luminous presence of *purusa* and under the grip of ignorance, masquerades as *purusa* as if to say, "I am spirit. Though I am pure, I appear as impure. Though not subject to pain and suffering, I appear to suffer." In other words, the locus of misidentification (*sarūpya*) is within the mind.

All the repetitions of the particle *iva* ("as if," "as though") and similar words and phrases employed by the commentators do not literally apply to *purusa*. They apply to the afflicted I-am-ness (*asmita*)—the affliction of egoity being the true explanation of *sarūpya* (YS I.4). It is in the *sūtra* (II.6) defining *asmita* that Patañjali uses the word *iva*: "as if" the two principles—the power of the seer and that of the mind—had assumed an identity appearing as a single self. Any superimposition (*adhyarōpa*) goes only this far and does not literally extend to include *purusa*. Any assumption of false identity (*abhimāna*) is an act of the misidentified ego-consciousness (*cittavṛtti*) or egoity (*asmita*) and to attribute this extrinsic form of self-identity to *purusa* is contrary to the understanding of authentic identity in Yoga philosophy.

## A Closer Look at "Perception" in the *Yoga-Sutra*

Both classical Samkhya and Patañjali's Yoga accept three means of knowledge or categories of valid cognition (*pramana*): perception (*pratyaksa*), inference (*anumana*), and valid testimony (*agama*).<sup>310</sup> Because the mind (*citta*) is constituted of the three *gunas*, all of its operations such as the processes of logic, modifications (*vrutti*) such as valid means of cognition (*pramana*), and acceptance or rejection of a postulate or a conclusion do not in themselves possess consciousness. Being insentient or nonconscious (*jada, acetana*), it is only through the presence of *purusa* that the mind and its processes can function and are intelligized.<sup>311</sup>

A *pramana* is an instrument, means, or method for reaching a valid apprehension (*prama*) of a state, condition, fact, object, or principle (*tattva*) previously not obtained.<sup>312</sup> Vyasa states that following from the act of perception (*pratyaksa*) of internal and external objects, there results (i.e., in *samyoga*) an apprehension by *purusa* of the *vrutti* of perception and not distinguished from it.<sup>313</sup> *Purusa* appears to become identical with the *vruttis* of the mind. In *Yoga-Sutra* IV.17 Patañjali states: "An object is known or not known due to the requisite coloration of the mind by that [object]."<sup>314</sup> What is this ordinary act of perception? Vyasa informs us that

the mind is colored (*uparaga*) by an external object through the channels of the senses. With that as its object, a modification (*vrutti*) is produced in the mind; this *vrutti* is the valid cognition called perception. It takes as its "field" the determination mainly of the particular nature of the object, which has, however, the nature of the universal. The result is an apprehension by *purusa* of the mental process, not distinguishable from it.<sup>315</sup>

An external object (*vastu*) is a requisite in perception so that the type of apprehension that occurs in the *vrutti* of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) may be excluded. The senses must consistently confirm the reality of the object. Such "proof" contradicts any "perception" of lesser validity (i.e., invalid cognition) and would prove the latter to be an error (*viparyaya*).

We can assume that when one person is attracted to another person, or the mind is drawn toward the experience of an object, the same process of "coloring" (*uparaga*) or "influencing" takes place with the qualities of the person or object reflecting in the mind. In the case of *pratyaksa*, the qualities of the object of experience pass through the channels of the senses. We can also assume that Vyasa's phrase *tad-visaya* (see n. 315 above): "With that as its object," refers to the entire process of coloring the mind in this way, with the mind taking on the form of the *vrutti* that is

being produced. If it were only a mental perception without contact through the senses, the realist philosophers of Samkhya and Yoga would not classify it as a valid perception (of the ordinary *pratyaksa* type). When the mind is presented certain information by the senses, a modification occurs in the mind whose object is the sense data. A doubt may arise regarding the actual properties of an object, particularly in the case of an object that shares certain of its properties with other objects. The determinative process (*avadharana*) helps the mind to eliminate general shared properties so that it focuses on the specific. For example, one can take

the question, "Is that a person or a post?" In this question the general shared properties of the person and the post (e.g., tallness, thinness) are eliminated, and by focusing on the specific properties, one determines the visible object to be either a person or a post. This *vr̥tti*, which chiefly determines the specifics, is a valid cognition called direct perception.<sup>316</sup> A perception is made possible because the origin of the awareness is *purusa*. Through its very presence as the witness or knower of the process of apprehension,<sup>317</sup> *purusa* gives to the mind its capacity to perceive. *Purusa*'s presence makes possible our processes of perception, which consist of the following: The "light" of *purusa* reflects in the pure *sattva* of the mind and enables the mind to perceive objects and experience sensations, and so on. The mind thereby perceives these objects as they also reflect into it. The reflection of *purusa* and that of the objects mingle in the mind generating *vr̥ttis* (perceptions) and the mind in turn can reflect on these perceptions. In ordinary perception the mind does not distinguish between its experience of the object from the external world and the awareness generated by *purusa*. A person's mental processes are mistaken as being processes within and of *purusa*: the objects, the experience, the *vr̥tti*, the mind, and *purusa* all being conceived to be as if identical.<sup>318</sup>

The above realism presents a problem because within the major schools of Indian philosophy "yogic perception" (*yogi-pratyaksa*, see below) is often considered to be the supremely valid type of perception. The ordinary person's perception definitely requires the presence of external objects and the mind's contact with them through the functioning of the senses. But does Patañjali intend to include the process of *yogi-pratyaksa* under *YS* I.7? Even a cursory reading of Vyasa's words leads us to understand that *yogi-pratyaksa* is not meant to be included here. The finer perceptions of the yogin are in fact described by Patañjali elsewhere.<sup>319</sup>

*Yogi-pratyaksa* is another term for direct apprehension (*sakṣatkara*)<sup>320</sup> which involves the yogin's conscious identification with an object. This is

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the basis of the practice of "unification" (*samapatti*), and constraint (*śamya*) through which various yogic powers (*siddhi*) can be acquired (e.g., the yogin's perception of past lives, *YS* III.18). If we take our cue from *YS* IV.17 (see n. 314 above), it appears that Vyasa's use of the phrase *uparaga* ("coloring") is for the purpose of stating the cause and process of the *vr̥ttis* produced in the mind from merely external sources. The above description of perception should not be taken as part of the definition of yogic perception, otherwise, as Vijñāna Bhikṣu points out, the realization of the Self and *isvara* could not occur,<sup>321</sup> not being a product of, and not having been induced through the contact between external objects and the senses. Nevertheless, Bhikṣu<sup>322</sup> and others (such as Vacaspati Miśra and Ramananda Yati) have attempted to classify *yogi-pratyaksa* (under *Yoga-Sūtra* I.7) as a type of direct perception.<sup>323</sup> This seems to be in conformity with and supported by Patañjali's philosophy in general. It should be noted that ordinary cognition or perception is subject to distortion due to various karmic factors in the mind (that is, *saṃskāras* and *vaśanas*) that affect or color how we perceive and appropriate the objects we encounter, as is implied in *Yoga-Sūtra* IV.17 (see n. 314 above). Whether classified as being ordinary or yogic, perception is made possible because the origin or root-consciousness is *purusa* by which the mind obtains its capacity to perceive<sup>324</sup> and identify with the objects or

content of experience.

Patañjali and Vyasa acknowledge the superiority of perception over inference and valid testimony. Why? Both inference and testimony are concerned only with the general qualities (*samanya*) of an object and not with its particularities (*visesa*). Words themselves are incapable of producing knowledge of particulars. Although the generic qualities of an object are also brought to consciousness in perception, still the special "field" of the latter is the ascertainment of particularities. Thus perception is seen to carry with it more conviction than knowledge derived from inference and testimony. Moreover, according to Yoga, the authority and efficacy of *anumana* (inference) and *agama* (reliable authority, i.e., *śruti* tradition, that which is heard) is ultimately transcended in higher perception. As Patañjali makes clear in YS I.49: "The condition of that insight [which is Truth-bearing, *rtambhara*] is of a particular purpose, and is different from the insight gained by tradition or from inference."<sup>325</sup> Direct perception gives knowledge of anything particular, but the yogic perception of "truth-bearing insight"<sup>326</sup> that arises in *samadhi* is entirely different in scope from that of heard (cf. BG II.52-53) or inferred knowledge as well as sensory perception in the ordinary world. Vyasa writes:

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Scriptural authority and the teaching received orally are the same as the knowledge within the category of valid testimony (*agama*). The area is generalities. Valid testimony cannot communicate the particular. Why not? Because the particular does not have the conventional association with a word. Inference too has only universals for its object. Furthermore, inference leads to a conclusion through a generality . . . Ordinary perception gives no knowledge at all of some subtle, remote or hidden object, but we should not think that the latter is not demonstrable and has no existence. A particular relating to subtle elements or to *purusa* is only perceptible through the insight [attained in] *samadhi* alone. 327

Ordinary valid cognition as understood in the *Yoga-Sutra* is therefore a sort of knowing wholly different from yogic "insight" (*prajña*). In its conventional usage, valid cognition is knowledge *about* reality (*purusa* and *prakṛti*). Insight (*prajña*) is direct yogic perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*, *sakṣatkara*), and its purpose is to disclose knowledge of *purusa*.<sup>328</sup> It may be concluded therefore that ordinary perception, inference, and valid testimony (authority) can produce correct knowledge *about* reality. But in Patañjali's system the above means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) are merely instruments of conventional understanding, rational knowing, or even metaphysical knowledge, all of which can function as a buffer separating one from insight-by-direct-experience. Ordinary valid cognition is a mediated knowledge of *purusa* and *prakṛti*; yogic insight or *prajña* (attained in *samadhi*) is immediate.

Pedagogically, it may well have been the case that Patañjali initiated disciples into yogic disciplines that, although including reasoned investigation (*tarka*) or discursive thought (*vitarka*, YS II.33-34), transcended the limitations of reasoning and discursive thinking.<sup>329</sup> Moreover, whereas the valid cognition of *Yoga-Sutra* I.7 has the limited capacity to bring about intellectual conviction, yogic "insight" (*prajña*) has the power to effect spiritual emancipation (*apavarga*). Both levels of perception (*pratyakṣa*) are communicated in a pedagogical context in the service



of soteriology. Therefore, the mind the vehicle of perception performs a crucial role in Patañjali's soteriological methodology. When, from textual sources such as scripture and the teachings of spiritual preceptors or *gurus*, as well as exercising our own processes of rational analysis and understanding, we have learned of and contemplated upon the culminating state of liberation in Yoga, there nonetheless can linger doubts (*samsaya*, *YS* I.30) about any existence subtler than that of the obvious world we "see" and "know," a world comprising the "things" of our daily perceptual experience. Perception, as defined in *Yoga-Sutra* I.7 and the *Yoga-Bhasya* (I.7), therefore needs to be extended and expanded to include the direct experience of the

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subtler aspects (*suksma*) of *prakṛti* through *yogi-pratyakṣa*. Having attained yogic insight directly through the vehicle of one's body and mind, the experience reinforces the faith (*śraddhā*, *YS* I.20) that what one had previously arrived at through inference, and based upon what teachers and texts have propounded, is true. Such perception strengthens one's resolve<sup>330</sup> to proceed to the subtler "invisible" reality and seek that identity (i.e., *puruṣa*), which one has not yet "experienced" and which alone can result in a state of freedom and lasting satisfaction. In Yoga epistemology, reality is accurately "seen" only by the seer who alone can "see" without any epistemic distortion caused by ignorance (*avidyā*) and the intervention of egoic states or egoity (*asmitā*).

The mind can be understood as having a twofold faculty of perception. On the one hand, there is an "outward facing" capacity of the *citta* which, directed toward the object of perception, functions in a rational and conceptual mode and issues in a reflective cognition and discerning power of the intellect (equivalent to *adhyavasāya* in *Samkhya-Karika* 23). On the other hand, the mind has an "inward facing" capacity "toward" *puruṣa* where it is temporarily disengaged from the external world of things and objects of the senses, and can function as a vehicle for liberating knowledge of discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyāti*). Perception of the ordinary kind (*pratyakṣa*) as studied in *Yoga-Sutra* I.7 functions by way of the "outward facing" power of the mind to perceive objects through the senses. Yogic perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) takes place through the "inward facing" power of the mind. The volitions of reasoned investigation (*pramāṇa*) and the higher knowledge called "insight" (*prajñā*) arise in the mind and both are types of mental content presented to *puruṣa* for its viewing. However, it is yogic perception that eventually leads to the mind's complete purification, sattvification, and liberation. Yogic perception liberating insight is soteriologically the most efficacious means in Yoga. At no time is the former lower level of perception to be confused with yogic perception and the discriminative discernment (between *puruṣa* and the mind or *prakṛti*) that occurs in the higher stages of *śamadhī* and culminates in the realization of *puruṣa*. Rather, perception in its "outer facing" mode is initially to be understood in the context of the apparent identity of the mind and *puruṣa* wherein extrinsic selfhood in the situation or mode of "emergence" (*vyūttṛthana*) is mistaken for *puruṣa*.

Patañjali explains the mind's epistemological limitations. *Yoga-Sutra* IV.20 tells us that the mind (i.e., *vr̥tti*) and the "object" cannot in one circumstance (i.e., simultaneously) be clearly ascertained.<sup>331</sup> The mind cannot ascertain itself and the "object" at the same time; the mind's



is to cognize objects while its processes are witnessed by the self-luminous *purusa*. Also, if one mind were to know another mind, this would result in an unending series of minds each perceived by another. This infinite regress or overextending of the intellect from the intellect (from one cognition to another) would result in a confusion of memory.<sup>332</sup>

Unlike empirical selfhood, which is part of the "seeable" (*drsya*), *purusa* can never be made an object, nor can *purusa* be realized through the ordinary processes (*vr̥ttis*) of valid cognition (YS I.7). Patañjali tells us (YS IV.18) that *purusa* is transcendent of the object-oriented realm of the "seeable" as the knower (witness) of the content and intentions of the empirical consciousness or mind. In *Yoga-Sutra* III.35, however, it appears that *purusa* can be made an object of knowledge. Patañjali states: "Since it is for the purpose of the other [*purusa*], experience is [based on] the idea that there is no distinction between the *purusa* and the *sattva*, though they are absolutely unmixed; from *samyama* (the practice of constraint) on the purpose being for itself (serving its own purpose), there arises knowledge of *purusa*."<sup>333</sup> In his commentary, Vyasa surmises that *purusa* cannot be known in the ordinary way and cannot be made an object of constraint (*samyama*): "It is not that *purusa* is known through the *sattva-intellect* which has the idea of *purusa*. It is *purusa* that sees the idea supported by its own self. Thus it is said [BA Up IV.5.15]: 'By what indeed would one know the knower?'"<sup>334</sup> Why is it that *purusa* cannot be known or seen in the ordinary way? It is not that all distinctions necessarily collapse in some absolute realm; rather, it is that as pure experiencer and knower, *purusa* can never be made an object of experience and knowledge. *Vr̥ttis* and *purusa's* awareness of them are two separate factors. The final goal is not one of knowledge as a mental state or activity, nor could it be a subjective state of being. In Yoga one cannot "find" true identity for *purusa* is not an entity or object to be found, that is, "there is no one there to find; the witness cannot be witnessed."<sup>335</sup>

*Purusa* as pure "subject" is both transcendent and immanent, uninvolved yet present and necessary to ordinary experience. The reality of *prakṛti* (and hence of *citta* and *vr̥tti*) is not denied. However, what are normally held to be real independently existing "things" (*vastu*) or categories of existence (*tattvas*, as in Samkhya) are seen in Yoga to be linked to the perceptual processes of the mind and as appropriated by empirical selfhood. The "world" thus experienced becomes an egoically referenced reality based on reified notions or ideas (*pratyaya*) of self and world that, having formed as sediments in the mind, limit human identity within the confines of a distorted way of "seeing" (i.e., a "failure-to-see") and "re-

lating" to the world (i.e., how the sense-of-I relates to the "things" of the world).

Psychologically, in such a fractured or fragmented state of selfhood (*cittavr̥tti*), the network of impressions (*samskaras*), habit patterns (*vasanas*), and *vr̥tti*-identifications continues to sustain and reinforce a predominantly afflicted human nature. The power of consciousness potentially

present to all is forgotten and concealed within this framework or "wheel" (or "whirl") of misidentification and spiritual ignorance. Life is experienced through a repetitive or seemingly unending generation of habit patterns (*vasanas*) rooted in dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) and affliction (*klesa*). Yet mistaken identity and its self-centered misappropriation of the world can, according to Yoga, be ended.

We have seen that cognition and knowledge play a crucial role in Patañjali's system, and are structured and function in the mind due to a reflection (understood analogically) of the presence of *purusa*. Without *purusa* or pure consciousness, ordinary "knowledge" and experience would not take place. Based on yogic insight into the nature of human identity, Patañjali was then able to communicate a "path" of Yoga through which the afflictions (*klesas*), so fundamental to the human condition of struggle and conflict in *samyoga*, can be uprooted and overcome. But the "path" from *samyoga* to Yoga (liberation) requires, as we have seen, a thorough study of the mind, for it is only by way of the transformation of the *mind* and its "modifications" (i.e., mental processes) that the key to success in Yoga becomes evident. Therefore, the concept of the mind (*citta*) its nature, structure, and functioning is an essential component or building block of Patañjali's philosophy. Along with the content of the previous chapter (chapter 2) focusing on classical Yoga's metaphysical perspective, a solid albeit theoretical foundation for understanding and appreciating Patañjali's presentation of Yoga has, it is hoped, been achieved.

Yoga has, not inappropriately, been described as a "theory-practice continuum,"<sup>336</sup> a philosophy, including a discipline, that unites theory and practice. With this idea held in mind, we will now go on to examine closely Patañjali's soteriological methodology and praxis-orientation beginning with an analysis of the meaning of "cessation" (*nirodha*) in Yoga, and then moving on to look at central methods of Yoga discipline showing how Yoga can be seen to culminate in an embodied and integrated state of liberated consciousness and identity.

## Chapter Four

### *Nirodha*, Yoga Praxis, and the Transformation of the Mind

#### *Nirodha*: The Foundation of Yogic Praxis

The samsaric identity of self is lockingly locked into an epistemological and ontological duality with the objective world ingeniously captured by Patañjali in the expression *cittavrtti*. Being by nature an extrinsic identity of self and fraught with affliction (*klesa*), *cittavrtti* is rooted in ignorance (*avidya*) and as such can be characterized as impermanent (*anitya*), impure (*asuci*), dissatisfaction (*duhkha*), and nonself (*anatman*) (YS II.5).<sup>1</sup> Clearly, then, the yogin must learn to distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic identity of self, between *cittavrtti* and *purusa*. By locating the cause and functioning of affliction within the mind (*citta*) itself, Yoga asserts that there is a way to overcome misidentification with the modifications (*vrtti*) of the mind and "achieve" emancipation from the afflictions that permeate our everyday modes of perception, experience (*bhoga*), and livelihood. For example, Patañjali tells us that the modifications arising

from the afflictions are overcome through meditation (*dhyana*).<sup>2</sup> Our true form (*svarupa*) or identity (*purusa*) is not intrinsically predisposed to the influences and affects of habit patterns (*vasanas*), latent impressions (*samskaras*), and afflicted mental processes or modifications (*vrttis*) that perpetuate actions (*karma*) rooted in ignorance (*avidya*).

How is the purpose of Yoga the very ending of mistaken identity, suffering and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*)<sup>3</sup> to be brought about? The cessation

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of misidentification and its concomitant dissatisfaction is effected through a process of purifying and mastering the *vrtti*-generating complex: the mind and the activity to which it gives rise. The foundation of yogic praxis, the mastery of mind, takes place through the process of *nirodha* as stated in *Yoga-Sutra* I.2: "Yoga is the cessation of [the misidentification with] the modifications of the mind."<sup>4</sup> Through a study of the meaning of "cessation" (*nirodha*), the theory-praxis unity so central to Yoga philosophy can be better understood and appreciated. The process of "cessation" incorporates many forms of practice depending on the needs of the practitioner and includes the physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of our being. As the cornerstone of all Yoga practice *nirodha* can be seen to encompass a wide range of methods cited throughout the *Yoga-Sutra* that can be applied in a variety of situations.<sup>5</sup> In comparison, classical Samkhya prescribes essentially one practice for the release from sorrow and dissatisfaction: the cultivation of knowledge (*jñāna*). Yoga, by contrast, offers over twenty practices that can be undertaken to prepare the mind for the event of spiritual liberation wherein *purusa* is allowed to shine forth in its pristine purity.<sup>6</sup>

However, rather than being "any ascetic technique or any method of meditation"<sup>7</sup> (as in Eliade's broad definition of Yoga), Patañjali's Yoga involves a serious inquiry into the structures and contents of the mind along with an analysis of how the mind including the empirically rooted sense of self differs from *purusa*. The human dilemma of misidentification is such that with each *vrtti* the consciousness reflecting in the mind becomes that *vrtti* and identifies with it, just as the sun reflected in a lake appears to be modified according to the nature of each wave in the water. To whatever takes place in the mind, the reflected I or ego says, "I am this wave, I am this experience," or "This is me, this is my experience." The *vrttis* of the ordinary person carry with them the influence or "coloring" and "seed" of misidentification (*vrtti-sarupya*, *YS* I.4) in the perceptions and experiences taking place resulting in a confusion of identity in the condition of *samyoga*, the seer being mistaken for the seeable. Vyasa gives a dramatic portrayal of the underlying process of misidentification involving the empirical sense of self and the way out of this dilemma through right vision (*samyag-darsana*):

that other [i.e., empirical identity] is subjected again and again to dissatisfaction brought on by [it]self, casting it off and then subjected again to what has been cast off . . . with the mental processes from beginningless time infected so to say with the various habit patterns, taking on what should be avoided, namely "I" and "mine," born again and again (on

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that empirical self) the three-fold suffering, with causes both objective and subjective, flood down. Seeing that other one, and himself, and all beings, carried away by the beginningless stream of pain, the yogin takes refuge in right vision, destroyer of suffering. 8

Vyasa's above description notwithstanding, it is essential to note here that in Yoga the power of identification with the mind and *vr̥tti* is not intrinsically problematic and without purpose. Identification involves potentialities of power (*sva-swami-saktyoh*, YS II.23). When it is misdirected and misappropriated, identification remains confined to a particular person and what that person calls "I" and "mine." From this egoic perspective, the world and other persons are viewed as being separate from oneself. However, when the power of identification is properly directed and concentrated through Yoga, it can be transformed into illuminating and expanding states of consciousness and one can ultimately know one's identity as *purusa*. Identification is thus a power to be accessed and harnessed in Yoga discipline (*sadhana*). The average person is born with a limited power of identification. It is, as it were, a constitutional defect (*dosa*) caused by *avidya* and is not one's "personal" fault; nor is it ultimately the fault of one's parents, teachers, education, or society as a whole. For Yoga, the human dilemma of mistaken identity (*sarupya*) is generated by ignorance or a profound misconception of authentic identity (*purusa*). This impure consciousness or confused state of selfhood is actually "built into" the unenlightened human apparatus, is a congenital infection located within our psychophysical being. Yet as the vehicle or catalyst that ousts one from one's complacency in the condition of ignorance by the sheer uneasiness, pain or affliction it creates, it can be said to be purposeful. Moreover, Patañjali informs us that wrong cognition or error is a momentous problem that must be tackled if one is to be free from ignorance and the turmoil it creates. Our authentic identity is *purusa*, pure consciousness. As a reflection of *purusa*, however, consciousness has two basic modes in which it can function: (1) as the consciousness (mind) that is under the sway of ignorance and is propelled in the direction of affliction; and (2) as the consciousness (mind) that due to increasing purification and illumination is propelled in the direction of liberation from ignorance. As will be later argued, "cessation" (*nirodha*) can be understood: (1) as a process through which ignorance is counteracted, temporarily preventing the afflictions' domination or hold over the mind and thereby checking the distorted or wrong functioning of *vr̥tti*, that is, *vr̥ttis* as appropriated in the condition of *samyoga*; and (2) as a process through which knowledge (*jñāna*) or insight (*prajñā*) is revealed, which can be

called the "sattvification of consciousness," and which, grounded in knowledge of *purusa* (*purusa-jñāna*), allows for the corrected or right functioning of *vr̥tti*, that is, *vr̥ttis* as appropriated through the illumination and purification of mind. At the highest level, the process of *nirodha* culminates in the goal of *Yoga-kaivalya*.

*Nirodha* (Cessation): Annihilation/Negation or Transformation of the Mind?

*Nirodha* (cessation) is one of the most difficult terms employed in the *Yoga-Sutra* and its meaning plays a crucial role for a proper comprehension of Patañjali's system of Yoga. The "attainment" of liberation in Yoga is dependent upon the destruction of impurity (*asuddhi-ksaya*, *Yoga-Sutra* II.28) and the increasing light of knowledge (*jñāna-dipti*, *Yoga-Sutra* II.28) both of which take place in the process of *nirodha*. Since, as I shall now argue, the misunderstanding of this process has been fundamental to the misapprehension of the meaning of Patañjali's Yoga, there is a need to clarify it.

The word *nirodha* is derived from *ni* (down, into) and *rudh*: "to obstruct, arrest, stop, restrain, prevent."<sup>9</sup> In some well-known translations of *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 (*yogas cittavrttinirodhah*) *nirodha* has been rendered as "suppression,"<sup>10</sup> "inhibition,"<sup>11</sup> "restriction,"<sup>12</sup> "cessation,"<sup>13</sup> "restraint"<sup>14</sup> and "control."<sup>15</sup> These meanings,<sup>16</sup> I suggest, are highly problematic, erroneous, or misleading if understood, as is often the case, with a view that emphasizes *nirodha* as an ontological negation or dissolution of the mind and its functioning. I am suggesting that any attempt to interpret Patañjali's Yoga as a practice that seeks to annihilate or suppress the mind and its modifications for the purpose of gaining spiritual liberation distorts the intended meaning of Yoga as defined by Patañjali. In regard to the process of *nirodha*, the wide range of methods in the *Yoga-Sutra* indicates an emphasis on the ongoing application of yogic techniques including meditation, not a deadening of the mental faculties wherein the operations of consciousness, including our perceptual and ethical natures, are abandoned or switched off. By defining *nirodha* as "cessation," I mean to imply the "undoing" or "dissolution"<sup>17</sup> of the conjunction (*samyoga*) between *purusa* the "seer" (*drastr*) and *prakrti* the "seeable" (*dr̥rya*), the conjunction that Vyasa explains as a mental superimposition (*adhyaropa*) resulting in the confusion of identity between *purusa* and the mental processes.<sup>18</sup> Our sense of self becomes misidentified with the mental processes (*vrttis*) thereby creating, in

the words of Vyasa, "a mental self out of delusion."<sup>19</sup> *Nirodha*, I am suggesting, refers to the cessation of the worldly, empirical effects of the *vrttis* on the yogin's consciousness, not the complete cessation of *vrttis* themselves. *Nirodha* means to cease the congenital, epistemological power of the *vrttis* over the yogin, that is, *nirodha* is the epistemological cessation of *vrttis* in the form of the congenital ignorance (*avidya*, *YS* II.3-5) of our true spiritual identity and ultimate destiny.

To understand *nirodha* one needs to comprehend the entire Yoga scheme of the process of manifestation or "evolution" and the "return to the origin," especially the latter. The last *sutra* of the *Kaivalya-Pada* (*YS* IV.34) defines the liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) as: *purusarthasunyanam gunanam pratiprasavaḥ kaivalyam*, "Aloneness is the return to the origin of the *gunas*, now without any purpose for *purusa*."<sup>20</sup> The important term, *pratiprasava* (see discussion in chapter 2), refers to the "involution" or "counterflow" of the *gunas* into their source or state of "equilibrium." It is of interest to note the one earlier context (only) in which Patañjali uses this term. *Yoga-Sutra* II.10 states: "In their subtle form, they [the *klesas*] are to be overcome by a return to the origin or source (*pratiprasava*)."<sup>21</sup> In the above *sutra* the term *pratiprasava* refers to the dissolution of affliction in the mind implying a purification and illumination of



consciousness. Scholars have often interpreted *prasava* with an ontological emphasis signifying the "streaming forth" of the ultimate building blocks (*tattvas*) of *prakṛti* into the myriad forms of the cosmos in all its dimensions, including the human organism.<sup>22</sup> *Pratiprasava*, by the same token, is often understood to denote the process of the dissolution of those forms relative to the microcosm of the yogin who is about to win liberation.<sup>23</sup> Is this ontological dissolution of manifest existence where the *gunas* are recalled back to their unmanifest condition of equilibrium the intended meaning of *pratiprasava* as the term is used in the *Yoga-Sutra*? Koelman refers to *pratiprasava* as the "inverse generation," the definite return of a given prakṛtic organism to its ultimate substrative cause.<sup>24</sup> He goes on to describe this process as follows:

Everything has been exhausted or burnt out so that no living seed is left to enable a new energisation in the shape of a living prakṛtic organism.<sup>25</sup>

Like a tree that slowly withers away for want of any moisture or contact with the soil, however rich that soil may be, the prakṛtic organism tends to dissolution, to the disintegration and suppression of our empirical personality. [The yogin] has induced a state of psychomental anaemia by starving his psychical life.<sup>26</sup>

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These are, according to Koelman, some of the effects of Yoga discipline, and obviously imply the decomposition or death of the psychophysical organism of the yogin.

I would like to suggest that the term *pratiprasava* can be more appropriately rendered with an epistemological emphasis rather than (as in the above) an ontological one. Epistemologically, *pratiprasava* denotes a return to the source, withdrawal, or dissolution of the afflicted state of the *gunas*, that is, insofar as the constituents of matter/nature have been under the influence of *avidya* (ignorance) and have fulfilled their purpose for *purusa* in the context of samsaric experience and liberation from the bondage of the afflictions, *karmas*, and their fruition. *Purusa* is therefore "disjoined" or "disengaged" from the *gunas* in the condition of *samyoga* implying here a state in which there is no longer misidentification with the mind and its modifications as in the empirical mode of selfhood.<sup>27</sup> *Pratiprasava* can be further understood as "withdrawal from the epistemological power of the *gunas* over the yogin." Vyasa uses the term *pratiprasava* in the context of the elimination of the *klesas* (afflictions)<sup>28</sup> a process in Yoga that involves a cognitive and moral cleansing or purification of the body and mind (i.e., *prakṛti*) leading to a state of liberating knowledge. This need not imply the ontological negation or dissolution of prakṛtic or manifest (i.e., human, embodied) existence. *Yoga-Sutra* IV.32<sup>29</sup> also supports the view that the ultimate state of the *gunas* arrives when the tripartite process (*triguna*) has already served its purpose for experience (*bhoga*) and liberation (*apavarga*) and is of no further use soteriologically. By this is meant that the causative operations of the afflictions come to an end and there is the cessation of afflicted action.<sup>30</sup> The eternality (*anantya*) of knowledge (*jñāna-sattva*) is no longer veiled<sup>31</sup> or concealed.

What has been stated as the final goal in the *sutra* explaining the culmination of Yoga (YS IV.34) is linked to and supported by Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (YS I.2). Part of the intent of this study is to show how *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 can be seen as "threading together" and integrating the



text of the *Yoga-Sutra* as a whole. The "cessation of the [misidentification with] the modifications of the mind" (*cittavrttinirodha*) integrates the already interrelated concerns in Yoga of practice (*sadhana*), the "return to the origin" (*pratiprasava*), and the highest state of *samadhi* where the yogin embodies a state of equilibrium, equipoise, and freedom (*kaivalya*). In this, *nirodha* can be seen to encompass a plurality of practices as well as descriptions of culminating states of Yoga providing a "thread" of continuity throughout the *Yoga-Sutra* in which theory and practice are unified, of a piece.

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The mind (*citta*), which incorporates the entire "inner instrumentality" (*antahkarana*), is the "substratum" or arena of the *vrttis* and *samskaras* in which all the modifications arise, all the cognitive, affective, and emotive processes take place. It is also that very "substratum" into which the yogin's *misidentification* with the mind dissolves, that is, where *samyoga*, for that particular yogin, goes into permanent dissolution (*laya*). Such dissolution (*laya*) is considered to be Yoga. Vijñāna Bhikṣu is correct to point out that Yoga does not result in the nonexistence of *vrttis* because that does not fit the idea of the special state of the "substratum" in Yoga.<sup>32</sup> Unlike Nyaya philosophy, for example, Yoga does not admit of the existence of a specific category called "absence" (*abhava*), "absence" referring to the special state of the "substratum" itself. In Yoga philosophy, dissolution means that the karmically binding *vrttis* and their effects (and affects) dissolve, not the existence of *vrtti*, that is, all *vrttis*, in total. The state of *nirodha* or *laya* need not imply the ontological negation of *vrttis*.<sup>33</sup> Bhoja Raja comments: "Yoga means 'cessation,' that is their [i.e., the *vrttis*] dissolution (*laya*) into their cause when their outward transmutation ceases and the process of mutation is reversed."<sup>34</sup> Bhoja appears to give an ontological emphasis to the meaning of *nirodha*, thereby implying a definitive dissolution of the existence of the modifications in total. Our understanding sides more along the lines of Vijñāna Bhikṣu's interpretation, which alludes to the process of the effects of the *gunas* (all *vrttis* being composed of the three *gunas*) in the form of misidentification being dissolved back into their cause ignorance (*avidya*); and ignorance, no longer having a hold on the mind, disappears from the yogin's view, ceases to function due to the enlightened state of consciousness. The gradual process of *nirodha* leads the *gunic*-identified consciousness of self toward a state of dissolution into the original pure *sattva* of the mind a state of utter lucidity or transparency of consciousness (mind) wherein no epistemological distortion can take place, yet *vrttis* (e.g., valid cognition, memory, etc.) can still arise, can still function.

A word of caution must be given in order to avoid confusing the concept of "cessation" or "dissolution" of *vrttis* (in the sense that we have used it in the above) with the idea of rendering the *vrttis* nonexistent. The key to understanding the dissolution of *vrttis* into their cause lies in the Samkhyan theory of causation known as *satkaryavada*, which was explained earlier (see chapter 2). In this foundational theory all states of matter-energy including our psychophysical being are transformed according to the attributes within them, but there is never any amount of energy or material existence more or less than there was or will be. Nothing that ever exists goes into nonexistence;<sup>35</sup> it simply becomes unmanifest, the form re-

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turning to dwell as an attribute hidden in its cause, where it originally arose and from which it may emerge again. The temporary disappearance of any "entity," form, thought, or idea is not its extinction. Patañjali would not accept that whatever disappears is ontologically destroyed. Manifest existence does not become merely empty or extinct (*sunya*), but identification with it is temporarily suspended, submerged, dissolved, or absorbed (*laya*). Modern interpreters of Yoga, however, often speak of the nonexistence or deadening of the *vrttis* in *nirodha*, implying, as it were, an anaesthetization of human consciousness, the view that is here being countered.

The meaning of *nirodha* as the cessation of the misidentification with the modifications of the mind (or the dissolution of the misperceived identification with the *vrttis* of the mind) is confirmed by the intent implicit in statements throughout the *Yoga-Sutra* and more explicitly in Vyasa's *Bhasya*. For example, *Yoga-Sutra* II.27 mentions seven "grounds" or "stages" of knowledge that the yogin attains. This "sevenfold-insight" (*saptadha-prajña*) is described as following from the unwavering discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*), the means whereby the misalliance or distorted conjunction (*samyoga*) of the seer and the seeable is progressively ended.<sup>36</sup> *Yoga-Sutra* II.27 states: "Therein [for the one who possesses the unfaltering discriminative discernment] the last stage of transcendent-insight (wisdom) is sevenfold."<sup>37</sup> Patañjali does not explain what is meant by the "sevenfold-insight," however, though Vyasa offers a very probable elucidation. Summarizing Vyasa, the first four stages or "fourfold release" are: (1) that which is to be prevented (*duhkha*, *samyoga*) has been identified, known; (2) that which is to be discarded [i.e., the cause of *duhkha* or dissatisfaction] has been abandoned; (3) through the attainment of unification (in *samadhi*) also termed "cessation" (*nirodha*), freedom has been attained; (4) the means of discarding the conjunction (*samyoga*), that is, the practice of discriminative discernment, has been perfected.<sup>38</sup> Vyasa tells us that the last three stages of the "sevenfold-insight" are known as "release of the mind" (*citta-vimukta*). Vyasa informs us that having attained the fifth stage of the "sevenfold-insight," described as the intellect having fulfilled its role of providing experience and liberation, a sixth stage ensues whereby: "The *gunas*, like rocks dislodged from the top of a mountain peak finding no more resting place, are inclined toward dissolution (*pralaya*) into their own cause. Together with that cause (*samyoga*, *avidya*), they are no longer produced into effects again since there is no further purpose for them."<sup>39</sup> The mind has accomplished its purpose of providing experience and liberation resulting in the cessation of mistaken identity. By this Vyasa means that the *gunas* are of no further purpose insofar as they

have fulfilled their purpose as a vehicle for the yogin's liberation.<sup>40</sup> Thus, the seventh and final stage takes place the stage of the "aloneness" of the pure identity of *purusa* that is beyond any superimposed connection with the mind.

For the sake of clarity, however, we must attempt to pinpoint what Vyasa means when he asserts that the *gunas* are no longer produced into effects. Discriminative discernment, the nature of which is *sattva-guna*,<sup>41</sup> is the expedient by which the discarding or abandonment (*hana*, *YS*

II.26) of *samyoga* and ignorance is brought about. As *Yoga-Sutra* II.25 makes clear, without ignorance (as cause) there is no conjunction (*samyoga*); the overcoming of misidentification brings about the freedom of pure identity as *purusa*, the "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) or "goal" of Yoga.<sup>42</sup> Vyasa asserts that ignorance specifically refers to the complex network of habit patterns (*vasanas*) and personality traits based on erroneous or misconceived knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*) and its *samskaras*:

Under the influence of the habit patterns based on erroneous knowledge (misidentification of self), the mind does not attain fulfillment of what it has to do, namely "to know" *purusa*. While it [the mind] has that involvement, continuously it [the mind in its afflicted nature] revives. But in the culminating knowledge of *purusa* it attains fulfillment of what it had to do. With its [former] involvement at an end, and the failure-to-see terminated, there is no cause of bondage and it [the mind under the influence of *avidya*] does not revive again.<sup>43</sup>

Vyasa's statement (see n. 39), that the *gunas* are no longer produced into effects, can be understood to mean that the mind has been released from the binding mechanism of afflicted identity in *samyoga*; the mind does not revive or generate *vrttis* in the former afflicted and misappropriated mode of mistaken identity (*asmita*), that is, as self-referenced to an egoic sense of identity. The mind is no longer anchored in the epistemological distortion of the failure-to-see (*adarsana*), and this removal of ignorance results in the yogin's release from bondage, dissatisfaction, and further suffering. *Purusa*, thus, is said to be established in its "own form" or nature (*svarupa*).<sup>44</sup> Unlike the changing, ego-centered world of empirical selfhood, *purusa*, whose nature is uncaused, is no longer misconstrued as being under the influence of or subservient to the three *gunas* as mental consciousness and whose nature is cause and effect,<sup>45</sup> that is, changing. Based on our interpretation given in the above and as evidenced by other statements in Vyasa's *Bhasya*, it seems reasonable to suggest that Vyasa's description (in *YB* II.27) of the dissolution of the *gunas* refers to the dissolution of the

*gunas in the form of ignorance or affliction*, that is, of the worldly, empirical effects of the *gunas* on the yogin's consciousness, thereby altering self-identity. "Dissolution" or "cessation" in Yoga need not be understood to mean the "disintegration and suppression of our empirical personality."<sup>46</sup> Rather, "dissolution" is of the (mis)perceived identification with the *vrttis* of the mind. Yoga involves a radical deconstruction of a positive misconception of self and world caused by *avidya*.

For the sake of clarification, I will now take issue with what I consider to be a popular misconception centered around the intent of Yoga praxis. In Swami Vivekananda's (late-nineteenth-century) philosophical perspective,<sup>47</sup> *nirvikalpa-samadhi* understood by Vivekananda to be the spiritual goal of Vedantais equated with the goal of liberation as experienced in Patañjali's Yoga. The system of *raja-yoga*, based primarily on Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra*, is proposed by Vivekananda as a method for enabling one to attain direct perception of religious truths. In particular, he contends that *samadhi*, as the culminating experience of Patañjali's system, is the self-valid and only satisfactory authoritative source of all religious knowledge or

Vivekananda contends that *nirvikalpa-samadhi*, resulting in the liberating realization of the Self (*atman*), finds its equivalent meaning in Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (YS I.2). He often describes the goal of *raja-yoga* as the total suppression of all thought forms.<sup>49</sup> Since he understands that the prerequisite for *nirvikalpa-samadhi* is an inactive mind, the aim of Yoga is defined by him as follows: "Yoga is restraining the mind-stuff (*citta*) from taking various forms (*vr̥tti*)."<sup>50</sup> "Yoga is the science in which we stop *citta* from assuming, or becoming transformed into several faculties . . . only when the 'mind-stuff,' the *citta* is controlled to absolute calmness is the Self to be recognized."<sup>51</sup> Vivekananda speaks of the necessity to curb each thought as it enters into the mind, thereby making the mind a kind of vacuum,<sup>52</sup> and repeatedly asserts that the knowledge of the Self (*atman*) spontaneously follows the extinction of the mind. In the above quotation he actually presents Self-knowledge (*atmajñāna*) as being dependent on this extinction; *samadhi* is characterized by the definitive or final absence of all mental modifications.<sup>53</sup> Vivekananda therefore proposes that the goal of spiritual practice (*sadhana*) is attained by the complete cessation of mental modifications. On this basis he has put forward several noteworthy injunctions regarding the aspirant's attitude and efforts in relation to the mind:

We have to exclude all thoughts from the mind and make it blank; as fast as thought comes we have to banish it.<sup>54</sup>

Control the mind, cut off the senses, then you are a *yogi*. 55

The mind has to be killed.56

The rascal ego has to be obliterated.57

So when the mind will end, be broken into pieces entirely, without leaving any *samskara*, we shall be entirely free, and until that time we are in bondage.58

One must seriously question the logic behind this approach to human consciousness and the mind as it relates to Yoga philosophy.

One will naturally ask how practitioners who attempt to obey any teachings resulting in death to their minds would have the capacity to comprehend or carry out any further instructions. Perhaps, more importantly, how could one function practically as a human being without the faculties of thinking, memory, discernment and reason, and an individual sense of self with which one can distinguish oneself from other people and the world? Surely such a person would have to be mad or unconscious. If all the great Yoga masters of the past had obliterated or so thoroughly suppressed their minds in order to attain spiritual liberation, how did they speak, teach, reason, remember, empathize, or even use the word "I"? The mind and the body are the only vehicles in which to attain liberation. It is the mind, as Yoga readily admits, that must be utilized for study and to listen to the spiritual adept or *guru*; it is the mind that is needed to follow a spiritual path to liberation; and it is equally the mind that is required by the aspirant in

order to function as a human being in day-to-day life.

By advising or explaining that the mind and its various faculties are to be negated, suppressed, abolished, or severed from consciousness, scholars, teachers, and writers on Yoga have, I would like to suggest, missed the point of practicing Yoga. For, in Yoga philosophy, it is not the *mind*, but rather the exclusive identification with material existence including our various forms of egoity as one's true identity that is the source of all human difficulties, sorrow, frustration, and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*). It is a specific state of consciousness or cognitive error evidenced in the mind and not the mind *itself* that is at issue. In other words, it is the condition of misidentification (*sarupya*) the samsaric condition of self and its self-referenced world and not the mind in total that must be discarded in Yoga. Any advice or teaching that suggests the destruction or negation of the mind in Yoga is, it seems to me, detrimental to a human being and to the practice of Yoga and is representative of a fundamental and pervasive

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misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Patañjali's Yoga. How could progress on the path of Yoga be made with such an approach? What would the ethical ramifications be? The belief that mental annihilation or negation leads to spiritual emancipation has become a popular and unfortunate teaching of modern representatives or interpretations of Yoga. Despite the fact that it is neither truly yogic, practical, logical nor appealing, and furthermore may be destructive for aspirants, recent teachings and works on Yoga have often prescribed or assumed the negation or suppression of the mind, ego, and thoughts as the primary means to self-emancipation.<sup>59</sup> This stance, I submit, is a gross misrepresentation of Yoga; a confused, misleading and, at best, naive attempt at conveying the depth and profundity of the yogic process that Patañjali refers to as *nirodha*. As will be explained in chapter 6, Yoga does involve levels of insight in which the ordinary mental processes and identification with *vr̥tti* are temporarily suspended. This process culminates in ecstasy (*asamprajñata-samadhi*): a state where the pure experiencer or *knower-purusa-is* "alone" and the yogin is left with nothing more to experience or know for the sake of liberation. This advanced and crucial stage of yogic practice is for the purpose of the final elimination of ignorance; but it need not be understood as resulting in a definitive or permanent cessation or suspension of the mental processes of the mind in total.

I am arguing that it is misleading to view *nirodha* as a process of repression, suppression, or inhibition. *Nirodha* does not refer to a forced cessation, coercion, or restriction or to the nonexistence of *vr̥ttis*, as many modern translators seem to imply.<sup>60</sup> I am suggesting that Yoga (YS I.2) is not such a manipulation or control of the mind, nor is it a "blank" or unconscious state of mind or a "thoughtless" or "mindless" state of being. One recent commentator on the *Yoga-Sutra* aptly writes:

*Nirodha* does not mean and imply a willful control of *vr̥ttis*, or their suppression or repression. Willful control, suppression, and repression must necessarily result in a derangement, if not the destruction of the human psyche. Because any egocentric act of [a human being], already caught in *vr̥ttis* *sarupya* ["conformity" of self-identity to the nature of *vr̥tti*], which has conditioned [one's] mind, will be tantamount to exercising [one's] mind in the same old way . . . This can never bring about *nirodha*, but only the

death of the psyche, if the pressure of willful control, suppression or repression is persisted beyond the point of endurance.<sup>61</sup>

Could efforts to achieve a willful control of the mind (as mentioned in the above) be the result of a fanatical, ascetical, imbalanced approach to Yoga,

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a misguided attempt to transcend ego and to go beyond the enterprise of dissatisfaction and affliction? Does psychic closure a compulsive shutting out/down or switching off of the psyche, constitute an authentic opening to true identity? A careful examination of the mind and its functioning in the context of Yoga philosophy suggests that any form of psychic suppression or repression runs counter to the underlying principles on which Yoga practice is based. Ego-transcendence is not something that can be forced or ultimately willed. The ego itself must give way or let go into the illuminating power of *sattva*, which, located in a subtler dimension of the mind (the *buddhi*), eludes the ego's grasp and its self-centered efforts as well as other afflicted modes or attitudes generating action or inertia (stasis) as mediated through *rajas* and *tamas* respectively. In short, self-transcendence is only possible as a voluntary gesture, a gesture that is often misunderstood by seekers resulting in a perversion of praxis leading to forms of self-denial or self-indulgence that can surreptitiously inflate the ego and even cause harm to the psychophysical organism and to others.

The "willful control" referred to in the above quotation (n. 61) must, therefore, be qualified in the context of those personality types in which *rajas* and *tamas* are predominant and *sattva*-knowledge is covered over (*avarana*, YS IV.31). Such willfulness leading to suppression, and so forth, is simply a form of misguided effort based on rajasic and tamasic *vr̥ttis* and predispositions in the form of aggressive (*ghora*) or deluded (*mudha*) ideas<sup>62</sup> (*pratyaya*) or intentions in order to achieve a state of *nirodha*. For example, *nirodha* cannot be equated with a state of inertia or stasis (*tamas*) wherein the mind and its modifications are suppressed or forcibly stopped, rendered inoperative. It is misleading to assert, as has S. Dasgupta,<sup>63</sup> that *nirodha* is a complete (final) stopping of the movements of the mind. According to Vyasa (YB I.2), such an inert state of the mind, far from being an experience of yogic illumination, merely constitutes a state of *tamas*,<sup>64</sup> implying a confusion of sorts or delusive mentality leading to dullness or static vacant states of mind, perhaps even mistaking what are nonvirtuous qualities in Yoga for being virtuous ones. The disempowerment of *avidya* over the mind is not to be confused with the *guna* of *tamas*! The mind's highest disposition is sattvic, *sattva* or "illumination" (*prakasa*)<sup>65</sup> being the purest and most lucid aspect of *prakṛti*. *Sattva* is inclined to ideas of a peaceful (*santa*) nature<sup>66</sup> and supportive of the practice of Yoga. As a moral, psychological, and epistemological state, *tamas* is not supportive of the practice of Yoga, is not Yoga proper. The nonafflicted (*aklista*) *vr̥ttis*, intentions, and ideas (*pratyaya*) pertaining to a sattvic nature are morally and cognitively drawn upon or attuned to, serve the soteriological dimension

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of Yoga, and are part and parcel of the sattvification of the will or intellect the faculty of discernment and decision making. *Vrttis* return to their source of pure *sattva* and can then arise in a purified and illuminated mode when that purpose is fulfilled, as for example, in the form of yogic perception and moral virtues. Thus the cessation of *vrttis* in the process of *nirodha* refers to the "undoing" or dismantling of the yogin's misidentification with *vrtti* in *samyoga*. *Avidya* the cause of the erroneous appropriation of *vrttis* is dispelled, and the purified mind, in its subtlest nature as pure *sattva* (knowledge or insight) can give rise to the right functioning of *vrtti* in that *vrttis* are no longer appropriated by a mistaken identity of self.

Explaining the Samkhyan view of causation in terms of yogic praxis, Patañjali shows how, through direct experience and perception (*yogi-pratyaksa*), we can see that our mind and sense of self continuously change depending on the nature and type of *vrttis*, cognitions and ideas (*pratyaya*), in the process of apprehension, that we are entertaining at any given moment. This changing sense of identity, which continuously wavers from authentic identity, must be transcended in Yoga. Thus, Yoga discourages any clinging to ideas or perceptions of *purusa* experienced along the way; whatever idea one arrives at through the process of *vrtti* will never be the actual liberated state itself. Only by breaking through the barriers imposed by the relative states of consciousness or the mind can one enter into the domain of the knowledge of *purusa* (*purusa-jñāna*) and experience life in the light of yogic awareness rather than the limited awareness in the situation of *samyoga*. The Samkhyan theory of *satkaryavada* takes on a highly experiential dimension in the actual practice of Yoga. The experiential element consists of: (a) putting into practice a method or methods that lead one to experience yogic perception in *samadhi* wherein *cittavrttinirodha* will be "attained" and matured; and (b) the transformative processes including the physical, ethical, and psychological that occur while the process of "cessation" is taking place.

Primarily, Patañjali takes the Samkhyan theory of causation and applies it to understanding states of mind or "shapes" the mind takes when left to its own karmically derived momentum. The modifications (*vikrtis*) of the mind are its *vrttis*, all the mental functioning, processes, and content. Insofar as we are ensconced in a worldview generated by *avidya* and are ineluctably programmed within the circumscribed patterns of afflicted identity (*asmita*) a mere product of the *gunas* in the form of misidentification our self-referential center of awareness and its compulsive attachment to *vrtti* must be severed in order for the mind to be transformed into finer states of perception and understanding. What is *pralaya* or *prati-sañcara* (the dis-

solution of the universe and its phenomena) in the cosmological context of Samkhya <sup>67</sup> becomes in the *Yoga-Sutra* respectively *nirodha* or *pratiprasava* (the cessation or dissolution of the misperceived identity with *gunas* as they manifest in the form of *vrttis*). This can only happen through the experiences in *samadhi* that culminate in "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).

In the *Yoga-Sutra* the principles (*tattvas*) of existence are of special relevance with regard to their relation to the individual yogin, including the intellect, ego, mind-organ, senses, and body. One needs to know their origin and processes of manifestation and actualization so as to cease from any misidentification with them. Not only does the empirical sense of self identify with the

body and the nature of the mind and everything about which one says "I am"; it even becomes identified with the objects and persons one calls "mine," and experiences dissatisfaction or enjoyment according to the changes that take place in relation to the objects of experience, including our *vr̥ttis*. Patañjali asks us to learn to discern the difference between our true identity as Self (*purusa*) and our self as a mistaken identitythe congenital conflation or mixture/conjunction (*samyoga*) of the "seer" and the "seeable"by observing the processes of identification and cognition taking place within our own minds. Thus Patañjali describes the nature of the "seeable" (*dr̥syā*) with an epistemological emphasis focusing more on its manifestations as psychological and cognitive phenomena rather than as ontological essences (as in Samkhya). *Purusa* appears to take on or conform to (*sarūpya*) an identity which, based on the changing nature of the *guṇas*, is contained within *prakṛti* and defined and given shape according to the nature of the mind and its modifications (*vr̥ttis*). This reflected albeit deluded I-consciousness, as human consciousness, appears in the form of a body-mind and in the nature of the elements (*bhūtas*) and the sense-organs (*indriyas*), and is for the purpose of experience and eventual emancipation<sup>68</sup> from the samsaric condition of self in *samyoga*.

In Yoga, even ignorance and misidentification ultimately serve the highest purpose of liberation through a fundamental transformation of the mind. The various categories of the "seeable" should not be reified,<sup>69</sup> but rather should be understood as interconnected and interdependent dimensions of human experience. The descriptions of the "seeable" outlined in *Yoga-Sūtra* II.18-19<sup>70</sup> can be understood as descriptions of the situation of the seer (*purusa*) as if misidentified with the seeable (*prakṛti*). *Prakṛti*'s various levels of manifestation are correlated in the *Yoga-Sūtra* with states of consciousness, self-understanding, and identity analogous to *purusa*, and, I suggest, are to be understood with an epistemological emphasis; through *prakṛti*, the yogin comes to realize authentic identity as *purusa*.

The ultimate significance of *prakṛti* is seen in very definite, positive terms, wherein, from at least a provisional point of view, *prakṛti* has meaning, metaphysically speaking, in the service of soteriology: the metaphysical dualism of *purusa* and *prakṛti* can be taken as a provisional perspective and as one that has been abstracted from yogic experience. As I have suggested in chapter 2, this provisional approach to the existences of *purusa* and *prakṛti* can serve important pedagogical purposes. In fact, the whole concept of the mind (*citta*) in Yoga can be seen primarily as a heuristic device, rather than as a substance per se, whereby the yogin comes to understand the functioning of consciousness and discerns the difference between the mind (*citta*) and *purusa*. The essence of the "seeable" to which Patañjali refers and whose reality is for the purpose of *purusa*<sup>71</sup> translates into being a form of *vr̥tti*-identification, that is, identification and experience referenced to an egoic center of consciousness with its mental content in the form of thoughts, intentions, or ideas (*pratyaya*). Ego-identity is essentially a *vr̥tti*-accumulated sense of self, which as a false "center" of consciousness, has become dependent on the activity of *vr̥tti* for its existence. Egoity is thus an *activity* of misidentification of self constituted of the three *guṇas*. The yogin must ultimately be identified as the auto-transparent knower (YS IV.18) or seer of *vr̥ttis*free from any misidentification with and misappropriation of *vr̥tti*in order to discern permanently the difference between mistaken identity in *samyoga* and authentic identity as

*purusa*. It is here that a clear understanding of the difference between *purusa* or pure consciousness (our intrinsic identity as the "seer") and *prakṛti* or matter (the "seeable," including all modifications of the mind or processes of identification that give form to an extrinsic nature and identity of selfhood) is essential.

In his commentary on *Yoga-Sutra* I.1 Vyasa defines Yoga as *samādhi* (*yogah samādhih*).<sup>72</sup> He goes on to state the two divisions of that Yoga as: (1) *samprajñāta*, the *samādhi* of cognition consisting of four types (outlined in *YS* I.17), and in which sattvic *vr̥ttis* persist and can still arise in the context of *sarūpya*, "conformity" to or misidentification with the nature of *vr̥tti*; and (2) *asamprajñāta*, the supracognitive *samādhi* in which all the *vr̥ttis*, including the sattvic ones, are mastered and all attachment to *vr̥tti* and its resultant effects in the form of sorrow and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*) is overcome, transcended. In (2), ignorance no longer masks authentic identity for the yogin. The power of misidentification has been temporarily removed and *purusa*, left "alone," abides in its true form (*svarūpa*) and identity.<sup>73</sup> Vyasa elaborates on the meaning of Patañjali's definition of Yoga (*YS* I.2), pointing out that because the word "all" is not included to suggest

the "cessation" of all misidentifications with *vr̥tti* which reduce *purusa* to some form of prakṛtic existence, however subtle, thus reifying *purusa* it implies that *samprajñāta* is also included in Yoga.<sup>74</sup> In *samprajñāta* or cognitive *samādhi* the rajasic and tamasic *vr̥ttis* all of which are of an afflicted (*klista*) nature are mastered by resorting to the sattvic, nonafflicted (*aklista*) *vr̥ttis*.<sup>75</sup> If *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 had said all *vr̥ttis* in total, then the definition would have been limited to *asamprajñāta* the supracognitive *samādhi* and the cognitive *samādhi* would not be included in Yoga. The term *nirōdha* is therefore ambiguous. It refers to both the *process* of cessation of the misidentification with the modifications of the mind *and* the culmination or "goal" of Yoga, that being spiritual liberation. There is a similar ambiguity in the terms *samādhi* and Yoga.

If *nirōdha* were seen as the restriction, suppression, repression, or the ontological negation of *vr̥ttis*, then Yoga would have to be defined as a particular condition of the substratum of those *vr̥ttis*, the substratum being a state somewhere within the mind. But *samādhi*, it must be emphasized, is not such a state within the mind. As I later argue, in the actual experience of *samādhi* the mind is not made blank or is not in a state of void, nullification, or the permanent absence of *vr̥tti*. The mind may continue to function according to its own nature but as a purified instrument of *sattva*-intelligence that is capable of perfectly reflecting the light of *purusa*. The *vr̥ttis* of the mind become transparent to the knower (*purusa*) of *vr̥ttis*, whereas in *samyoga* the *vr̥ttis* are "colored" in affliction, egoity, attachment, aversion, and so on constantly altering and fragmenting one's sense of self. *Nirōdha* means to take away or discard the empirical limitations, including all "restrictions" and suppressions located in the mind; *nirōdha* is the removal of the *klesas* and karmic barriers only to reveal the full-blown nature of *purusa*. The yogin therefore is not a mindless, inactive being. Rather, the mind has become an instrument of consciousness under the yogin's direction. The modifications of the mind may continue in day-to-day life but they no longer enslave the yogin, no longer divert the yogin's attention away from authentic identity. Ultimately the yogin attains to the status of a *jīvanmukta* one who is liberated while yet

embodied<sup>76</sup> and can use the body and mind out of benevolence and compassion for the spiritual benefit of others. The presence of the enlightened being, adept, or spiritually wise person is confirmed in the historical tradition of Yoga through the *guru-sisya* relationship, a relationship made possible by the grace of the *guru* or liberated being (*jivanmukta*).

What therefore is the "*cittavrtti*" that must cease through the discipline of Yoga? Based on the argument put forward in this study that mental

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activity, cognition, feelings, emotions, and thoughts are not incompatible with Yoga praxis or the final goal of *purusa*-realization. I will now attempt to clarify Patañjali's definition of Yoga. No doubt addressing an audience primarily composed of Yoga aspirants, it seems logical to suggest that Patañjali defined Yoga in *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 with a strong pedagogical intent so that his listeners would be able to grasp (and be sufficiently disillusioned with) their present understanding of themselves and the world. *Nirodha* implies that it is the worldview born of ignorance "located" within one's own psychophysical being that is to be abandoned or discarded, not *prakṛti* herself. *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 is in part a teaching and a heuristic device that is aimed at devaluing the level of understanding based on misidentification with the body and mental processes and that sees identification with or attachment to thought-constructs or mental content as bringing ultimate satisfaction. *Nirodha* is not the denial or renunciation of *prakṛti in total*; it is a negative affirmation of the reality of *purusa*. Initially one could say that *nirodha* actually is a recommendation to the practitioner to develop meditational practice. Yet on the other hand, Patañjali had to inform seekers who had incorrectly assumed a subjectively idealist viewpoint that the mind and the objects perceived through it are real and are not to be negated or denied. As noted earlier, many people see the external, "objective" world and therefore it does not arise from the mind itself (YS IV.15-16). *Prakṛti* is real; the external world is not denied or renounced. All effects are preexistent in their cause. However, the concern of Yoga is not merely to describe, categorize, or explain the "outside" world, but rather is to show various means by which the practitioner may obtain direct access to empirical reality without the interference of *avidya*'s network of confused and impure identity patterns that veil a clear, direct perception of the world. Yoga "undoes" the world of misidentification, *cittavrtti* or fractured selfhood and corrects a basic misalignment between the seer and the seeable so that life as a whole, and on the basis of an unfractured self-identity, is revealed. Clearly, *cittavrtti* does not have the capacity to see and experience life from the perspective of Yoga *darsana*, which discloses the full integrity of life. The cultivation of an ever-deepening process of "cessation" in Yoga serves to dismantle the habitual tendency to reify one's self and the world by unfolding an awareness that reveals the transcendent yet immanent seer (*purusa*).

The yogin does not need to force, struggle with, or push away the mind, *vṛttis*, and thoughts as is usually recommended in discussions on *nirodha*. Any attempt at a forced removal of *vṛtti* or coerced "identification" with *purusa* is merely a perpetuation of the rajasic and tamasic tendencies or

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habit patterns (*vasanas*) of the mind. The yogin's need is to contact and connect with more *sattva-intelligence*, which is concealed in the mind. However, due to the afflictions present along with their karmic investment, this innate sense of *sattva* is covered over<sup>77</sup> and obscured from entering fully into consciousness. Through Yoga discipline, one learns to recognize and identify with purer, sattvic, and subtler forms of *vr̥ttis* and is relieved from the former identification with *vr̥ttis* of a rajasic and tamasic nature that were predominant. The mind can then more easily settle into its finest nature of *sattva*; the yogin's understanding becomes sattvified. Similarly, by identifying as *purusa*, in *asamprajñata*, the yogin overcomes the need to identify with sattvic *vr̥ttis* for the purpose of steadying and stabilizing self-identity. Cessation (*nirodha*) implies a process of "subtilization"<sup>78</sup> or sattvification of consciousness, of a gradual de-identification with *vr̥tti* to the point of being unmistakably one-in-identity as *purusa*.

Thus the cessation of the misidentification with the modifications of the mind involves a progressive "interiorization," "subtilization," or "sattvification" of consciousness, of one's focus of attention, wherein initially the congenital perceived misidentification with the tamasic and rajasic (*klista-*) *vr̥ttis* constituting one's mental apparatus ceases (in *samprajñata-samadhi*). Eventually (in *asamprajñata-samadhi*) the congenital perceived misidentification with sattvic (*aklista-*) *vr̥ttis* also ceases. Yet *vr̥ttis* themselves do not cease to exist. Even in the enlightened yogin there are tamasic, rajasic, and sattvic dimensions constituting his or her prakrtic apparatus but these gunic qualities no longer obscure the yogin's perception of reality. The yogin is, however, detached from any identification with the *gunas*, is no longer enslaved to the *vr̥tti*-generating complex of the mind.

Summarizing this section, it has been strongly suggested that *nirodha* denotes an epistemological emphasis and refers to the transformation of self-understanding, not the ontological cessation of *prakṛti* (i.e., the mind and its modifications). *Nirodha* is not, therefore, as many have explained, an inward movement that annihilates or suppresses *vr̥ttis* and thoughts, nor is it the nonexistence or absence of *vr̥ttis*; rather, *nirodha* involves a progressive expansion of perception that eventually reveals our true identity as *purusa*. Taking another angle and clarifying further our interpretation of Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (YS I.2), I suggest that *cittavṛtti* (from the definition of Yoga as *cittavṛtтинirodha*) describes the very basis of all the empirical selves: under the influence of *avidya* the unenlightened person's mental processes (*vr̥tti*) both generate and are ineluctably driven by<sup>79</sup> deeply rooted impressions (*samskaras*)<sup>80</sup> and habit patterns (*vasanas*)<sup>81</sup> sustaining a sense of I-am-ness or egoity (*asmita*) that is by definition afflicted. Seen

in the above context, *cittavṛtti* can be understood as a generic term standing for a misconceived knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*)<sup>82</sup> that, although seeking to ground empirical selfhood, amounts to no more than an error that is structured in the network of our psychological makeup and veils our identity as *purusa*. The epistemic distortion or erroneous knowledge (*mithya-jñāna*)<sup>83</sup> functioning as the *vr̥tti* of *viparyaya* (YS/YB I.8) acts as the basis for all misidentification with



*vyutthana*, YS III.9) of perception and extrinsic identity. Thus, after questioning why the knower is released while still alive, Vyasa tells us: "Because erroneous cognition (*viparyaya*) is the cause of rebirth. When *viparyaya* has vanished no one is ever seen to be born anywhere."<sup>84</sup> That is, the liberated yogin does not see *purusa* as an entity misidentified as body, mind, intellect, ego, and so forth, that is reborn or comes into being. Unlike ordinary, empirical identity, the yogin's identity is no longer diverted into the prakrtic dynamic of cause and effect including birth and death. *Purusa* is never born and as such is not subject to death; *purusa* is immutable, immortal. Ignorance claims its foundational support or agent (*asmita*) in the mind and forms a mind of its own kind<sup>85</sup> through the *vrtti* of *viparyaya*. In short, our afflicted identity rooted in spiritual ignorance functions through *viparyaya*. Oddly enough, this fundamental insight, which can be attributed to Vyasa,<sup>86</sup> has not been clearly noted by scholars. I have attempted to clarify Vyasa's position, and furthermore suggest that Vyasa's insight into the nature of *viparyaya* has profound implications for our understanding of Patañjali's whole system.

Accordingly, *cittavrtti* does not mean all modifications or mental processes in the mindcognitive, affective, or emotivebut is the very seed (*bija*)<sup>87</sup> mechanism of the misidentification with *prakrti* and from which all other *vrttis*, thoughts, intentions, or ideas arise and are (mis)appropriated in the unenlightened state of mind. There are therefore many *vrtti*-identifications (YS I.6) that can come from and modify the seed mechanism of *cittavrtti*.<sup>88</sup> *Cittavrtti*'s nature is dualistic and functions as a polarization within *prakrti*: a masquerading consciousness of selfhood conceived as being separate from the world. It is this dualistic, afflicted sense of self or ego as separate from the world and other human beings that must, according to Yoga, "dissolve" or "cease." The yogin learns to witness this subject-object dichotomy within *prakrti* (or worldview born of *avidya*) as constituting the "seeable" (*drsya*). Spiritual ignorance gives rise to a malfunctioning or misalignment of *vrtti*as appropriated or referenced to egoitythat in Yoga can be "corrected" thereby allowing for the right functioning or proper alignment of *vrtti*. *Vrtti* will then function as subordinate to the knower (*purusa*) of *vrtti* rather than the sense of self in

effect remaining subordinate to *vrtti*. *Cittavrtti* is an analogical understanding of consciousness in that the consciousness that has become the mind as a reflected state of (*purusa*'s) consciousness is analogous to pure consciousness, *purusa*. It is the *cittavrtti* as our confused and mistaken identity of authentic selfhood (*purusa*), not our *vrttis*, thoughts and experiences *in total* that must come to a state of definitive cessation.

I am suggesting that the pivot of the predicament of *purusa*'s "entanglement" within *prakrti* is epistemological and it is here that we should look for an opening into the meaning of Patañjali's Yoga. Our analysis thus far views the conjunction (*samyoga*) of *purusa* and *prakrti* much as a state of epistemic distortion, a mental superimposition (*adhyaropa*, YB II.18) caused by ignorance (YS II.24) and resulting in the confusion of identitylocated within the mind itselfbetween *purusa* and the mind. There is no real evidence to the effect that *samyoga* constitutes a definitive association or ontological alliance between *purusa* (the seer) and *prakrti* (the seeable), or that any *direct* or *truly aligned* association of *purusa* and *prakrti* is intrinsically



binding. A closer examination of the *Yoga-Sutra* and Vyasa's commentary suggests that *samyoga* involves a misalliance between spirit and matter, a misalignment that, as the cause of suffering and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*), needs to be corrected. The condition of ignorance "creating a mind of its own kind" and the resulting mistaken identity in *samyoga*, which fundamentally *is* a misguided relationship to and misappropriation of the world, does not grant direct insight into the nature of the perceived world. This in turn leads to problematic, obfuscated, or karmically binding involvements in the world. *Samyoga* is a failure to gain sufficient access to the world of the "seeable," in short, a "failure to see" (*adarsana*), an alienation from authentic identity, which alone has the power "to see." Yoga corrects the misalliance inherent in the condition of *samyoga* and allows for a full participation in the world to the point of "uniting," in *samadhi*, with the objects of experience. *Samyoga* is an incorrect way of viewing the world. Yoga is clear seeing (*YS II.20*) of the true nature of *purusa* and world; Yoga purifies and establishes our identity and the mind in a state of equilibrium, balance, "sameness" of purity between *purusa* and the mind <sup>89</sup> that is "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) or freedom as a state of embodied knowledge and nonafflicted action.

Through Yoga, the mind can be transformed, purified, and liberated from the bound state of affairs in *samyoga*. *Nirodha* is to be sought because its pursuit implicates the yogin on a path of liberating knowledge or "right vision" (*samyag-darsana*, *YB II.15*) that ultimately culminates in the realization of our true identity *as purusa*. The cessation of the misidentification

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with *cittavrtti* in our day-to-day existence does not, however, imply the cessation of our personal identity: mind, body, personality, relationships, career, and so forth; rather, "cessation" results in our consciousness remaining unbound, nonenslaved, and transparent to things of a worldly nature while yet being thoroughly engaged in practical life.

#### *Abhyasa* (Practice) and *Vairagya* (Dispassion)

The central means given in the *Samadhi-Pada* for the attainment of *nirodha* are practice (*abhyasa*) and dispassion (*vairagya*). Patañjali states: "Cessation arises through practice and dispassion." <sup>90</sup> This *sutra* refers to the cessation of the *vrttis* insofar as they arise from the seed mechanism (*cittavrtti*) of ignorance (*avidya*) and misidentification with *prakrti* (*vrttisarupya*). *Cittavrtti* is an analogical understanding of consciousness and is our primary analogue of empirical discourse wherein *purusa* and the mechanism of *cittavrtti* become indistinguishable, resulting in the misappropriation by ego-consciousness of those *vrttis* that, Vyasa tells us, basically consist of pleasure, pain, and delusion. <sup>91</sup>

The yogic "path" formulated by Patañjali can be (and has been) appropriately described as a bipolar process of gradual "interiorization" <sup>92</sup> resulting in an expansion and liberated state of self-identity. Vyasa illustrates the functional interdependence of *abhyasa* (the positive pole of "practice") and *vairagya* (the negative pole of "dispassion") in a helpful metaphor:

The stream of the mind flows both ways. It flows to the good and it flows to evil. The one commencing with "discrimination" and terminating in aloneness flows to the good.

The one commencing with failure to discriminate and terminating in conditioned existence flows to evil. Through dispassion the current towards conditions/objects [extrinsic identity] is dammed, and by practice of the discriminating vision the current of "discrimination" is made to flow. Thus the cessation [of the misidentification with] the modifications of the mind depends on both [practice and dispassion].<sup>93</sup>

The "stream" metaphor used by Vyasa helps us to understand how closely the psychological, ethical, and soteriological aspects are interwoven into the Yoga view of the incessant modifications of the mind. The imagery of "both ways" (i.e., "two directions") transforms the flow of mental life into something more than a mere psychological description. "Both ways" are initially characterized as flowing toward all that is: (1) good, auspicious, beautiful and benevolent (*kalyana*), and (2) evil/"demeritorious" (*papa*),

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which in Hindu thought has both a naturalistic and moral dimension. Later, Vyasa specifies that the direction that flows toward "discrimination" and emancipation is "to the good," whereas the direction commencing with a failure to discriminate resulting in an afflicted identity of selfhood is "to evil," clearly indicating a soteriological concern. The metaphor acquires a specific technical significance in the *Yoga-Sutra* as the stream of modifications (*vrttis*) that can flow in both directions are, as we have already seen, classified as being either afflicted (*klista*) and leading to further suffering and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) in the condition of *samyoga*, or nonafflicted (*aklista*) and leading to discernment (*khyati*)<sup>94</sup> and the liberated state of "aloneness" through Yoga. The stream of the mind encompassing the nature and functioning of *vrtti* refers to the movement (of attention) either toward liberating knowledge in the process of *nirodha* or toward ignorance in the process of misidentification. "Both ways" have not only a cognitive direction denoting what is good and bad epistemically, but also have a moral direction.<sup>95</sup> The term *vrtti* incorporates both cognitive and moral content and refers to cognitive and moral conditions as interrelated aspects of our being. As well as referring to moral *ends* (i.e., of good and evil), liberating knowledge (*jñana*) and ignorance (*avidya*) are also value terms and point to the moral *condition* of the yogin or knower. The moral and epistemological dimensions are thus interrelated in Yoga. It is crucial to take note of this integral aspect of Yoga. Feeling, emotion, and volition are intimately bound up with our modes of cognition. Liberating knowledge "flowing to the good" implies purity and clarity of mind and is a condition arising from *sattva*, the illuminative constituent or power of the mind. Spiritual ignorance "flowing to evil" implies a confused or delusive sense of identity rooted in various impurities of mind (and body) and is predominately a condition arising from *tamas* seen here as the deluding constituent or power of the mind. Such a range of qualities constitutes the moral and cognitive extremes of the mind and indeed our empirical identity. There is, I submit, no need in Yoga to divorce cognition from ethics and the world of human relations. For example, the "inner" illuminative experiences that can take place in Yoga are indeed related to the "outer" world. They inform the nature of our relationships (cf. *YS* I.33) by purifying/sattvifying them and serve to illuminate our understanding of and participation in the world.

The practitioner is being advised to choose not just one of the two methods, either practice or

dispassion, but the two together. Each of the two fulfills an essential part of the purpose of Yoga, as Vyasa makes clear. Unless practice is accompanied by an attitude of dispassion, the whole

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enterprise of Yoga, which implies a balance, will be offset the yogin therefore inflating rather than transcending the egoic modes of consciousness. Furthermore, dispassion without practice is as well inefficacious for self-transcendence: "The psychosomatic energies released through dispassion are not channelled appropriately and thus may lead to confusion and possibly delusion instead of liberation."<sup>96</sup> Both means are interdependent in Yoga. Practice and dispassion transform randomly generated thoughts or distracted states of mind (see next section below) into one-pointed, concentrated states or responsible intentions and ideas, thus propelling one on in the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*). Practice includes a wide range of techniques to stabilize the mind, while the cultivation of dispassion prevents the yogin from misappropriating the results of such practice, that is, in an egoic, selfish, or irresponsible manner. The bipolarity of the yogic path is already highlighted in the *Bhagavadgita* (VI.35), which uses the same terms adopted by Patañjali to designate the two poles. Kṛṣṇa tells his disciple, Arjuna: "Doubtless, O mighty-armed, the mind is unsteady and difficult to restrain; but O son-of-Kuntī, it [the mind] can be held (mastered) through practice and dispassion."<sup>97</sup>

Even though in *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 *nirodha* has already been defined, the term occurs again in *Yoga-Sutra* I.12 as the stated result of practice and dispassion. The *Yoga-Sutra* (I.13-14) asserts: "Practice is the effort toward stability in that [process of *nirodha*]."<sup>98</sup> "That practice, however, is firmly grounded when properly attended to for a long time and without interruption."<sup>99</sup> Yoga practice needs the three qualifications stated above. It must be observed: with proper attentiveness (i.e., care), for a long time, and without interruption. In other words, the practice must be consistent, regular, and persistent over a long time and with careful attention, and one might add, a positive and devout attitude. The above qualifications are supplemented by Vyasa with the cultivation of austerity (*tapas*), sexual restraint (*brahmacarya*), knowledge (*vidya*),<sup>100</sup> and faith (*śraddha*).<sup>101</sup> When practice becomes firmly established, the yogin cannot be swayed from it even by the strongest adversity (*dveṣa*) or pain, nor can the yogin be allured away from practice by the subtlest pleasures or attractions (*rāga*). The yogin must have the necessary vigor, enthusiasm, and will power to undertake the discipline "to the end" in order to realize its spiritual effects and "attain" fulfillment.<sup>102</sup> In short, the yogin must be utterly committed to practice.

It is noteworthy that Vyasa qualifies the word *sthiti* (stability) in *Yoga-Sutra* I.13 to mean the tranquil flow of the mind, the ordinary patterns of *vṛttis* having subsided.<sup>103</sup> Practice is the effort towards stability or steadiness of mind. This does not mean, however, a complete transcendence of *vṛttis*.

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As Viṣṇu Bhikṣu surmises, the usage of the term *sthiti* in *Yoga-Sutra* I.13 implies that the mind is free of any kind of *vṛtti* other than that which is involved with the object in a state of one-

pointed contemplation. One does not begin even the practice of the lower forms of cognitive *samadhi* until after this stability is established.<sup>104</sup> In the context of *Yoga-Sutra* I.13 Vacaspati Misra asserts that "stability" here means a state free of the rajasic and tamasic *vr̥ttis* implying a one-pointedness of mind wherein sattvic *vr̥ttis* alone remain.<sup>105</sup> Certainly in the context of practice (*abhyasa*), *sthiti* could not refer to a delusive state of *tamas*: a dullness of mind, or an overall lack of mental alertness. According to Bhoja Raja (*RM* I.13), *sthiti* refers to a mental state that takes place when the mind is without *vr̥ttis* and dwelling in its own nature.<sup>106</sup> However, Bhoja's definition would raise the meaning of *sthiti* to a state beyond the experience of cognitive (*samprajñata*) *samadhi*; the path would then come after the goal, the effort would supersede its own purpose. The intent of the *sutra* seems to be to state implicitly that the effort toward *abhyasa* or meditational praxis denotes bringing the mind to stillness or stability, which implies freedom from the rajasic turbulences or tamasic delusions, the mind's one-pointedness on a single sattvic *vr̥tti* remaining uninterrupted so that it flows in a calm, smooth stream "toward" liberation. Moreover, it can be suggested that, epistemologically, stillness or stability of the mind means that the former type of functioning of the mind (i.e., individual identification taking place exclusively in its rajasic or tamasic modes) has been "stilled" and the transformation into sattvic understanding has dawned. Again, the important theme in Yoga of the "sattvification of consciousness" is being underlined.

Vyasa states that the purpose behind the effort to be firmly grounded in practice is that the yogin is then "not suddenly overpowered by a *samskara* of extraversion or emergence (*vyutthana*),"<sup>107</sup> which would exacerbate affliction and lead to further dissatisfaction (*duhkha*). In its full-blown sense, perhaps Dasgupta is not far off the mark when he writes: "Practice stands for the concentrated inner application to the realization of the [transcendent] being which constitutes the essence of all yogic operations. It consists of the careful discrimination between the real and the wholesome on the one hand and the transient and all that is unworthy of human motivation on the other. It is the inwardness and unification resulting from this enlightened discernment."<sup>108</sup> But one must be careful not to overemphasize the method of practice (*abhyasa*) for it has intrinsic value in Yoga only in relation to dispassion (*vairagya*), the meaning of which we will now examine.

Turning to the second method mentioned above to bring about "cessation," namely dispassion (*vairagya*), Patañjali states: "Dispassion is the

knowledge of mastery in one who does not thirst for any object either seen [i.e., of an earthly nature] or heard of [i.e., of the subtle worlds]."<sup>109</sup> The word *vairagya* is derived from the verb root *rañj* "to color." Literally, *vairagya* means the state of being devoid of, or free from *raga*, the attachment that accrues, as it were, from the objects of attraction reflecting in and coloring or influencing the mind. Yet this is not a complete definition of *vairagya* for the purpose of Yoga. Vijñāna Bhikṣu tells us that merely the absence of the "coloring process" or conditioning of the mind will not suffice, nor will even the freedom from attractions that is gained from seeing their faults; this form of *vairagya* is not conducive to the goal that is implicit in the process of *nirodha*. Mere disinterest in or indifference toward objects of experience whether enjoyable or

painful can be of no value for this purpose, as for example, a disinterest in "objects" or conditions that may bring about the event of an illness. Bhikṣu points out"<sup>110</sup> that often an attraction toward objects or other persons remains even after one becomes aware of their attendant faults or imperfections. Therefore dispassion as defined by Patañjali in *Yoga-Sutra* I.15 does not imply a simple turning away from or suppression of a craving, becoming perhaps indifferent in an apathetic way through some form of intermittent withdrawal; rather, dispassion means a knowledge (*saṃjñā*) of mastery (*vasikara*).

Masterybreaking free from the movement of misidentification with *vṛttī* is an essential part of dispassion. If this were not so, one might mistakenly think one had attained *vairagya* when one simply had not acknowledged and experienced the objects of one's desire or lacked the capacity to enjoy them. Seen here, the normally upheld translation of *duḥkha* as "suffering" in a way leaves much to be desired. In the present context under discussion, *duḥkha*, which can be translated as "dissatisfaction," refers to an *inability to be satisfied*. In Yoga (and Sāṃkhya, see *SK* 23) such a state of powerlessness or impotence refers to a state of *tamas*. *Duḥkha* is a state of dissatisfaction brought on by inner, psychological, subjective causes at least as much as external, objective causes. Nor could *vairagya* entail a superficial abandonment of one's aversions (*dveṣa*) toward the world, other persons, and things. Any literal (physical) discarding of objects implying an outward mode of renunciation of what is essentially an inner afflicted condition of mind would simply result in the avoidance of, or inability to deal with, real life situations, thereby perpetuating the original affliction. For example, being attached to a state of impotence or helplessness (*tamas*), one could easily develop an aversion or negative attitude toward the world, internalizing one's anger or pain. Thus, having "given up" the world, perhaps including one's family and relationships, one

has merely disempowered oneself from working through one's deep-seated pain. The ego-mechanism closes in on itself with nothing to blame but the world. The result of such an aversion or negative attachment may take the form of a compulsive struggle to "give up" or escape from the world by "practicing" aloofness or indifference toward it. But Yoga is not about the cultivation of *amoral* attitudes, nor does it imply an escape from one's own *samskaras*, *vasanas*, and mental-emotional tendencies. To withdraw from the world out of a sense of fear, anger, greed, or pride, or simply to avoid social interaction with others as if such interactions were of little or no importance in Yoga, is to misunderstand profoundly the meaning and purpose of Yoga. To anesthetize our feelings, to fail to be responsible or accountable for our actions, intentions, or attitudes to others<sup>111</sup> and the world, is a sign of hubris rather than illumination.

