fix: add markdown sanitization for malicious notebooks #1315
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
|
The latest updates on your projects. Learn more about Vercel for Git ↗︎
|
dmadisetti
commented
May 4, 2024
mscolnick
reviewed
May 5, 2024
| ```` | ||
|
|
||
| Nested fence | ||
| ````text |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
i didnt even know 4 ticks was a way to nest 3 ticks
|
🚀 Development release published. You may be able to view the changes at https://marimo.app?v=0.4.12-dev2 |
mscolnick
pushed a commit
that referenced
this pull request
May 5, 2024
* fix: add markdown sanitization for malicious notebooks * *sufficient * fix: check for code block by regex
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Was looking over the merge this morning and realized it would be possible to "inject" code blocks.
I don't think this could be used that maliciously since running a notebook is already pretty risky. Maybe injecting a <script> tag that would only appear during conversion.
Either way, it's a bug. If you can think of more unsafe behavior let me know. Might be a cool chance to use one of those LLM fuzzers.