*Vasikara* ("mastery," see n. 109) is the capacity for direct perception of an object devoid of attachment or aversion.<sup>112</sup> Both *raga* and *dveṣa* are based on a superimposition that incorrectly attributes or seeks for permanent happiness or fulfillment in either the attachment or aversion to objects including other persons. It is not, however, the sheer presence or absence of objects that releases one from attachment or aversion; one is released through the transformation of one's present state of understanding. The issue here is really epistemological (rather than ontological) and has to do with a metaphorical and attitudinal rather than a literal understanding of



*vairagya* often understood as a "physical" detachment or movement away from the objects of experience. Dispassion is a knowledge of mastery wherein the yogin becomes increasingly disengaged from misidentification with the "seeable," that is, attachments and aversions based on a mistaken identity of selfhood (*asmita*). Mastery is not mastery over nature or the world, is not ultimately *purusa's* mastery over *prakṛti*, but as I will later argue, implies a harmony with our embodied, relational existence, nature, and the world. Dispassion removes our self-inflicted forms of conflict and imbalance. Through dispassion, the *gunas* are allowed to function in harmony with self-identity, resulting in a nonenslavement to things *prakṛtic*, for instance, *vṛtti*. The path of Yoga is not to be reduced to a master-slave mentality, of "spirit" triumphant over matter/nature/energy. The knowledge of mastery implied in *vairagya* corrects all former life-imbances, all enslavement to *prakṛtic* existence. Thus, dispassion is an irreplaceable method for the removal of ignorance (*avidyā*), which, as we have seen, is the cause, in Yoga, of all dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*).

*Vairagya* is not so much an act of dispassion or detachment as it is a state of understanding and insight, dispassion being for Patañjali a knowledge of

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"mastery" resulting from a genuine persistence on the part of the yogin to disengage the mind from everything that is inimical to its steadiness in practice, thereby generating purification from affliction. Normally, the ordinary person's "mindstream" and thought patterns flow in the "outward direction" (*vyutthana*) extrinsically motivated toward worldly experience in *samsara*. The yogin breaks the momentum of that flow through dispassion and makes the stream progressively more subtle or *sattvic* through the practice of Yoga, leading to the discriminative discernment between the pure *purusa* and the mistaken sense of self that has become sedimented within the mind and that, due to ignorance, masquerades as true identity until all attachment to the *gunas* including *sattva* is transcended." <sup>113</sup>

Using Vyasa's metaphor, it is through practice that the stream of discriminative discernment is opened up, releasing its flow from the *samsaric* blockages and "knots" of empirical self-identity. The predisposition of the *vṛttis* to flow *samsarically* in the direction of extrinsic identity and fuel the seed mechanism of *cittavṛtti* is checked or prevented, at least temporarily. Through this bipolar methodology, the conjunction (*samyoga*) between the seer and the seeable, as if manifesting a real creation in the form of a polarization or bifurcation of the subject or "experiencer" (empirical selfhood) and the object or "experienced" (world), gradually ceases and ignorance loses its hold or sway over the mind.

Patañjali knows of two levels of dispassion. He asserts: "That superior [dispassion] is the thirstlessness for the *gunas* [which results] from the discernment of *purusa*."<sup>114</sup> As we shall see, the lower or preliminary stage of dispassion (*apara-vairagya*) defined in *Yoga-Sutra* I.15 above falls within the practice of cognitive *samādhi* (*samprajñata*, *YS* I.17), but it is external to the higher stage of dispassion (*para-vairagya*) that is associated with the supracognitive *samādhi* (*asamprajñata*, *YB* I.18). Vyasa informs us: "One who sees the defects in objects perceptible and heard about is dispassionate. But one who from practising the discernment of *purusa* has one's mind purified and strengthened in discriminating knowledge is dispassionate toward the *gunas*



whether with manifest or unmanifest qualities."<sup>115</sup> Through the lower form of *vairagya* the yogin develops dispassion toward the objects and conditions of this world as experienced through the senses, such as the compulsive need or craving for sensual enjoyment (e.g., food, drink, sex) as well as worldly affluence, success, possession, and power.<sup>116</sup>

The yogin develops dispassion toward: (a) the manifest attributes of the *gunas*, those that constitute knowledge of, and consequent activity in, the gross (*sthula*), visible world as well as the attainment of heavenly realms or the subtle (*suksma*), invisible worlds; and (b) the unmanifest attributes

as experienced by the *videha* ("bodiless") yogins, and *prakrti-laya* yogins those "absorbed" or "merged" in unmanifest *prakrti*.<sup>117</sup> It is this lower-level *vairagya* that is said to be the means of reaching the *prakrti-laya* state in the *Samkhya-Karika*.<sup>118</sup> The yogins of the above categories do not go beyond the lower stage of dispassion to the higher form of dispassion; they have not mastered the higher level of *vairagya* by attaining dispassion toward the unmanifest qualities of the *gunas*. They continue to seek permanence, happiness, purity and authentic identity within *prakrti*'s domain, remaining, in a more subtle mode, under the spell of ignorance and its network of deeply rooted impressions (*samskaras*), habit patterns (*vasanas*), and modifications (*vr̥ttis*), the basic fabric of afflicted selfhood.

Vyasa continues: "Of these two [levels of *vairagya*], the latter is nothing but clarity of knowledge."<sup>119</sup> Vacaspati Misra understands the higher *vairagya* as eliminating the effects of *rajas*, the mind now being clear and in a state of discriminating knowledge or *sattva*. On this basis Vacaspati Misra states that the mind now requires no external objects, not even as objects of concentration.<sup>120</sup> This explanation is misleading. No matter how much the clarity of *sattva* may be emphasized, Vyasa's passage cannot refer merely to a state of mind or *gunic* consciousness, but rather it fits the definition of higher dispassion in which the effects or influences of all three *gunas*, including *sattva*, have been transcended and any dependence on *prakrti* has ceased, at least temporarily. The knowledge contained by the primary constituents (*gunas*) is certainly not indicated here. A more accurate reading, it would appear, is that the passage refers to the pure state of Self-knowledge which is synonymous with that freedom from all craving (*vaitrsnya*), the definition of higher dispassion given by Patañjali. This clarity of knowledge constitutes freedom from any compulsive attraction or enslavement to the manifest or unmanifest aspects of the *gunas*. When the purity of knowledge or higher dispassion unfolds, the yogin contemplates and observes thus: "Whatever was to be attained has been attained. The afflictions which were to be eliminated have been eliminated. The continuous chain of the cycle of being has been broken, without the breaking of which one is born and dies, and having died will be born again. *The ultimate limit of knowledge is dispassion* [italics mine]. After this very state of dispassion aloneness follows."<sup>121</sup>

It appears to be the case that without the higher dispassion liberation cannot be attained, at least not by discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyaṭi*) in itself. As Patañjali states: "Through dispassion toward even this [discernment of the distinction between *purusa* and the *sattva* of consciousness], the seeds of impediments are destroyed, and there is aloneness."<sup>122</sup> Attachment

to the knowledge of the difference between *purusa* and *sattva* the discernment (*khyati*) that provides the yogin with omniscience (*sarvajñatrtva*) and supremacy over all states of being (*adhisthatrtva*)<sup>123</sup> can yet bind the yogin to phenomenal existence and misidentification. Here it can be said that Yoga's higher dimension of *vairagya* goes beyond the classical Samkhyan (*SK*) adherence to discrimination (*viveka*) as the final means to liberation. An ongoing purification of the mind (from ignorance) takes place for the embodied yogin until *kaivalya* ensues. *Para-vairagya* transcends discriminating knowledge and enables the yogin to achieve a clear, direct knowledge of *purusa*. It represents an act of will along with its own transcendence subsequently leading to *asamprajñata-samadhi*, the state of supracognition through which *avidya* and its effects (e.g., *samskaras*) and affects (*duhkha*) are finally laid to rest. As it is direct knowledge of *purusa*, Yoga's higher dispassion, by constituting a total disengagement from the superimposed condition of *samyoga*, is the final means to liberation. There must develop in the yogin an equanimity (*upeksa*)<sup>124</sup> toward even the highly advanced stage of discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*); a nonacquisitive attitude (*akusida*) must take place at the highest level of yogic practice.<sup>125</sup> Vyasa emphasizes that the identity of *purusa* is not something to be acquired (*upadeya*) or discarded (*heya*).<sup>126</sup>

The highest state of dispassion concerns knowledge of *purusa* itself. Any dependency on or attachment to Yoga methods and techniques and the functioning of the mind for the purpose of experience and the pursuit of liberation is ultimately a bondage or form of enslavement to ignorance. Through *para-vairagya* the yogin, as it were, becomes aware of knowledge of the knower-of-discernment (*vivekin*) that is revealed when no other thoughts or ideas arise in the mind because the coverings of impurity that veil true identity have been "washed away."<sup>127</sup> This transcendent knowledge arises because the mind has become detached even from its power of discernment;<sup>128</sup> all *attachment* to power including attachment to the (supreme) power over all beings as well as omniscience is finally discarded in Yoga.

It is of interest to note that the higher dispassion alone transcends the *vr̥tti*-mechanism of empirical identity: its activities and appropriation including the various means of Yoga, which, as W. Halbfass observes, "may even turn into obstacles if the seeker becomes attached to their pursuit and believes that such 'result-oriented,' inherently dualistic and samsaric activities can bring about final liberation."<sup>129</sup> As has become evident by now, Yoga is acutely aware of the danger referred to in the above, namely that the yogin may remain only within the sphere of the mind (*citta*) or three *gunas* while making efforts to transcend the mind and "acquire" freedom

or true identity. One is struggling to attain a freedom that one already intrinsically *is* and as such can never really acquire. This paradoxical situation can only be fully resolved through *samadhi*.

The three fulfillments or accomplishments given in Vyasa's *Bhasya* (*YB* I.16; see n. 121) appear

to be a general summary of the sevenfold (*saptadha*) wisdom or insight (*prajña*)<sup>130</sup> that follows from *vivekakhyati* and culminates in the knowledge that *purusa* is "the light of its own form only, alone and pure."<sup>131</sup> It is *purusa* and not the mind or empirical sense of self that "sees" this knowledge in its sevenfold final stage.<sup>132</sup> This knowledge is "known" or "seen" only by *purusa* and can be claimed only by *purusa*. Moreover, though it is the mind that has been transformed and liberated through knowledge and the cessation of the seed-mechanism (*cittavrtti*) of misidentification and ignorance, it is *purusa* that is said to be skillful and free because *purusa* has "become what it always was and is beyond the three *gunas*."<sup>133</sup> What takes place after this awareness of the ultimate limit of knowledge (i.e., dispassion) is the abiding of identity in its true form (*svarupa*) as *purusa*, and this realization provides a foundational grounding for the permanently liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).

### A Preliminary Look at the Meaning and Practice of *Samadhi*

A careful examination of the concept of *samadhi* is essential for understanding Patañjali's philosophical perspective, for it is based upon the meaning of *samadhi* that the arguments of Yoga, and in particular, Patañjali's soteriological methodology, derive their greatest strength and value. In classical Yoga, the term *samadhi* is generally conceived as being the last member and the consummation of the yogic path of self-transformation, referring to the eight-limbed (*astanga*) Yoga outlined in the *Sadhana-Pada* (chapter II) of the *Yoga-Sutra*.<sup>134</sup> *Samadhi*, and the meditative discipline that accompanies it, are the *sine qua non* in Yoga for the realization of the truth of existence. The importance of this stage is expressed in Vyasa's definition (*YB* I.1) of Yoga: *yogah samadhih* ("Yoga is *samadhi*"). In effect, much of the first chapter (*Samadhi-Pada*) of the *Yoga-Sutra* constitutes a definition of the stages of *samadhi* in Patañjali's thought. A special feature of the *Yoga-Sutra*, therefore, is the detailed analysis Patañjali proffers of different kinds of *samadhi*, which has often been misinterpreted and rarely done justice to. Patañjali's distinct stress on *samadhi* shows a deep insight of his own into the phases of meditational praxis that are encountered by earnest practitioners of Yoga.

Throughout our study of the concept of *samadhi* it will become apparent just how closely Yoga theory and practice are intertwined and how the culmination of Yoga "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) is made possible. In the experiences of *samadhi* the types of knowledge that arise and the methods by which that knowledge takes place form, as it were, an "inner" core of Yoga soteriology and inform us of the metaphysical basis of Yoga praxis as viewed in its pedagogical context.

Etymologically, "*samadhi*" is an abstract noun derived from the verb root *dha*: "to put, place, or hold" (in its feminine, nominal form *dhi*) and joined with the verbal prefixes *sam* ("together") + *a* ("unto") to form the stem *samadha*, which literally means "putting together": "to place or put or fix together . . . ; to compose, set right, . . . put in order, . . . restore . . . , to add," are a few of the meanings given for the term *samadha*.<sup>135</sup> Some of the meanings cited for the term *samadhi* are: "joining or combining with," "union," "a whole," "bringing into harmony," "intense application or fixing the mind on," "attention," "completion," "profound or abstract meditation," "intense absorption or contemplation."<sup>136</sup> Yet, as is evident from even a cursory look at various

translations of the term, it may be misleading to translate the word *samadhi*, as it is used in the context of the *Yoga-Sutra*, according to any one specific meaning as given in the above or elsewhere.

Suggested renderings of the term *samadhi* are: "trance,"<sup>137</sup> "meditation,"<sup>138</sup> "concentration,"<sup>139</sup> "absorption,"<sup>140</sup> and "enstasy."<sup>141</sup> "Ecstasy"<sup>142</sup> or "rapture," terms often used to convey a sense of exalted feeling, are also cited as general meanings for *samadhi*. But despite the multitudinous ways of construing the term, most attempts are either too restricting or too vague to be acceptable. For example, "trance" can refer to states of mind that are: half-conscious, sleeplike, catalytic, hypnotic, or morbid states of mind that are more indicative of a predominance of *tamas* rather than *sattva*. "Rapture" can convey the sense of being carried away by something or someone through a profound attraction or attachment to the desired object and having more to do with a state of mind in which *rajas* is predominant. "Concentration" can be interpreted to mean an exclusively mental process of fixing one's mind on something external to or utterly separate from oneself. "Meditation" is, from a yogic perspective, often misunderstood to mean the act of "thinking" or "pondering over." In fact, the terms "concentration" (*dharana*) and "meditation" (*dhyana*) are given as the sixth and seventh "limbs" (*angas*) respectively of the "eight-limbed" (*astanga*) Yoga (YS II.29) and are preparatory or preliminary stages to the eighth limb *samadhi*. Therefore, to describe or explain *samadhi* only in terms of "con-

centration" or "meditation" is to miss the intent of Patañjali's usage of the term, which, technically speaking, designates the highest stage of practice and awareness in a semantic "hierarchy" of yogic discipline.

M. Eliade uses the Greek term "enstasis" or "enstasy,"<sup>143</sup> which attempts to clearly demarcate the phenomena of *samadhi* from that of "ecstasy," a term frequently confused or conflated with "enstasy." R. C. Zaehner<sup>144</sup> observes that enstasy "is the exact reverse of ecstasy, which means to get outside oneself and which is often characterised by a breaking down of the barriers between the subject and the universe around him." Patañjali does include *ananda* (YS I.17), meaning "bliss" or "joy," as a state of cognitive *samadhi*. The Greek-derived word *ecstasy* means to stand (*stasis*) outside (*ex*) the ordinary (empirical) self, whereas *samadhi* ultimately signifies one's "standing in" (*en*) the Self one-in-identity as *purusa* as one's authentic being or intrinsic identity. In ecstasy, the experience entails at least a partial transcendence of the limited ego-identity or *cittavrtti* mechanism accompanied perhaps by a sense of well-being. As normally conceived, ecstasy can refer to states of emotional rapture and mental exaltation. Since these characteristics do not appear to apply to or fully capture the typical yogic state of "mind-transcending" consciousness, Eliade and Feuerstein<sup>145</sup> have proposed to render the term *samadhi* as "enstasy." But the distinction is not always clear cut. Both interpretations are correct according to the stage or level of *samadhi* being experienced.

There are, in Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra*, *samadhi*-experiences that resemble more ecstasy than enstasy. These, I will be suggesting, refer to the stages of *samprajñata-samadhi* (YS I.17), the object- or content-oriented *samadhies* of cognition that are accompanied by degrees of mental "refinement" (in *vitarka*- and *vicara-samadhi*), or perhaps intense joy (*ananda*), or a subtler and

more lucid sense of self-identity in *asmita-samadhi*. By ordinary standards these states are extraordinary and constitute a significant shift in one's sense of self. They are ecstatic in that they shift one's normal focus of attention "outside of" or beyond the empirical self as it is normally experienced and perceived in the state of "emergence" (*vyutthana*, YS III.9 and 37) or extrinsic self-identity, that is, samsaric existence. The above stages constitute part of the unfoldment of the "sattvification" of self-awareness in the process of *nirodha*. However, the experiences in ecstasy can be said to take place "outside" *purusa* in that they are associated with the subtler objects of prakrtic existence as perceived in the mind and do not directly or consciously involve *purusa* as the pure, knowing experiencer; they are not *purusa-centered*. In this sense they may be understood as being ecstatic. *Asamprajñata-samadhi* the supracognitive *samadhion* the

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other hand is enstasy or true abiding "in" or rather *as* the *purusa*. It is not, as Zaehner would have it, a complete *reversal* of ecstasy, at least not in the context in which this study is proposing to use the term ecstasy. Ecstasy and enstasy are not mutually exclusive states. Rather, ecstasy is propaedeutic to enstasy: there is a continuum or continuity of experience that links the two in the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*). Only in enstasy, however, is Yoga discipline fully matured, a maturation made possible through the cessation of any tendency to "see" (i.e., misperceive) *purusa* "outside" itself or to mistake or misidentify prakrtic existence for *purusa*.

Therefore I will refer to *samadhi* as meaning both "ecstasy" (as in cognitive or *samprajñata-samadhi*, YS/YB I.17) and "enstasy" (as in supracognitive or *asamprajñata-samadhi* referred to by Vyasa in YB I.18), bearing in mind the above distinctions and carefully noting that ecstasy is propaedeutic, and not inimical, to enstasy. Ecstasy refers to the process of *samadhi* in its cognitive (and affective) stages and results in illuminating experiences of *sattva* for the purpose of *purusa*, namely experience and liberation. Enstasy is the realization of *purusa* in its true form (*svarupa*, YS I.3) and transcends all samsaric experience or misidentification with and identity-dependency on *prakrti*'s realm. Enstasy is the awareness of one's experiencer as *purusa*, utterly "alone" and with nothing (or no-thing) left to experience for the sake of liberation. Positively conceived, enstasy is a state of supracognition as the ever-free knower of *vrtti* (YS IV.18); or, negatively conceived, enstasy is the "a-cognition" of "seeing," that is, of falsely cognizing, *purusa* within *prakrti*, and the termination of the "failure-to-see" (*adarsana*). The yogin is then no longer implicated in the struggle and dissatisfaction inherent in the deluded or confused gunic modes of consciousness or samsaric identity of self.

### Preparation for *Samadhi*

According to Vyasa, two primary forms of Yoga are outlined by Patañjali. One, described in the first chapter (*Samadhi-Pada*), is for the advanced yoginone with a concentrated, engrossed mind. The other form of Yoga, described in the second chapter (*Sadhana-Pada*), is for one not so advanced in yogic discipline in that it shows how one of an extroverted and distracted mind may become steady in Yoga.<sup>146</sup> For one whose mind is concentrated, the practice of *samadhi* is emphasized. For one whose mind is distracted, the practice of Yoga must involve a preliminary



stage of purification. Vacaspati Misra observes that in the *Samadhi-Pada* practice

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(*abhyasa*) and dispassion (*vairagya*), which result in *samadhi*, are stated as the means of Yoga: "However," he goes on to state, "as these two do not come into being instantaneously for one whose mind is extroverted, that one is in need of the means taught in the second chapter in order to purify the *sattva* [of the mind.]" <sup>147</sup>

So long as the mind is ineluctably activated by inner samsaric drives, functions, disturbances, and agitations, it cannot be made pure and attain stability. It flows in the direction of affliction: to all that is evil and destructive in life. What is needed is a counterflow (*pratiprasava*) to the destructive tension of the mind, a return to its intrinsic clarity and purity through the process of *nirodha*, thereby counteracting the outward flow (*vyutthana*) of worldly identification wholly fixed upon or obsessed by the objects of experience. *Vyutthana*, the extroverted state of mind and extrinsic nature of self-identity, is a deluded and extrinsic sense of selfhood that contains an implicit desire to know the nature of an object that it holds separate from itself and to derive satisfaction or even permanent happiness through this knowledge. It is a compulsive, extraneous, emerging consciousness rooted in ignorance (*avidya*) and appearing in the form of egoity (*asmita*).

The word *vyutthana* can mean "rising up," "swerving from the right course," "independent action."<sup>148</sup> A *vrtti* of a *vyutthana*-nature, which can arise from or generate a *vyutthana-samskara*,<sup>149</sup> is not merely a mental modification, fluctuation, "wave," or "whirl" of consciousness that goes outward to the world, but signifies the processes of cognition and experience that "arise" from and are appropriated by a mistaken identity (*cittavrtti*); in effect, the *vrtti*-generating power of *vyutthana*<sup>150</sup> leads to a misidentification of self and misappropriation of the world, self-identity having been entangled in the network of *vasanas* and *samskaras* the "inner" wheel of *samsara*. Thus one is "forgetful" of authentic identity and fails to recognize *purusa* as one's intrinsic identity. Due to thoughts and impressions of a *vyutthana*-nature, one looks to and becomes dependent on others for meaning and identity, feels possessive and fearful, and is ignorant of the "knowledge" of one's true nature (*purusa*). Moreover, one's identification or thought patterns are conditioned in terms of a compulsive lack of "something" that one feels one needs in order to be fulfilled, yet a "some-thing" that is experienced as existing "outside" of oneself. The expression *vyutthana* thus carries with it the sense of separation or alienation from authentic identity, incompleteness, compulsive desire and dependence on "objects" (that is, things, persons, wealth, and so on). It is only by a "reversal" of the usual centrifugal, de-centering "flow" of the mind and its extroverted impressions, traits and habit patterns that influences in the form of

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afflictions can cease (*nirodha*) and the mind and empirical identity through a process of a centering or a centripetal "flow" of attention can function correctly and "fit into" their proper



place with respect to *purusa*: *that of the known or seeable rather than the knower or seer itself*.

<sup>151</sup> *Vrtti* will then be subordinate to the knower (*purusa*) of *vrtti* rather than our selfhood being contingent upon and a product of the movement or functioning of *vrtti* as in the previous condition of *samyoga* (that is, egoity and ignorance) the *vyutthana* (extrinsic) mode of identity.

The ground to be prepared in Yoga is the entire body-mind organism for it is through the psychophysical being as a whole that yogic insight (*prajña*) arises and *purusa* is revealed as the true seer. In the *Sadhana-Pada*, it appears that Patañjali offers two main Yogas by which the process of *nirodha* is effected. The counterflow to the usual afflicted tendencies (*klistavrttis*) of the mind is attained, as indicated in *Yoga-Sutra* II.1-2, through a practice called *kriya-yoga* (the Yoga of "action," not to be confused with the *karma-yoga* of the *BG*), which has as its purpose the attenuation of the afflictions and the cultivation of *samadhi*.<sup>152</sup> *Kriya-yoga* consists of: austerity (*tapas*), personal scriptural (i.e., self-) study (*svadhyaya*, see below), and devotion to *isvara* (*isvara-pranidhana*).<sup>153</sup> Vyasa qualifies *svadhyaya* (literally, "one's own going into") as the recitation of purifying *mantras* such as the sacred syllable *Om*, or the study of scriptures on spiritual liberation.<sup>154</sup> The second Yoga, the eight-limbed Yoga (*astanga*, *YS* II.29), is the one most commonly identified with Patañjali<sup>155</sup> and an overview of this will be presented in the last section of this chapter. A comparative analysis of these forms of Yoga is not within the scope of this study.<sup>156</sup> However, it must be admitted that they both share a common praxis-orientation and purpose: effecting the cessation of afflicted identity of the misidentification with the *cittavrtti* mechanism thus leading to the realization of *purusa*.

It is noteworthy that Patañjali includes a section in the *Samadhi-Pada* on methods for purifying, clarifying, and stabilizing the mind prior to the practice of *samadhi*. *Yoga-Sutra* I.33-39 give the *cittaparikarmas*: the ways of refining, purifying, and preparing the mind through diligent practice (*abhyasa*). Thus the mind may reach a necessary degree of stability and attentiveness so as to be steadied for the attainments of *samadhi*. For example, *Yoga-Sutra* I.34 informs us that by expulsion and retention of the breath (*prana*) one attains stability of mind.<sup>157</sup> As well, Patañjali states (*YS* I.37) that by having as its object of concentration a mind (e.g., of a sage) that is in a condition free from all attachment, one's mind becomes stabilized.<sup>158</sup> Or according to Vyasa, as in the case of enlightened sensory awareness (*divya-samvid*)<sup>159</sup> or directly perceived sensations, there arises the activ-

ity of involvement with an object that steadies the mind-organ (*manas*, *YS* I.35).<sup>160</sup> Another example, mentioned in chapter 3 (*YS* I.33), states that the mind is made clear and pure by cultivating friendliness, compassion, happiness, and equanimity in conditions or toward objects, be they joyful, sorrowful, meritorious or demeritorious.<sup>161</sup> Elsewhere (*YS* I.36) Patañjali suggests that one direct one's mental activity to bring about (meditative) experiences that are sorrowless and illuminating.<sup>162</sup> Each of these techniques requires a redirecting and restructuring of the thought process, a transformation from identification with distracted, afflicted, and self-centered mental activity in the condition of *cittavrtti* to identification with responsible thought, intentions (*pratyaya*), attitudes, and volitions. All ethical virtues are explicitly mentioned by Patañjali with reference to the obtaining of the stability of mind for the purpose of furthering the yogin's

practice and awareness. That he has not discussed the social implications of ethical virtues in Yoga does not mean that he was unaware of their importance for society. His purpose was not to explain the virtues as social virtues, but to point out their significance for Yoga soteriology. Cultivating the moral attributes in Yoga (as in YS I.33), one develops a transformed personality in which one's sattvic nature has increased resulting in a greater propensity toward purer (YS II.41), nonafflicted, and nonselfish attitudes and activity. One generates morally and cognitively purer virtues, including responsible, nonharmful, and creative mental activities (sattvic *virttis*) that replace the more afflicted (*klista*) or painful (rajasic) and stagnated (tamasic) types of *virttis*. Due to its destructive and delusive nature, identification with the afflicted *virttis* conceals or frustrates the potential within human nature for an enriched cognitive and moral development, individually and collectively, including the relational sphere of human existence.

When the effort is made to obtain stability of mind, the mind can then pass through five stages (*bhumis*), levels, or qualities. Vyasa<sup>163</sup> lists these as:

1. *Ksipta*: impulsive, restless, agitated, disturbed
2. *Mudha*: dull, somnolent, stupified
3. *Viksipta*: distracted, changeable
4. *Ekagra*: one-pointed, concentrated
5. *Niruddha*: mastered, nonenslaved, transcendent

Vyasa (YB I.1) has included *ksipta* and *mudha* in his enumeration of the states of mind but throughout the rest of his *Bhasya* he has nothing much to say about them. These two states are of little practical interest to Patañjali and Vyasa in the context of Yoga practice itself. Of the five states of

mind listed in the above, the agitated, impulsive state (*ksipta*) is dominated by *rajas* and is always unsteady, forcing one's mind (attention) to waver, scattering it from one object to another. The dull, somnolent state of mind (*mudha*) is dominated by *tamasa* state that is also predominant in the state of sleep<sup>164</sup> and is responsible for forms of stupor (e.g., as in states of inebriation) and dullness as well as cowardice, mental confusion, and an overall lack of alertness. There is not a definite boundary line between *ksipta* and *mudha*. Often in a wakeful or active state of mind we may consider ourselves to be alert, but under the influence of *tamas* forget or neglect to do something.

There are other examples of the alternation between *ksipta* and *mudha*, or between the dominance of *rajas* and *tamas*. According to Vijñana Bhikṣu,<sup>165</sup> *rajas* draws us toward the objects of attraction, causing a mood called *raga* in which the mind is colored or influenced by the object of attraction. When the desire to enjoy or possess the object of that attraction or attachment (*raga*) is thwarted, a disappointment ensues. The mind becomes clouded with *tamas*, and consequently depression (*visada*) sets in. One can similarly analyze the fluctuations of

varying moods and emotional states (which have their cognitive counterparts) by observing the alternating dominance of *rajas* and *tamas*. *Avidya* or spiritual ignorance is in its most dense form in the condition of *tamas* that, as a natural "staining" constituent of the mind, dominates the knowing mechanism. *Tamas* and *rajas* both, insofar as they veil the *sattva* component of the mind, lend themselves to immoral and amoral states that, as we have seen earlier, correlate with delusion, confusion, and various forms of selfish behavior.

*Viksipta*, the third state of mind, is subtler than, and an improvement upon, both *ksipta* and *mudha*. On the journey toward clarity of knowledge and *samadhi*, *sattva* begins to assert its illuminative power. The mind now begins to find some sustained concentration, but its former habit patterns keep propelling it away from *sattva*. In this condition the mind is still under the influence of *rajas* and *tamas*; however *sattva* has begun to make its presence known and felt. When the mind having attained a state of concentration is unable to maintain it, that state is called "distraction" (*viksipta*, *viksepa*).<sup>166</sup> In *Yoga-Sutra I.30* the term *viksepa* is used as a synonym for *antaraya* ("obstacle") and clearly suggests that the nine distractions (*viksepas*) given by Patañjali impede one from engaging properly in the practice of Yoga. The nine obstacles are listed as follows: sickness (*vyadhi*), languor (*styana*), doubt (*samsaya*), carelessness or negligence as in the lack of commitment to the means of *samadhi* (*pramada*), laziness (*alasya*), sense addiction (i.e., caused by past addiction to objects) (*avirati*),

false views (*bhrantidarsana*), failure to attain the stages of Yoga (*YB I.30*) (*alabhabhumikatva*), and instability as when a state has been attained but the mind is not able to remain established in it (*anavasthitatva*).<sup>167</sup> All of the above impediments are called *viksepas* because they divert the mind from the path of Yoga.<sup>168</sup> Vyasa asserts that the nine obstacles appear only in conjunction with their corresponding mental processes (*vrttis*), and that without the obstacles the latter do not arise. Only in *samadhi* is the mind truly stabilized.<sup>169</sup>

The natural accompaniments of the above distractions are: pain/dissatisfaction (*duhkha*, which Vyasa<sup>170</sup> says refers to the three types of pain: *adhyatmika* the physical and mental pain proceeding from oneself; *adhibhautika* pain caused by other beings; and *adhidaivika* pain proceeding from deities or natural forces), despair (*daurmanasya*), unsteadiness of the "limbs" of the body (*angam-ejayatva*), and faulty inhalation (*svasa*) or exhalation (*prasvasa*).<sup>171</sup> Vyasa informs us that these natural accompaniments accrue to one whose mind is in the distracted state and not to one whose mind is concentrated or harmonized in *samadhi*. Vyasa uses the word *samahita*, which is the ordinary past passive participle of *samadha*, expressing the fact that a harmonizing of the mind or resolution of the conditions of all conflict, including personal conflict, have been accomplished by reaching *samadhi*.<sup>172</sup> Only then are the nine obstacles and their five correlates overcome completely. Furthermore, as Vyasa emphasizes, any state of *samadhi* subordinated and eclipsed by distraction (in the distracted state of mind) is not fit to be included within the category of Yoga.<sup>173</sup> The dominance of *rajas* and *tamas* in the first three states of mind implies that one is unable to focus properly on Yoga discipline; through the various distractions one can easily lose the necessary grounding or traction for further development or growth in Yoga.

Having dismissed the first three states as not being classified as Yoga (i.e., *samadhi*) proper, Vyasa introduces the fourth state of mind: *ekagra*, the one-pointed state of mind that attains its stability and matures in the practice of *samprajñata-samadhi*. Thus begins Yoga proper. Koelman informs us that: "The first three psychological dispositions . . . must first undergo the discipline of the Yoga of action [*kriya-yoga*]. Only the last two psychological states are directly disposed for the purely mental discipline of *Rajayoga*."<sup>174</sup>

Cognitive *samadhi* has as its foundation the "one-pointed" state or *ekagra*, which refers to the one-pointedness (*ekagrata*) of the mind on an object. Vyasa describes *samadhi* in the one-pointed mind as having the power to: (1) fully illuminate an actual object as it is; (2) diminish the

afflictions or impurities; (3) loosen the bonds of *karma*; and (4) bring about the possibility of total "cessation" (*nirodha*) into view.<sup>175</sup> In the state of *niruddha* (*nirodha*) the most subtle state of the mind the dependency on an objective "prop" or object of contemplation in *samadhi* comes to an end, and the yogin, liberated from mistaken identity and thus having transcended the effects (and affects) of *vrtti* or cognition, is left "alone" as the auto-transparent knower, no longer under the influence of *avidya*.

### An Overview of the *Astanga-Yoga*

Here I will follow the more elaborated scheme (YS II.28-55 and III.1-8) of the "eight-limbed" Yoga (*astanga*), which consists of: *yama* (restraint), *niyama* (observances), *asana* (postures), *pranayama* (control of breath, restraint of vital energy currents), *pratyahara* (withdrawal of the senses), *dharana* (concentration), *dhyana* (meditation), and *samadhi* (ecstasy, enstasy).<sup>176</sup>

Through the practices involved in *astanga-yoga* there results the destruction of impurity and an increasing light of knowledge up to the discriminative discernment between the seer and the seeable.<sup>177</sup> The disjunction from, or disengagement with, the condition of *samyoga* implying the cessation of the seed-identification or misidentification with the seeable in the condition of *cittavrtti* can then take place.

Within these eight "limbs," the empirical world is dealt with aspect by aspect in a manner similar to the reversal of the Samkhyan process of world manifestation and actualization. All actions, intentions, volitions, and thoughts are scrutinized and subjected to a purification or process of sattvification in which all attachment and aversion toward initially the grosser and later on the subtler manifestations of and identifications within *prakṛti* are discarded. One's actions and interactions in the world are first brought under control or harmonized through the application of ethical restraints and observances. The first limb, *yama* (YS II.30),<sup>178</sup> means "restraint" and includes five important moral obligations. These are: nonviolence (*ahimsa*),<sup>179</sup> truthfulness (*satya*),<sup>180</sup> nonstealing (*asteya*),<sup>181</sup> sexual restraint (*brahmacarya*),<sup>182</sup> and nonpossessiveness/greedlessness (*aparigraha*).<sup>183</sup> As abstinences in the practice of Yoga, they involve refraining from actions that generate negative impressions, and constitute the "great vow" that, as *Yoga-Sutra* II.31 spells out, must be practiced irrespective of place, time, circumstances, or a particular person's social status.<sup>184</sup> These moral obligations are

unconditionally valid and demonstrate that moral integrity is an indispensable aspect of successful Yoga practice.

The second limb, *niyama*,<sup>185</sup> requires the observance of particular activities that are conducive to the quest for spiritual liberation. These refer to rules for regulating life and consist in the observance of moral, physical, and mental purity (*sauca*),<sup>186</sup> contentment (*samtosa*),<sup>187</sup> austerity (*tapas*),<sup>188</sup> personal/scriptural (self-) study (*svadhyaya*),<sup>189</sup> and devotion to the 'Lord' (*iavarapranidhana*).<sup>190</sup> The last three observances are, arguably, the same that were said earlier to constitute *kriya-yoga*.<sup>191</sup> Through these regulatory activities, applied in day-to-day life, one minimizes the distractions that arise due

to interacting in the world, thereby stabilizing one's social intercourse.

If there is any obstruction to the practice of the *yamas* and *niyamas* brought about by the distraction of discursive thought in the form of contrary ideas, such as violence/harming, and so on, the yogin must be devoted to the cultivation of their opposite.<sup>192</sup> For, as Patañjali warns:

Discursive thoughts like violence and the others, done or caused to be done or approved of, preceded by greed, anger or delusion [whether] mild, medium or intense all result in endless dissatisfaction/sorrow and ignorance; thus the cultivation of their opposites [is prescribed].<sup>193</sup>

The above practice applies not only to *yama* and *niyama* disciplines but to various techniques or methods mentioned earlier<sup>194</sup> that prescribe purificatory and ethical practices.

The first two limbs, *yama* and *niyama*, regulate the yogin's social and personal life in an effort to reduce the production of unwholesome volition or intention, which would only add to the binding karmic residue (*karmasaya*) already stored in the mind. The yogin's goal is to cease to be under the sway of *karma* in the form of ignorance including all the impressions embedded in the depths of the psyche. For this transformation of consciousness to be successful, the yogin has to create the right environmental conditions, within and without. *Yama* and *niyama* can be seen as the first necessary steps in this direction.

In Yoga the social dimension involving our emotive and ethical natures is seen in the background and attitudes of the yogin and includes an interpersonal context. The cultivation of positive, virtuous attitudes such as friendliness, compassion, and nonviolence imply a gradual eradication of other attitudes that are the companions of a disturbed state of mind enveloped in affliction. Obviously, the point of Yoga is not for the yogin to adopt various attitudes or modes of understanding that intentionally conflict with others and society at large. The point is *not* to shun or escape from the world or neglect our personal and moral responsibilities in society. The personal soteriological resolve of the yogin incorporates an understanding

of person through which an affective, emotive, and moral core involving interaction and relationship with others is not seen as irrelevant in the pursuit of liberation. Virtues such as benevolence and compassion, for example, are essential to develop on the Yoga path (*yogadharma*) in order to eradicate any propensity to cause fear or harm in others.<sup>195</sup> Without the cultivation of higher virtues, one-pointedness or concentration of mind cannot be sustained leaving one unprepared to undergo further refining processes of purification and illumination and the arising of discriminative discernment. To strengthen the *aklista-vrttis* means to weaken the power of the *klista-vrttis*. Thus, to describe the yogin's accomplishment as being "too selfish," the yogin being one who "uses insight and discipline to remain self-enclosed,"<sup>196</sup> simply ignores or fails to consider the important fact that Patañjali lists compassion (*karuna*) and friendliness (*maitri*) as two of the virtues to be cultivated by the yogin.

Once the *yamas* and *niyamas* have been sufficiently grasped, practised and matured, the yogin can focus directly on the body (i.e., the most obvious aspect of one's immediate sense of self or identity) through the perfection of right posture (*asana*). According to *Yoga-Sutra* II.46 one's posture should be firm and comfortable<sup>197</sup> making one both relaxed and alert.<sup>198</sup> The proper execution of posture makes the yogin immune to the impact of the "pairs of opposites" (*dvandvas*)<sup>199</sup> such as heat and cold, dark and light, quiet and noise, that is, external conflict. From *asana* one develops regulation of the breath (*pranayama*).<sup>200</sup> Patañjali mentions four movements or modifications of *pranayama*.<sup>201</sup> After the successful practice of the fourth form of *pranayama* which transcends the internal and external conditions of the breath<sup>202</sup> it is said that the "covering" of the inner light (*prakasa*) ("covering" referring here to the karmic impulses that veil discriminative knowledge or *sattva*) disappears.<sup>203</sup> Furthermore, from the practice of *pranayama* the mind-organ (*manas*) is said to attain fitness for concentration.<sup>204</sup> Thus the practice progresses inwardly to deal with more subtle phenomena of the mind.

The fifth limb, *pratyahara*, is when the senses, disjoined from their respective objects, assume as it were the nature of the mind.<sup>205</sup> Withdrawn from their objects, the senses are freed of external stimuli and settle in their source, the mind. The mind is no longer distracted by external sources. Such an effort does not result in the destruction of the senses. The yogin is not in a coma or a catatonic or lifeless state. On the contrary, when the senses are inwardly settled, the mind generally becomes very active and it then becomes necessary to tackle the more subtle aspects of one's self-identity such as the impressions (*samskaras*) and *vrttis* that govern the habit-

uations of the mind. Attention can then be focused internally: on an internal object. *Pratyahara* is said to result in the supreme mastery or "obedience" of the senses,<sup>206</sup> which is the ability to "switch off" at will and allow for a state of inward-mindfulness. Vyasa gives the following simile: "As when the queen-bee flies up and the (other) bees swarm after it, and when the queen-bee settles and they also settle: similarly, the senses are mastered when the mind is mastered."<sup>207</sup> The senses, following from the mind's withdrawal from sensory activity, also withdraw.

*Dharana*, the sixth limb, is concentration in which the yogin's consciousness as a purely mental



process is focused on one place or a single locus,<sup>208</sup> which may be a particular part of the body (e.g., the tip of the tongue or nose; or a *cakra* such as the naval circle, heart lotus, or the light-center in the head), or an external object that is internalized.<sup>209</sup> The term *dharana*, which stems from the root *dhr*, "to hold, maintain," refers to the holding of one's attention, which is fixed on an internalized object. The underlying process is called *ekagrata* (composed of *eka*: "one, single," and *agrata*: "pointedness"), which stands for the singleness of mind or unwavering (purely focused) attention the very foundation of yogic concentration which deepens and matures in *dhyana* and *samadhi*.<sup>210</sup>

*Dhyana* (YS III.2) meditation follows from *dharana* as a linear continuation of one-pointedness. Patañjali understands *dhyana* as an unbroken, singular "extension" (*eka-tanata*)<sup>211</sup> of one idea (*pratyaya*), cognition, or intention with regard to the object of concentration, an uninterrupted flow of attention from the yogin to the object of concentration. All arising ideas or cognitions revolve around the object of concentration. Meditation (*dhyana*) is, however, a mental state with its own distinctive properties. T. R. Kulkarni writes:

While in *dharana* the mind remains bound up, as it were, in a restricted space, its continuation in that bound up state in such a way that the experimental state corresponding to it remains uniformly and homogeneously the same despite variations in the internal or external perceptual situation, constitutes *dhyana* . . . In the state of *dhyana*, the indeterminateness of perception disappears with the mind remaining unaffected by distracting stimuli.<sup>212</sup>

J. W. Hauer, known to have personally experimented with Yoga, describes his insights into the nature of meditation:

[*Dhyana*] is a deepened and creative *dharana*, in which the inner object is illumined mentally. The strict contemplation on one object of consciousness

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is now supplemented with a searching-pensive contemplation of its actual nature. The object is, so to speak, placed before the contemplative consciousness in all its aspects and is perceived as a whole. Its various characteristics are examined till its very essence is understood and becomes transparent . . . This is accompanied by a certain emotive disposition. Although the reasoning faculty functions acutely and clearly, it would be wrong to understand *dhyana* merely as a logical-rational process: the contemplator must penetrate his object with all his heart, since he is after all primarily interested in a spiritual experience which is to lead him to ontic participation and the emancipation from all constricting and binding hindrances. <sup>213</sup>

The British psychologist John H. Clark characterizes *dhyana* as being a paradoxical process in that meditation "both empties the mind and, at the same time, encourages alertness."<sup>214</sup> By adding a depth and lucidity of consciousness in meditation, the yogin's alertness or sense of wakefulness is enheightened even though there can be very little if any awareness of the external environment. *Dhyana* is a necessary condition for *samadhi* to ensue. The definition of *samadhi*

in *Yoga-Sutra* III.3 begins "*tad eva*"<sup>215</sup> showing clearly that *samadhi* is not separate from *dhyana* but is a continuation albeit a deepening/flowering/maturing of the meditative process.

In *dharana* and *dhyana* the mind (*citta*) is involved as a locus of empirical selfhood or self-appropriation, a cognizer or prakrtic sense of self that claims to know and see the object and intensify or make subtle one's relationship with the object; the distinction between the subject, object, and cognition persists. However, through the practice of the eighth limb *samadhi* the mind of the yogin becomes so completely absorbed in the object that it appears to become the object, reflecting the object as it truly is: "That [meditation], when it shines forth as the object only, apparently empty of its own form/nature [as knowledge], is indeed *samadhi*."<sup>216</sup> *Samadhi* refers to the "oneness" or identity we must attain in order to know the true nature of anything. *Samadhi* involves a complete transformation of the usual mode of knowing or perceiving (*pratyaksa*). It is a transformation (*parinama*) of the mind and consciousness from a state of "all objectivity" or "dispersiveness" into one-pointedness (*ekagrata*).<sup>217</sup> Prior to *samadhi* the mind received the impressions of the objects through the senses and imposed its own habit patterns and *vrttis* upon the objects. In *samadhi* the mind progressively acts as the arena or medium through which there is no subjective or egoic center of consciousness that can introduce any distortion of the object; there is only the pure grasping, knowing. No agency or organ interferes between the object and the knowing. Thus, the insight (*prajña*) obtained in cognitive *samadhi* is not a mental projection, is not a self-referenced, indulgent (i.e.,

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emotive, affective, wishful/imaginative, cognitive) projection onto the object. It is not individual (i.e., "my") knowledge, nor is it subjective. It refers wholly and exclusively to the object; it is clear insight into the object as it is without any violation or forcing from the yogin (observer), for, at the moment of the *samadhi* experience of knowing, the observer as a subject separate from the object does not come into play.<sup>218</sup>

The last three limbs of Yoga, namely: concentration, meditation, and *samadhi*, continually practiced and cultivated together, constitute what is called *samyama* ("constraint").<sup>219</sup> It is the application of *samyama* to any object that leads to the yogin's direct perception (*saksatkara*, *yogi-pratyaksa*) of it yielding suprasensuous knowledge or insight (*prajña*).<sup>220</sup> The application of *samyama* and its mastery progresses gradually<sup>221</sup> wherein the mind becomes like a precious jewel taking on the true "color" of the object that fuses with it.<sup>222</sup> It is a unitive state of awareness in which the unification (*samapatti*)<sup>223</sup> of subject, object, and means of perception is achieved. The special attention that prevails in the state of *samyama* can be brought to bear on any aspect of *prakrti* encompassing all that can be known, however subtle, and extending to unmodified or undifferentiated (*alinga*) *prakrti*.<sup>224</sup>

Each of the eight limbs, from the *yamas*, for example, the cultivation of nonviolence to proficiency in *samadhi*, serves to lessen the influence of the afflictions on the mind and body and cuts away at the root cause ignorance (*avidya*) that binds one in the condition of *samyoga* and the samsaric cycle of egoful thoughts, actions, habits, and their repetition. Of the eight limbs, the last three are said to be "inner means" (*antaranga*)<sup>225</sup> and the first five are said to be outer or external to the last three.<sup>226</sup> However, by comparison with the "seedless" (*nirbija*) *samadhi* or

enstasythe perfected state of Yogathe combined practices of the latter three limbs, though direct means (in the case of the former two limbs) to "seeded" (*sabija*) or cognitive *samadhi* and (in the case of the later means) to the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyaṭi*), are yet "outer" (*bahiranga*) means<sup>227</sup> on the journey to the realization of one's identity as *purusa*. The "seedless" *samadhi* (*nirbija*, YS I.51) represents the climax of the path of Yoga, the culmination of the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*). The stages of cognitive *samahi* are concerned, at very subtle levels of perception, with mistaken identity or selfhood still involved in the tripartite relationship of knower-knowledge-known and, as such, are experienced in the context of the mind (*citta*) and its modifications (*vṛtti*). In its supracognitive state, however, *samadhi* (*asamprajñata*) refers to the "liberated" state of consciousness (*purusa*) or inalienable identity, the intrinsically enlightened Self

left alone by itself; the yogin then has nothing further to experience (*bhoga*) or know for the sake of liberation (*apavarga*).

Throughout the above analysis it can be seen how one "limb" builds upon and complements the other, leading from the more everyday, common life of virtuous forms of self-appropriation, restraints, and observances and their social significance to the more uncommon awakening to *purusa*-realization beyond the ego-personality. In this sense the "eight-limbed" Yoga can be depicted as a ladder entailing a spiritual progression that can be looked at from different perspectives. Viewed from one angle, the progression consists of a growing unification of consciousness or increasing light of knowledge; from another angle, it discloses itself as a matter of progressive purification.<sup>228</sup> As a means to spiritual emancipation, the whole system of Yoga takes off and gains, as it were, an effective momentum as the process of the sattvification of consciousness unfolds, preparing the yogin for ultimate self-transcendence.

However, it is obvious that not all practices in Yoga fit neatly into one particular "member" or category. Some of the earlier practices result directly in the attainment of, as well as preparation for, the later ones: "Thus, for instance the practice of purification (*sauca*) [one of the *niyamas*] may comprise a physical cleaning process, a psychic process of catharsis and also a moral act of pure intention."<sup>229</sup> In Hindu tradition, purification emphasizes: natural (physical and mental), moral, and ritual purification. In Yoga the ritualistic emphasis is transcended insofar as the yogin adopts a more disinterested or detached ethic in relation to the merit gained by faithfully practicing, for example, the *yamas* and the *niyamas*; such attainments would be, from the yogin's perspective, not unlike the virtues gained through traditional, ritualistic religion. The yogin downplays the importance of outer ritual and focuses instead on physical, moral, and mental purification. As in the early Upanisadic tradition, the earlier Vedic emphasis on the importance on external ritualoften intended for material gain and for "worldly" purposesbecomes "internalized" or spiritualized and experienced as a *sacrifice* (*yajña*) of misidentified selfhood or spiritual ignorance. This internalization of attention allows the yogin to "locate" ignorance within the mind and to sattvify or purify the psychophysical being as a whole.

Vyasa distinguishes external (*bahya*) cleanliness from internal (*abhyantara*) or mental purity. The former is achieved by such means as earthy water (baths) and a pure diet, whereas the latter

is brought about by a cleaning of the impurities of the mind<sup>230</sup> involving concentration and meditation. Mental purification is essential in order to transcend any self-centered ritualistic mentality. Ultimately, the mind in its *sattva* aspect

must be so pure so as to flawlessly mirror or receive the light of *purusa* without any distortion.<sup>231</sup>

Patañjali also informs us that perfection in *samadhi* can be attained through devotion to *isvara*,<sup>232</sup> another one of the observances (*niyama*). Vyasa states that the *samadhi* of one who is fully devoted to *isvara* is perfect. Through devotion the yogin comes to know unerringly whatever he/she desires even in other places, times, and bodies, and the knowledge attained from that *samadhi* reflects the object (desired) as it actually is.<sup>233</sup> Moreover, through this devotional (*bhakti*) and meditational disposition toward *isvara*, the yogin's liberation is said to be near at hand. Vyasa observes (*YB* I.23): "On account of the special devotion which is through the love of God, the Lord inclines toward the yogin and rewards the yogin according to his/her meditative and devotional disposition. By this disposition [i.e., approach] only, the yogin draws near to the attainment of *samadhi* and to its fruit [emancipation]."<sup>234</sup> In the above, Vyasa allows for a psychic component of devotion, a meditative and devotional reorientation of the mind to the Lord (*isvara*). Later in his commentary, Vyasa supplements the meaning of devotion to *isvara* by adding: "Devotion to the Lord is the offering-up of all actions to the supreme teacher, or the renunciation of their fruits."<sup>235</sup> This is practically a restatement of (or at the least is very close to) one of the fundamental doctrines of the *Bhagavadgita*, namely, the "Yoga of action" (*karma-yoga*), where the spiritual devotee, Arjuna, sacrifices every action and thought to the Supreme Being by renouncing all selfishness or attachment to the egoic fruits of his actions. Thus *niyama* implies more than self-effort, because it entails the element of *isvara*'s grace and favor.<sup>236</sup> However, according to *Yoga-Sutra* I.23 devotion to *isvara* is a possible, not a necessary means to the enstatic consciousness.<sup>237</sup>

It is also possible that the first five limbs outlined in *Yoga-Sutra* II.29 need not be completely sufficient conditions in determining the last three. Cultivating and perfecting physical posture (*asana*) or developing moral conduct may aid meditational practice but does not guarantee it. Ideally, the external behavior will reflect the internal development, "inner" and "outer" viewed as being intertwined with each other. For example, one does not necessarily attain to a clarity of mind by breathing or thinking in a certain way; one breathes and thinks in that way because one's mind is clear/pure. Nor does it seem appropriate that the earlier methods are to be discarded when the later ones are practiced, or that the latter should not be cultivated until the earlier ones are perfected. But some steadiness of mind is presupposed in the earlier stages before initiating the later methods, and the

latter help to master the former. Meditation (*dhyana*) and *samadhi* do have clear ethical implications. By overcoming *vrtti*-patterns that arise from the *klesas* (YS II.11), meditational praxis<sup>238</sup> aids the yogin in the cultivation of virtues such as compassion, joyfulness, and so on (YS I.33). Perhaps the most fundamental of all moral injunctions nonviolence (*ahimsa*) denotes much more than a physical restraint of "nonkilling"; it can refer to nonharming in both thought and action, an attitudinal perspective and "inner" state of nonviolence where one is no longer embedded within and predisposed to the psychological matrix of inherent dissatisfaction and conflict both in oneself and in the world as was formerly the case in the condition of *samyoga*.<sup>239</sup> It can also be noted, therefore, that meditational praxis contributes to the "good life." The state of attentiveness or one-pointedness in Yoga is often overlooked as a virtue; yet it clearly plays a pivotal role in the development of other virtues. Moreover, as I later argue,<sup>240</sup> there is no sound reason why the virtues attained through Yoga discipline cannot be seen as an integral component of an embodied state of liberation in Yoga. The tendencies of the afflictions to assert themselves (YS II.10-11) are only fully recognized and overcome through meditation and *samadhi*. Similarly, the practices of posture and control of the breath<sup>241</sup> are not exclusively bodily acts but also have a psychic correlate.

Some of the apparent linear interpretation of the eight-limbed Yoga arises from the tendency to objectify, enumerate, and categorize the practices and attainments in Yoga, a tendency derived no doubt in part from the analytical and sequential nature of the eight-membered discipline. But these eight members could, from a somewhat different perspective, be seen not only as being complementary, but also as being integral, overlapping and sustaining, feeding into each other and giving rise to a transformed sense of identity, a nonfragmented (holistic) state of being. Having purified, "gathered together," and integrated one's physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual components, the yogin can live in the world not being enslaved by worldly perspectives and involvements. It is by the combined momentum and power of the methods and insight that the yogin progresses along the "path" of Yoga in the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*).<sup>242</sup> It would, however, be incorrect to interpret the "limbs" as definitive stages<sup>243</sup> to be surpassed and even discarded along the way. The plurality of practices and stages of attainment in Yoga as illustrated in the eight-limbed Yoga (there being many other methods and descriptions of Yoga given throughout the *Yoga-Sutra*) "coexist in complementarity, not competition."<sup>244</sup> Moreover, all practices and perspectives are an integral part of a continuum or continuity throughout the *Yoga-Sutra* in that they are

all supportive of and work toward a transformation of consciousness and identity as a whole that alone can bring an end to dissatisfaction, misidentification, and ignorance.

The disclosure of authentic identity (*purusa*) and the establishment of selfhood in its true form (*svarupa*) is dependent upon the insights that arise in *samadhi*. I will now turn to an analysis of the stages of cognitive *samadhi*, examining further the process and meaning of "cessation" (*nirodha*) up to the attainment of the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*) between the seer and the seeable.

## Chapter Five

### Cognitive *Samadhi*

Patañjali distinguishes between two kinds of *samadhi*: the first covering all those ecstatic states connected with objects of cognition; and the latter being devoid of objects and thus transcending all mental content. The former, which can also be designated as the "seeded" (*sabija*)<sup>1</sup> or "extrovertive" type of *samadhi*, is termed *samprajñata-samadhi*<sup>2</sup> and constitutes a range of ecstatic experiences that have an objective "prop" (*alambana*) with which the mind becomes identified and "united" and which are associated with yogic insight (*prajña*). The second kind, what can be called the "objectless" or "introvertive" type of *samadhi*, is termed *asamprajñata*,<sup>3</sup> the "acognitive"<sup>4</sup> or rather supracognitive and "seedless" (*nirbija*) *samadhi*. It is acognitive in that there is no longer any cognition of authentic identity (*purusa*) as existing in *prakṛti*, no longer *prakṛti*'s misidentification with *purusa*. As *samprajñata* explicitly denotes illuminated yogic experiences that take place "outside of" or are "external to" *purusa*-realization, I will refer to it as ecstasy.<sup>5</sup> *Asamprajñata* denotes the *purusa* being left "alone" by itself the confused identity in the condition of *samyoga* having been discarded. The yogin is left with nothing more to experience or know for the sake of "liberation." I will refer to it as enstasy. Eliade renders the term rather conveniently as enstasis "without [mental or objective] support."<sup>6</sup> The main concern in the present chapter is with *samprajñata-samadhi*:

those stages in Yoga where the yogin, as it were, comes to recognize more subtle forms of *prakṛtic* identity in a self-reflexive manner through the process of the subtilization of knowledge or *sattvification* of the mind, that is, through states of self-reflection. *Asamprajñata*, however, transcends self-reflexive knowledge, that is, it is a transmental or transconceptual state of identity.

A general definition of *samprajñata* is based on the derivations of the word from: (1) "*sam*," meaning "together," "altogether," and as a preposition or prefix to verbs and verbal derivatives it can express "conjunction," "thoroughness," "intensity," "union."<sup>7</sup> (2) "*pra*," a preposition meaning "before," "forward," "in front," "forth";<sup>8</sup> the preposition "*pra*" joins with (3) *jñata*, "known . . . perceived, understood" (from the verb root *jñā*, "to know")<sup>9</sup> to form *samprajñata*. Some of the meanings for *samprajñata* are: "distinguished, discerned, known accurately [as in the] Yoga-Sutra."<sup>10</sup> *Samprajñata* refers to the *samadhi* of cognition wherein one has the consciousness of an object or mental content.

In his *Bhasya*, Vyasa introduces the *sutra* on *samprajñata-samadhi* by asking: "How is the *samadhi* defined which is cognitive and which follows when the [misidentification with] the modifications (mental processes) of the mind has ceased by the two means [*abhyasa* and



*vairagya*]?"<sup>11</sup> Earlier (YB I.1) Vyasa stated that "Yoga is *samadhi*." Now the specifics of that definition are being described. Vijñāna Bhikṣu qualifies the above statement by Vyasa (n. 11), correctly explaining that cognitive *samadhi* refers to a stage of practice where the yogin has brought the rajasic and tamasic *vr̥ttis* under "control."<sup>12</sup> This reinforces and clarifies the traditional understanding in classical Yoga that it is only in the supracognitive *samadhi* (*asamprajñata*) that all the *vr̥ttis*, including the sattvic ones, are mastered<sup>13</sup> and that any attachment to or soteriological dependence on *vr̥tti* is finally overcome. *Purusano* longer misconceived as being attached to or dependent on knowledge and enjoyment (*mind-sattva*) as had previously been the case in the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*) is "left alone" in its self-effulgent nature as the ever-free knower.

The stages of *samprajñata-samadhi* are highlighted by Patañjali in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17. He writes: "*Samprajñata* [arises] from association with [the forms of] cogitation i.e., having verbal association (*vitarka*), reflection (*vicara*), joy (*ananda*), and I-am-ness (*asmita*)."<sup>14</sup> Vyasa's commentary runs as follows:

The mind's experience of a "gross" object of support/contemplation [in *samadhi*] is "cogitation." It is "reflection" when the object of support is subtle. "Joy" means delight. "I-am-ness" is the perception of the essential, unified nature of self. Of these [four forms of cognitive *samadhi*], the first

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*samadhi* with "cogitation" is associated with all four. The second one with "reflection" is without the verbal associations of the first. The third one with associations of "joy" is without the subtle associations of the second. The fourth, "I-am-ness" only, is without the association of joy. All these kinds of *samadhi* are with supportive objects/content. 15

Thus the *Bhasya* proposes the following schema to understand the order of the four forms of cognitive *samadhi*:

1. *Vitarka* ("cogitation") actually includes all the other subsequent forms also, namely *vicara*, *ananda*, and *asmita*.
2. *Vicara* ("reflection") is without *vitarka* but also includes *ananda* and *asmita*.
3. *Ananda* ("joy") is without *vitarka* and *vicara* but includes *asmita*.
4. *Asmita* ("I-am-ness") is without *vitarka*, *vicara*, and *ananda*.

Feuerstein rightly comments that the systematic schema of Vyasa "is a beautiful illustration of the *sat-karya* axiom according to which the effect is preexistent in its cause. In this particular case, the lowest degree of . . . realization contains *in posse* the . . . cognitive elements typical of the higher forms [of cognitive *samadhi*]."<sup>16</sup> In Yoga, contemplation on each "effect" leads to the direct perception (*saksatkara*)<sup>17</sup> of the form and nature of that "effect."

The reason for the initial position of *vitarka-samadhi* in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17 is given by Vacaspati

Misra. He writes:

Just as an archer, when a beginner, pierces first only a gross and afterwards a subtle target, so the yogin, when a beginner, has direct experience merely of some gross object of concentration made up of the five gross elements, [such as] the Four Armed [i.e., Visnu], and afterwards a subtle object. So with regard to the object of the mind the experience becomes a subtle one. Meditation has for its sphere of action the causes of the gross phenomena, the subtle elements, the five *tanmatras*, the manifested and the unmanifested essence of matter [*prakṛti*].<sup>18</sup>

The experiences to be realized in the four stages of *samprajñata* exist in everyone in potential form. The mind is not normally prepared to enter the subtler stages at once at least it is not the common experience. It is not likely that an average practitioner could suddenly leap to the highest state of *samādhi* and understand the processes of the intermediate states as part of such an instantaneous development. If a development of this nature should normally occur, there would be no need for the order as described

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by Patañjali. As a rule, and as Vacaspati implies (see n. 18 above), only by starting from the grosser objects does the mind gradually harmonize or unite with the subtlest and settle there. Vijñāna Bhikṣu affirms that this application by stages is, however, only a general rule, "since by the grace of *isvara* or by the grace of the enlightened teacher (*sad-guru*), [the yogin] finds his or her mind capable of abiding in the subtle stages at the very beginning [of practice]. Then the previous lower stages need not be practiced by the one desirous of liberation, [for this would be] a waste of time."<sup>19</sup>

### *Samādhi*: The Heart of Patañjali's Soteriological Methodology

Throughout the *Yoga-Sūtra*, Patañjali's central concern is how to attain a knowing-oneness that is not merely a mental activity or self-reflective state of mind, but rather involves a tacit recognition, an uncompromising identity as the ever-free, unmodified *purusa*. Identity as *purusa*, recognizing one's true Self as pure, nonfragmented consciousness, is the primary concern in Yoga practice, wherein the seer is established in its authentic form (YS I.3): the aloneness of "seeing" (YS II.25). Without this realization, as Patañjali says, we can never be certain we are knowing other "things" clearly and not merely seeing "things" in a distorted manner (through an impure mind) that colors our perception and experience of them. In *samādhi*, contemplation on and unification with the objects of experience is not for its own sake but provides insight (*prajñā*) that leads to liberation. The main purpose of Patañjali's detailed analysis of four stages of cognitive *samādhi* is to help the yogin or "knower" who, having become sensitive "like an eyeball"<sup>20</sup> to the presence of pain and dissatisfaction within the mind and in the world at large, desires to be liberated from such suffering and its causes *amyoga* which arises from ignorance (*avidyā*).

The intent of the *Yoga-Sūtra* is primarily soteriological: How do we "attain" identity as *purusa* and "know" that clearly? The means offered by Patañjali can be understood to proceed through

an analysis of different stages or levels of insight (*prajña*) expressing a "deeper" and "clearer" understanding of oneself and the world. Through yogic ecstasy (*samprajñata*) our attention is led to four related though distinct kinds of insight and associations with self ultimately leading, in the case of the discernment of *purusa* (*purusa-khyati*), to ecstasy or realization of *purusa*.

What then is the purpose of the various associations, identifications, and levels of self-understanding attained in *samprajñata-samadhi*? It is to

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fulfill the soteriological purpose described in *Yoga-Sutra* I.15-16: to develop a knowledge or consciousness of freedom, mastery, nonenslavement, implying detachment or dispassion (*vairagya*) toward each level of identification with the objects of experience "either seen or heard of" culminating in a superior form of dispassion (YS I.16) toward the manifest and unmanifest existence of the *gunas*. At each stage of *samadhi* one may have a "conviction" that the next subtler level of experience is purer, more permanent, more joyful, and a closer "likeness" or resemblance to the real nature of *purusa*. However, by means of direct experience (*saksatkara*) and insight (*prajña*) the yogin discovers that the purity or virtues attained are only relative, at best derived from *sattva-guna* the finest constituent of *prakṛti*. Each level of unification or identification that takes place in *samadhi* is successively found to be attended by or prone to affliction (*klesha*), that is, mistaken identity and invariable dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) rooted in spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) and generating further karmic residue (*karmasaya*). The identifications or states of unity attained in *samadhi* are expedients to the realization of authentic identity (*purusa*). Yet these high-level yogic experiences may in turn be misappropriated or self-referenced, claimed by an I-sense or egoity that is not *purusa*, and lead to further misidentification, confusion, and dissatisfaction. Dispassion toward all experiences in *samadhi* liberates the yogin from further attachment to the results or "fruit" attained through practice (*abhyasa*). Practice keeps the process of Yoga (*nirodha*) in a working condition and allows for subtler realizations and perceptions to take place.

According to *Yoga-Sutra* II.4 <sup>21</sup> the *klesas* exist in various states. They can be:

1. "Dormant" (*prasupta*), that is, exist in the form of latent impressions (*samskaras*)<sup>22</sup> in the potential condition as a seed (*bija*),<sup>23</sup> awakening when they confront their objects and generating various afflicted forms of psychomental activity;
2. "Attenuated" (*tanu*), that is temporarily prevented from taking effect by way of cultivation of their opposite (*pratipaksa-bhavana*, YS II.33) or other yogic techniques;<sup>24</sup>
3. "Interrupted" (*vicchinna*), which is the case when one kind of *klesha* (e.g., attachment or *raga*) in the form of desire temporarily blocks the operation of another (e.g., anger as associated with aversion, *dvesa*),<sup>25</sup>
4. "Aroused" (*udara*), meaning "fully active," in that "what possesses the mind in regard to an object is called aroused."<sup>26</sup>

According to Patañjali (YS II.2),<sup>27</sup> it is the purpose of *kriya-yoga* to achieve the attenuation of these afflictions and bring about the cultivation of *samadhi*.

Vyasa also declares that whatever is given form or influenced by spiritual ignorance, "that the afflictions inhere in. They are felt at the time of deluded apprehension, thought or ideas; when ignorance dwindles, they dwindle accordingly."<sup>28</sup> Through *samadhi* the mind is borne on toward the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*): the knowledge that *sattva* and *purusa* are different.<sup>29</sup> However, ego-centered apprehensions, intentions, or ideas such as self-appropriated notions of identity (e.g., "I-am-ness" or "It is mine") may continue to arise from the activation of previous *samskaras*<sup>30</sup> whose seed-power or cause in the form of the afflictions gradually fades away.<sup>31</sup> Patañjali informs us that the overcoming or abandonment of this self-centered mentality or thinking is like that of the afflictions,<sup>32</sup> a process referred to as *pratiprasava* (YS II.10 and IV.34): the "return" to the state of equilibrium or nonafflicted identity. Just as the afflictions are reduced to the condition of "scorched seed" (i.e., are made obsolete) through unfaltering discriminative discernment,<sup>33</sup> so the previous *samskaras*, having become "seeds" scorched by the fire of knowledge, can no longer generate attachment to ideas<sup>34</sup> or fixed notions of self rooted in ignorance.

Viewed from within the pedagogical context of the Yoga tradition, Patañjali emphasizes that a necessary detachment or dispassionate attitude toward each successive experience in the practice of *samadhi* must develop for the yogin. Simply perfecting a particular level of realization in *samadhi* and remaining at that level of understanding is not conducive to furthering one's spiritual growth. It is only when a complete detachment or dispassion (*vairagya*) develops toward the present experience that the next step can be taken involving a yet subtler object of contemplation and support.

Since the mind must be purified and illuminated, and therefore brought to a gradual refinement or subtilization of understanding through the sattvification of consciousness, it must "move along" the scale of the various evolutes of *prakṛti* until it reaches an identification with the subtlest, finest possible state. Liberation lies in our becoming disentangled from the misidentification with the objects of experience, a form of identification involving a misguided sense of relation with the objects of experience and the world understood in terms of "my" objects, "my" attainments or "my" world that merely perpetuates a self-serving mentality. All the objects, including mental content, are evolutes, transformations or actualizations of *prakṛti*. If bondage and suffering are due to an enslavement to the *vyutthana* mode or centrifugal tendency of consciousness of mistaken identity and

self-fragmentation, freedom can take place through a counterprocess of the *nirodha* mode or centripetalization of consciousness, an interiorization and centering of consciousness that transcends and heals the fractured consciousness of self, thereby correcting our mistaken

identity. The process of *nirodha* can be broadly conceived as a de-identification with <sup>35</sup> and final dispassion toward the "seeable" (*drsya*) starting from grosser forms of manifestation (i.e., physical objects) up to and including unmanifest *prakṛti*. Through the process of "cessation" one can realize that *purusa* is distinguishable from everything with which one had been misidentified and through which self-identity had become shaped by the seeable in one way or another. The sattvification and ultimate liberation of consciousness has to be effected voluntarily by the yogin's efforts<sup>36</sup> and, as the pedagogical context of Yoga ascertains, under the guidance of a spiritual preceptor (*guru*) or perhaps through devotional surrender or dedication to *isvara*.

The twenty-four principles (*tattvas*) with which the mind may identify and unite are divided fourfold by Patañjali. Patañjali's model<sup>37</sup> can be understood to include the following:

1. The "Particularized" composed of the sixteen *visesas* distinct, specific forms of *prakṛti* comprising : (a) the five gross elements (*bhūtas*), namely: earth, water, fire, air, space; (b) the five action organs or conative senses: hands, feet, voice, evacuation, and generation; (c) the five sense organs or cognitive senses: smell, taste, sight, touch, and sound; (d) the mind-organ (*manas*).
2. The "Unparticularized" or six *avisesas*, the general material causes of the *visesas*, namely: (a) the five subtle elements (*tanmatras*) that produce the five gross elements; and (b) *asmita-matra*, pure I-am-ness or ego (*ahamkāra*), the identifying or self-referencing principle by which the conflated self-identity of *purusa* and *prakṛti* or root composite sentience (*asmita*) begins to identify itself as such-and-such a being particularizing itself into individual selves ("I's") or persons.
3. *Linga-matra*, the "Designator" or first manifestation of the presence of *prakṛti*, referring to the subtlest evolute, *mahat* or the "great (self)" (*mahan ātma*), which is also a synonym for the *buddhi*. This principle is the receptacle for the reflected consciousness of *purusa*, the point where a material evolute first appears to "unite" with *purusa* producing *asmita*, "I-am-ness" (YS II.6), the root composite sentience not as yet self-conscious as a particular "I." It is at this junction or interface where *purusa* and the mind "meet" that our notion of person takes root and develops.

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4. *Alinga*, the "Unmanifest," "Undifferentiate," or transcendent core of *prakṛti*, not manifest (*avyakta*) as the phenomena of the universe.

In cognitive *samādhi* the above states can act as the "objects" of experience and can be utilized as supportive factors for the aspiring yogin. This type of *samādhi* is based on the constitution of the empirical personality consisting of the mind (*citta*, which includes, as we have seen, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, and *manas*), the subtle elements, the action and sense organs, and the gross elements.

In the context of Yoga praxis, the cosmogonic model of Patañjali is not meant as a purely speculative construction. Rather, it is "a mixture of a priori theorizing and a posteriori explanation of concrete yogic experiences" (see n. 38 below) and, moreover, is to be used as a heuristic device for properly orienting the yogin on "his [her] inner odyssey." <sup>38</sup> As stated

previously, this study understands Patañjali's metaphysical schematic as having been abstracted from yogic experience, whereas in classical Samkhya it appears that all experiences are fitted into a metaphysical system that at the highest level posits a radical duality or severance between *purusa* and *prakṛti*. The model in Yoga is primarily a practical map comprised of contemplative directives that engage one in the process of sattvification or meditative interiorization, and realization of intrinsic identity. Secondly, the model acts as a descriptive account of the processes of manifestation and actualization of *prakṛti*.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the yogin is progressively led toward the ultimate realization of *purusa* via a scheme not unlike that which is portrayed in the Upanisads and which denotes more and more causally subtle grades of self-understanding, identity, and being.<sup>40</sup> Eventually the yogin transcends the hierarchy of cognitive possibilities provided by *prakṛti* and becomes established in the identity of the knower, *purusa* alone.

Since the various levels of cognitive *samādhi* lead from the identification with grosser objects or content (as effects) to the identification with subtler objects or content (as causes), the lower-level *samādhis* include (in potential) the subtler levels but at each level any attachment to the former and less subtle identification and experience is transcended. When the *vṛttis* concerning any effect are mastered in the process of *nirodha*, the mind's "doors" of perception open to the material and efficient cause of that effect. The efficient cause does not actuate the objects or content of *prakṛti* but removes obstacles to their realization<sup>41</sup> as causally subtler grades of identification accompanied by progressively more subtle (sattvic) levels of self-understanding and cognitive clarity. By developing the capacity to locate, identify with, and be detached from more refined (and less afflicted)

states of the reflected consciousness of *purusa*, the yogin gradually diminishes the impurities or afflictions (*klesas*) within the mind. The result is an increasing "light" of *sattva*-knowledge or insight (*prajñā*) and refinement of experience that leads to discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyaṭi*).<sup>42</sup>

As a method, and when practiced together with concentration and meditation, *samādhi* refers to one of the disciplines used to attain the highest levels of yogic interiorization or constraint (*śamyaṃ*). In regards to content, cognitive *samādhi* refers to the ecstatic states of consciousness of the yogin who is yet dependent on objects (*prakṛti*), and to the types of knowledge and levels of self-understanding unfolded through its practice.<sup>43</sup> Like *nirodha*, the term *samādhi* alludes to both a *process* of purification and illumination and a *state* of consciousness and self-identity. In fact, the yogic insight (*prajñā*) gained from the mastery attained in the practice of *śamyaṃ*<sup>44</sup> can be none other than the full-depth of cognitive *samādhi*, that is, *nirvicāra-samādhi*.<sup>45</sup> The success of the method or practice presupposes a sattvified state of awareness and understanding. Liberating knowledge cannot be acquired, produced, or manufactured by the mind. Mechanical, repetitive approaches to practice involving the use of yogic technique cannot bring about or acquire insight or the desired goal of liberated selfhood. According to Yoga philosophy, insight already exists in the mind as a potential within nature (*prakṛti*) in the form of *sattva-intelligence*. Through the "beginningless" accumulation of the sedimentation of ignorance in the mind, liberating knowledge is covered over, concealed from consciousness. However, by means of the



attenuation of the afflicted condition of the mind, insight and "goodness" the sattvic nature of consciousness is gradually revealed as being intrinsic to the mind. To repeat from an earlier chapter (3), it is the presence of *purusa* and its reflected "light" in the mind (*citta*) that makes the functioning of consciousness in the mind, including cognition, possible.

Cognitive *samadhi* obstructs the recurring manifestation of the afflictions in the form of *rajas* and *tamas* while simultaneously aiding in the direct experience of the pure *sattva* of the mind as being distinct from the *purusa*. *Samadhi* uncovers fully the light of *sattva* through which our misconceived identity and distorted cognition or error (*viparyaya*) dissolves and clear knowledge (*jñāna*) or insight (*prajñā*) is revealed. All barriers to the realization of *purusa* are thus removed.

While through ordinary perception (*pratyakṣa*) a tangible object can be seen, experienced, thought of, contemplated, yet its material cause may not be conscious, known, or obvious. Observing a clay pot, for example, one normally may not think of what the clay pot is made of. But when

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knowledge of the underlying nature of the pot (i.e., as clay) reaches a definite clarity or "fullness," the clay substance the real "stuff" of the pot becomes, as it were, more "real" or "permanent" and the pot is perceived as a subsidiary of the clay. A clay pot breaks easily; its durability and stability is minimal compared to that of its cause, the clay. Using a clay pot and its material cause (*upadana*) as an analogy, we can say that it is for the above reason that the subtler objects in the practice of *samadhi* lead to a greater and more lasting stability and one-pointedness of mind. As the mind focuses on the normally experienced, conventional nature of an object, it slowly transcends its tangible or extrinsic nature and grasps the unobvious, the cause or intrinsic nature and value that was previously not known, seen, or experienced. In Yoga, the identification with the modification (*vṛtti*) of the effect is, through the process of *nirodha*, understood, mastered, and transcended, thereby disclosing the form (*vṛtti*) of its cause. The identification with *vṛtti* may take the form of a *pratyaya-pratyaya* referring to the significance or content of a *vṛtti* including fixed, egoic notions of self and identity that are cemented or crystallized in the mind (see discussion on YS I.41 below). Because a cause is always subtler, less tangible, and is located deeper within the mind-processes closer, as it were, to the light of *purusa* the next step in the practice of *samadhi* is invariably subtler. Thus, the process of the sattvification of the mind that leads the attention of the yogin from the grosser objects or content to the more subtle, and effects to causes, continues until the yogin reaches the most refined state of understanding and experience. This is the meaning of progress in cognitive *samadhi*. When the mind becomes as "unified" with the object as a red-hot ball of iron is with fire<sup>46</sup> (where there is no perceivable difference between the fire and the ball of iron), the former (familiar) ground is superseded and the next exercise to gain the yet subtler, finer ground begins.

The process of *samadhi* and its application in stages through *samyama* (YS III.6) leading to the progressive attainment of yogic insight does not entail an ontological negation or cessation of the "seeable," nor does it entail a denial, withdrawal, or "escape" from the phenomenal world. Rather *samadhi* suggests a fullness, completion, and transcendence of experience and its effects

in the form of misidentification and attachment at each stage of practice. In *samadhi* transcendence implies a knowledge of mastery (*vasikara*),<sup>47</sup> a dispassion toward, not a denial of or isolation from relative existence, thereby dispensing with the empirical *limitations* or *prakrtic barriers* to the realization of *purusa*. What is involved here is not only a focusing

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of attention on a subtler object or rising to a higher realm that includes universalist values such as an ethical universal of purity or insight, but a "rising above" ("transcend" is from the Latin *trans* + *scandere*: to climb over or rise above) our normal perception and relation to the "given" the "seeable" or experienced "object" that allows the possibility of leverage over it, of changing the perception and relation to that "given." Transcendence involves a gradual shedding of the layers of ignorance and misidentification, the mental conditioning of *cittavrtti*. What is transcended in Yoga is one's identity as it is given shape and functions within the framework of a bifurcation between self and world rooted within *prakrti*, a consciousness of self that ineluctably holds itself to be separate from, yet craves satisfaction through, the objects of experience. The yogin becomes detached from the world of *samyoga* and its polarization of self and world a subject-object dichotomy that governs and defines our self-identity as egoity. The failure-to-see, that is, the failure to distinguish between the true experiencer (*purusa*) and what is experienced, comes to an end and along with it the misidentification or affliction that had been responsible for generating a "mental self out of delusion" (*YB* II.6) is dispelled from consciousness.

I have noted in the last chapter that the practice of *samadhi* is not merely the concentration on an object or idea, nor is it getting lost in self-hypnotism. Nor has it to do with a relapse into unconsciousness or "drug-induced" experiences.<sup>48</sup> Having been released from its rajasic and tamasic functioning, the mind in the experience of *samadhi* is not made dull, inactive, incapacitated, thoughtless, or unconscious. *Samadhi* is accompanied by acute "wakefulness," alertness, and mental lucidity, in fact, an overcoming of the egoic limitations of consciousness. The possibility for a "trans-egoic" or an "egoless knowing" (as Yoga claims takes place in the state of *samadhi*) was rejected for instance by the twentieth-century psychologist C. G. Jung, who felt that the yogic claim to a deepening and fullness of knowledge and consciousness through ego-transcendence was a psychological impossibility. A total overcoming of ego-identity would result, Jung argued, in a state of unconsciousness, not in a perfected state of self-awareness. In fact, Jung held the opinion that Yoga technique was an exercise of the conscious ego that served to *increase* the ego's hold on consciousness.<sup>49</sup> In disagreement with Jung, our study suggests that the redirecting of attention through the yogic practices of concentration (*dharana*), meditation (*dhyana*), and "unification" (*samadhi*) serves to disengage consciousness from egoic patterns of identification, thereby opening up consciousness to subtler levels of perception, understanding, and

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identity. Through meditative discipline in Yoga the mind can be purified and liberated from all

mistaken identity of self, resulting in the illumination of consciousness for the yogin.

The essence of cognitive *samadhi* is the centering of our diversified, fractured being leading at its most profound or advanced level into an organic and spiritual reunification of our individuated sense of self with the universal matrix (*mahat*) of manifest *prakrti*. *Prakrti*, it is to be remembered, while being a multidimensional principle of existence, is yet in essence of one "piece." The main task of the yogin lies in the gradual overcoming of the power of the emerging (*vyutthana*) ego-consciousness or extrinsic identity of selfhood and the simultaneous cultivation of the sattvification process in *nirodha* that counteracts the powerful tendency of human consciousness to become attached to and utterly shaped by the objects of experience. *Yoga-Sutra* III.11 explains that the mind has two basic characteristics to which it conforms: (1) dispersiveness or the tendency of attention to be drawn into all-objectivity, and (2) one-pointedness.<sup>50</sup> The mind can become concentrated through the dwindling of its dispersive predispositions generated by the forces of attachment (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesa*) and the subsequent cultivation of one-pointedness wherein the transformation (*parinama*) termed "ecstasy" (or "unification" in cognitive *samadhi*) takes place. At this concentrated stage the mind is favorably disposed toward illuminating insight and dispassionqualities of its inherent sattvic natureas the distractions (*viksepa*) or obstacles (*antaraya*, *YS* I.30) to such illumination are rendered inoperative. In *Yoga-Sutra* III.12 Patañjali tells us, "Hence again, when there is similarity between the arising and the quieted (subsided) ideas, there is the transformation (*parinama*) of one-pointedness (*ekagrata*) of the mind."<sup>51</sup> In *samadhi* the mind "like a precious jewel" (*YS* I.41: see discussion in next section) equally assumes the form of both the subsiding and then the arising idea during the period in which *samadhi* takes place. The transformation (*parinama*) that has taken place in the mind possessing this particular quality is referred to as "one-pointedness" (*ekagrata*).<sup>52</sup> During this period of *samadhi* the mind retains its state of one-pointedness whether an idea has subsided or another idea arises. This state of one-pointedness is the basis for yogic perception (*yogi-pratyaksa*). Both of the above transformations can be seen as a change in form (*dharma*, see discussion on page 61) or quality of the mind implying an increasing steadiness and sattvification of consciousness.

It could be argued that the levels of *samadhi* are more or less common to other schools of Yoga or Hindu thought. Yet the analysis of *samadhi*

given by Patañjali, from the point of view of the depths of human existence, is centrally important and more illuminating than many of the others. In order to know the true nature of things, Patañjali tells us in no uncertain terms that it is necessary to experience states of *samadhi* and attain greater epistemic "oneness" with our objects of experience. Why, might we ask, is this "oneness" necessary in order to know the true nature of things? The answer Patañjali gives is that, otherwise, hindrances in the form of impurities (i.e., the afflictions) are bound to get in our way, to come between us, as knowers, and what we are trying to know. These hindrances, impediments to "oneness," can be seen to come from three places (*YS* I.41): (i) the nature of the knower or grasper (*grahitr*); (ii) the nature of what is being known or grasped (*grahya*); and (iii) the nature of the medium between these two, the act of knowing or grasping (*grahana*).<sup>53</sup> Ian

Kesarcodi-Watson aptly observes:

If I perceive things through inner or outer veils mental ones like biases, preconceptions, categories, memories; or physical ones like defective sense-organs I will not perceive things properly. Or if these things do not present themselves properly to me, or are not allowed to present their proper selves by something intervening, like smog or a hessian screen, again, it will not be their true nature that I will perceive.<sup>54</sup>

How do we purge ourselves and situations of the preceding kinds of unclearness? Numerous questions may arise which can lead one to doubt the possibility for the kind of epistemic clarity Yoga is talking about. For example, one could ask: Is the world as object(s) in some essential sense only a construct? Is all knowledge radically interpretive? Is every act of perception and cognition contingent, mediated, situated, contextual, theory-bound? Is what one knows and experiences to an indeterminate extent a projection? To these questions and others like it Patañjali would reply with a final, emphatic "No." Human cognition is not so limited although, as we have seen, Patañjali admits that there are obstructions to clear "seeing," obstructions that, however, *can be removed, discarded or overcome* through yogic discipline. Kesarcodi-Watson makes the following incisive comment:

In the end Patañjali declares, and I think rightly, that we escape these problems by being at-one-with the things we seek to know. Without this oneness we never can be quite sure that it is the *svarupa* [true form/nature] of the thing we are acquainted with, and not some mere surrogate. This is, indeed, the central problem of perception. Many, especially in Western thought, have counselled despair; or fled to one or another of several forms

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of Idealism. Very few have had the courage to claim that we really can contact *svarupas*. Yet this is what Patañjali does in his doctrine, or doctrines of *samadhi*.<sup>55</sup>

Even though the mind has the capacity for direct knowledge of things, or to register clear insight into the nature of our objects or conditions of experience, it fails to do so because of the afflictions (*klesas*) and their intervening processes which generate misidentification with mental content or the objects of perception (i.e., through the *vrtti*-generating complex). Only when their (i.e., the afflictions) interruption is finally prevented through the clarity attained in *samadhi* does the full realization (*saksatkara*) of the objects of perception or contemplation occur. In Yoga, unmediated perception is possible and such clarity allows for insight into the true nature of any object. This is the direct perception of the yogin (*yogi-pratyaksa*). In Yoga philosophy these finer states of perception arise in *samprajñata* and not in the "lower" concentrations (the *cittaparikarmas*, YS I.33-39), where the totality of the object of concentration cannot be fully grasped. Through the concept of *samadhi* Yoga has worked out the epistemological presuppositions necessary in order to connect the interiority of the inner viewer (observer) with the interiority of the objects viewed (observed).

In spite of the central role given it in the process of liberation in Yoga, one must guard against mistaking higher perception as an end in itself. It is not that the yogin's direct perception of a

grosser object in *samadhi* automatically leads to the finer ground of a subtler object. A material object or mental content cannot in itself bring about spiritual realization or ego-transcendence. In perception only a *vr̥tti* is generated. One must also develop a detachment or dispassion toward that *vr̥tti* of perception. Insight into the true nature and form (*svarupa*) of an object in *samadhi* only leads to the powers (*siddhis*) that are described in the third chapter (entitled the *Vibhuti-Pada*) of the *Yoga-Sutra*. The *Yoga-Sutra* posits an ultimate goal (*kaivalya*) of Yoga that is decidedly not personal knowledge or power. The practice of *samyama* has also a soteriological purpose. Patañjali and Vyasa view yogic power as instrumental to the attainment of *kaivalya*, but also as being without intrinsic value. Citing Adolf Janáček, C. Pensa points out that the powers in Yoga are presumed to be "a sign of correct Yoga procedure"<sup>56</sup> but are not the true aim of Yoga. G. Feuerstein correctly avers:

the special gifts acquired through the practice of constraint [*samyama*] cannot possibly be stamped as unwanted side-effects which inevitably block the yogin's path to Self-realization . . . The danger lies not in the extraordinary insight or powers which the practice of constraint is said to yield,

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but in the yogin's attitude towards them. For, like any form of knowledge or power, these super-normal results can be misused or become ends in themselves. The popular opinion that these yogic abilities are not part of the path to Self-realization is demonstrably wrong. 57

According to *Yoga-Sutra* III.37 certain supernormal powers called *pratibha* (understood in *Yoga-Sutra* III.36 as "vividness" or "intuitive illumination" in regard to hearing, touching or sensing, sight, taste, and smell)<sup>58</sup> are to be looked upon as "impediments to *samadhi* but perfections in the state of extroversion or emergence (*vyutthana*)."<sup>59</sup> These powers, which can be understood as a natural byproduct of the yogin's meditative practice, are accomplishments only from the point of view of the egoic consciousness. Indulging in them only serves to inflate the ego and prevents spiritual growth precisely because the deployment of them presupposes that we invest our attention in the sensorial world and the desire for power or control over it (reinforcing the subject-object duality within *prakṛti* that Yoga seeks to overcome). The powers are made available or accessed by means of an ascension through the *tattvas* (principles of existence) as enumerated in Samkhya. The enhanced abilities, for example, to observe the subtle elements (*tanmatras*) giving rise to the gross elements (*bhutas*) which is the import of *Yoga-Sutra* III.36 and clearly follows the Samkhyan scheme<sup>60</sup> need not be a problem in Yoga. It is rather one's attachment to these powers or selfish manipulation of them that inevitably creates difficulties and confusion for oneself and others. Any clinging to or misappropriation of power means that we reinforce the habit of assuming we are ego-personalities rather than *purusa*. Clearly then the powers are detrimental if one had no higher goal or aspiration. On the other hand they can be supportive of the true "goal" of Yoga: "aloneness" (*kaivalya*). *Siddhis* can be understood as natural by-products or "fruits" of a disciplined mind properly cultivated in concentration, meditation, and *samadhi* and not utilized for selfish gain or control. The yogin is capable, through *samyama*, to attain a mastery over the elements (*bhutas*, *YS* III.44) and develop the set



of eight powers: of becoming minute, perfection of the body, and so on, (as mentioned in YS III.45 and YB III.45). It is noteworthy that the powers can be read as a progression from mastery of the elements, to mastery of the sense organs (YS III.47), mastery of the source of the manifest (*pradhana*, YS III.48), and sovereignty over (i.e., nonenslavement to) all states of existence, as well as knowledge of all (YS III.49). Yet, in the final analysis, there is the need for a detachment or dispassion toward all power and knowledge (as YS III.50 clearly indicates, see n. 122 in chapter 4) in order for the liberated state of "aloneness" to

arise. Even the "supreme" knowledge and power arising from the purified realm of the *gunas* can be no substitute for the immortal knower, *purusa*.<sup>61</sup> Vyasa boldly advocates that although great powers can be accessed through Yoga, the true yogin does not venture to transgress the natural laws of *prakṛti*.<sup>62</sup> Patañjali was not opposed to the right use of *siddhis* which could serve to bring about a more insightful understanding of oneself and the cosmos or else he would not have dedicated the entire third chapter of his work to these manifestations of power (*vibhūti*s). Vyasa maintains that the realization of the purity of *purusa* and the culminating stage of liberated "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) can take place whether the yogin has acquired power (that is, the powers or *siddhis*) or not; for when the seed of all affliction has been "burned up" or purified out of the mind, the yogin has no further dependence on knowledge.<sup>63</sup>

#### An Analysis of *Yoga-Sutra* I.41

When the modifications (*vṛttis*) of the mind have diminished or subsided through practice (*abhyasa*) and dispassion (*vairagya*),<sup>64</sup> the "barriers" between the mind and the object dissolve and both "coincide." This process is elucidated by Patañjali in *Yoga-Sutra* I.41 as follows: "[The steadied mind] of diminished modifications, like a precious (flawless) jewel assuming the color (i.e., respective qualities) of the grasper, grasping, or grasped, has unification."<sup>65</sup> This *sutra* describes the basic processes and mechanism of any form of cognitive *samādhi*. The term *samapatti* has been translated as: "balanced-state,"<sup>66</sup> "engrossment,"<sup>67</sup> "transformation,"<sup>68</sup> "thought transformation,"<sup>69</sup> "illumination,"<sup>70</sup> "complete identity,"<sup>71</sup> "consummation,"<sup>72</sup> "Zusammenfallen,"<sup>73</sup> "coincidence,"<sup>74</sup> "intentional identity,"<sup>75</sup> "identification-in-samādhi,"<sup>76</sup> "unity."<sup>77</sup> According to Monier-Williams, *samapatti* means "coming together, meeting, encountering."<sup>78</sup> In the context of the *Yoga-Sutra*, *samapatti* (herein translated as "unification") denotes the proficiency, accomplishment, and transmutation of the mind (*citta*) that takes place in *samādhi*. More specifically, *samapatti* is the insight (*prajñā*) thus gained as derived from *samprajñāta* (YS I.17) signifying that the mind "breaks into" and coincides with the sphere of the "object" grasped, unifies or fuses with it, and reveals its innermost nature or "essence." This process of "unification" is elaborated upon by way of an example. Vyasa writes:

The analogy is given of a precious jewel. As a crystal, according to the things set near it, becomes tinged with their colors and appears to take on



their respective forms, so the mind is colored by the object of contemplation, and through uniting with the object appears in the form of the object. 79

Having extinguished, through practice and dispassion, the external impurities of the mind, the objects or supportive factors (*alambana*) can more clearly and fully reflect in the mind and an identification or unification occurs. In the above analogy, both the crystal and the colored object although they persist in actually remaining two separate, distinct "entities" appear, from the moment in which the crystal is placed near the object, as a single thing: a colored crystal. Similarly, the mind and the object in *samadhi* are two different prakrtic states that at the moment of the identification appear in the experience of the yogin *as if* they are the same "thing" (ontologically) due to the total absorption of the mind in the object. As the crystal does not undergo any permanent modification by having been colored by the object, likewise the mind, as the underlying "dharma-holder" (*dharmin*) of consciousness, is not intrinsically altered by being absorbed in, that is, assuming the form or characteristic (*dharma*) of, the object.

Patañjali and the Yoga school look upon the "one mind" (*cittam-ekam*, YS IV.5) as the primary "state" or "dharma-holder" (*dharmin*) that remains constant (as pure unblemished *sattva*) throughout the transformations (*parinama*) that occur in ordinary life. All impressions (*samskaras*, whether of a *vyutthana* or a *nirodha* nature YS III.9) and thought constructs/ideas/intentions (*pratyaya* YS III.12) are considered as forms or characteristics (*dharma*) of the mind. Applying the *satkaryavada* doctrine that change affects only the form of a thing, not its underlying "substance" we have seen how the three basic forms or states of an object, namely: its "subsided" (*santa*) or past aspect, its "arisen" (*udita*) or present aspect, and its "undetermined" (*avyapadesya*) or future aspect are related to the same *dharmin* that is constantly present, yet different from (i.e., is not to be reduced to), its forms or modifications.<sup>80</sup> For example, the mind is not annihilated or negated when the mental processes diminish or subside. Hence, throughout the changing modes of identity brought about by the impressions and mental processes, the mind does not intrinsically lose its finest, essential nature as pure *sattva* (i.e., clarity, knowledge) that reflects the pure light of *purusa*. Without the presence of this reflected illumination of *purusa* in the mind, the human personality in whatever mode could not function. The mind, however, extrinsically conforms or corresponds to its characteristics (*dharma*s) as in the case of, for example, its tendency toward either

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dispersiveness/objectivity or one-pointedness (YS III.11), extroversion or interiorization (YS III.9), these being transformations of the forms (*dharma-parinama*) in which consciousness and cognition function. Each characteristic (*dharma*) is connected with the three aspects of time/designation (*lakṣaṇa-parinama*) and has its own states or stages of development (*avastha-parinama*).<sup>81</sup>

In his exposition of *Yoga-Sutra* I.41 Vyasa states: "When the modifications/mental processes have subsided means: when the ideas/intentions have diminished."<sup>82</sup> Based on Vyasa's commentary (YB I.1), we have previously explained that the definition of Yoga given in *Yoga-*

*Sutra* I.2 does not only mean that Yoga is the cessation of the misidentification with *all vrttis* because the cessation with the misidentification with *all vrttis* takes place only in enstasy (*asamprajñata*), whereas cognitive *samadhi* or ecstasy (*samprajñata*) is also meant to be included in Yoga. Since *Yoga-Sutra* I.41 deals (at least provisionally) with *samprajñata* or *sabija-samadhi*, as *Yoga-Sutra* I.46 suggests, Vyasa (*YB* I.41) omits the word "all." In other words, Vyasa's clause, "the modifications/mental processes have subsided" indicates that *vrttis* other than those<sup>83</sup> of the one-pointedness (*ekagrata*, *YS* III.11-12) with the object in *samadhi* have been mastered and have therefore subsided because the identification/unification (*samapatti*) defined in this *sutra* is also a form of *vrtti*, albeit one of knowledge, insight, or yogic perception (*prajña*, *yogi-pratyaksa*). The subsiding of the *vrttis* in this context is limited to the rajasic and tamasic mental processes. Vacaspati Misra therefore explains that the ability of the mind to function in a crystal-like fashion requires a *sattva* dominance within consciousness.<sup>84</sup>

Both Vyasa and Vijñana Bhikṣu explain *vrtti* (as used in *YS* I.41) in the context of *pratyaya*. *Vrtti* and *pratyaya* do not strictly refer to the same thing, *vrtti* indicating an underlying mental process and *pratyaya* meaning the product/content (i.e., cognition, idea, intention) or significance of a *vrtti* that, by means of this mental process, arrives at consciousness. However, for the purpose of the explanation that follows, the apparent identification of both terms seems acceptable.<sup>85</sup> Vyasa and Vijñana Bhikṣu acutely observe that when the *samapatti* takes place the *pratyayas* have not all been eliminated since there subsists one *pratyaya* the *samapatti* itself, which constitutes in itself a *pratyaya*.<sup>86</sup> It is evident that in the experience of *samapatti* there occurs an act of perception/cognition in which something becomes present or is revealed to consciousness.

*Yoga-Sutra* I.41 constitutes a phenomenological analysis of experiences in cognitive *samadhi* wherein the "seeable" (*drśya*, *prakṛti*) is described experientially. Concerning the objects, the "grasped" (*grāhyas*), Vyasa states:

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Colored by a gross object which is its supportive factor, the mind appears to take on the nature of that object. Similarly, when colored by contemplation on a subtle object, unified with a subtle object, it appears to have the nature of that subtle object. Colored by any particular thing (material object) and identified with that thing in *samadhi*, it appears as that particular form. 87

The realm of the "grasped" in Yoga can be divided into three categories:

1. The gross objects of support and identification (*sthūla-alambana*), comprising the five gross elements and involving the physical senses.
2. The subtle objects of support and identification (*bhūta-sūkṣma*): theoretically including all subtle principles from the subtle elements (*tanmatras*) up to and including unmanifest *prakṛti*.<sup>88</sup>
3. The various material objects or particular "things" of the universe (*visva-bheda*s), comprising the "sentient" and "insentient" entities and objects (such as cows and jars respectively).

It appears to be the case that the category of the "grasped" (*grahyas*) in Yoga is structured to include the objects of *samapatti* only in the *vitarka*-and *vicara-samadhis*: the lower forms of cognitive *samadhi*. This seems to be consistent with the approach adopted in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17 and I.42-44. The gross and subtle objects of the category of the "grasped" refer technically to the external or "objective" world only and therefore could not be inclusive of the "subjective" or "interior" categories of ego (*ahamkara*) and intellect (*buddhi*), and then on to the unmanifest *prakrti* (*alinga*).<sup>89</sup>

Concerning the instruments of knowledge or "grasping" (*grahanas*), Vyasa says: "So also with the senses, which are the instruments of grasping. The mind, colored by the instruments of grasping, identified (unified) with them, appears to have the nature of the instruments of grasping."<sup>90</sup> "Grasping" refers to the perceiver's own senses and this may include the innermost senses, namely, *ahamkara* and *buddhi*.<sup>91</sup> At this stage of our analysis it seems reasonable to suggest that because the physical senses have already been included in the gross elements (as *grahyas*), only the "inner" senses need to be understood as *grahanas*.

On the term *grahitr* ("grasper," "knower"), Vyasa writes:

Similarly, when the mind is colored by the self who is the prakrtic agent of grasping (i.e., the empirical grasper) as its supportive factor, united with *purusa* as that grasper, it appears to have the nature of *purusa* as that grasper. Again, when the mind is colored by the liberated *purusa* as its

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supportive factor, unified with that liberated *purusa*, it appears to have the nature of that liberated *purusa*.<sup>92</sup>

*Grahitr*, explained by Vyasa as the prakrtic agent of experience, cannot be subdivided between gross and subtle and no such attempt, to our knowledge, has been made by the commentators. Vyasa, however, differentiates between (a) *grahitr purusapurusa* appearing as an empirical or prakrtic agent, and (b) *mukta purusa* the liberated Self. Vyasa not only says "*grahitr*" the prakrtic, empirical, or knowing agent but adds "*purusa*" so as to preclude *buddhi* alone<sup>93</sup> but to include *purusa* reflected in the mind as *asmita*, totally "identified" with it, as *mahan atma* (the "great self") or *mahat*.<sup>94</sup> Vyasa consistently describes the locus of knowledge with reference to *purusa* regardless of how *purusa*'s identity (or misidentity) is being conceived (e.g., as an analogical understanding of consciousness as in *cittavrtti*, *asmita*).<sup>95</sup>

The question arises: Are there indeed two kinds of *purusas*? In Yoga, certainly not. There is no intrinsic difference between the *purusa* that appears to dwell in a bound personality and the *purusa* that appears to be liberated. *Purusa* is ever-free by nature (*nitya-mukta-svabhava*). The subject of *Yoga-Sutra* I.41 (at least provisionally) is not the intrinsic nature of *purusa* but the stages of cognitive *samadhi*. The final stages of cognitive *samadhi* may be divided into three levels: (1) the realization, mastery of, and unification with *buddhi* the principle of intelligence also referred to as *mahat*, where there is not yet the realization of *purusa*; (2) the realization of the reflection of *purusa* in the *buddhi* in *asmita* the principal constituent, the agent

or "grasper" (*grahitr*); (3) the realization that the reflection is not itself *purusa*. *Purusa* is the ever-free principle of pure consciousness, the reflection of which is seen in *asmita-samadhi* (YS I.17). Vyasa therefore differentiates between the reflection of *purusa* (in *asmita*) and the changeless *purusa* whose existence transcends the realm of the *gunas*.

As the constituents of an empirical personality the principles of *prakrti* can be divided into a scheme of apprehension that can be formulated as follows:<sup>96</sup>

1. *Visesas*, the sixteen manifestations of the "Particularized," the objects (*grahyas*) "grasped" by the "grasper" or knower-agent. Egothe sense of self (*ahamkara*, *asmita-matra*) or sixth *avisesais* the instrument through which *asmita* appropriates or claims the knowledge of the objects. *Ahamrkara* is *grahana*, the instrument of grasping or cognizing.

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2. *Avisesas*, in the form of the five subtle elements (*tanmatras*), are also objects "grasped" (*grahyas*).

3. *Linga-matra* (*buddhi* or *mahat*) receives and reflects consciousness from *purusa*, thus creating *asmitegoity* or I-am-ness the composite sentence, as if the seer and the seeable are a single self (YS II.6). This is where the potential for dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) actually takes root. The division or polarization of "seeing" into "seer and seeing" and the subsequent conjunction (*samyoga*) based on the epistemological distortion enveloping the subject (subjectified self) and the objectified world can be dismantled and discarded. When the mind, fragmented by the power of ignorance, is assumed to be the locus of the seer, there results the afflicted I-sense (*asmita*), a mere reflection of *purusa*. The reflected sense of I-am-ness, and not *purusa*, is the agent (*grahitr*), the one who attempts to grasp or apprehend.

The above scheme is important in the classification of *samadhi* in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17: (1) *Grahyas* are the supportive factors (*alambana*) in the *vitarka*- and *vicara*-accompanied ecstasies. (2) *Grahana* is the supportive factor in the *ananda*-accompanied ecstasy. (3) *Grahitr* is the supportive factor in the *asmita*-accompanied ecstasy. How these states interconnect and are related will be dealt with later. The Yoga tradition states the above to be the purposeful factors of cognitive *samadhi*.<sup>97</sup> Any other objects are only parts or composites of these.

A note of caution should be given here regarding *samprajñata*, especially those *samadhi*-experiences that focus on the sixteen *visesas*, and particularly the five gross elements. One may mistake these to be *samadhis* on the external world, that is, the earth, physical forms, and so on, with all the gross elements. It should be remembered that: (a) a perception of gross elements in the ordinary world falls within the normal category of *pratyaksa* (YS I.7), a *vr̥tti* that has subsided, and (b) holding the perception in the mind is memory (*smṛti*), another *vr̥tti* that has subsided. In *samadhi* the focus on supportive factors is internal, as they exist, operate and are cognized within the mind (*citta*): The locus for identification with the "grasped" (*grahya*) is the *manas*, the locus for identification with "grasping" (*grahana*) is *ahamkara*, and the locus for identification with the "grasper" (*grahitr*) is the *buddhi*. It is within the mind (*citta*) that their nature is observed and mastered through a more refined process of perception (*yogi-pratyaksa*).

*Samadhi* consists of the convergence of the particular evolute as one of the subjectively inherent components of the mind with its correlate or counterpart in the objective world. For example, since mind (*citta*) is the "controller" of the senses (YS II.54-55

and YB II.54-55), the various powers of the senses are all included in the mind. The mind focuses on the objects and assimilates the *vrttis* arising through the experience of those objects. Thus, the lower-level agent of *samadhi*, the mind-organ (*manas*) and the object converge and merge establishing a "unification," fullness and perfection of the insight (*prajña*) at that level. This applies not only to *vitarka* but to all the levels of cognitive *samadhi*.

In the process of *nirodha* there takes place an interiorization of attention, a necessary, inward movement or "flow" of consciousness in the mind, allowing for a retracing of consciousness and identity from a distorted, unsteady state of dispersion and emergence (*vyutthana*) to a finer, concentrated state whereby experience, no longer frustrated due to epistemic distortion, is allowed to complete itself through a full merging or unification with the object of experience. This process involves as well a retrieval in consciousness of the formerly obscured and misappropriated source principles or subjective evolutes (e.g., *manas*, *ahamkara*, *buddhi*) through which experience takes place. Only such a merging or "oneness" with the object will enable the yogin to transcend the mechanism of ignorance through which misidentification and dissatisfaction are perpetuated. At each stage in *samadhi* consciousness is focused so as to dispel the ignorance coloring the mind's perception. The yogin can then "see" and "know" the object as it actually is, in itself.

### *Vitarka-Samadhi*

Of the four states of cognitive *samadhi* (*samprajñata*) outlined in YS I.17 the less refined or most impure state is called *vitarka*. We have seen that the stages of *samadhi* are graded according to the grossness or subtlety, tangibility/concreteness or intangibility/abstractness of the evolutes of *prakṛti*. It is more difficult to concentrate on the subtler "inner" principles within the mind (*citta*) than on grosser, "outer" objects. It is recommended, therefore, that one should start with gross forms and, as Vacaspati Misra acknowledges,<sup>98</sup> then reach more subtle stages.<sup>99</sup>

*Vitarka* has been translated as: "deliberation,"<sup>100</sup> "reasoning,"<sup>101</sup> "supposition,"<sup>102</sup> "rationale überlegung,"<sup>103</sup> "philosophical curiosity,"<sup>104</sup> "consciousness of sentient,"<sup>105</sup> "cogitation,"<sup>106</sup> "analysis of gross object,"<sup>107</sup> "discursive thought."<sup>108</sup> I shall in the above context adopt the term "cogitation." *Vitarka*, in normal language, refers to a mental activity, a process of thought in which the various details of an object are examined. In Patañjali's Yoga

*vitarka* has the technical sense of contemplation on the sixteen *visesas* including *virat* (or cosmic form of the "godhead" as in BG IX. 10-11) as well as the manifest or incarnate forms of a



deity with the goal of finally realizing the whole nature of the object. H. Aranya gives the following examples as objects of cogitation: cow, jar, yellow, blue.<sup>109</sup> R. Sarma lists other objects under this category, which include the sun, moon, and stars, as well as Rama, Krsna, Siva, Durga, and other deities."<sup>110</sup> It is to be understood that the deities as objects of cogitation are the images of the deities or the same deities manifest or appearing in some form.

"Cogitation" refers to the spontaneous thought processes that occur in relation to a "gross" (*sthula*) object/form or content for contemplation. There is no doubt that *vitarka* is a special form of mental activity. That is how it is interpreted by Vyasa, Vacaspati Misra<sup>111</sup> and Vijñāna Bhikṣu.<sup>112</sup> Vyasa states: "The mind's experience (*abhoga*) of a 'gross' object of support/contemplation is 'cogitation'."<sup>113</sup> The word *abhoga* ("expansion," "fullness")<sup>114</sup> means the experience of insight (*prajñā*) in which the realization of "making evident"/"effecting with one's own eyes" (*sakṣatkara*) the true form and nature of an object of support/contemplation has occurred. At the first level it is considered gross because the object is in its gross form, thereby giving to the mind the like *vṛtti*, the mind identifying and uniting with that modification of knowledge. Vijñāna Bhikṣu explains that all the details of the grosser form of an object including the past, present, and future manifestations, its near and remote (distant) features, and so on, are attended to with the goal of finally realizing the whole nature of that object"<sup>115</sup> in an ensemble-type knowing outside the time-space dimension. As cogitation (*vitarka*) is refined, the next step comes into view and the formerly concealed nature of the object of support is gradually revealed. The cogitation should remain constant, continuously maintained, ascertained (*avadharana*).<sup>116</sup> Thus, the cultivation (*bhavana*) then causes the perceived or object, the faculty of perception, and the perceiver or agent, to unify, become "one" epistemologically. In the final realization of the nature of the object, the knowledge of all its aspects occurs at once, not in sequence, or in parts, or apart from the perceiving mind. Such a total, whole realization maintained without interruption is termed "the *samādhi* associated with *vitarka*." It is *grahya-samāpatti* (YS I.41); its area of mastery is *grahya*, the objects grasped within the gross body. *Vitarka* is further divided into *sa-vitarka* and *nirvitarka*.

The first division of *vitarka* is outlined by Patañjali as follows: "Unification is with cogitation (*sa-vitarka*) when it is commingled with conceptualization of word, object (signified), and knowledge."<sup>117</sup> *Savitarka*-

*samāpatti* is invariably accompanied by the names of the objects of contemplation. Hence, this *sūtra* centers upon the words, the objects denoted thereby, and the ideational knowledge that is the relationship between the words and the objects grasped. Vyasa says:

For instance, we can see that the process of knowing takes place without distinguishing between the word "cow," the object "cow," and the idea (knowledge) "cow," though they are all on different levels; for there are some characteristics distinguished as belonging to words and others to objects signified, and still others to ideas (knowledge).<sup>118</sup>

Vacaspati Misra explains: "In ordinary life, although word, object, and idea are distinct, in the process of knowing they are not distinguished."<sup>119</sup> When there is the holding of a word in



consciousness (in this instance "cow"), there arises the conceptual or imaginative cognition (*vikalpa*) that the object denoted (the cow itself) and the mental ideation (of the cow) are not distinct from the word. In other words, when a cow is held as an object, there arises the conception that the word and the ideation are not apart from the object. Similarly, when the mental content or idea of the cow appears, the conceptualization or *vikalpa* registers that the word "cow" and the external object perceived as cow (which was denoted by the word) are both indistinct or inseparable from the idea. On closer examination, however, it can be found that these components of the word-object-ideation complex named "cow" are all distinct, each with their own characteristics. For example, the word is formed of syllables or letters of the alphabet; the object "cow" has hardness, legs, a tail, and so on; the idea is more abstract and is devoid of apparent dimension and parts. In conceptualization (*vikalpa*) the error of nondistinction among these components appears, causing them to be identified or commingled with each other. Vyasa continues:

When, during insight attained in *samadhi*, the yogin achieves unification with an intended object such as a cow and this unification appears intertwined with the mental constructs of the word, object signified, and the knowledge derived, [then] that interspersed identification is called "the one associated with cogitation."<sup>120</sup>

In *savitarka* unification, the word, object, and the idea are commingled and confused, causing the *samadhi* to be mixed with the notions and ideations, the constituents of which are analyzed and consequently are several. Having many constituents as supportive factors superimposed (*adhyasa*)<sup>121</sup> on

each other as though they were the same thus prevents the true one-pointedness (*ekagrata*) and unification from developing in its fullness.

The mental processes embedded in the confusion outlined above occur in patterns such as the following: In the process of experiencing the presence of a single word-object-idea such as "cow," the yogin does not at this stage distinguish among these three constituents. Therefore it is uncertain which one of these three constituents is being attended to, realized, or mastered. The understanding and mastery is thus incomplete. There remains a separation between the observing mind and the object (cow) so that there may appear the observation: "This is a cow I am viewing." Vijñāna Bhikṣu has adopted the expression *gaur-ayam bhasate*,<sup>122</sup> which means literally, "here this cow shines forth, appears, is being experienced." In this experience the occurrence of the thought "cow" comprises the superimposition of the word and the object. In the series of thoughts: "appears, is being experienced," it is the object and the idea that are confused. Since these superimpositions of word, object, and idea on one another causing the appearance of a conceptual or imagined unity in a manifold reality only present what, in effect, is unreal, all such superimpositions come under the category of *vikalpa*. Any superimposition as such does not aid the yogin to realize or fully master the reality of any of its constituents, just as water and milk mixed together cannot be classified separately either as one or the other.

The ideas that arise are called "cogitations" only as an analogy to the ordinary thought processes

where thoughts come and go one after the other. One should not think that the experiences in *savitarka-samadhi* are merely a product of the ordinary perceptual processes, and therefore that they can be reduced to the category of discursive thought or reasoning. If this were the case, there would be no state of the absorption of mental activity. The ordinary mental process or *vr̥tti* of perception (*pratyakṣa*) is, temporarily at least, suspended, but the identification/unification (*samapatti*) "is in terms of and expressed in rationalizing and conceptualizing signs."<sup>123</sup> Ordinary thought processes lack the immediacy and lucidity of *savitarka*, of the spontaneous thought processes that occur in cognitive *samadhi*. Feuerstein writes: "There is no rambling of thoughts in *samadhi*, no vague conceptualization, but these . . . ideas constitute spontaneous acts of insight or knowledge, which although grounded in the concepts derived from ordinary experiencing, have a different quality or feel to them."<sup>124</sup>

Because of the presence of the analyzing and particularizing activity or cogitation (*vitarka*) of the mind, of the words (*śabda*), of the cognitive process, and of the conceptualizing activity (*vikalpa*), it can be said that

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in the yogin's mind is still taking place a perceptive process that has to do with what, in general, Indic epistemological theories call a "*śavikalpa* perception."<sup>125</sup> As it is yet touched by epistemological distortion due to ignorance (*avidyā*), this stage of *samadhi* constitutes a lower category of perception (*apara-pratyakṣa*) in contrast with the higher perception (*para-pratyakṣa*)<sup>126</sup> of *nirvitarka* to be explained next.

In YS I.43 Patañjali informs us that: "Supra-cogitative unification is when memory is completely purified, as if emptied of its own form, and with the object alone shining forth."<sup>127</sup> In *nirvitarka*, all cogitation or association with "gross" thought has ceased. Vyasa's commentary reads: "When, however, there is complete purification of the memory of verbal conventions in that insight attained in *samadhi* which has become empty of conceptualization of ideas heard or inferred, then the object stands out in the form of its real nature alone."<sup>128</sup> The expression *pari-suddhi*, which is used by both Patañjali and Vyasa, is not merely "purification" but may be taken to mean at this stage of the processes of *samapatti* a "complete purification." It has been understood as denoting the abandonment and eradication of such memory altogether.<sup>129</sup> Based on our analysis in the preceding chapter, purification can be understood with an epistemological emphasis, meaning here the dissolution (*pralaya* or *pravilaya*)<sup>130</sup> of memory as referenced to an afflicted identity of selfhood: memory that has been rooted in or filtered through a confusion or error (*viparyaya*) within consciousness. Memory (*smṛti*) is a *vr̥tti*, and its association with ignorance/misidentification (in the form of the superimposition of karmic residues onto the form of the object) is to be transcended in the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*).

This purification does not result in the yogin suffering a loss of memory of words and their meaning in practical life. Rather, it means the yogin no longer carries the former confused memory into *samadhi*, does not rely on words, and so on, as objects (mental content) of support for the mind. At this stage the practice becomes free of the attachment to names and verbal contemplation; the experience in *samadhi* is now dissociated from any dependency on speech and language. Not only does the yogin not resort to the memory of words and their denotations,

but the entire cogitative process that was caused by the presence of words and indicative of the nature of universals is left behind. This includes the three categories of: (1) *agama pramana*: verbal testimony; (2) *anumana pramana*: inference [both (1) and (2) being categories of the *vr̥tti* of valid cognition (YS I.7)]; and (3) the unification defined as *savitarka* that has a less subtle degree of

realization (*saksatkara*) and that can be described as impure and alloyed. Again, we read from Vyasa:

[The object then] excludes all else and remains distinctly in the form of its own nature. That is supra-cogitative unification and it is the higher direct perception. It is the seed of authority and inference; from it they both originate. That seeing (perception) is not associated with any knowledge from valid authority or inference. The yogin's perception, not interspersed and confused with any other source of valid cognition, arises out of this *nirvitarka-samadhi*. 131

There is now not the slightest superimposition of the "erroneous" onto the object. The mind transcends the limitations of a "cogitative identity" of self, that is, cogitation as appropriated by or referenced to egoity, and moves on to a more complete unification or identification with the object at hand. The reality or true form of the object known (*grahya*) is revealed. It is thus that the phrase from *Yoga-Sutra* I.43 (see n. 127 above): *svarupa-sunya-iva*, "as if emptied of its own form" with reference to the mind and to the *samapatti*, becomes meaningful. "As if" (*iva*) indicates that the yogin does not become mindless, but that the locus of self-identity within the mind along with the cognition that "I know the object" no longer obscure clear perception of the object in *vitarka-samadhi*. In this experiential unification of grasper, grasping, and grasped, the subject whose former level of self-understanding was limited to the mode of cogitation is no longer ensnared by those epistemological limitations. Thus ensues a transcendence of the limitations of perception and self-identity misidentified with gross associations in the mind.

The cessation of the superimposition of karmic residue resulting from the purification of memory allows for a mode of cognition and experience that is no longer influenced by the misidentifications and projections of the past. The "grasper" no longer performs an obstructive role in the mode of being a "cogitator" of objects, that is, identified with the ideas or *vr̥ttis* arising in *savitarka*. Although it does not seem to be the case, the stability of the mind "unified with" the object and its coloration by the object continue to occur. The extraordinary presence of the object monopolizing, as it were, the consciousness of the yogin, and as a consequence of it, the disappearance of the word, of the conventional knowledge and of the conceptualizations create the false appearance that the stability of the mind in the object and its coloration by it have also disappeared. The yogin is no more aware of the process of stabilization and coloring that has taken

place in the mind; that is to say, it is as if this process did not exist for the yogin. But the word *iva* ("as though," "as if") is used to show that memory and, by implication, the mind's essential form/nature as *sattva*-knowledge, implying clear insight, are not destroyed. For this reason, Patañjali can say that the mind (in its functioning as memory) at this moment of the process appears *as if* devoid of its own form.

Koelman refers to the level of *samadhi* in *nirvitarka* as "refined sense-intuition shorn of its super-structures," which "cannot be communicated to others, it is eminently personal. To express it or explain it to others one has to resort to the universalizing and rationalizing way of thinking."<sup>132</sup> That is why yogins who have attained to a form of perception unhindered by processes of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) can make efforts to communicate, teach, and transmit that clarity of knowledge through the medium of concepts,<sup>133</sup> verbal testimony, and inference, even though these particular *vrttis* and their mental content or significance in the form of ideas (*pratyaya*) do not themselves constitute the direct experience. Rather, these *vrttis* and their significance can be used as a heuristic device to point beyond their meaning to the direct experience/perception itself that in the mode of supracognition (*nirvitarka*) is the source and cause of cogitation. In *nirvitarka* the yogin's identity and perception are transcendent of and no longer dependent on the former functioning of *vrtti* and the processes of apprehension in *savitarka*.

In Yoga, an origin or cause is not dependent on its effects. As Vacaspati Misra explains, even though the perception of smoke leads to the inference that there is fire, the fire itself is not dependent on the smoke.<sup>134</sup> By way of the above analogy, it should be clear that the yogin attains higher perception through non- or rather trans-conceptual ecstasy and can then appropriate *agama* and *anumana* (which deal with abstract universals or generalities) heuristically for the purpose of aiding others in the study of Yoga and for clarifying the crucial element in Yoga of direct experience or unmediated knowledge. Even though liberating knowledge is taught in the revealed texts (*sruti*) or by a *guru*, it is impossible to experience it directly without entering into *samadhi* oneself just as one cannot experience the sweetness of sugar through mere description (of its sweetness) alone.<sup>135</sup> Nor in Yoga can the *guru's* guidance be complete without proper initiation (*diksha*) of the aspiring yogin into the direct experience of higher perception in which doubt and skepticism subside, thereby freeing up the yogin's energy and attention for the pursuit of the "goal" of liberation itself.

The real objects of the empirical, practical world are indeed the objects of contemplation and support in *vitarka-samadhi*. They are not merely the

ideas of objects or their atoms, but rather the object as a complete whole (*avayavin*) to which all its parts (*avayavas*) belong.<sup>136</sup> That the true nature of a gross object whether it be a cow, a stone, or any other object within nature is realized internally in *samadhi* does not mean that its objective, external nature or form is considered to be less real or is even denied. Since the object's complete nature is perceived internally, the direct perception includes the existence of its grosser manifestations that are also understood, mastered, and transcended. On account of the purification of the *vitarka* activity of the mind that removes misidentification with, and

misappropriation of, the mental processes at this level of *samadhi* (the cessation of the misidentification and attachment that normally accompanies the functioning of *vrtti* in the form of *pramana*, *vikalpa*, and so forth, already having been attained), it can be said that in the yogin's mind is taking place a perceptual or awakening process that has to do with what, in general, Indic epistemological theories call a "*nirvikalpa* perception."<sup>137</sup>

### *Vicara-Samadhi*

Seeing that *vitarka-samadhi* (in both its "*sa*" and "*nir*" forms) is involved with the *gunas* and their manifestations/actualizations, the yogin develops dispassion (*vairagya*) toward these experiences and opens up to a range of experiences in the next stage of cognitive *samadhi*, that stage being referred to as *vicara-samadhi*. *Vicara* is without the verbal, cogitative, or grosser associations of *vitarka*.<sup>138</sup> The level of *vitarka* refined, subtilized, becomes *vicara* "reflection," with subtle associations. The term *vicara* has been translated as: "reflection,"<sup>139</sup> "discrimination,"<sup>140</sup> "clear vision,"<sup>141</sup> "sinnende Betrachtung,"<sup>142</sup> "consciousness of discrimination,"<sup>143</sup> "meditation,"<sup>144</sup> "analysis of subtle object."<sup>145</sup>

*Vicara*, which will be translated by "reflection," is used by Patañjali in a sense specific to Yoga. The word *vicara* is derived from *vi* + *car*,<sup>146</sup> expressing a progressive movement. In the context of the *Yoga-Sutra* *vicara* refers to the movement of the mind away from the gross objects to subtler objects of association. Having seen the defects and limitations of the involvement with gross objects and content, however clearly realized in *vitarka*, which confine the yogin's level of perception to "cogitation" (*savitarka*) or "without cogitation" (*nirvitarka*), the yogin looks at the causes of those objects and accompanying self-identifications. The yogin thus moves from the sixteen *visesas* (generated from the *avisesas*) to the six *avisesas* themselves: the five subtle elements (*tanmatras*) and the ego-sense

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(*ahamkara* or *asmita-matra*). The yogin contemplates these subtler essences of the elements and of the senses and brings before consciousness all the "subtle" particularities and constitutive parts of a "subtle" object. It is the making evident of, "effecting with one's own eyes" (*saksatkara*) the subtle. The mind takes the form of the *vrtti* of perception during *vicara-samadhi* and becomes identified with it. According to Vyasa, *vicara* then becomes an expanded perception and experience (*abhoga*) of the mind toward the subtle object of support (*alambana*), awakening deeper insight (*prajña*) in which the realization of the true nature of the object occurs.<sup>147</sup> It is the fullness and perfection of the mind with regard to subtle objects as has already been described with regard to the gross objects.

The (Samkhya-) yogin H. Aranya suggests that *vicara* is a refined analytical process.<sup>148</sup> The philosophical analysis of the relationship of the evolutes of *prakṛti* with *puruṣa* finally leads to the realization that "I am none of the evolutes with which I have identified myself." However, this type of analytical process seems more a part of the practice of intense *vicara* contemplations on the path of *jñāna-yoga* as taught in the Vedānta lineage. It may also reflect an obvious Samkhyan influence on Aranya's interpretation, that is, the classical Samkhyan approach to liberation tends to present itself as an intellectual path based on an analysis of the evolutes of



*prakṛti* (see discussion on Yoga and Sāṃkhya in chapter 2). In the context of Yoga, analytical thought is more likely to fall within the categories of: (a) the *vr̥tti* of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), specifically inference (*anumāna*, which prior to *samādhi* has been transcended), or (b) *svādhyāya*, "self-study" involving the personal recitation of *mantras* and the study of scriptural injunctions leading to liberation, the fourth of the *niyamas* ("observances") that constitute the second limb (YS II.32 and 44) of the "eight-limbed" Yoga (see discussion in chapter 4). Both of these categories play a more preparatory role in Yoga and may be seen as being propaedeutic to, but not inclusive of, *samādhi*. The evidence suggests that *vicāra* is a technical term for the practice of yogic one-pointedness on objects with subtle associations in order to know their nature and, furthermore, to master their nature entirely through dispassion (YS I.15). It is possible that one-pointedness can be seen as an "analytical thought process" in that it deals with the sort of subtilization found in the processes of liberating knowledge (*jñāna*). However, to subsume *vicāra* under the category of an "analytical thought process" does not seem to do justice to the Yoga system at this level of experience in *samādhi*.

Among the subtle evolutes and according to the scheme adopted in this study (see chart on p. 77 referring to the categories of Sāṃkhya and their

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overlap with Yoga), the objects of this level of *samādhi* are: (1) the five subtle elements (*tanmatras*) sometimes said to be located in the subtle body (*sūkṣma-sarīra*) which are the cause of the five gross elements and are the five subtle essences of the five cognitive senses consisting of sound, touch, form-percept, taste, and smell; and (2) *ahamkāra* or *asmita-mātra* (the sense of self, individualized I or ego). As the immediate cause of the subtle senses, *ahamkāra* begins to be mastered in this form of ecstasy, but primarily, as I will later suggest, it is the object of support in the next stage of ecstasy: *ananda*. I have argued in chapter 2 that according to Yoga philosophy it is not correct to replace *ahamkāra* (i.e., *asmita-mātra*, an ontological principle of *prakṛti*) with the term *asmita* (the affliction of I-am-ness or egoity, a mistaken identity of self) or with the total "inner instrumentality" (*antahkarana*) that is collectively subsumed under the term *citta* (mind) in Yoga and is threefold in Sāṃkhya: (1) *manas*, the mind-organ or lower mind, which is one of the sixteen *viśeṣas* (the "Particularized"), the objects of support in *vitarka-samādhi*; (2) *ahamkāra*, ego-included by the classical commentators as being one of the six *avīśeṣas* and the object of support in the later stages of *vicāra-samādhi* and in *ananda-samādhi*; (3) *buddhi* (*mahat*, intelligence) or *linga-mātra*, the first *prakṛtic* principle of manifestation and object of support/contemplation in *asmita-samādhi*.

Yet, in the light of the above definitions of the various levels of *samprajñāta* that specify the different components of the *antahkarana* involved, it would be clearly erroneous to assume that the entire *antahkarana* is an object of support in *vicāra-samādhi*, that is, in the context of its technical usage in *Yoga-Sūtra* I.17. I will deal more with this issue in the discussion below on the *ananda* and *asmita* ecstasies. The *vicāra-samādhi* also correlates with *grāhya* (YS I.41); its field of mastery is *grāhya*, the objects grasped, not with gross associations, which is the field of *vitarka*, but with subtle associations.

*Vicāra-samādhi* appears to be further divided into *savicāra* and *nirvicāra*. *Yoga-Sūtra* I.44



states: "Similarly explained [as in the *savitarka*-and *nirvitarka-samapattis*], when it is on subtle objects, are the [unifications called] 'with reflection' (*savicara*) and 'supra-reflection' (*nirvicara*)."<sup>149</sup> In the *savitarka*- and *nirvitarka-samapattis*, the gross elements in various tangible forms grasped with the external senses and focused internally within the mind-organ (*manas*) are the objects of support. In the *savicara* and *nirvicara* identifications, the five subtle elements and the subtle senses of apprehension are the objects of support and contemplation. Vyasa states: "Of these two, the *savicara* unification refers to subtle elements whose qualities are manifest, and are delimited by the experience of space (location), time, and

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cause."<sup>150</sup> In *savicara*, Vyasa tells us, the object of *samadhi* is experienced with reference to a particular location, time, and cause. Even though the subtlest, minutest particles seemingly occupy no space, nevertheless a relationship in space (i.e., a location) is attributed to them, the detailed mechanism of which is an area of specialization within Vaisheshika philosophy as well as modern physics. The same applies to time.<sup>151</sup> Causation in the above refers to the fact of the subtle, atomic realities of the gross elements being products of the respective *tanmatras*.<sup>152</sup> Vyasa clarifies the manifest characteristics of *savicara*, asserting that: "The object of support is the subtle elements, characterized by the qualities which are now manifest, and it presents itself to insight in the *samadhi*. This is to be grasped as one single idea [i.e., grasped by a unitary intelligence alone and not divided up among several ideas]."<sup>153</sup> Vyasa continues:

That unification on the subtle elements is called "supra-reflection" (without subtle associations) when, corresponding to and being the essential nature of all of the qualities, there is in all ways and by all means no delimitation by any qualities subsided, arisen, or undetermined.<sup>154</sup>

The qualities of an object may be: (a) dormant, subsided, (b) manifest, arisen, or (c) undetermined (YS III.14). An object has many attributes that are manifested from time to time, while others may subside or are held in potential form. When certain qualities have already made their appearance, after some time they become dormant, submerged, and are of the past. Some qualities manifest in the present, and some undetermined at the moment will arise in the future. In *savicara-samadhi* the direct realization of the nature of the object is limited only to those characteristics that are manifest, have arisen (*udita*), in the present. The insight thus gained is delimited. However, Vyasa says that "this is to be grasped as one single idea,"<sup>155</sup> that is, as a state of one-pointedness (*ekagrata*, YS III.11-12) in *samadhi*.

To summarize the rest of Vyasa's commentary (YB I.44), it is made clear that in contrast to the imagery in *savicara*, the awakening insight (*prajña*) in *nirvicara*, which is without imagery, comprises the entirety of the subtle object (e.g., the subtle elements or subtle senses of apprehension) of contemplation. The object here is not delimited by space, time, or causation, nor is it limited to those attributes that are apparent only in its present time. All of its possibilities and potentialities are grasped and realized in the one-pointedness of *samadhi*; not being divided up among many ideas, the object is grasped as a complete whole by a unitary (nonfractured) intelligence (*buddhi*). Vyasa is very emphatic in stating that the

objects here are: (1) *sarva-dharma-anu-patin*: such that they relate to all their qualities; (2) *sarva-dharma-atmaka*: such that their self-nature comprises all their qualities; (3) *sarvatha*: in every possible way; (4) *sarvatah*: from whichever possible mode. Vyasa emphasizes that at this stage the subtle object, in its true form alone, colors the mind by its proximity (*uparañj*), the mind (i.e., knowledge or *prajñā* in Vyasa's commentary) understood here to be as though devoid of its own form, with only the object remaining.<sup>156</sup> Vacaspati Misra is of the opinion that *savicara*- and *savitarka-samadhis* share the state of a *vikalpa* of the divisions of the word-object-idea triad, and that *nirvicara*, like *nirvitarka*, is free of such cognition.<sup>157</sup> In clear disagreement with Vacaspati, Vijñāna Bhikṣu argues that since the limitations of *vikalpa*-cognition have already been abandoned in *nirvitarka*, which is a lower (that is, less subtle) stage of ecstasy, how then can it continue to be pursued in the next higher stage, which is *savicara*? Bhikṣu declares that the "error" that has already been abandoned in the previous stage cannot then find a place in the next stage.<sup>158</sup> Bhikṣu's understanding seems to be more in accord with Vyasa, who states: "Thus by explaining *nirvitarka*, the absence of *vikalpa* in the case of both of these has been explained."<sup>159</sup> Based on Vyasa's commentary, it is more technically correct to say that *savicara* and *nirvicara* are both extricated from the defect of the *vikalpa*, which has already been transcended in *nirvitarka*.

In *nirvicara-samapatti*, the yogin is completely "at one" (epistemologically) with the object, that is, the yogin knows its past states as well as its present moment and is fully aware of the various possibilities of the future. The last limitations of space and time attributed to the object are transcended. According to Vyasa, an ecstatic state reaches both the supracognitive and suprarreflective levels when the mind is, as it were, void of its own nature and is free to "become" the object itself. Whereas the "unification" (*samapatti*) in *nirvitarka-samadhi* is a distinct perception limited to the gross object, in *nirvicara-samadhi* the "unification" is expanded to include subtle objects. These so-called objects at the subtlest level are themselves the "seeds" of ignorance (*avidyā*) in the form of *samskaras* the deep-rooted impressions or karmic residue of affliction in the mind. These seeds of affliction are to be "roasted," are to become, in the words of Vyasa, like burned (*dagdham*) seeds of rice.<sup>160</sup> Once scorched through meditative discipline by the "fire of knowledge" (*YB IV.28*) these "seeds" in the form of mistaken identity and attachment can no longer sprout. Through *samadhi*, the insight (*prajñā*) thus gained along with the increasing purification and refinement of the mind leads to a deepening of dispassion. From this detached perspective, neither subject nor object, perceiver nor

world, can be seen as substantial or separate.<sup>161</sup> There is no longer any adumbration of interpretation as applied to the object or condition at hand. Yoga states that the object shines forth alone, nonseparate from the mind, which is as if empty of its own form.

The "*nir*" forms of ecstasy are indicative of a radically different knowledge from their "*sa*" forms. Both the "*nir*" types of *samadhi* are forms of knowledge that can be called

"indeterminate" (as opposed to the "determinate" knowledge inherent in the "sa" forms). Indeterminate knowledge can be understood here as being knowledge, whether of gross or subtle objects, in which the distinction between the consciousness of the subject (the "grasper") knowing the object (the "grasped") is not present. As soon as the distinction is present, the other formations like the word-object-idea triad (in *śavītarka*) or space, time, and causation (in *śavīcara*) make their appearance and monopolize the yogin's consciousness. In more ordinary perception we are not aligned with and therefore do not "catch" or become aware of the stages and experiences of indeterminate knowledge; they remain concealed, "hidden" from our conscious view, existing merely in potential form as insight (*prajñā*) embedded in the *sattva* of consciousness. But the indeterminate knowledge of which Patañjali speaks is something attained through voluntary effort (cf. *YS* I.20-22) leading to purification of mind. Yoga maintains that we can and should recognize or become aware of these purer, more subtle levels of cognition if we want to progress to the supracognitive level of *śamādhi* and on to the intrinsic identity as *puruṣa*. A conceptual, rational, and egoic understanding of oneself and the world is thus superseded by an immediate, transconceptual, transrational, and trans-egoic understanding. And to repeat a suggestion made in chapter 4, Yoga does not hold to an anti-intellectual or prerational/preconceptual perspective amounting to a regression in consciousness. Nor does Yoga discipline proper bring about a suppression or repression of *vṛttis*. As argued earlier, such misunderstandings of the transformative processes leading to illumination and purification are more representative of tamasic (e.g., deluded/stagnated/escapist) states of mind and identity that are far removed from the purer states of awareness arrived at through Yoga.

In *Yoga-Sūtra* I.47 it is implied that *nirvīcara-śamāpatti* is the highest stage of cognitive *śamādhi*, which suggests the following progressive ("hierarchical") organization<sup>162</sup> in descending order from the purest, most subtle, and most *sattvified* to the least pure, least subtle, and least *sattvified*: *nirvīcara-śamāpatti*, *śavīcara-śamāpatti*, *nirvītarka-śamāpatti*, *śavītarka-śamāpatti*. Patañjali describes the *nirvīcara* ecstasy as culminating in a state of "supra-reflexive lucidity" (*nirvīcara-vaīśaradya*) that is coterminous with

the state of clarity of the inner or authentic self/being known as *adhyātma-prasāda*.<sup>163</sup> At this finer level, knowing and knower "lose" their dualistic and independent status and states as well: the analogy of radiance or clarity extends to oneself (*adhyātma*). The insight (*prajñā*) engendered in the highest stage of object-oriented *śamādhi* is said to be "truth-bearing" (*rtam-bhara*)<sup>164</sup> because it discloses the contemplated object as it is without any mental distortions: "there is no trace of erroneous knowledge in it" (*YB* I.48).<sup>165</sup> In addition to the aspect of cognitive clarity there likewise occurs in the lucidity of *nirvīcara* a clarity and ease regarding one's affective/emotive nature, thus incorporating, for example, the sense of "contentment" (*śamtosa*) and "unexcelled happiness" obtained (*YS* II.42; see n. 187 in chapter 4) through the cultivation of the various "observances" (*niyamas*). The cessation of the afflicted *vṛttis*, as Vijñāna Bhikṣu suggests, simultaneously bears with it the subsiding of all afflicted and compulsive affective/emotive patterns of thought and behavior and any further karmically binding activity thus generated.<sup>166</sup> That is why clarity (implying serenity) becomes a characteristic of the yogin immersed in this stage of *śamādhi*. Vyāsa writes:

When the *mind-sattva (buddhi)*, whose nature is luminosity, is freed from [the effects of] *rajas* and *tamas*, and has a steady flow without any veiling contamination of impurity, that is, the lucidity . . . has occurred, there is clarity in the inner being of the yogin, which is a progressively clearer and more brilliant light of knowledge of the object as it really is.<sup>167</sup>

Drawing on Vyasa's metaphor (*YB* I.12, see discussion in chapter 4) of the "steady flow of the mind toward the good," there is implied in the above and after a sufficient degree of purification has taken place a momentum or movement in the "direction" of transcendence and liberation ("aloneness"). The yogin's identity is freed from the binding effects of *rajas* and *tamas*, thus bringing about a sattvification of consciousness. The yogin becomes cognitively, morally, and affectively purified, spiritually developed and uplifted as person, ushering the yogin into a different order of life from that of an egoic or selfish mentality rooted in *samyoga* dissatisfaction and ignorance. Having attained to that insight (*prajñā*) which is "truth-bearing" (*rtambhara*, *YS* I.48), "bearing the truth in oneself,"<sup>168</sup> the yogin apprehends the innate order (*rta*) of cosmic existence and is integrally linked with that order.

*Adhyatma* (*YS* I.47) refers to the disclosure of the clarity of the inner being, an awakening to one's spiritual identity as a reflection in the *sattva*. In cognitive *samadhi* it appears to be limited to the identification with

mind-*sattva* and does not literally apply to *purusa*. This stage of *samadhi* reminds us of Vyasa's description (*YB* I.1)<sup>169</sup> of *samadhi* in the one-pointed state (*ekagra*) of mind that fully illuminates an object as it is, diminishes the afflictions, loosens the bonds of karma, and brings the state of the cessation of mistaken identity (*cittavrtti*) into view. There ensues a transcendence of self as identified with subtle associations of the mind. The sense of self no longer acts as a vehicle that obstructs perception and misappropriates objects in the mode of "reflection," that is, one ceases to misidentify with the ideas (mind content) and *vrttis* arising in *savicara*. In *nirvicara* the mind is released from the binding associations and identifications that formerly accompanied the experience of subtle objects. A deepening detachment or dispassionate knowledge and mastery has taken place. The yogin is emancipated from the limitations of empirical identity ensconced within the "reflexive" mode of knowledge and self-understanding. Vijñāna Bhikṣu<sup>170</sup> makes the pertinent suggestion that although the "truth-bearing" insight (*rtambhara-prajñā*) arises in the last stage of cognitive *samadhi*, the steps leading to it are through *vitarka*, *vicara*, and so on. It follows that there is a "vertical" progression or continuum that implies some direct perception in the earlier stages as well and accounts for the interdependence and interconnectedness of the levels of perception in *samadhi*. The lower levels of insight gained pertaining to gross objects are not negated or abandoned but are integrated and reconciled in a manner that no longer references experience to a false center of consciousness laying claim to authentic identity. The first three stages of *samprajñāta* naturally lead to the fourth (*asmita*) and the insights generated through the former may be incorporated in the later. Thus, the insight and mastery gained from the lower ecstasies is not extinguished or relinquished, rather it is included, consolidated, and integrated. At each level, the empirical

limitations of a superimposed condition (*cittavrtti*) of *purusa* or authentic identity are discerned and sifted out from the yogin's purview, allowing for a clearer understanding and insight into the true nature of *purusa*. *Avidya* and misidentification are thus differentiated from liberating knowledge (*vidya*, *prajña*) and intrinsic identity. An unbroken continuum of perception can then take place through which all objects, gross or subtle, can be known in the light of the clarity of the inner being/self.

The yogin's experience in *nirvicara* is far from being "misty," "vague," or "mysterious." It is as vivid and immediate as is possible for one who lives at the levels of ordinary awareness to imagine. The yogin's consciousness, although transcending the normal barriers of egoic identity, has not however been reduced, nor has it been negated or subsumed into the realm

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of the "unconscious." In *samadhi* a state of suprawakefulness is disclosed in which the yogin "comes face to face with the true nature of the object, which ordinarily remains hidden behind the outer forms." <sup>171</sup>

The subtle objects, as Patañjali points out, extend up to, and terminate their forms in unmodified *prakrti*.<sup>172</sup> Vyasa takes pains to emphasize<sup>173</sup> that the reference to the subtle objects of support (*sukhma-visaya*) in *Yoga-Sutra* I.44 does not mean that only atoms (*paramanus* or *anus*) and the subtle elements constitute the limit of the subtle realm. A mistake of this nature could be made because objects of support in the *vicara*-accompanied *samadhi* are the subtle elements and the subtle senses and *Yoga-Sutra* I.44 speaks of *savicara* and *nirvicara* as being realizations of the subtle realm. The subtle realm does not, however, end there but extends all the way to the higher stages of ecstasy where *ahamkara* and *linga-matra* (*mahat/buddhi*) are realized. Thereafter *alinga* (unmanifest *prakrti*) is understood and included.

It should be noted that even though the formal Samkhya system considers unmanifest *prakrti* to be beyond any cognition at all too shy a "maiden" to show "her" face to *purusa* (*SK* 61) in *Yoga prakrti* is indeed "experienced" by the *prakrti-lasya* yogins who have merged their awareness into *prakrti*, as Patañjali and Vyasa explain.<sup>174</sup> Thus, the yogin's subtle realm extends all the way up to unmanifest *prakrti*. There is nothing of a prakrtic nature more subtle beyond *alinga*.<sup>175</sup> Yet, as Vyasa is careful to state:

Now *purusa* also is subtle, is that not so? But the subtlety of *purusa* is not in the same category as that of the unmanifest beyond the great principle/designator (*linga*). Furthermore, *purusa* is not the cause which generates the designator but is the [indirect] cause. Thus the unexcelled subtlety as it is in *prakrti* (*pradhana*) has been explained.<sup>176</sup>

*Purusa* is not an object in *samadhi*. *Purusa* is "subtle" but is in an entirely different category from *prakrti* and her evolutes. Whereas the levels of subtlety in *prakrti*'s evolutes are comparative, *purusa*'s "subtlety" is not relative or subject to transformation, but is unchanging, absolute. Unlike *prakrti*, *purusa* has no direct products as its effects. As pure consciousness, *purusa* is an indirect cause of the awareness *asmi*, "I am," that makes its appearance in the composite sentience *asmita* when *purusa*'s presence passively reflects in *linga-matra*. That is the



extent of *purusa*'s "involvement."

Since the topic of these *sutras* is cognitive or object-oriented *samadhi* (i.e., ecstasy), and it is not until *asamprajñata* (objectless *samadhi*) that the "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) of *purusa* can occur, the degrees of subtleness mentioned above only lead up to unmanifest *prakṛti*. Backtracking somewhat

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to the stages of cognitive *samadhi* (as outlined in *YS* I.17), a crucial question now arises. Bearing in mind that *Yoga-Sutra* I.47-50 extol the perfection of *nirvicara-samadhi* and that *Yoga-Sutra* I.51 explains *asamprajñata-samadhi*, where do the *ananda*- and *asmita*-accompanied ecstasies that were included in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17 fit in to Patañjali's scheme? Although this has not been explicitly mentioned by Vyasa or by any of the major Sanskrit commentators, it appears that the term *nirvicara* is not limited to being a variation of the *vicara*-accompanied ecstasy alone. The term *nirvicara-samapatti* can be taken in a broader sense to include the other two ecstasies: *ananda* and *asmita*, which appear to have been left out or overlooked. Two reasons can be posited<sup>177</sup> why this is so: (1) The later two forms of cognitive *samadhi* are also in this sense forms of *nirvicara-samapatti* because the association with subtle objects as in *vicara* has ceased. The experience in the *ananda*-accompanied *samadhi* is "I am joyful," and in *asmita-samadhi* it is simply "I am." These are neither discursive-like thoughts associated with *vitarka*-accompanied *samadhi*, nor subtle thoughts of the *vicara* type of ecstasy, but are rather deeper, more subtilized, sattvified experiences in *nirvicara-samapatti*. (2) The subtle realm incorporated in *samadhi* extending up to and including unmanifest *prakṛti* clearly warrants recognition of the other two ecstasies.

Vyasa does assume that *ananda* and *asmita* (*YB* I.17) constitute the contents of separate stages of cognitive *samadhi*. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that Vyasa would take *ananda*- and *asmita-samadhi* to be instances of *nirvicara-samapatti* and that this can be seen as being in accordance with Patañjali's scheme. It would then follow that the *vicara*-accompanied ecstasy referred to in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17 is a specific category of cognitive *samadhi* that technically and structurally corresponds with *savicara-samapatti*; *vicara* (*YS* I.17) thus is not intended to include the full depth of the *nirvicara* levels.

### *Ananda-Samadhi*

On the subject of the third form of ecstasy presented in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17 called "joy" (*ananda*) Vyasa writes: "Joy means delight."<sup>178</sup> The word for joy, *ananda*, does not denote here a state of intrinsic, unconditional, transcendent "bliss," one of the familiar epithets of *brahman* the Supreme Being as extolled, for example, in Upanisadic works and Vedantic commentaries. In *Yoga-Sutra* I.17 *ananda* is initially the conditional and temporary property called *sukha*: the pleasure, well-being, or happiness inherent in the *sattva-guna*. In *ananda-accompanied samadhi* the yogin grasps

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or captures the delight of *sattva* and identifies/unites with this exalted sense of happiness.

It is acknowledged in the Samkhya and Yoga traditions that pleasure belongs to the *sattva* of the mind and is within the realm of the "experienced" or "seeable," that is, it is object-oriented. *Purusathe* pure, unchanging seer transcends the realm of the *gunas* and is by nature free of the binding influence of, or attachment to, *sattva*. This is related to the idea that pleasure, pain, and other experiences belong to the transformations (*parinama*) of *prakrti* and so *purusa's* nature, although immanent as well as transcendent, maintains its immutable, unmodified, and nonfragmented identity throughout all the changes taking place within *prakrti*. Even though the *prakrtic* scheme includes the delusive power of *tamas*, the often turbulent nature of *rajas*, and the pleasurable states of *sattva*, human beings basically involve themselves with the world in pursuit of the pleasure of *sattva*. It is ultimately the *attachment* to the pleasure derived from *sattva* that causes misidentification, dissatisfaction, and bondage and that, even on the subtle levels of *prakrti*, generates and sustains samsaric or mistaken identity.

In the *savitarka* and *savicara* ecstasies, the insights attained show one the futility of pursuing happiness through the various objects of contemplation, starting with "cogitation" (*vitarka*) on the earth elements and going up to the "reflection" (*savicara*) on the subtle elements and possibly the initial stages of the sense of self (*ahamkara*). As identification with the grosser evolutes/objects/content gradually dissolves or is transcended, and an identification with their subtler causes arises, in *ananda-samadhi* identification dissolves or merges into *ahamkara*. Koelman appropriately writes that after mastering the *vicara* stage one sets oneself "to focus the subjective-objective entities" in order "to concentrate and achieve one-pointed attention on those entities which constitute [one's] own cognitive organism."<sup>179</sup>

Since tamasic *ahamkara* generates the elements, and sattvic *ahamkara* generates the mind-organ (*manas*), the sense organs and action organs, all with the aid of *rajas* (activity/motion),<sup>180</sup> it can be understood that a gradual refinement of awareness would lead the yogin to the more subtle "location" of *sattva* as it presents itself in *ahamkara*. As is the case with the other evolutes of *prakrti*, *ahamkara* consists of all three *gunas* yet *rajas* and *tamas* are here subordinated to *sattva*, especially now that the yogin has ascended beyond the *vitarka* and *vicara* levels. The locus of joy that was experienced and referenced through the grosser evolutes has its "fount" here. The yogin then concentrates on the pleasure of the *sattva* of *ahamkara* and enjoys a temporary blissful state. To repeat, this temporary state of intense joy is not

to be mistaken for the notion of the absolute bliss of *brahman*. In classical Yoga this elevated joy (*ananda*) must also be seen in its parts and as a whole until the "unification" of the enjoyer and the enjoyed is perceived and the expanded sense of awareness attains to a greater fullness; that is, its nature (i.e., of "joy") is fully realized.<sup>181</sup> Vijnana Bhiksu explains that in *ananda-samadhi* the only *vrtti* that prevails is: "I am happy, joyful."<sup>182</sup> Even though *mahat* or *buddhi* proper is not reached until the next level (*asmita*) of cognitive *samadhi*, it can be assumed here that the sattvic nature of *mahat* filters through into *ahamkara* (*asmita-matra*), adding to the sense of joy.

Those yogins who attain this level of experience (*ananda-samadhi*) may be temporarily absorbed in joyful states of contemplation or mystical ecstasy. Yet there is a danger at this stage in that the yogin may incorrectly consider the enhanced sense of well-being in *ananda* to be the supreme attainment in Yoga. Having mastered the ego-principle everything from the physical body made up of the *visesas* to the *ahamkara* powers (*siddhis*) may attend upon the yogin. Remaining identified at this level of *samadhi*, one may be called *videha*, "bodiless" one, or a "bodiless shining god" (*videha deva*).<sup>183</sup> The root cause of the *videha*'s attachment and misidentification with the rapturous conditions of *ananda* is of course ignorance (*avidya*), which leads one to mistake the noneternal as eternal, the nonself as self, and so on, and thus keeps one engulfed within and enslaved to subtle forms of prakrtic existence. The *videha*'s state is a possible stage along the way but if a dispassion toward it is not cultivated it merely results in a subtler form of pleasure addiction and misidentification in *samyoga*. Egoity (*asmita*) itself has not yet been rooted out. From the enlightened perspective in Yoga this stage of attainment and identity is still within the gunic realm of impermanence leading to further dissatisfaction.

The field of *ananda-samadhi* is *grahana*, the "grasping" or instrument of knowledge. Unlike the *vitarka*- and *vicara-samadhis*, it is not subdivided (for example, into *sananda* and *nirananda*) by Patañjali or Vyasa. I therefore understand Vacaspati Misra as having given an erroneous explanation of the cause and nature of the rapture in this ecstasy. He writes: "Because the nature of *sattva* is illumination . . . the experience of the sattvic pleasures inherent in the senses is the delight of this *samadhi*."<sup>184</sup> This statement is incorrect in suggesting that the object experienced here is that joy inherent in the senses (*indriyas*). Vijñāna Bhikṣu points out that the above suggestion confuses the *ananda* ecstasy with *vitarka* and *vicara*, in which the full realization of the nature of the senses has already occurred, the senses (*indriyas*) as objects of support having already been "left behind" as unworthy of further pursuit. If the pleasure inherent in the senses were

the object of contemplation in this ecstasy, such experiences would generate the kind of *vr̥ttis* in which attraction/attachment (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesa*) are implied. This would like the "sa" and "nir" forms of the *vitarka* and *vicara* ecstasies necessitate two levels in the *ananda*-accompanied ecstasy: (1) one with the *vr̥tti*-identification centered on "joy," and (2) a subtler one without the *vr̥tti*-identification of "joy." Neither Patañjali nor Vyasa have suggested two categories for this ecstasy, and therefore Vacaspati Misra's interpretation seems erroneous.<sup>185</sup>

For the purpose of furthering our analysis on *ananda-samadhi*, it is necessary to focus the discussion somewhat on the next stage of cognitive *samadhi*: the *asmita*-accompanied ecstasy. Vacaspati Misra, stating the delight inherent in the senses to be the object of the *ananda*-accompanied ecstasy, considers *purusa*, qualified by *ahamkara*, to be the object of *asmita-samadhi*.<sup>186</sup> This raises a question about *buddhi* (*mahat*) the first and finest evolute in the order of manifestation and the last to be experienced, incorporated, and mastered. If *ahamkara*, which arises from *mahat*, is the object in *asmita-samadhi*, in what other ecstasy would *mahat* (*buddhi*) be mastered? Furthermore, in what ecstasy would *asmita* be realized? There are no further stages of *samadhi* given by Patañjali after the *asmita*-type with supportive factors (*alambanas*) or

objects of contemplation. Nor would this fit in to our present scheme of understanding, which for the sake of clarity, is repeated as follows: (1) sixteen *visesas*, the gross objects known (*grahya*) in *vitarka-samadhi*; (2) five *avisesas*, the subtle objects known (*grahya*) in *vicara-samadhi* (3) *ahamkara* (the sixth and most subtle of the *avisesas*, the instrument of knowledge or "grasping" *grahana*), experienced in the later stages of *vicara* and in *ananda-samadhi* (note that *ahamkara* is not the same as *asmita*); (4) *linga-matra* (*mahat/buddhi*) wherein *asmita* the agent of knowledge (*grahitr*) is experienced in *asmita-samadhi*. It must be pointed out that there is little agreement among the commentators with regard to the objects of contemplation in both the *ananda* and *asmita* ecstasies. Disagreements among the commentators notwithstanding, the above scheme can function as a heuristic device in Yoga by presenting a consistent and workable framework for formulating a careful classification relating the levels of cognitive *samadhi* in both a metaphysical/theoretical and experiential/practical way.

Vijñāna Bhikṣu's<sup>187</sup> view that delight (*hlada*) alone is the object of contemplation in *ananda-samadhi* does not sufficiently explain the source and nature of the rapture. He includes *ahamkara* and *mahat* among the objects of *savicara-samadhi*.<sup>188</sup> In this case, there appears to be a confusion between *grahya* and *grahana*. Since, as our study suggests, *ananda-samadhi*

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has *grahana* as its classification, delight (*hlada*) alone cannot be the "object" of contemplation. Being the instrument of "grasping" through which knowledge is self-referenced/appropriated, the evolute *ahamkara* (*asmita-matra*) must find a place in the practical scheme of Yoga.

H. Aranya<sup>189</sup> is of the opinion that the sense of happiness in *ananda-samadhi* arises from the feeling of relaxation in the five organs of action, the five sense organs, and the three constituents of the inner senses: *manas*, *ahamkara*, and *buddhi*. This may well represent the affective nature of the experience, but Aranya's view confuses the subtle scheme of understanding related to these ecstasies and therefore remains incomplete with regard to the ecstasy associated with joy. I agree, however, with Aranya's suggestion (below) that the object of contemplation in the *asmita*-accompanied ecstasy is *buddhi* intent upon *purusa*. He writes: "The object concentrated upon in *asmita samadhi* is not the real *purusa* but its imitation, the pseudo-seer . . . It is *buddhi* shaped after the *purusa*, . . . a sort of feeling of identity between the pure consciousness and individual consciousness or *buddhi*."<sup>190</sup>

Bhoja Raja's view that *ahamkara* is the object of support in the *ananda* ecstasy and *buddhi* being the supportive object in the ecstasy of *asmita* seems accurate. However Bhoja Raja errs in that he considers the pleasure of the *ananda* ecstasy to be the attribute of pure consciousness, or rather the power of consciousness (*citi-sakti*), which by definition (YS IV.34) transcends the realm of the *gunas*. Bhoja says:

When [contemplation on the] *sattva* of the inner instrumentality somewhat penetrated by a residue of *rajas* and *tamas* is cultivated, then, there being no *gunas* located in the power of consciousness, the excellence of its (the *antahkarana*'s) essence whose nature is pleasure and illumination thus cultivated, is called the *samadhi* associated with joy.<sup>191</sup>

Bhoja's entire statement seems self-contradictory. If the contemplation is still on the *sattva* of the *antahkarana*, then the (pure) power of consciousness (*citi-sakti*) has not yet been realized. Furthermore, *sattva*, whose nature is pleasure and illumination, is a part of *prakṛti* and not an attribute of *citi-sakti* (i.e., *purusa*). The above statement by Bhoja can be stretched somewhat and understood to mean that one is now closer to *citi-sakti*, whose own bliss (*sukha*, happiness in the case of the *sattva guṇa*) and illumination (i.e., knowledge, *jñāna*) have begun to penetrate the *sattva* of the inner sense, causing the excellence of the latter's pleasure and illumination to expand, thus overcoming the residue of *rajas* and *tamas*. In any case, Bhoja's comment does aptly suggest that in *ananda-samadhi* the *sattva*

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is still somewhat alloyed with a trace of *rajas* and *tamas* (as is the case with *ahamkara/asmita-matra*).

Bhoja Raja considers *asmita* to be the counterpart of the *ahamkara* evolute in Samkhya philosophy. According to the understanding of Patañjali's system presented in this study, it has been suggested that *ahamkara*, as the object of support in *ananda-samadhi*, is purified and no longer performs an obstructing role in the realization of authentic identity. The *samadhi* associated with joy serves its purpose in that contemplation on becoming aware of the limitations or temporary nature of the *ahamkara*-principle has been accomplished. I am arguing that if *asmita* (not *asmita-matra*) and *ahamkara* were at all identical, there would be no possibility, indeed no need for, the stage of *asmita-samadhi*. Like many other commentators, however, Bhoja Raja insists upon maintaining the identity of *ahamkara* and *asmita*, but he divides them by function, asserting:

The identity of *ahamkara* and *asmita* should not be doubted. Where the inner sense referring to itself as "I" (*aham*) apprehends the objects of experience, it is called *ahamkara*. When by turning inwards in the transformative process of dissolution or return to the source (*prakṛti*) there appears (in the mind) a mere reflection of "pure being," that is called *asmita*. 192

While it is accurate to say that *ahamkara* is outward-going toward the mind-organ (*manas*), the senses, and the objects of the senses, and that *asmita* located in *mahat (buddhi)* is a more subtle, internalized process that occurs in the "inner face" of the mind (*citta*), there is no real basis for asserting an identity of *ahamkara* and *asmita*. *Asmita* occurs in *mahat (buddhi)*, which is subtler than its product, *ahamkara*.

Vacaspati Misra as well equates *asmita* with *ahamkara*. Even though in Samkhya the senses (*indriyas*) are an evolute of (i.e., directly arise from) *ahamkara*, not of *mahat*, he writes: "The senses are products of *asmita*. Therefore *asmita* is their subtler form. That intellect (*buddhi*) unified with the self (*atman*) is referred to as the perception of the essential nature of the self."<sup>193</sup> Here Vacaspati confuses *buddhi* with *ahamkara*. The criticism directed at Bhoja Raja also applies to Vacaspati Misra in this regard.

*Asmita-Samadhi*

Having awakened to and fully realized *ahamkara* in the *ananda* ecstasy, the yogin sees the inherently flawed nature of gunic identity at this stage (that is, the yogin observes here the gunic limitations on self-identity), cultivates

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dispassion (*vairagya*) toward this state of identification, and moves to the yet subtler ground of the ecstasy associated with *asmita*. Just as the products among the evolutes can be said to "dissolve" or are transmuted into their subtler and subtler causes, so the yogin's identification with *ahamkara* "dissolves" (*nirodha*) and an identification with *buddhi/mahat* arises. The root-identification as *asmita* ("I-am-ness") or afflicted (mistaken) identity of self (where ignorance takes root in the mind) denotes a cosmic, pre-individual or even trans-individual state of being within *prakrti* and is referred to as *mahat* (*Yoga-Bhasya* II.19) or the "great self" (*mahan atma*). The identification as *asmita* accompanies the yogin through the contemplation and unification that focuses on the *mind-sattva*, *mahat/buddhi*, the evolute of "intelligence." Since the previous identifications with the "less refined" evolutes, such as *ahamkara*, have been transcended meaning that the yogin is no longer misidentified with those phenomena and *mahat* (*buddhi*) is the first evolute of *prakrti*, there is no other object of contemplation or support but *mahat* itself. It is the "designator" (*linga-matra*), the "first sign" that *prakrti* gives of her presence. The principle of convergence and unification of the object and the agent of contemplation reaches its finest dimension here. Vyasa asserts: "I-am-ness is the perception of the essential, unified nature of self." <sup>194</sup> Since the "inner face" of *citta* (*buddhi*) is the most sattvic and purest constituent of the evolutes of *prakrti*, it most approximates is analogous to *purusa*. Pure consciousness "reflects" in *buddhi* as into a clear crystal. It is here and nowhere else that *purusa* and *prakrti* "meet" in *samyoga*, taking on a single nature, as it were, which is defined as the affliction of "I-am-ness" (*YS* II.6 and *YB* II.6). It is in the reflected consciousness in the mind that ignorance and misidentification "begin" and are terminated, a process with which *purusa* is said to have no direct involvement.

At the interface or juncture of the seer and the seeable spring all notions or ideas of selfhood, the reflected consciousness being the primary ("sentient") constituent of our self as person. The growth of self as person is made possible through this conjunction; all the various projections, adjuncts, and instruments of selfhood arise from this "meeting place." Here the person first utters "I am," meaning: "I am this conditioned, contingent, delimited being, a composite of consciousness and insentience." In realizing the nature of *asmita*, the yogin understands it as the final "break" between *purusa* (intrinsic identity) and *cittavrtti* (mistaken or extrinsic identity) whereby the two constituents of "I-am-ness" "insentience" in its finest essence of the *mind-sattva*, and the reflection of the *purusa* therein dissolve or "undo" their "union" (*samyoga*) or superimposed condition of

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selfhood <sup>195</sup> that resulted in a confusion of identity between *purusa* and the mental processes



(*vr̥ttis*).

The stage of *samadhi* associated with *asmita* means the realization of *mahat/buddhi/linga-matra* in which the *guna* of *sattva* is predominant. In the previous ecstasy called *ananda*, *sattva* is dominant, although, as Bhoja Raja explains, at this stage of *samadhi* the experience of *sattva* is still somewhat penetrated by residual *rajas* and *tamas*.<sup>196</sup> In *asmita-samadhi* the *rajas* and *tamas* have been completely subdued, but not expelled, and only the purity and clarity of *sattva* shines. In this experience the sattvic inward face of *buddhi* is "turned away" from its outward facing evolute, *ahamkara* or ego. That is, ego-identification, the nature of which is, for example, to appropriate objects and experiences as being "mine" and not "yours," "ours," or "his"/"hers," and so on, is transcended, submerged, or rather transformed into the pure "am-ness" that is still first-personal but not egoistic. The normal, individual conditions and barriers imposed on consciousness are dissolved in the experience of pure *sattva*, but the *ahamkara* as *grahana* (the instrument through which intelligence asserts itself, experiences, and knows) is not destroyed or negated. Rather, the yogin now experiences a heightened form of perception and understanding that is freed from the misidentification with mere egoic identity. Ontologically, *mahat*, out of which the ego arises and is absorbed, is pure "am-ness" but not "is-ness," which is third-personal and may not have the significance of self-conscious being. The yogin realizes that by turning the mind "inwards" through the practice of *samadhi* the purity of the mind's *sattva* receives the reflection of *purusa*. It is due to the presence and power of consciousness (*purusa*) in its reflected state functioning through the mind, and not the mind itself, that all the life-processes of our psychophysical being are initiated and sustained.

The word *asmita* does not refer merely to being, or to existence, but to the consciousness of being or existence, since the term *asmi* is specific to a subject ("I") that proclaims its existence. The concept of *asmita* has a close relationship in Yoga with that of *sarupya* (YS I.4). *Sarupya*, implying a misidentification with or conformity to the nature of *vr̥tti*, represents the objective aspect (the situation of *purusa* appearing to conform to the mental processes), and *asmita* the root-subjective aspect (the consciousness of being, conditioned by an identification with the mental processes) of a single phenomenon: the superimposed limitation of selfhood in *samyoga* due to misidentification with the prakrtic conditions of individual and cosmic existence, the congenitally conflated realm of *purusa* (the seer) and *prakrti* (the seeable) constituting one's mistaken identity or conditioned being.

In a rare description of *asmita-samadhi*, Vyasa states: "The mind that has reached the unification called *asmita* becomes serene and infinite like a great (still) ocean."<sup>197</sup> Because *purusa* is an undisturbed, infinite existencelike a "still" ocean the inward face of the mind (*buddhi*) receiving *purusa's* "reflection" and as experienced in *asmita-samadhi* appears like an infinite, calm ocean, without ruffling, that is, without distracting or disturbing mental "waves" or activity. The experience of this "reflection" of *purusa* is both expansive like the ocean and minute like an atomic particle. Vyasa quotes from the Samkhyan teacher, Pañcasikha: "Having found that self which is minute like the atom, one realizes oneself only as 'I am'."<sup>198</sup> No contradiction need be implied in the description of the Self (*atman*) or its reflection as being both minute and



expansive. It is repeatedly described as being as subtle as, or more specifically in the Upanisads, as being more minute than an atomic particle.<sup>199</sup> It is also, however, referred to as being great/expansive (*mahan*)<sup>200</sup> or even as being both minute and great.<sup>201</sup> It is noteworthy that the descriptions of the realization of *atman* (or *purusa*) and of its "reflection" in *asmita* (correlating with cosmic being *mahan atma* or *mahat*) are very similar. It is as though one person were to describe the sky in its utter vastness and another speak of its clear reflection in a pond.

What needs to be emphasized at this point in our analysis is that the progression in *samadhi* from *vitarka* to *vicara* to *ananda* to *asmita* results in experiences of an ever-increasing sense of I or self, a *continuously expanding sense of self-identity*. This expanding sense of identity, which incorporates the levels of person/individual and cosmic (trans-egoic/individual) being, arises due to the finer perceptions (*yogi-pratyaksa*) or insights (*prajña*) of the yogin that disclose the nature of the objects experienced (the seeable, *drsya*). As stated in chapter 2, Yoga ontology follows from epistemology. In *asmita-samadhi* the yogin is identified with *mahat*<sup>202</sup> (cosmic or trans-individual being) or *mahan atma* (the great self), attains omniscience, and experiences self-identity as an undivided, nonfractured, unified self-nature or being.<sup>203</sup> Through *samadhi* one's identity has expanded to include the whole of manifest existence, a state that is transcendent of any subject-object (ego-world) bifurcation or fragmentation within *prakrti*. The yogin knows "I am the whole, the all-pervading sense of self that gives rise to and permeates all manifest existence." In *asmita-samadhi* the yogin is liberated from the idea of being a bound or limited identity dependent on being in association with joy or happiness (*sukha*) and attached to the pleasure of *sattva*. It is not until *asmita-samadhi* that the insight attained is said to be "truth-bearing" (*rtambhara*) disclosing the object as it is without any epistemological

distortion. At this exalted stage of *samadhi*, rather than being deprived of the levels of knowledge, perception, and understanding gained previously, the yogin reconciles and incorporates these levels into the fullness and perfection of the "truth-bearing" insight.<sup>204</sup> Having discarded all *attachment* to the lower or grosser levels of perception, the yogin's capacity to experience, understand, perceive, remember, rationalize, and so on, far from being negated or abandoned, is transformed, purified, enhanced; the various mental faculties thus being properly harnessed can then function more effectively in the practical world. There is a recognition and purification of self-identity in relation to the world and nature culminating in a reunification and integration of the individuated sense of self (*ahamkara*) with the trans-individuated, cosmic, or universal sense of "I-am-ness" or self as supported in *mahat/buddhi*.

Perception is not suppressed, flattened out, or destroyed through Yoga; it is transformed. The lower levels of realization are encompassed, not negated. By attaining increasingly subtler levels of perception through the sattvification of the mind, the yogin is more capable of embodying a richer affective lifeone that is inclusive rather than exclusive of the practical, relational worldfor prior to *samadhi* what had been held as ontologically and epistemologically separate from oneself is now seen for what it actually is, part of one corpus (*prakrti*) of existence. The moral-affective dimension of Yoga that includes the cultivation of friendliness, compassion, happiness, and so on, toward others (YS I.33) is an indispensable part of the yogin's journey into subtler

levels of realization and self-understanding and thus the overcoming of the selfish, contracted nature of ego. Through moral purification finer perception can arise, virtue thus acting as an efficient cause for removing nonvirtue (YB IV.3; see chapter 2), which in turn allows for greater concentration and meditative insight in Yoga. What is involved here is not a suppression but a reconciliation of past actions and a healing summation and transmutation of the human psyche. The moral, affective, and epistemological dimensions of Yoga are refined, and virtues, whether of an ethical or cognitive nature, are seen to converge in the *sattva* of the mind. By developing the capacity or power (*siddhi*) to "contact" or "locate" finer, clearer, and undiverted reflections of *purusa* within the mind, the yogin is purified of distorted perception, deluded self-understanding, and a host of other forms of nonvirtue. An increasing light of *sattva* including liberating knowledge (*jñāna*, YS II.28), dispassion (*vairāgya*, YS I.15), and other virtues such as compassion (*karuṇa*, YS I.33) pervades the yogin's consciousness, augmenting and spiritualizing the yogin's identity.

Yoga is not therefore a dissolution, negation, or rejection of psychophysical being the purpose of which is to isolate the yogin from relational, embodied existence. By including subtler dimensions of consciousness, Yoga can mean "addition" <sup>205</sup> implying here a recognition of its much overlooked capacity to value, enhance, and vivify human embodied life: cognitively, ethically, physically, and so on. To repeat our claim from the last chapter, "dissolution" or "cessation" (*nirōdha*) is of the deluding power of misidentification (in *samyoga*); "cessation" (*nirōdha*) is not a complete relinquishment of the power of identification itself that enables one to give attention to, empathize, understand, and "unite" with objects, persons, and so forth. Yoga discards all ignorance and attachment, not knowledge (*vr̥tti*) and relational existence in total. In order to be accomplished in Yoga, the yogin must be able to pinpoint or arrive at the cause of *samyoga* namely, ignorance (*avidyā*), the mind in its unenlightened state as locus of selfhood. *Samādhi* uproots the afflictions as they manifest themselves within our prakṛtic makeup including the subtler levels of *ahamkāra* and *buddhi*. In *samyoga*, *purusa* seems to conform to the nature of the seeable, selfhood being experienced within the context of the afflictions implying a mistaken identity of self (*asmitā*). The world (of objects) is misperceived through the "eyes" of egoity or ignorance. The mind's (*citta*) nature is paradoxical in that: (1) In *asmitā-samādhi* the root-afflicted-identity (*asmitā*) is located where the seer and the seeable appear to be one (in the *buddhi*). Yet (2) the *buddhi* or finest instrument of the mind (*citta*) has the quality of *sattva* or illumination through which the yogin discerns the difference between the *purusa* and the *sattva* of consciousness and gradually uproots and eradicates the affliction of *asmitā*. There results a purification of self in relation to the world and nature. Thus, through a series of subject-object identifications in cognitive *samādhi*, the yogin succeeds in temporarily transcending the polarization of self and world, the subject-object dichotomy that had previously governed and defined self-identity in *samyoga*. In fact, Patañjali's main concern throughout his analysis of *samādhi* is not with the objects themselves but with the misidentifications, attachments, aversions, desires, and fears that accompany the experiences of objects.

*Prakṛti* and her various manifestations, including the concept of mind (*citta*), are ingeniously utilized by Patañjali for pedagogical purposes, that is, as states (or powers) of identification that,

functioning positively as contemplative directives along the "path" of Yoga, can serve as heuristic devices for practitioners of Yoga. The practitioner must first discover or recognize aspects or evolutes of *prakṛti* that he or she is misidentified with, attached to, or has an aversion toward. By way of yogic technique and

one-pointedness of mind the practitioner then learns to "undo" any misidentification with objects or mental content including thought constructs/ideas (*pratyaya*) and mental processes (*vr̥tti*). Through cessation (*nirodha*) brought about by practice and dispassion, including the unhinging of attention from its confinement to ego-consciousness, the power of identification or *vr̥tti*-generating complex no longer functions under the influence of ignorance (*avidyā*). All *enslavement* to the nature of the seeable (*dr̥śya*) is eradicated. *Prakṛti* is not negated from the yogin's purview; she is more correctly aligned with pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) and therefore can be more fully incorporated. Through a deepening process of purification and illumination of the mind, misidentification dissolves. Thus in *samādhi*, *prakṛti*ion whatever level, gross or subtle ceases to function as an obstacle to clear, liberating insight. Without *prakṛti* there would be no ontological backdrop, no levels of existence or vehicles through which knowledge could take place. It would be impossible for liberation to arise because there would be no forms of subject-object identifications from which to locate any semblance of pure consciousness, overcome attachment, and grow in one's understanding. The concept of mind (*citta*) is in part a heuristic device for understanding the nature and functioning of reflected consciousness. In its unenlightened mode (*vyūthana*) under the sway of ignorance in the form of *vasanas* of misconceived knowledge (YB II.24) the mind as reflected, impure (prakṛtic) consciousness can be viewed as the cause and sustaining power of *samyoga*, bondage, and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). Yet when *sattva*-knowledge is allowed to shine forth, the mind, as reflected albeit purified consciousness, can be seen as the efficient cause of liberation disclosing knowledge for the purpose of *puruṣa*, the final cause (YB II.19). Thus Vyasa tells us that in the mind alone takes place both bondage and liberation.<sup>206</sup>

When *asmita* has been examined (in *asmita-samādhi*) its nature is fully realized. This corresponds to the state of "unification" (*saṁapatti*) with the "grasper" (*grāhitr*), (see discussion above on YS I.41); the "field" or focus of this ecstasy is the prakṛtic agent of knowledge. At this level "grasping" (knowing) and "grasper" (knower) lose their independent status: the analogy of radiance or clarity extends to one's inner being (*adhyātma*).<sup>207</sup> Vyasa<sup>208</sup> and Vacaspati<sup>209</sup> have understood contemplation on the "grasper" (*grāhitr*) as being that mysterious intersection of the prakṛtic knower-agent (located in mind-*sattva* or *buddhi*) and *puruṣa*, the authentic knower-witness. Here unification with the "grasper" (*grāhitr*) links up with *asmita-samādhi*. The yogin concentrates on the reflected "knower" ("grasper") in *prakṛti*; the real knower (YS IV.18) *puruṣa* cannot be made an object of knowledge, a

mental content (*pratyaya*) or modification (*vrtti*). What the yogin actually succeeds in realizing is *asmita*, the mental stand-in for *purusa*. Koelman puts it this way: "By concentration on the knower we reach the awareness-light projected by the Self. We do not actually grasp the very essence of the Self, we gain access only to its liminal result, that is its illuminating participation in the *sattva* of the [*buddhi*]." <sup>210</sup>

I have translated Vyasa's description of *asmita: eka-atmika samvit*<sup>211</sup> (YB I.17) as "the perception of the essential, unified nature of self." This refers to the prediversified, undifferentiated (unified), or rather trans-egoic condition of reflected self-identity in *prakrti*. The sattvic illumination of the mirror of *buddhi* and the reflected light of *purusa* are unified in *asmita*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu<sup>212</sup> explains that the word *eka* ("one") here signifies "only one," that is to say: "Only one, the Self (*atman*), is its object." He interprets this to mean that at this stage of *samadhi* there is only one object of support, the mind's perception of only the *purusa*, by which one realizes that "I am." As the object of contemplation merges here with the agent, the mind appears unified with *purusa*. In this view it is correct that the mind is seen to be unified with the Self, but it would be incorrect to assume that the pure, unreflected *atman* (*purusa*) is the object of contemplation. If we understand Bhikṣu's statement literally, then it seems safe to say that Bhikṣu has erred by asserting that in *asmita-samadhi* the yogin knows "I am thus alone," that is, that there is nothing further to know, and that this is the ultimate ground (or height) of realization. The union in *asmita* more likely expresses (as Bhikṣu would probably agree) an analogical understanding of consciousness. In Yoga philosophy, *asmita* is the apparent unity in consciousness of two very distinct self-identities: the Self or intrinsic identity on the one side, and on the other side its most subtle *prakrtic* conditioning, an extrinsic, empirical identity of self. It is then disclosed that what was taken for authentic identity, which is pure and unchanging, is really a composite and changing identity (*cittavrtti*), *asmita* being generated through the interplay of *purusa* and the mind under the influence of *avidya*. Actually, the realization of the pure *purusa* does not begin until *asamprajñata*, the supracognitive *samadhi*.

The only "passage" to authentic identity in Yoga seems to be through the exercise of a purified cognitive faculty.<sup>213</sup> The mind *in itself* does not form a link between *purusa* and *prakrti*. Only an actual exercise of knowledge on the side of *prakrti* is the "wire" (or "stream") that can convey the "current" (or "flow") within the mind that in turn leads to liberation (*Yoga-Bhāṣya* I.12). Knowledge (*jñāna*) becomes the efficient cause of spiritual "release." Due to the presence of *purusa*, the mind inevitably "undoes" its

own samsaric entanglements as locus of mistaken identity (*cittavrtti*) by means of the cultivation of knowledge. This process of the cessation (*nirodha*) of mistaken identity continues throughout the stages of cognitive *samadhi* up to the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*). At this level of perception *asmita-samadhi* matures into the realization of *vivekakhyati*, the re-cognition or illuminated cognition (YB II.26) of the distinctness of mind-*sattva* and *purusa*. Because of the unified, one-pointed awareness of *asmita*, this ecstasy, as with the *ananda* state of ecstasy, is not divided into *sasmita* and *nirasmita*.

The ability of the yogin in the practice (*abhyasa*) of *samadhi* to identify completely with the

object of support/contemplation and yet cultivate dispassion or detachment (*vairagya*) allows for the realization that the yogin's true being is not the same as, nor is it dependent on, the contemplated object. Moreover, the yogin is aware that the realization of *purusa* is still to take place. *Asmita-samadhi* reveals insight into the nature of the original identification (*asmita*) with the reflection of consciousness in the mind. With clear insight and understanding, its practice enables the yogin to cultivate dispassion toward the subtlest vicissitudes of *prakrti*. Patañjali's use of the term "as if" (*iva*, YS II.6 and III.3) applied to this stage of "unification" indicates that even the "identification" of the seer or power of seeing with the seeable or objects of experience is only an apparent "as if" identification or union. In Yoga one becomes "as if" ontologically at one with the objects in the "*nir*" forms of *samadhi* because at this stage of practice there is as yet an implied ontological duality of seer and seeable. In cognitive *samadhi*, the actual oneness attained with our objects of experience can more accurately be understood with an epistemological emphasis. The knower-agent in *asmita-samadhi* is nonseparate from the known, the power and potential of the whole of manifest existence (*mahat*). This can be seen to be the case because the reflection of the infinite *purusa* received by the mind is and has to be as vast or all-pervading as manifest *prakrti*<sup>214</sup> herself, just as the consciousness of our being a person is at least as extensive as our physical body. The "I" that identifies itself with the physical body is a function of the ego-principle, a mere evolute of *prakrti*. The unsullied *purusa* can be realized only *after* the pure reflection of pure consciousness is apprehended in *asmita-samadhi*. This realization is at the end of a series of identifications with, and dispassion toward, the grossest to the subtlest evolutes of *prakrti*; and the series of *samadis* (i.e., unifications or *samapattis*) explained by Patañjali are such a series.

In Yoga a distinction must be made between two types of knowledge gained by the yogin in *samprajñata*. First there is immediate knowledge

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(*prajñā*) independent of extraneous influences of the prakrtic world, the purest level of which is *buddhi*, or in its cosmic aspect *mahat*. This at its highest is "*nirvicara*" knowledge translated as "I am the whole," the recognition of an organic unity between grasper, grasping, and grasped bringing or "putting back" together, healing *prakrti*'s formerly fragmented parts as separate realities caused by the divisive and delusive nature of ignorance (*avidya*), that is, egoic consciousness and extrinsic identity. An epistemological oneness of knower and known, self and world takes place wherein the distinctions of knower, knowing, and known or grasper, grasping, and grasped (YS I.41) dissolve and there is no longer the predisposition to separate the perceiver from things perceived or vice versa. Yet there is also the use to which this primary experiential knowledge is put, for the purpose of liberation; that is *vivekakhyati*.<sup>215</sup> I understand *vivekakhyati* to mean the discriminative discernment between: (1) the extrinsic nature of consciousness and self-identity located in the mind (in *samyoga*) a reflected, gunic state of consciousness and (2) the intrinsic nature of consciousness and self-identity, the authentic "form" of Self (*svarupa*, *purusa*).

All misidentification with things prakrtic must eventually dissolve in the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*) in order for emancipation to ensue. There are yogins who become absorbed in the



source of all manifestation (*alinga*). Those who attain this state of utter absorption with unmanifest *prakṛti* and consider it to be the final destination are yogins referred to as *prakṛti-laya* (YS I.19). They have dissolved their identification with the evolutes and have become identified with undifferentiated, unmanifest *prakṛti* herself. However, they have not yet realized *purusa* and so continue in bondage to samsaric existence, living a kind of pseudo-liberation.<sup>216</sup> At this point, however, there appears to be nothing further to attain. The yogin does not realize without proper guidance or a *guru* that absorption in unmanifest *prakṛti* is actually not the end of the journey. In this state there are no "objects" except *prakṛti* herself. The yogin must now make efforts to "turn toward" *purusa*. However, if this direction does not become clear and the necessary guidance is not available or accepted, the *prakṛti-laya* (yogin) may mistake this point to be the culmination of Yoga, self-awareness becoming identified completely (i.e., misidentified) with *prakṛti*. All other *vṛttis* of identification have subsided but ignorance has not been completely eradicated. The *prakṛti-laya*'s sense of identity is still rooted in error (*viparyaya*), attachment, and the desire to have control or mastery over *prakṛti*.<sup>217</sup> The identification with *prakṛti* has not been transcended. It is interesting that Vyasa classifies the "unmanifest" (*alinga*) as not being caused by any purpose of *purusa*: "No purpose of *purusa* brings it about,

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nor is there any purpose of *purusa* in it." <sup>218</sup> It can be concluded that identification with and attachment to unmanifest *prakṛti* merely constitutes a detour on the path of Yoga. From the perspective of the liberated state, *prakṛti-laya* is simply another form of bondage. One could argue that at best *prakṛti-laya* is a "mild" (*mṛdu*) form of practice in comparison to the "moderate" (*madhya*) and "ardent" (*adhimatratva*) forms of practice involving more advanced yogins.<sup>219</sup> Apparently content with this state of identity and "form of practice" where there is as yet an "idea/intention of becoming" (*bhava-pratyaya*),<sup>220</sup> the yogin must continue to take birth in order to become purified from all misidentification with *prakṛti* and eventually abide in authentic identity as *purusa*.

### A Further Look at Cognitive *Samadhi*

For the purpose of clarifying the analysis given in this chapter on the stages of *samprajñata-samadhi*, it would now seem appropriate to ask the question: How many types of cognitive *samadhi* are there? A critical look at scholarly literature on Yoga reveals that there is a great deal of confusion on this issue. It is of interest to note the following statement by Feuerstein:

"Joy" and "I-am-ness" . must be regarded as accompanying phenomena of every cognitive [ecstasy]. The explanations of the classical commentators on this point appear to be foreign to Patañjali's hierarchy of [ecstatic] states, and it seems unlikely that *ananda* and *asmita* should constitute independent levels of *samadhi*.<sup>221</sup>

Our study disagrees with Feuerstein, suggesting that he has misapprehended the specific placement that these ecstatic stages are assigned, at least implicitly so, by Patañjali. I have previously shown how Vyasa can be read as taking *ananda*- and *asmita-samadhi* as later stages of *nirvicara-samapatti* and the sorts of experiences these two stages of *samadhi* represent.<sup>222</sup>



Vacaspati Misra proposes a model of eight types of "unification" (*samapatti*). He states: "Thus [with regard] to the 'objects of knowledge' there are four *samapattis*, [and there are a further] four [in respect to] the 'grasper' and the 'process of grasping'. Thus there are eight of these."<sup>223</sup> Following from *nirvicara-samapatti* which I have argued is the highest *samapatti* in Vyasa's classification, Misra adds four other stages, in effect doubling Vyasa's number. These stages, from highest to lowest, may be listed as follows:

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(1-2) *Nirasmita-* and *sasmita-samapatti*, both with "I-am-ness" as the object of support or objective prop.

(3-4) *Nirananda-* and *sananda-samapatti*, both with the sense organs as objects of support or objective props.

(5-6) *Nirvicara-* and *savicara-samapatti*, both with subtle objects as objects of support or objective props.

(7-8) *Nirvitarka-* and *savitarka-samapatti*, both with gross objects as objects of support or objective props.

Vijñana Bhikṣu proposes a six-stage model, explicitly rejecting Vacaspati Misra's view, according to which the mainstay of *vitarka-* and *vicara-samadhi* is the internalized object (*grahya*), of *ananda-samadhi* the instruments of cognition or grasping (*grahana*), and of *asmita-samadhi* the category of the grasper (*grahitr*). Bhikṣu instead regards joy (*ananda*) as a state that arises when the mind passes beyond the *vicara* stage; due to an increase in the quality of *sattva* there is a direct experience of a special pleasure termed "joy," which is then made the supportive factor of the ecstasy called *ananda*.<sup>224</sup> I have already given a critique of both Vacaspati Misra and Vijñana Bhikṣu on their views of *ananda-* and *asmita-samadhi*. This study agrees, however, with Vijñana Bhikṣu's adamant denial of a *nirananda*<sup>225</sup> or a *nirasmita*<sup>226</sup> form of *samadhi*.

G. Koelman offers a very elaborate analysis of the *samapattis*, opting for Vacaspati Misra's interpretation.<sup>227</sup> Koelman argues that the eight types of *samapattis* as delineated in the *Tattva-Vaisaradi* "are the core of Patañjali's mental discipline" and are indeed "a magnificent piece of psychology."<sup>228</sup> As one scholar suggests, however, "it remains an open question to what degree this [i.e., Koelman's] theoretical model is founded on *bona fide* experiential information."<sup>229</sup> There do not appear to be any sound grounds for justifying a need for a *nirananda* or a *nirasmita* stage of *samadhi*. Patañjali's own view seems to be that *nirvicara-samapatti* is the highest form of cognitive ecstasy, as this study has attempted to show by using a scheme of classification that adheres to the careful step-by-step process of *samadhi* outlined in both the *Yoga-Sutra* and the *Yoga-Bhasya*.

The *samadhis* with supportive factors (*salambana*) are also called *samadhis* "with seed" (*sabija*). As Patañjali asserts in *Yoga-Sutra* I.46: *ta eva sabijah samadhih*, "These [*savitarka*, *nirvitarka*, *savicara*, *nirvicara*] are *samadhi* with seed."<sup>230</sup> *Sabija samadhi* is a technical name for cognitive *samadhi*. In the literature on classical Yoga there appear to be two main interpretations of the

term *bija* as given in *Yoga-Sutra* I.46. According to Vyasa, "seed" (*bija*) refers to the "object" of contemplation or support.<sup>231</sup>

Bhoja Raja, in his commentary *ad locum*, also explains the term *bija* by "*alambana*" or "object of support."<sup>232</sup> The meaning of *Yoga-Sutra* I.46 in the context of the above interpretation of *bija* is that the forms of contemplation constituted by the *samapattis* do metaphorically have a supporting factor in the object<sup>233</sup> on which the mind has become one-pointed (*ekagra*).

Other interpreters maintain for *bija* its literal meaning of "seed."<sup>234</sup> Ramananda Yati and J. W. Hauer follow this interpretation wherein the forms of *samadhi* constituted by the *samapattis* have in themselves the seeds or potentialities (i.e., *samskaras*) of new mental processes (*vrttis*), which necessarily have to actualize themselves and, as a result, create further bondage. Hauer declares that *bija* stands for the seed of new *vrttis*.<sup>235</sup> Ramananda Yati understands *bija* in the sense of "seed of bondage."<sup>236</sup>

Vijñāna Bhikṣu states that the exterior objects (i.e., referring to the prakṛtic realm that is external to *purusa*) have qualities not belonging to the *purusa*. From these objects arise impressions (*samskaras*), characteristics (*dharmas*), and so forth, which are the seeds of dissatisfaction and future sorrow (*duhkha*, see *YS* II.16).<sup>237</sup> Elsewhere Bhikṣu considers that the forms of *samadhi* constituted by the *samapattis* are "with seed" both because they have an object of support (*alambana*) and because they give rise to new mental processes<sup>238</sup> with which the yogin becomes (mis)identified. I comply with Bhikṣu's later interpretation<sup>239</sup> and furthermore suggest that the seed-mechanism of misidentification (*cittavrtti*) or mistaken identity of the mind (*citta*) with *purusa* is the original or "source-seed" that must be uprooted and eradicated. This primal seed of ignorance or *samskara*, as we have seen, takes the form of the *vasanas* of erroneous knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*, *YB* I.24).<sup>240</sup>

Most commentators have struggled with *Yoga-Sutra* I.46, trying to resolve the apparent contradiction in the number of forms of cognitive *samadhi*. Vyasa's commentary seems to the point:

Those four unifications have external objects as their seeds; thus, *samadhi* too, is [said to be] with seed. When it is a gross object, the *samadhi* is *savitarka* or *nirvitarka*; when it is a subtle object, it is *savicara* or *nirvicara*. Thus is [cognitive] *samadhi* counted to be fourfold.<sup>241</sup>

Apparently ignoring Vyasa's clear statement, Vacaspati Misra has asserted that there are eight kinds of cognitive *samadhi*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu understands that there are six kinds. It is not crucial to our study to pursue all of their enumerations, classifications, and differing arguments. However, it is noteworthy that Vyasa has *not* stated that there are four kinds of cognitive

*samadhi*, but rather that cognitive *samadhi* is to be divided "fourfold" (*caturdha*). As explained earlier, the divisions<sup>242</sup> run as follows:

1. *Savitarka-samapatti* correlates with *savitarka-samadhi*
2. *Nirvitarka-samapatti* correlates with *nirvitarka-samadhi*
3. *Savicara-samapatti* correlates with *savicara-samadhi*
4. *Nirvicara-samapatti* correlates with *nirvicara-samadhi*, *ananda-samadhi*, and *asmita-samadhi*.

What is common to the above stages of ecstasy is that what is being known is within the realm of *prakrtic*, empirical experience and therefore is exclusive of *purusa*. *Purusa*, however, can at no time be made into an object or entity that the yogin takes it upon to realize outwardly or within the mind. Accordingly, all these forms of *samadhi* are labelled *samprajñata*, the *samadhi* of the accurate knowing of objects, including objective and subjective "distinguishables" that pertain to the realm of *prakrti*, that is, empirical identity. Were I really to know my authentic Self, clearly a manner of "oneness" or identity that is *asamprajñata* is required. It could not be a knowing to which I might give mental shape or form (*vrtti*), for that would mean it would be of some object, which *purusa* cannot be. The insights (*prajna*) that arise in cognitive *samadhi* cover, comprehend all phenomena, including my empirical persona, and enshrine in its higher stages unabashedly empirical claims that cannot be tested in any "rational" way by argument but can only be fully grasped and understood through direct experience, yogic perception (*yogi-pratyaksa*).

Patañjali maintains that in cognitive *samadhi* there are still "things of the mind" mental processes, content, or thought constructs that get in the way of or hinder our realization of *purusa*, intrinsic identity. The mind is likely to sully the purity of *samadhi* in *savitarka* and *savicara* in the ways explained earlier. The "nir" forms are plainly and simply those occasions of attained epistemological oneness when the mind does not interfere as stated. At the moment of the experience of pure knowing or knowingness, the sense of self as normally understood and felt as an ego-subject that is separate from the object of experience and that misappropriates or lays claim to the experience no longer veils (or remains an impediment or obstacle to) clear knowledge and understanding. Our misidentification of self-rooted in ignorance (*avidya*) and given shape through the samyogic/samsaric processes of *vrtti* and *samskara* that generate and sustain our notions (*pratyaya*) of egoity (*asmita*) is shown to be the product of a profound epistemological distortion that resides deep within the mind yet

that can effectively be removed through insight (*prajña*) or knowledge (*jñana*) in *samadhi*. However much *purusa* is conceived to be concealed or excluded in *samyoga*, it must be emphasized that without the presence of *purusa* as knower-witness no cognition or knowledge (*vrtti*) under any circumstances could arise in consciousness or function in the mind. The explanation of the existence of a "path" or "mapping" of Yoga from ordinary experience (*bhoga*) to the liberated "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) is based on the understanding that *purusa* is ubiquitous

and already present, immanent (though seemingly stained and misidentified as an entrapped entity within *prakṛti*) as the true knower/experiencer of ordinary cognition. Due to *purusa's* immanence, the sequence of "unification" (*samapatti*) from *grahya* to *grahana* to *grahitṛis* rendered pertinent and effective for liberation. Through the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*), the yogin succeeds in dissolving or discarding the limitations in the form of misidentification with *vr̥tti* imposed on self-identity.

*Purusa* is present throughout ordinary states of awareness and indeed the stages of cognitive *samādhi* through an "as if" identification taking the form of a reflected, albeit masquerading consciousness, a pseudo sense-of-self *that in seeking to secure its identity through prakṛti can never truly ground itself because it is itself extrinsic, inauthentic identity, irrevocably conditioned by and contained within the changing gunic realm*. Patañjali declares that all forms of *samprajñata*, being contemplations on and realizations of supportive factors, are *samādhis* "with seed" (*sabija*). Because they are *samādhis* on the realities perceived within the composite person and are "exterior" to *purusa*, they yet contain the seed of ignorance, further bondage, dissatisfaction, and sorrow. Therefore *samprajñata* is to be contrasted with *asamprajñata*, the supracognitive *samādhi* that, at the very highest level of realization, is said to be "seedless" (*nirbija*),<sup>243</sup> unaffected by ignorance and its *samskaras* and therefore free from all dissatisfaction. Thus the practice and cultivation of *samādhi* continues for the sake of each misidentified being. Even though in *samprajñata* the yogin is established in a one-pointedness (*ekagrata*) of mind that removes the barriers separating subject from object, the purest and most illuminated or sattvified state of mind (*niruddha*, *nirodha*) one in which the yogin is no longer dependent on objects of contemplation for the sake of liberation is yet to be attained.

We will now go on to complete our study of *samādhi* and the cessation (*nirodha*) of mistaken identity (*cittavṛtti*) in Yoga. Included in this final chapter will be an examination of the enstatic, supra- or transcognitive (*asamprajñata*) state of *samādhi* as well as a consideration of the meaning of the culminating state of liberation called "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).

## Chapter Six

### From Knowledge to the "Aloneness" of the Knower

#### The Soteriological Role of *Samskara* In Yoga

We have seen that one of the practical aims of Yoga is to generate and strengthen the nonafflicted mental processes (*aklista-vṛttis*) and impressions (*samskaras*) that help to eradicate the impurities of the mind rooted in error (*viparyaya*) and its five parts, namely, the afflictions (*klesas*)<sup>1</sup> As long as the afflictions are in place, a human being is ineluctably oriented toward experiences in the limited realms of *prakṛti*. The five *klesas* are the motivational matrix of the unenlightened mind. The cultivation of discipline in Yoga gives rise to sattvic virtues such as friendliness (*maitri*) toward other beings, nonviolence (*ahimsa*), compassion (*karuna*), and so forth. As ignorance (*avidya*) is gradually replaced by knowledge (*vidya*), attachment (*raga*),

aversion (*dvesa*), and so on, will also be replaced by their opposites, through their inevitable linking together by the mental impressions (*samskaras*). *Samskaras* of benevolence, dispassion, and the like, in opposition to their corresponding impurities, will, in their turn, counter the influence of ignorance and its web of afflictions (i.e., egoity/I-am-ness, attachment, aversion, desire for continuity/fear of death), contributing in this manner to an increasing light of knowledge,<sup>2</sup> an illumination of consciousness.

Thus, yogic disciplines culminating in *samadhi* are designed to bring about and foster those *samskaras* that can eventually subdue and eliminate

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the afflictions, gradually assuring an undisturbed "flow of" the mind toward liberation.<sup>3</sup> The more positively impregnated mental activities (*vrttis*) produce sattvic impressions (*samskaras*) and these in turn give rise to a different, positively transformed mental activity that will then produce new impressions, and so on.<sup>4</sup> The yogin's personality likewise becomes transformed meaning that it becomes morally and cognitively purified of the binding effects of *rajas* and *tamas*. The yogin develops a clarity of knowledge through which *prakṛti* is increasingly appropriated in a nonconflicting and unselfish manner. Purity of the *sattva* implies a mastery over *rajas* and *tamas* and their identity-constricting influences (i.e., attachments, aversions), and consists in a dispassion toward what is perceived and experienced. Purity (*suddhi*) generally stands for purity of the mental *sattva*,<sup>5</sup> even though the yogin's final "step" is that of becoming free from the influence of the *gunas* in their entirety and hence also from *sattva*.<sup>6</sup> In this way Yoga seeks to give, in the words of C. Pensa:

an analytical and "scientific" explanation . . . predominant in Indian religion, according to which true knowledge has such a totally transforming effect on the individual as to release him from the *samsara*. Terms such as knowledge, purification, *samadhi*, liberation, are thus all very closely related and interdependent; but this intimate association and reciprocity could not be had outside the connective tissue represented by the *samskaras* and their law.<sup>7</sup>

After considerable journeying on the "path" of Yoga, the yogin seeks to attain an eventual "victory" over *karma* in its form of spiritual ignorance (*avidya*). Again, Pensa incisively states:

Without such a victory there would be no sense in talking about freedom and absolute independence as the final result of the yogic *marga*. Nevertheless and here we have a vital point if this victory-liberation is to be achieved, it must be "sown" continually in accordance with the iron logic of the basic law: liberation may be achieved only on condition that the mind (*citta*), through adequate depuration, be enabled to produce the necessary amount of karmic impulses [*samskaras*] endowed with the specific quality of giving rise in their turn to liberation.<sup>8</sup>

In Yoga philosophy *samskara* functions both as a binding influence in the form of ignorance and where *rajas* and *tamas* predominate, or as a liberating force in the form of knowledge (*jñāna*) residing in the *sattva* of the mind. As Pensa implies in the above, in its most sattvic form

*samskara* has a profound soteriological significance in Yoga. There are

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many levels at which the strength of worldly, afflicted *karma* is reduced. For example, there are many expiatory observances of prayer, ritual offerings, and meritorious acts that reduce the power of already existing karmic traits, predispositions, and *samskaras* by adding to the karmic residue (*karmasaya*) the force of these thoughts and acts.<sup>9</sup> But these efforts do not free one from the entire bondage of *karma* and the inherent dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) within *samsara* because there is still one's involvement as an egoic identity: the inclination toward dependence on further acts and attachment to the results of those acts (in the form of gainful award engendering happiness/pleasure or loss generating sorrow, pain and aversion) still remains. The true yogic sacrificethe "interiorized" or "spiritualized" sacrifice (*yajña*) of egotism itself (as proclaimed, for example, by the early Upanisadic sages)<sup>10</sup> must be distinguished in Yoga from "external" or extrinsic forms of sacrifice or ritual that, motivated from a basic misconception of self rooted in a selfish mentality and desirous of material or spiritual gain, are clearly inefficacious for bringing about spiritual emancipation.<sup>11</sup>

The perceptual knowledge attained in *samprajñata* helps to reveal our very identity or being, which due to an epistemological error had seemingly become entangled and dispersed in the prakrtic realm. At the stage of *nirvicara-samadhi* (*samadhi* without subtle associations) the knowledge that arises is said to be "truth-bearing" (*rtam-bhara*);<sup>12</sup> the yogin has attained a "knowing-oneness" with the whole of manifest *prakrti* (*mahat*), including the ability to knowthrough *siddhis* or "powers" brought about by the application of *samyama* or "constraint" (see below)all of the various manifestations that arise out of *mahat*. At this stage the inner reflective awareness of self has become pure, clear,<sup>13</sup> and capable of contemplating its own true nature or essence. It is, however, only the lucidity and clarity made possible through the reflected presence of *purusa* in *asmita-samadhi* that is intended here. Vijñāna Bhikṣu correctly points out that the word *tatra* ("therein," YS I.48) refers to *sabija-samadhi*,<sup>14</sup> and even there only to the subtlest of the *samadhis* "with seed," namely *asmita*-accompanied *samadhi*, the highest form of *nirvicara* ecstasy. We must bear in mind that *all* forms of cognitive *samadhi* are experiential states that involve objects or mental content and in which misidentification of self is only partially transcended; still contained within the mind is the "seed" of ignorance, further confusion and sorrow that can "sprout" at any time, destabilizing, as it were, the yogin's developed state of one-pointedness. From a different perspective, the forms of cognitive *samadhi* can be regarded as yogic means for obtaining particular knowledge of

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*prakrti* and her manifestations or actualizations through the capacity of the mind for epistemic oneness with the object of support and contemplation.<sup>15</sup> At the most subtle awakening in *samprajñata*, the yogin is able through discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyaṭi*) to distinguish between the finest aspect of *prakrti*the *sattva* of the mindand *purusa*. This highly refined



discernment gives rise to sovereignty (*adhishthartva*) over all states of prakrtic existence and omniscience, that is, "knowingness"/"knowledge of all" (*jñatrtva*).<sup>16</sup>

Patañjali goes on to state: "The *samskara* born of that [truth-bearing insight] obstructs other *samskaras*."<sup>17</sup> Turning to Vyasa on this *sutra* we are informed that:

Upon the yogin's attainment of insight arising from *samadhi*, a fresh *samskara* made by that insight is produced. The *samskara* generated by the truth-bearing insight obstructs the accumulated residue of the *samskaras* of emergence (worldly, afflicted identification). When the *samskaras* of emergence are overcome, the ideas and intentions arising from them no longer occur. With the cessation of these ideas, *samadhi* presents itself. Then there is insight arising from the *samadhi*; from that, more *samskaras* are generated from the insight. Thus a fresh deposit of such *samskaras* is built up. From that again [is generated] insight which in turn produces more *samskaras* of insight. Why would this new accumulation of *samskaras* not draw the mind into an [afflicted] involvement with it? It is because the *samskaras* generated by insight cause the destruction of the afflictions, and so do not constitute anything that would involve an [afflicted state of] mind. In fact, they cause the mind to cease from its [afflicted] activity. Indeed, the mind's [afflicted] endeavor terminates in knowledge.<sup>18</sup>

As the impressions (*samskaras*) generated by *samadhi* gather force and are renewed on a regular basis through practice (*abhyasa*), the impressions of emergence (*vyutthana*) which are rooted in and add to an extraverted or extrinsically oriented sense of self weaken. The "old," former residue (*asaya*) of the mind constituting the deposits of afflicted, worldly *karma* and *samskaras* is gradually replaced with regularly replenished new impressions of *samadhi* generating insight (*prajña*), that is, yogic perception (*yogi-pratyaksa*), which again reinforces the impressions or *samskaras* of *samadhi*. Thus the past habitual pattern or cycle of egoically appropriated *vrttis* and afflicted impressions (*samskaras*) is broken. Due to the fact that these impressions of insight are of the nonafflicted (*aklista*),<sup>19</sup> sattvic kind, they do not generate any further afflictions in that they do not add to the rajasic and tamasic components or predispositions of the mind that would

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perpetuate misidentification as in the situation of *vyutthana*, the extrinsic mode of human identity.

What *Yoga-Sutra* I.50 indicates, at least from a soteriological perspective, is the fruit of the "truth-bearing" (*rtambhara*) insight (*prajña*). As the mind becomes purified of affliction including the *samskaras* and personality traits (*vasanas*) that sustain affliction it becomes capable of a steady "flow" toward the "good" meaning a "flow" of discernment<sup>20</sup> from which an identity shift can take place, an identity shift involving a transformation of consciousness from a mistaken, samsaric identity in *samyoga* to authentic or true identity (*svarupa*) as *purusa*. The starting point of this discernment may be, as Vyasa suggests, a questioning of one's individual identity, pondering on one's state of being by dwelling on questions such as, "Who have I been?" and "What shall we become?"<sup>21</sup> However, one must go beyond this initial inquiry in order to experience the rarefied consciousness of pure *sattva*, which

by transcending the individual consciousness, discloses discerning knowledge: "The one who sees the distinction [between extrinsic and intrinsic self-identity] discontinues the cultivation of self-becoming."<sup>22</sup> Having confused true identity for empirical or prakrtic selfhood by conforming (*sarupya*) to the changing nature of *vr̥tti*, one must then attain the discriminative discernment reflected in the pure, finest *sattva* of the mind (*citta*). In this achievement of knowledge the generation of the false or misidentified sense of self ceases. One no longer has any need to ask questions from the perspective of a confused person who upon seeking liberation remains ensconced in his or her own spiritual dilemma. As Patañjali goes on to inform us, the mind thus inclined toward discernment (i.e., discrimination = *viveka*) has a definite propensity for the liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).<sup>23</sup>

Impressions based on the clarity and stability of knowledge in *samadhi* have the power to remold, reshape, and restructure the psychological and epistemological functioning of the mind. As a result of these *samskaras* of insight, the new cycle or "wheel" of *samskara-vr̥tti-samskara* breaks the former "beginningless" (YS IV.10) cycle of samsaric identity by impeding, and therefore helping to remove, the worldly, afflicted *samskaras* of *vyutthana*. They prevent their effects (and affects), namely the *vr̥ttis* of extrinsic identity or worldly identification, rendering them ineffective, obsolete, incapable of functioning. Neither Patañjali nor Vyasa state exactly why the *samskaras* of insight (*prajña*) annul the appearance of other *samskaras*. Bhoja Raja explains the ability and strength given to this type of *samskara* by the fact that the insight that engenders it is in direct "contact" or alignment with the real

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nature or "thatness" (*tattva*) of existence,<sup>24</sup> implying an innate "order" or balance in life. This alignment comprised of knowledge structured in the mind (consciousness) in the form of "truth-bearing" insight (*rtambhara-prajña*), cosmic and individual existence is something that does not happen with other *samskaras* (of a *vyutthana* nature), being as they are rooted in ignorance and disconnected from the real nature of existence (*atattva*, see n. 24). A preponderance of the latter type of *samskaras* forces human identity to contract or "fall" from the natural (intrinsic) order, harmony, and balance of life.

Clarifying Vyasa, Vijñāna Bhikṣu<sup>25</sup> states that the regular practice and cultivation of *samprajñata* leading to a series of insights (*prajñas*) confirms and strengthens its *samskaras* without which the *samskaras* of emergence (*vyutthana*) will continue to arise. A single experience of *prajña* alone does not thwart the *samskaras* of emergence, but the opposing *samskaras* built up through sustained practice gradually attenuate<sup>26</sup> them. The mind's power to serve as a vehicle of ignorance and egoity is therefore weakened. Thus a pattern of *samadhi-prajña-samskara-samadhi* ensues. Through the *vr̥ttis* of higher perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) and their resultant *samskaras* of insight, the deluding power of ignorance and its regular pattern of *vyutthana-samskaras* and *vr̥ttis* that normally exacerbate an afflicted sense of self diminish in power and are eventually expelled altogether.

Why does Patañjali say (YS I.50, see n. 17 above) that it is the *samskara* of the *prajna* that obstructs the production of *vyutthana-samskaras*, and not that it is the *prajña* itself that does so? One plausible explanation of why Patañjali expresses himself in this way has to do with the

importance that the *samskara* is given at this point in the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*). At this stage of *samadhi* the *samskara* helps to generate and sustain insight (*prajña*), and the existence of the *prajña* presupposes that all other mental processes must have already subsided; at this moment of yogic praxis there cannot be the production of any afflicted type of *samskaras*. Patañjali is saying, according to our understanding, that it is the *samskara* of the insight (*prajña*) as the cause that checks the appearance of the other (*vyutthana*) *samskaras*. It is not the *prajña* itself as the effect that obstructs the effects of the residue of past action. The yogin is operating on the most subtle levels of *prakṛti*, in effect radically reordering the mind by changing the tendency of consciousness to generate identity captivated by the manifest realm as it has normally (and habitually) been understood, or rather misperceived. However, this is not as yet the final awakening in Yoga.

The goal in Patañjali's Yoga as expressed in *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 (Yoga is *cittavṛttinirodha*), is the utter cessation (*nirodha*) of the afflictions (*klesas*)

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in the form of an afflicted, gunic identity (*cittavṛtti*) of self. It is Patañjali's understanding that insight (*prajña*) and its *samskaras* are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the complete removal of ignorance and its effects, which include dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*). Thus *samadhi*, even at this subtle stage of practice, is still "with seed" (*śabija*). While *samprajñata* arrests the extrinsic (*vyutthana*-) mode of selfhood, of egoic, worldly identification and experience (*bhoga*)<sup>27</sup> experience being one of the purposes of the "seeable" (*dṛśya*, *YS* II.18), *prakṛti* or the mind (*citta*) the *samskaras* of insight foster the other purpose or assignment of the mind,<sup>28</sup> which is liberation (*apavarga*).<sup>29</sup> This involves nothing less than the final eradication or overcoming of *avidyā*'s hold over the mind, a "grip" or monopolizing power that is responsible for the superimposed condition of the "failure-to-see" (*adarsana*) resulting in mistaken identity. Even *prajña* and its impressions are not capable of overcoming or displacing the latent potential in the mind for epistemological distortion, selfish mentality, and afflicted activity. Insight (*prajña*) itself is a quality or virtue of the *sattva* of the mind, a special cognition or *vṛtti* of knowledge (*jñāna*) made possible due to the reflected and increasingly intensified presence of *puruṣa*. The locus of identity must, however, shift from the mind to *puruṣa*. The yogin is not satisfied simply with generating purer knowledge-type *samskaras*. As we will soon see, the yogin's goal is to cease to generate any *samskaras* at all, in effect, to transcend the whole samskaric-mode of self-identity by terminating the remaining *samskaras*. Yet, we must ask, how can a mind that is being fueled with the *samskaras* of insight in the experience of *samadhi* "with seed," and therefore still under the influence of the afflictions, reach "seedless" (*nirbija*) *samadhi*?

Enstasy (*Asamprajñata-Samadhi*)

After *samadhi* in the seeable/knowable and involving objects is attained and perfected, *samadhi* in the "unknowable" or "without the known" (*asamprajñata*) can be cultivated. Ultimately, the stage of "seedless" or "objectless" (nonintentional, contentless) *samadhi* takes place in which all affliction and its effects are "burned away," "scorched," bringing about the total cessation (*nirodha*) of *puruṣa*'s "superimposed condition" (i.e., *cittavṛtti*). Transcending the stages of

cognitive *samadhi*, all the potencies (*samskaras*) that form the root cause (i.e., *avidya*) of mistaken identity become purposeless, inactive, and dissolve from consciousness; and the consciousness of the "knower" formerly directed to the objects of experience settles down in the

pure knower (*purusa*) or experiencer for which there will be nothing then to be "known" or "experienced" soteriologically, that is, for the purpose of liberation. This *samadhi* is the supracognitive *samadhi*, *samadhi* in the autotransparent knower itself (i.e., the yogin's consciousness "directed toward," "merging in" and identified as *purusa*), which can never be an object of knowledge and is, in that sense, unknowable.<sup>30</sup>

*Yoga-Sutra* I.18 asserts: "The other [state] is preceded by the practice of the idea of discontinuation and has *samskara* only as residue."<sup>31</sup> Vyasa refers to "the other" in the above as "*asamprajñata samadhi*."<sup>32</sup> This *sutra* presupposes two questions: (1) What are the means to attain the supracognitive *samadhi*? (2) What is the nature of this *samadhi*? The phrase *virama-pratyaya-abhyasa-purvah* ("preceded by the practice of the idea of discontinuation") answers the first question and is explained in different ways by the commentators. Vacaspati Misra appears to support the notion (which I have argued against in chapter 4) that *virama* refers to the absence of all *vrttis*, implying here the ontological cessation of *vrttis*.<sup>33</sup> Vijñana Bhikṣu, who stresses an epistemological emphasis (*YV* I.18), declares that higher dispassion (*para-vairagya*) rejects the knowledge or self-identifications (i.e., identification with *vrttis* in *samprajñata-samadhi*) as being insufficient. I understand Vijñana Bhikṣu as saying that the meaning of *virama-pratyaya* is the awareness of the termination of the misidentification with knowledge (*vrtti*).<sup>34</sup> H. Aranya explains that the practice of higher dispassion is itself *virama-pratyaya*.<sup>35</sup> Bhoja Raja suggests that the abandonment of all concern with *vitarka* and such supports is in itself *virama-pratyaya*.<sup>36</sup>

Both Vijñana Bhikṣu and Vacaspati Misra agree, however, that the practice of *virama-pratyaya* means to enter repeatedly into a purer awareness than that engaged in cognitive *samadhi*.<sup>37</sup> The process involves, as Bhoja Raja asserts, establishing this practice again and again, cultivating the mind in this way.<sup>38</sup> Aranya seems to imply that the practice is perfected when the identification with the *vrtti* "I am" from *asmita* disappears.<sup>39</sup> In the enstatic realization of *asamprajñata* there is no longer misidentification, indeed no longer any soteriological need for identification with objects of support or mental content as in cognitive *samadhi*. This higher *samadhi* is characterized by the presence of residual *samskaras* only (*samskara-sesa*). Vyasa states: "When all [misidentification with] the mental processes and content has subsided and only the *samskaras* remain as residue, such cessation (*nirodha*) is the supracognitive *samadhi*. The means to this *samadhi* is higher dispassion. The practice with supportive factors is ineffective as a means of attaining it."<sup>40</sup> When even the *vrttis* of sattvic knowledge revealed in cognitive *samadhi* are mastered and the yogin is detached from

them, they are no longer fed or formed into *samskaras*. In ecstasy (*asamprajñata*), the *samskaras* cease to generate *vr̥ttis* of misidentification or egoity and simply lie as inoperative residue.

Does *asamprajñata* refer to a state of consciousness in which there is no cognition of any kind and therefore is to be rendered as "unconscious" as has been suggested in some translations or interpretations? <sup>41</sup> Taking a more positive approach to the nature of *asamprajñata*, S. Dasgupta comments: "This state, like the other states of the *samprajñata* type, is a positive state of the mind and not a mere state of vacuity of objects or negativity. In this state, all determinate character of the states disappears and their potencies only remain alive."<sup>42</sup> G. Koelman asserts that: "Concentration [sic] without objective consciousness should not be conceived as total absence of knowledge; only knowledge by objectification is absent."<sup>43</sup> Elsewhere, however, Koelman refers to *asamprajñata* as "unconscious absorption"<sup>44</sup> which is somewhat misleading in that the yogin finally attains an awakening of consciousness that reveals intrinsic identity to be *purusa*. In this state of *purusa*-realization the yogin's consciousness is established in the true form of the seer, the being "who" truly "sees" and is fully conscious (*cetana*). *Prakṛti* has no capacity to "know" or be conscious of *purusa*. Yet this shortcoming on the part of prakṛtic existence including ordinary human consciousness in no way justifies our classifying of *asamprajñata* as an "unconscious" state. Formally speaking, the nonconscious (*acetana*) is reserved for *prakṛti*'s domain and any attempt to portray *purusa* as an unconscious state is, from the perspective of Yoga, unwarranted.

Vyasa's commentary on *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 specifies that when the last stain of *rajas* is removed, the mind becomes established in the knowledge that *sattva* and *purusa* are different. This statement should not be confused with the purpose of *Yoga-Sutra* I.3. In the final analysis the term *nirodha* as used in *Yoga-Sutra* I.2 explains the state of the *mind* during *asamprajñata*, whereas *Yoga-Sutra* I.3 tells us that the seer's identitythe true form of Self (*purusa*)is established in its own authentic nature, and this realization of *purusa* takes place in *asamprajñata*. Awareness as restricted to the mind (and which can include illuminating insight or discriminative discernment) is a *vr̥tti*, but Self-awarenessthe conscious principle (*purusa*)is an immutable constant. Pure consciousness is not at all in the same category as the mental processes. The whole point of *asamprajñata* is to dwell in the true nature of *purusa* that, if not Self-aware, would be nonexistent. If *asamprajñata-samnidhi* is construed merely as an unconscious state, then what would happen to the unchanging power of consciousness (*citīśakti*, *YS* IV.34)? The conscious principle*purusa*, the seeris the power of seeing (*YS* II.20), pure con-

sciousness itself, and it is a mistake to proclaim this principle as unconscious in *asamprajñata-samadhi*. *Yoga-Sutra* I.18 only seems to contrast *enstasy**purusa* abiding in its true naturewith the ecstatic states outlined in *Yoga-Sutra* I.17, not by indicating the true nature of *purusa* (as realized in *asamprajñata*), but rather by explaining what happens to the mind after *asamprajñata* takes place: simply that, according to Vyasa, it receives *nirodha-samskaras* (see below for explanation). While it may be said that in ecstasy (*asamprajñata*) there is a temporary suspension of the mental processes as well as any identification with objects (i.e., the



functioning of *vr̥tti*), it would be misleading to conclude that higher *samadhi* results in a definitive cessation of the *vr̥ttis* in total (see chapter 4), predisposing the yogin to exist in an incapacitated, isolated or mindless state and therefore incapable of living a balanced, useful, and productive life in the world.

In *Yoga-Sutra* I.51 the final stage in the process of *nirodha* is enumerated as follows: "With the cessation of even that [*samskara* of *prajñā*], the cessation of everything else [i.e., all misidentification] ensues and that is seedless *samadhi*." <sup>45</sup> Vyasa explains:

This (higher *samadhi*) not only opposes the (identification with) insight (attained in cognitive) *samadhi* but impedes even the *samskaras* generated by that insight. Why? Because the *samskara* brought about by cessation (*nirodha*) counteracts the *samskaras* generated by (cognitive) *samadhi*. The existence of *samskaras* being formed in the mind as a result of this cessation is inferred from the experience that the cessation remains steady for progressively longer periods of time. The mind [as a vehicle for ignorance], along with the *samskaras* of *samadhi* on external objects (i.e., emergence or externalization = *vyutthana*) and the *samskaras* of cessation which lead one to liberation, are dissolved into their own original basis. Thus, the *samskaras* [of *nirodha*] do not cause the mind [in its previous state of ignorance] to continue to exist but prevent its involvement. Since that mind, no longer empowered, withdraws together with the *samskaras* (which lead to liberation), the *purusa* is established in its own true nature and is therefore called pure, alone, and free or liberated.<sup>46</sup>

In the above it has been understood that by the use of the term *vyutthana* referring to the extrinsic or attached modes of self Vyasa is including *samprajñata-samadhi*, which in contrast to *enstasy* (*asamprajñata*) the topic of *Yoga-Sutra* I.51 involves ecstatic experiences of identification that are yet "external" to authentic identity (*purusa*). There still remain dependency factors of support that by lying "outside" the domain of true selfhood, in *prakṛti*'s realm, prolong the yogin's susceptibility to the deeply embedded "seeds" of ignorance (*avidya*) that can germinate into further

dissatisfaction (*duhkha*). Up to the level of insight and self-mastery attained in *samprajñata*, the term "*vyutthana*" served as an antonym to *samadhi* (and *nirodha*) and denoted a "movement" of the mind "away" from *purusa* toward objects of perception, thereby generating an extrinsic identity of self, compulsive attachment to objects, and afflicted, worldly involvement. However, in contrast to *enstasy* ("standing or abiding in the Self"), it can be said that the ecstatic states of cognitive *samadhi* are also extrinsic modes of self-identity (*vyutthana*), that is, they arise within the context of *prakṛtic* experience and are based on an "externalized" or extrinsic nature and awareness of selfhood. The innermost core of Patañjali's Yoga constituting the climax of yogic purification is said to be *nirbija* ("without seed"), in comparison with cognitive *samadhi*, which being classified as *sabija* ("with seed"), is considered an exterior part (*bahiranga*, *YS* III.8) <sup>47</sup> of Yoga.

*Enstasy* (*asamprajñata*) not only eliminates any dependency on insight (*prajñā*) as a basis for



self-identity but also overcomes the *samskaras* of *prajña*. All prakrtic (gunic) self-understanding persisting within the core of the mind (*citta*) whether informed through corporeal or bodily identifications, whether in the form of affective, emotional, moral, cognitive, or egoistic identities, memories or *samskaras* of former attachments (*raga*), aversions (*dvesa*) or fear of death and desire for continuity (*abhinivesa*) must all be transcended. The *Yoga-Sutra* attests to contemplative experiences that cross the boundaries of ordinary human perception and initiate an exploration into an ontologically different mode of consciousness. In *asamprajñata-samadhi* the yogin's quest for authentic identity deepens and is now focused directly on the "extricated" and undefiled presence of *purusa*, a liberating realization resulting in the discovery of a trans-empirical and indestructible foundation of being; it is the recognition of a previously concealed, yet unchanging identity that is eternally pure (*suddha*), "alone" (*kevala*), and free (*mukta*).<sup>48</sup>

Vyasa tells us that while "cessation" (*nirodha*) overcomes any attachment to insight (*prajña*), the *samskaras* of *nirodha* thus generated counteract the *samskaras* of insight. A single "experience" or realization of *purusa* in *asamprajñata*, however, is unlikely to accomplish this task all at once. When regular practice undertaken with proper attention and reverence is cultivated and strengthened over time,<sup>49</sup> it causes an unbroken flow of calm or serenity in the mind and the final results accrue.<sup>50</sup> Vyasa suggests that a calm flow of the mind arises only through sustained practice, which brings about the *samskaras* of *nirodha*, for initially the state of peacefulness in the mind can easily be unsteadied and overwhelmed by the *samskaras*

of "extroversion" or "emergence" (*vyutthana*).<sup>51</sup> Only after the initial enstatic realizations in *asamprajñata* and through its transformative or "maturing" effects on the mind can the transcendence of the identifications in the ecstatic levels of *samprajñata* occur.<sup>52</sup>

*Asamprajñata-samadhi*, which initially coincides with a temporary stage of *purusa*-realization, presupposes a total turnabout or *metanoia* of consciousness, a complete shift in identity and transformation of understanding. Contrary to what C. Pensa<sup>53</sup> writes, the supraconscious *samadhi* is ultimately the *only* avenue to recover an awareness of our transcendent identity and autonomous freedom as *purusa*. For only this transphenomenal state of *samadhi* can fully kindle a fire of enstatic transcendence that does not involve the once powerful habit pattern or trait (*vasana*) of egoity (*asmita*). In *asamprajñata*, counter-*samskaras* are generated based on *purusa*-realization that gradually render obsolete all of the remaining types of *samskaras*. The yogin develops the "habit" of entering into the state of pure identity as *purusa* by regularly ascending into supraconscious *samadhi*. The former "habit" of egoic or samsaric identity is weakened when the yogin returns from the enstatic consciousness (*asamprajñata*) to the normal waking state of the mind. The "eight-limbs" of Yoga (*astanga*) outlined by Patañjali in the *Sadhana-Pada* (YS II.29)<sup>54</sup> can be seen as aids in this progressive shift from egoity to *purusa*. Yet, in the final analysis, the afflictions (*klesas*) are terminated not through any specific exercise, technique, attitude, behavior, or intention but solely by the dispassionate "act" of de-identifying completely with any notion of our psychophysical being as constituting authentic identity, *purusa*.

The direct means to ecstasy (*asamprajñata*), as stated by Vyasa,<sup>55</sup> is higher dispassion (*para-vairagya*). The yogin must take the step of becoming utterly dispassionate toward<sup>56</sup> (detached

from) the much esteemed yogic state of discernment (*khyati*) (between the finest aspect of *prakṛti* the *sattva* and *purusa*) and the supreme knowledge and power that proceed from it.<sup>57</sup> Higher dispassion, according to Vyasa, is the finest, most subtle limit of knowledge;<sup>58</sup> the yogin's thirst for liberating knowledge is quenched through knowledge of *purusa* as revealed in the last stage of insight (*prajñā*), which is said to be sevenfold (*YS* II.27).<sup>59</sup> Vyasa specifies that knowledge of *purusa* (*purusa-jñāna*, *YS* III.35) is attained by performing *Samyama* ("constraint") on the idea of *purusa* being, by nature, pure consciousness.<sup>60</sup> Vijñāna Bhikṣu notes that outside this particular *samyama* there is no other means given for direct perception of *purusa*.<sup>61</sup> Clarifying the nature of this high-level perception, Vyasa discloses that it is *purusa* that sees this knowledge of itself (as the knower) when no other processes

of apprehension or ideas arise in the mind.<sup>62</sup> It is the purest reflection of *purusa*, whereby the yogin realizes that there is no further need to look or seek "outside" *purusa* within *prakṛti*'s domain in order to gain liberation. The mind has temporarily attained fulfillment of what it had to do: to act as a vehicle for the liberating knowledge of *purusa*.<sup>63</sup> However, it is still subject to the "seed" of *avidyā* and needs further purification. All *prajñā*, thus, is but a temporary state; it is not the purest state of knowing/seeing, that being a permanent power belonging to the knower/seer, *purusa* alone.

The higher dispassion, as Vyasa suggests, grows in stages. Upon returning from *asamprajñāta* to the waking state, the yogin observes the time that has elapsed and thereby infers that the state of *nirodha* (*niruddha*) has indeed occurred. It is important to note that the state of mind being referred to here as *nirodha* (*niruddha*) is, formally speaking (*YB* I.1), the purest state of the mind that follows from the one-pointed state of mind (*ekagra*) in cognitive *samādhi*. It is the accumulated force of the experiences of *nirodha* that creates impressions until dispassion develops to the utmost degree. If this were not so, the increased intensity and length of the enstatic "experience" would not result. Thus, the yogin infers that both *nirodha* and its impressions do take place.<sup>64</sup> Having transcended all *vr̥tti*-knowledge and mental content through higher dispassion, the *gunas* no longer hold any epistemological power over the yogin. There is no memory (*smṛti*) carried over from the "experience" in *asamprajñāta*.

Yet a question ensues: Since the *nirodha*-state of the mind (generated from *asamprajñāta*), not being a *vr̥tti*, does not produce a corresponding idea, cognition, or insight, how is it possible for a *samskāra* of *nirodha* to form? One response to this query, given by H. Aranya, is that the flow of ideas and apprehensions exists before the experience of *nirodha* and continues after it. The break in that flow is recognized by the mind and this recognition constitutes the *nirodha-samskāra*. As these breaks occur more frequently and are prolonged through practice, the tendency to enter into the state of *nirodha* increases.<sup>65</sup> Finally, misidentification with the flow of ideas (*pratyaya*) and mental processes (*vr̥tti*) permanently ceases and the yogin forever abides in the true enstatic nature of *purusa*, the seer (*YS* I.3). This supracognitive awareness must be cultivated under all conditions including during: (1) the "formal" practice (*sādhana*) of *samādhi* in the meditative posture, and (2) ordinary involvement in the world. While performing all the necessary duties of the world personal or otherwise the yogin continues to reflect upon all

knowledge (*vrtti*) as it arises in the mind. The yogin then traces this "flow" of knowledge back to the pure knower

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(*purusa*) of knowledge until the *samskaras* that formerly corrupted the attention needed for this purpose become so weakened that ecstasy becomes increasingly integrated with the wakeful state. Up to this time the yogin's attention had been interrupted constantly by the prakrtic identifications. But now after a profound journey of purification and illumination of understanding, the yogin, remaining alert, aware and open to the everyday world, finds repose in an uninterrupted, "seedless" *samadhi* where identification with *vrttis*, thoughts, emotions, relationships, and so forth, is recognized as a nonenslaving association. Prior to *nirbija-samadhi*, this trans-empirical awareness must be diligently cultivated by overcoming the *samskaras* of mistaken identity, attachment, and so on, including the objects and mental content that left their imprints in *samprajñata-samadhi*. Bhoja Raja describes it thus: As the yogin progresses through the stages of cognitive *samadhi*, the knowledge-*vrtti* at each stage is dissolved into its own samskaric cause; as each *vrtti* arises from a *samskara*, the yogin discerns "not this, not this" (*neti neti*). Denying *vrttis* any intrinsic worth, pure consciousness is pursued with greater intensity until the culminating state of "seedless" *samadhi* is reached.<sup>66</sup> This view as articulated by Bhoja Raja echoes an important teaching of the Upanisads.<sup>67</sup>

The process of cessation (*nirodha*) results in an expansion of insight, self-understanding, and identity in *samadhi*, followed by a creative potency. *Nirodha* does not mean the destruction, suppression, or negation<sup>68</sup> of the mental processes or the realm of the *gunas* in total, as we have argued earlier.<sup>69</sup> It is not a deadening of the mind but entails a form of mental initiative that allows for a sattvification (i.e., purification and illumination) of consciousness (the mind). The final cessation of mistaken identity thus can be viewed as a positive process disclosing a finer attunement between *purusa* and *prakrti* and producing *samskaras* in no less fashion than is the case with the *vrttis*.<sup>70</sup> However, as the *samskaras* of *nirodha* grow progressively more intense, they end up turning, paradoxically, against any form of mental activity based on egoity, misidentification, and ignorance, including their own existence. The consequence of all this can be none other than *kaivalya*: *purusa* entirely free shines with its own power of consciousness (*citisakti*).<sup>71</sup> The process of final cessation (*nirodha*) epitomizes well the bipolarity of the yogic "path" where both *abhyasa* (i.e., the "practice of the idea of discontinuation" *virama-pratyaya-abhyasa*) of misidentification with *vrtti*, YS I.18) and *para-vairagya* (i.e., the higher dispassion that serves as the final means to ecstasy) are the primary methods that the yogin must utilize in order to be properly prepared for the "event" of liberation.

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A brief summary of the process of *nirodha* as it passes through the various states of mind can now be formulated. In the following order of development, *nirodha* involves: (1) turning the mind away from external, grosser identifications resulting in restless, agitated, or rajasic (*ksipta*)

and dull, somnolent, or tamasic (*mudha*) states of mind, allowing for (2) the beginnings of *samadhi* as in the distracted (*viksipta*) state of mind when, for a short period *sattva* gains ascendancy; the *samskaras* of *viksipta* are gradually supplanted by those of (3) one-pointedness (*ekagrata*) and the "truth-bearing" insight where the binding power of the rajasic and tamasic or afflicted modifications (*klista-vrttis*) and their *samskaras* is discarded so that the "tide" or current of the *samskaras* of a *vyutthana*-nature no longer waxes or wanes giving a wavering, unsteady nature to the mind. Consequently, (4) the discriminative discernment of the distinction between *purusa* and the finest aspect of *prakrtisattva* can take place. All attachment even to the purely sattvic, nonafflicted (*aklista*) *vrttis* of insight (*prajñā*) along with their *samskaras* dissolves when the state of *nirodha/niruddha* gains considerable strength and momentum. In *asamprajñata*, *purusa* dwells by itself and this enstatic "experience" generates a *nirodha-samskara*. Moreover, as Bhoja Raja affirms, "the *samskaras* born of *nirodha* burn the *samskaras* born of 'one-pointedness' (*ekagrata*) and also burn themselves." <sup>72</sup> There being no stage of samsaric involvement after this, no other *samskaras* can replace the *nirodha-samskaras* that have "burnt" or "consumed" themselves.

The higher dispassion arising from the discernment of *purusa* (YS I.16) is the crucial means that prevents the mind from being overtaken by the *vyutthana*-mode of identification; it is an advanced stage of mastery (*vasikara*) following from the lower form of dispassion (*vairagya*) defined in YS I.15<sup>73</sup> where the yogin is no longer under the binding influence of the *avidya*-dominated play of the *gunas* (i.e., *samyoga*). Soteriologically, the *gunas* have become "void of purpose" (*artha-sunya*, YB I.18). Epistemologically, the yogin is freed from the limited forms of perception and self-understanding based on *samprajñata*-identifications. This state is also referred to as "having *samskara* only as residue" (*samskara-sesa*, see n. 31). If this state is in its initial stages and is not sufficiently established in the mind, further misidentification with objects (and therefore of selfhood) can arise.<sup>74</sup> Eventually this subtle residue of *samskaras* dissolves in a last purificatory stage of the mind and the yogin permanently lives in "a state, as it were, of the absence of objects [of support] . . . the seedless *samadhi* which is supra-cognitive."<sup>75</sup>

It appears to be the case that both Patañjali and Vyasa use the term *samskara* to refer to mental impressions that are structured and function within the overall context of spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) a misapprehension of authentic identity, of the true nature of *purusa* and within the context of liberating knowledge (*jñāna*, *prajñā*) that frees the yogin from ignorance and its effects (and affects). *Samskara* means a mental impression based on some degree of ignorance of *purusa* and can include knowledge (*jñāna*) or insight (*prajñā*) as it continues to function within the broader epistemological framework of the "failure-to-see" (*adarsana*), that is, the failure to identify as *purusa* and "see" clearly from the perspective of *purusa*. *Samskaras* arise within the context of our primary analogue of empirical discourse *cittavrtti* wherein there lies any potential for, including any present manifestation of, mistaken identity. This is obviously the case for impressions (*samskaras*) of an afflicted, extrinsic (*vyutthana*) nature. Yet it is not so apparent for impressions generated by insight (*prajñā*) and the final state of cessation (*nirodha*). *Samskaras*, therefore, paradoxically refer to one of the principal building blocks or forms of ignorance in the process of *samyoga* and misidentification as well as referring to one of the

*principal removers or eliminators of ignorance and the situation of samyoga or misidentification. Vrttis*, as we have seen,<sup>76</sup> also perform a similar paradoxical role in Yoga. However, even though the *samskaras* of *prajña* counteract and annul the rajasic and tamasic *samskaras* in the *vyutthana*-mode of empirical identity, and the *nirodha-samskaras* in turn obstruct and supersede the sattvic *samskaras* of insight in cognitive *samadhi*, both of these types of *samskaras* (*prajña* and *nirodha*) remain only until the seed-mechanism (*cittavrtti*) of our mistaken identity with the "seeable" is completely eradicated and their purpose to bring about experience and liberation has been fulfilled.<sup>77</sup> The use of the *samskaras* of *prajña* and *nirodha* are similar to the act of using a thorn to remove another thorn and then discarding both when the job is done. The mind thus ceases to generate further *samskaras* and has become utterly pure, *samskara*-free, transparent to all modes of misidentification. When Vyasa tells us that the *samskaras* of the yogin have become "burned," their seeds "scorched" (YB IV.28), it is meant that *avidya* the cause of *samyoga* and all the *samskaras* that take the form of habit patterns of misconception or error (*viparyaya-vasanas*, YB II.24) has been burned, and not that the mind or "consciousness-of" (the power of identification) or the functioning of mental impressions and memory in total have been destroyed.<sup>78</sup> The yogin's understanding and the functioning (*vrtti*) of the mind have been transformed, not negated.

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In short, only ignorance (*avidya*) and its concomitant misidentification (the superimposition of identity in *samyoga*) are eliminated in Yoga. It is, in a sense (and a very specialized sense at that), correct to say that in Yoga "*prakṛti* dissolves"; but we must be very careful to pinpoint exactly what we mean when we say this. After all, the nature of manifest *prakṛti* is to be engaged in a process of constant change and transformation involving the three *gunas*, a process that incorporates periods of manifestation ("creation"), stabilization (sustenance, maintenance), and dissolution of formed reality. "Dissolution," "a returning to the source" (i.e., of unmanifest *prakṛti*) is an intrinsic dynamic of the conditional realm of the *gunas*. This study submits that it is *prakṛti* in her mental/psychological formation of *samskaras* and *vrttis* of misidentification (mistaken identity) that dissolves in Yoga.<sup>79</sup> The former and habitually impure mind or selfish mentality rooted in misperception/misconception (*viparyaya*) and its *samskaras* (and habit patterns or *vasanas*) is transformed into a purified mind rooted in knowledge. The psychology of limited counterproductive states of mind is transformed through direct insight into the true nature and states of *prakṛti*, thereby undoing an afflictive process (*klista, klesa*) of egoity built on the "failure-to-see" (*adarsana, avidya*). Clearly Yoga philosophy, far from negating human nature, has profound ramifications for psychological improvement. The superimposed condition of *purusa* or state of *samyoga* that is the cause (YS II.17) of impending dissatisfaction or sorrow (*duhkha*, YS II.16) is discontinued or discarded and there is no purpose for the further production of *samskaras*. This finality to the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*) is called "seedless" (*nirbija*-) *samadhi*, meaning that the "seed" of all ignorance has been eliminated. Thus Yoga as a spiritually emancipating process takes place within the framework of misidentification/superimposition and its annihilation. Through a series of de-identifications of selfhood with phenomenal existence involving a sustained discipline of practice coupled with a dispassionate awareness, Yoga yields greater insight into the nature of the mind, thus opening the way for clearer knowledge of *purusa* until there arises an unmistakable identity as *purusa*.



## "Aloneness" (*Kaivalya*): Implications for an Embodied Freedom A Final Analysis and Assessment of the *Yoga-Sutra*

The term *kaivalya*, meaning "aloneness,"<sup>80</sup> has elsewhere been translated as "absolute freedom,"<sup>81</sup> "total separation,"<sup>82</sup> "transcendental aloneness,"<sup>83</sup> "independence,"<sup>84</sup> "absolute isolation,"<sup>85</sup> and "isolation."<sup>86</sup> In the classical

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traditions of Samkhya and Yoga, *kaivalya* is generally understood to be the state of the unconditional existence of *purusa*. In the *Yoga-Sutra*, *kaivalya* can refer more precisely to the "aloneness of seeing" (*drseh kaivalyam*) that, as Patañjali states, follows from the disappearance of ignorance (*avidya*) and its creation of *samyoga*<sup>87</sup> the conjunction of the seer (*purusa*) and the seeable (i.e., *citta*, *gunas*) explained by Vyasa as a mental superimposition. "Aloneness" thus can be construed as *purusa's* innate capacity for pure, unbroken, nonattached seeing/perceiving, observing or "knowing" of the content of the mind (*citta*).<sup>88</sup>

In an alternative definition, Patañjali explains *kaivalya* as the "return to the origin" (*pratiprasava*) of the *gunas* that have lost all soteriological purpose for the *purusa* that has, as it were, recovered its transcendent autonomy.<sup>89</sup> This *sutra* (YS IV.34) also classifies *kaivalya* as the establishment in "own form/nature" (*svarupa*), and the power of higher awareness (*citisakti*).<sup>90</sup> Although the seer's (*purusa*) capacity for "seeing" is an unchanging yet dynamic power of consciousness that should not be truncated in any way, nevertheless our karmically distorted or skewed perceptions vitiate against the natural fullness of "seeing." Having removed the "failure-to-see" (*adarsana*), the soteriological purpose of the *gunas* in the samsaric condition of the mind is fulfilled; the mind is relieved of its former role of being a vehicle for *avidya*, the locus of selfhood (egoity), and misidentification, and the realization of pure seeing the nature of the seer alonetakes place. *Yoga-Sutra* IV.34 completes the definition of Yoga as *cittavrttinirodha*, whereupon the seer abides in its own form or pure identity (YS I.3).

According to yet another *sutra* (YS III.55), we are told that *kaivalya* ensues when the *sattva* of consciousness has reached a state of purity analogous to that of the *purusa*.<sup>91</sup> Through the process of sattvification the subtilization or "return to the origin" (*pratiprasava*) in the *sattva* the transformation (*parinama*) of the mind (*citta*) takes place at the deepest level, bringing about a radical change in perspective: the former impure, fabricated states constituting a fractured identity of self are dissolved or discarded, resulting in the complete purification of mind. The mind thus purified probably refers to the "one mind" (*cittam ekam*, YS IV.5)<sup>92</sup> in its most refined and subtle form of *sattva* (or *buddhi*), which being pure like *purusa* is associated with "aloneness."<sup>93</sup> For Patañjali goes on to say: "There [in that one mind], what is born of meditation is without [karmic] residue."<sup>94</sup> When the *gunas* have fulfilled their purpose for providing experience and liberation, their afflicted condition dissolves forever and *purusa*, absolutely disjoined from them in their form of ignorance, is no longer incorrectly associated with sorrow and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*).<sup>95</sup> Through

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knowledge and its transcendence, self-identity overcomes its lack of intrinsic grounding, a lack sustained and exacerbated by the web of afflictions in the form of attachment, aversion, and the compulsive clinging to life based on the fear of extinction. The yogin is no longer dependent on liberating knowledge (*mind-sattva*),<sup>96</sup> is no longer attached to *vr̥tti* as a basis for self-identity. The beginningless succession of changes of the *gunas* (or empirical characteristics) that was incorrectly assumed to be related to authentic identity (*purusa*), and that was itself the first notion of bondage, comes to an end. This ending, it must be emphasized, does not mark a definitive disappearance of the *gunas* from *purusa's* view.<sup>97</sup> For the liberated yogin, the *gunas* cease to exist in the form of *avidya*, its *samskaras*, *vr̥ttis*, and false cognitions, notions or fixed ideas (*pratyaya*) of selfhood that formerly veiled true identity. The changing gunic modes cannot alter the yogin's now purified and firmly established consciousness. The mind has been liberated from the *egocentric world of attachment to things prakrtic*. Now the yogin's identity (as *purusa*), disassociated from ignorance, is untouched, unaffected by qualities of mind,<sup>98</sup> uninfluenced by the *vr̥ttis* constituted of the three *gunas*. The mind and *purusa* attain to a sameness of purity (YS III.55), of harmony, balance, evenness, and a workability together: the mind appearing in the nature of *purusa*.<sup>99</sup>

According to J. Gonda, the various methods and limbs of Yoga have but one purpose, the isolation (*kaivalya*) of the spirit. Gonda sees *kaivalya* as incorporating the perfect simplicity and uniformity of the nucleus of personality.<sup>100</sup> As an addendum to Gonda's position it can be stated that *kaivalya* in no way presupposes the destruction or negation of the personality of the yogin, but is an unconditional state in which all the obstacles or distractions preventing an immanent and purified relationship or engagement of person with nature and spirit (*purusa*) have been removed. The deep-rooted "knots" (*gran̥thi*) of the mind<sup>101</sup> in the form of habit patterns (*vasanas*) of misconceived knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*)<sup>102</sup> have been undone ("untied"). The mind, which previously functioned under the sway of ignorance coloring and blocking our awareness of authentic identity, has now become purified and no longer operates as a locus of misidentification, confusion, and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*). *Sattva*, the finest quality (*guna*) of the mind, has the capacity to be perfectly lucid/transparent, like a dust-free mirror in which the light of *purusa* is clearly reflected and the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*)<sup>103</sup> between *purusa* and the *sattva* of the mind (as the nature of the "seeable") can take place.<sup>104</sup> The crucial (ontological) point to be made here is that *prakṛti* ceases to perform an obstructing role in *kaivalya*. In effect, *prakṛti* herself has become liberated<sup>105</sup> from *avidya's* grip

including the misconceptions, misappropriations, and misguided relations implicit within a world of afflicted selfhood. The mind has been transformed, liberated from the egocentric world of attachment, its former afflicted nature abolished; and self-identity left alone in its "own form" or true nature as *purusa* is never again confused with all the relational acts, intentions, and volitions of empirical existence. Vyasa explicitly states that emancipation happens in the mind and does not literally apply to *purusa*, which is by definition already free and therefore has no

intrinsic need to be released from the fetters of samsaric existence.<sup>106</sup> While this is true from the enlightened perspective, it would not be inappropriate to suggest that, figuratively speaking, in the state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) *purusa* and *prakrti* are simultaneously liberated in that, all ignorance having been removed, *they are both "known," included, and are therefore free to be what they are.* There being no power of misidentification remaining in *nirbija-samadhi*,<sup>107</sup> the mind ceases to operate within the context of the afflictions, karmic accumulations, and consequent cycles of *samsara* implying a mistaken identity of selfhood subject to birth and death.

The *Yoga-Sutra* has often been regarded as calling for the severance of *purusa* from *prakrti*; concepts such as liberation, cessation, dispassion, and so on, have been interpreted in an explicitly negative light. Max Müller, citing Bhoja Raja's commentary<sup>108</sup> (eleventh century CE), refers to Yoga as "separation" (*viyoga*).<sup>109</sup> More recently, numerous other scholars<sup>110</sup> have endorsed this interpretation, that is, the absolute separateness of *purusa* and *prakrti*. In asserting the absolute separation of *purusa* and *prakrti*, scholars and nonscholars alike have tended to disregard the possibility for other (fresh) hermeneutical options, and this radical, dualistic metaphysical closure of sorts surrounding the nature and meaning of Patañjali's Yoga has surely proved detrimental to a fuller understanding of the *Yoga darsana* by continuing a tradition based on an isolationistic (and therefore one-sided) reading or perhaps misreading of the *Yoga-Sutra* and Vyasa's commentary. Accordingly, the absolute separation of *purusa* and *prakrti* can only be interpreted as a disembodied state implying death to the physical body. However, Patañjali observes that the "desire for continuity" (*abhinivesa*) in life arises even in the sage,<sup>111</sup> although it would be accurate to say that the sage, having developed dispassion toward all things, is no longer enslaved by this basic "thirst" or "clinging to life" or by any fear of extinction. To dislodge the sage from bodily existence is to undermine the integrity of the pedagogical context that lends so much credibility or "weight" to the Yoga system. Thus it need not be assumed that in Yoga liberation coincides with physical death.<sup>112</sup> This would only allow for a

soteriological end state of "disembodied liberation" (*videhamukti*). What is involved in Yoga is the death of the atomistic, egoic identity, the dissolution of the karmic web of *samsara* that generates notions, specifically misconceptions, that we are merely "subjects," each one of us trapped in the prakrtic constitution of a particular body-mind.

The transformation from ignorance into the enlightened perspective requires a fundamental restructuring of ideas of self that takes place through a process that we have termed the "sattvification" of the mind or consciousness. In the ordinary consensus reality of empirical existence the sense of self misidentified with any aspect of *prakrti* thinks that it is the seer. Upon meditative reflection it is disclosed that the empirical I-sense is not the seer,<sup>113</sup> but merely masquerades as the seer. A high-level power of discernment ascertaining the difference between the seer and the seeable (which includes our empirical I-sense) arises and aids in the dissolution of any remaining fixed or reified notions of self and world that maintain egoity and its compulsive attachment to the "things" of the world. The separate, empirical, and prakrtic I-sense in *samyoga* (often equated with the principle of *ahamkara*) is then understood to be a function

within *prakṛti* catalyzed by the affliction of *asmita*. But due to the purification attained in *samādhi*, the sense of self no longer interferes in the act of perception thus resulting in a state of "unification" (*samapatti*) or nonseparation between seer, seeing, and the seeable. As *YS* III.55 implies, *kaivalya* requires the presence of both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* in the act of pure "seeing," *puruṣa* "providing" the consciousness of the seer who actually "sees," and *prakṛti* supplying the arena of the seeable, the existence of the seen.<sup>114</sup>

Not being content with mere theoretical knowledge, Yoga is committed to a practical way of life implying "physical training, exertion of will power and acts of decision, because it wants to deal with the complete human situation and provide real freedom, not just a theory of liberation."<sup>115</sup> To this end, Patañjali included in his presentation of Yoga an outline of the "eight-limbed" path (*astāṅga-yoga*)<sup>116</sup> dealing with the physical, moral, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of the yogin, an integral path that emphasizes organic continuity, balance, and integration in contrast to the discontinuity, imbalance, and disintegration inherent in the condition of *samyoga*. The idea of cosmic balance and of the mutual support and upholding of the various parts of nature and society is not foreign to Yoga thought. Vyasa deals with the theory of "nine causes" (*nava karanāṇi*) or types of causation according to tradition.<sup>117</sup> The ninth type of cause is termed *dhṛti* meaning "support," "sustenance" and is explained by Vyasa as follows: "The cause of sustenance for the sense organs is the

body; and that [body] is supported by these [sense organs]. The elements sustain the bodies and the bodies support each other; and because there has to be mutual support, animal, human, and divine bodies support all entities."<sup>118</sup> On the basis of Vyasa's explanation of *dhṛti*, we can see how mutuality and sustenance are understood as essential conditions for the maintenance of the natural and social world. There is an organic interdependence of all living entities wherein all (i.e., the elements, animals, humans, and divine bodies) work together for the "good" of the whole and for each other.

At this point I would like to emphasize a much overlooked aspect of Yoga thought. Far from being exclusively a subjectively oriented and introverted path of withdrawal from life, classical Yoga acknowledges the intrinsic value of "support" and "sustenance" and the interdependence of all living (embodied) entities, thus upholding organic continuity, balance, and integration within the natural and social world. Having achieved that level of insight (*prajñā*) that is "truth-bearing" (*rtambhara*),<sup>119</sup> the yogin perceives the natural order (*rta*) of cosmic existence, "unites" with and embodies that order. To fail to see clearly (*adarsana*) is to fall into disorder, disharmony, and conflict within oneself and with the world. In effect, to be ensconced in ignorance implies a disunion with the natural order of life and inextricably results in a failure to embody that order. Through Yoga one gains proper access to the world and is therefore established in right relationship to the world. Far from being denied or renounced, the world, for the yogin, has become transformed, properly engaged. The term 'Yoga,' which can mean "addition,"<sup>120</sup> carries with it the philosophical connotations of an inclusiveness in that Yoga ultimately *adds or includes the power of consciousness that is puruṣa but not to the exclusion of prakṛti*. Seen here, *samyoga* amounts to no more than a misperceived union resulting in a misalignment of *puruṣa*

and *prakṛti*. Yoga, understood as a disengagement with the world of *samyoga*<sup>121</sup> (i.e., ignorance, misidentification, dissatisfaction, sorrow), corrects this misalignment, allowing for a proper alignment in consciousness between these two principles.

Yoga is the "skill in action" (cf. *BG* II.50) that enables the yogin to disengage or unfocus the *attention* away from the distracted mind caught within the changing world of *prakṛtic* identity dependent on the "consciousness-of-objects" (*citta*, *vṛtti*). The yogin then develops the capacity for (re)focusing on and "retrieving" the unchanging pure consciousness (*purusa*). The process of *nirodha* is an effort at breaking away, letting go of the ordinary focus of consciousness that generates the notion of an empirical/conceptual self standing apart from the objective world. Thus,

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for the skillful yogin *samyoga* ceases, but not for the empirical selves since the world based on *samyoga* (samsaric/extrinsic identity) is their common experience.<sup>122</sup> By our conforming (*sarupya*) to the modifications (*vṛtti*) of the mind (*citta*), *purusa* (the seer) appears to take on the nature of the realm of the seeable (*drśya*) in the state of *samyoga*, giving rise to mistaken identity. The world of *samyoga* and mistaken identity, not *prakṛti* in total (i.e., the everyday world of nature, forms and phenomena as well as their unmanifest source) constitutes the "nature/essence of the seeable" (*drśyasya-atma*, *YS* II.21) that eventually disappears for the liberated yogin (see above).

The status of *samyoga* and its samsaric identifications are being emphasized here as an epistemological error rather than an ontological realm (i.e., *prakṛti*). Yet such an afflicted state of affairs in *samyoga* remains for those who have not attained liberating insight. By focusing on the true nature of the seer (*purusa*), Yoga does not mean to negate *prakṛti* or suggest a radical withdrawal from the seeable, thereby removing *prakṛti* (formed reality, relative states of existence) completely from the yogin's view. The yogin does not become a "mind-less" (or "body-less") being. Rather, the yogin is left with a transformed, fully *sattvified* mind, that, due to its transparent nature, can function in the form of nonbinding *vṛtti*s whether of a cognitive or affective/emotive nature—thoughts, ideas, intentions, and so forth. Aranya argues that liberated yogins who embark on their role as a teacher (*guru*) "for the benefit of all" do so through their ability to create or construct a new (individualized) mind (*nirmana-citta*, *YS* IV.4) "which can be dissolved at will" and does not collect *samskaras* of ignorance. Such a mind, Aranya continues, cannot "give rise to bondage,"<sup>123</sup> can no longer veil the yogin's true identity as *purusa*.

In contradistinction to the interpretation mentioned above, which views Yoga as a radical "separation" between spirit and matter/psychophysical being, I am suggesting that far from being incompatible principles, *purusa* and *prakṛti* can engage or participate in harmony, having attained a balance or equilibrium together. The enstatic consciousness of *purusa* can coexist with the mind and indeed all of *prakṛti*.<sup>124</sup> The yogin fully reconciles the eternally unchanging seer with the eternally changing realm of relative states of consciousness only by allowing the mind, in the experience of *samādhi*, to dwell in its pure *sattvic* nature in the "image of *purusa*," and then to be engaged once again in the field of relative existence. The process of "cessation" (*nirodha*) deepens from cognitive (*samprajñata*, *YS* I.17) *samādhi* into supracognitive

(*asamprajñata*) *samadhi*,<sup>125</sup> where it can be said that the seer abides in its own form/intrinsic identity (*tada drastuh svarupe'vastanam*).<sup>126</sup>

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According to Vyasa, the repeated practice of the "experiences" of enstasy gradually matures the yogin's consciousness into *kaivalya*, "aloneness" or permanent liberation. The steadfastness of the consciousness in *kaivalya* should not be misconstrued as either being or leading to sheer inactivity, pacifism, or lethargy; rather, stability in *nirbija-samadhi* allows for a harmony in activity in which the *gunas*, no longer struggling for predominance, do not conflict with each other and are attuned to *purusa*. We need not read Patañjali as saying that the culmination of all yogic endeavor *kaivalya* is a static finality or inactive, isolated, solipsistic state of being. In fact, *Yoga-Sutra* IV.34 tells us that *kaivalya* has as its foundation the very heart of the unlimited dynamism or power of consciousness (*citisakti*) that is *purusa*; <sup>127</sup> like an incandescent flame *purusa* is utterly white hot in contrast to the sputtering, affected "flame" of the mind and self-identity in *samyoga*. In terms of our primary analogue of empirical existence (*citta-vrtti*), *purusa* is not "active," or better still *purusa* is not seen to be "active." In terms of *purusa*'s inexhaustibility, *purusa* constitutes a supremely dynamic presence that allows for a state of nonafflicted activity (YS IV.30 and YB IV.30). To conclude that in the liberated state the yogin is incapable of any activity whatsoever simply amounts to a tautological statement, indeed implies a circular argument addressed from a prakrtic or gunic rather than enlightened perspective.<sup>128</sup>

In the liberated state of "aloneness" it can be said that *prakrti* is so integrated in the yogin's consciousness that it has become "one" with the yogin. *Kaivalya* can be seen to incorporate an integrated, psychological consciousness along with the autonomy of pure consciousness, yet pure consciousness to which the realm of the *gunas* (e.g., psychophysical being) is completely attuned and integrated. On the level of individuality, the yogin has found his (her) place in the world at large, "fitting into the whole";<sup>129</sup> no longer struggling to maintain or seek an identity rooted in *prakrti*'s domain, the yogin is established in a lasting contentment/peace that transcends the changing nature and conditions of empirical reality. This epistemic transformation and reassessment of experience involves the recognition and inclusion of a formerly concealed, nonappreciated, and obscured mode of being and constitutes Yoga's understanding of immortality, a spiritual recovery wherein authentic identity is uncovered, disclosed.

In the last chapter of the *Yoga-Sutra* (*Kaivalya-Pada*), "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) is said to ensue upon the attainment of *dharmamegha-samadhi*, the "cloud of *dharma*" *samadhi*. This *samadhi* follows from the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*) and is the precursor to "aloneness."<sup>130</sup> The high-level discriminative vision (also called *prasamkhyana* in the texts) is the fruit

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of *samprajñata-samadhi* but is not itself *dharmamegha-samadhi*.<sup>131</sup> The yogin must be disinterested in and detached from *vivekakhyati* and the resulting sovereign power and



omniscience.<sup>132</sup> Having relinquished all thirst for the "seen" and the "heard," indeed for the *gunas* themselves,<sup>133</sup> the yogin discards all involvement with the samsaric realm of attachment and pride because of the awareness of the undesirable (sorrowful) consequences of such re-entrance.<sup>134</sup> The inclination toward misidentification with *vr̥tti* has ceased. The yogin has abandoned any search for (or attachment to) reward or "profit" from his or her meditational practice. A perpetual state of discerning insight follows<sup>135</sup> through which the yogin is always aware of the fundamental distinction between: extrinsic identity/the world of change, and intrinsic identity/pure unchanging consciousness. *Yoga-Sutra* IV.29 states: "Indeed, following from [that elevated state of] meditative reflection, for the one who has discriminative discernment and is at all times nonacquisitive, there arises the 'cloud of *dharma*' *samadhi*."<sup>136</sup> Vyasa asserts that because the seed-*samskara* of taint is destroyed, no further ideas rooted in ignorance and based on an afflicted identity of self can arise.<sup>137</sup>

*Dharmamegha-samadhi*, so it appears, presupposes that the yogin has cultivated higher dispassion (*para-vairagya*) the means to the enstatic consciousness realized in *asamprajñata-samadhi* (YB I.18).<sup>138</sup> Thus, *dharmamegha-samadhi* is more or less a synonym of *asamprajñata-samadhi* and can even be understood as the consummate phase of supracognitive *samadhi* or ecstasy, the final step on the long and arduous yogic journey to authentic identity and "aloneness."<sup>139</sup> A permanent identity shift from the perspective of the human personality to *purusa* takes place. Now free from any dependence on or subordination to knowledge or *vr̥tti*, and detached from the world of misidentification (*samyoga*), the yogin yet retains the purified *gunic* powers of virtue including illuminating "knowledge of all"<sup>140</sup> (due to purified *sattva*), nonafflicted activity<sup>141</sup> (due to purified *rajas*), and a healthy, stable body-form (due to purified *tamas*). Fully awakened into the self-effulgent nature of *purusa*, the yogin witnesses, observes, perceives *prakṛti*, yet ceases to be ensnared and consumed by the drama or play of the *gunas* whether in the form of ignorance or knowledge, cause or effect, personal identity or sense of otherness. The auto-transparent knower, knowledge, and action coexist in a state of mutual attunement.

One problem that easily arises in Yoga hermeneutics is when the knower and knowledge are completely sundered and the doctrine of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) becomes reified into a radically dualistic, orthodox perspective that paralyzes the possibility of developing fresh ways to understand the relation between the knower and knowledge. Initially there must be some

relation, some continuum (i.e., consciousness and its modes: reflected or pure), or liberation would not be possible because one could never make the transition from delusion to enlightenment. The point of their distinction is that one must not try to attempt to understand or grasp the transcendent knower from a relative, empirical, and therefore inept perspective.

*Yoga-Sutra* IV.30 declares: "From that [*dharmamegha-samadhi*] there is the cessation of afflicted action."<sup>142</sup> Hence the binding influence of the *gunas* in the form of the afflictions, past actions, and misguided relationships is overcome; what remains is a "cloud of *dharma*" that includes an "eternality of knowledge" free from all impure covering (*avarana-mala*, YS IV.31) or veiling affliction and where "little (remains) to be known."<sup>143</sup> The eternality or endlessness of



knowledge is better understood metaphorically rather than literally: it is not knowledge expanded to infinity but implies *purusa*-realization that transcends the limitations and particulars of knowledge (*vrtti*).

The culmination of the Yoga system is found when, following from *dharmamegha-samadhi*, the mind and actions are freed from misidentification and affliction and one is no longer deluded/confused with regard to one's true nature and identity (*svarupa*). At this stage of practice the yogin is disconnected (*viyoga*) from all patterns of egoically motivated action. Vijñāna Bhikṣu argues that while cognitive *samadhi* abolishes all the *karma* except the *prarabdha karma* the *karma* that is already ripening in the present the enstatic realization in *asamprajñata-samadhi* has the potency to destroy even the *prarabdha karma*,<sup>144</sup> including all the previous *samskaras*.<sup>145</sup> The *karma* of such a yogin is said to be neither "white" (*asukla*), nor "black" (*akṛsna*), nor "mixed."<sup>146</sup> There is a complete exhaustion or "burning up" of the afflictions (*klesas*) and latent impressions (*samskaras*). According to both Vyasa<sup>147</sup> and Vijñāna Bhikṣu,<sup>148</sup> one to whom this high state of purification takes place is designated as a *jivanmukta*, one who is liberated while still alive (i.e., embodied). The modern commentator, H. Aranya, also asserts that through freedom from affliction in the form of *samskara* the yogin attains to the status of a *jivanmukta*.<sup>149</sup>

By transcending the normative conventions and obligations of karmic behavior, the yogin acts morally not as an extrinsic response and out of obedience to an external moral code of conduct, but as an intrinsic response and as a matter of natural, purified inclination. The stainless luminosity of pure consciousness is revealed as one's fundamental nature. The yogin does not act *samsarically*, that is, ceases to act from the perspective of a delusive sense of self confined within *prakṛti*'s domain. Relinquishing all obsessive or selfish concern with the results of activity, the yogin re-

mains wholly detached from the egoic fruits of action.<sup>150</sup> The yogin does not, for example, indulge in the fruits of ritual action, in the merit (*punya*) and the demerit (*apunya*) generated by good and bad observance of traditional ritualistic religion. By the practice of a detached ethic, the yogin must transcend this ritualistic, self-centered mentality. This does not imply that the yogin loses all orientation for action. Dispassion (detachment) in its highest form (*para-vairagya*, YS I.16) is defined by Vyasa as a "clarity of knowledge" (*jñāna-prasada*).<sup>151</sup> It is attachment (and compulsive desire), not action itself, that sets in motion the law of moral causation (*karma*) by which a person is implicated in *samsara*. The yogin is said to be attached to neither virtue nor nonvirtue, and is no longer oriented within the egological patterns of thought as in the epistemically distorted condition of *samyoga*. This does not mean, as some scholars have misleadingly concluded, that the spiritual adept or yogin is free to commit immoral acts,<sup>152</sup> or that the yogin is motivated by selfish concerns.<sup>153</sup>

Actions must not only be executed in the spirit of unselfishness (i.e., sacrifice) or detachment, they must also be ethically sound, reasonable, and justifiable. If action were wholly contingent upon one's mood or frame of mind, it would constitute a legitimate pretext for immoral conduct. Moreover, the yogin's spiritual journey far from being an "*a-moral* process"<sup>154</sup> is a highly moral

process! The yogin's commitment to the sattvification of consciousness, including the cultivation of moral virtues such as compassion (*karuna*)<sup>155</sup> and nonviolence (*ahimsa*),<sup>156</sup> is not an "a-moral" enterprise, nor is it an expression of indifference, aloofness, or an uncaring attitude to others. Moral disciplines are engaged as a natural outgrowth of intelligent (sattvic) self-understanding, insight, and commitment to self-transcendence that takes consciousness out of (*ec-stasis*) its identification with the rigid structure of the monadic ego, thereby reversing the inveterate tendency of this ego to inflate itself at the expense of its responsibility in relation to others.

Having defined the "goal" of Yoga as "aloneness" (*kaivalya*), the question must now be asked: what kind of "aloneness" was Patañjali talking about? "Aloneness," I submit, is not the isolation of the seer (*drastr, purusa*) separate from the seeable (*drsya, prakrti*), as is unfortunately far too often maintained as the goal of Yoga, but refers to the "aloneness" of the power of "seeing" (YS II.20, 25) in its innate purity and clarity without any epistemological distortion and moral defilement. The cultivation of *nirodha* uproots the compulsive tendency to reify the world and oneself (i.e., that pervading sense of separate ego irrevocably divided from the encompassing world) with an awareness that reveals the transcendent, yet

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immanent seer (*purusa*). Through clear "seeing" (*drsi*) the purpose of Yoga is fulfilled, and the yogin, free from all misidentification and impure karmic residue (as in the former contextual sphere of *cittavrtti*), gains full, immediate access to the world. By accessing the world in such an open and direct manner, in effect "uniting" (epistemologically) with the world, the yogin ceases to be encumbered by egoism (i.e., *asmita* and its egoic attitudes and identity patterns), which, enmeshed in conflict and confusion and holding itself as separate from the world, misappropriates the world. While such a selfish appropriation of the "things" of the world may achieve a temporary or extrinsic sense of satisfaction, it also contains the seed of its own dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) because the *only* avenue to intrinsic well-being or happiness<sup>157</sup> according to Yoga is to live not as a mistaken identity ineluctably making efforts at trying to fill up its own inner "lack" of permanency, but to abide as the permanent seer (*drastr, purusa*) or experiencer (*bhoktr*)<sup>158</sup> that "sees" and "experiences" the world without any selfish seed of desire or lack.

In ecstasy (*asamprajñata-samadhi*), unlike cognitive (*samprajñata-*) *samadhi*, there is no objective prop bolstering a reflected self-identity; there is no separated object or subject but the *purusa*, nor is there any power of knowing except that of *purusa*. This is the basis of *kaivalya*, "aloneness," not because there is an opposition, separation or conflicting modes of identity, but because there is no mistaking of *prakrti* for *purusa* (that is, no misconception of *purusa's* identity). Authentic identity is no longer misperceived as existing "outside" of itself. Clearly then, Yoga is not a Cartesian-like dichotomy (of thinker and thing).<sup>159</sup> Nor can Yoga be described as a metaphysical union of an individuated self with the objective world of nature or the more subtle realms of *prakrti*. Rather, Yoga can be seen to unfold in *samadhi* states of epistemic oneness that reveal the nonseparation of knower, knowing, and the known (YS I.41), grounding our identity in a nonafflicted mode of action. *Kaivalya* implies a power of "seeing" in

which the dualisms rooted in our egocentric patterns of attachment, aversion, fear, and so on, have been transformed into unselfish ways of being with others.<sup>160</sup>

The psychological, ethical, and social implications of this kind of identity-transformation are, needless to say, immense. I am suggesting that Yoga does not destroy or anesthetize our feelings and emotions thereby encouraging neglect and indifference toward others. On the contrary, the process of "cessation" (*nirodha*) steadies one for a life of compassion, discernment and service informed by a "seeing" that is able to understand (literally meaning "to stand among, hence observe") and is in touch

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with the needs of others. What seems especially relevant for our understanding of Yoga ethics is the enhanced capacity generated in Yoga for empathic identification with the object one seeks to understand. This is a far cry from the portrayal of the yogin as a disengaged figure, psychologically and physically removed from the human relational sphere, and who in an obstinate and obtrusive fashion severs all ties with the world and nature. Such an image of a wise yogin merely serves to circumscribe our vision of humanity and, if anything else, stifle the spirit by prejudicing the spiritual, abstract (and disembodied) realm over and against nature and our human embodiment. Throughout our study we have been consistently arguing that in Yoga philosophy "seeing" is not only a cognitive term but implies purity of mind (and physical discipline), that is, it has moral content and value. Nor is "knowledge" (*jñāna*, *vidya*) in the Yoga tradition to be misconstrued as a "bloodless" or "heartless" gnosis.

Yoga involves the sacrifice of attachment to the limiting power of the "owned" (*sva*, YS II.23), which includes the mind (*citta*), for the unlimited power of the "owner" (*svamin*, YS II.23) or power of "seeing," a sacrifice of one's separated, fragmented self with all of its hopes and fears, likes and dislikes, pleasures and sorrows, ambitions/successes and failures for the purpose of the unfractured consciousness of the seer, the "one" who truly "sees." This entails a sacrifice of all mistaken identity or misidentification with the seeable (*drśya*) in *samyoga* for the purpose of authentic identity as *purusa*. The perspective referred to as *Patañjala Yoga Darsana* culminates in a permanent state of clear "seeing" brought about through the discipline of Yoga. Yoga thus incorporates both an end state or "goal" and a process, that is, being and becoming.<sup>161</sup>

On the "path" of Yoga one places one's faith (*śraddha*, YS I.20) in the presence or awareness of *purusa*, which is without qualities (*nirguna*) or properties and yet is the authentic foundation of one's existence. Yoga does not call for mere blind faith but stresses the need for clarity of mind initially grounded in the direct experience of *sattva* which, as Vyasa asserts: "like a good mother protects a yogin."<sup>162</sup> When *purusa* is perceived as being distinct (YS III.49) from the extrinsic (gunic) identity of self, however *sattvic* which lays claim to the experience in the form of "my knowledge," "my reward," "my experience," the yogin then loses interest in any attachment to the things of the mind; the personality is purified and relinquishes all claim to authentic identity. With this shift in identity from egoity and its limited knowledge-component (both of which are a part of the seeable) to the knower of all knowledge, from misidentification with *citta* to identity as *purusa*, the obfuscations of past conditioning (*samskaras*, *vasanas*)

are removed and the yogin finds his/her right place in the world "fitting in" to the world (the cosmos) at large. A clarity of the inner self (*adhyatma-prasada*, YS I.47) or right "internal" order (*rta*) is revealed in which "truth-bearing insight" (*rtambhara-prajña*, YS I.48), free from any trace of erroneous knowledge, arises in the yogin's consciousness.<sup>163</sup>

We must bear in mind that in Yoga there is no bifurcation or dichotomization between the cosmological and the psychological, the macrocosmic universe and the microcosmic human being.<sup>164</sup> The superimposition (*adhyaropa*, YB II.18) a projection of changing, impure, sorrowful states as real existences "in" *purusa* caused by ignorance provides the fundamental structure of our cosmological/objective world and psychological/subjective world in *samyoga*; the "inner" world of self and "outer" world of the universe are both normally experienced as a bifurcation within *prakṛti*, a subject-object duality implying a given, reified world as referenced to a separate sense of self. In Yoga, the structures of the world (*prakṛti*), as experienced directly in *samādhi*, function heuristically as contemplative directives for the purpose of subtilizing and sattvifying the yogin's consciousness: *prakṛti* is utilized for the liberating of identity from "within" the microcosmic, psychophysical organism.

Clearly seen, the body-mind and *prakṛti* in general are no more impediments to *purusa*-realization. Nor, from the perspective of Yoga philosophy, is *prakṛti* designated as being either ontologically unreal or a mere projection of the mind. The process of "cessation" (*nirodha*), which may be considered an ongoing sacrifice of egoity in Yoga, involves a continual surrender of perspectives or fixed notions/ideas/cognitions (*pratyaya*) of self to the point where the fragmented, dis-eased world of *samyoga* ends and a healing vision of self and world, now both properly harnessed and "put back together," issues forth. Cognition and attention, no longer separated from the known and the attended, cease to function as binding patterns of misidentification and attachment as in the network or mental-complex of *cittavṛtti*. The sacrifice (Latin *sacer facere*, "to make sacred") of egoic identity for the purpose of identifying as *purusa* (that is, spiritual emancipation) is precisely what renders *prakṛti* sacred and ultimately reveals her intrinsic significance and value. By implication, in "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) sacrifice becomes an effortless, automatic (spontaneous) sanctification of the totality of life.

Yoga, in its program of purification, goes beyond the position of classical Samkhya (see n. 112), which seems to rest content with a discriminating knowledge (*viveka*) leading to a final isolation of *purusa* or absolute separation between *purusa* and *prakṛti*. At the end of the day, *prakṛti*'s

attunement to, or alignment with the purpose of *purusa* appears to be all for nought. Yet, if *purusa* the conscious principle were free to start with, why would consciousness get "involved" with *prakṛti*? *Purusa*'s seeming "entanglement" does intelligize *prakṛti*,<sup>165</sup> which on her own is said to be devoid of consciousness (YS IV.19).<sup>166</sup> The end result of *purusa*'s apparent "involvement" with *prakṛti*, the state of liberated knowingness or omniscience, is enriching and

allows for a verifying and enlivening of human nature, identity, and consciousness. From an integral perspective, one can argue that *prakṛti* performs her task of providing experience and liberation so that consciousness in its reflective mode or capacity as the mind may have content and function in various intentional, relational, and practical modes. *Puruṣa* is perceived to shine only through an experiential journey into subtler realms of *prakṛti*, thereby disclosing finer insights into the nature of consciousness.

Interpretations of Yoga that adhere to an absolute separation, implying a final unworkable duality between spirit and matter, amount to an impoverishment of ideas. Simply to foist, as many have done, this radical dualistic perspective often inherited from interpretations of classical Sāṃkhya onto Patañjali's system results in a parochialization and trivialization of classical Yoga, marginalizing its importance and reducing its overall integrity as one of the six major orthodox Hindu *darsanas*.<sup>167</sup> In Yoga, however, knowledge can be utilized in the integrity of being and action. Thus, Vyasa states that "the knower is liberated while yet living."<sup>168</sup> The *puruṣa* is "alone" not because it is "at home" in a purely atomistic or monadic state<sup>169</sup> bereft of any accessibility any open "door" or "window" to an external realm of existence and therefore having no connection whatsoever to *prakṛti*. Rather, the *puruṣa* is "alone" because it transcends the faulty mechanism of *samyoga*, which, like a broken wheel on a cart, brings about frustration and, if not properly attended to, unending dissatisfaction.<sup>170</sup>

Seen here, our sense of self is "tossed" or "whirled about" within the confining boundaries of identity implicit in the scheme or samsaric wheel of *cittavṛtti*. Free of such confinement, including all forms of obsession and all ideas of "acquiring" and "possessing," *puruṣa* is never a product of, nor is it affected or influenced by, the *guṇas* and *karma*. *Puruṣa* shines in its own nature and glory only after one has overcome all misconceptions about reality. Having discarded all forms of misconception or "afflicted space" within the mind, the "wheel" of life through which consciousness and self-identity function can move smoothly, unimpaired.

Can *puruṣa's* existence embrace states of action and knowledge, person and personality? The tradition of Yoga answers in the affirmative. Vyasa

asserts that having gone beyond sorrow, "the omniscient yogin, whose afflictions and bondage have been destroyed, disports himself [herself] as a master."<sup>171</sup> Established in the true nature of *puruṣa*, the yogin is now truly empowered to radiate the light of *puruṣa*. In *kaivalya*<sup>172</sup> the enstatic consciousness and *sattva* of the mind "merge," as it were, in a "sameness" of purity resulting in a perfect attunement of mind and body in relation to *puruṣa*. The karmic power of *avidyā* functioning within *prakṛti* ceases to have a hold over the yogin, the karmic ego having been exploded, its barriers dissolved. The yogin's attention is no longer sucked into the vortex of the conflicting opposites (*dvandvas*) in *samsāra*, is no longer embroiled in the polarizing intentionalities of desire: the vectors of attraction (i.e., attachment or *raga*) and revulsion (i.e., aversion or *dveṣa*). Yogic emancipation does not imply a state of apathy or passivity but rather suggests a mode of comportment different from that which takes place according to the tensions in the opposition between activity and passivity. Free from the egoic intrusions of worldly existence, the yogin is said to be left "alone."



The *purusa* can be said to express itself in the time-space continuum in a particular body and with a particular personality and mind. Yoga does not deny the existence of individuality; it allows for a trans-egoic development that is not the dissolution of the individual person and his/her personality, but, rather, that includes their extension into the recognition, moral integrity, and celebration of the interconnectedness (because of the nonseparation, i.e., *prakṛti* is "one") of all embodied beings and life as a whole. Enstasy is lived simultaneously with our psychophysical being. The link between the enstatic consciousness (*purusa*) and the world is the purified *sattva* of the mind.

We must question assertions to the effect that having attained liberation the psychical apparatus of the yogin is destroyed,<sup>173</sup> or that in the enlightened state the yogin's body lives on in a state of catalepsy until death.<sup>174</sup> What disappears for the yogin is the "failure-to-see" (*adarsana*)<sup>175</sup> the worldview born of *avidya* that generates the parasitic consciousness of self in *samyoga* not *prakṛti* herself. The purified mind and evolutes of *prakṛti* (e.g., intellect, ego) can now be used as vehicles for an enlightened life of interrelationship, interaction, and service, such as imparting knowledge to others: the purity and cognitive power impersonated in the *guru* or spiritual adept is transformed from an end into an available means. When one who is accomplished in Yoga (i.e., has reached the state of *nirbija-samadhi*) opens one's eyes to the world of experience, the knower or experiencer (*purusa*) will be one's true center of experience. The *gunas* (i.e., *vṛttis*) will be subordinate to the knower<sup>176</sup>/experiencer,<sup>177</sup> the "owner" of the field of the see-

able.<sup>178</sup> Once the final stage of emancipation is reached, the lower levels of insight previously gained are not destroyed but are included by means of a nonbinding appropriation and incorporation of those insights in the light of freedom.

This study therefore suggests that through the necessary transformation of consciousness brought about in *samadhi*, an authentic and fruitful coherence of self-identity, perception, and activity emerges out of the former fragmented consciousness in *samyoga*. In Yoga the state of freedom does not necessitate being without thoughts or *vṛttis*. Freedom means to identify as the very knower (*purusa*), which, while present to the mind and its modifications (*vṛttis*), remains eternally unattached, never enslaved, subsumed, or consumed by the realm of the seeable. This realization includes a "knowledge born of discrimination" that is liberating, inclusive of all objects (and conditions) and all times, and is nonsequential.<sup>179</sup> The experience of transparency in *kaivalya* reveals the simultaneity and interconnectedness of all beings, conditions, and things without abandoning, distorting, or displacing the *sattvic* realizations cognitive and ethical characteristic of the former states of clarity, insight, and understanding. What is discarded in Yoga is not the mind in total, but ignorance and its creation of misidentification with phenomena or mistaken identity. When it is said that one has realized *purusa* through "cessation" (*nirodha*), it is meant that there is no further level to experience for one's liberation. *Nirodha* does not indicate the denial of formed reality or the negation of relative states of consciousness. Nor need *nirodha* imply being rooted in a conception of oneself that abstracts from one's identity as a social, historical, and embodied being. *Nirodha* refers to the expansion of understanding necessary to perceive every dimension of reality from the perspective of pure, untainted



consciousness.

If Patañjali's perception of the world of forms and differences had been destroyed or discarded, how could he have had such insight into Yoga and the intricacies and subtle nuances of the unenlightened state?<sup>180</sup> If through *nirodha*, the individual form and the whole world had been cancelled for Patañjali, he would more likely have spent the rest of his days in the inactivity and isolation of transcendent oblivion rather than presenting Yoga philosophy to others! Rather than being handicapped by the exclusion of thinking, perceiving, experiencing, or activity, the liberated yogin actualizes the potential to live a fully integrated life in the world having overcome all enslavement to *avidya*. The yogin simultaneously lives as it were in two worlds: the dimension of the unqualified (*nirguna*) existence of *purusa*, and the relative dimension (*saguna*), yet two worlds that work together as one.

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There is then no reason why *kaivalya* cannot be seen as a "bridge" concept, bridging together or harnessing two formerly undisclosed principles or powers by correcting a misalignment between them based on a misconception or misperception of authentic identity. In this context *kaivalya* is an analogical term and can be understood with an epistemological emphasis. In Yoga, the *guru* is not physically isolated or alone but remains free even in the midst of relationships and commitments. The liberated yogin can exist in relation to the world not being morally or epistemologically enslaved by worldly relationship. The yogin is *in* the world but is not defined by worldly existence. The yogin's identity is not *of the world*, that is, is not *of a worldly afflicted nature*. Having himself/herself passed through innumerable lifetimes as a human being experiencing various joys and sorrows, the *guru* understands ordinary human life as well as the plight of the aspiring yogin. To be sure, the *guru* does not "experience" thoughts and emotions in the same way that an ordinary person does. The adept's consciousness transcends all mental activity including the affects of good (merit) and evil (demerit). However, it is said the adept "cannot but do what is perfectly consonant with his own nature, cannot but do the right thing"<sup>181</sup> because the adept is perceived to act not for self-gratification alone but for the spiritual benefit of others.

The purified body-mind of the yogin is used as an instrument for benevolent action in the world, while at the same time, the ego-personality is continually transcended through dispassionate acts of conscious self-surrender. Identity thus is not a mental, subjective state that can indulge and enjoy according to its own whims, but refers to an ontological category. Transcending the affective dimension in Yoga does not signal the end of the yogin's feeling-emotional nature; feelings, desires, and emotions, like cognition, are not simply reducible to the category of affliction, nor are either they or their objects to be obliterated or suppressed in Yoga.<sup>182</sup> As a fully liberated being the yogin is now able to engage life spontaneously and innocently yet animate freely a full range of feelings, emotions, and passions without being overtaken by them and without causing harm to others. Pedagogically this would have important implications in that the entire spectrum of human emotion could be used by the adept for the purpose of instruction.

Like the Buddha, Patañjali regards *duhkha* as the fundamental emotion or affect in response to

the contingency of samsaric identity and existence. Overcoming dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) yet-to-come (YS II.16) is one of the principal aims of Yoga and for this to take place dispassion is essential. But dispassion (*vairagya*) is not a severing, narrowing, or flatten-

ing out of our affective lives. The relationship between subject and object in Yoga is freed to transcend mundane intention and expectation. Moreover, the advanced yogin can experience ordinary pleasure and sorrow without wavering feeling more satisfied or diminished in his or her identity, for all is experienced in the light of *purusa*. For example, the *guru's* participation in the field of action and simultaneous nonattachment to the fruits of action<sup>183</sup> are grounded in an identity that transcends the three *gunas*. The freedom granted to the yogin is not merely a "negative" freedom or "freedom from" the fetters of worldly turbulence, misidentification, and sorrow, but can be more positively construed to incorporate a "freedom to," meaning that the yogin can embody a highly developed, virtuous state in a manner that does not distort the yogin's understanding and identity.

I conclude here that there is no reason why the liberated yogin cannot be portrayed as a vital, creative, thoughtful, empathetic, balanced, happy, and wise person. Having adopted an integrative orientation to life, the enlightened being can endeavor to transform, enrich, and ennoble the world. I am therefore suggesting that there is a rich affective, moral, and cognitive as well as spiritual potential inherent in the realization of *purusa*, the "aloneness" of the power of consciousness/seeing.

The Sanskrit commentators on the *Yoga-Sutra* and the *Yoga-Bhasya*, including Vacaspati Misra and Vijñana Bhikṣu, tend to favor the ideal of "liberation in life" or "embodied liberation" (*jīvanmukti*). The tradition clearly acknowledges an "altruistic" motive in the pursuit of enlightenment<sup>184</sup> that can be considered an integral part of classical Yoga, since the *guru* is recognized as a major catalyst for spiritual (and social) transformation in India and elsewhere. The *Yoga-Sutra* functions as a text that from its very incipience (YS I.1-4) serves to direct the attention of the aspirant to the "goal" of *purusa*-realization; along the way it strongly encourages aspiration (e.g., YS I.21) by inculcating the yogin toward liberating insight and awareness instilled by practice and dispassion. But, as we have seen, the yogin must eventually surrender all attachment to the idea of acquiring or obtaining pure identity (*purusa*). Traditionally in Yoga it is often held that yogic technique ultimately succeeds only through the grace and compassion of the realized or fully awakened *guru*. That is to say, spiritual emancipation is made accessible to one who receives guidance from a liberated being (*jīvanmukta*) and who in turn is committed to yogic discipline.

While still functioning within the prakṛtic constitution of a body and mind, the yogin-adept is thus never deluded into any association with affliction implying a desire for continuity (*abhinivesa*, YS II.9) based on a misidentification with mortal states and the consequent fear of death. Even

though the prakrtic apparatus will eventually perish, the yogin remains established in immortal consciousness, the true nature of *purusa*. Yoga does account for transformation into other births due to the outflowing nature of *prakrti* (YS IV.2, YB IV.2; see discussion in chapter 2). But that Patañjali has not made an objective investigation into how the yogin is going to continue in existence after death to the physical body is not surprising. For one, classical Yoga does not admit of any need for a migratory subtle body (*sukṣma-sarira*).<sup>185</sup> As a disembodied state (i.e., conceived as such after physical death), *kaivalya* need not be interpreted as an isolated, self-contained, relationless realm. If we are to assume that there exist a plurality of *purusas*, *prakrti* can be seen as a stepping stone for the eventual exit of liberated *purusas* from "this world" into a state of mutual interrelatedness and intersubjectivity, thereby giving a different perspective to the meaning of the "flight of the alone to the alone." Or again, from this pluralistic perspective, all *purusas* (and *isvara*?) could be seen to intersect resulting in an interfusion or ontological merging of sorts, all being omnipresent and of one nature pure consciousness with no prakrtic barriers and therefore without the distorting power of ignorance (*avidya*) that generates such barriers or impediments to *purusa*-realization.

Patañjali's real concern, however, is with the transformation of human nature, consciousness, and identity in this very world a world that includes our body, personhood, nature, and innumerable conditions and objects of experience. To repeat, "Patañjali's practical and pragmatic orientation emphasizes that spiritual emancipation can take place in this very lifetime and can be understood as an embodied state of freedom."<sup>186</sup> Are there an apparently innumerable number of omnipresent yet discrete *purusas*? Nowhere in the *Yoga-Sutra* does Patañjali make a direct case for multiple *purusas*.<sup>187</sup> Indeed, if the culminating realization in Yoga incorporates all objects (space) and time and is simultaneous (YS III.54) *purusa*'s nature being ubiquitous then how can there be a large number of omnipresent, distinct, and different *purusas* occupying the same space (as it were) and yet in principle purporting to have no distinguishing characteristics (for all are pure consciousness and "attributeless" by nature)? One way of resolving this problem (as has been suggested in chapter 2) is to argue that the issue of innumerable *purusas* is largely an epistemological one having to do with a plurality of individualized minds through which pure consciousness discloses itself. To be sure, one of the major implications of multiple *purusas* for Patañjali's system would be to underline the uniqueness of each individual's perspective or consciousness.<sup>188</sup>

Whether or not Patañjali actually adhered to the notion of a plurality of *purusas* remains an open question. In fact, Patañjali's psychological and epistemological orientation does not lend itself easily to metaphysical speculation. Merely labelling Patañjali's philosophy as being dualistic or otherwise does not satisfy the practical concerns of Yoga per se. I have suggested, however, in chapter 2 that Patañjali can be understood as having adopted a provisional, practical dualistic metaphysics but that there is no proof that his system culminates in a metaphysical duality. Building upon our previous argument that views Yoga from an integral perspective, I am suggesting that in *kaivalya* the liberated identity of *purusa* can incorporate an integration of

spirit and matter including our psychophysical being and nature such that *purusa* may be seen to contain every potential experience, in fact everything within itself. Or, one could say that following from the complete purification or sattvification of the mind, *purusa* knows itself to be everything. At this level of realization, one is no longer held captive to any sense of duality. One beholds *purusa* one's true identity or Self in the entire cosmos, and the entire cosmos, which is also one's Self, in *purusa*.

The practical and soteriological orientation in the *Yoga-Sutra* can in no way be separated from the pedagogical dimension of Yoga. The diversity and flexibility of methods and the actual process of purification and illumination of consciousness is of much greater importance to Patañjali than a metaphysical systemization of reality. Patañjali, a Yoga master and wise pedagogue, emphasizes the processes leading up to *purusa*-realization and he clearly prefers a schema that attempts to establish the identity and distinctness of the seer (*drastr*, *purusa*) or pure consciousness against all that is of the nature of the seeable (*drsya*) including the objectifiable processes of the mind (*citta*), that is, the modifications (*vrtti*) and objective content or constructs (*pratyaya*) of awareness. Moreover, *realizing* the distinctness and pure, nonfractured identity of the *purusa* is of greater concern than any grand explanation of ultimate reality whether that reality be dualistically or nondualistically understood. This study suggests that the duality of the seer and the seeable in the *Yoga-Sutra* is best conceived, at least initially, as a provisional, relative one that is meant to serve the practical and pedagogical purpose of allowing the yogin to distinguish, in his or her understanding, reality as "seen" by *purusa* from the perspective of intrinsic identity and reality as "seen" by the mind and its influences and from the perspective of egoity or extrinsic identity.

Patañjali does not view the "discriminative discernment" (*vivekakhyati*) between *purusa* and *prakrti* merely in inferred or abstract, metaphysical

terms or principles. In classical Yoga discriminative discernment necessitates a consciousness of mastery over the forces of *rajas* and *tamas* whereby the mind is fully sattvified, transformed, purified through the recognition that mind-*sattva* and *purusa* are distinct.<sup>189</sup> *Vivekakhyati* incorporates moral value and content as well as cognitive clarity. As Vyasa asserts (YB I.12), the "stream of the mind" that commences with "discrimination" (*viveka*) and terminates in "aloneness" flows to the "good," while the failure to discriminate properly leads to "evil."<sup>190</sup> Experiences of identity in the situation of *samyoga* are based on the failure to distinguish between the absolutely unmixed *purusa* and the mind (*sattva*),<sup>191</sup> between the "seer-consciousness" that truly "sees" objects (including the subtlest content of the mind) and the self-consciousness that has conformed to the changing nature of the mind. Ordinary human consciousness is of the nature of the "seeable" and assuming itself to be the seer misperceives the reality of *purusa* as well as *prakrti*. This study is suggesting that an epistemologically nuanced emphasis be given to the nature of discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyati*) in Yoga. What is being emphasized is for the yogin to distinguish between levels of perception, understanding, and knowledge (i.e., states of consciousness) rather than ontological categories alone.

It would not be true to the style or spirit of Patañjali's thought to end up reifying *kaivalya* into an ultimate principle of existence, "all else" falling under the category of "illusion," for such an interpretation can easily lead to a form of idealism that accentuates a sense of aversion (*dvesa*) toward and emotional alienation from the world. But to withdraw from the world and merely renounce one's responsibilities while remaining in an afflicted condition oneself (e.g., self-pity, envy, hypocritical or self-righteous behavior, pride, or a plain lack of energy and confidence) can only generate egoity, forms of spiritual mediocrity, a misappropriation of yogic technique/methods, and pseudo-liberation all of which are not to be equated with Yoga. The dualistic framework that Patañjali adopts reflects the condition of the aspiring yogin. It instills a pragmatic and practical orientation that engages the yogin-practitioner in the cultivation of a spiritual discipline capable of leading the yogin from states of ignorance/impurity/mistaken identity to knowledge/purity/authentic identity. The reality of the body, mind, nature, and materiality in general also real to one on the "path" of Yoga is not denied. Idealistic interpretations of reality are, in fact, refuted in Yoga.<sup>192</sup>

*Kaivalya* can be said to represent the culminating fruit of the yogin's commitment to the realization of an underlying identity or reality that engages *purusa* and *prakṛti* both, thereby transcending all conceptual under-

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standing, including all dualistic or nondualistic notions, regarding that identity or reality. Koelman argues that Patañjali's Yoga can adapt itself to different philosophical backgrounds: whether there is a distinct *purusa* for each human personality as classical Samkhya teaches, or whether there is ultimately one supreme Self (*paramatman*) as Sankara's Advaita Vedanta maintains is, according to Koelman, indifferent to Yoga technique as such.<sup>193</sup>

The process of "cessation" (*nirodha*) seeks to disclose the experiencer, the unseen seer also referred to in the *Upanisads*.<sup>194</sup> The purpose of yogic meditative discipline is to reveal the object of perception as it is "in itself" (i.e., in *samadhi*) and break through to the point where there can be no epistemological distortion between the seer and the seeable. The yogin sacrifices the characteristic feature of ordinary human identity, which is its bipolar nature, its tension between subject and object. *Purusa* is transcendent, yet is also an immanent (ineffable) presence that can only be expressed metaphorically. Patañjali does not espouse negative descriptions of the nature of *purusa* but prefers metaphors in the context of "seeing" (*drastr*, *drs*, *drsi*, *drsi-matra*), "cognizing" (*citi*, *citi-sakti*), and "owning" (i.e., referring here to the "owner" or *svamin*) that comply with his epistemological and psychological rather than a metaphysical approach.

What contribution does Patañjali make to the rich, historical, and philosophical "tradition" of Hinduism? We shall confine our comments here within the context of the *sad-darsana* the so-called six orthodox Brahmanic perspectives of life. Samkhya, with its emphasis on ontology, is concerned with enumerating and describing the principal categories of existence. All experiences succinctly fitted into an ontologically oriented framework culminates in a complete severance of *purusa* and *prakṛti*, a radical metaphysical duality. The stress in the Nyaya school is on principles of logic and reasoning and deals largely with epistemological issues and procedures. The Vaisheshika system (Vaisheshika means "pertaining to individuality or



particularity") is concerned with differences between material states, with the physical properties of matter, and, by experimentation, how the self and mind use those properties. Vaisesika stresses ontological questions and distinctions about the nature of reality. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are highly analytical in their approaches. The tradition of Purva Mimamsa, in keeping with the exegetical tradition of Vedic ritualism, is mainly concerned with the meaning and implementation of *dharma*, understood here as "right action" as in the Vedic solemn ritual and *karma* in its strictest sense. Uttara Mimamsa (i.e., Vedanta) insists on the crucial, authoritative role given to scripture for validating metaphysical and soteriological matters; and, in the case of Advaita Vedanta, the need for knowledge (*vidya*,

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*jñāna*) as the means for attaining *brahman*, the ultimate Reality of the Upanisads, is clearly emphasized.

Granting validity to above schemes, Patañjali's overriding concern is with the practical implications of all the enumerating, reasoning, experimenting, ritual action and scriptural authority. How may we finally experience and know that our true identity is immortal, eternally pure, wise, and free? One of Patañjali's main contributions lies in showing how and by what methods, consciousness, misidentified with *prakṛti* (matter, psychophysical being, nature), can be purified, illuminated, and restored to its original authentic identity *as puruṣa*, a state of freedom termed the "aloneness of seeing" (*drśeh kaivalyam*). Despite the opinion of some that Patañjali has made little if any contribution to Yoga philosophy this study suggests that Patañjali's presentation of Yoga makes a significant philosophical contribution to our understanding of Yoga.<sup>195</sup>

More specifically, Patañjali's unique contribution (and one might say his real "genius") lies in his ability to overcode previous teachings on Yoga adding a profoundly articulate and integral understanding of Yoga as defined in *Yoga-Sutra I.2*. The definition of Yoga as *cittavṛttinirodha* masterfully incorporates a sophisticated philosophical theory of Yoga along with a rich diversity of yogic practices. This central definition of Yoga can be seen as "threading together" the *Yoga-Sutra* as a whole as well as skillfully communicating the meaning and essence of Yoga as being: (1) process and transformation implying spiritual growth and development, and (2) a culminating state of freedom, of enlightened identity (i.e., consciousness and being). Classical Yoga reveals how *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* the two components (spiritual and material) of our human nature and identity can work together in harmony and attain the highest "good" as well as the highest cognitive realization in the liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*). The reality of nature, the mind, and our human embodiment need not be ultimately denied, disposed of, or rendered inherently problematic.

Patañjali wrote (spoke?) not from the standpoint of revealed scripture or theoretical clarification, but from the perspective of concrete experience. The aphoristic method of the *Yoga-Sutra* leaves much unsaid, throwing aspirants back upon themselves with a powerful stimulus to self-inquiry, self-testing, and self-discovery but within the established tradition (i.e., already discovered "truths") of Yoga. To practice Yoga does not give one a platform to engage licitiously in an "independent consciousness research"<sup>196</sup> project or an open-ended experimentation or inquiry

into the nature of consciousness. For nothing can really be added to the knowledge contained in Yoga. Moreover, Yoga is rooted in a pedagogical dynamic-

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the *guru-sisya* relation which functions as a vital building block and catalyst for self-transformation and direct experience of pure identity. While recognizing the practical and heuristic (albeit provisional) value of forms of belief, creeds, theories, models of reality, debate, questions and answers, and points of view, the purpose in Yoga is to move beyond their limited, conceptual, and subjective dimensions and engage Yoga directly. Thus, after declaring that Yoga alone is the teacher, Vyasa cites an ancient expression: "By Yoga Yoga is to be known; Yoga progresses from Yoga. He who cares for Yoga, forever remains in Yoga."<sup>197</sup>

Yoga presupposes the integration of knowledge and activity; there can be no scission between *theoria* and *praxis*. The *Yoga-Sutra* is a philosophical text where *praxis* is deemed to be essential. Without actual practice the theory that informs Yoga would have no authentic meaning. Yet without examination and reflection there would be no meaningful striving for liberation, no "goal" as it were to set one's sight on. In an original, inspiring, and penetrating style, Patañjali bridges metaphysics and ethics, transcendence and immanence, and contributes to the Hindu fold a form of philosophical investigation that, to borrow J. Taber's descriptive phrase for another context, can properly be called a "transformative philosophy." That is to say, it is a philosophical perspective that "does not stand as an edifice isolated from experience; it exists only insofar as it is realized in experience."<sup>198</sup>

Yoga philosophy is primarily a means for transforming our understanding and perception of reality; it is not overly concerned with a metaphysical categorization, enumeration, objectification, or systemization of reality, that all too easily can be misappropriated and lead to reified notions of self and world. Grounded in a pedagogical context, Yoga ontology (YS II.19) is initially abstracted from direct experience and acts as a contemplative directive for the realization of the underlying, transconceptual realities; a "realized" ontology follows from Yoga epistemology. Patañjali's soteriological, practical, and transformative approach does not mean that his system fails to consider the ontological implications of Yoga. Rather, Yoga philosophy, like other systems of Indian thought (e.g., within Buddhism and nondualistic Vedanta), is representative of a form of "thought about being that is rooted in and motivated by a desire for absolute liberation, a kind of 'soteriontology'."<sup>199</sup> Moreover, this study suggests that Patañjali's Yoga has profound implications for an embodied state of liberation.

Having expounded a central, foundational definition of Yoga (YS I.2), Patañjali pragmatically lays out various means to liberation through which the pure power of "seeing" the nonseparation of knower, knowing, and

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known is revealed. In what state, being, or consciousness may *purusa* be said to dwell in

*kaivalya*? Perhaps *kaivalya* is a transition to a nondualistic state: the unmodifiable, immutable *brahman* or one indivisible reality acknowledged in schools of Vedanta. The *Yoga-Sutra*, having done the work of providing practical guidance that leads to *kaivalya*, remains silent<sup>200</sup> and lets the experience or realization itself answer. In ecstasy (*asamprajñata-samadhi*) the yogin moves beyond the "seeable," beyond all prakrtic limitations of consciousness and identity, and directly "experiences," or rather *identifies as purusa*. Yoga brings about a trans-empirical or transworldly dimension that, being both world-transcending and world-transforming, does not negate self and world but properly bridges or aligns them. As *purusa* is self-luminous,<sup>201</sup> in *kaivalya* the *telos* of all knowledge "*purusa* stands alone in its true nature as pure light."<sup>202</sup>

*Purusa* "knows" itself and the realm of the seeable by its own light of consciousness. Thus *purusa* is "known" only by *purusa* and not by the mind.<sup>203</sup> In knowing itself, *purusa* is free to be itself, to abide in its inviolable identity, nature, and glory. Through praxis a transformation of consciousness takes place involving a transformed perception of self-identity and the world. Even "knowing *purusa*" is a metaphor for an experience or state that is better described as a coming-to-dwell as the formless knower in pure knowingness/pure seeing. Self-identity no longer needs to know itself reflexively, but is peaceful and immutable because it needs or lacks nothing. In *kaivalya* the rupture from authentic identity is healed and a fullness of being emerges.

## Conclusion

Although several valuable, contemporary scholarly writings have helped to present Patañjali's philosophy to a wider academic and popular audience, our study suggests that Patañjali has far too often been misinterpreted or misrepresented due to the use of inappropriate methodology: partial and misleading definitions of Sanskrit yogic terms and reductionistic hermeneutics leading to an imposed radical, dualistic finality or closure to Patañjali's perspective of Yoga. Many scholars have repeatedly given ontological definitions and explanations for terms that, this study maintains, are more appropriately understood with an epistemological emphasis. Consequently, the specialized sense inherent in Yoga soteriology is diminished. The soteriological intent of Yoga need not preclude the possibility for an integrated, embodied state of liberated identity. A bias is invariably created within the language encountered in the translations and interpretations of the *Yoga-Sutra* resulting in an overemphasis on content, due consideration not having been given to form, structure, and function.

It is crucial to view Yoga contextually as it is understood, experienced, and embodied by the yogin and not simply to impute a content-system to the whole process of Yoga. The bias extends to the ontological priorities of *purusa* over *prakrti* and by consequence the priority of axiology over epistemology. *Purusa* is generally explained or understood as the

enlightened and ultimately hegemonic principle of pure consciousness, our true identity that alone has intrinsic spiritual value. *Prakṛti*, we are often told, is the nonspiritual cosmogonic principle comprised of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*), has a deluding, binding, yet paradoxically subservient nature (for the purpose of *puruṣa*), and eventually disappears from the yogin's (i.e., the "seer's") purview, having been granted no real value or place in the liberated state. It is not clear that the language of the *Yoga-Sūtra* is explanatory. It could equally be descriptive, in which case the axiological and ontological priorities would collapse thereby challenging the widely held scholarly view that the relationship between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, the seer (*drastr*) and the seeable (*drsya*), is exclusively or definitively an asymmetrical relation, that is, *prakṛti* exists for the purpose of *puruṣa* and her value is seen merely in instrumental terms and within the context of a soteriological end state that excludes her.

In Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (*YS* I.2) the focus of this study *nirodha* has frequently been understood as an ontological cessation, suppression, or "deadening" of the mind (*citta*) and its modifications (*vr̥tti*), and this misunderstanding has led, I suggest, to some major interpretive errors. First, one can witness a reductionistic application of positivistic presuppositions to a trans-empirical, transconceptual, mystical system: scholars have often concluded that when liberation (*apavarga*) or "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) has been attained, the yogin will no longer be capable of experiencing or engaging the world since the body and mind will have ceased to function (at least effectively so). Second, the pedagogical context of Yoga involving the oral/historical teaching tradition has either been ignored or else this important foundational dynamic within Yoga has not been sufficiently taken into consideration and incorporated into the philosophy. Our hermeneutic must include a way of reading the tradition of Yoga within its cultural/religious context.

Third, by explaining *nirodha* as an ontological cessation or negation of *vr̥ttis*, many scholars have given a negative, one-sided, and spurious definition of Yoga. The result is a volatile concept of *nirodha*, one that emphasizes Yoga as being a form of world-denial and psychophysical negation or suppression. Seen here, phenomenal reality for the liberated yogin (including the mind-body complex) is rendered as a meaningless or purposeless existence and "dissolves" into or returns to its "preformed" state, the unmanifest, nonconscious, undifferentiated (disembodied) realm of the *guṇas* that has lost all connection with consciousness. Consequently, Patañjali's philosophy *as a whole* becomes parochialized, even trivialized, and can be viewed as unapproachable, unintelligible, unattractive, and impractical.

*Puruṣa* indeed has precedence over *prakṛti* in Patañjali's system, for *puruṣa* is what is ordinarily "missing" in human life and is ultimately the state of consciousness one must awaken to in Yoga. According to this study, the liberated state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*) need not denote an ontological superiority of *puruṣa*, or an exclusion of *prakṛti*. *Kaivalya* can be positively construed as an integration of both principles an integration that, I have argued, is what is most important for Yoga. The sheer questioning of why *puruṣa* being by nature ever-pure, wise, and free would care or even bother to be involved or integrated with "insentient" *prakṛti* is itself laced

with a radical dualistic assumption about Yoga that is perhaps more indicative of a spiritually elitist understanding of Patañjali's thought: *prakṛti*, conceived to be the "inferior," less worthy, and therefore undesirable reality of the two, is left behind for good in the enlightened state. Moreover, the calling into question of *puruṣa*'s association with matter presupposes that the nature of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*'s "togetherness" or "union" is intrinsically rooted in ignorance and can therefore only generate mistaken identity, suffering, frustration, and dissatisfaction (*duḥkha*).

But what if the nature of the relationship *itself* (between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) is transformed from the binding, obfuscated involvements inherent in the situation of *samyoga* to the liberating mode of activity and "seeing" inherent in Yoga? Yoga can be understood then as having corrected a basic "misalignment" rooted in "misconception" between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, implying therefore the disclosure of a clearly established "union" or "alignment" between these two principles. The problem of "self" and "identity" in Yoga lies not in ontology; the existence of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are not in doubt but in perception, self-understanding, and the activity of decision making. How and what we perceive and how we choose to act are crucial considerations in Yoga.

Admittedly, the more integrative approach to Patañjali's Yoga *darsana* suggested in this study does raise some rather provocative questions that I feel need to be raised in order to reflect adequately on the profundity and practical emphasis of this foundational scripture of Yoga, the *Yoga-Sutra*. Instead of assuming an absolute incommensurability between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, we can ask: Have these two principles usually conceived as eternally existent ever *been* separate (i.e., absolutely disjoined)? Could they ever *be* separate? Does pure consciousness *in itself* as a purely isolated, relationless state actually exist? Or, not unlike the term *citta*, could it (i.e., pure consciousness) be understood as a heuristic notion, perhaps even a stage along the way ("experienced" in *asamprajñata*-

*śamādhi*), that skillfully serves to lead to the fullness of our identity as revealed in *kaivalya*? There is no ultimate evidence given in the *Yoga-Sutra* to conclude, on a definitive basis, that the unbound identity of the seer (*draṣṭṛ*, *puruṣa*) does not or cannot engage with or even include the realm of the seeable (*dṛśya*, *prakṛti*).

To break *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* apart, to keep one and try to discard the other, is an enterprise that creates disequilibrium or imbalance involving confused notions of identity or "self" that, I submit, are clearly inimical to Yoga. Such notions may have a compulsive attachment-orientation (*raga*, *YS* II.7) whereby we succumb to the world and can become easily enmeshed in forms of narcissism and egocentrism by aggressively objectifying and exploiting the world and others. Or such notions may be stringently rooted in an aversion-orientation (*dveṣa*, *YS* II.8) involving an exaggerated and impoverished sense of "isolation" from the world, a form of escape or flight of self with an impulse toward self-negation. Both of these extremes: worldly entrapment and escape from the world, must be transcended in Yoga.

Patañjali's definition of Yoga (*YS* I.2) can be seen as an effective prescription for correcting the deluded or confused state of affairs in *samyoga*. Epistemologically, the mind (*citta*) has two



basic opposing tendencies or qualities: ignorance (*avidya*) of reality, and knowledge (*jñāna*) of reality. The degree or level of knowledge that exists depends to what extent our psychophysical being has undergone the purifying and illuminating process of sattvificationsattvification implying a process through which ignorance is gradually discarded and knowledge predominates. Paradoxically, the mind that under the grip of ignorance formerly acted as a locus for misidentification in *samyoga* and was burdened and restricted in its power of perception, becomes through a transformative process in Yoga an instrument of liberating knowledge or insight (*prajñā*). This knowledge, it has been argued, is then incorporated and integrated in the state of "aloneness" (*kaivalya*).

Viewed from another angle, under the influence of *avidya* the reflected consciousness of *purusa* in the mind makes *purusa* appear embroiled in *samsara*, selfhood being conceived within prakṛtic existence as a mere product or creation of the three *gunas* (*triguna*). Thus, one's identity is confined within the *cittavṛtti* schematic, resulting in a misidentification with and misappropriation of *prakṛti*. Through the process of the "cessation" (*nirodha*) of the misidentification with *vṛtti*, ignorance in the form of the *samskara*-complex of personality traits or habit patterns (*vasanas*) entrenched in erroneous knowledge (*viparyaya-jñāna*) or misperception is sifted out from the yogin's view. Impurity (*asuddhi*) dissolves, leading to an increasing light of knowledge (*jñāna-dīpti*, YS II.28), and the mind,

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inclined toward discriminative discernment (*viveka-khyati*), then has a propensity for *kaivalya* (YS IV.26). The result of this transformed state of identity is nothing less than the "aloneness of seeing" unencumbered in its fullness. I have proposed that the *Yoga-Sutra* does not uphold a "path" of liberation that ultimately renders *purusa* and *prakṛti* incapable of "cooperating" together. Rather, the *Yoga-Sutra* seeks to "unite" these two principles without the presence of any defiled understanding, to bring them "together," properly aligning them in a state of balance, harmony, and a clarity of knowledge in the integrity of being and action.

By viewing the *Yoga-Sutra* as having given a legitimate voice to the quest for an absolute separation of *purusa* and *prakṛti*, scholars and other writers on Yoga may well have misread Patañjali, portraying the great master as having taught a form of radical dualism that has often been at the center of controversy and may even be considered an anomaly within Hinduism. A dominant philosophical position within Hinduism that is prior to the *Yoga-Sutra*, and that includes Upanisadic writings and the *Mahabharata*, has been nondualistic or panentheistic. Thus, most Yoga thought or schools that preceded Patañjali, or that subsequently developed after the *Yoga-Sutra*, have advocated some form of nondualism or theism. Indeed, yogic (Hindu) teachings that arose after Patañjali as recorded, for example, in the *Yoga Upanisads*, *Yogavasistha*, Hindu tantric works (e.g., the *Mahanirvana-Tantra*), works in Kashmiri Saivism, and *hatha-yoga* can be seen as reaffirmations of a nondual understanding of reality and are informed more by the metaphysics of, for example, (Advaita) Vedānta than by the Sāṃkhya dualistic framework. Are we to understand Patañjali's Yoga as a system that "can almost be regarded as an interlude in a tradition that was from the outset nondualistic"? <sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding the long-lasting success and primarily practical influence of the *Yoga-Sutra* as

well as the overall status granted to classical Yoga as one of the six orthodox philosophical schools (*darsanas*) of Brahmanical Hinduism, we suggest that the inappropriate label of "radical dualism" inflicted upon Patañjali's philosophy, combined with a somewhat attenuated or elusive concept of "God" (*isvara*), has disparaged its integrity and prevented the Yoga *darsana* from assuming greater religious, philosophical, and cultural significance than it truly deserves. This study has argued for a more open-ended approach to Patañjali's thought, an approach that, it has been suggested, orients us toward or more closely aligns us with the intent or purpose of Yoga itself.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, Patañjali's Yoga, defined as *cittavrttinirodha*, need not imply the extinction or evaporation of our "personhood" along with the objective,

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material world. Rather, it seems more accurate to assert that Yoga culminates in the eradication of spiritual ignorance (*avidya*) the root cause of our misidentification with, and attachment to, worldly (or otherworldly!) existence. In this way, Yoga removes our selfishness, suffering, and dissatisfaction (*duhkha*) rooted in an afflicted and mistaken self-identity (*asmita*). I have emphasized how Yoga as "the cessation of [the misidentification with] the modifications of the mind" can be seen as a bipolar process of practice (*abhyasa*) and dispassion (*vairagya*), a process that has been articulated through a detailed analysis of Patañjali's stages of cognitive *samadhi* (*samprajñata*) and the state of supracognitive *samadhi* (*asamprajñata*). In our exposition of the multileveled process of *samadhi* an attempt has been made to show how the expansion of consciousness and burgeoning of knowledge and ethical virtues attained through the rarified *sattva* of the mind contribute to the cessation of *purusa's* superimposed, object-oriented condition of externalization/emergence (*vyutthana*) and extrinsic identity, thus leading to the objectless ecstasy (*asamprajñata*).

In the process of *nirodha* two seemingly antithetical impulses can be discerned: One presses for a deconstruction and unmasking of a prakrtic identity of self's cognitions, emotive dispositions, beliefs, worldview, and so forth and the other for an integration and reconciliation of individuality/personhood/embodiment and its place in the world. Yoga allows for a dynamic interplay and creative tension between identification and association within the empirical world (*prakrti*) and a trans-empirical or transworldly identity (*purusa*). Through the summation and transmutation of all past experience, achieved in *asamprajñata*, Yoga can thus be recognized as a highly developed and integrated state of mystical illumination that extends and enhances our self-identity. Liberated from the pain of self-limitation and all destructive personality traits or habit patterns (*vasanas*), and having incorporated an expanded and enriched sense of personal/empirical identity embodying virtues such as nonviolence (*ahimsa*), compassion (*karuna*), and yogic insight (*prajña*), the yogin can dwell in a state of balance and fulfillment serving others while feeling/being truly at home in the world. The yogin can function in relation to the world not being morally or epistemologically enslaved by worldly relationship. Freedom therefore is not to be equated with living in an everyday world conditioned by attachment; it is living and acting in the everyday world with *purusa*-realization. Nor is freedom to be confused with escape from the world. Freedom denotes a transformation of our entire way of being or

mode of action as embodied within the lived world itself.

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Both morality and perception (cognition) are essential channels through which human consciousness, far from being negated or suppressed, is transformed and illuminated. Yoga combines discerning knowledge with an emotional, affective, and moral sensibility, allowing for a participatory epistemology that incorporates the moral amplitude for empathic identification with the objects or persons one seeks to understand. The enhanced perception gained through Yoga must be interwoven with Yoga's rich affective and moral dimensions to form a spirituality that does not become entangled in a web of antinomianism, but that retains the integrity and vitality to transform our lives and the lives of others in an effective manner. By upholding an integration of the moral and the mystical, Yoga supports a reconciliation of the prevalent tension within Hinduism between: (1) spiritual engagement and self-identity within the world (*pravṛtti*), and (2) spiritual disengagement from worldliness, and self-identity that transcends the world (*nivṛtti*). Yoga discerns and teaches a balance between these two apparently conflicting orientations.

This study has attempted to counter the radically dualistic, isolationistic, and ontologically oriented interpretations of Yoga presented by many scholars where the full potentialities of our human embodiment are constrained within a radical, rigid, dualistic metaphysical structure and propose instead an open-ended, morally and epistemologically oriented hermeneutic that frees Yoga of the long-standing conception of spiritual isolation, disembodiment, self-denial, and world-negation and thus from its pessimistic image. Our interpretation does not impute that *kaivalya* denotes a final incommensurability between spirit and matter. It was suggested that while Patañjali can be understood as having adopted a provisional, practical, dualistic metaphysics, there is no proof that his system ends in duality.

Throughout our study I have endeavored to show where writings on Patañjali ranging from traditional Yoga scholiasts to modern academics have often explained the meanings of key yogic terms such as *nirodha* and *kaivalya* in an unclear, confused, or misleading manner. I have undertaken to clarify the meanings of central terms in Yoga and add new meanings, showing how the latter relate to the literal or conventional meanings generally used. Thus, I have suggested improvements over past translations and interpretations of the *Yoga-Sutra*, and have consulted (for analytical and critical purposes) the works by Vacaspati Misra, Bhoja Raja, Vijñana Bhikṣu, H. Aranya, and others who have contributed to the exegetical tradition of classical Yoga. This study has taken the view that Vyasa's commentary, the *Yoga-Bhāṣya*, provides the key to unlocking

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the profundity of meaning contained within the *Yoga-Sutra*, thus illuminating our understanding of Patañjali.

As well as being one of *the* seminal texts on yogic technique and transformative/liberative approaches within Indian philosophy, Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra* has to this day remained one of the most influential spiritual guides in Hinduism. In addition to a large number of people within India, millions of Westerners are actively practicing some form of Yoga influenced by Patañjali's thought, clearly demonstrating Yoga's relevance for today as a discipline that can transcend cultural, religious, and philosophical barriers. The universal and universalizing potential of Yoga makes it one of India's finest contributions to our modern/postmodern struggle for self-definition, moral integrity, and spiritual renewal. The main purpose of this present study has been to consider a fresh approach in which to reexamine and assess classical Yoga philosophy, one that helps to disclose the integrity of the *Yoga darsana*. There is, I submit, nothing in what I argued that can be proven to be incompatible with Patañjali's thought. Thus, it is my hope that some of the suggestions presented in this study can function as a catalyst for bringing Patañjali's *Yoga darsana* into a more fruitful dialogue and encounter with other religious and philosophical traditions both within and outside of India.

## Notes

### Chapter 1.

#### Selected Background Material

1. G. Feuerstein (1979a), *The Yoga-Sutra of Patañjali: A New Translation and Commentary*, p. 26.
2. M. Eliade (1969), *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*, p. 4.
3. G. Larson (1978), Review: Gaspar M. Koelman (1970), *Patañjala Yoga: From Related Ego to Absolute Self*, in *PEW*, 28.2: 236-239.
4. G. Feuerstein (1989), *Yoga: The Technology of Ecstasy*, p. 15. The best historical and thematic reference on Yoga, to which this chapter is indebted, is the above-mentioned work by Feuerstein.
5. See *ibid.*, pp. 40-62, for a discussion on most of these forms of Yoga.
6. M. Monier-Williams (1899), *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 853.
7. G. Feuerstein (1989: 16) and (1975), *Textbook of Yoga*, p. 3.
8. The word Yoga, as Feuerstein mentions (1989: 16), is also related to German *joch*, Swedish *ok*, Latin *iugum*, Greek *zugos*, French *joug*, and Russian *igo*, which all have similar meanings.
9. Monier-Williams, (1899: 853).

10. See Eliade (1969: 361).

11. BG IV.3.

12. See Hauer's (1958), *Der Yoga*, and M. Falk's (1941), *The Unknown Early Yoga and the Birth of Indian Philosophy*; see also K. Werner (1977), *Yoga and Indian Philosophy*.

13. Contemporary scholarship tends to agree on this point. Feuerstein (1989: 97) writes: "traces of an early form of Yoga can even be detected in the Indus civilization that flourished in the second and third millennia BCE). According to this view, Yoga thus antedates the invasion of the Sanskrit-speaking tribes from the steppes of Southern Russia, who called themselves Aryans ("noble folk") and who had long been thought to have given birth to the tradition of Yoga." There are some major problems in trying to discern the religious life of the people of the Indus Valley Civilization. However, there are some examples available of their writing, in a pictographic script, mainly upon small seals that may have been used to seal bags of grain. Scholars have looked for materials that prefigure religious phenomena in the later development of Indian culture. One of the seals discovered portrays a male, ithyphallic, horned person, perhaps a human being, perhaps a deity, sitting in what appears to be a yogic posture a variant of the lotus position with animals around him. This figure has been associated with the important god of Hinduism, Siva, who is considered to be a great yogin, and who

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is often referred to as Pasupati the "lord of the animals." This suggests that the practice of Yoga and the worship of the god Siva are derived from this pre-Aryan Indus Valley Civilization. For more on the Indus Valley Civilization and Yoga, see Feuerstein (1989: 97-101); see also J. Marshall (1931), *Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization*; M. Wheeler (1968), *The Indus Civilisation*; and B. Allchin and R. Allchin (1982), *The Rise of Civilisation in India and Pakistan*.

14. See Joshi (1965), "On the Meaning of Yoga." *PEW*, 15.1: 53.

15. See Dasgupta (1922), *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, p. 226.

16. References from the RV are taken from Swami S. P. Sarasvati, trans. (1977, 1987), *Rg-Veda Samhita*, vols. 2, 5, 6, and 13. Unless otherwise noted, translations from Sanskrit sources used in this study are mine. RV X.114.9 in (1987), vol. 13, p. 4592: *kas chandasam yogam a veda dhirah ko dhisnyam prati vacam papada*.

17. Joshi (1965: 54).

18. The Sanskrit text of the Upanisads can be located in S. Radhakrishnan (1953), *The Principal Upanisads*; page numbers following references to passages from the *Upanisads* are taken from Radhakrishnan's book. See p. 257 for text of BA Up IV.3.10: *na tatra rathah, na rathayogah, napanthano bhavanti; atha rathan, rathayogan, pathah srjate*. "There are neither chariots nor animals for yoking to chariots, nor paths; then he produces chariots,



animals for yoking to chariots and paths."

19. E.g. *RV* III.42 and *Satapatha Brahmana* III.5.1.24.

20. See *Katha Up* I.3; *Mait Up* II.6; *Mahabharata*, *Vanaparva*, 211.23.

21. Dasgupta (1922: 226).

22. S. Dasgupta (1930), *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*, pp. 39, 44.

23. S. Dasgupta (1922: 226).

24. Cf. *Atharva Veda* XIX.43.1; *RV* IV.1.1; and *Yajur Veda* II.2.

25. Joshi (1965: 55).

26. The term Veda ("knowledge") refers to the oldest section of the sacred canon of Hinduism comprising the *Rg Veda*, *Yajur Veda*, *Sama Veda* and *Atharva Veda*. The hymns (*sukta*, *mantra*) of these ancient collections composed as early as 1200 BCE (i.e., the *Rg Veda*), are traditionally acknowledged to have been "heard" or "perceived" by seers (*rsis*) and are regarded as part of revealed scripture (*sruti*).

27. See *RV* X.90.12-13; cf. Eggeling, *The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. 43, p. xv.

28. *RV* X.90.16ab.

29. *RV* V.81.1 in (1977), vol. 5, p. 1802: *yuñjate mana uta yuñjate dhiyo viprah*.

30. See R. Panikkar (1977), *The Vedic Experience: Mantra-mañjari*, pp. 350-351 for a discussion of the term *rta*.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

32. See *Atharva Veda* XI.8.6.

33. See Uma Vesci (1985), *Heat and Sacrifice in the Vedas*.

34. See, for example, *RV* I.23.5 and V.68.4.

35. J. Miller (1974), *The Vedas: Harmony, Meditation and Fulfilment*, p. 45. I am grateful to G. Feuerstein (1989, p. 103) for having introduced me to Miller's stimulating work. See also Antonio de Nicholas's (1976), *Meditations Through the Rg Veda* (New York: Nicolas Hayes) for insights on issues raised in this section of our study.

36. J. Gonda (1963: 68-69). Concerning *dhitih*, Gonda writes (p. 171): the "suffix (*ti*) helps to form words expressing that the idea conveyed by the root manifests itself and is realized as an actuality."

37. The *dhitayah* (plural of *dhiti*) refer to materialized visions, often inspired hymns. The term *dhita* denotes "an object of visionary sight"; the adjective *dhira* means "gifted with vision" and hence "able on account of the possession of a vision." The quality expressed by *dhira* may enable a sage or wise person to overcome practical difficulties of various kinds. Thus there are a whole family of concepts that originate in the *Rg Veda* and that precede the related term *dhyana* of classical times.

38. See Miller (1974: 61).

39. Ibid., p. 354.

40. RV V.40.6 in (1977), vol. 5, p. 1672: *gulham suryam tamasapavratena turiyena brahmanavindad atri*.

41. See Miller (1974: 97). This is in reference to the fourth *brahman*. Vedic Sanskrit employed two words for prayerful or meditative contemplation: *brahman* and *dhi*. Both have different meanings yet are closely linked together. The term *dhi* refers to visionary insight, intense thought, and reflection; and *brahman* is derived from the verbal root *brh*, meaning "to grow, expand."

42. Ibid., p. 100. This is evidenced in the text quoted in n. 40 (above); cf. also RVI.50.10 and I.164.21.

43. See ibid., on RV VIII.48.3: "we have become immortal; we have gone to the light; we have found the gods." See also ibid., p. 92, where Miller writes:

In the state of heightened awareness as was familiar to Vedic sages they beheld the "golden one" (*apasyama hiraṇyayam* RV I.139.2) not with visionary thoughts or mental insight (*dibhis cana manasa*) but "with the very eyes of Soma [our] very eyes" (*svebhir aks abhih somasya svebhir aksabhih*) or as the verse could also be translated "with the very eyes of Soma, indeed its very eyes," the meaning being the same, as "its very eyes" become the eyes of the seers. These "eyes" may mean the perception granted through ecstasy, since after drinking Soma the bards could exclaim "we have become immortal, we have come to the light, we have found the gods" (VIII.48.3), the juxtaposition of gods (i.e., divinity), of light (i.e., enlightenment) and immortality (i.e., the abolition of limitation) expressing the gradation of the rapture experienced. The direct mention that there is no mental visioning but an actual realization through the eyes granted by Soma, the insight of the god-intoxicated spirit, lifts up the vision to a higher level than that so far considered. It is also remarkable that the eyes of Soma are equated with "very eyes" as it can be taken that the essence of the seer's perception or "eyes" is one with Soma. From this it may be easily inferred that the eyes of the immortal spirit which are the real eyes, are referred to here.

Such a declaration as outlined by Miller constitutes one of the nearest of Rg-Vedic approaches to YS III.3 on *samadhi*.

44. See, for example, A. B. Keith (1925), *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanisads*, p. 311, who takes this position.

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45. See Miller (1974: 191). In the *Nasadiya Sukta* or hymn of creation (*RV* X. 129), the manifest worlds are said to have been produced by virtue of the excessive self-heating (*tapas*) of the primordial Being. For a translation and commentary on *RV* X.129, see J. Miller, "The Hymn of Creation: A Philosophical Interpretation," in G. Feuerstein and J. Miller (1971), *A Reappraisal of Yoga: Essays in Indian Philosophy*, pp. 64-85.

46. See the *purusayajña* in *SB* I.3.2.1 and Panikkar (1977: 392-393).

47. See *SB* II.3.1-39 and the *Pranagnihotra Up*. Interestingly, the *SB* does contain clear references dealing with speculation on the nature of the source of manifest existence, the life-force or breath (*prana*) and rebirth, all within the context of Vedic sacrificial mysticism.

48. *Svarga* ("heaven") or *svarga-loka* ("heavenly realm") is the domain of the deities and, as the *Bhagavadgita* (see IX.20-21) states, of virtuous people who devote themselves to the Divine through forms of sacrifice (*yajña*), but who will nonetheless be reborn as soon as their merit (*punya*) is exhausted. One cannot rely on a heavenly state for attaining everlasting security free from the pain (*duhkha*) of the samsaric world of change. "Heaven" should not be made equivalent to liberation itself. From the enlightened perspective, heaven is still implicated in samsaric existence.

49. See Radhakrishnan (1953), *The Principal Upanisads*, p. 764.

50. See *BA Up* III.4.1.

51. *BA Up* III.4.2 (p. 220).

52. See *BA Up* I.4.10 (p. 168): *aham brahmasmi*.

53. See *YS* II.12-16.

54. See *BA Up* IV.4.22 (p. 279).

55. *BA Up* IV.4.13 (p. 276).

56. *BA Up* IV.4.20 (p. 278).

57. See *BA Up* II.4.12 (p. 200).

58. See, for example, *BA Up* II.3.6; III.9.26; IV.2.4; IV.4.2.

59. This method is used, for example, in *taraka-yoga* dealt with in the *Advaya-Taraka* ("Nondual Deliverer") *Up*, one of the *Yoga Upanisads*. This approach is also illustrated in the *Nirvana-Satka*, a well-known didactic poem ascribed to Sankara, the great eighth-ninth century CE exponent of nondual (Advaita) Vedanta.

60. See *BA Up* III.8.9-11 (pp. 232-233).

61. *Chand Up* III.17.4 (p. 396).

62. *Chand Up* III.16.1 (p. 394): *puruso vava yajnah*.

63. R. E. Hume, trans. (1921), *The Thirteen Principal Upanisads*, pp. 272-273.

64. *Tait Up* II.4.1 (p. 545): *yoga atma*. Elsewhere, in another section of the *Tait Up* (III.10.2), the compound *yoga-ksema* is used, meaning, according to Radhakrishnan, "acquisition" and "preservation" respectively. This suggests that the technical designation of the term Yoga had not yet attained preeminent status.

65. Alongside Hinduism and the philosophical and mystical insights of the Upanisadic sages, Jainism and Buddhism become major socioreligious movements in India. Founded by Vardhamana Mahavira (sixth century BCE), an older contemporary of Gautama the Buddha, Jainism is a non-Vedic, dualistic system and shares common features with Yoga. Jainism excels in its rigorous observance of moral precepts, especially "nonharming"/"nonviolence" (*ahimsa*). This foundational ethical ideal, together with an extensive teaching about the moral force/intention (*karma*) inherent in human

behavior, has exerted a lasting influence on the tradition of Yoga. Also noteworthy is the Jaina soteriological doctrine termed *kevala* and the doctrine of the individual self *or jiva*. The liberated or released self is called *kevalin*. Later Jaina writers have articulated ideas and practices that are similar to Hindu forms of Yoga. For example, the esteemed scholar Haribhadra (eighth century CE) has utilized some of the codifications of Patañjali. Haribhadra's *Yogadrstisamuccaya* outlines four systems of eightfold Yoga where he lists Patañjali's *astanga-yoga* and goes on to align it with his own eightfold system. His "seed of Yoga" (*Yoga-Bindu* 367) states that the code of more advanced Yoga discipline is meditative practice. For more on Jaina Yoga, see G. Feuerstein (1975: 63-69) and (1989: 129-138). For a recent study that focuses on the doctrine of "nonviolence" (*ahimsa*) within an Indic (including a Jaina) context, see C. Chapple (1993), *Nonviolence to Animals, Earth, and Self in Asian Traditions*. For studies on Jainism see W. Schubring (1962), *The Doctrine of the Jainas*; and P. S. Jaini (1979), *The Jaina Path of Purification*. Gautama the Buddha (sixth century BCE), the founder of Buddhism, is referred to in the Pali canon as being devoted to meditation, and the later Sanskrit scriptures of Mahayana Buddhism often refer to him as a yogin. Sometimes understood as a pragmatic version of Yoga, his teaching is founded in a rejection of (Brahmanic) metaphysical speculation, especially regarding the notion of an eternal Self (*atman*). The Buddha's noble eightfold path to liberation from suffering (*duhkha*) emphasized practical discipline and direct experience to countermand the human tendency to theorize about spiritual life and reify it rather than to encounter it directly. For example, the eighth member of the noble eightfold path, termed *samyak-samadhi* ("right concentration"), consists of eight stages of meditative practices (known as *jhana* in Pali and *dhyana* in Sanskrit) for the purpose of transcending individuated consciousness and leading to

enlightenment, or *nirvana*. The contribution of Buddhism to the development of the tradition of Yoga has been considerable, just as the preceptors of Yoga have contributed over time to the unfolding of Buddhist teachings. There has been a long historical interplay between Buddhism and Hinduism that culminated in the movements of Tantrism, some schools of which are not easily identifiable as being either Buddhist or Hindu. The *Yoga-Sutra* of Patañjali adopts a terminology at times close to Mahayana Buddhism. The important connections between classical Yoga and Buddhism have been noted by scholars though no rigorous detailed studies to my knowledge have hitherto been undertaken. Particularly the parallels between the *YS* and the *Abhisamayalankara* deserve closer examination; and the parallel use of some key terms in the *YS* and texts such as the *Lankavatara-Sutra* and the *Madhyantavibhagabhasya* both of the later texts associated with the Yogacara Buddhist tradition are worthy of more serious scrutiny. For more specialized studies related to the above, see: L. de la Vallee Poussin (1936-37), "Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali," *Melanges chinois et bouddhiques*, pp. 223-242; and E Senart (1900), "Bouddhisme et Yoga," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, vol. 42, Nov., pp. 345-364. For other studies on Yoga and Buddhism, see: M. Eliade (1969: 162-199); and G. Feuerstein (1975: 54-62) and (1989: 139-146). For other studies on Buddhism, see: T Stcherbatsky (1923), *The Central Conception of Buddhism*; B. Sangharakshita (1980), *A Survey of Buddhism*; and Paul Williams (1989), *Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations*. As stated in the Introduction, this study does not examine yogic paths and techniques within Jainism and Buddhism, nor is it concerned with an investigation into the influences of Jainism and Buddhism on Hindu Yoga and, in particular, the *YS* of Patañjali. A study

along these lines would necessarily involve an analysis of material that, for lack of space, lies outside the scope of this present study. For a brief added look at a few of the parallels between Jainism and Buddhism in relation to Patañjali's Yoga, see n. 40 in chapter 2 of this study.

66. *Katha Up* I.2.12 (p. 613).

67. *Katha Up* I.2.23 (p. 619).

68. *Katha Up* I.3.3-4 (pp. 623-624).

69. *Katha Up* I.3.10-11 (p. 625).

70. *Katha Up* II.3.11 (p. 645).

71. *Svet Up* I.3 (p. 710).

72. *Svet Up* I.11 (p. 716).

73. *Svet Up* I.13-14 (p. 717).

74. *Svet Up* III.8 (p. 727); cf. *R V V* 40.6 in n. 40 above and *BG* VIII.9.



75. See *Svet Up* VI.21 (p. 749).

76. Although the *Mait Up* most likely belongs to the second century BCE, it undoubtedly contains passages that are considerably older.

77. *Mait Up* III.2 (p. 805).

78. *Mait Up* II.7 (p. 804).

79. *Mait Up* IV.4 (p. 811).

80. *Mait Up* IV.1 (p. 809).

81. *Mait Up* VI.18 (p. 830).

2. We note here the switching of concentration and meditation in this sequence and the citing of *tarka* (which is not a part of the eight-limbed scheme outlined by Patañjali). There is also the absence of any acknowledgment of ethical restraints (*yama*) and self-discipline/observances (*niyama*), which constitute the foundation of the eight-limbed Yoga (*astanga-yoga*) of Patañjali. However, this does not mean that moral guidelines were entirely neglected in the *Mait Up*; they were simply not formalized.

83. See Eliade (1969: 125) and Hauer (1958: 95-117).

84. Dasgupta (1922: 227).

85. *BG* III.4 (p. 133); see G. Feuerstein (1990), *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Yoga*, p. 232. For Sanskrit text of the *BG* consult page numbers given in S. Radhakrishnan (1948), *The Bhagavadgita*; translations are mine.

86. *BG* II.48 (p. 120).

87. *BG* III.4 (p. 133).

88. *BG* III.6-7 (p. 134).

89. *BG* III.22 (p.140).

90. See, for example, *BG* III.25 and VI.18.

91. *BG* VI.29 (p. 203).

92. G. Feuerstein (1989: 160).

93. *BG* IV.17-18 (pp. 162-163).

94. *BG* IV.20 (p. 164).

95. *BG* IV.33 (p. 168).

96. In fact, all eighteen chapters of the *BG* can each be called a "different" Yoga. Although Yoga is not systematically outlined in the *BG*, it can be argued that the text aims for an integral philosophical approach.

97. *BG IX.4-5* (pp. 238-239).

98. See *BG XVIII.57-58* (p. 372).

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99. *BG XIII.34* (p. 313).

100. See *BG II.71-72* (p. 129).

101. *BG VI.15* (p. 198).

102. *BG XVIII.54-55* (p. 371).

103. *BG XV.18* (p. 332).

104. *BG VI.31* (p. 204).

105. *BG VI.47* (p. 211).

106. For example, the *Bhagavata-Purana* (ca. ninth to eleventh century CE) is the most important scripture of the *Bhagavata* sect. Its philosophical foundations are by and large those of nondual Vedanta tempered by the conception and worship of the personal form of the Lord, as *Kṛṣṇa*. The *Bhagavata-Purana* is imbued with Yoga and Sāṃkhya teachings. All the elements of Patañjali's *astanga-yoga* ("eight-limbed Yoga") are present, yet the overall focus is on service and devotion to the personal God. Thus the main path advanced in this Purana is clearly *bhakti-yoga*. This is contrasted with "Yoga," which likely refers to the "dualistic" approach usually assigned to classical Yoga. Of particular interest is the section in the *Bhagavata-Purana* known as the *Uddhava-Gita* (XI.6-29) where Kṛṣṇa expounds the Yoga of devotion (*bhakti*) to the sage Uddhava. This section includes a discourse (XI.20.6-9) where the three approaches of *jñāna-yoga*, *karma-yoga*, and *bhakti-yoga* are distinguished. See J. M. Sanyal (1973). Also, a noteworthy exponent of Hindu *bhakti* is Ramanuja (eleventh century CE), the founder of the Viśiṣṭadvaita school of Vedanta and the leading theologian and philosopher of the medieval *bhakti* movement. An enthusiastic proponent of Vaiṣṇavism, his gifted intellect and zeal made him the chief opponent of Śaṅkara's philosophy. For Ramanuja, *bhakti* is not a state of profuse emotionalism but is one firmly rooted in wisdom (*jñāna*). The highest devotee is a knower (*jñānin*) of the Lord. In his approach he sought to integrate *karma-yoga*, *jñāna-yoga*, and *bhakti-yoga*, but emphasizing union with the Lord ultimately through *bhakti*; see J. Lipner (1986), *The Face of Truth: A Study of Meaning and Metaphysics in the Vedantic Theology of Ramanuja*; and R. C. Lester (1976), *Ramanuja on the Yoga*. The pure nondualist, Vallabha, and the ecstatic Kṛṣṇa Caitanya, both of roughly the fifteenth century CE, recommend *bhakti* as the principal means of liberation. Both were Vaiṣṇava preceptors and great *bhakti* yogins.

107. Franklin Edgerton, trans. (1965), *The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy*, p. 261.

108. Ibid., p. 262.

109. *MBh* XII.188.15 (p. 1058): *vicaras ca vitarkas ca vivekas copajayate*. Sanskrit text is from S. K. Belvalkar, et al., eds., (1958), *The Mahabharata*, Santiparvan 2 and 3, vol. 16. In Patañjali's terminology, the terms *vitarka* and *vicara* can refer to stages of cognitive *samadhi* (i.e., *samprajñata*, *YS* I.17), and *viveka* is discriminative knowledge that distinguishes between *purusa* (the seer) and *prakṛti* (the seeable). In a later section of the *MD* (XII.294.7-8) Vasistha instructs Janaka on the method of Yoga using key yogic terms such as *pranayama* (breath-control), *dharana* (concentration), and *ekagrata* (one-pointedness of mind), all which are given more technically precise explanations in the *YS*. See Belvalkar (1951: 1631), and Edgerton (1965: 326 n. 1).

110. *MBh* XII.188.22; see Edgerton, trans. (1965: 262). An in-depth look at Yoga in the *MD* would necessarily involve a thorough and independent study in its own right.

111. Feuerstein (1974: 69).

112. This Yajñavalkya is not to be confused with the revered adept of the *BA Up* (eighth century BCE).

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113. *YYS* I.43: *samyogo yoga ity ukto jivatmaparamatmanoh*. Text from K. S. Sastri, ed. (1938), *The Yogayajñavalkya*, p. 5. Probably a different Yajñavalkya authored the *Yajñavalkya-Smṛti*, a work on law and ethics (*dharma*) written around the first to third century CE. In one verse (I.8) this text notes that the highest teaching (*dharma*) is that which leads to the vision of the Self (*atma-darsana*) by means of Yoga. This Yajñavalkya has also been credited with the authorship of the *YYS*. P. C. Divanji (1953, 1954), "The Yogayajñavalkya," mentions the period of 200-400 CE as a possible date for the *Yoga-Yajñavalkya*. Feuerstein (1989: 300) argues it is a later work, perhaps belonging to the twelfth century CE, or even later.

114. From *Tantric Texts*, A. Avalon, ed. (1929), *Mahanirvana Tantra*, XIV.123 (p. 463): *yogo jivatmanor aikyam*. The eleventh-century CE dating is given by Feuerstein (1989: 309).

115. Text from Feuerstein (1974: 70) *sivasaktisamayogah yogaiva na samsayah*; see also *Tantrasara* by Abhinavagupta, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. 17, (1918), edited by M. S. Kaul.

116. See H. H. Wilson, trans. (1870), *The Vishnu Purana*, vol. 5, pp. 227-228. The *Visnu-Purana*, which deals with Yoga in its short sixth book, understands Yoga as the path of meditation (*dhyana*).

117. According to the *BG* (II.49), *buddhi-yoga* consists in one's taking refuge in the faculty of intelligence (*buddhi*) in order not to be impelled by the fruit of one's deeds. Later on in the *BG* (X. 10) *buddhi-yoga* is said to be given by Lord Kṛṣṇa to those who worship Him

with love. See also *BG* XVIII.57.

118. See *BG* IX.28 and *Mundaka Up* III.2.6.

119. See *MBh* XII.188.1ff. where a fourfold meditation is taught, the goal of which is "extinction" (*nirvana*). The *BG* (XVIII.52) emphasizes that *dhyana-yoga* must be cultivated in conjunction with dispassion (*vairagya*). See also chapter VI in the *BG*, entitled "Dhyana-Yoga."

120. See the *Tri-Sikhi-Brahmana Up* (II.23), one of the *Yoga-Upanisads*, where *kriya-yoga* is contrasted with *jñana-yoga* and equated with *karma-yoga*. According to the *Bhagavata-Purana* (XI.27.49), *kriya-yoga* can be either Vedic or tantric ritual practice. Both approaches lead to union with the Divine. In *YS* II.1 *kriya-yoga* is said to be comprised of asceticism (*tapas*), study/personal recitation (*svadhyaya*), and devotion to *isvara* (*isvara-pranidhana*). In modern times (twentieth century) *kriya-yoga* was taught by Paramahansa Yogananda as a form of *raja-yoga*.

121. *Nada-yoga* is a prominent teaching in the *Yoga-Upanisads*. It is indirectly referred to earlier in the *Maitrayaniya Up* (VI.22), where we are told of those who listen to the sound (*śabda*) inside the heart by placing the thumb against the ears. According to Bhartrhari (ca. sixth century CE), the highest form of being is the soundless Word (*vac*), which is imbued with the power (*śakti*) to burst forth (*śphut*) into creative expression. The "bursting forth" of the Word (*śphota*), also called *Sabda-Brahman* or *Word-Brahman*, is the immanent ground of all manifestation, including all things and all meaning, down to the grossest forms and is an idea which may be derived from the Upanisads (see *BA Up* IV.I.2 and *Mait Up* VI.22-see above).

122. *YB* I.1 (p. 1): *yogah samadhih*. The Sanskrit text of the *YS*, the *YB* of Vyasa, the *Tattva-Vaisaradi* of Vacaspati Misra, and the *Raja-Martanda* of Bhoja Raja is from *The Yoga-Sutra of Patañjali* (1904), K. S. Agase ed.

123. An in-depth analysis of the term *samadhi* in classical Yoga is given later in chapters 4-6.

124. Eliade (1969: 77); cf. Feuerstein (1989: 11).

125. Feuerstein (1979a: 26).

126. M. Müller (1899: 309).

127. *RM* I.1 (p. 1): *pum prakṛtyor viyogo'pi yoga*.

128. See P. T. Raju (1985), *Structural Depths of Indian Thought*, p. 344.

129. *BG* II.50 (p. 120): *yogah karmasu kausalam*.

130. BG II.53 (p. 122): *srutivipratipanna te, yada sthasyati niscala samadhav acala buddhis, tada yogam avapsyasi.*
131. TV I.1 (p. 2): "yuja samadhau" ity asmad vyutpannah samadhy artho na tu "yujir yogē" ity asmat samyogārtha ity arthah.
132. See n. 29 above.
133. Examples of this usage include: RV I.82.6; Kausitaki Up II.6; Kena Up I.1; BA Up V.13.2.
134. It is unlikely, as I go on to state in chapter 2, that the Patañjali who authored the *Mahabhasya* is the same Patañjali who is credited for writing the YS. It remains, however, an unresolved issue.
135. As this study attempts to do in later chapters (esp. 4-6).
136. See Madhavacarya (1882), *The Sarva-Darsana Samgraha*, pp. 242-243.
137. Ibid., p. 243.
138. U. Arya (1986: 75). In his study (1979b) entitled, *The Yoga-Sutra of Patañjali: An Exercise in the Methodology of Textual Analysis*, Feuerstein (p. 28) mentions the interesting hypothesis, initially put forward by K. B. R. Rao (1966: 375), that Vyasa (cf. YB II.19) subscribed to the so-called *eka-uttara* ("increasing by one") theory. He writes (ibid.), "This is an ontogenetic model operating on the principle of progressive inclusion."
139. Madhavacarya (1882: 243).
140. See Sanskrit text of YSS in G. Jha, trans. (1894), *The Yogasara-Samgraha of Vijñana Bhikṣu*, p. 22 reads: *aruruksuyuñjamanayogarudhapah.*
141. BG VI.3 (p. 188).
142. BG VI.4 (p. 188).
143. BG VI.18 (p. 199).
144. BG II.56 (p. 123).
145. YB III.51 (p. 169): *catvarah khalvami yoginah prathamakalpiko madhubhumikah, prajñajyotir, atikrantabhavaniyas ceti.*
146. See YS II.27 (p. 97): *tasya saptadha prantabhumih prajña.*
147. YB III.51 (p. 169): *tatrabhyasi pravrttam atrajyotih prathamah. rtambhhara-prajño dvitiyah. bhutendriyajayi tritayah sarvesu bhavitesu bhavaniyesu krtaraksabandhah kartavya sddhanadiman. caturtho yas tv atikrantabhavaniyastasya cittapratisarga eko'rthah, sapta vidhasya prantabhumiprajña.* Also worthy of mention is the later (ca. 1800 CE) *Siva-Samhita* (V.10-14), one of the principal manuals of *hatha-yoga*, which distinguishes four types of students depending on the practitioner's commitment to spiritual life:

1. The weak or mild (*mrdu*) practitioner, who is unenthusiastic, fickle, timid, unenergetic, etc., and is fit for *mantra-yoga*;
2. The moderate (*madhya*) practitioner, who is endowed with even-mindedness, patience, a desire for virtue, kind speech, etc., and is fit for *laya-yoga*;
3. The exceptional (*adhimatra*) practitioner, who demonstrates firm understanding, self-reliance, bravery, vigor, faithfulness, delight in Yoga practice, etc., and is capable of practicing *hatha-yoga*;

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4. The extraordinary (*adhimatratama*) yogin, who displays energy, enthusiasm, charm, heroism, fearlessness, purity, skillfulness, surrender to the teacher, control over the senses, etc., and is fit to practice all types of Yoga referring here to *rajayoga* (V.9).

See B. D. Basu, ed. (1914), *The Yoga Sastra: Siva Samhita*, in *The Sacred Books of the Hindus*, vol. 15, pp. 54-56.

148. YB I.20 (p. 24): *te khalu nava yogino mrdumadhyadhimatropaya bhavanti, tad yatha mrdupayo, madhyopayo'dhimatropaya iti. tatra mrdupayas trividhah mrdusamvego, madhyasam vegas tivrasamvega iti. tatha madhyopayas tathadhimatropaya iti.* "Yogins are of nine kinds, according to the methods which they follow, either mild or moderate or ardent, and then sub-divided according to the energymild, moderate or ardentwith which they practise their respective methods. A mild method may be practiced with mild or moderate or ardent energy and likewise with the moderate method and likewise with the intense." Thus the nine kinds of yogins are those of: (i) mild method with mild energy or intensity; (ii) mild method with moderate energy or intensity; (iii) mild method with ardent energy or intensity; (iv) moderate method with mild energy or intensity; (v) moderate method with moderate energy or intensity; (vi) moderate method with ardent energy or intensity; (vii) ardent method with mild energy or intensity; (viii) ardent method with moderate energy or intensity; (ix) ardent method with ardent energy and intensity.

149. TV I.21 (p. 24): *mrdumadhyadhimatrah pragbhaviya samskaradrsta vasady esam te tathoktah.*

150. As will be discussed in chapter 3; cf. YS II.12-13 and IV.8.

151. YS I.21 (p. 24): *tivrasamveganam asannah.*

152. YB I.21 (p. 24): *samadhilabhah samadhiphalam ca bhavati.*

153. TV I.21 (p. 24): *samadheh samprajñatasya phalam asamprajñatatas tasyapi kaivalyam.*

154. YS I.22 (p. 25): *mrdumadhyadhimatratvat tato'pi visesah.* It appears that the YS can be seen to yield, at the most, a ninefold classification of yogins.



155. Cf. Feuerstein (1979a: 41).
156. M. Eliade (1969: 5).
157. *Siva Purana* VII.2.15, 38.
158. Eliade (1969: 5). See also Feuerstein (1989: 20).
159. *BG* IV.34 (p. 169).
160. Joel D. Mlecko (1982), "The Guru in Hindu Tradition," in *NUMEN*, vol. 29, fasc. 1, July, p. 34.
161. See *Siva-Samhita* (1914) p. 25: *bhavedvir yavati vidya guruvaktra samud bhava, anyatha phalahina syannir viryapyati duhkhada*.
162. The word *diksa* and its underlying concept goes back to the *Atharva Veda* II.5.3.
163. R. K. Mookerji, ed. (1951), *Ancient Indian Education*, pp. 214-215.
164. Lama A. Govinda (1972), *The Way of the White Clouds*, p. 3.
165. G. Feuerstein (1984), "Worshipping the Guru's Feet," *The Laughing Man*, vol. 4, no. 4, p. 11.
166. See Feuerstein (1989: 27). On *diksa*, see the important medieval Hindu tantric work, the *Kularnava Tantra* (X. I and XIV.39).
167. *RV* IV.7.6.

168. *Yajur Veda* VII.27.
169. Mookerji (1951: xxvi).
170. *Tait Up* I.3.3 (p. 529).
171. *Chand Up* IV.4.3.
172. *Katha Up* I.2.8 (p. 610). The teacher-disciple context in India as well as elsewhere can have its negative or perverted side: see the *Maitrayaniya Up* VII.8 ff. (pp. 854-855), which warns against false teachers who merely deceive the naive.
173. See Monier-Williams (1899: 201).
174. See, for example, *BA Up* IV.5.15 (p. 286); see also n. 58 above.
175. See *Tait Up* III.1-6 (pp. 553-558).
176. See *Chand Up* VI.12.3 and VI.13.3 (p. 463). In VI.12, it is stated that the invisible

essence that maintains the life of the Nyagrodha tree, indeed the whole world, is the same as the essence of our human identity. The one who *knows* this essence, *is* this essence. The discussion that then ensues (VI.14.1-2) elaborates on the spiritual aspirant's need for a teacher in order to reach the perfected state of liberation.

177. Mookerji (1951: 114).

178. Shashibhusan Dasgupta (1962), *Obscure Religious Cults*, p. 88.

179. See M. P. Pandit (1965), *The Kularnava Tantra*, pp. 98-99.

180. See Mlecko (1982: 45).

181. Dasgupta (1962: 88).

182. The *Advaya-Taraka Up* (16) gives an esoteric explanation of the word *guru*, deriving it from the syllable *gu*, indicating "darkness," and *ru*, indicating "dispeller." Thus, the *guru* is one who dispels the disciple's spiritual ignorance. See A. Mahadeva Sastri, ed. (1920), *The Yoga Upanisads, with the Commentary of Sri Brahma-Yogin*, p. 9. The *Advaya-Taraka Up* (16 and 17) states: *gusabdas tv andhakarah syat rusabdas tannirodhakah, andhakaranirodhitvat gurur ity abhidhiyate. gurur eva param brahma gurur eva para gatih, gurur eva para vidya gurur eva parayanam*. "The syllable *gu* [signifies] darkness; the syllable *ru* [signifies] the destroyer of that [darkness]. By reason of [the power] to destroy darkness, one is called *guru*. The *guru* alone is the supreme God. The *guru* alone is the supreme path. The *guru* alone is the supreme knowledge. The *guru* alone is the supreme resort."

183. See n. 65 above.

184. Feuerstein (1989: 38). Feuerstein's book (*ibid.*) entitled, *Yoga: The Technology of Ecstasy*, has already attempted this kind of in-depth survey of the history, literature, and branches of Yoga with varying degrees of success. To illustrate his point of yogic paths occasionally having incompatible goals, Feuerstein contrasts the ideal of *raja-yoga*, which he states (p. 38) "is to recover one's true Identity as the transcendental Self standing eternally apart from the realm of Nature," with the ideal of *hatha-yoga*, which he adds (*ibid.*) "is to create an immortal body." *Raja-yoga* most commonly refers to Patañjali's Yoga system. As I go on to suggest, the radically dualistic understanding of the *YS* does not do justice to the integrity of Patañjali's Yoga.

## Chapter 2. The *Yoga-Sutra*

1. Francis Humphreys (1981), Review: Georg Feuerstein (1980), *The Philosophy of Classical Yoga*, in *BSOAS*, vol. 44, part 2, pp. 393-394.

2. K. S. Joshi (1965: 53).

3. The *YS* belongs to the authoritative traditional or "remembered" (*smṛti*) literature within Hinduism and thus is not considered to be a "revealed" (*śruti*) or primary scripture. Yoga is mentioned in the writings of other Brahmanic schools, for example, in the *Vaisesika-Sutras* of Kanada (V.2.17) and the *Nyaya-Sutras* of Aksapada (IV.2.46). Badarayana's refutation of Yoga in the *Brahma-Sutras* (II.1.3) may have been intended for Patañjali's Yoga although this is uncertain. There are evaluations and critiques of Yoga thought and practice in different schools within Vedānta such as in the writings of Sankara (ca. 800 CE), the great Advaita Vedāntin (see also below), as well as in the writings of Ramanuja (eleventh century CE), the founder of Viśiṣṭhadvaita Vedānta. The oldest available commentary on the *YS* is the *Yoga-Bhāṣya* ("Discussion on Yoga") or *Vyāsa-Bhāṣya* by Vyāsa. It was composed around the fifth-sixth centuries CE and is the basis for all subsequent exegetical efforts in classical Yoga. Vyāsa is often alleged to be the same person who compiled the *MBh*, together with the *BG*, the vast Purāṇa literature as well as other works. This idea, however, does not appear to have any basis in reality given the development of ideas and *śāstra* expressions found in the *YB*. Both Frauwallner (1953: 482) and Chakravarti (1951: 138ff.) suggest that the author of the *YB* is indebted to the work of the Sāṃkhyan revisor, Vindhyavasin (see n. 73 below). In an unpublished paper (1995) entitled "Yoga, Vyākaraṇa and the Chronology and Works of Some Early Authors" (cited with permission), A. Aklujkar has outlined several arguments that tend to attribute the authorship of the *YB* to Vindhyavasin himself. The name Vyāsa means "collector" and here may refer more generically to a title rather than to a personal name. Unfortunately, as is the case with Patañjali, we know very little about Vyāsa. Vyāsa, the commentator on the *YS*, was in all likelihood a highly advanced yogin (cf. J. W. Hauer, 1958) since he wrote with great authority on esoteric matters pertaining to yogic discipline. Vyāsa's *Bhāṣya* (*YB*) plays a crucial part in our interpretation of Patañjali's thought and enlightens our understanding of the *YS*. Vacaspati Miśra's *Tattva-Vaiśarādī* ("Clarity on the Categories [of Existence]"), a *tika* (a gloss or commentary on a commentary) on the *YB*, is considered by some to be the most important work after Vyāsa. In addition to the *TV*, Vacaspati (ninth century CE) wrote outstanding commentaries on, for example, Sāṃkhya, Nyaya, and the Vedānta systems. He did not attempt to establish a philosophical system of his own (although he was a Vedāntin) and was content to attempt a lucid explanation of whichever text or philosophical system he was writing on. His knowledge often appears theoretical rather than practical and in the *TV* he tends to expand on philological and epistemological issues at the expense of more practical deliberation. His commentary on Vyāsa is arguably the most helpful one. *Raja-Martanda* ("The Royal Sun"), also known as *Bhoja-Vṛtti*, is by the eleventh century CE king, Bhoja Raja. He was an accomplished poet as well as being a patron of the arts, sciences, and spiritual traditions. Bhoja's commentary is on Patañjali and is almost totally independent, although it incorporates some of the *YB*. It is a work, as a *vṛtti* is intended to be (note here that the term *vṛtti* is being used in a different sense from its technical usage in the *YS*), with only brief argumentation here and there. From the fourteenth century CE there exists an admirable systematic account of classical Yoga in Madhavācārya's *Sarva-Darsana Samgraha*. In the sixteenth or seventeenth century CE Ramananda Yati wrote *Mani-Prabha* ("Jewel Lustre"), a brief *tika* on Vyāsa. Also in the sixteenth century Viṣṇuana Bhikṣu authored an elaborate commentary called *Yoga-Varttika* ("Exposition on

Yoga"), considered by some to be the second most important commentary on Vyasa. Bhikṣu also wrote the *Yogasara-Samgraha* summarizing his interpretation of Patañjali's philosophy. Vijñāna Bhikṣu was a renowned scholar and yogin who interpreted Yoga from a Vedantic point of view. One of his main contributions is his attempt to establish points of unity between the dualistic perspective of Samkhya and theistic/nondualistic thought in Vedānta, and some of his comments also provide valuable insights into the experiential dimension of Yoga itself. We can also mention *Pradipika* ("That Which Sheds Light") the work (i.e., *vṛtti*) by Vijñāna Bhikṣu's disciple Bhavaganesa, and Nagoji Bhatta's works (*vṛttis*): *Laghvi* and *Brhati*. Both of the above authors (sixteenth and eighteenth centuries respectively), for the most part, echo Vijñāna Bhikṣu. Narayana Tirtha's seventeenth or eighteenth century *Bhasya* entitled, *Yoga-Siddhanta-Candrika* ("Moonlight on the Tenets of Yoga"), and *Sutrartha-Bodhini* ("Illumination of the Meaning of the *Sutras*") a *vṛtti* are two works not dependent on Vyasa. Narayana Tirtha writes from a Vedantic point of view and especially draws upon the discipline of devotion (*bhakti*) in his interpretation. Other writings that can be noted are Raghavananda Sarasvati's *Patañjala-Rahasya* ("The Secret of Patañjali's System"), a subcommentary (*upa-tika*) of uncertain but recent date on Vacaspati's work, and Sadasivendra Sarasvati's (eighteenth century) *Yoga-Sudha-Akara* ("Mine of Ambrosia"). Ananta-deva Pandit's (nineteenth century) *Padacandrika* ("Moonlight on Words"), for the most part, scans the *RM* of Bhoja Raja. Baladeva Misra's *Yoga-Pradipika* is a twentieth-century work summarizing Vacaspati's work. Also from the twentieth century is Hariharananda Aranya's *Bhasvati* ("Elucidation") as well as his (1963) *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali*. Aranya was a Sanskrit scholar and a practitioner of Samkhya-Yoga. It is probable that many ancient commentaries have been lost to arson by Muslim conquerors as well as having disappeared due to the discontinuity of a line of teachers and neglect by owners. One example of a lost commentary is that of a versified version (eleventh century) from which al-Biruni, the famous Persian traveler, translated into Arabic; on this see S. Pines and T. Gelblum (1966, 1977). There are a number of other, lesser-known works, known by name only. On the whole, these secondary commentaries do not excel in originality, relying largely on Vyasa. With some exceptions, the secondary literature on classical Yoga can tend to be dry and repetitive, which underlines the notion that Yoga, in its authentic context, has always been an esoteric discipline taught mainly through oral instruction. It is not a tradition of bookish speculation or mere "book learning" (Feuerstein, 1989: 176). Throughout this study I have incorporated an analysis, sometimes critical, of the most important Sanskrit literature on Patañjali and Vyasa including works by Vacaspati Misra, Vijñāna Bhikṣu, Bhoja Raja, H. Aranya, and others who have contributed to the exegetical tradition of classical Yoga. Many of the secondary works do not appear to have come out of Patañjali's school itself, and therefore their expositions need to be examined with a good measure of discernment. There is also the very detailed commentary attributed to Sankara (ca. 800 CE), the great exponent of Advaita Vedānta. The *Yogasutrabhasyavivarana* (= *YSBhV*) ("An Exposition on the Commentary [of Vyasa] on the *Yoga-Sutra*"), which is more properly called *Patañjalayogasastravivarana*, is a work explaining the *YB* and is not so overly Vedantic as to obscure the Samkhyān tenets. Trevor Leggett (1990), in the "Technical Introduction" to his useful translation of the *Vivarana* entitled, *The Complete Commentary by Sankara on the*

*Yoga Sutra-s*, pp. 17-18, supports the view that the *Vivarana* is a genuine work of Sankara as do P. S. Rama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurti Sastri, the

editors of the *YSBhV*, which was published in 1952 as volume 94 of the Madras Government Oriental Series. Leggett subscribes to the text's authenticity, although he admits that the matter is still open. Studies/comments by P. Hacker, H. Nakamura, S. Mayeda, and T. Vetter represent part of a growing consensus among scholars that tends to accept the *YSBhV* as Sankara's own work. However, any efforts to prove that it is a work of the first Sankaracarya are on the whole unconvincing, especially regarding matters of style and ideology (on this see, for example, see G. Larson's comments in 1987: 626). There is presently nothing in the evidence that would prevent one from arguing that the author of the *Vivarana* was one of Sankara's later followers thereby implying that the text may be somewhat later than the time of Sankara. Gopinath Kaviraj has argued (see [as cited by Larson, *ibid.*] "Literary Gleanings, Jayamangala," *Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research*, Oct. 1927, pp. 133-136) that the *Vivarana* is a fourteenth-century work by a certain Sankaracarya. In his article entitled, "Philological Observations on the So-Called Patañjalayogasutrabhasyavivarana" (*Indo-Iranian Journal* 25 [1983]: 17-40), A. Wezler stipulates that the question of authorship of the *Vivarana* remains unanswered for the time being. W. Halbfass (1991: 205-242) offers a scholarly analysis and critical assessment dealing with the unsettled issue of the *Vivarana*'s authorship, including its philological status, historical role, and philosophical position. In a recent article (1992), T. S. Rukmani (see "The Problem of the Authorship of the *Yogasutrabhasyavivarana*," *JIP* 20: 419-423) outlines several noteworthy reasons to question Sankaracarya's authorship of the *YSBhV*. Doubts about the text's provenance and its heavy reliance on (i.e., it is a subcommentary to the exposition of Patañjali by Vyasa), yet uncommon exegetical independence from the classical Yoga school have, for the purpose of this study, precluded my taking further notice of it. In this study, as the reader will see, I have been directly guided by Vyasa's own work.

4. See R. Garbe (1894), *Samkhya and Yoga*; see also R. Garbe (1922), "Yoga," in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 12, pp. 831-833.
5. See Dasgupta (1922), *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1, pp. 231-233.
6. See *RM* (p. 1) in "Introduction" (stanza 5).
7. T. S. Rukmani (1981), *Yogavarttika of Vijñāna Bhikṣu, Samadhipada*, p. 3.
8. As Eliade mentions (1969: 9).
9. Jacobi (1929), "Über das ursprüngliche Yoga-System," pp. 583-584; see also H. Jacobi (1911), "The Dates of the Philosophical Sutras of the Brahmins," *JAOS* 31: 26; and J. Prasad (1930), "The Date of the *Yoga-sutras*," *JRAS* 84: 365-375.
10. Keith (1949), *Samkhya System*, pp. 69-70.

11. See J. H. Woods, trans. (1914), *The Yoga-System of Patañjali*, pp. xvii-xx. The evidence so painstakingly collected by Woods and the arguments advanced by him fix the date of the *YS* somewhere between 300 and 500 CE. All the evidence Woods has collected, and various arguments he uses to narrow down the date of the *YS* to somewhere between 400 and 500 CE, seem more relevant for fixing the date of the *Bhasya* of Vyasa. Both Jacobi and Woods dispute the common authorship of the *Mahabhasya* and the *YS* mainly on the basis of internal evidence. Jacobi (1911: 26) points out that there is no corresponding tradition among the grammarians regarding this common authorship. Woods (1914: xv-xvii) argues that in regard to philosophical terms and concepts there is no real accord between the two to support their common authorship. There are very wide differences of terminology that cannot be accounted for as being

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merely due to differences in subject matter. For a summary of some of the above as well as other views, see M. Eliade (1969: 370-372).

12. See Hauer (1958), *Der Yoga*, p. 233.

13. See E. Frauwallner (1953), *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, 1, p. 285.

14. See H. von Glassenapp (1958), *Die Philosophie der Inder*, pp. 221-222.

15. See M. Winternitz (1967), *History of Indian Literature*, vol. 3, part 2, p. 517.

16. See G. J. Larson and R. S. Bhattacharya, eds. (1987), *Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*, p. 15.

17. Feuerstein states (1979a: 3) that the *YS* is a product of the third century CE, although in a later work (1989, p. 169) he suggests the second century CE as a probable date.

18. Cf. Christopher K. Chapple (1994), "Reading Patañjali without Vyasa: A Critique of Four *Yoga Sutra* Passages," *JAAR* 62.1: 85. Chapple suggests in the above article that the *YS* was composed in the first or second century CE.

19. See Feuerstein (1989: 169).

20. Feuerstein (1979a: 3).

21. H. Aranya (1869-1947), author of a Sanskrit commentary (see n. 3 above) on the *YS*, claimed that his teacher, Svami Triloki Aranya, was one of the distinguished teachers in the line of *Yoga gurus* established by Patañjali.

22. Feuerstein (1989: 170-171). Some of the arguments against Buddhist doctrine put forward by the classical *Yoga* school will be mentioned from time to time in this study.

23. See R. K. Mookerjee (1951: 258-325) for an analysis of education as conceived in the philosophical *sutra* literature in Hinduism.



24. See n. 3 above.

25. Some earlier scholars who have questioned the unity of the *YS* are Paul Deussen (1920), S. Dasgupta (1922), and Otto Strauss (1925). More recently, Feuerstein (1979b, see n. 26 below) concedes to this problem also raised by Hauer (1958).

26. P. Deussen (1920: 1:510) tentatively suggested the following divisions: Text A: I.1-I.16; Text B: I.17-I.51; Text C: II.1-II.27; Text D: II.28-III.55; Text E: IV.1-IV.33. (According to most editions there are 34 *sūtras* in chapter 4.) J. W. Hauer (1958: 221-230) investigated and restated Deussen's conclusions, discerning five texts, four of which he thinks reflect distinct schools of yogic practice, with the fifth as a late polemical accretion. The five texts according to Hauer are: (1) the *nirodha*-text (*YS* I.1-I.22) stressing dispassion/detachment (*vairāgya*) and practice (*abhasa*) necessary for "cessation" (*nirodha*), with the obstacles to these methods termed '*vṛttis*' (mental modifications); (2) the *isvara*pranidhana-text ("devotion to the Lord"), its method (I.23-I.51) and its corresponding obstacles (*antarayas*); (3) the *kriyayoga*-text (II.1-II.27) proposed to overcome the *klesas* (afflictions); (4) the *yogangas*-text (II.28-III.55) which begins with the unwholesome "discursive thoughts" (*vitarkas*) and the cultivation of their opposites; and (5) *nirmana-citta*-text (IV.1-IV.34) or "individualized/fabricated mind." The texts, he says, were edited into one piece, though he provides no clear motive for the editor's eclecticism. Frauwallner (1973: 344-345) differentiates between the *nirodha* form of Yoga described in the *Samādhi-Pada* and the eight-limbed Yoga (*astanga-Yoga*) of the *Sādhana-Pada*, i.e., the former is perceived as taking a more negative approach calling for the suppression of "every mental activity" while the latter "seeks to raise the capac-

ity for knowledge to the highest." S. Dasgupta, while concluding that the first three *pādas* of the text were written early (the last chapter being a later addition), nevertheless asserts that the *YS* is "a masterly and systematic compilation" (1922: 229). Feuerstein (1979b: 37-104) argues that the *YS* could well be a composite of two distinct Yoga traditions. On the one hand there is the Yoga of action (*kriya-yoga*) text running from *YS* I.1 to II.27 and again from III.3 or 4 to IV.34; and on the other hand, interrupting the above text, there is the eight-limbed Yoga text (*astanga-yoga*) extending from *YS* II.28 to III.2 or 3 and including *sūtra* III.55 (see n. 31 below).

27. G. Feuerstein (1989: 172).

28. C. Pensa, foreword to, *The Philosophy of Classical Yoga*, by G. Feuerstein (1980: vii).

29. Tola and Dragonetti (1987: xii) take a similar approach and consider Patañjali to be the author of the entire text of the *YS*.

30. See C. Chapple (1994) who is, as well, sensitive to these issues.

31. M. Eliade (1969) finds the unity of the *YS* to derive from mystical foundations, reading the work as the record of an extraordinary experience presumed to result from yogic

experience. In a later work (1975: 14) he concedes that the text "may have been revised by many hands, to adapt it to new 'philosophical situations'." But despite the concession of possible recasting, Eliade's reading is highly unitary. He believes that the *YS* reflects a long tradition of reconfirmed yogic experience, whether or not a single person is its author. Adolf Janáček provides good reasons to question each of Hauer's arguments for dissecting the text. He claims (1959: 474) that the unity of the work lies in the fact that all the various practices advocated have a common purpose, which is "[to break] the links fettering together the subject and the object." Janáček (1951, 1954, 1957, 1958, and 1959) took pains to arrive at the recognition that the practices advocated in the *YS* all belong to a "voluntarist type of yoga," despite the many differences among them (1954, p. 82). Following from his suggestion that the *YS* could well be a composite of two distinct Yoga traditions (see note 26 above), Feuerstein then advances that the section dealing with *astanga-yoga* is quoted in the main body of the *YS* and is not a later interpolation as some scholars have submitted. If this were the case, "the widespread equation of Classical Yoga with the eightfold path would be a historical curiosity, since the bulk of the *Yoga-Sutra* deals with *kriya-yoga*" (Feuerstein, 1989: 329 n. 2). Yet Feuerstein cautions against his own (above) approach adding that "textual reconstructions of this kind are always tentative, and we must keep an open mind about this as about so many other aspects of Yoga and Yoga history" (ibid.). In an earlier work focusing on methodological issues, Feuerstein (1979b: 36-89) rightly draws attention to terminological repetitions along with uniformities of conception in all four chapters of the *YS* and makes a convincing case for a single author. As Feuerstein points out (1989: 329 n. 2), "[t]he advantage of this kind of methodological approach to the study of the *Yoga-Sutra*, which presumes the text's homogeneity . . . is that it does not violate the work substantially, as is the case with those textual analyses that set out to prove that it is in fact corrupt or composed of fragments and interpolations." Based on their reading of the *YS* as outlined in the discussion of Patañjali's central theme being that of "subtilization," Chapple and Kelly (1990: 4-9) argue for a continuity throughout the text later noting that (p. 13) "it is clear from purely internal evidence that the text involves the overlay and interweaving of various yogic traditions

which became harmonized not by consistency but through their joint appearance through Patañjali."

32. For example, *YS* I.12-16 discuss practice (*abhyasa*) and dispassion (*vairagya*); *YS* I.20 deals with the application of faith (*sraddha*), energy (*virya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), ecstasy (*samadhi*), and insight (*prajña*); *YS* I.23-32 and II.1, 32, and 45 make explicit the practice of devotion to *isvara*, *YS* I.33 states appropriate attitudes and behavior in interpersonal relationships; *YS* I.34 and II.49-53 explain techniques of control over the breath (*pranayama*); *YS* I.35 speaks about steadying the mind in activity and I.36 instructs one to cultivate thoughts that are sorrowless and illuminating. There are many other forms of practice including the eight limbs of *Yoga* (*astanga-yoga*) in the second *pada*, which will be discussed later on in this study.

33. See Chapple and Kelly (1990: 10-11).
34. Erich Frauwallner (1973: 335).
35. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 14).
36. *YS* I.1-4 (pp. 1,4, and 7): *atha yoganusasanam; yogas cittavrttinirodhah; tada drastuh svarupe'vasthanam; vrttisarupyamitaratra*. The translation of *nirodha* as "cessation" is ambiguous and needs clarification. As I argue in chapter 4, it would be erroneous or misleading to understand "cessation" as being the definitive cessation of the existence of *vrttis*, i.e., the ontological cessation of *vrttis*. In *YS* I.2 *nirodha* refers to the cessation of the empirical effects of *vrttis* in the form of spiritual ignorance (*avidya*), i.e., is an epistemological cessation of *vrttis*.
37. S. N. Dasgupta (1922: 229).
38. Ibid.
39. Eliade states (1969: 9), "they are not his discoveries, nor those of his time; they had been tested many centuries before him." He goes on to say that Patañjali's "sole aim is to compile a practical manual of very ancient techniques."
40. A number of scholars including Senart, Lindquist, la Vallee Poussin, Keith, and Eliade have pointed out parallels between Buddhist Yoga and Patañjali's Yoga. The presence of a wide-ranging network of Buddhist terminology in the *YS* shows, as Chapple argues (1990: 12), that Patañjali no doubt included yogic practices from Buddhist manuals without acknowledging the Buddhist parallels by incorporating, for example: the five practices given in *YS* I.20 of *sraddha*, *virya*, *smṛti*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*; and the *brahmaviharas*, outlined in *YS* I.33 (*maitrī*, *karuṇa*, *mudita*, *upekṣa*), and widely applied within Buddhism. There are also similarities between the *samādhis* listed by Patañjali and the four *dhyānas* in Buddhism as well as Patañjali's reference to seven *prajñas* in *YS* II.27. The term *parisuddha* ("complete purification"), used in *YS* I.43 (see notes 127 and 128 in chapter 5), corresponds to the fourth state of meditation listed in the *Dīgha Nikāya*, an important Buddhist text. The *Lankavatara Sūtra* more or less contemporaneous with the *YS*, uses the metaphor of a clear jewel (cf. *YS* I.41) to describe the elevated state of the *bodhisattva* (II.8). See D. T. Suzuki (1932), *Lankavatara Sūtra*. (London: George Routledge and Sons). Buddhism tends to avoid positive statements such as the recognized notions within Hinduism of seer (*drastr*), grasper (*grahitr*), or Self (*atman*, *purusa*). Turning to epistemology, in the analysis of perception there is an interesting similarity between Yogacara Buddhism and Patañjali's Yoga. In both, the separation between "grasper" and "grasping" must be overcome resulting in a transcendence or dissolution of the bifurcation between subject and object

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(cf. *YS* I.41 and *Lankavatara Sūtra* IV.80, 213, and 215). For more on the parallels between Buddhism and Patañjali's Yoga, see Emile Senart (1900: 345-364), and L. de la Vallee Poussin (1936-37: 223-242). The relationship between Jainism and the *YS*, which is less

explored by scholars, is certainly worthy of much more consideration. On this, C. Chapple (1990: 12) writes, "Three teachings closely associated with Jainism appear in Yoga: the doctrine of *karma*, the *telos* of isolation (*kevala* in Jainism, *kaivalyam* in Yoga), and the practice of nonviolence (*ahimsa*). In fact, the entire list of the five *yamas* (II.30) is identical with the ethical precepts taught by Mahavira, the contemporary of the Buddha who established the foundations of modern Jainism."

41. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 15).

42. In Hindu tradition *Hiranyagarbha* is acknowledged as the founder of Yoga and is generally regarded by scholars as being mythic. Later Yoga commentators believed that there was an actual person named Hiranyagarbha who had written a work on Yoga, but this does not really tell us anything about the person, Hiranyagarbha.

43. See Woods (1914: xiv).

44. See *YB* (I.1) p. 1.

45. Cf. Woods (1914: 3), and Feuerstein (1979a: 25), who both translate *anusasana* as "exposition."

46. Monier-Williams (1899: 31).

47. *Ibid.*, p. 1068.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 1069.

49. *YB* (I.1) p. 1: *athetyayam adhikararthah*; see Monier-Williams (1899) p. 17 on *atha* and p. 20 on *adhikara*.

50. See Mookerjee (1951: 262).

51. For example, as is the case in H. Aranya's works; see G. Larson (1987: 581).

52. See *YB* (I.51) p. 56.

53. J. W Hauer, quoted by G. Feuerstein (1979b: 25).

54. G. Feuerstein (1980: ix). Feuerstein, in agreement with Hauer, writes in a later work (1989: 174) that Vyasa "does not appear to have been in the direct lineage of Patañjali."

55. See, for example, C. Chapple (1994: 85-105), who criticizes Vyasa's interpretation of several *sutras* (i.e., I.19-22; I.41; II.17-27; III.53) and proposes "that the standard interpretation given by Vyasa needs to be reconsidered."

56. As Feuerstein himself admits; see (1979b: 23).

57. That is, developments prior to the *SK*. See E. H. Johnson (1937), A. B. Keith (1949), F. Edgerton (1924), and G. Larson (1969, 1987) for discussions on earlier Samkhya.

58. The most comprehensive study of the Samkhya tradition is by Gerald Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, eds. (1987). *Samkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*. See

also the older work (1969) by G. Larson entitled, *Classical Samkhya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning*. The term "*samkhya*" means "enumeration," "relating to number," or "calculation" (see Monier-Williams, 1899: 1128). It also refers "to a specific Hindu school of dualist philosophizing that proceeds by a method of enumerating the contents of experience and the world for the purpose of attaining radical liberation (*moksa*, *kaivalya*) from frustration and rebirth" (G. Larson, 1987: 3).

59. See, for example, *Katha Up* I.3.3-4 and I.3.10-11; see also *Svet Up* II.8-10.

60. Radhakrishnan, *Upanisads*, pp. 720-721.

61. Larson (1987: 6).

62. Radhakrishnan, *Upanisads*, p. 746.

63. However, the precise number of enumerated principles varies widely. In *MBh* XII.239 and XII.267 (28), seventeen basic principles are enumerated; in *MBh* XII.298, the standard list of twenty-five are given.

64. Cf. Chakravarti (1951: 38-39).

65. See Radhakrishnan (1948: 176): "That state which is obtained by the Samkhyas is also reached by the yogins. He who sees Samkhya and Yoga as one, sees indeed."

66. Cf. Edgerton, trans. (1965: 325): "But both of these have the same practical result, and both are declared (to lead to) freedom from death. Men who are devoted to weak intelligence regard them as separate; but we regard them as certainly only one. The same thing which Yoga-followers perceive, is perceived also by *Samkhya*-followers. Who looks upon *Samkhya* and *Yoga* as one, knows the truth." Other passages which stress the oneness of Samkhya and Yoga are *MBh* XII.295.42-43 and XII.293.29-30. Virtually identical are XII.304.4 and *BG* V.5.

67. Sanskrit text from Belvalkar *et al.*, eds. (1951-53), *The Mahabharata*, pp. 1583-1584; *MBh* XII.289.7 and XII.289.9 state: *pratyaksahetavo yogah samkhyah sastravinis cayah, ubhe caite mate tattve mama tata yudhisthira. tulyam saicam tayor yuktam daya bhutesu canagha, vratanam dharanam tulyam darsanam na samam tayoh*. In XII.289 (1) an indication is made whereby the two are clearly differentiated and XII.289 (2) tells us there are adherents within both schools which claim superiority for their interpretations. See Edgerton (1965: 291).

68. See Belvalkar (1951-53: 1061).

69. *MBh* XII.189.4-5.

70. *MBh* XII.189.17-18, 28; see also XII.294.7, where it is said that the superior strength of yogins is in their practice of meditation.

71. Radhakrishnan (1948: 176).

72. Ibid.; cf *BG* XIII.29, which implies that Samkhya by itself was a path to the liberation of the spirit and not just in conjunction with Yoga.

73. The sage Kapila is traditionally celebrated as the founder of Samkhya, though in later texts, such as some of the Puranas, he is acknowledged as a great yogin. Kapila handed over this lore to his pupil Asuri. Later *acaryas* such as Pañcasikha, Varsaganya, Vindyavasin, Jaigisavya, and Isvara Krsna belong to this tradition. We need briefly mention only some of the major influences on the Samkhyan tradition stemming from the first century BCE. The *Sastitantra*, a tradition of "sixty topics," was either a format for the treatment of philosophical Samkhya or the actual name of a text, an old form of which was attributed to Kapila or Pañcasikhaca. 100 BCE-200 CE. Varsaganya composed a revision of the *Sastitantraca*. 100-300 CE. In the first essay of his book entitled *Strukturen Yogischer Meditation* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), G. Oberhammer examines "Samkhyan meditation," by which he means those meditative structural approaches that have been handed down in the Sāmkhya tradition, particularly that of Varsaganya. Oberhammer's analysis of this "yogic" orientation is based on relevant quotations found in the *Yuktidipika* and intends to show that the soteriology of the old Samkhya tradition was not a purely rationalistic affair and that many of the Samkhyan metaphysical categories can only be understood against a background of meditative praxis. Followers of Varsaganya include: (a) Vindyavasin ca. 300-400 CE, who further revises

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the Samkhya system and participates in an intense polemic with the Buddhists. There is some speculation among scholars (e.g., P. Chakravarti, E. Frauwallner, and G. Larson) that the revision of Samkhya given by Vindyavasin eventually became the classical Yoga philosophy of Patañjali and Vyasa (see also Aklujkar [1995] in n. 3 above); (b) Isvara Krsna ca. 350-450 CE, whose *SK* is based on Varsaganya's *Sastitantra* but corrected as a result of the Buddhist debates and the work of Vindyavasin. See Larson (1987: 13, 131-146) for a discussion of dates and a philosophical analysis of these and other Samkhyan thinkers. For more on Samkhyan teachers see also: Keith (1949), *The Samkhyan System*, p. 47; and H. D. Sharma (1933), "The Samkhya-teachers," *Festschrift Moriz Winternitz*, pp. 225-231. A listing of Samkhyan teachers may be found in *MBh* XII.306.58-62. See also V. M. Bedekar (1958), "The Teachings of Pañcasikha in the Mahabharata," *ABORI*, vol. 38, pp. 233-234. Isvara Krsna's *SK* apparently constitutes a definitive summary of the technical philosophical tradition of Samkhya. Prior to the *SK*, Samkhya, as a technical system, did exist, i.e., the *SK* comes at the end of the normative period of formulation rather than at the beginning; on this see Larson (1987: 9).

74. Dasgupta (1930: 15).

75. According to H. T. Colebrooke (1873: 1: 265), the only significant difference between Yoga and Samkhya is the affirmation of the doctrine of *isvara* by the former and its denial



by the later. A host of other scholars do not fully acknowledge Yoga and Samkhya as being distinct philosophical schools. See, for example, M. N. Dvivedi (1934: xviii), R. Garbe (1917: 148), S. Radhakrishnan (1951, 2: 342), M. Eliade (1969: 7), and N. Smart (1968: 26). S. Dasgupta (1930: 2) observes, however, that although the two schools are fundamentally the same in their general metaphysical positions, they hold quite different views on many points of philosophical, ethical and practical interest. Recent scholarship has tended to support Dasgupta's claim. See, for example, F. Catalina (1968: 19), K. B. R. Rao (1966: 9), and G. Koelman (1970: 57-66, 104, 237). See also notes 76, 77, and 78 below and accompanying text.

76. Feuerstein (1980: 109-118).

77. Ibid., p III.

78. Larson (1987: 13) would obviously disagree with this dating. He suggests that the *SK* predates the *YS*. He lists Isvara Krsna's *SK* as (ca.) 350-450 CE and Patañjali's *YS* as (ca) 400-500 CE. Moreover, Larson feels that the *YS* philosophy is a school of Samkhya. He writes (ibid., p. 19): "there is a basic and normative Samkhya philosophy, concisely yet completely set forth in Isvara Krsna's *Samkhyakarika* and appropriated with a somewhat different inflection in Patañjali's *Yoga-Sutra* for the sake of yogic praxis. The former can be called simply the tradition of Karika-Samkhya and the latter, Patañjala-Samkhya." While admitting (ibid., p. 22) that the *YS* is "obviously a compilation of older *sutra* collections" he further advances (ibid.) that, "Keith may well have been correct in suggesting that the appearance of the *Samkhyakarika* may have been the occasion for an attempt by the followers of Yoga to systematize their own older traditions." See Keith (1949: 70).

79. *SK* 19.

80. *YS* II.17-20. See discussion later in this chapter on *prakṛti* and *purusa*. One could, however, look upon the *vṛttis* (*YS* I.6-11) as providing something of a proto-ontology equivalent in the first chapter.

81. *YS* II.16 (p. 78): *heyam duḥkhamanagatam*. "The suffering yet to come is to be overcome." It must be emphasized as well that the question of "how" also pre-

supposes the question of "why," why one would desire liberation from the samsaric realm. This question of "why" is answered, as we will see, in *YS* II.15, where we are told that from the perspective of the discerning yogin, all identity contained within the samsaric world is inherently dissatisfying.

82. *YB* IV.30 (p. 203). We will be saying more on this later.

83. See, for example, Sankara's (ca. eighth century CE) use of *vyavaharika* (the conventional empirical perspective) in contrast to *paramarthika* (the ultimate or absolute standpoint).

84. See in particular: Feuerstein (1980: 14, 56, 108); Eliade (1969: 94-95, 99-100); Koelman (1970: 224, 251); and G. Larson (1987: 13), who classifies Patañjali's Yoga as a form of Samkhya.

85. F. Edgerton (1924), "The Meaning of Samkhya and Yoga," *AJP* 45: 1-46.

86. I am adopting the term "maps" from G. Feuerstein; refer to n. 89 below and also Feuerstein (1989) pp. 176-178.

87. One might query, for example, whether the central expedient of *viññāna* (*SK* 2), recommended by Isvara Kṛṣṇa, to terminate suffering (*duḥkha*) is, in the last analysis, adequate for realizing the postulated goal of identity as Self. *Tattva-abhyāsa* or applied *viññāna* is, however, equated by R. Parrot [see (1985), "The Experience called Reason in Samkhya," *JIP* 13: 235-264] with wisdom as opposed to rational knowledge. Larson (1987: 27) states that the ethical goal of Samkhya is to discriminate the presence of a transcendent consciousness (*puruṣa*) distinct from *prakṛti* and its tripartite process, and thereby to attain radical isolation (*kaivalya*) or liberation from ordinary human experience. But can *viññāna* be synonymous with *prajñā* or yogic insight acquired in *samādhi* as described in the *YS* (I.17-18)? How, in Samkhya, is the *bhava* of (*SK* 23) *jñāna* actually brought about? K. B. R. Rao (1966: 432) speculated that it is the accentuated rationalism of classical Samkhya that must be held responsible for the fact that this school of thought never actually acquired the same recognition and prestige as the other Hindu *darsanas*. Feuerstein (1980: 115-116) seriously doubts the efficacy of the classical Samkhyan approach for arriving at genuine liberation, rendering *viññāna* as "an intellectual act." He argues that *viññāna*, as a sufficient means for attaining liberation, "is tacitly denied, by the adherents of Yoga." Koelman (1970: 237) also supports the claim that the method of *viññāna* in the *SK* (2) is inferior to yogic praxis. He writes: "It is not by dint of thinking that one can empty the intellect; only another faculty, the will, can inhibit the working of the intellect. In this, Yoga has seen more clearly than Samkhya, which considers liberation as a purely intellectual process."

88. Cf. *Katha Up* VI.7-8.

89. Feuerstein (1980: 117).

90. Foreword to Feuerstein (1980: viii).

91. *TV* II.23 (p. 93): *pradhīyate janyate vikarajatamaneneti pradhaanam*. Translators have struggled to express the meaning of *mulaprakṛti* with words such as "nature," "primordial nature," "primordial materiality," and "prime matter"; though these translations have generally been accepted, they are not precisely accurate and may even be misleading. The Samkhyan dualism is quite distinct from the Cartesian dualism that bifurcates reality into mental and material aspects. The dualistic perspective of Samkhya is made up of *puruṣa* as pure consciousness, and *prakṛti* as everything else, including the mental and the material. Psyche and the external world are not ultimately different. Both are forms of insentient (nonconscious, *acetana*) *prakṛti*. With the above explanation held in mind we shall adopt the simple term "matter" for *prakṛti*.

92. See S. Dasgupta (1922: 246-247), and Vacaspati Misra on *SK* 3; see also *Samkhya-Sutra* I.61: *sattvarajastamasam samyavastha prakrti*, in R. Garbe, ed. (1943), *The Samkhya-pravacana-bhasya* (Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 2, p. 29) of Vijñāna Bhikṣu as well as Vijñāna Bhikṣu's commentary (*SPB*) on *Samkhya-Sutra* I.61; see also *SPB* VI.39 and *passim*.

93. See Anima Sen Gupta (1969), *Classical Samkhya: A Critical Study*, pp. 5-72.

94. See K. B. R. Rao (1966: 55-56).

95. In Advaita Vedānta, the effect-that which is observed in our world-is often understood to be an unreal appearance or manifestation of *brahman*, which alone is the ultimate reality. Therefore *brahman* is the real cause of all appearances, which only possess limited, empirical levels of reality. This approach to causality is termed *brahma-vivarta-vada*; though the principle of *satkaryavada* is accepted, each effect is understood as an unreal appearance of *brahman*. This is in marked contrast to Samkhya and Yoga, which maintain that both the effect and the cause are on equal planes of reality. The above example is true of post-Saṅkara Advaitins only. Saṅkara did not hold *vivarta* but ascribed a lower level of reality, *vyavaharikam satyam*, to the phenomenal world. In the school of Viśiṣṭadvaita Vedānta, Rāmānuja conceived of souls and the material world as attributes or the body of the Absolute Cause, though real like the Cause; and in Dvaita Vedānta, Mādhva considered souls as finite, dependent beings while the Supreme Cause is independent being.

96. *YB* IV.11 (p. 185): *na hy apurvopajānah*.

97. *YB* IV.12 (p. 186): *nasty asataḥ sambhavaḥ, na caṣṭi sato vinasā*.

98. *TV* I.18 (p. 22): *karyasarupam karanam yujyate na virupam*.

99. *YS* IV.2 (p. 177): *jatyantaraparinamah prakṛtyapurat*. "The transformation into another life (i.e., birth) is implemented by [the] *prakṛti*[s]."

100. *YB* IV.2(p. 177): *purvaparinamapaya uttaraparinamopajanas tesam purvavayavanupravesad bhavati*.

101. See Rādhakrishnan (1948: 105-106): *na'sato vidyate bhavo na'bhavo vidyate sataḥ, ubhayaḥ api dr̥sto'ntas tv anayos tattvadasibhiḥ. avinasi tu tad viddhi yena sarvaṁ idam tatam, vinasam avyayasya'sya na kaścit kartum arhati*. Cf. *Chand Up* VI.1-4.

102. *YS* II.19 (p. 84).

103. *YS* III.13 (p. 124): *etena bhūtendriyesu dharmalakṣaṇavasthāparināma vyākhyataḥ*.

104. *YB* III.15 (p. 136): *cittasya dvaye dharmah paridr̥stas caparidr̥stas ca*. In *YB* III.52 (pp. 170-171) Vyāsa rejects the notion that "time" as normally conceived ("day," "night," "hour," etc.) is a real entity. The ultimate unit of time is the "moment" (*ksana*). Vyāsa tells us that a "moment" is the time taken to pass from one point of change in a substance to the

next. A succession or sequence (*krama*) consists of a continuity of the unbroken flow of the moments in it. Yet there is no aggregation of "moments" and their "succession," i.e., hours, days, and nights are basically mental constructs empty of reality yet appear real to those people who have a conceptual or reified view of the world. It is only the *ksana* or "moment" that has reality and is the support or foundation of any succession of change over time. "Succession" is a continuity of "moments." At each moment in time a subtle change takes place (perceptible to the yogin) and it is the accumulated effect of these subtle changes of which we become aware. See also YS III.9, 15, 52 and IV.33 and Vyasa's commentary on these *sutras*. In classical Yoga the

idea of the "moment" attains significance in spite of the general rejection of Buddhist "impermanence" by "orthodox" Hindu schools in general.

105. YS III.14 (p. 132): *santoditavyapadesadharmanupati dharmi*. "The *dharma*-holder corresponds to the subsided, arisen or undetermined form."

106. YS III.14; see n. 105 above.

107. See YB III.14 (p. 134).

108. Wilhelm Halbfass (1992), *On Being and What There Is*, p. 61.

109. YB III.13 (p. 131): *tatredam udaharanam mrddharmi pindakarad dharmad dharmantaram upasampadyamano dharmatah parinamate ghatakara iti. ghatakaronagatam laksanam hitva vartamanalaksanam pratipadyata iti laksanatah parinamate. ghato navapuratatam pratiksanam anubhavannavasthahparinamam pratipadyata iti*.

110. YB IV.13 (p. 187): *vartamana vyaktatmano'titanagatah suksmatmanah*.

111. YS IV.12 (p. 186): *atitanagatam svarupato'sty adh vabhedad dharmanam*. "Past and future exist in their own form due to differences between paths of the forms (*dharma*s) [generated by *prakrti*]."

112. YS IV.18(p. 193).

113. More discussion on the nature of *gunas* including their manifestation as characteristics of personhood and human identity appears in chapter 3.

114. See van Buitenen (1956, 1957), "Studies in Samkhya (I-III)," in *JAOS* 76, 77.

115. YS II.18 (p. 81): *prakasakriyasthitisilam bhutendriyatmakam bhogapavargartham drsyam*. "The seeable [*prakrti*] whose qualities are of luminosity, activity, and inertia, has the nature of the elements and the senses and is for the purpose of experience and emancipation."

116. See n. 115 above.

117. YB II.18 (pp. 81-82): *prakasasilam sattvam. kriyasilam rajah. sthitisilam tama iti. ete gunah parasparoparaktapravibhagah parinaminah samyogaviyogadharmana itaretaropasrayenoparjitamurtayah parasparangitve'py asambinnasaktipravibhagas tulyajatiyatulyajatiyasaktibhedanupatinah pradhanavelayam upadarsitasamnidhana, gunatve'pi ca vuparamatrena pradhanantarnitanumitastitah. purusarthakartavataya prayuktasamarthyah.*

118. G. Koelman (1970: 77).

119. Ibid.

120. G. Koelman's (ibid., p. 78) coinage. Cf. G. Feuerstein (1980: 36).

121. YS II.15 (p. 74): *parinamatapasamskaraduhkhair gunavrttivirodhac ca duhkham eva sarvam vivekinah.*

122. See YS II.19. In other words, the predominant interpretation among scholars is that phenomenal existence is an inherently problematic, even constantly turbulent state of affairs. The danger in the above interpretation is that *prakṛti* all too easily becomes equated with or reduced to affliction (*klesā*) itself.

123. See n. 121 above and text.

124. Patañjali uses the term *pratiprasava* twice, in YS II.10 and IV.34.

125. See Chapple and Kelly (1990: 60).

126. Feuerstein (1979a: 65).

127. Cf. T. Leggett (1990: 195) and U. Arya (1986: 146, 471).

128. YS II.19 (p. 84): *visesavisesalingamatralingani gunaparvani.* "The levels of the *gunas* are the particularized, the unparticularized, the designator and the unmanifest."

129. YB II.19 (pp. 84-85): *tatra"kasavayvagnyudakabhūmayo bhutani sabdasparsaruparasagandhatanmatranamavisesanam visesah. tatha srotratvakcaksujihvaghanani buddhindriyani, vakpanipadapayupasthah karmendriyani, ekadasam manah sarvrtham, ity etany asmitalakṣaṇasyavisesasya visesah. gunanam esa sodasako visesaparinamah. sadavisesah. tadyatha sabdatannmatram sparsatanmatram rupatanmatram rasatanmatram gandhatanmatram ceti ekadvitricatuh pancalakṣaṇah sabdddayah pañcavisesah sasthas caviśeso'smitamatra iti. ete sattamatrasya"tmano mahatah sadavisesaparinamah. yattatparamavisesebhyo lingammatram mahattattvam tasminnete sattamatre mahatyatmanyavasthaya vivṛddhikasthamanubhavanti. pratisamsrjyamanasca tasminneva sattamatre mahatyatmanyavasthaya*

*yattannihsattasattam nihsadasannirasadavyaktamalingam pradhanam tatpratiyanti.*

130. TV II.19 (p. 85): *sattva rajastamasam samyavastha*. See also TV II.17 (p. 79): *pradhanasamyam upagato'pi*. The state of equilibrium, balance, or equipoise is known as *samyavastha* or *pralaya* and is where the unmanifest *gunas* "neutralize" or balance one another's energy prior to all their manifestations.

131. Seen. 129 above.

132. TV I.45 (p. 50).

133. TV II.19 (p. 85): *yavati kacit purusarthakriya sabdadibhogalaksaana, sattvapurusanyatakyatilaksana vasti sa sarva mahati buddhau samapyata ityarthah.*

134. See n. 129 above and text.

135. See *ibid.*

136. G. Koelman (1970: 107).

137. *Ibid.*

138. On this see P. Chakravarti (1951: 134), who has made a strong case against the identification of the Patañjali referred to in the *Yuktidipika* with the author of the *YS*.

139. SK 24. Often in Hindu literature the term *ahamkara* denotes the illusory sense of self confined to the nature of *prakṛti* as a body-mind and having various properties such as "my thoughts," "my feelings," "my actions," etc.

140. S. Radhakrishnan (1951), *Indian Philosophy*, vol 2, p. 434.

141. YB I.45 (p. 50): *tesahamkarah. asyapi lingamatram suksmo visayah; tesa* ("these") refers to the subtle elements (*tan-matras*).

142. YS II.6 (p. 64): *drgdarsanasaktyor ekatmatevasmita [= eka-atmata-iva-asmita]*.

143. Vyasa often uses the terms *buddhi* and *citta* synonymously, although we understand the former to be included in the later, as is explained in chapter 3.

144. YB II.6 (p. 64): *puruso drksaktir buddhir darsanasaktir ity etayor ekasvarupapattir ivasmita klesa ucyate. bhoktrbhogyasaktyor atyantavibhaktayor atyantasamkirnayor avibhagaprdptdv iva satyam bhogah kalpate. svarupapratilambhe tu tayoh kaivalyam eva bhavati kuto bhoga iti. tatha cuktam "buddhitah param purusam akarasilavidyadibhir vibhaktam apasyan kuryat tatra"tmabuddhim mohena.*" Vacaspati Misra (TV II.6, p. 64) tells us that the above quotation used by Vyasa is by the Samkhya teacher, Pañcasikha.

145. YS III.35 (p. 154): *sattvapurusayor atyantasamkirnayoh pratyayaviseso bhogah . . .*

146. Aranya (1963), *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali*, trans. by P. N. Mukerji, p. 195. When quoting Aranya, I will be using the translations by Mukerji.

147. YS IV.4 (p. 178): *nirmanacittanyasmitamatrat.*



148. *YS* IV.4 will be explained further in chapter 3.

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149. S. Dasgupta (1920), *A Study of Patañjali*, p. 51.

150. Koelman (1970: 108).

151. Feuerstein (1980: 46).

152. For example, Koelman (1970: 108) writes: "Only when plurified or suppositated by the Ego-function [*ahamkara*] can the Great Substance (*mahattattvam*) . . . be strictly called *buddhi*." Koelman sees *buddhi* in an individuated sense only. Feuerstein (1980: 44) understands *buddhi*, in Patañjali's philosophy, as standing "for 'cognition' only and not for any ontological entity."

153. This "cosmic being," it could be argued, has been mythologized as Hiranyagarbha, who came to designate the "first-born" entity in the evolutionary series, as taught in Vedanta. According to the *MBh* (XII.291.17), Hiranyagarbha is none other than the higher mind or *buddhi*.

154. S. Chennakesavan (1980), *Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy*, p. 134.

155. This experience is referred to in *YS* I.17 as *asmita-samadhi*.

156. G. Feuerstein (1980: 41).

157. S. Dasgupta (1922).

158. See n. 141 above.

159. G. Koelman (1970: 115).

160. *TV* II.19 (p. 84): *pañca tanmatrani buddhikaranakanyavisesatvad asmitavad iti*. "The five subtle elements have *buddhi* as their cause because they are unparticularized, like I-am-ness."

161. As outlined in the *SK* (24).

162. Aranya (1963: 196-197).

163. *YB* IV.2 (p. 177): *tatra kayendriyanam anyajatiyaparinatanam . . . purvaparinarupaya uttaraparinarupajanas tesam apurvavayavanupravesad bhavati*.

164. *YB* IV.2 (p. 177): *kayendriyaprakrtayas ca svam svam vikaram anugrhnantypurena dharmadi nimittam apeksamana iti*.

165. *YB* III.14 (p. 134): *desakala karanimittapabandhan na khalu samanakalam atmanam abhivyaktir iti*. "Under the constraints of place, time, form, and cause, the essences do not

manifest simultaneously."

166. As Vacaspati clarifies (TV III.14) p. 134.

167. Vijñana Bhikṣu (YV IV.2) mentions such powers as the yogin's ability to multiply his body, implying a change of shape without intervening death and birth. See T. S. Rukmani (1989: 3-4).

168. See Johnston (1937: 26), and Larson (1969: 174).

169. TV IV.2 (p. 177): *manusyajatiparinatanam kayendriyanam yo devatiryagjatiparinamah sa khalu prakṛtyapurat. kayasya hi prakṛtiḥ prthivyadini bhutani. indriyanam ca prakṛtir asmita. tadavayavanupravesa apuras tasmad bhavati.*

170. See n. 169 above.

171. See TV IV.2 (p. 177).

172. YS IV.3 (p. 177): *nimittam aprayojakam prakṛtinam varanabhedaś tu tatah ksetrikavat.* It is understood here that the farmer does not initiate the flow of water but directs the flow by way of barriers. See n. 174 below.

173. Some aphorisms of Kanada (*Vaisesika-Sutras* IX.1.1 to 10) are specifically directed to refute the Sāṃkhya and Yoga doctrine of *satkāryavada*. In Vaisesika, the product does not preexist in its material cause. It is actually brought into existence in the process of causation.

174. YB IV.3 (pp. 177-178): *yathā ksetrikah kedarantaram pīlavayisuh samam nimnam nimnataram va napah paṇinapakarsati avaranam tv aśam bhinatti tasmin bhinne svayam evapah kedarantaram aplavayanti, tathā dharmah prakṛtinam avaraanam adharmam bhinatti, tasmin bhinne svayam eva prakṛtayah svam svam vikaram aplavayanti.*

175. See YB IV.3 (p. 178).

176. YB IV.12 (p. 186): *satas ca phalasya nimittam vartamanikarane samartham napurvopajanane. siddham nimittam naimittikasya viśesanugrahanam kurute napurvam utpadayati.* "An efficient cause can bring to actuality a result already existent, but not produce what had not previously existed. A recognizable cause gives a particular aid towards what is effected; it produces something not indeed nonexistent before."

177. YB I.45 (p. 50): *nanvasti puruṣaḥ sūkṣma iti. satyam. yathā lingat paramalingasya saukṣmyam na caivam puruṣasya. kim tu, lingasyānvayikaranam puruṣo na bhavati hetuś tu bhavati.*

178. YB II.19 (p. 86): *alingavasthayaṃ na puruṣārtha hetuṇālingavasthayaṃ madau puruṣārthata karanam bhavati. na tasyah puruṣārthata karanam bhavati. na sau*

*purusarthakrteti nitya"khyayate. trayanam tvavasthavisesanamadau purusarthata karanam bhavati. sa cartha heturnimittam karanam bhavatityanitya"khyayate.*

179. Koelman (1970: 76).

180. TV IV.3 (p. 178): *na ca purusartho'pi pravartakah. kim tu taduddesenesvarah. uddesyatamatrena purusarthah pravartaka ity ucyate. utpitsos tv asya purusarthasyavyaktasya sthitikaranatvam yuktam . . . varasyapi dharmddhisthanartham pratibandhapanaya eva vyaparo veditavyah.*

181. YB III.14; see n. 165 above.

182. YB IV.11 (p. 185): *heturdharmatsukhamadharmaduhkham, sukhadrage duhkhadvesas tatasca prayatnastena manasa vaca kayena va parispsandamanah paramanugrhnatyupahanti va tatah punardharmadharmau sukhaduhkhe ragadvesaaviti pravrttamidam sadaram samsaracakram. asya ca pratiksanamavartamanasyavidya netri mulam sarvaklesanamityesa hetuh.*

183. See chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the term *karman*.

184. As quoted in Feuerstein (1980: 118).

185. See Monier-Williams (1899), *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 487.

186. Ibid., p. 334.

187. See Larson (1969).

188. YS II.25 (p. 96): *tadabhavat samyogabhavo hanam taddrseh kaivalyam*. "Without it (ignorance), there is no conjunction, and that abandonment (of ignorance) is the aloneness (*kaivalya*) of seeing."

189. YS II.20 (p. 87): *drasta drsimatrah suddho'pi pratyayanupasyah*. "The seer is seeing alone; although pure, it appears in the form of a cognition (idea, apprehension)." After stating in YS I.3 that our true nature and identity is the seer, YS I.4 informs us that unless we are aware as the seer, we yet conform in our identity to the changing nature of *vrtti* or the modifications of the mind. See n. 36 above.

190. YS IV.18 (p. 193): *sada jñatas cittavrttayas tatprabhoh purusasyaparinamitvat*. "The modifications of the mind are always known due to the immutability of their master, *purusa*." In Yoga as portrayed in the epic literature of the *MBh*, the term *purusa* is widely referred to as the "knower" (*jñā*) or the "field-knower" (*ksetra-jñā*), the "field" being *prakṛti*. See, for example, BG XIII.34. In YB II.17 Vyasa uses the term

191. YS II.23.
192. YS IV.22.
193. YS IV.34.
194. YS II.20.
195. YS II.6.
196. YS III.35 (p. 154): *sattvapurusayor atyantasamkirnayoh . . .*
197. YS III.49 (p. 167): *sattvapuruasnyata . . .*
198. YS IV.19 (p. 194): *na tat svabhasam drsyatvat*. "That [cittavrtti, i.e., mind, extrinsic identity] has no self-luminosity, because of the nature of the seeable [i.e., it is itself something known, perceived]." Cf. SK 20.
199. YS II.17 (p. 79): *drastrdrsyayoh samyogo heyahetuh*. "The conjunction between the seer and the seeable is the cause of what is to be overcome [i.e., suffering, dissatisfaction (*duhkha*)]."
200. SK 11; see Larson (1969: 263-264).
201. SK 19: *saksitvam . . . kaivalyam madhyasthyam drastrtvam akarttrbhava*; see Larson (1969) p. 265.
202. S. Dasgupta (1924), *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion*, p. 19.
203. See Edgerton (1965: 332).
204. YB I.24 (p. 26): *kaivalyam praptas tarhi santi ca bahavah kevalinah*. "There are many *kevalins* who have attained liberation." Cf. YB II.22 (p. 90) and IV.33 (p. 205). It is of interest to note that *kevalin* is a Jaina term. Those who attain *kaivalya* according to Yoga are called *kaivalin* and not *kevalin*. On this matter U. Arya (1986: 289) writes: "It appears that Vyasa is challenging the view of the Jains, who do not believe in a . . . God but do believe that those who reach the highest perfection through yoga and are called *kevalins* become *ishvaras* after death. In Vyasa's view, Patañjali's definition of *ishvara* does not apply to them."
205. See TV I.41 (p. 44).
206. S. Dasgupta (1930), *Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought*, p. 167.
207. YS II.22 (p. 90).
208. See G. Feuerstein (1980: 23).
209. See, for example, *Mundaka Up* I.2.9 and *Svet Up* II.14.
210. See SK 18.

211. Larson (1987: 80).

212. Text from the *YV* (II.22) taken from T. S. Rukmani, trans. (1983), *Yogavarttika of Viṇṇana Bhikṣu*, vol. 2: *Sadhanapada*, p. 149: *buddhya krtah samapito' rtho yasyeti*.

213. See *SPB* in R. Garbe, ed. (1943), *Harvard Oriental Series*, vol. 2, pp. 69-70.

214. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

215. *YB* II.18 (pp. 83-84): *tavetau bhogapavargau buddhikrtau buddhav eva vartamanau . . . buddher eva purusarthaparisamaptir bandhas tadarthavasayo moksa iti*.

216. *YS* II.18,21.

217. See Radhakrishnan (1953: 167).

218. See Radhakrishnan (1948: 374).

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219. See K. B. R. Rao (1966: 278); see P. M. Modi (1932: 81ff.) and G. Feuerstein (1980: 5-7) for studies on the twenty-six principles outlined in *MBh* XII.296.

220. *MBh* XII.296.7; see Edgerton (1965: 317).

221. *MBh* XIII.296.20; see Edgerton (1965: 319) and Feuerstein (1980: 6).

222. *MBh* XII.296.11 and 13; see Edgerton, (1965: 318).

223. Feuerstein (1980: 6); see *MBh* XII.296.27.

224. See, for example, XII.296.11 and XII.306.53-54.

225. P. M. Modi (1932), *Aksara: A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 81.

226. For instance, Feuerstein (1980: 116) conjectures that Isvara Kṛṣṇa assumed a typical agnostic stance. What distinguishes epic Sāṃkhya and Yoga from their classical formulations is, above all, their theistic (panentheistic) orientation. It does not appear to be the case that *isvara* is a necessary principle for all yogins, i.e., devotion to *isvara* can be an optional approach to liberation in the first chapter of the *YS* (implied by the word *va*, meaning "or" in *YS* I.23). Thus, the "nontheism" of classical Sāṃkhya, and "optional" theism of classical Yoga can be understood as deviations from a firmly established theistic base, reflected in the Upanisads. Feuerstein suggests (1989: 164), "The reason for this shift away from the original panentheism of [Sāṃkhya] and Yoga was a felt need to respond to the challenge of such vigorously analytical traditions as Buddhism by systematizing both [Sāṃkhya] and Yoga along more rationalistic philosophical lines." However, we must keep an open mind regarding this, especially in relation to Yoga where rational knowledge is

clearly subservient to direct perception.

227. See YS I.23-29 below and YS II.45. Eliade and Feuerstein clearly endorse the theistic orientation of these *sutras*. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 3) do not impute that Patañjali's descriptions of *isvara* constitute a theistic stance. However, they do not in turn underestimate the potential importance of the concept of *isvara* in Patañjali's Yoga.

228. YS I.24 (p. 25): *klesakarmavipakasayair apamrstah purusavisesa isvarah*.

229. YB I.24 (p. 26): *sa tu sadaiva muktah sadaivesvara iti*.

230. YS I.25 (p. 29): *tatra niratisayam sarvajñabijam*.

231. YS I.26 (p. 31): *purvesam api guruh kalenanavacchedat*.

232. YS I.27 (p. 32): *tasya vacakah pranavah*.

233. YS I.28 (p. 33): *tajjapas tadarthabhavanam*.

234. YS I.29 (p. 33): *tatah pratyakcetanadhigamo'py antarayabhavas ca*.

235. YS I.23 (p. 25): *isvarapranidhanad va*. "Or [*samamdhi* is attained] by devotion to the Lord."

236. YB I.24 (p. 27): *yo'sau prakrstasattvopadanad isvarasya sasvatika utkarsah*.

237. This suggests one reason why such a being is called *isvara*. TV I.24 (p. 27): *nesvarasya prthagjanasyevavidyanibandhanas cittasattvena svasvamibhavah . . . tapatrayparitan pretyabhavamaharnavaj . . . jñanadharmopadesena*.

238. TV I.24 (p. 27): *na punar avidyam avidyatvena sevamanah . . .*

239. TV I.24 (p. 27): *na ceyam apahatarajastamomalavisuddhasattvopadanam vinetylocya sattvaparakarsam upadat te*.

240. TV I.24 (p. 26): *jñanakriyasakti sampadaisvaryam*.

241. YB I.25 (p. 30): *bhutanugraha prajoyanam*. For more on the meaning of "devotion to *isvara*" see the section on *astanga-yoga* in chapter 4 of this study.

242. YB I.24 (p. 27): *tasya sastram nimittam. sastram punah kim nimittam, prakrstasattva nimittam*. "This perfection does it have a cause or is it without a cause?"

The cause is sacred scripture. Then what is the cause of scripture? The cause is the perfection (of the divine mind)."

243. See YB I.23 (p. 25); *prasada* can also mean "clarity," "serenity," "tranquility" all qualities through which spiritual transformation is enhanced and freedom (*moksa*) is



allowed to take place.

244. See G. Oberhammer (1964: 197-207).

245. M. Eliade (1969: 74).

246. Feuerstein (1980: 12).

247. Here we can mention a few scholars who at times underestimate the importance of *isvara* in Patañjali's system. See, for example: R. Garbe (1917: 149); S. Radhakrishnan (1951, 2: 371); N. Smart (1968: 30); and G. Koelman (1970: 57).

248. *YS* II.17 ; see n. 199 above.

249. See *YS* II.15 and n. 121 above.

250. *YS* IV.22 (p. 197): *citer apratisamkramayas tadakarpatta svabuddhisamvedanam*. "When the unmoving higher consciousness assumes the form of that [mind] then there is perception of one's own intellect."

### Chapter 3.

#### The Mind (*Citta*)

1. On this see the *Samkhya-Karika* of Isvara Krsna and G. Larson's (1987, 1969) explanation of these terms as used in classical Samkhya.

2. A general schematic of perceptual processes is summarized in the *BG* (III.42) and *Katha Up* (III.10 and VI.7).

3. In *YS* IV.31 Patañjali uses the words *avarana-mala* meaning "impure coverings" or "veils" of ignorance that obstruct the eternality of knowledge.

4. As G. Feuerstein (1980: 24) mistakenly asserts.

5. For a fruitful study of the creative potential of consciousness and activity in South Asian Indian thought, see C. Chapple (1986), *Karma and Creativity*. The following examples gathered from Chapple's study (*ibid.*: 34-35) illustrate the more creative dimension given to the mind in Upanisadic literature. The translations of the Upanisads are taken from S. Radhakrishnan (1953). The *Chand Up* III.18.1 (p. 397) asserts that "one should meditate on the mind (*manas*) as *Brahman*." "For truly, beings here are born from mind (*manas*), when born, they live by mind and into mind, when departing, they enter," states *Tait Up* III.4.1 (p. 555). In *Aitareya Up* III.1.3 (p. 523) we are told that the "world" is guided by and established in intelligence (*prajñana*). The *Kausitaki Up* (III.6) (pp. 779-780) states that when intelligence is applied to any faculty, a unity is experienced; all elements (*bhutas*) depend on the mind. Yet the mind is not an autonomous power that creates out of nothing; as the *Kausitaki Up* (III.8) (p. 782) makes clear, a naive idealism is not implied.

6. See C. Chapple (1986: 35).

7. See, for example, the *Mait Up*, which sheds some light on the relationship between the mind and spiritual emancipation. Under the condition of ignorance, the mind is burdened

with various propensities that conceal its potential power. In this deluded state a person is karmically predisposed to repeat patterns of affliction remaining entrapped in the samsaric world. One can, however, become freed from the enslavement to action caused by ignorance by tapping into the inherent powers of the mind.

*Mait Up* VI.34 (pp. 845-846) asserts that worldly existence and identity are generated by thought (*citta*): "One's own thought, indeed, is *samsara*; let a man cleanse it by effort. What a man thinks, that he becomes, this is the eternal mystery." This purification process involves both thought and action and necessitates a restructuring of the intentions that lead to human action. Freedom (*moksa*) involves a radical transformation of perspective so that the mind (and person) is no longer obsessed by the objects of sense due to the affects of past experience. The impure mind is purified, made tranquil, and the binding effects of *samsara* are overcome. In the Samkhya system the highest predisposition (*bhava*) of the intellect (*buddhi*) is knowledge (*jñāna*) (*SK* 23), which alone can liberate the Samkhyan from attachment and bondage.

8. See Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p. 395.

9. Ibid.

10. See (e.g.) *RV* I.163.11 as well as *RV* V.79 and X.103.12; see also *Atharva Veda* I.34.2 (in the sense of "intent"-a love spell).

11. See (e.g.) *Mait Up* VI.34. See also *Chand Up* VII.5.2 (where the term appears in the following compounds: *cittavant*, *citta-atman*, and *citta-ekayana*), and *Chand Up* VII.5.3. Cf. Radhakrishnan (1953) and R. E. Hume (1921), who both often translate *citta* as "thought."

12. G. Feuerstein (1980: 58).

13. Cf. *BG* VI.18, where Radhakrishnan (1948: 199) translates *citta* as "mind," referring to the disciplined mind established in the *Self* (*atman*). See also *BG* VI.19-20, and XIII.9, where *sama-cittatva* ("equal-mindedness") is regarded as a manifestation of knowledge (*jñāna*).

14. *YS* IV.19 (see n. 198 in chapter 2).

15. *TV* II.20 (p. 87): *buddhidarpane purusapratibimbāsamskrantir eva buddhipratisamveditvam pumsah*. I will be saying more on "reflection theory" in Yoga later in this chapter.

16. *YS* IV.22; see n. 250 in chapter 2.

17. *YS* IV.23 (p. 197): *drastrdrsyoparaktam cittam sarvartham*. "[Due to] the mind being colored by the seer and the seeable, [it can, therefore, know] all purposes."

18. Koelman (1970: 22) argues that the English word "consciousness" (cognate with the Latin *con-scire*) implies duality and should, therefore, be used when referring to the "mind." He adds (ibid), "The term 'awareness,' however . . . excludes by its very morphological structure that connotation of duality" and should be used when referring to *purusa*. However, by qualifying the term "consciousness" as being either: (1) empirical (phenomenal), i.e., mind, or (2) pure or immortal, the distinction between *citta* and *purusa* is clarified.

19. *YS* I.2 and I.6-II. The *vrttis* are discussed later in this chapter.

20. Vyasa (*YB* II.6) and Vacaspati (see, for example, *TV* II.20) often use the terms interchangeably. G. Koelman suggests (1970: 103) that since Yoga purports to be a "technique" for the transcendence of all experiential states, it "is entitled to equate the mind with that where the resulting elaboration is impressed, it takes the *terminus a quo* in lieu of the *terminus ad quem*. This is the reason why . . . (*buddhi*) and mind (*manas*) are often used indiscriminately. This is also the reason why a more general, a more extensive term, comprising the whole complex organism of experience, occurs by far most frequently, viz. *citta*."

21. See R. Prasada (1912: 5), S. Dasgupta (1920, 1922), I. K. Taimni (1961: 6), S. Purohit Swami (1973: 25), H. Aranya (1963 :7), Bangali Baba (1976: 106), Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 3), C. Chapple and E. Kelly (1990: 33).

22. See Swami Vivekananda (1966), J. H. Woods (1914), and H. Zimmer (1951).

23. See G. Koelman (1970: 99).

24. See M. Eliade (1969: 36) and G. Feuerstein (1979a: 26).

25. See G. Larson (1987: 27).

26. See J. W Hauer (1958: 239).

27. See H. Jacobi (1929).

28. See C. H. Johnston (1912).

29. See M. N. Dvivedi (1930) and J. R. Ballantyne (1852-53).

30. See G. Jha (1907).

31. S. Dasgupta (1920: 92).

32. G. Koelman (1970: 100).

33. G. Feuerstein (1980: 58).

34. YV I.2 (p. 33): *cittam antahkarana samanyam ekasya ivantahkaranasya vrttibhedamtrena catudhar vibhagat*.
35. YS I.2, 30, 33, 37; II.54; III.1, 9, 11, 12, 19, 34, 38; IV.4, 5, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26.
36. YS I.35 (p. 39): *visayavati va pravrttir utpanna manasah sthitinibandhani*; YS II.53 (p. 115): *dharanasu ca योग्याता manasah*.
37. YS III.48 (p. 167): *tato manojavitvam vikaranabhavah pradhanajayas ca*.
38. See Koelman (1970: 104).
39. YB I.10 connects *manas* with sleep and YB I.34 with breath or life energy (*prana*); YB I.36 links *manas* with sense-activity. See also YB II.15, 30; IV.3, 7, 11.
40. YS IV.21 (p. 196): *cittantaradrsye buddhibuddher atiprasangah smrtisamkaras ca*. "In trying to see the mind with another [mind] there is an overextending of the intellect from the intellect resulting in a confusion of memory." Refer to n. 16 above and text on YS IV.22.
41. As Vyasa asserts in YB I.2 and which will be examined later.
42. See n. 17 above.
43. YS IV.4 (p. 178): *nirmanacittanasmitamatrat*.
44. YB IV.3 (p. 178): *yada tu yogi bahunkayan nirmimite tada kim eka manaskas te bhavanty athan eka manaska iti*.
45. YS IV.1 (p. 176): *janmausadhimantratapahsamadhijah siddhayah*. "Powers arise due to birth, drugs, *mantra*, asceticism or from *samadhi*."
46. YB IV.4 (p. 178): *asmitamatram cittakaranam upadaya nirmanacittani karoti, tatah sacittani bhavantiti*.
47. See YB IV.5 (p. 179).
48. YS IV.5 (p. 179): *pravrttibhede prayojakam. cittamekamanekesam*.
49. See Feuerstein (1979a: 129).
50. See (1980: 46) and (1979a: 128).
51. See Feuerstein (1980: 58-59).
52. See YS III.55 (p. 175): *sattvapurusayoh suddhisamye kaivalam iti*. "In the sameness (i.e., likeness) of purity between the *sattva* [of the mind] and the *purusa*, the aloneness (i.e., liberation) [is established]." See also Chapple and Kelly (1990: 108-109).

53. YS IV.14 (p. 188): *parinamaikatvdd vastutattvam*.
54. YS IV.15 (p. 190): *vastusamye cittabhedat tayor vibhaktah panthah*. YS IV.16 (p. 192): *na caikacittatantram vastu tadapramanakam tada kim syat*; this *sutra* is missing in some of the manuscripts (e.g., in Bhoja Raja's *RM*) and it is possible that it is an original part of Vyasa's commentary.
55. See n. 53 above and translation of YS IV.14 in the main text.
56. See YB IV.14 (pp. 188-189). Vyasa no doubt was aware of the Buddhist school founded by Asanga (which probably postdates Patañjali). YS IV.14-16 may well refer to an earlier Vijñānavada school. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 7) argue that Patañjali need not be seen as explicitly polemicizing against this "idealist" view, but as "merely advancing the Samkhya perspective that all things stem from *prakṛti* through *parinama*."
57. BG XVIII.23-25; see Radhakrishnan (1948: 359-360).
58. See Monier-Williams (1899: 258).
59. This formula of three kinds of *karma* has been taught, for example, in the later Advaita Vedānta tradition; cf. H. Zimmer (1951), *Philosophies of India*, pp. 441-442.
60. YS III.22 (p. 147): *sopakramam nirupakramam . . . karma . . . va*.
61. YB III.22 (p. 147): *ayurvipakam karma dvividham sopakramam nirupakramam ca. tatra yatha"rdram vastram vitanitam laghiyasa kalena susyet tatha sopakramam. yatha ca tad eva sampinditam cirena samsusyed evam nirupakramam*.
62. YS II.3 (p. 59): *avidyasmitaragadvesabhinivesah klesah*.
63. YS II.12 (p. 67): *klesamulah karmasayo drstadrstajanmavedaniyah*.
64. YS II.13 (p. 68): *sati mule tadvipako jatyayurbhogah*.
65. YS II.14 (p. 73): *te hlaparitapaphalah punyapunyahetutvat*.
66. YB II.15 (p. 74): *ragajah karmasaya*.
67. YB II.15 (p. 76): *dvesajah karmasaya*.
68. YB II.15 (p. 76): *karmasayo lobhan mohac ca*.
69. Monier-Williams (1899: 1120).
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid. See also J. Lipner (1994), *Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, p. 264.
72. Monier-Williams (1899: 1120).
73. See J. H. Wood (1914), G. Jha (1907), and S. Dasgupta (1920, 1924, 1930).

74. See P. Corrada (1969: 204).
75. See G. Koelman (1970: 278).
76. See Bangali Baba (1976: 9).
77. See G. Feuerstein (1979a: 57; 1980: 68).
78. YS IV.9 (p. 181): *jatidesakalavyavahitanam apy anantaryam smrtisams-karayor ekarupatvat.*
79. YB IV.9 (p. 182): *jatidesakalavyavahitebhyah samskarebhyah smrtih. smrtes ca punah samskara ity evam ete smrtisamskarah karmasayavrttilabhavasadvajyante.*
80. YS II.12-14; see notes 63-65 above.
81. YS IV.10 (p. 182): *tasmanaditvam ca"iso nityatvat.* "They (the *samskaras*) are beginningless, due to the perpetuity of desire."
82. YB IV.9 (pp. 181-182): *yatha'nubhavas tatha samskarah. te ca karma vasananurupah.* "As were the experiences, so are the *samskaras*. And they are in the form of the karmically derived habit patterns or *vasanas*."

83. G. Larson (1993), "The Trimurti of Smṛti," *PEW* 43.3: 380. See also YB II.13 and YS IV.8-9.
84. See the section on *vṛtti* later in this chapter.
85. YB I.5 (p. 10): *tatha jatiyakah samskara vṛttibhir eva kriyante. samskarais ca vṛttaya iti. evam vṛttisamskaracakram anisam avartate.*
86. See n. 182, chapter 2, on YB IV.11.
87. G. Feuerstein (1990), *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Yoga*. p. 309.
88. YS II.9 (p. 122): *vyutthananirodhasamskarayor ahhibhavapradurbhavau nirodhaksanacittanvayo nirodhahaparinamah.*
89. YS III.10 (p. 123): *tasya prasantavahita samskdarat.*
90. YS III.18 (p. 144): *samskrasaksatkaranat purvajatiññanam.*
91. G. Feuerstein (1980: 68).
92. YS III.50 (p. 168).
93. YB II.50 (p. 168): *dagdhasalibijakalpani.*



94. YS II.7 (p. 64): *sukhanusayi ragah*.

95. YS II.8 (p. 65): *duhkhanusayi dvesah*.

96. YB II.15 (p. 76): *ka punah samskaraduhkhata. sukhanubhavad sukhasamskarasayo duhkhanubhavad api duhkhsamskarasaya iti. evam karmabhyo vipake 'nubhuyamane sukhe dukkhe va punah karmasayapracaya*.

97. TV II.13 (p. 68): *sukhaduhkhaphalo hi karmasayas tadarthyena tannantariyakataya janmayusi api prasute. sukhaduhkhe ca ragadvesanusakte tadavinirbhagavartini tadabhava na bhavatah . . . tadiyah atmabhumih klesasalilavasikta karmaphalaprasavaksetram . . .*

98. The term *vasana*, which will hitherto be translated as "habit pattern," is a derivative of the root *vas* meaning "to dwell, abide, remain." It is not by accident nor a mere coincidence that the term *vasana* basically represents selfhood under the influence of ignorance, i.e., as a mistaken identity that being extrinsic to *purusa*, is defined by or rather "dwells in" and is dependent on the "objects" of experience. It has been translated as "subconscious impression" (G. Jha, 1907), "residual potency" (R. Prasada, 1912), "psychical subliminal impression" (Koelman, 1970: 50), "subliminal-trait" (G. Feuerstein, 1979a: 130) and "habit pattern" (C. Chapple and E. Kelly, 1990: 110).

99. YS IV.8 (p. 180): *tatastadvipakanugunanam evabhivyaktir vasananam*. "Therefore [follows] the manifestation of those habit patterns which correspond to the fruition of that [karma]."

100. G. Feuerstein (1979a: 131).

101. YB I.24 (p. 26): *tadanuguna vasana asayah*.

102. Cf. YS IV.9 in n. 78 above.

103. YB II.13 (p. 71): *klesakarmavipakanubhavanirvartitabhistu vasanabhiranadikalasammurchitamidam cittam vicitrikrtamiva sarvato matsyajalam granthibhiriva*"*tatamityeta anekabhavapurvika vasanah*.

104. See n. 63 above.

105. See nn. 65 and 97 above.

106. See n. 89 above on YS III.10; Vyasa's commentary YS III.10(p. 123) runs as follows: *nirodhasamskarabhyasa patavapeksa prasantavahita cittasya bhavati*. "From practice [generating] *samskaras* of cessation, there comes about a calm flow of the mind."

107. YS IV.7 (p. 180): *karmasuklakrsnam yoginastrividhamitairesam*.

108. See also YS II.14 and the terms *apunya* and *punya* in n. 65 above.

109. YB IV.7 (p. 180): *catuspadi khalviyam karmajatih. krsna suklakrsna suklasuklakrsna ceti. tatra krsna duratmanam. suklakrsna bahihsadhanasadhya. tatra parapidanugrahadvarenaiva karmasayapracayah. sukla tapah svadhyayadhyanaavatam. sa hi kevale manasyathattatvddabahihsadhanadhina na parapidayitva bhavati. asuklakrsna samnyasinam ksinaklesanam caramadehnam iti. tatasuklam yogina eva phalasamnyasadakrsnam canupadanat. itaresam tu bhutanam purvam eva trividham iti.*

110. Including of course the higher form of *samddhi* called *asamprajñata*, through which the mind is completely cleansed of ignorance; see YS I.18 and YB I.18.

111. The term *nis-kama* (see discussion in chapter 1) is often translated as "desireless" and is used by Vijnana Bhiksu in YV IV.7; see YV(1989: 19).

112. See YV IV.7 (ibid.), where Vijnana Bhiksu distinguishes between true and false *samnyasins*, i.e., of those who have transcended egoic identity and those who have merely put on the *samnyasin's* robes and act as if they have truly renounced. The true mark of renunciation, as Bhiksu goes on to explain, is the purification of affliction. If affliction is sufficiently dissolved, then even one engaged in the duties of a householder can be freed from egoic attachment to the results of actions. See YV (1989: 20).

113. YS IV.24 (p. 199): *tadasamkhyeyavasanaabhiscitramapi parartham samhatakaritvat.*

114. YS II.21 (p. 89): *tadartha eva drsyasya"tma.* "The nature of the seeable is only for the purpose of this [seer]." Cf. SK 36-37 and YS II.18 as well as YS III.35 and IV.34.

115. YB IV.11 (p. 185): *manas tu sadhikaram asrayo vasananam. na hy avasitadhikare manasi nirasraya vasana sthatum utsahante.*

116. YB IV.24 (pp. 199-200): *samhatyakarina cittena na svarthana bhavitavyam, na sukhacittam sukhartham na jñanam jñanartham ubhayam apy etat parartham. yas ca bhogenapavargena carthanarthavan purusah sa eva paro . . .*

117. YS II.23 (p. 91): *svasvamisaktyoh svarupopalabdhihetuh samyogah.* "The conjunction [between the seer and the seeable] is the cause of the apprehension of the own-form of the powers of owner and owned."

118. YS II.21: see n. 114 above.

119. YB IV.10 (pp. 183-184): *ghataprasadapradipakalpam samkocavikasi cittam sariraparimanakaramatram ity apare pratipannah. tatha cantarabhivah samsaras ca yukta iti. vrttir evassya vibhunas cittasya samkocavikasinity acaryah.*

120. YB IV.10 (p. 184): *dharmadi nimittapeksam.*

121. TV IV.10 (p. 184): *tasmadahamkarikatvac cetaso'hamkarasya ca gaganamandalavat trailokyavypitvad vibhutvam manasah. evam cedasya vrttir api vibhviti sarvajñatapattir ity ata uktam.* Cf. also TV IV.17 (p. 193).

122. G. Koelman (1970: 104).

123. Ibid.

124. H. Aranya (1963: 395).

125. YS III.49 (p. 167): *sattvapurusanyataakhyatimatrasya sarvabhavadhishatrtvam sarvajñatrtvarm ca*. "Only from the discernment of the difference between *purusa* and the *sattva* is there sovereignty over all states of existence and omniscience."

126. TV IV.10; cf. Feuerstein (1980: 61), who argues that Vacaspati's notion of an omniscient *karana-citta* "makes the concept of *purusa* (Self) superfluous." It makes

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more sense, however, to understand the *citta* in the above way as serving a cosmic purpose for the sake of the *purusa*, the "omniscient one" or "knower," without which the *karana-citta* would be incapable of registering any knowledge whatsoever. The *karya-citta* could be conceived of as the individual mind(s) arising from the cosmic or root *citta*.

127. See notes 14 and 16 above on YS IV.19 and IV.22 respectively.

128. Seen. 117 above.

129. See Monier-Williams (1899: 1009).

130. Ibid, p. 1010.

131. See Woods (1914: 8), Koelman (1970: 86), Feuerstein (1979a: 26), Chapple and Kelly (1990: 33); see also Halbfass (1991), *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, p. 227.

132. See Taimni (1961: 6), Aranya (1963: 7), and Prasada (1912: 5).

133. See Müller (1899: 337).

134. See Hauer (1958: 240).

135. See Purohit Swami (1973: 25).

136. See Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 3).

137. See Larson (1993: 377), who as well suggests "functions" as an appropriate translation for *vrtti*.

138. See Hiriyantha (1949).

139. YS I.6 (p. 10): *pramanaviparyayavikalpanidrasmrtayah*.

140. YS I.7-11 (pp. 10-16).

141. YS I.7 (p. 10): *pratyaksanumanagamah pramanani*.

142. YS I.8 (p. 12): *viparyayo mithyajñanam atadрупapratistham*. "Error is incorrect knowledge not based on the [actual] form [of an object]."

143. See n. 62 above.

144. YB I.8 (p. 13): *sa kasmanna pramanam. yatah pramanena badhyate. bhutartha visayatvat pramanasya. tatra pramanena badhanam apramanasya drstam. tad yatha dvicandra darsanam sadvisayenaikacandradarsanena badhyata iti seyam pañcaparva bhavaty avidya, avidyasmitaragadvesabhinivesah klesa iti eta eva svasamjñabhis tamo moho mahamohas tamisro'ndhatimisra*.

145. YS II.17; see n. 199 in chapter 2.

146. YS II.24 (p. 94): *tasya hetur avidya*. "The cause of this [conjunction] is ignorance."

147. YS II.4 (p. 59) states: *avidya ksetram uttaresam prasuptatanuvicchinnodaranam*. "Ignorance is the origin of the others (i.e., afflictions), which may be dormant, attenuated, intercepted, or fully active."

148. See n. 62 above.

149. See n. 168 below.

150. See n. 169 below.

151. I. K. Taimni (1961: 130).

152. YS II.5 (p. 61): *anityasuciduhkhanatmasu nityasucisukhatmakhyatiravidyd*.

153. Text taken from Larson (1969); SK 47 (p. 275): *pañca viparyayabheda bhavanty . . .*; SK 48 (p. 275): *bhedas tamaso'stavidho mohasya ca dasavidho mahamohah. tamisro'stadasadha tatha bhavaty andhatamisrah*.

154. TV I.8.

155. YV I.8 and II.5.

156. TV I.8 (p. 13): *avidya samanyam avidyasmitadis pañcasu parvasvity arthah*.

157. YV I.8 (p. 73): *pañcaparva yavidya samsaranarthabijam sa, iyam eva = mithyajñanarupa vrttir eva, etad visesa eveti yavat*. YV I.8 (p. 71): *bhramas thale jñanakarasyaiva visaye samaropa iti bhavah. samsayasyapy atraivantarbhavah*.

158. YB II.3 (p. 59): *klesa iti panca viparyaya ity arthah. te spandamana gundhikaram dradhayanti, parinamam avastha payanti, karyakarana srota unnamayanti, parasparanugrahatantri bhutva karmavipakam cabhinirharantiti*. The term *spanda* ("quiver," "vibration"), used by Vyasa in the above description, refers not to activity or

movement as ordinarily understood but rather to the first "movement" of (mis)identification with *gunas*.

159. I am following the explanations provided by Vijñāna Bhikṣu (YV I.8) and/or Vacaspati Miśra (TV I.8) after having consulted U. Arya (1986: 168-170). For explanations of the *viparyayas* in Samkhya, see Larson (1987: 57-58).

160. See YV I.8 (p. 74).

161. Ibid.: *astasvanimadyaisvaryesvan atmasvatmiyabuddhir asmita*.

162. YS III.45 (p. 164): *tato'nimadipradurbhavah kayasampattaddharmanabighatas ca*. "Hence [from the conquest of the elements] arise the manifestation [of eight powers], such as becoming minute and so forth, perfection of the body, and unassailability of its [bodily] attributes." See Vyasa's description of these powers in YB III.45 (pp. 164-165).

163. YV I.8 (p. 74): *svatvasmitayoh paryaya tvat*, i.e., *asmita* is derived from *asmi* (I am). The beingness of "I" in this context means the same as belonging to "I" or ego-possession/attachment. To misperceive the *siddhis* as being an intrinsic aspect of self-identity and therefore to possess them as such is to feed into the delusion termed *moha*.

164. YV I.8 (pp. 74-75): *tatha drstanusravika bhedena dasasu sabdadi visayesu rago dasavidho mahamohah*. TV I.8 (p. 13): *tatha yogenastastavidham aisvaryamupadaya siddho bhutva drstanusravikañabdadindasa visayan bhoksya ity evam atmika pratipattir mahamoho ragah*.

165. YV I.8 (p. 75): *tathastaisvaryasya visayadasakasya ca paripanthinidveso 'stadasadha tamisrah*.

166. TV I.8 (p. 13): *evam animadi guna sampatta drstanusravikavisayapratyupasthane ca kalpante sarvam etannanksyatiti yastrasah so'bhiniveso'ndhatamisrah*.

167. See Arya (1986: 170).

168. YB II.7 (p. 65): *sukhabhijñasya sukhānsmṛti purvā sukhe tatsaddhane va yo gardhas trsna lobhah sa raga iti*. "When one familiar with a pleasure now has a memory of it, one's eagerness for the pleasure or for the means to it, that thirst or greed, is [called] attachment." See also n. 94 above on YS II.7.

169. YB II.8 (p. 65): *dukkhabhijñasya dukkhanasmṛti purvā dukkhe tatsadhane va yah pratigho manyurjighamsa krodhoh sa dvesah*. "When one familiar with a pain now has a memory of it, that aversion toward the pain or what causes it, the desire for retaliation, malice, revenge and anger, is [called] aversion." See n. 95 above on YS II.8.

170. YS II.9 (p. 65): *svarasavahi viduso'pi tatha rudho'bhinivesah*. "Desire for continuity, arising even in the wise (sage), is sustained by its own inclination." Vyasa seems to take the primary meaning of *abhinivesa* to be fear of death (annihilation). Unlike *raga* and *dvesa*, and their resultant pleasure-pain impressions of which examples are easily found in this life itself, the *samskara* of fear and anxiety involving death cannot be so easily accounted for, there being no such definitive experiences in this life.

Thus, for Vyasa, the idea of a previous death and the experience of former lives is confirmed. *Abhinivesa* arises naturally and spontaneously from the habit patterns (*vasanas*) of the past experiences of death pangs (YB II.9; pp. 65-66).

171. YS III.54 (p. 174).

172. Cf. for example, Koelman (1970: 183-184), and Feuerstein (1979a: 32); both appear to overlook this key insight into Yoga epistemology and its implications for understanding the meaning of Patañjali's whole system. See also our discussion on *nirodha* in chapter 4.

173. See YV I.8 (p. 71): *atra ca sastre'nyathakhyatih siddhanto na tu samkhyavad a ivekamatram*.

174. See n. 152 above.

175. YB II.5 (p. 63): *yatha namitro mitrbhavo na mitramatram kim tu tadviruddhah sapatanah . . . , evam avidya na pramanam na pramanabhavah kim tu vidyaviparitam jñānantaram avidyeti*.

176. YS I.9 (p. 13): *sabdajñānanupati vastusunyo vikalpah*.

177. See I. K. Taimni's (1961) usage.

178. See R. S. Mishra's (1972) usage.

179. YB I.7 (p. 12): *aptena drsto'numito varthah paratra svabodhasamkrantaye sabdenopadisyate, sabdat tadartha visaya vrttih srotur agamah*.

180. YB I.9 (pp. 13-14): *sa na pramanoparohi na viparyayoparohi ca. vastusunyatve'pi sabdajñāna mahatmya nibandhano vyavaharo drsvate. tadyatha caitanyam purusasya svarupam iti. yada citir eva purusas tadd kim atra kena vapadisyate. bhavati ca vyapadese vrttih. yatha caitrasya gaur iti. tatha pratisiddhavastudharmo niskriyah purusah*.

181. Feuerstein (1979a: 32).

182. YS I.10 (p. 15): *abhavapratyayalambana vrttir nidra*.

183. YB I.10 (p. 15): *sa ca samprabodhe pratyavamarsat pratyayavisesah. katham, sukham ahamasvapsam*.

184. YS I.38 (p. 41): *svapnanidrajñānalambanam va*. "Or resting on the knowledge [derived] from dreams or sleep [the mind is made clear]."

185. YS I.11 (p. 16): *anubhutavisayasampramosah smrtih*.

186. YB I.11 (p. 16): *kim pratyayasya cittam smarati ahosvid visayasyeti*.



187. Ibid.: *grahyoparaktah pratyayo grahyagrahanobhayakaranirbhasas tajjatiyakam samskaram arabhate.*

188. See n. 187 above.

189. YB I.11 (p. 16): *sa samskarah svavyañjakañjanas tadkaram eva grahyagrahanobhayatmikam smrtim janayati.*

190. See YV I.11 (p. 88).

191. YB I.11 (p. 16): *tatra grahanakarapurva buddhih.*

192. See YV I.11 (p. 88): *vyakhyayanuvyavasaya . . .*

193. YB I.11 (p. 16): *grahyakarapurva smrtih.*

194. YB I.11 (p. 17): *sarvah smrtayah pramanaviparyayavikalpanidrasmrtinam anubhavat prabhavanti.*

195. See TV I.11 (p. 16).

196. Without explaining himself further, Bhoja Raja asserts that of the five types of *vr̥ttis*, the means of knowledge or valid cognition, error, and conceptualization occur in the wakeful state (*jagrat*). The experience of these three combined, masquerading as

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direct perception (*pratyaksa*), becomes the dream state (*svapna*). Sleep is a unique state in that it is marked by the absence of other *vr̥ttis* even though it is in itself a *vr̥tti*. Memory is the effect of any or all of these *vr̥ttis*. RM I.11 (p. 4) states: *tatra pramanaviparyayavikalpa jagrad avastha. ta eva tadanubhava balat praksyamanah svapnah. nidra tu asamvedyamanavisaya. smrtis ca pramanaviparyayavikalpanidranimitta.*

197. YV I.11 (p. 90): *etah sarvah pramanadi vr̥ttayo buddhi dravyasya suvarṇasy eva pratima"divad visaykara dravyarupah parinamah . . .*

198. YB I.11 (p. 17): *sarvas caita vr̥ttayah sukhadukkhamohatmikah. sukhadukkhamohas ca klesesu vyakhyeyah.*

199. YB I.11 (p. 17): *sukhanusayi ragah, dukkhanusayi dvesah, mohah punar avidyeti.*

200. YS I.5 (p. 9): *vr̥ttayah pañcatayyah klistaklisstah.* "The modifications are fivefold; afflicted or nonafflicted."

201. YSS in G. Jha (1894: 3): *buddhiv̥rttis ca pradipasya sikhavad buddher agrabhago yena cittasyaikagratavyavaharo bhavati. sa eva ca bhaga indriyadvaya bahyarthe samyujya arthakarena parinamate.*

202. Samkhya-Pravacana-Sutra V.107 (p. 488): *bhagagunabhyam tattvantaram vr̥ttih*

*sambandhdrtham sarpati iti*. Sanskrit text from N. Sinha, trans. (1915), *The Samkhya Philosophy*, in *The Sacred Books of the Hindus*, Vol. 11.

203. In R. Garbe, ed. (1943), *Samkhya-Pravacana-Bhasya or Commentary on the Exposition of the Samkhya Philosophy by Vijñanabhikṣu*, vol. II; see SPB V.107 (p. 140).

204. TV III.47 (p. 166): *virttir alocanam visayakara parinatir iti yavat*.

205. RM I.2 (p. 2): *virttayo'ngangibhavaparinamarupas tasam . . .*

206. RM I.5 (p. 3): *virttayas cittasya parinamavisesah*.

207. TV I.2 (p. 6): *yada ca vivekakhyatir api heya tada kaiva katha virttyantaram dosabahulanam iti bhavah*.

208. YB I.5, 8, 11 and II.11.

209. See, for example, YS II.15: *guna-vritti*; see also YS II.50 and III.43.

210. Cf. Koelman (1970: 86), who appears to equate the term *virttiwithparinama*.

211. See n. 182 in chapter 2.

212. See n. 200 above.

213. YB I.5 (p. 9): *klesahetukah karmasayapracaye ksetribhutam klistah. khyativisaya gunahikara virodhinyo'klistah*.

214. TV I.5 (p. 9): *klesa asmitadayo hetavah pravrttikaranam yasam virttinam tas tathoktah. yad va purusarthapradhanasya rajastamomayinam hi virttinam klesakdranatvena klesayaiva pravrttih*.

215. YV I.5 (p. 57): *atra ca hetuh prayojanam. klesas catra mukhya eva grahyo duhkakhyah. tatha ca klesahetukah duhkaphalikavisayakaravrttaya ity arthah*.

216. G. Feuerstein (1980: 66).

217. YV i.5 (p. 57): *aklista aklesaphalakah*.

218. Cf. Aranya (1963: 18).

219. TV I.5 (p. 9): *vidhutarajastamaso buddhisattvasya prasantavahinah prajñaprasadah khyatis taya visayinya*.

220. YV I.5 (p. 57): *khyatisadhanasyapi samgrahaya visaya padam iti*.

221. YV I.5 (p. 57): *tas ca gunadhikaravirodhinyah, gunanam sattvadinam adhikarah karyarambhanam tadvirodhinyo'vidyakamakarmadirupakarananasakatvat. khyativisaya vivekakhyati sambaddha ity arthah*.

222. Ramananda Yati (1903), *Patañjaladarsanam with a gloss called Maniprabha*, p. 4.
223. See *YS* I.18 and *YB* I.18; *YS* III.50 states that the yogin must develop dispassion/detachment even toward discriminative discernment and its effects, i.e., omniscience and sovereignty over *prakṛti*.
224. *RM* I.5 (p. 3): *klesair vaksyamanalakṣanair akrantah klistah. tadviparita aklistah*.
225. See Hauer (1958: 243).
226. See, for example, the writings of Taimni, Vivekananda, Bangali Baba, Rama Prasada, Ballentyne, and Max Müller (1899: 337). Purohit (1973) uses "painful" and "pleasurable."
227. See *SPB* II.33 (p. 266) in N. Sinha, trans. (1915), *The Samkhya Philosophy*.
228. See Aniruddha's commentary on the *Samkhya-Sutras* (p. 1104) in R. Garbe, ed. (1987), *Samkhya Sutra and Samkhya System*.
229. *YB* II.19; see n. 178 in chapter 2.
230. See, for example, *YS* II.18, 21 and IV.24.
231. *YS* III.9; see n. 88 above.
232. *YB* I.2 (pp. 4-5): *cittam hi prakhyapravṛttisthitisilatvat trigunam prakhyarupam hi cittasattvam rajastamobhyam samsrstam aisvaryavisayapriyam bhavati. tad eva tamasanuviddham adharmajñānavairagyanaishvaryopagam bhavati. tad eva praksinamohavarānam sarvataḥ pradyotamanam anuviddham rajolesamalāpetam svarupapratistham sattvapurusanyataakhyatimatram . . .*
233. See *YS* I.15-16 and discussion on *vairagya* in chapter 4.
234. See Monier-Williams (1899: 234).
235. See Larson (1969: 266).
236. Monier-Williams (1899: 170).
237. On the physical side, *sattva* gives rise to lightness, brightness, and other related material properties and is associated with the color white; *rajas* is responsible for mobility of various kinds and is associated with the color red; *tamas* produces darkness, inertia, decay, and related phenomena and is associated with the color black.
238. See chapters XVII and XVIII in the *BG*.
239. See Feuerstein (1979a: 81). More will be said on yogic liberation and its embodied, ethical implications in chapter 6.
240. *YV* I.5 (p. 58).

241. As, for example, in its role of bringing forth the two processes of the *sattvika* and *tamasa ahamkara*, i.e., the manifestation of the subjective sensory world and the objective sensed world respectively.

242. See TV I.5 (p. 10).

243. YB I.5 (p. 10): *klistapravahapatita apy aklistah. klistacchidresv apy aklista bhavanti.*

244. See TV I.5 (p. 10).

245. See Aranya (1963: 18).

246. See TV I.5 (p. 10). The process of dispassion (detachment) will be explained in greater detail in chapters 4 through 6.

247. Some of the above examples are taken from Narayana Tirtha's *Yogasiddhantacandrika* as cited in Arya (1986: 143).

248. YS I.33 (p. 38): *maitrikarunamuditopeksanam sukhaduhkhapunyapunyavisayanam bhavanatascittaprasadanam.*

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249. YB I.33 (p. 39): *evamasya bhavayatah suklo dharma upajayate. tatas ca cittam prasidati. prasannam ekagram shhitipadam labhate.*

250. YB I.1 (p. 3). The states of mind according to Yoga will be discussed in chapter 4.

251. See n. 85 above.

252. See n. 36, chapter 2.

253. See n. 36, chapter 2.

254. YS II.17; see n. 199 in chapter 2.

255. See n. 121 in chapter 2.

256. See n. 117 above.

257. See YS III.35 (n. 196, chapter 2) and III.49 (n. 125 above).

258. See n. 277 below.

259. See n. 261 below.

260. See, for example, n. 265 below.

261. YB IV.23 (p. 198): *mano hi mantavyenarthenoparaktam, tatsvayam ca visayatvad visayina purusena" tmiyaya vrttya'bhisambaddham, tadetaccittameva drastrdrsyoparaktam*

*visayavisayinirbhasam cetanacetanasvarupapannam visayatmakam apy avisayatmakam ivacetanam cetanam iva sphatikamanikalpam sarvartham ity ucyate.*

262. YB I.4 (pp. 8-9); see n. 277 below.

263. Ibid.; see n. 277 below.

264. See F. Catalina (1968: 136).

265. TV I.4 (p. 8): *samnnidhis ca . . . yogyata laksanah. asti ca purusasya bhoktrsaktis cittasya bhogyaaktih.*

266. YB II.18 (p. 84): *etena grahanadharanohapoha tattva jñanabhinivesa buddhau vartamanah puruse'dhyaropitasad bhavah.*

267. YB I.4 (p. 8): *vyutthane yas cittavrttayas tadavisistavrttih purusah.*

268. See n. 117 above.

269. YB II.23 (p. 91): *purusah svami drsyena svena darsanartham samyuktah. tasmāt samyogadrsyasyopalabdhir ya sa bhogah. ya tu drastuh svarupopalabdhih so 'pavargah.*

270. YB II.23 (pp. 91-92): *darsanakaryavasanaḥ samyoga iti darsanam viyogasya karanam uktam. darsanam adarsanasya pratidvām dvityadarsanam samyoga nimittam uktam . . . darsanasya bhava bandhakaranasyadarsanasya nasa ity ato darsanam jñanam kaivalyakaranam uktam. kim cedam adarsanam nama.*

271. See YB II.23 (pp. 92-93). The eight alternative explanations for *avidya* listed by Vyasa, which were probably prevalent during his time, are summarized as follows: (1) the prevailing of the *gunas* over the *purusa*; (2) the failure of *prakṛti* to bring the *purusa* to liberating sight; (3) the fact that the *gunas* are purposeful; (4) *avidya* producing a mentality of its own kind; (5) the manifestation of the latent impressions of activity, the potency for stasis having ceased; (6) the need of *pradhana* to make itself known; (7) the requirement of the presence of *purusa* for things knowable to be known, with an attendant apparent reflection of things knowable back upon the *purusa*; and (8) the identity of the failure-to-see with knowledge. Later in YB II.23 (p. 94), Vyasa says that the above explanations are the alternatives contained in the [yogic] *sastra* and that this multiplicity of opinion concerns a common object, namely the conjunction of the constituents (*gunas*) [of *prakṛti*] with *purusa*. For more on the term *avidya* see T. S.

Rukmani (1986), "Avidya in the System of Yoga and an Analysis of the Negation in It," *The Adyar Library Bulletin*, pp. 526-534.

272. YB II.23 (p. 92): *avidya svacittena saha niruddha svacittasyotpattibijam.*

273. YS II.24 (p. 94): *tasya hetur avidya.*

274. YB II.24 (p. 95): *viparyayañānavasanetyarthah*.

275. YB II.23 (p. 94): *tatra vikalpabahutvametat sarvapurusanam gunanam samyoge sadharanavisayam. yastu pratyakcetanasya svabuddhi samyogah*.

276. G. Larson (1969: 191).

277. YB I.4 (pp. 8-9): *cittam ayaskantamanikalpam samnidhimatropakari drsyatvena svam bhavati purusasya svaminah. tasmac cittavrttibodhe purusasyanadih sambandho hetuh*.

278. YB II.18 (pp. 83-84): *yatha vijayah parajayo va yoddhrsau vartamanah svamini vyapadisyate, sa hi tatphalasya bhokteti, evam bandhamoksau buddhav eva vartamanau puruse vyapadiyate, sa hi tatphalasya bhokteti*.

279. G. Koelman (1970: 143).

280. TV II.17 (p. 80): *pragbhavitaya samyogasyavidya karanam sthithetutaya purusarthah karanam tad (= bhogapavargau purusarthata) vasena tasya (samyogasya) sthiteh*. We note here that the purpose "of" the Self (*purusa*) is an objective genitive and not a subjective genitive, i.e., *purusartha* means "for the sake of *purusa*." It is not that *purusa* actively has purposes.

281. Cf. BG XVIII.30-32, which discusses three types of understanding (*buddhi*): (1) a discerning *buddhi* that knows what is to be done, etc., and is sattvic; (2) a *buddhi* that understands incorrectly and whose nature is rajasic; and (3) a *buddhi*, whose nature being tamasic, is completely deluded.

282. YB II.6 (p. 64): *atmabuddhim mohena*.

283. YB IV.22 (p. 197): *aparinamini hi bhoktrsaktir apratisamkrama ca parinaminy arthe pratisamkrant eva tadvrttimanupatati. tasyas ca prapta caitanyopagraha svarupaya buddhivrtter anukrimatrataya, buddhivrttyavisista hi jñānavrttir akhyayate*.

284. Cf. YB IV.23 (p. 198), where Vyasa uses the term *pratibimba* for "reflection."

285. YB II.17 (p. 79): *tadetad drsyam ayaskantamanikalpam samnidhimatropakari drsyatvena svam bhavati purusasya drsirupasya svaminah*.

286. See YB IV.22 (p. 197); Vyasa is quoting some authority here. The verse quoted tells us that the secret cave in which *brahman* is hidden is neither the underworld, nor the mountain cave, nor darkness, nor the hidden caverns of the sea. The last stanza ends thus: *guha yasyam nihitam brahma sasvatam buddhivrttimavisistam kavayo vedayante*.

287. TV I.7 (p. 11): *caitanyam eva buddhidarpana . . .*

288. G. Koelman (1970: 137).

289. TV II.17 (p. 79): *citicchaypattir eva buddher buddhipratisamveditvam udasinasyapi pumsah*. See also TV IV.23 (p. 198): *tacchayapattih purusasya vrttih*. See also for *chaya*: TV II.20, 21, 23; III.35 and IV.22. For a critique of the *cicchayapattivada* adopted by Vacaspati Misra see Vijñāna Bhikṣu's comments in YV I.7 (p. 66).



290. See n. 283 above on YB IV.22; see also YB II.6 and Vacaspati's STK 5.

291. YS II.20 (p. 87): *drasta drsimatrah suddho'pi pratyayanupasyah.*

292. YB II.20 (pp. 87-88): *drsimatra iti drksaktir eva visesanaparamrstety arthah. sa puruso buddheh pratisamvedi. sa buddher na sarupo natyantam virupa iti. na tavat sarupah. kasmāt. jñatajñata visaya tvat parinamini hi buddhih. tasyas ca visayo*

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gavadirghatadirva jñatas cajñatas ceti parinamitvam darsayati. sadajñata visayatvam tu purusasyaparinamitvam paridipayati. kasmāt. nahi buddhis ca nama purusavisayas ca syddagrhitā grhita ceti siddham purusasya sadajñatavisayatvam tatas caparinamitvam iti. See also SK 17 for the proofs establishing purusa.

293. YB II.20 (p. 88-89): *suddho'py asau pratyayanupasyo yatah. pratyayam bauddham anupasyati, tamanupasyannatadatma'pi tadatmaka iva pratyavabhasate.*

294. YB II.15 (p. 77): *santam ghoram mudham va pratyayam trigunam eva"rabhante.*

295. YB II.18 and II.15.

296. YB II.15 (p. 77): *evam ete guna itaretarasrayenoparjita sukhaduhkhamoha pratyayah sarve sarvarupa bhavantiti, gunapradhanabhavakrtas tvesam visesa iti . . . tadasva mahato dukkha samudayasya prabhavabijam avidya.*

297. TV I.3 (p. 7). It is interesting to note that the terms *upadhi* and *aupadhika* are not strictly from the early Yoga philosophical system. They have been borrowed by Vacaspati Misra without reserve from the Vedānta doctrinal system, thus creating a syncretic terminology. This by no means changes the Yoga doctrine itself, but only emphasizes grounds that are, according to Vacaspati, shared by both Vedānta and Yoga.

298. TV I.4 (pp. 7-8): *itaratra vyutthane yas cittavrttayah santaghoramudhas ta evavisista abhinna vrttayo yasya purusasya sa tathoktah . . . japakusumasphatikayor iva buddhipurusayoh samnidhanad abhedagrahe buddhivrttih puruse samaropya . . .*

299. Ibid. (p. 8): *yatha maline darpanatale pratibimbitam mukham malinamaropya socatyatmanam malino'smiti.*

300. TV IV.22 (p. 198); see also TV III.35.

301. TV III.35 (p. 155): *buddhes caitanyabimbodgrahena caitanyasya santadyakaradhyaropah.* TV IV.23 (p. 198): *tasmaccittapratibimbataya caitanyagocara'pi cittavrttirna caitanyagocareti.*

302. SPB I.199.

303. See T. S. Rukmani (1988), "Vijñānabhikṣu's Double Reflection Theory of Knowledge

in the Yoga System," *JIP* 16: 370.

304. YV I.4 (p. 48): *sa carthakarata buddhau parinamarupa . . . puruse ca pratibimbarupa*.

305. YV I.4 (p. 50): *yatha ca citi buddheh pratibimbam evam buddhav api citpratibimbam svikaryamanyatha caitanyasya bhananupapatteh; svayam saksatsvadarsane karmakarttr virodhena buddhyarudhatayaivatmano ghatadivajjñeyatvabhyupagamat*.

306. YV I.4 (p. 45): *yady api purusas cinmatro'vikari tatha'pi buddher visayakaravrttnam puruse yani pratibimbani tany eva purusasya vrttayah, na ca tabhir avastubhutabhih parinamitvam sphatikasy evatattvato'nyathabhavad*.

307. The two divergent views of Vacaspati and Vijñāna Bhikṣu regarding the nature of experience by *purusa* are discussed further in TV IV.22 and YV IV.22 respectively. See also Rukmani (1988), "Vijñānabhikṣu's Double Reflection Theory of Knowledge in the Yoga System," *JIP* 16: 367-375.

308. See n. 202 above.

309. See n. 334 below.

310. YS I.7; see n. 141 above.

311. YS IV.22-23.

312. See Monier-Williams (1899: 685).

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313. YB I.7; see n. 315 below for text.

314. YS IV.17 (p. 193): *taduparagapekṣitvaccittasya vastu jñatajñatam*.

315. YB I.7 (p. 11): *indriyapranalīkaya cittasya bahyavastuparagat tadvisaya samnyavisesatmano'rthasya viśeṣavadharana pradhana vrttiḥ pratyakṣam pramāṇam. phalam avīśīṣṭaḥ paūruseyas cittavrttibodhah*.

316. See Arya (1986: 150).

317. YB I.7 (p. 11): *pratisamvedi purusa . . .*

318. This is the explanation offered by Vacaspati Miśra and H. Aranya on YB I.7.

319. See, for example, YS III.17-19, 25-29, 33-36, 43, 49, 52, and 54. An example of *yogi-pratyakṣa* is the yogin's effecting the perception of *samskāras* whereby knowledge of previous births is attained (YS III.18). Another example of yogic perception is the discriminative discernment (*vivekakhyatī*) that *mind-sattva* and *purusa* are different, as we are told in YS III.49 (see n. 125 above).

320. See TV I.7 and YV I.7.

321. See YV I.7 (p. 61).

322. Ibid.

323. In TV I.7 Vacaspati sees the definition of *pratyaksa* in YB I.7 as a "pointer" to the implicit and more complete idea of direct perception or realization (*saksatkara*). Ramananda Yati understands *yogi-pratyaksa* as taking place in *samadhi*. When the mind is clear and no longer dependent on external objects, there appears a clear reflection of pure consciousness.

324. See YS IV.22-23 and YB IV.22-23.

325. YS I.49 (p. 52): *srutanumanaprajñabhyam anyavisaya visesarthatvat*.

326. YS I.48 (p. 51): *rtambhara tatra prajña*; see chapter 5 for further discussion on this topic.

327. YB I.49 (pp. 52-53): *srutamagamavijñanam tatsamanyavisayam. na hy agamena sakyo viseso'bhidhatum, kasmāt, na hi visesena krtasamketah sabda iti. tatha'numanam samanyavisayam eva. . . . anumanena ca samanyenopasamharah. tasmac chrutanumanavisayo na visesah kascid astiti. na casya suksmavyavahitaviprkrstasya vastuno lokapratyaksena grahanam asti. na casya visesasyapramanakasyabhavo'stiti samadhiprajña nirgrahya eva sa viseso bhavati bhutasuksmagato va purusagato vd.*

328. YS III.35; see n. 333 below.

329. As, for example, in the processes leading up to *savitarka-samapatti* (YS I.42) and culminating in *nirvitarka-samapatti* (YS I.43); on this see our discussion in chapter 5.

330. On the topic of levels of commitment to practice in Yoga refer to our discussion in chapter 1 on YS I.21-22 and Vyasa's commentary.

331. YS IV.20 (p. 195): *ekasamaye cobhayanavadharanam*.

332. YS IV.21; see n. 40 above.

333. YS III.35 (p. 154): *sattvapurusayor atyantasamkirnayoh pratyayaviseso bhogah pararthatvat svarthasamyamat purusajñanam*.

334. YB III.35 (p. 155): *na ca purusapratyayena buddhisattvatmana puruso drsyate. purusa eva tam pratyayam svatmavalambanam pasyati, tatha hy uktam"vijñataram are kena vijaniyat" iti.*

335. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 116); see also BA Up III.7.23.

336. C. Pensa in G. Feuerstein (1980: vi).

Chapter 4.  
*Nirodha*

1. See n. 152 in chapter 3.
2. *YS II.11* (p. 67): *dhyanaheyas tadavrttayah*.
3. By overcoming dissatisfaction (*YS II.16*) and its cause (*YS II.17*), classical Yoga can be seen to have the same purpose as classical Samkhya and Buddhism.
4. *YS I.2* (p. 4): *yogas cittavrttinirodhah*.
5. As mentioned in chapter 2, in his open-ended approach Patañjali offers a diversity of practices that more or less complement each other. The openness of the *YS* is expressed, for example, in *YS I.39* (p. 42): *yathabhimatadhyanaadva*, "Or [clarity of mind results] from meditation as desired."
6. See also Chapple (1986: 36-37) and Larson (1987: 26-29) on the classical systems of Samkhya and Yoga; other comparisons or contrasts between these two *darsanas* are raised throughout our study.
7. Eliade (1969: 4).
8. *YB II.15* (p. 76): *itaram tu svakarmopahrtam duhkham upattam upattam tyajantam tyaktam tyaktam upadadanam anadivasanavicitraya cittavrttya samantato'nuviddham ivavidyaya hataavya evahamkaramamakarnupatinam jatam jatam bahyadhyatmikobhayanimittastriparvanastapa anuplavante. tad evam anadina duhkhasrotasa vyuhyamanam atmanam bhutagramam ca drstva yogi sarvaduhhaksayakaranam samyagdaranam saranam prapadyata iti*.
9. Monier-Williams (1899: 884).
10. See, for example, G. Jha (1907: 3), H. Aranya (1963: 1), M. N. Dvivedi (1930: 2), M. Eliade (1969: 36).
11. See, for example, I. K. Taimni (1961: 6), T. Leggett (1990: 60).
12. See, for example, J. H. Woods (1914: 8), G. Koelman (1970: 237), G. Feuerstein (1979a: 26), T. S. Rukmani (1981: 31).
13. See, for example, J. Varenne (1976: 87), G. Larson (1987: 28); in a more recent work (1993: 377), Larson translates *nirodha* as "cessation" or "restraint."
14. See, for example, Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 5), Chapple and Kelly (1990: 33).
15. U. Arya (1986: 93). See also Purohit (1973), who translates *nirodha* as "controlling."
16. Other translations of *nirodha* include: "hindering" (Ballantyne, 1852), "Unterdrückung" (Jacobi, 1929: 587), and "Zur-Ruhe-bringen" or "Bewaltigung" (Hauer, 1958: 239).
17. See J. B. Sykes, ed. (1976), *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, p. 299, where "dissolution"

can mean the "undoing or relaxing of bond."

18. *YB* II.18 (p. 84); see n. 266 in chapter 3.

19. *YB* II.6 (p. 96); see n. 144 in chapter 2.

20. *YS* IV.34 (p. 207).

21. *YS* II.10 (p. 66): *te pratiprasavaheyah suksmah*.

22. Cf. Feuerstein (1979a: 65) and Koelman (1970: 249).

23. Cf. Feuerstein (1979a: 65) and (1980: 36).

24. Koelman (1970: 249).

25. *Ibid*.

26. *Ibid*.

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27. See *YB* III.50 (p. 168): *tadetesam gunanam manasi karmaklesavipakasvarupenabhivvyaktanam caritarthanam pratiprasave purusasya*"*tyantiko gunaviyogah kaivalyam*.

28. Cf. *YB* II.2 and II.27 as well as n. 27 above.

29. *YS* IV.32 (p. 204): *tatah krtarthanam parinamakramasamaptir gunanam*. "Then [with that eternality of knowledge] the *gunas* have fulfilled their purpose, and the succession of their changes is terminated."

30. Following from *dharmamegha samadhi* (*YS* IV.29: 202) there is the cessation of afflicted action; *YS* IV.30 (p. 202): *tatah klesakarmanivrttih*. See further explanation on *YS* IV.29-30 in chapter 6.

31. *YS* IV.31 and *YB* IV.31 (p. 203).

32. *YV* I.2 (p. 33): *cittam antahkaranasamanyam ekasyaivantahkaranasya vrttibhedamatrena caturdha atra darsane vibhagat, tasya yavallaksyamana vrttayas tasam nirodhas tasam layakhyo'dhikaranasyaivavasthaviseso'bhavasasman mate'dhikaranavasthavisesarupatvat, sa yoga ity arthah*.

33. In Yoga, for example, the "absence" of a clay pot on the "ground" simply points to the nature of the clay or "ground" itself (*hhutalasvarupam*); cf. Rukmani (1981: 27 n. 2).

34. *RM* I.2 (p. 2): *nirodho vahirmukhaparinativicchedadantarmukhataya pratilomaparinamena svakarane layo yoga ity akhyayate*. While it may not be Bhoja's intention to support the notion of the nonexistence of *vrttis* in *nirodha*, his commentary (the

RM) appears to lack the philosophical sophistication required for interpreting the meaning of *nirodha* along epistemological lines.

35. YB IV.12; see n. 97 in chapter 2.

36. YS II.26 (p. 96): *vivekakhyatir aviplava hanopayah*. "The means of abandonment [of *samyoga*] is the unfaltering discriminative discernment."

37. YS II.27 (p. 97): *tasya saptadha prantabhumih prajña*.

38. YB II.27 (pp. 97-98).

39. YB II.27 (p. 98): *guna girisikharatatacyuta iva gravano niravasthanah svakarane pralayabhimukhah saha tenastam gacchanti. na caisam pravilinanam punar asty utpadah prayojanabhavad iti*.

40. See YS II.22.

41. See YB I.2.

42. YS II.25 (p. 96): *tadabhavat samyogabhavo hanam taddrseh kaivalyam*.

43. YB II.24 (p. 95): *viparyayajñanavasanyarthah. viparayajñanavasana vasita ca na karyanistham purusakhyatim buddhih prapnoti sadhikara punar avartate. sa tu purusakhyati paryavasana karyanisthm prapnoti, caritadhikara nivrtdarsana bandhakaranabhavanna punar avartate*.

44. YB II.25 (p. 96): *tasyadarsanasyabhavad buddhipurusasamyogabhava atyantiko bandhanoparama ity arthah. etaddhanam. taddrseh kaivalyam purusasyamisribhava punar asamyogo gunair ity arthah. duhkharana nivrtau duhkhoparamo hanam, tada svarupapratisthah purusa ity uktam*.

45. Cf. YB II.2, 27 and IV.34.

46. G. Koelman (1970: 249).

47. As outlined in (1977) *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda* (hereafter abbreviated CWSV) 8 vols. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram).

48. For an examination of Swami Vivekananda's understanding of *samadhi* as it relates to Patañjali's Yoga system, see A. Rambachan (1994), *The Limits of Scripture: Vivekananda's Reinterpretation of the Vedas*, pp. 98-112.

49. Vivekananda also describes *samadhi* as a source of knowledge, giving the impression that he identifies the state with a particular level of mental activity (see, for example, CWSV 1: 185, where he describes *samadhi* as a state of mind; see also CWSV 2: 390 and CWSV 4: 59). This description is contradicted by several passages in which he repeatedly affirms that



*samadhi* is consequent upon the death of the mind and characterized by a total absence of mental functions. There is an obvious tension in his writings in that this portrayal of *samadhi* is seen both as a state in which the mind still obtains and as a state where the mind ceases to exist.

50. Swami Vivekananda, CWVS 1: 200.

51. CWVS 8: 40; see also CWVS 1: 234 and CWVS 7: 195.

52. CWVS 1: 188, 212-213.

53. CWVS 8: 36; see also CWVS 7: 140, 196.

54. CWVS 8: 48.

55. CWVS 7: 71.

56. CWVS 7: 195; see also CWVS 2: 255.

57. CWVS 8: 31.

58. CWVS 2: 256.

59. I do not think the issue being raised here is merely one of semantics but rather reflects a basic misunderstanding of Yoga philosophy itself and the actual process of thought- or mind-transcendence that takes place in Yoga. It is of interest to note that the practice of Yoga as usually understood in modern Western contexts is often confined to physical exercises or postures (*asana*), perhaps accompanied by breathing exercises (*pranayama*) and techniques for concentration (*dharana*) of the mind. The deeper more subtle practice of meditation leading to *samadhi* is often ignored albeit for good reasons as it is often the case that the Yoga instructors are not qualified themselves nor are they experienced in higher meditative disciplines. Alternatively, for an inexperienced instructor to teach meditation to students of Yoga would be, from the perspective of the tradition of Yoga itself, pedagogically unsound and irresponsible. Moreover, if Yoga practice is presented as resulting ultimately in the annihilation or negation of the mind, it would not be unreasonable to presume that aspirants would resist the serious study and practice of Yoga, believing that Yoga would make them incapable of functioning effectively in the world. In an about-face in his perspective, Vivekananda contradicts his more negative approach to the mind when (see CWSV 8: 47-48) he appears to instruct his listeners to make no effort to control their thoughts, but simply to watch them. In his authoritative book (1976) entitled *Yoga and the Hindu Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), J. Varenne (pp. 6-7) questions the meaning of "cessation" (*nirodha*) in Yoga and rightly concludes that "Yoga is indeed the cessation of agitation of the consciousness." But he later goes on to support a more suppressive approach to the mind in Yoga. See, for example, where he writes (p. 114): "the chitta, whose activity yoga makes it an aim to destroy."

60. See the above listed interpretations of *nirodha* (notes 10-16). The exceptional interpretation here is Chapple and Kelly (1990: 8, 122), who, without "Vedanticizing" the Yoga system of Patañjali, imply that Yoga culminates in an embodied state or "experience" of liberation involving nonafflicted action.

61. P. Y. Deshpande (1978), *The Authentic Yoga*, pp. 22-23.
62. See YB II.15 in n. 294, chapter 3.
63. Dasgupta (1922: 268).
64. See YB I.2 and YS II.18.
65. See YS II.18 and YB I.2.
66. See YB II.15 in n. 294, chapter 3.
67. See Dasgupta (1922: 247); the term *prati-saṅcara* is used in the *Tattvasamasa-Sutra* (6); see Larson (1987: 319).
68. YS II.18; see n. 115 in chapter 2.
69. As is often the case in the classical Samkhya tradition and its interpretations.
70. See notes 115 and 128 in chapter 2.
71. YS II.21; see n. 114 in chapter 3.
72. YB I.1 (p. 2).
73. YB I.2 (p. 4). I will be presenting a detailed explanation of the various stages of *samadhi* in chapters 5 and 6.
74. YB I.2 (p. 4): *sarvasabdagrahanat samprajñato'pi yoga ityakhyayate*.
75. This is easily inferred from YB I.2 (see chapter 3, n. 232); see also TV I.1 (p. 4): *rajastamomayi kila pramanadivrttiḥ sattvikim vrttimupadaya samprajñate niruddha*.
76. See YB IV.30 (pp. 202-203): *klesakarmanivrttau jivanneva vidvanimukto bhavati. kasmāt, yasmād viparyayo bhavasya karanam. na hi kṣināviparyayah kascit kenacit kvacijjato drśyata iti*. "On cessation of afflicted action, the knower is liberated while yet living. Why? Because erroneous cognition (*viparyaya*) is the cause of rebirth [of egoity]. When error has vanished, no one is ever seen to be born anywhere." Here (again) there is room for an epistemological understanding-of "reborn," that is, one who is said to be reborn is misidentified as a body-self that takes birth and will eventually perish. The liberated yogin may have a body that is subject to birth and death yet the yogin is no longer misidentified as the body or as any other aspect of prakṛtic existence.
77. See YS IV.31; see also YS II.52 and III.43, where the expression *prakasaavarana* "covering of light" is used. Both *sūtras* allude to the removal or dwindling of the "coverings" of *rajas* and *tamas* that conceal *prakasa*-the inner light or illuminating quality of *sattva*-knowledge (the *guṇa* of *sattva*).

78. "Subtilization" is a term used by Chapple and Kelly (1990: 4).
79. See *YB* I.5 (p. 10).
80. *YS* II.15; *YS* IV.9-10.
81. *YS* IV.8,24.
82. *YB* II.24 (p. 95).
83. *YS* I.8 (p. 12).
84. See n. 76 above.
85. See *YB* II.23 (p. 92) and n. 272 in chapter 3.
86. See *YB* I.8 (p. 13) and n. 144 in chapter 3.
87. This correlates well with the term *sabija* (*YS* I.46) used by Patañjali as will be seen in chapter 5 of this study.
88. Vyasa ( *YB* I.1, p. 4) refers to the supracognitive *samadhi* wherein all *vrttis* and their effects are transcended-as *sarvavrttinirodha*. There is no reason why *sarvavrttinirodha* cannot be read as the complete cessation of the one *seed-vrtti* of error (*viparyaya*) that, according to Vyasa ( *YB* I.8), contains all afflicted identity. The

cognitive *samadhi* is included as Yoga proper because it serves to dissolve misidentification with *vrttis* and is propaedeutic to the higher *samadhi*. The term *sarva* can refer to all the *vrttis* of identification that support misidentification or mistaken identity.

89. *YS* III.55 (p. 174): *sattvapurusayoh suddhisamye kaivalyam iti*. "In the sameness of purity between the *sattva* (of the mind) and *purusa*, there is aloneness."
90. *YS* I.12 (p. 17): *abhyasavairagyabhyam tannirodhah*.
91. *YB* I.11; see n. 198 in chapter 3.
92. See C. Pensa in Feuerstein (1980: viii) and also Feuerstein (1980: 78). K. S. Joshi (1965: 60) argues that *abhyasa* and *vairagya* can be seen as two poles of any form of Yoga.
93. *YB* I.12 (p. 17): *cittanadi namobhayatovahini vahati kalyanaya vahati papaya ca. ya tu kaivalyapragbhara vivekavisayanimna sa kalyanavaha. samsarapragbhara'vivekavisayanimna papavaha. tatra vairagyena visayasrotah khili kriyate. vivekadarsanabhyasena vivekasrota udghatyata ity ubhayahinas cittavrttinirodhah*.
94. See *YB* I.5 on *klista* and *aklista*.

95. The interrelatedness of knowledge, ignorance, and moral aspiration is illustrated, for example, in the *Katha Up* (I.2. 1-9), where two paths are outlined: (1) the path of ignorance that leads to self-indulgence and that falls into the power of the Lord of Death (Yama), and (2) the path of wisdom (*vidya*) that leads to immortality and that is beyond Yama's grasp.

96. Feuerstein (1990: 381).

97. *BG* VI.35 (p. 206): *asamsayam mahabaho mano durnigraham calam, abhyasena tu kaunteya vairagyena ca grhyate.*

98. *YS* I.13 (p. 17): *tatra sthita yatno'bhyasah.*

99. *YS* I.14 (p. 18): *sa tu dirghakalanairantarasatkarasevito drdhabhumih.*

100. It can probably be assumed here that knowledge (*vidya*) presupposes a necessary preparation and includes a proficiency in the tradition, in the texts, and in the systematic method of practice.

101. *YB* I.14 (p. 18): *dirghakalasevito nirantarasevitah satkarsevitah, tapasa brahmacaryana vidyaya raddhaya ca sampaditah satkaravandrdhabhumir bhavati.*

102. *YB* I.13 (pp. 17-18): *tadarthah prayatno viryamutsahah. tat sampipadayisaya tatsddhananusthanamabhyasah.* Koelman notes (1970: 257) that while extraordinary will power is implied in all prescriptions and exercises in Yoga, nowhere is the word "will" (*iccha*) explicitly mentioned in the *YS* or the *YB*. It is one of the five activities of the intellect mentioned in the *Tattva-Samasa-Sutras* (9).

103. *YB* I.13 (p. 17): *cittasyavrttikasya prasantavahita sthitih.*

104. *YV* I.13 (p. 94).

105. *TV* I.13 (p. 17): *rajasatamasavrttir ahitasya prasantavahita vimalata sattvikavrtti vahitaikagrata sthitih.*

106. *RM* I.13 (p. 5): *vrttir ahitasya cittasya svarupanisthah parinamah sthitistasyam . . .*

107. *YB* I.14.(p. 18): *vyutthanasamskarena dragityevanabhe bhutavisaya ityarthah.*

108. S. Dasgupta (1930: 61).

109. *YS* I.15 (p. 18): *drstanusravikavisayavitrnsasya vasikarasamjña vairagyam.*

110. *YV* I.15 (p. 96): *ragabhavamatram dosadarsanajanyo ragabhavo va na nirodhahetur vairagyam rogddinimittakarucitto yoganudayad, dosadarsanajavairagyadanantaramapi visayasamnidhyena citta ksobhatah saubharyaderyoganispattes ca.*

attachment arising from seeing defects [in objects] is not a cause for cessation. [This is] because Yoga does not come into being based on a dislike of causes such as illnesses; [also] even after [achieving a certain] detachment arising from seeing the defects [in the objects] *rsis* like Saubhari failed to attain Yoga because of the agitation of [his] mind in the presence of the objects [of the senses]."

111. YS I.33 clearly shows the fallacy of developing such pseudo-notions of "detachment" in Yoga; see n. 248 in chapter 3.

112. YV I.15 (p. 98): *ragadvesasunyasy a visayasaksatkarasya योग्याता वासिकारासमज्ञा*"*khyam vairagyam . . .*

113. See notes 125 and 333 in chapter 3 on YS III.49 and III.35 respectively.

114. YS I.16 (p. 19): *tatparam purusakhyater gunavaitrsnyam.*

115. YB I.16 (pp. 19-20): *drstanusravikavisaya dosadarsi viraktah purusadarsanabhysattacchuddhi pravivekapyayita buddhir gunehhyo vyaktavyaktadharmakebhyo virakta iti.*

116. See n. 117 below.

117. YB I.15 (pp. 18-19): *striyo'nnapanam aisvaram iti drstavisaye vitrsnasya svarga vaidehyaprakrtilayatvapraprtavanusravikavisaye vitrsnasya divyadivyaavisayasamprayoge'pi cittasya ... vasikarasamjña vairagyam.* U. Arya (1986: 206) paraphrases the word "women" (*striya*) as "the opposite sex" and "out of consideration for contemporary concerns." He goes on to write (pp. 206-207): "These texts were taught in monastic settings by yoga masters for whose male disciples the attraction of women must have been a common problem. Although there have been many great women yogis (yoginis) known to the tradition, it is somehow thought that men are not as strong an attraction to aspiring women as women are to men." Arya's point, I think, is well taken and discloses an unfortunate and already well-known bias certainly present within Hinduism and other religious traditions of the world which, focusing on religious literature written from a male perspective, tends to overlook the intrinsically spiritual nature and identity of women and does not address the issue of life as understood and experienced from a woman's perspective. If Vyasa were a woman he undoubtedly would have addressed the issue of sexuality from a somewhat different perspective!

118. SK 45: *vairagyat prakrtilayah . . .*

119. YB I.16 (p. 20): *tatra yaduttaram tajjñānaprasadamatram.*

120. TV I.16 (p. 20): *tadeva hi tadrsam cittasattvam rajolesamalenapyaparamrstamasya"rayo'ta eva jñānaprasada . . . khyativisese sati vartamanakhyatimanityarthah.*

121. YB I.16 (p. 20): *yasyodaye sati yogi pratyudita khyatir evam manyatepraptam prapaniyam, ksinah ksetavyah klesah, chinnah slistaparva bhavasamkramah, yasyavicchedajjanitva mriyate mrtva ca jayata iti. jñānasyaiva para katha vairagyam. etasaiva hi nantariyakam kaivalyam iti.*

122. YS III.50 (p. 168): *tadvairagyad api dosabijaksaye kaivalyam*.

123. YS III.49; see n. 125 in chapter 3.

124. YV I.16(p. 101).

125. YS IV.29 (p. 202): *prasamkhyanye'pyakusidasya sarvatha vivekakhyater dharmameghah samadhih*. This *sutra* will be discussed in chapter 6.

126. YB II.15 (p. 78): *tatra hatuh svarupamupadeyam va heyam va a hhavitumarhati*. "Here, the true nature/identity of the one who is liberated cannot be something to be acquired or discarded."

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127. YB II.27 (p. 97): *saptadheti asuddhyavaranamalapagamaccittasya pratyayantaranutpade sati saptaprakaraiva prajña vivekino bhavati*.

128. YB I.2 (p. 6): . . . *viraktam cittam tamapi khyatim nirunaddhi*.

129. W. Halbfass (1991), *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*, p. 227.

130. YS II.27.

131. YB II.27 (p. 98): *svrupamatrajyotir amalah kevali purusa . . .*

132. Ibid.: *etam saptavidham prantabhumi prajñamanupasyanpurusah . . .*

133. Ibid.: *pratiprasave'pi cittasya muktah kusala ityeva bhavati gunatitativaditi*.

134. YS II.29.

135. Monier-Williams (1899: 1159).

136. Ibid.

137. See M. N. Dvivedi (1930: 52), R. Prasada (1912: 31).

138. See M. Müller (1899: 448), G. Jha (1907: 19).

139. See S. Dasgupta (1922: 271), Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 74), J. H. Woods (1914: 40).

140. See H. Zimmer (1951: 435), G. Koelman (1970: 188).

141. See M. Eliade (1969: 77), G. Feuerstein (1979a: 37).

142. See G. Feuerstein (1989: 195-196).

143. See n. 141 above.



144. R. C. Zaehner (1969), *The Bhagavad Gita*, p. 143.
145. However, in a later work (1989: 183, 195) Feuerstein adopts the term "ecstasy" for *samadhi* (see n. 142 above and n. 5 in chapter 5 of our study).
146. YB II.1 (p. 57): . . . *samahitacittasya yogah. katham vyutthitacitto'pi yogayuktah syadityetadarabhyate.*
147. TV II.1 (p. 57): *abhyasavairagye hi yogopayau prathame pada uktau. na ca tau vyutthitacittasya dragityeva, sambhavat iti dvitiyapadopadesyamupayamapeksate sattvasuddhyartham.*
148. Monier-Williams (1899: 1040).
149. As can be inferred from YB I.5 and YS III.9.
150. There is an obvious tension between *vyutthana* and *nirodha* in the *Yoga-Sutra*, a tension that is not fully resolved until the highest stage of practice, namely *asamprajñata-samadhi*. On this see chapter 5 and especially chapter 6.
151. See YS IV.18-22.
152. YS II.2 (p. 58): *samadhibhavanarthah klesatanukaranarthas ca.*
153. YS II.1 (p. 57): *tapahsvadhyayesvarapranidhanani kriyayogah.*
154. YB II.1 (p. 58): *svadhyayah pranavadipavitranam japo moksasastradhyayanam va.*
155. See references to G. Feuerstein in notes 26 and 31 in chapter 2; see also Feuerstein (1979a: 59).
156. For a comparative study of *kriya-yoga* and *astanga-yoga* see Feuerstein (1979b: 37-104).
157. YS I.34 (p. 39): *pracchardanavidharanabhyam va pranasya.*
158. YS I.37 (p. 41): *vitragavisayam va cittam.*
159. YB I.35 (p. 39).
160. YS I.35 (p. 39): *visayavati va pravrttir utpanna manasah sthitinibandhani.*
161. See n. 248 in chapter 3.

162. YS I.36 (p. 40): *visoka va jyotismati.* Vyasa mentions (YB I.36: 40) that by concentrating on the heart-lotus (*hrdaya-pundarika*) there is direct awareness of the *buddhi*. The perception of luminous forms such as the sun may also take place through this form of concentration.

163. YB I.1 (p. 3): *ksiptam mudham viksiptam ekagram niruddham iti cittabhumayah.*
164. See TV I.1 (p. 3): *mudham tu tamahsamudrekannidravrttimat.*
165. YV I.1 (p. 24): *ksiptam rajasa visayesveva vrttimat. mudham tamasa nidradivrttimat.*
166. Cf. TV I.1 (p. 3) and YV I.1 (p. 24).
167. YS I.30 (p. 34):  
*vyadhistryanasamsayapramadalasyaviratibhrantidarsanalabddhabhumikatvanavasthitatvani  
cittaviksepas te'ntarayah.* I have briefly elaborated on some of the meanings of the above  
terms as given by Vyasa.
168. TV I.30; YV I.30.
169. YB I.30 (p. 34): *sahaite cittavrttibhir bhavanti. etesamabhava na bhavanti purvaktas  
cittavrttayah. .... samadhipratilambhe hi sati tadavasthitam syaditi.*
170. YB I.31 (p. 35): *dukkhamadhyatmikamadhibautikamadhidaivikam ca.*
171. YS I.31 (p. 35): *dukkhadaurmanasyagamejayatvasvasaprasvasa viksepasahabhuvah.*  
See also YB I.31.
172. YB I.31 (p. 35): *ete viksepasahabhuvo viksiptacittasyaite bhavanti. samahitacittasyaite  
na bhavanti.* "Put or held together, joined, assembled, combined, united . . . composed,  
collected, concentrated . . . put in order, set right, adjusted" are some of the meanings  
Monier-Williams gives (1899: 1160) for *samahita*. *Samahita* implies a harmonizing of the  
mind or resolving of the conditions of agitation and conflict in the mind; on this see Arya  
(1986: 332).
173. YB I.1 (p. 3): *tatra viksipte cetasi viksepopasarjanibhutah samadhirna yogapakse  
vartate.*
174. G. Koelman (1970: 161).
175. YB I.1 (pp. 3-4): *yastvekagre cetasi sadbhutamartham pradyotayati ksinoti ca  
klesankarmabandhanani slathayati nirodhamabhimukham karoti sa samprajñato yoga  
ityakhyayate.*
176. YS II.29 (p. 101): *yamaniyamasanapranayamapratyaharadhranadhyanasamadhayo  
'staavangani.*
177. YS II.28 (p. 98): *yoganganusthanad asuddhiksaye jñanadiptiravivekakhyateh.*
178. YS II.30 (p. 102): *ahimsasatyasteyabrahmacaryaparigraha yamah.*
179. YS II.35 (p. 107): *ahimsapratisthayam tat samnidhau vairatyagah.* "When in the  
presence of one established in nonviolence, there is the abandonment of enmity."
180. YS II.36 (p. 107): *satyapratisthayam kriyaphalasrayatvam.* "When established in  
truthfulness, [there is] correspondence between action [and its] fruition."

181. YS II.37 (p. 108): *asteyapratisthayam sarvaratnopasthanam*. "When established in non-stealing, all precious things appear for [the yogin]."

182. YS II.38 (p. 108): *brahmacaryapratisthayam viryalabhah*. "When established in sexual restraint, vitality is obtained."

183. YS II.39 (p. 108): *aparigrahasathairye janmakathamtasambodhah*. "When steadied in nonpossessiveness [the yogin obtains] knowledge of the conditions of birth."

184. YS II.31 (p. 104): *jatidesakalasamayana vacchinndh sarvabhauma mahavratam*.

185. YS II.32 (p. 104): *saucasantosatapahsvadhyayavarapranidhanani niyamah*.

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186. YS II.40 (p. 109): *saucat svangajugupsa parairasamsargah*. "Through purity [the yogin attains] distance toward his own body, and non-contamination by others." This *sutra* is not meant to imply an aversion or dislike toward the body but rather a discerning and detached attitude based on a healthy respect for the body as a vehicle for the purification of consciousness; the yogin is no longer enslaved or consumed by a mere body-identification of self and does not pollute the body through unhealthy contact with others. YS II.41 (p. 109): *sattvasuddhisauamanasyaikagryendriyajayatmadarsanayogyatvani ca*. "[Also:] purity of *mind-sattva*, cheerfulness, one-pointedness, mastery of the senses, and fitness for the vision of the self [are achieved]."

187. YS II.42 (p. 109): *samtosad anuttamah sukhalahhah*. "From contentment, unsurpassed happiness is gained."

188. YS II.43 (p. 110): *kayendriyasiddhir asuddhiksayat tapasah*. "From austerity arises the dwindling of impurity and the perfection of the body and senses."

189. YS II.44 (p. 110): *svadhyayad istadevatasamprayogah*. "Through personal, scriptural (i.e., self-) study [the yogin establishes] contact with the desired deity." See also n. 154 above.

190. YS II.45 (p. 110): *samadhisiddhir isvarapranidhanat*. "Through devotion to *isvara* arises perfection in *samadhi*."

191. This is, however, a matter for interpretation. See, for example, references to Feuerstein in notes 26 and 31 of chapter 2.

192. YS II.33 (p. 105): *vitarkabadhane pratipaksabhavanam*.

193. YS II.34 (p. 106): *vitarka himsadayah krtakaritanumodita lobhakrodhamohapurvaka mrdumadhyadhimatra duhkhañjananantaphala iti pratipaksabhavanam*.

194. See, for example, n. 248 in chapter 3 and text for n. 161 above.

195. See YB II.33 (p. 105).

196. B.-A. Scharfstein (1974), *Mystical Experience*, pp. 131-132.

197. YS II.46 (p. 110): *sthiraasukhamsanam*. "The posture should be firm and comfortable." Vyasa (YB II.46) mentions postures such as the lotus position.

198. YS II.47 (p. 111): *prayatnasaithilyanantasamapattibhyam*. "[It is accompanied] by the relaxation of effort and by unification with the infinite." It appears that the posture can be perfected when the mind is in *samadhi*, that is, at a later stage; or the posture can be perfected at an earlier stage by the relaxation of effort. See YB II.47 (p. 111).

199. YS II.48 (p. 111): *tato dvandvanabhigatah*. "From that [the yogin] becomes immune to the pairs of opposites."

200. YS II.49 (p. 112): *tasminsati svasaprasvasayor gativicchedah pranayamah*. "*Pranayama* is to be in this [posture] and 'cut-off' the flow of inhalation and exhalation." The breath is only an external aspect or form of manifestation of *prana* which is the "life-force" or "vital energy" that interpenetrates and sustains the body and its functions. For more on the term *prana* see Feuerstein (1989: 258-259).

201. The first three as outlined in YS II.50 (p. 112) are: "external" (*bahya*), "internal" (*abhyantara*), and "stopped" (*stambha*).

202. The fourth form (YS II.51: 113) is a withdrawal from the external and internal conditions of the breath: *bahyabhyantaravisayaksepi caturthah*.

203. YS II.52 (p. 114): *tatah ksyate prakasavaranam*; YB II.52 (p. 114): . . . *ksyate vivekajñānavarāṇīyam karma*.

204. YS II.53 (p. 115): *dharanasu ca योग्याता मानसाह*. This *sutra* invites comparison with YS I.34, where it is said the mind is made steady through controlled expulsion and retention of the breath. See n. 157 above.

205. YS II.54 (p. 115): *svavisayasamprayoge cittasvarupnukara ivendriyanam pratyaharah*.

206. YS II.55 (p. 116): *tatah parama vasyatendriyanam*. "From that, the supreme obedience of the senses [arises]."

207. YB II.54 (pp. 115-116): *yatha madhukararajam maksika utpatantamanutpatanti nivasamanamanu nivisante tathendriyani cittanirrodhe niruddhanity esa pratyaharah*.

208. YS III.1 (p. 118): *desabandhas cittasya dharana*. "Concentration is the binding of the mind to a [single] place."

209. YB III.1 (p. 118).

210. It appears that *ekagrata* (YS III.11-12) is initiated in the practice of *dharana*, deepens in meditation (*dhyana*) and matures in the stages of cognitive *samadhi*. Thus, Vyasa refers to the fourth state of mind, which matures in *samprajñata*, as *ekagra*, "one-pointed." See also n. 52 in chapter 5.
211. YS III.2 (p. 119): *tatra pratyayaikatanata dhyanam*. "The unbroken continuity or extension of one idea with regard to that [object of concentration] is meditation." Feuerstein (1990: 96) translates "one-directional flow" for *eka-tanata*.
212. T. R. Kulkarni (1972), *Upanishads and Yoga*, p, 119.
213. Quoted by G. Feuerstein (1980: 84-85).
214. J. H. Clark (1983), *A Map of Mental States*, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) p. 29.
215. See n. 216 below.
216. YS III.3 (p. 119): *tad evarthamatranirbhasam svarupasunyah iva samadhih*.
217. YS III.11 (p. 123): *sarvarthataikagratayoh ksaodayau cittasva samadhiparinamah*. "When there is the dwindling of all objectivity, and the arising of one-pointedness, there takes place in the mind the transformation of *samadhi*." For more on *ekagrata*, refer to notes 51 and 52 in chapter 5.
218. Undistorted insight (*prajña*) initially occurs in the *nirvitarka* and *niricara* forms of cognitive *samadhi*. The processes leading to insight will be explained in chapter 5.
219. YS III.4 (p. 120): *trayamekatra samyamah*.
220. YS III.5 (p. 120): *tajjayat prajnalokah*. "From mastery of that [*samyama*], the light (illumination) of insight."
221. YS III.6 (p. 120): *tasya bhumisu viniyogah*. "Its application is by stages."
222. See YS I.41. An analysis of YS I.41 will be given in chapter 5.
223. See YS I.41 and YS I.42-44 where the stages of *samapatti* are outlined. An analysis of the stages of "unification" (*samapatti*) is given in chapter 5.
224. YS I.45. The yogin can merge with unmanifest *prakṛti* as in the case of the *prakṛti-layas* (YS I.19).
225. YS III.7 (p. 121): *trayamantarangam purvebhyah*. "[Distinct] from the prior [five] ones are the three inner limbs."
226. We can infer from YS III.7 that the first five limbs of the *astanga-yoga* are "external" aids compared to the last three.

227. YS III.8 (p. 122): *tad api bahirangam nirbjasya*. "Yet these are outer means in relation to the seedless [enstasy]." The notion of "seedless" will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6.

228. YS II.28; see n. 177 above.

229. G. Feuerstein (1979a: 80).

230. YB II.32 (p. 104): *tatra saucam mrjjaladijanitam medhyabhyavaharanadi ca bahyam. abhyantaram cittamalanamaksalanam*.

231. See n. 186 above on YS II.41 and purity of the *mind-sattva*.

232. See n. 190 above on YS II.45.

233. YB II.45 (p. 110): *isvararpitāsarvabhavasya samadhisiddhiryaya sarvamipsitamavitatham janati desantare dehantare kalantare ca. tato'sya prajña yathabhutam prajanatiti*.

234. YB I.23 (p. 25): *pranidhanad bhaktivisesadadvarjita isvarastamanugrhnatyabhidhyanamatreṇa. tad abhidhyanamatrad api yogina asannatamah samadhilabhah samadhiphalam ca bhavatiti*.

235. YB II.1 (p. 58): *isvarapranidhanam sarvakriyanam paramaguravarpanam tatphalasamnyaso va*.

236. See the last section of chapter 2.

237. YS I.23 (p. 25): *isvarapranidhanad va*. The *sutra* appears to present a choice between (1) the five methods (*upayas*) of YS I.20: faith, energy, mindfulness, cognitive *samadhi*, and insight, and (2) YS I.23: devotion to *isvara*.

238. See n. 2 above. Here I take issue with Feuerstein (1979a: 66), who deduces that all *vrttis* are "overcome" or restricted in *dhyana* (the stage of practice prior to *samadhi*), thereby refuting the assertions found in the major Sanskrit commentaries or subcommentaries that the *vrttis* are ultimately mastered only through *samadhi*. YS II.11 actually states that the mental processes arising from the *klesas* are overcome through *dhyana*. The *vrttis* caused by the *klesas* must be taken here to be of the *klista* or afflicted type and dominated by *rajas* and *tamas*. All *vrttis* including the sattvic or nonafflicted (*aklista*) type are mastered only in *samadhi*. It is the grosser tendencies and affects of the afflictions that are removed through meditation until having been made subtle they (the *klesas*) are dissolved in the process of *pratiprasava* (YS II.10), i.e., through *samadhi*. Vyasa (YB II.11) includes the practice of *prasamkhyana*, which refers to a high-level state in *samadhi* needed to bring about the final elimination of the misidentification with *vrtti* in its more subtle afflicted seed-form. Feuerstein rigidly separates *dhyana* from *samddhi*, which Vyasa does not. Feuerstein also wrongly holds (1980: 74) that *pratyayas*, since they exist in *samddhi*, are more subtle than *vrttis* (for more here see notes 82, and 84-85 in chapter 5). Feuerstein understands YS I.2 as "a preliminary definition of *Yoga*" (1980: 73) "intended to kick off the discussion" (1979a: 26), and that YS I.3 ("Then there is abiding in the seer's own



form") does not in fact follow from YS I.2; in other words, there is, according to Feuerstein, an "unexpected hiatus" (ibid.: 28) between these two *sutras*.

239. See YS II.15-17.

240. For more on the embodied implications of freedom in Patañjali's Yoga, see chapter 6.

241. See notes 197-204 above.

242. Feuerstein (1974: 72) rightly argues for a circular arrangement among the eight members where the center of the circle is the goal of Yoga: *kaivalya*. G. Koelman

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(1970: 162-163) takes up "Yoga Technique," discussing *kriya-yoga*, *yoganga*, and the levels of *samadhi* in terms of a typology of levels: (i) the somatic level (p. 162), which has as its goal the "pacification of the body"; (ii) the ethical level (p. 167), intended for the purification and stabilization of the mind; (iii) the psychological level (p. 182), for ensuring "the liberating disjunction of the Self from its conditioning prakrtic organism"; (iv) the metaphysical level (p. 247), which is identical with emancipation, the realization of *purusa*. Koelman's model is useful and in a way complements Patañjali's distinction between the "external members" (*bahir-anga*) and "internal members" (*antar-anga*) of the eight-limbed path. However, in his analysis it appears that the final stages become incompatible with the earlier ones resulting in a disengagement from or disintegration of human existence rather than an integration and engagement of the liberated identity of the yogin with empirical reality.

243. This is, unfortunately, what has often been done.

244. See Chapple and Kelly (1990: 15).

## Chapter 5.

### Cognitive *Samadhi*

1. See YS I.46. As can be easily inferred from YS III.8, *samprajñata* is, compared to the "seedless" (*nirbija*) *samadhi*, an outer limb of Yoga; see n. 227 in chapter 4.

2. Vyasa (YB I.1-2 and I.17) and the main commentators after him understand YS I.17 to refer to *samadhi* that is linked with objects or mental content; or, as Feuerstein puts it (1979a: 37), *samprajñata* is "object-oriented." YS I.18 is interpreted by Vyasa as providing information on another kind of *samadhi* that he calls *asamprajñata* and is devoid of all objective supports. See also the section on a preliminary look at the meaning and practice of *samadhi* in chapter 4 of our study.

3. The term *asamprajñata* does not appear in the YS. But the term *samprajñata* appears in YS I.17 with the term *anya* ("other") in the following *sutra* glossed by the major commentators as "*asamprajñata-samadhi*." Clearly, *asamprajñata-samadhi* is the best

candidate there.

4. As translated by Arya (1986: 248). The translation of *asamprajñata* as "acognitive" is, however, highly problematic as it can all too easily lead one to conclude that this *samadhi* is an unconscious or mindless state that makes one incapable of functioning effectively in the world.

5. Obviously both kinds of *samadhi* can be called ecstatic in that they occur outside of or expand beyond the ordinary sense or limits of self or ego. However, in Yoga, *purusa* alone is true identity; there is no second principle of authentic selfhood. In line with this fundamental philosophical premise I have designated the two kinds of *samadhi* as ecstasy and enstasy. Lumping together both kinds or categories of *samadhi* as "enstasis" (see Eliade, 1969: 79, 84) or "enstasy" (Feuerstein, 1979a: 37-38) blurs the important distinction made in Yoga between *samprajñata* and *asamprajñata*. More recently, Feuerstein (1989: 11) translates *samadhi* as "ecstasy," which he readily admits does not have exactly the same connotations as "enstasy." He is, however, more emphatic about the distinction in an even more recent work (1990: 106). See our discussion in chapter 4 on a preliminary look at the meaning and practice of *samadhi*.

6. Eliade (1969: 84).

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7. Monier-Williams (1899: 1152). *Sam* is sometimes prefixed to nouns in the sense of *sama* and can mean (ibid.): "same," "equal," "full," "complete," "whole," "entire."

8. Ibid., p. 652.

9. Ibid., p. 425; note also the abstract noun *prajña*, which means (ibid.: 659): "wisdom, intelligence, knowledge, discrimination."

10. Ibid., p. 1174.

11. YB I.16 (p. 20): *athopayadvayena niruddhacittavrtteh kathamucyate samprajñatah samadhir iti*.

12. YV I.17 (p. 104): *upayadvayenabhyasavairagyabhyam niruddharajasatamasavrtteh*.

13. As Vyasa makes clear in YB I.1. See also Vacaspati's (TV I.1) comments as well as n. 12 above and n. 238 in chapter 4.

14. YS I.17 (p. 20): *vitarkavicaranandasmitarupanugamat samprajñatah*.

15. YB I.17 (p. 21): *vitarkascittasya"lambane sthula abhogah. suksmo vicarah. anando hlahadah. ekatmika samvidasmita. tatra prathamah catustayanugatah samadhih savitarkah. dvitiyo vitarkavikalah savicarah. trtiyo vicaravikalah sanandah. caturthastadvikalo 'smitamatra . . . sarva ete salambanah samddhayah*.

16. G. Feuerstein (1980: 89). See the discussion in chapter 2 on *satkaravada* and refer to *SK* 9; cf. *SK* 22 on the causal succession of the categories of existence that appears to give an ontological emphasis to the Samkhyan system.
17. Both Vacaspati Misra (*TV* I.17) p. 21 and Vijñāna Bhikṣu (*YV* I.17) p. 105 often use the term *saksatkara* for yogic perception.
18. *TV* I.17 (p. 21): *yatha hi prathamiko dhanuskah sthulameva laksyam vidhyatyatha suksmamevam prathamiko yogi sthulameva pañcabhautikam caturbhujadi dhyeyam saksatkarotyatha suksmam iti. evam cittasya"lambane suksma abhogah sthulakaranabhutasuksmapañcatanmatralingalinga vitsayo vicarah.*
19. *YSS* (pp. 44-45): *ayam tutsarga eveti pragevoktam. yatho yadisvaraprasadat sadguruprasadat va adav eva suksmabhumikayam avasthiti योग्यता स्वचित्तस्य दृश्यते तदा ना स्तुलदी पुरवपुरवभूमिकया मुमुक्षुर्बहिः कालक्षेपः कर्तव्यः.*
20. See *YB* II.15 (p. 76): *aksipatrakalpo hi vidvan iti*; see also *YB* II.16 (p. 79).
21. *YS* II.4 (p. 59): *avidya ksetramuttaresam prasuptatanuvicchinnodaranam.*
22. *YB* IV.29 (p. 202): *samskarabija.*
23. See *YB* II.4 (p. 59).
24. *YB* II.4 (p. 60).
25. *Ibid.*: *ragakale krodhasyadarsanat.*
26. *Ibid.* (p. 61): *visaye yo labdhavrttih sa udarah.*
27. See note 152 in chapter 4.
28. *YB* II.4 (p. 61): *yadavidyaya vastvakaryate tadevanuserate klesa viparyasapratyayakla upalabhyante ksiyamanam cavidyamanu ksiyanta . . .*
29. *YB* II.26 (p. 97): *sattvapurusanyatapratyayo vivekakhyatih.*
30. See *YS* IV.27 (p. 201): *tacchidresu pratyayantarani samskarebhyah.*
31. *YB* IV.27 (p. 201): *pratyayantaranyasmiti va mameti va janamiti . . . ksiyamanabijebhyah purvasamskarebhya iti.*
32. *YS* IV.28 (p. 201): *hanamesam klesavad uktam.*
33. Cf. *YS* II.26.
34. *VB* IV.28 (p. 202): *yatha klesa dagdhabijabhava na prarohasanartha bhavanti tatha jñānagni na dagdhabijabhavah purvasamskaro na pratyayaprassur bhavati.*

35. The term "de-identification" does not imply here that the power or capacity of the mind to identify with the objects of experience has been taken away from the yogin or permanently discarded.

36. As YS I.21-22 make clear. See the section on "pedagogy" in chapter 1.

37. Here I have consulted Arya's (1986: 224-225) formulation of Patañjali's model. See chapter 2 (n. 129) of our study for a more detailed explanation of the ontological schematic outlined in YS II.19 and YB II.19.

38. G. Feuerstein (1979a: 14).

39. Ibid.

40. See, for example, *Katha Up* VI.7-8.

41. YS IV.3; see n. 172 in chapter 2.

42. See YS II.28 and YB II.28.

43. This refers to the *samapattis* of YS I.42-44.

44. YS III.4-5; see notes 219 and 220 in chapter 4.

45. YS I.47-50; see the discussion on *nirvicara-samadhi* later in this chapter.

46. The analogy of the "red-hot ball of iron" is given by Vijñāna Bhikṣu; see YV I.17 (p. 110): *taptayah pindavad ekibhavana sthulasaksatkare purusaparyantanam sarvesameva bhanat*. "In the direct perception of the gross object there is perception of everything up to *purusa* because of an identity, as in [the case of] a red-hot ball of iron."

47. YS I.15; see n. 109 in chapter 4.

48. Patañjali does state in YS IV.1 that the *siddhis* (supranormal powers) can be the result of birth, herbs, *mantra* recitation, asceticism, or *samadhi*. But nowhere in the YS does Patañjali claim that drugs can replace the self-discipline and commitment required for the attainment of *samadhi*. Furthermore, the *siddhis* are not the true goal of Yoga.

49. See C. G. Jung (1936), "Yoga and the West," in *Collected Works*, vol. 11, and (1973), *Letters*, vol. 1, pp. 262-263; see also C. G. Jung (1963), *The Integration of the Personality*, (London: Kegan Paul), p. 26, and (1978), *Psychology and the East*. For a critique of Jung's views, especially on his equating *samadhi* with the psychologist's "unconscious," see Swami Akhilananda (1947), *Hindu Psychology: Its Meaning for the West*, p. 167; see also H. Jacobs (1961), *Western Therapy and Hindu Sadhana: A Contribution to Comparative Studies on Psychology and Metaphysics*, p. 164. Paralleling Kant, Jung argued from the perspective of the epistemological limitations of human nature (i.e., one cannot know "the thing-in-itself") and the more theological claim within, for example, Christianity, that human nature is inescapably flawed. For a general discussion of Jung's views on Eastern thought and practice, see Coward (1985), *Jung and Eastern Thought*. While Jung's position is obviously prejudiced, he was right to warn against Westerners merely imitating the East

and carelessly or impulsively abandoning their historical roots; see, for example, Jung (1953), "Psychological Commentary on the *Tibetan Book of the Dead*," in *Collected Works*, vol. 11, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969).

50. See n. 217, chapter 4 on YS III.11; Vyasa writes (YB III.11: 123): *sarvarthata cittadharmah. ekagrata'pi cittadharmah*. J. H. Woods translates the compound *sarvaarthata* as "dispersiveness."

51. YS III.12 (p. 124): *tatah punah santoditau tulyapratyayau cittasyaikagrataparinamah*.

52. YB III.12 (p. 124): *samadhicittamubhayoranugatam . . . sa khalvayam dharminas cittasyaikagrataparinamah*. The transformation (*parinama*) termed

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"*samadhi*" (YS III.11) may be used by Patañjali to include the early stages of cognitive *samddhi* when the state of one-pointedness initially arises in the mind. Through continued practice, cognitive *samadhi* is more matured, and the mind attains to prolonged periods of one-pointedness, as YS III.12 seems to imply.

53. As can be inferred from Patañjali's analysis in YS I.41. See n. 65 below.

54. Ian Kesarcodi-Watson (1982), "Samadhi in Patañjali's Yoga-Sutras," *PEW* 32.1: 79-80.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

56. Janáček (1951) quoted by Pensa (1969: 200). Elsewhere Pensa (1973: 39) emphasizes that the powers cannot be "separated from the essentially organic and unitary structure of *Yoga*."

57. Feuerstein (1979a: 104).

58. YS III.36 (p. 156): *tatah pratibhasravanavedanadarsasvadavarta jayante*.

59. YS III.37 (p. 156): *te samadhavupasarga vyutthane siddhayah*. Cf. *Mahabharata* XII.232.22 and XII.266.7, which advise that these "intuitive illuminations" arising from one's spiritual practice should be ignored or conquered.

60. See Chapple and Kelly (1990: 95).

61. Cf. *BG* III.42, where the senses are described as being great, the mind as being above the senses, the intellect as being superior to the mind, and even greater than the intellect is said to be the Self.

62. YB III.45 (p. 165): *na ca sakto'pi padarthaviparyasam karoti*. The ethical implications of Vyasa's statement should not go unnoticed and suggest that those who abuse power while claiming to be yogins are not true yogins.

63. YB III.55 (p. 175): *tada purusasyopacaritabhogabhavah suddhih. etasyamavasthayam*

*kaivalyam bhavatisvarasyanisvarasya va. . . nahi dagdhaklesabijasya jñane punarapeksa kacidasti.*

64. The practice referred to here is the meditative practice on one principle (*ekatattvabhyasa*, YS I.32), dealt with in YS I.32-39, and meant for stabilizing the mind and preventing the obstacles or distractions (YS I.30-31) from arising. Vyasa includes *vairagya* here (YB I.31) even though it is not mentioned in YS I.32 itself. It appears that from the point of their introduction in YS I.12 and onward both *abhyasa* and *vairagya* can be seen to include the necessary expedients and preconditions for all yogic attainments and insights.

65. YS I.41 (p. 43): *ksinavrtter abhijatasyeva maner grahitgrahanagrahyesu tatsthatadañjanata samapattih.*

66. Woods (1914); Rukmani (1981: 206).

67. Aranya (1963: 99).

68. Bangali Baba (1976: 21).

69. R. Prasada (1912: 64).

70. Sri Purohit Swami (1973).

71. Dvivedi (1934).

72. Taimni (1961).

73. Hauer (1958: 243).

74. Feuerstein (1979a: 51).

75. Koelman (1970: 197).

76. Leggett (1990: 152).

77. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 52).

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78. Monier-Williams (1899: 1161).

79. YB I.41 (p. 43): *abhijatasyeva maner iti drstantopadanam. tatha sphatika upasrayabhedattattadrupoparakta upasrayarupakarena nirbhasate tatha grahyalambanoparakta cittam grahyasamapannam grahyasvarupakarena nirbhasate.*

80. YS III.14; see notes 105 and 106 in chapter 2.

81. YS III.13; see n. 103 in chapter 2.

82. YB I.41 (p. 43): *ksinavrtter iti pratyastamitapratyayasyetarhah.*



83. YV I.41 (p. 208): *ksinavrtter apagatavrttyantarasya cittasyetyarthah*.

84. TV I.41 (p. 43): *abhyasavairagyabhyam ksinarajasatamasapramanadivrtte cittasya . . . tadanena cittasattvasya svabhavasvacchasya rajastamobhyamanabhibhava uktah*. "[From which the modifications have subsided] describes the mind as existing in the state in which that class of modifications (*pramana*, valid cognition) that are of a rajasic or a tamasic nature have subsided as a result of practice and dispassion. In this manner it is stated that the *sattva* of the mind, which is by nature pure, is not overpowered by *rajas* (disturbing activity) and *tamas* (inertia, dullness)."

85. This explanation for the relationship between *vrtti* and *pratyaya* contrasts with Feuerstein's hierarchical summarization of the process of *nirodha* in that Feuerstein (1979a: 28) sees "*pratyaya-nirodha*" ("restriction of the presented-ideas") as a level of "restriction" that takes place after "*vrtti-nirodha*" ("restriction of the fluctuations").

86. See n. 82 above; see also YV I.41 (p. 209): *pratyayasya pratyayantarasetyarthah, samapatter api pratyayatvat*.

87. YB I.41 (p. 43): *bhutasuksmoparaktam bhutasuksmasamapannam bhutasuksmasvarupabhasam bhavati. tatha sthulalambanoparaktam sthularupasamapannam sthularupabhasam bhavati. tatha visvabhedoparaktam visvabhedasamapannam visvarupabhasam bhavati*.

88. See YV I.41 (p. 210); cf. YS I.40 (p. 42): *paramanuparamamahattvanto'sya vasikarah*. "The yogin's mastery [extends] from the most minute to the greatest."

89. Vacaspati Misra also holds this opinion; see TV I.41 (p. 43).

90. YB I.41 (p. 43): *tatha grahanesvapindriyesvapi drastavam. grahanalambanoparaktam grahanasamapannam grahanasvarupakarena nirbhasate*.

91. As Vijñāna Bhikṣu notes in YV I.41 (p. 210): *indriyanam suksmam buddhyahamkarav iti bhasyakaro vaksyati*.

92. YB I.41 (pp. 43-44): *tatha grahitṛpurusalambanoparaktam grahitṛpurusasamapannam grahitṛpurusasvarupakarena nirbhasate tatha muktapurusalambanoparaktam muktapurusasamapannam muktapurusasvarupakarena nirbhasata iti*.

93. YV I.41 (p. 211): *grahitṛtvam buddher api vyapadisyata iti tadvyavarttanaya purusapadam*.

94. See n. 129 in chapter 2 on YB II.19 and Aranya (1963: 102, 197).

95. Vacaspati's reflection theory, however, tends to shift the locus of knowledge to the *buddhi* or intellect.

96. See Arya (1986: 376-377).

97. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 52) give a translation of YS I.41 that is at variance with Vyasa's interpretation, translating YS I.41 as follows: "[The accomplished mind] of

diminished fluctuations, like a precious (or clear) jewel assuming the color of any near object, has unity among grasper, grasping, and grasped." Stating that Vyasa posits three types of "unity" (*samapatti*), they argue (ibid.) for only "one form of unity where . . . all three aspects of grasping, etc., collapse, regardless of what is grasped, gross or

subtle." YS I.41 can be interpreted as positing one unity among grasper, grasping, and grasped, but this can be the case only after sufficient purification of the mind has taken place. As a study of *vitarka* and *vicara* (which follows this section) makes clear, the earlier stages of *samapatti* (in the "sa" forms) do not entail the necessary purity of mind to enable a full-fledged unity of the three components of the above triad to take place. Much of what goes on at the lower-level *samapattis* is a removal of misidentification (ignorance) so that unification among the grasper, grasping, and the grasped can arise. Vyasa understands *samapatti* as a multileveled practice that progressively purifies and illuminates consciousness, thereby allowing insight and pure "seeing" to arise. In fact, the stages of *samapatti* are considered by Patañjali to fall under the category of *samadhi* with seed (*sabija*, YS I.46), the potential still remaining for the "seeds" of ignorance to "sprout." When sufficient purification of consciousness in relation to the grasped, grasping, and grasper has transpired, only then can there be an authentic unification among grasper, grasping, and grasped. *Samapatti* does not *begin* with this unification. Vyasa is pointing out where ignorance can arise in forms of cognitive *samadhi* and how that ignorance can be eradicated. His emphasis here is pedagogical as well as epistemological. *Samapatti* involves a process of the increasing sattvification of consciousness where the yogin's attention is led from the grosser to the most subtle aspects of the "seeable" (including the ego and intellect) through which insight (*prajña*) dawns and the discriminative discernment between *sattva* and *purusa* comes about. Vyasa's perspective, however, can be seen to incorporate the above view held by Chapple and Kelly: When sufficient purification and illumination of consciousness have taken place, on whatever level, be it that of the grasped, grasping, or grasper, there is a unification of all three implying no epistemological distortion. But the stages of purification in *samadhi* are important and must not be overlooked in Yoga. For a critique of Vyasa's reading of YS I.41 (and other passages of the YS) see C. Chapple (1994), "Reading Patañjali Without Vyasa: A Critique of Four *Yoga Sutra* Passages." *JAAR* 62.1: 85-105.

98. See n. 18 above.

99. Here I will elaborate upon what Vijñāna Bhikṣu has said (see n. 19 above). The question arises as to whether the methodical and analytical approach of YS I.17 is essential in order to prepare the yogin for *asamprajñata-samadhi*. Patañjali allows for dedication to *isvara*, a devotional practice that can result in purification and, according to the commentators, "favor" from *isvara*. On the topic of "godhead," the commentators have for the most part expressed their own religious perspectives and have attempted to find a place for it within the scheme of Patañjali and Vyasa. The realization of the various aspects or descent (*avatara*) of the deity may be categorized in two ways: In one approach the yogin is engaged in meditational practice and *samadhi* to such a degree that the purified

consciousness may ascend and project itself to the subtle worlds that are the domains of particular aspects of the deities. In the other, the deity is so pleased by the devotee's *japa* (repetition of the name *Om* [*pranava*] or simply mental concentration on a *mantra*) and meditation/contemplation (as in YS I.27-28) that it projects an appearance of itself in order to bestow the grace of its descent and presence to the devotee. As an experiential fact in Yoga the two, however, cannot be separated. The ascent of the yogin's consciousness through self-effort and the descent of "divine grace" both are aids in the cultivation of *samadhi*. If a yogin's practice (*sadhana*) or "cultivation" (*bhavana*) is focused on a particular deity, it is required that the yogin

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take this same supportive factor (*alambana*) through all the four stages of *samprajñata* in the order in which they occur (see YV I.17: 105). The order in which the four stages are practiced and mastered is important. However, according to Vijñāna Bhikṣu, Patañjali seems to imply that if the yogin's awareness spontaneously ascends to a "higher ground" through dedication to *isvara*, then it need not be necessary to climb methodically and laboriously over the lower steps (see n. 19 above). Thus, the "favor" obtained through devotion to *isvara* may be understood as an efficacious expedient and "shortcut" that can bypass the more formal method as presented in YS I.17. Although the possibility of such an instantaneous realization of a higher state is conceded to by Vyasa (YB I.23), for the purposes of this study it is assumed that an ongoing method is normally requisite for attaining mental purification and insight in order that the yogin may become fit for the realization of *purusa*. In the tradition of Patañjali, all objects of *samadhi* are either parts or composites of *grahya*, *grahana*, or *grahitr*. For example, a candle flame for concentration is part of the fire element. An icon may be considered a composite product of all five gross elements. The so-called "theism" of Yoga encouraged the later commentators such as Vijñāna Bhikṣu to state more clearly that the mental image of *virat*, the universal form of *isvara*, or the figure of a deity or descent (*avatara*) is often used as the object of concentration. Although at first glance these mental images may not appear to be included in the scheme of Patañjali, the theology of the Purana texts explains that *isvara* may take forms that appear material-like to the devotees, even though the spiritual power and energy utilized for such appearances is actually "nonmaterial," i.e., more subtle. As seen from the point of view of the devotee seeking experiences leading to illuminations in *samprajñata-samadhi*, the form of such a "divine manifestation" is a visible one subject to experiences involving the senses; therefore, concentration on such an image is concentration on the *visesas*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu (YV I.17: 110), citing the *Garuda-Purana* (I.229.25) as one of the authoritative traditional texts that regards the general order of the *samadhis*, tells us that in the early stages of Yoga one should concentrate on Lord Viṣṇu "with form." Then, once the mind has mastered the gross form of the object, it should slowly be turned toward the subtle. One of the main tasks of the spiritual preceptor or *guru* is to guide the disciple (*sisya*) in selecting an appropriate object of meditation—the one that will be most helpful to that particular disciple. One not attracted to such mental images of a deity may begin one's concentration on other parts or composites of the *visesas* by adopting a form of meditation as desired (YS I.39). For more on the status and role of *isvara* in the YS see our discussion in chapter 2.

100. J. H. Woods (1914).  
101. Vivekananda (1966); Taimni (1961).  
102. Bangali Baba (1976: 9).  
103. Hauer (1958: 24).  
104. R. Prasada (1912: 31).  
105. Sri Purohit Swami (1973).  
106. Feuerstein (1979a: 37); Koelman (1970: 198).  
107. Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 52).  
108. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 40).  
109. Aranya (1963: 48).  
110. R. Sarma (1967).  
111. TV I.17 (p. 21): *svarupasaksatkaravati prajña"bhogah*.

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112. See, for example, YV I.17 (p. 106): *visesena tarkanamavadharanam . . .*; see also n. 115 below.  
113. See n. 15 above and related text.  
114. See Monier-Williams (1899: 145).  
115. YV I.17 (p. 106): *sthulayorbhutendriyayoradrstasrutamatasesavisesasaksatkarah sa vitarka ityarthah*.  
116. See n. 112 above.  
117. YS I.42 (p. 44): *tatra sabdhrthajñānavikalpāih samkirna savitarka samapattih*.  
118. YB I.42 (pp. 44-45): *tadyatha gauriti sabdo gaurityartha gauriti jñānamityavibhagena vibhaktdnamapi grahanam drstam. vibhajyamanas canye sabdadharma anye'rthadharma anye vijñānadharma ityetesam vibhaktah panthah*.  
119. TV I.42 (p. 44): *tadevamavinirbhagena vibhaktanamapi sabdarthajñānananam grahanam loke drstam drastavyam*.  
120. YB I.42 (p. 45): *tatra samapannasya yogino yo gavadyarthah samadhiprajñayam samarudhah sa cecchabdarthajñānavikalpanuviddha upavartate sa samkirna samapattih savitarketyucyate*.

121. See *RM* I.42 (p. 14). See also *YS* II.17, which points out the confusion arising from the overlapping or superimposition of words, objects, and ideas on one another; from *samyama* ("constraint") on the distinctions of them, there is knowledge of the sound (i.e., utterance) of all beings.
122. See *YV* I.42 (pp. 212-215).
123. Koelman (1970: 199).
124. Feuerstein (1979a: 53).
125. As suggested by Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 160).
126. Vyasa (*YB* I.42: 45) refers to *nirvitarka* as "*param pratyaksam*" the higher perception of the yogin.
127. *YS* I.43 (p. 46): *smrtiparisuddhau svarupasunyevarthamatranirbhasa nirvitarka*. See *YS* III.3 cited in n. 216 of chapter 4.
128. *YB* I.42 (p. 45): *yada punah sabdasamketasmrtiparisuddhau srutanumanajñanavikalpasunyayam samadhiprajñayam svarupamatrenavast-hito'rtha . . .*
129. Vacaspati (*TV* I.42: 45) uses the word *tyakta*, "abandoned." Vijñana Bhikṣu, however, uses the expression (*YV* I.43: 218): *samketasmrtistya jyate*, meaning "gives up the memory of convention."
130. In *RM* I.43 (p. 14) Bhoja uses the term *pravilaya*.
131. *YB* I.42 (p. 45): *tatsvarupakaramatratayaivavacchidyate. sa ca nirvitarka samapattih. tat param pratyaksam. tacca srutanumanayorbijam. tatah srutanumane prabhavatah. na ca srutanumanajñanasahabhutam. taddarsanam. tasmad asamkirnam pramanantarena yogino nirvitarkasamadhijam darsanam.*
132. Koelman (1970: 210).
133. See *TV* I.42 (p. 45).
134. Ibid.
135. See *YV* I.43 (p. 219); see also Vyasa's commentary on *YS* I.49 in n. 327 of chapter 3.
136. *YB* I.43. In fact, Patañjali declares that all the forms of *prakṛti*, whether manifest or not, whether present or latent, have the three *gunas* for their essence. He states in *YS* IV.13 (p. 187): *te vyaktasukṣma gunatmanah*. "These [forms], manifest and subtle, are of the nature of the *gunas*." *YS* IV.14 (p. 188, see n. 53 in chapter 3) goes

'thatness' of an object." Vyasa (YB I.43 and IV.13-16) refutes views (see below) held by certain opponents and reasserts the Samkhyan view (i.e., *satkaryavada*) that seeks to retain an ontological continuity between an effect and its material cause. The Nyaya-Vaisesika schools adhere to *arambhavada* (the doctrine of a "new beginning"), which is based on the perspective that qualities begin afresh in the effects that are produced when atoms of various elements combine, and that their prior absence in the anterior (the cause) is evident; that is, that it is known that those qualities were not there previous to their appearances in newly created objects. While both the above doctrines agree that the effect is new formally, in the later it is regarded as also new *qua* being. See Potter, ed. (1977), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, 2: 58-59. The Buddhists of the Sautrantika and Vaibhasika schools hold that an object (e.g., a jar) is simply a combination of uncountable numbers of atoms, not their transmuted product, and that there are not cause and effect relationships between the atoms and the jar. This is known as the "aggregation doctrine" (*sanghata-vada*). Vyasa sees Patañjali as taking a stand against the Buddhist Yogacara school, which has been viewed by some as a form of pure idealism in that it is argued that this school, sometimes referred to as Vijñānavada, holds that all perceived objects exist merely as ideas within a universal mind (*alayavijñāna*), thereby negating the reality of the manifest objective world. YS IV.14 and 16 can be interpreted as a tacit refutation of the above idealism. For more here see notes 54-56 and related text in chapter 3.

137. As suggested by Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 164).

138. See n. 15 above for the text of YB I.17.

139. See Woods (1914), Taimni (1961), Koelman (1970: 202), Feuerstein (1979a: 37), Chapple and Kelly (1990: 40).

140. See Vivekananda (1966).

141. See Bangali Baba (1976: 9).

142. See Hauer (1958: 241).

143. See S. Purohit Swami (1973).

144. See R. Prasada (1912: 32).

145. See Tola and Dragonetti (1987: 51).

146. See Monier-Williams (1899: 389).

147. See n. 15 above for the text of YB I.17.

148. Aranya (1963: 49) writes: "As the fundamental principles and subtle yogic ideals are realized through such thinking, the concentration on subtle objects is called *vicarnugata samadhi*."

149. YS I.44 (p. 48): *etayaiva savicara nirvicara ca suksmavisaya vyakhyata*.

150. YB I.44 (pp. 48-49): *tatra bhutasuksmavabhivyaktadharmakesu desakalanimittanubhavavacchinnesu ya samapattih sa savicaretyucyate*.



151. For an examination of the concept of time in Indian systems of thought, see A. N. Balshev (1983), *A Study of Time in Indian Philosophy*

152. TV I.44 (p. 48): *nimittam parthivasya paramanorgandhatanmatrapradhanebhyah pancatanmatrebhya utpattih*, i.e., causefor instance, the atom of earth is produced by the five subtle elements among which the subtle element of smell is predominant. Even though the word *nimitta* normally refers to an efficient cause, here it can be understood to be taken in the broader sense of any causative factor including the process of the subtle elements producing respective effects.

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153. YB I.44 (p. 49): *tatrapyekabuddhinirgrahyamevomitadadharmavisistam bhutasuksmamalambanibhutam samadhiprajñayamupatisthate*.

154. Ibid.: *ya punah sarvatha sarvatah santoditavyapadesyadharmanavacchinnesu sarvadharmamupatistu sarvadharmatmakesu samapattih sa nirvicaretyucyate*.

155. See n. 153 above.

156. YB I.44 (p. 49): *evam svarupam hi tadbhutasuksmametenaiva svarupena"lambanibhutameva samadhiprajñasvarupamuparañjayati. prajña ca svarupasunyevarthamatra yada bhavati tada nirvicaretyucyate*.

157. TV I.44 (p. 49): *atra samketasmrtyagamanumanavikalpanuvedhah sucitah*.

158. YV I.44 (p. 233): *purvabhūmikayam tyaktavikalpasyottarabhūmikayamasambhavad*

159. YB I.44 (p. 49): *evamubhayoretayaiva nirvitarkaya vikalpahanirvyakhyateti*.

160. YB III.50: see n. 93 in chapter 3; see also notes 30-34 of this chapter.

161. Cf. the Mahayana Madhyamaka Buddhist doctrine of "emptiness" (*sunyata*), which disallows essentiality to both subject and object.

162. See Feuerstein (1980: 89).

163. YS I.47 (p. 51): *nirvicaravaisaradye'dhyatmaprasadah*.

164. YS I.48 (p. 51): *rtambhara tatra prajña*.

165. YB I.48 (p. 51): *na ca tatra viparyasajñānagandho'pyastiti*.

166. See YSS (p. 2), where Bhikṣu asserts that *nirrodha* not only involves the *vṛttis* of YS I.6 but also includes *vṛttis* which have to do with desire or will (*iccha*); cessation (*nirrodha*) implies both a moral and affective as well as a cognitive purification.

167. YB I.47 (p. 51): *asuddhyavarānamalapetasya prakasatmano buddhisattvasya rajastambhyamanabhibhūtah svacchah sthiti pravaho vaisaradyam. yada nirvicarasya*

*samadhervaisaradyamidam jayate tada yogino bhavatyadhyatmaprasado bhutrthavisayah kramannanurodhi sphutah prajñalokah.*

168. See Monier-Williams (1899: 223).

169. See n. 175 in chapter 4.

170. YV I.1 (p. 26): *savitarkadikramenaiva saksatkaravrdhaya caramabhumikayamrtambharaprajñodayena bhumikacatustaya eva saksatkarasambandhad iti.*

171. Swami Nikhilananda (1951: 95).

172. YS I.45 (p. 50): *suksmavisayatvam calingaparyavasanam.*

173. YB I.45 (p. 50): *parthivasyanorgandhatanmatram suksmo visayah . . . tesamahamkarah. asyapi lingamatram suksmo visayah. lingamatrasyapyalingam suksmo visayah. na calingatparam suksmamasti.* "In the case of an atom of earth, the subtle element of odor is a subtler object [for the vicara meditation] . . . Subtler than these [subtle elements] is the ego-sense (*ahamkara*). Subtler than that is the designator (the great principle *linga-matra* or *mahat*). More subtle than that is the unmanifest (*alinga, pradhana*). There is nothing more subtle [i.e., prakrtic] beyond the unmanifest."

174. See YS I.19 (p. 22): *bhavapratyayo videhaprakrtilayanam*; see n. 117 on YB I.15 in chapter 4 and the discussion later in this chapter on the status of the *prakrtilayas*, especially the text referring to notes 216-220.

175. See n. 172 above.

176. YB I.45 (p. 50): *nanvasti purusah suksma iti. satyam. yatha lingatparamalingasya sauksmyam na caivam purusasya. kim tu, lingasyanvayikaranam puruso na bhavati, hetus tu bhavatiti. atah pradhane sauksmyam niratisayam vyakhyatam.*

177. See Arya (1986: 408).

178. *anando hladah*; see n. 15 above on YB I.17 and related text.

179. Koelman (1970: 207).

180. Cf. SK 25.

181. See n. 15 above for Vyasa's text.

182. YV I.17 (p. 107): *tadnim canandagocara evaha sukhiti cittavrttirbhavati na suksmavastusvapiti vicaranugatad visesah.* "At that time there is only *ananda* as the object; the modification of the mind of the form 'I am happy' is there; and there is no modification with regard to even subtle objects. Thus it is different from the Yoga connected with

*vicara.*"

183. See *YB* I.19 (p. 22) where Vyasa seems to imply that at this level of *samadhi* the *videha* has attained a degree of mastery of the "subtle worlds" made up of the six *avisesas*.

184. *TV* I.17 (p. 21): *prakasasllataya khala sattvapradhanadahamkaradindriyanyutpannani. sattvam sukhamiti tanyapi sukhaniti tasminnabhogo hlada iti.*

185. *YV* I.17 (pp. 108-109). Feuerstein (1989: 196) appears to follow Vacaspati Misra's interpretation of *ananda*- and *asmita*-*samadhi* by dividing these stages of *samadhi* into two categories, namely: *sananda-samapatti* ("ecstatic coincidence with bliss") and *nirananda-samapatti* ("ecstatic coincidence beyond bliss") as well as *sasmitasamapatti* ("ecstatic coincidence with 'I-am-ness'") and *nirasmita-samapatti* ("ecstatic coincidence beyond 'I-am-ness'").

186. *TV* I.17 (p. 21): *asmitaprabhavanindriyani. tenaisamasmita suksmam rupam. sa ca"tmana grahitra saha buddhirekatmika samvit.* See main text referring to n. 193 below.

187. See *YV* I.17 (p. 107).

188. *YV* I.17 (p. 106): *prakrtimahadahamkarapañcatanmatrarpa bhutendriyayoh suksma . . sa vicara.*

189. Aranya writes (1963: 49): "The object or basis of this concentration [on bliss] is a particular feeling of [sattvic] happiness felt all over the mind and the senses due to a particular state of calmness."

190. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

191. *RM* I.17 (p. 6): *yada tu rajastamolesanuviddhamantahkaranasattvam bhavyate tada gunabhavaccitisakteh sukhaprakaamayasya sattvasya bhavyamanasyodrekat sanandah samadhir bhavati.*

192. *Ibid.*: *na cahamkarasmitayor abhedah sankaniyah. yato yatrantahkaranamahamityullekhena visayanvedayate so'hamkarah. yatrantar mukhataya pratilomapariname prakrtiline cetasi sattamatramavabhati sa'smita.*

193. See n. 186 above for text.

194. *YB* I.17 (p. 21): *ekatmika samvidasmita.*

195. See the section on *samyoga* in chapter 3 of our study and also *YS* II.17 cited in n. 199 of chapter 2.

196. See n. 191 above.

197. *YB* I.36 (p. 41): *tatha'smitayam samapannam cittam nistarañgamahodadhikalpam santamanantam . . .*

198. *Ibid.*: *yatredamuktam"tamanumatramatmanamanuvidyasmityevam tavatsamprajanite" iti.*

199. See, for example, *Katha Up* II.8; *Mait Up* VI.20, 38 and VII.7; *Mundaka Up* II.2.2 and III.1.9; see also *BG* VIII.9.

200. See, for example, *BA Up* IV.4.20 and 22; *Katha Up* II.22.

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201. See, for example, *Katha Up* II.20 and *Svet Up* III.9.

202. See our discussion in chapter 2 on *YB* II.19 (cited in n. 129).

203. On this see Aranya (1963: 365), who states: "When the powers of omnipotence and omniscience are acquired the yogin becomes like Almighty Isvara. That is the highest state of the Intellect. Purusa with such adjuncts, i.e., such adjuncts and their seer combined, is called Mahan Atma or the Great Self. The adjuncts by themselves are also called Mahat-tattva."

204. See notes 164, 165, and 170 above.

205. See Monier-Williams (1899: 856). From another perspective, one can say that by *adding* or including the consciousness of *purusa* or authentic identity in Yoga, one's life becomes complete, full, whole.

206. See reference to *YB* II.18 in n. 215 of chapter 2.

207. *YS* I.47; see n. 163 above.

208. *YB* I.41; see n. 92 above.

209. *TV* I.41 (pp. 43-44): *asmitaspadam hi grahita purusa iti bhavah*.

210. Koelman (1970: 215).

211. See n. 15 above.

212. *YV* I.17 (p. 109): *eka evatma'syam visayatvenastityekatmika*. [*tatha cuktam*-] *ekalambane ya cittasya kevalapurusakara samvit saksatkaro'smityetavanmatrakaratvadasmitetyarthah*. Bhiksu later qualifies *asmita* as being of two kinds: pertaining to *jivatman* (qualified being) or pertaining to *param-atman* (unqualified being).

213. See, for example, *YS* III.35 (p. 154): *pararthatvat svarthasamyamat purusajnanam*; refer to n. 333 in chapter 3.

214. Cf. n. 197 above.

215. *YS* II.26.

216. *YB* I.19 (p. 23): *tatha prakrtilayah sadhikare cetasi prakrtiline*

*kaivalyapadamivanubhavanti.*

217. See the discussion on *viparyaya* in chapter 3.

218. YB II.19 (p. 86): *alingavasthayam na purusartho heturnalingavasthayamadau purusarthata karanam bhavatiti. na tasyah purusarthata karanam bhavatiti. nasau purusartha krteti . . .*

219. YS I.21-22. Chapple and Kelly (1990: 41-42) argue that the *prakṛti-layas* are to be deemed "mild" (*mrdu*) or weak in their practice compared to the "moderate" (*madhya*) intensity or type of practice as outlined in YS I.20 and the "ardent" (*adhimatratva*, YS I.22) or "strongly intense" type of yogin (*tivra-samvega*, YS I.21).

220. YS I.19 (p. 22): *bhavapratyayo videhaprakṛtilayanam*. "Of the ones who are absorbed in *prakṛti* and of those who are bodiless, [there is] an idea/intention of becoming." See also n. 117 and text in chapter 4 of this study which mentions the "bodiless" (*videha*) yogins along with the *prakṛti-layas*.

221. Feuerstein (1979a: 38).

222. In doing so I have responded to Feuerstein's query on this matter. He writes (1980: 90): "It is unclear how he [Vyasa] envisages the correlation between these postulated types [of ecstasy in YS I.17] and the four varieties of *samapatti* as cited in YS I.42-44. Does he [Vyasa] take *ananda* and *asmita-samadhi* to be instances of *nirvicara-samapatti*?"

223. TV I.46 (pp. 50-51): *tena grahye catasrah samapattayo grahitgrahanayoscatasra ityastau siddha bhavantiti*. Feuerstein (1989: 196; see n. 185 above) appears to endorse Vacaspati Misra's reading of eight stages.

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224. YV I.17 (p. 107): *yascittasya vicaranugatabhumyaroḥatsattvaparakarsena jayamane hṛdakhyasukhavisesa abhogah saksatkaro bhavati sa anandavisayatvadananda ityarthah*; see also n. 182 above.

225. YV I.17 (pp. 108-109).

226. YV I.17 (p. 109): *asya asmitaya api sasmitanirasmitarupo vibhago nasti*.

227. See Koelman (1970: 198ff).

228. Ibid., p. 223.

229. Feuerstein (1980: 91).

230. YS I.46 (p. 50).

231. YB I.46 (p. 50): *tascatasrah samapattayo bahirvastubija iti samadhirapi sabijah*.

232. *RM* I.46 (p. 15): *ta evoktalaksanah samapattayah saha bijena"lambanena vartata iti sabijah samprajnatah samadhirityucyate, sarvasam salambanatvat.*

233. This is also the interpretation of Ballantyne, Taimni, and Aranya, although they do not affirm, as explicitly as Bhoja Raja does, the equivalence: *bija* = *alambana*.

234. Cf. Dvivedi, Vivekananda, and those explicitly mentioned below.

235. Hauer (1958: 243, 466 n. 11).

236. *MP* I.46 (p. 23): *bandhabija*.

237. *YV* I.46 (p. 240): *bahirvastunyanatmadharmah. samskaradharmadayo duhkhabijani jayante abhya iti bahirvastubijah.*

238. *YSS* (p. 26): *dhyeyarupalambanayogat tadapi vrttibijasamskarotpattes ceti.*

239. Parts of Vyasa's remaining commentary appear to support Vijnana Bhiksu's understanding of the term *bija*; see, for example, *YB* III.50 and IV.28.

240. This has been discussed in some detail in chapter 3 (refer, for example, to n. 274) and chapter 4.

241. *YB* I.46 (p. 50): *tascatasrah samapattayo bahirvastubija iti samadhirapi sabijah. tatra sthule'rthe savitarka nirvitarkah, suksme'rthe savicaro nirvicara iti caturdhopasamkhyatah samadhir iti.*

242. See Arya (1986: 409). Though it appears that the *samapattis* are referred to as "*samadhi*," Vijnana Bhiksu (*YV* I.46) makes it clear that *samapatti* and *samadhi* are not to be confused as synonyms. While *samapatti* only occurs at the time (at least provisionally during the process of purification) in which *samprajnata-samadhi* takes place, it can be understood as the effect or the quality of the mind during *samprajnatasamadhi*. As such, *samadhi* is the cessation of distraction and misidentification, a one-pointedness of mind, whereas *samapatti* refers to the unification or identity of the mind with the object of contemplation resulting from this one-pointedness. In other words, *samapatti* is both contained in, and arises from *samadhi*. The two represent and are experienced as a continuum of awareness and identity.

243. The term *nirbija* is used in *YS* I.51 and III.8.

## Chapter 6.

### The "Aloneness" of the Knower

1. *YB* II.28 (p. 99): *tesamanusthanatpancaparvano viparyayasuddhirupasya ksayo nasah.* See discussion on the *klesas* in chapter 3.

2. *YS* II.28.

3. *YB* I.12-13.



4. *YB* I.5; see n. 85 in chapter 3 and the discussion in the main text on *klista-* and *aklista-vrtti*.
5. See *YS* II.41, where the expression *sattvasuddhi* is used.
6. *YS* III.50 and IV.34.
7. C. Pensa (1969: 207).
8. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
9. As Vijñāna Bhikṣu maintains, the *sastras* mention many expiations (*prayascittas*) for the eradication of demerit or evil (*papa*) that has begun to fructify; see *YV* I.1 and I.50 on pp. 29 and 256 respectively.
10. See, for example, *Chand Up* III.16.1.
11. On this see *YB* IV.10 (pp. 184-185) where Vyasa points to various internal means in Yoga (such as meditations on friendliness, faith, and so on, culminating in knowledge and detachment) as being independent of and superior to external means (such as various performed deeds leading to praise or salutations, and so on). The "mental" means adopted in Yoga are said to be productive of the highest *dharma*. See also the *BG* (IV.33), which declares the superiority of the "knowledge-sacrifice" over sacrifice of material things.
12. *YS* i.48; see n. 164 in chapter 5.
13. *YS* I.47; see n. 163 in chapter 5.
14. *YV* I.48 (p. 245): *tasminsamahitacittasyeti purvoktasabijayoga . . .*
15. This is also implied in the practice of *samyama* ("constraint"), involving concentration, meditation, and *samadhi* (*YS* III.4).
16. *YS* III.49; see n. 125 in chapter 3.
17. *YS* I.50 (p. 53): *tajjah samskaro'nyasamskarapratibandhi*.
18. *YB* I.50 (pp. 53-54): *samddhiprajñāpratilambhe yoginah prajñakrtah samskaro navo navo jayate . . . samadhiprajñāprabhavah samskaro vyutthanasamskarasayam badhate. vyutthanasamskarabhibhavattatprabhavah pratyaya na bhavanti. pratyayanirodhe samadhirupatisthate. tatah samadhija prajña, tatah prajñakrtah samskara iti navo navah samskarasayo jayate. tatasca prajña, tatasca samskara iti. kathamasau samskaratisayascittam sadhikaram na karisyatiti. na te prajñakrtah samskarah klesaksayahetutvaccittamadhikaravisistam kurvanti. cittam hi te svakaryadavasadayanti. khyatiparyavasanaṁ hi cittacestitam iti*.
19. See *YB* I.5 as cited in n. 85 of chapter 3, and refer to n. 18 above.
20. *YB* I.12; refer to n. 93 in chapter 4.

21. YB IV.25 (p. 200): *tatra"tmabhavabhavana ko'hamasam kathamahamasam kimsvididam kathamsvididam ke bhavisyamah katham va bhavisyama iti.*
22. YS IV.25 (p. 200): *visesadarsina atmabhavabhavananivrttih.*
23. YS IV.26 (p. 201): *tada vivekanimnam kaivalyapragbharam cittam.*
24. RM I.50 (p. 15): *tattvarupataya'naya janitah samskara balavattvadatatattvarupaprajñajanitansamskaranbadhitum . . .*
25. YV I.50 (p. 254): *adrdhaisca prathamikaih samprajñatasamskaraistasya badharthantanutaparam paraiva kriyate.*
26. See n. 25 above. YS II.2 refers to the attenuation (*tanu-karana*) of affliction brought about by *kriya-yoga*; see notes 152 and 153 in chapter 4.
27. YS II.18.
28. YS IV.24.
29. YS II.18.

30. YB III.35; see n. 334 in chapter 3.
31. YS I.18 (p. 21): *viramapratyayabhyasapurvah samskaraseso'nyah.*
32. YB I.18; see n. 40 below.
33. TV I.18 (p. 21): *viramo vrttinam abhavas tasya pratayah karanam . . .*
34. YV I.18 (p. 112): *vrttya'pi viramyatamiti pratyayo viramapratyayah, param vairagyam jñane'pyalambuddhirjñanamapi samyatvity evam rupa . . .*
35. Aranya writes (1963: 52): "The meaning of attaining such cessation is the practice, i.e., constant repetition in the mind of the idea of supreme detachment."
36. RM I.18 (p. 6): *viramyate'neneti viramo vitarkadicintatagah.*
37. YV I.18 (p. 112): *tasya abhyasat paunah punyajjayata ityadyavisesanarthah. TV I.18 (p. 21): tasyabhyasastadanusthanam paunahpunyam tadeva purvam yasya sa tathoktah.*
38. RM I.18 (pp. 6-7): *viramapratayastasyabhyasah paunahpunyena cetasi nivesanam.*
39. Aranya (1963: 52).
40. YB I.18 (pp. 21-22): *sarvavrttipratyastamaye samskaraseso nirodhascittasya samadhirasamprajnatah. tasya param vairagyamupayah. salambano*

*hyabhyasastatsadhanaya na kalpata iti viramapratyayo nirvastuka alambani kriyate.*

41. See, for example, J. H. Woods (1914: 12) and G. Jha (1907: 20) where "*asamprajñata*" has been described as "unconscious." See also n. 49 and text in chapter 5, which offers a critique of Jung's position on *samadhi*.

42. Dasgupta (1924: 124).

43. Koelman (1970: 239).

44. Ibid., p. 131.

45. YS I.51 (p. 54): *tasyapi nirodhe sarvanirodhannirbijah samadhih.*

46. YB I.51 (pp. 55-56): *sa na kevalam samadhiprajñavirodhi prajñakrtanamapi samskaranam pratibandhi bhavati. kasmāt, nirodhajah samskarah samadhijsamskaranbadhata iti. nirodhasthitikalakramanubhavena nirodhacittakrtasamskarastitvamanumeyam. vyutthananirodhasamadhiprabhavaiḥ saha kaivalyabhagiyaḥ samskaraiscittam svāsyam prakrtavavasthitayam praviliyate tasmāt samskarascittasyadhikaravirodhino na sthitiḥetavo bhavantīti. yasmādavasitadhikaram saha kaivalyabhagiyaḥ samskaraiscittam nivartate, tasmīnnivṛtte puruṣaḥ svarupamatrapratistho'taḥ suddhaḥ kevalo mukta ityucyata iti.*

47. Refer to notes 225-227 in chapter 4 and the discussion in chapter 5.

48. YB I.51; see n. 46 above for text.

49. As stated in YS I.14.

50. YS III.10; see chapter 3, n. 89 and related text.

51. YB III.10 (p. 123): *[nirodha] . . . samskaramandye vyutthanadharmina samskarena nirodhadharmasamskaro'bhibhuyata iti.* See also n. 106 in chapter 3.

52. As Vijñāna Bhikṣu suggests (YV I.51: 259).

53. Pensa states (1969: 208): "*asamprajñata-samadhi* figures as an accelerator of the yogic way, not as an essential instrument."

54. See the section in chapter 4 on *astanga-yoga*.

55. See n. 40 above.

56. YS III.50; see n. 122 in chapter 4 and YB III.50 and I.2.

57. YS III.49; see n. 125 in chapter 3. Patañjali goes on to state in YS III.51 (p. 168): *sthanyupanimantrane sangasmayakaranam punaranistaprasangat.* "Upon the

invitation of those well established, there is no cause for attachment and pride because of the renewed association with the undesired [realms]." The meaning of this *sutra* takes us back to the meaning of dispassion (YS I.15; see n. 109 in chapter 4). The comments made by Chapple and Kelly (1990: 104) are worth noting. They write: "Even if one is tempted to re-enter the realm of attachment, the momentum to do so has ceased, because one is constantly aware of the undesirable outcome of such a return." Of course, the "undesirable outcome" refers to sorrow or dissatisfaction (*duhkha*).

58. YB I.16; see n. 121 in chapter 4.

59. See notes 37-39 in chapter 4.

60. YB III.35 (p. 155): *tasmacca sattvatparinamino'tyantavidharma visuddho'nyascitimatrarupah purusah . . . yastu tasmadvisistascitimatrarupo'nyah pauruseyah pratayastatra samyamatpurusavisaya prajña jayate.*

61. YSS (p. 55): *tam imam samyamam vihayatmasakstkarasyanya upayo nasti.*

62. YB III.35 (see n. 334 in chapter 3); see also n. 127 in chapter 4 on YB II.27.

63. YB II.24 (see n. 43 in chapter 4); see also YS IV.24 (n. 113 in chapter 3) as well as notes 115 and 116 in chapter 3.

64. See n. 46 above and related text.

65. Aranya (1963: 123) writes: "It might be argued that as stoppage of cognition is not a form of knowledge, how can there be latent impressions thereof" and "*nirodha* is nothing but broken fluctuation, and the latent impression is of that break of fluctuation. Complete renunciation can give rise to latent impressions, which only bring stoppage of mutation and thus stop the mind from fluctuating. There is going on incessantly a break between the appearance and the disappearance of modifications of the mind, which break is only lengthened in concentration on *nirodha samadhi*."

66. RM I.51 (p. 16): *tasyapi samprajñatasya nirodhe pravilaye sati sarvasam cittavrttinam svakarane pravilayadya ya samskaramatrad vrttirudeti tasyastasya neti netiti kevalam paryudasannirbijah samadhiravirbhavati.*

67. See, for example, BA Up II.3.6; III.9.26; IV.2.4; IV.4.22; IV.5.15.

68. See YSS (p. 4), where Vijñana Bhikṣu states: *nirodho na naso'bhavasamanyam va.*

69. See especially the argument presented in the section on *nirodha* in chapter 4.

70. YSS (p. 4): *vrttyeva nirodhenapi samskaro janyate.*

71. YS IV.34.

72. RM I.18 (p. ): *nirdahati evamekagratajanitansamskarannirodhajah svatmanam ca nirdahanti.*

73. See n. 109 in chapter 4.

74. See Vyasa's commentary on *YS* III.10 in n. 51 above.

75. *YB* I.18 (p. 22): *tadabhyasapurvakam hi cittam niralambanamabhavapraptamiva bhavatityesa nirbijah samadhirasamprajnatah.*

76. See especially the section on *vrtti* in chapter 3.

77. *YS* II.18, 21, and 22.

78. See, for example, Koelman (1970: 249) and Feuerstein (1979a: 58, 142, and 144) who both imply that the psychophysical being of the yogin becomes incapacitated, disintegrates or is negated in the liberated state.

79. *Samskaras* are, in effect, the hidden (*adrsta*) impressions which activate and shape our human, prakrtic existence and are canalized by efficient causes such as vir-

tuous or unvirtuous actions. As Vyasa says (*YB* IV.2: 177), *nimitta = dharmadi*. See our discussion on *karma*, *samskara*, and *vasana* in chapter 3.

80. The term *kaivalya* comes from *kevala*, meaning "alone." Feuerstein (1979a: 75) also translates *kaivalya* as "aloneness" but with a metaphysical or ontological emphasis that implies the absolute separation of *purusa* and *prakrti*.

81. See R. Prasada (1912: 142).

82. See C. Pensa (1969: 209).

83. See T. Leggett (1990: 252).

84. See S. Phillips (1985), *JIP* 13: 402.

85. See M. Eliade (1969: 93).

86. See Tola and Dragonetti (1987: xvii) and T. S. Rukmani (1989: 139). Koelman (1970: 251) adopts the term "isolation" as in a solipsistic state. Varenne (1976) uses the term "isolation," (p. 67) as well as the expression "absolute solitude" (p. 138). Chapple and Kelly (1990) also use the term "isolation," implying, however, "an embodied experience [as] given in [*YS*] I:3" (p. 122) wherein the seer abides in its own form or true identity. While noting (p. 8) that the purity resulting from Yoga "guarantees nonafflicted action," it does not appear to have been the intent of Chapple and Kelly in their analysis and translation of the *YS* to consider further the nature of *kaivalya* as an embodied state of liberation.

87. *YS* II.25 (p. 96): *tadabhavat samyogabhavo hanam taddrseh kaivalyam.*

88. *YS* II.20 and IV.18.

89. *YS* IV.34 (p. 207): *purusarthasunyanam gunanam pratiprasavah kaivalyam*

*svarupapratistha va citisaktir iti.*

90. See n. 89 above.

91. YS III.55 (p. 174): *sattvapurusayoh suddhisamye kaivalyamiti*. See also n. 52 in chapter 3 for translation. On a cautionary note, one must be careful not to characterize the state of *sattva* itself as liberation or *kaivalya*, for without the presence of *purusa* the mind (as reflected consciousness) could not function in its most transparent aspect as *sattva*. It is not accurate, according to Yoga philosophy, to say that the *guna* of *sattva* is equivalent to liberation itself. The question of the nature of the *gunas* from the enlightened perspective is an interesting one. In the *Bhagavadgita* (II.45) Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to become free from the three *gunas* and then gives further instructions to be established in eternal *sattva* (beingness, light, goodness, clarity, knowledge), free of dualities, free of acquisition-and-possession, Self-possessed (*nirdvandvo nityasattvastho niryogaksema atmavan*). It would appear from the above instructions that the nature of the *sattva* referred to here transcends the limitations of the nature of *sattva guna*, which can still have a binding effect in the form of attachment to joy and knowledge. It is, however, only by first overcoming *rajas* and *tamas* that liberation is possible.

92. See n. 48 in chapter 3.

93. See Chapple and Kelly (1990: 109).

94. YS IV.6 (p. 179): *tatra dhyanajamanasayam*.

95. YB III.50.

96. YB III.55 (p. 175): *nahi dagdhaklesabijasya jñane punarapeksa kacidasti*. "When the seeds of afflictions have been scorched there is no longer any dependence at all on further knowledge."

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97. H. Aranya writes (1963: 123) that in the state of *nirodha* the *gunas* "do not die out but their unbalanced activity due to non-equilibrium that was taking place . . . only ceases on account of the cessation of the cause (*avidya* or nescience) which brought about their contact."

98. YB IV.25 (p. 201): *purusastvasatyamavidyayam suddhascittadharmairaparamrsta*.

99. YB I.41; see n. 92 in chapter 5.

100. See J. Gonda (1960: 312).

101. Vyasa (YB II.13) likens the mind and its *vasanas* to a fishing net with its knots; see n. 103 in chapter 3.

102. YB II.24; see n. 43 in chapter 4.



103. YS II.26.

104. YS III.49.

105. Vijñāna Bhikṣu insists (YV IV.34: 141) that *kaivalya* is a state of liberation for both *purusa* and *prakṛti*, each reaching its respective natural or intrinsic state. He then, however, cites the *Samkhya-Karika* (62) where it is stated that no *purusa* is bound, liberated, or transmigrates. It is only *prakṛti* abiding in her various forms that transmigrates, is bound and becomes liberated. See also n. 106 below and main text.

106. YB II.18; see n. 215 in chapter 2 for text.

107. YS I.51 and III.8.

108. RM I.1 (p. 1).

109. Müller (1899: 309).

110. See, for example, Eliade (1969), Koelman (1970), Feuerstein (1979a), and Larson (1987).

111. YS II.9; see n. 170 in chapter 3.

112. I am here echoing some of the points made by Chapple in his paper entitled, "*Cittavṛtti* and Reality in the *Yoga Sutra*," in *Samkhya-Yoga: Proceedings of the IASWR Conference, 1981*, pp. 103-119. See also Chapple and Kelly (1990: 5) where the authors state: "*kaivalyam* . . . is not a catatonic state nor does it require death." *SK* 67 acknowledges that even the "potter's wheel" continues to turn because of the force of past impressions (*samskaras*); but in Yoga, higher dispassion and *asamprajñatasamadhi* eventually exhaust all the impressions or karmic residue. Through a continued program of ongoing purification Yoga allows for the possibility of an embodied state of freedom utterly unburdened by the effects of past actions. As such Yoga constitutes an advance over the apparently fatalistic perspective in Samkhya where the "wheel of *samsara*" continues (after the initial experience of liberating knowledge) until, in the event of separation from the body, *prakṛti* permanently disappears from view and unending "isolation" (*kaivalya*) is attained (*SK* 68). In any case, the yogic state of supracognitive *samddhi* goes beyond the liberating knowledge of *viveka* in the Samkhyan system in that the yogin must develop dispassion even toward discriminative discernment itself. For more on an analysis of the notion of liberation in Samkhya and Yoga, see C. Chapple's chapter on "Living Liberation in Samkhya and Yoga," in *Living Liberation in Hindu Thought*, ed. by Andrew O. Fort and Patricia Y Mumme.

113. Cf. *SK* 64.

114. Thus, as Chapple (1983: 112) writes, although both *purusa* and *prakṛti* "are seen as fulfilling separate and discrete functions . . . both are necessary and present, even in the act of 'truly seeing'." Vyasa (YB II.17) has also used the term "knower-of-the-field" (*ksetrajña*), meaning the seer. Cf. *BG* XIII.34, where the one who sees the

field (*ksetra*, *prakṛti*) as distinct from the knower of the field (*ksetrajñā*, *purusa*) is said to be wise. The author wishes to acknowledge the work of Chapple (1983) in helping to formulate some of the ideas mentioned in this part of the discussion.

115. Klaus Klostermaier (1994), *A Survey of Hinduism*, p. 402.

116. YS II.29; see the discussion in chapter 4 on *astanga-yoga*.

117. YB II.28 (pp. 99-101).

118. YB II.28 (p. 101): *dhṛtikaranam sarramindriyanam. tani ca tasya. mahabhutani sariranam, tani ca parasparam sarvesam tairyagyaunamanusadaivatani ca parpararthatvat.*

119. YS I.48; see n. 164 in chapter 5.

120. Refer to n. 205 in chapter 5.

121. Cf. BG VI.23, where Yoga is defined as the "disengagement from the union with suffering" (*duhkha-samyoga-viyoga*).

122. YS II.22; see n. 207 and related text in chapter 2.

123. Aranya (1963: 384).

124. YS III.54 (see n. 179 below) and YS III.55 (see n. 91 above).

125. YB I.18; see n. 40 above.

126. YS I.3; see n. 36 in chapter 2.

127. See n. 89 above.

128. Our position thus counters the often held notion that in *kaivalya* the yogin can no longer act and has become, in effect, disembodied.

129. See K. Klostermaier (1989), "Spirituality and Nature," in *Hindu Spirituality: Vedas Through Vedanta* ed. by Krishna Sivaraman, pp. 319-337.

130. See Feuerstein (1980: 98-101) and Klostermaier (1986), "Dharmamegha Samadhi: Comments on Yogasutra IV.29," in *PEW* 36.3: 253-262.

131. This has been clearly articulated by Feuerstein (1980: 99) and is evident from statements in Vyasa's commentary; see YB I.2, 15 as well as II.2 and IV.29.

132. YS III.49-50.

133. YS I.15-16 and III.50.

134. See n. 57 above on YS III.51.

135. YB IV.29 (p. 202): *yada'yam brahmanah prasamkhyane'pyakusidastato'pi na kimcitprarthayate. tatrapī viraktasya sarvatha vivekakhyatireva bhavati . . .*

136. YS IV.29 (p. 202): *prasamkhyane'pyakusidasya sarvatha vivekakhyater dharmameghah samadhih*. It is noteworthy that Vyasa (YB II.15) likens Yoga (p. 78) to medicine with its four parts: illness, the cause of illness, the state of good health, and the remedy. Thus Yoga is portrayed as a "fourfold division" whose four parts (*caturvyuha*) are: (1) *samsara*, which (along with its sorrowful states) is to be discarded; (2) the conjunction (*samyoga*) between *purusa* and *prakṛti/pradhana*, which is the cause of what is to be discarded; (3) liberation, which is the complete cessation of the conjunction; and (4) right knowledge, which is the means to liberation. But see also n. 126 in chapter 4 of our study, which draws on a quote from the same passage (YB II.15) declaring that the true nature/identity of the one (i.e., *purusa*) who is liberated is not something to be obtained or discarded. The inalienable identity of *purusa* puts it in a "category" that transcends the dualistic categories of means and ends, causes and effects, obtaining and discarding. In a stimulating and incisive essay on this topic, W. Halbfass (1991: 243-263) points out the limitations of the applicability to Yoga of the medical/therapeutic paradigm. In particular he writes (p. 253): "The denial of *hana* ['discarding'] and *upadana* ['obtaining'] with regard to the ultimate goal of Yoga is a

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denial of the fundamental premises of the medical, therapeutic orientation; in a sense, it revokes the 'fourfold scheme' and the therapeutic paradigm itself. Indeed, it is not only through the adoption of this paradigm, but also through its transcendence, that Yoga and other schools of Indian thought articulate their self-understanding." Of course the fundamental "disease" that Yoga seeks to overcome is *avidya* and its manifestation as *samyoga*.

137. YB IV.29 (p. 202): *samskarabijaksayannasya pratyayantaranyutpadyante*.

138. See n. 40 above.

139. See Feuerstein (1980: 98).

140. YS III.49 and III.54

141. YS IV.7; see notes 107-112 in chapter 3. See also YS IV.30 (n. 142 below).

142. YS IV.30 (p. 202): *tatah klesakarmanivṛttih*. Thus, it may be said that to dwell without defilement in a "cloud of *dharma*" is the culminating description by Patañjali of what tradition later referred to as living liberation (*jivanmukti*). To be sure, there is a "brevity of description" in the YS regarding the state of liberation. Only sparingly, with reservation (one might add, caution) and mostly in metaphorical terms does Patañjali speak about the qualities exhibited by the liberated yogin. Chapple (1996: 116, see below) provides three possible reasons for this "brevity of description" regarding living liberation in the context of the YS (and Samkhya, i.e., the *SK* of Isvara Kṛṣṇa): (1) He states: "(T)he genre in which both texts were written does not allow for the sort of narrative and poetic embellishment

found in the epics and Puranas." (2) Perhaps, as Chapple suggests, "a deliberate attempt has been made to guarantee that the recognition of a liberated being remains in the hands of a spiritual preceptor." What is to be noted here is that the oral and highly personalized lineage tradition within Yoga stresses the authority of the *guru*, which guards against false claims to spiritual attainment on the part of others and thereby "helps to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the tradition." (3) A further reason for brevity "could hinge on the logical contradiction that arises due to the fact that the notion of self is so closely identified with *ahamkara* [the ego or prakrtic sense of self]. It would be an oxymoron for a person to say ["I am liberated.]" The Self (*purusa*) is of course not an object that can be seen by itself thus laying emphasis, as Chapple points out, on the ineffable nature of the liberative state that transcends mind-content, all marks, and activity itself.

143. YS IV.31 (p. 203): *tada sarvavarānamalapetasya jñānasya nantyaññeyamalpam*.

144. See YV I.1; YSS (p. 2) states: *asamprajñatayogasya cakhilavrttisamskaradahadvara prarabdhasyapy atikrameneti*.

145. See n. 144 above and YV I.1 (p. 31).

146. YS IV.7 and YB IV.7 (see notes 107 and 109 respectively in chapter 3).

147. YB IV.30 (see n. 76 in chapter 4).

148. YV IV.30 (pp. 123-124). Elsewhere in his YSS (p. 17) Vijñāna Bhikṣu tells us that the yogin who is "established in the state of *dharmamegha-samadhi* is called a *jīvanmukta*": *dharmameghah samadhiḥ . . . asyānavasthāyam jīvanmukta ityucyate*. Vijñāna Bhikṣu is critical of Vedāntins (i.e., Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta school) who, he says, associate the *jīvanmukta* with ignorance (*avidyā-kleśa*) probably because of the liberated being's continued link with the body despite Yoga's insistence on the complete overcoming of the afflictions.

149. See Aranya (1963: 433; also p. 226).

150. This is the essence of Kṛṣṇa's teaching in the *BG* on *karma-yoga*; see, for example, *BG* IV.20 and our discussion on the *BG* in chapter 1.

151. YB I.16; see n. 119 in chapter 4.

152. See R. C. Zaehner (1974), *Our Savage God*, pp. 97-98.

153. See B.-A. Scharfstein (1974), *Mystical Experience*, pp. 131-132.

154. See Feuerstein (1979a: 81).

155. YS I.33.

156. YS II.35.

157. See *YS* II.5 (n. 152 in chapter 3), where Patañjali indirectly describes *purusa* as being a joyful state, i.e., a state of intrinsic happiness or satisfaction (*sukha*) that, like other inalienable aspects of *purusa* such as purity and permanency, is not to be confused with an emotional state. To be sure, *kaivalya* is not an emotional condition that, being of the nature of the mind, comes and goes, changes. It would be highly misleading to suggest that *kaivalya* implies either an alienation/isolation from the world or a state of loneliness, for these are states of mind and afflicted states at that. Such a misrepresentation of Yoga only buttresses the ill-founded notion that Yoga is an escape from the world.

158. See *YB* II.6 and IV.21, 22.

159. On this point see n. 4 and related text in chapter 3.

160. For example, *YS* I.33 (see n. 248 in chapter 3) can be seen as a preparatory discipline for an ethical embodiment of liberation in Yoga.

161. Thus the term "Yoga" (like the terms "*nirodha*" and "*samadhi*") is ambiguous in that it means both the process of purification and illumination and the final "goal" of liberation or "aloneness." Due to Yoga's traditional praxis-orientation it becomes all too easy to reduce Yoga to a "means only" approach to well-being and spiritual enlightenment. In the light of its popularity in the Western world today, in which technique and practice have been emphasized often to the exclusion of philosophical/theoretical understanding and a proper pedagogical context, there is a great danger in simply reifying practice whereby practice becomes something the ego does for the sake of its own security. Seen here, practice often then conceived as a superior activity in relation to all other activities becomes all-important in that through the activity called "practice" the ego hopes and strives to become "enlightened." Practice thus becomes rooted in a future-oriented perspective largely motivated out of a fear of not becoming enlightened; it degenerates into a form of selfishly appropriated activity where "means" become ends-in-themselves. Moreover, human relationships become instruments for the greater "good" of Self-realization. Thus rationalized, relationships are seen as having only a tentative nature and value. The search for enlightenment under the sway of this kind of instrumental rationality/reasoning (i.e., the attempt to "gain" something from one's practice, namely, enlightenment) never really goes beyond the level of ego and its compulsive search for permanent security, which of course, according to Yoga thought, is an inherently afflicted state of affairs. To be sure, the concern in Yoga is to (re)discover *purusa*, to be restored to true identity thus overcoming dissatisfaction, fear, and misidentification by uprooting and eradicating the dis-ease of ignorance (*avidya*). Yet (see n. 136 above), as W. Halbfass puts it, true identity "cannot be really lost, forgotten or newly acquired" (1991: 252) for liberation "is not to be produced or accomplished in a literal sense, but only in a figurative sense" (ibid.: 251). Sufficient means for the sattvification of the mind are, however, both desirable and

acknowledging that "aloneness" cannot be an acquired state resulting from or caused by yogic methods and techniques, and that *purusa* cannot be known (YB III.35), acquired or discarded/lost (YB II.15), Yoga in effect transcends its own result-orientation as well as the dualistic categories of means and ends.

162. YB I.20 (pp. 23-24): *sraddha cetasah samprasadah. sa hijananiva kalyani yoginam pati.*

163. See notes 163-169 in chapter 5. See also the discussion in chapter 1 on *rta*.

164. Often yogic knowledge or teachings are extended by the principles of analogy and isomorphism between the macrocosm (the universe at large) and the microcosm that is the human organism. A striking example of this isomorphism is to be found in the *Yoga-Darsana Upanisad* (IV.48-53), where the eternal *tirtha* (sacred font, holy water, place of pilgrimage) is considered inferior to the *tirtha* in the body, and mountains and other places of spiritual significance (e.g., Varanasi) are identified with various parts of the human body.

165. YS IV.19, 22, 23.

166. See n. 198 in chapter 2 and also SK 20.

167. C. Chapple claims that Samkhya has also been misinterpreted. See his chapters entitled "The Unseen Seer and the Field: Consciousness in Samkhya and Yoga" in *The Problem of Pure Consciousness*, ed. by Robert K. C. Forman and "Living Liberation in Samkhya and Yoga," in *Living Liberation in Hindu Thought*, ed. by Andrew O. Fort and Patricia Y. Mumme.

168. YB IV.30; see n. 76 in chapter 4 for text.

169. See, for example, Eliade (1969: 32-33) and Koelman (1970: 251), who both maintain this solipsistic view, i.e., of *purusa* understood as a monadic state.

170. See Vyasa's description of *samsara* as a "six-spoked wheel" (YB IV.11 in n. 182 of chapter 2), and the root meaning of *duhkha* (see notes 185-186 and relevant text in chapter 2) as referring to a "wheel" with a "bad axle-hole."

171. YB III.49 (p. 168): *ityesa visoka nama siddhiryam prapya yogi sarvajñah ksinaklesabandhano vasi viharati.*

172. YS III.55; see n. 91 above.

173. See Koelman (1970: 249-250).

174. See Feuerstein (1979a: 142, 144).

175. YB II.23.

176. YS IV.18.

177. YB IV.21,22.



178. YB III.49 (pp. 167-168): *sarvatmano guna vyavasayavyavaseyatmakah svaminam ksetrajam . . .*

179. YS III.54 (p. 174): *tarakam sarvavisayam sarvathavisayamakramam ceti vivekajam jñanam.*

180. Although the historical identity of Patañjali the Yoga master is not known, we are assuming that Patañjali was, as the tradition would have it, an enlightened Yoga adept; for more on Patañjali see the introductory section in chapter 2.

181. Koelman (1970: 258). Ethical conduct can be seen as a prerequisite to and/or as a natural concomitant of spiritual realization. This is the case in nondualistic Vedanta where according to the text entitled *Vivekacudamani* (v. 37), those who have achieved spiritual insight are inherently beneficial, "just as the spring season" (*vasantavad*): this of course echoes notions within Mahayana Buddhism.

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182. See BG III.33, where the wise those who have overcome ignorance are said to function in a natural "conformity" or alignment with their prakrtic constitution, following or "attuned to" *prakṛti* without suppression.

183. BG IV.20.

184. This is certainly one of the most praiseworthy aspects within Mahayana Buddhism. The four *brahmaviharas* cited in YS I.33 obviously well known by Patañjali and authorities within Buddhism as well as some of the ethical teachings (i.e., the *yamas* and *niyamas*) outlined in the *astanga-yoga* section of the *Sadhana-Pada* support the notion of an altruistic approach within Yoga.

185. Refer to notes 121-122 and text in chapter 3.

186. Refer to chapter 3, p. 106.

187. As I have argued in chapter 2.

188. As I have suggested in chapter 2.

189. YB III.35 (pp. 154-155): *buddhisattvam prakhyasilam samanasattvo-panibandhane rajastamasi vasikṛtya sattvapurusana pratyayena parinatam*: see also YB II.26.

190. See n. 93 in chapter 4.

191. YS III.35 (p. 154): *sattvapurusayor atyantasamkirṇayoh pratyayaviseso bhogah . . .*

192. YS IV.16; see n. 54 in chapter 3.

193. See Koelman (1970: 260). While, historically, forms of Yoga practice as set out in the YS have found a legitimate place within different schools of Vedanta as well as later schools

of Yoga, one must take caution not to evaluate Yoga on the basis of mere technique alone.

194. See, for example, *B*  $\neg$  *Up* III.4.2.

195. See also our discussion of Patañjali in chapter 2 and Chapple's noteworthy comment: refer to n. 41, chapter 2.

196. See W. Halbfass (1988), *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding*, p. 393.

197. *YB* III.6 (p. 121): *yoga evopadhyayah . . . ogena yogo jñatavo yogo yogatpravartate. yo'pramattastu yogena sa yoge ramate ciram.*"

198. J. Tabor (1983), *Transformative Philosophy. A Study of Sahkara, Fichte and Heidegger*, p. 26.

199. W Halbfass (1992: 38, also 232-234).

200. This is appropriate in that, from *prakṛti*'s perspective, *purusa* is a mysterious, ineffable silence. It appears that *isvara* as symbolized by the *pranava* (the syllable *Om*, *YS* I.27) is the closest approximation to that silence.

201. *YS* IV.18-19, 22-23.

202. *YB* III.55 (p. 175): *tatpurusasya kaivalyam, tada purusah svarupamatra-jyotiramalah kevali bhavati.*

203. *YB* II.27 and III.35.

## Conclusion

1. G. Feuerstein (1990: 82).

2. J. Varenne (1976: 145) suggests that specialized texts within the tradition of Yoga such as the *Bhagavadgita*, *Yoga-Sutra*, and *Yoga Upanisads* should be viewed as being complementary to one another in order to arrive at a synthetic understanding of

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Yoga within Hinduism. He argues for an underlying unity as well as a diversity of possible approaches in Yoga. One area for potentially fruitful research in Yoga would be to explore closely the relationship between Patañjali's Yoga and later expressions of Yoga as outlined, for example, in the *Yoga Upanisads* and Kashmiri Saiva Yoga. Further research also needs to be carried out concerning the nature of the relationship between Patañjali's Yoga, Buddhism, and Jainism.

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