
Security Development Lifecycle

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Project Overview

- ❖ UI-Labs - Project Owners / Developers
- ❖ Rolls Royce - Potential Customer
- ❖ Been in development for ~3 years
- ❖ Rolls Royce wanted recommendation on functionality and security status.

Technology Stack

- ❖ Angular App up front with PHP serving pages in some places
- ❖ Java Spring REST backend
- ❖ PostgreSQL for the database.
- ❖ Deployed on Azure

Security Audit Process

- ❖ White Box Evaluation
- ❖ Automated Scans
- ❖ Manual attacking via proxy
- ❖ Automatic and manual source code analysis
- ❖ Generally just thinking like an attacker

Discovered Issues

- ❖ Committed credentials in (public) Github
- ❖ SQL Injection vulnerabilities in several endpoint
- ❖ Arbitrary CRUD operations on anyones documents
- ❖ No server side validation
- ❖ Timing attack on file upload
- ❖ Attacking document versioning

Broken Development Process

- ❖ Broken build process - can't update dependencies
- ❖ Not able to run project locally (at the time)
- ❖ Pumping out new features without addressing tech debt and known issues

Security Foundations

Some Terminology

- ❖ Adversary (threat agent)
- ❖ Attack
- ❖ Countermeasure
- ❖ Risk
- ❖ Security Policy
- ❖ System Resource (Asset)
- ❖ Threat
- ❖ Vulnerability

CIA-AA Triad

- ❖ Confidentiality
- ❖ Integrity
- ❖ Availability
- ❖ Authenticity
- ❖ Accountability

Security Challenges

- ❖ Not as easy as it seems
- ❖ Battle of the wits
- ❖ Little perceived benefit until security failure occurs
- ❖ Constant monitoring and maintenance
- ❖ Often an afterthought
- ❖ Security undermines convenience often

Security Development Lifecycle

Weakest Link

- ❖ **Application Layer is the weakest point**
- ❖ 75% of money spent on infrastructure. 3 / 4 of attacks target applications
- ❖ Only 1 / 3 of developers are confident in their code

A Step Forward

- ❖ Integrate a Security Development Lifecycle
- ❖ Train developers in secure coding practices
- ❖ Incorporate Threat Modeling, Secure Coding Techniques, Secure Code Review, and Security Focused Testing into the development process.

SDL-IT & SDLC




Image: https://www.owasp.org/images/d/d0/OWASP_SDL-IT.pdf

Risk Assessment

- ❖ Happens during the envisioning stage
- ❖ Application Inventory
- ❖ Determine Application Risk Categorization
 - ❖ High Risk
 - ❖ Medium Risk
 - ❖ Low Risk

Threat Model / Design Review

- ❖ Happens during design review
- ❖ Provides a consistent methodology for objectively evaluating threats
- ❖ Review application design to verify compliance with security standards and best practices
- ❖ Verify application meets security principles

Internal Review

- ❖ Happens during development / code review
- ❖ Review security checklists and policies
- ❖ Team conducts code review and attack and penetration tests

Pre-Production Assessment

- ❖ Happens during (beta) testing phase
- ❖ Low Risk Applications
 - ❖ Host level scan
- ❖ High / Medium Risk Applications
 - ❖ Host Level Scan
 - ❖ White Box Code Review

Post-Production Assessment

- ❖ Happens after production deployment
- ❖ Host level scan

SDL Resources

- ❖ Mitre - Common weaknesses & vulnerabilities
- ❖ OWASP - www.owasp.org
- ❖ Microsoft SDL - <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/sdl/>
- ❖ Static Code Analysis - Snyk, FindBugs, ect
- ❖ Security Checklists
- ❖ Threat Modeling - Adam Shostack
 - ❖ Elevation of Privilege Cards
- ❖ Secure Design Principles (next slide)

Secure Design Principles

- ❖ Economy of Mechanism - Keep it simple
- ❖ Fail-safe Defaults - Permission rather than exclusion
- ❖ Complete Mediation - Caching causes headaches
- ❖ Open Design - Obfuscation != security
- ❖ Separation of Privilege - Similar to least privilege
- ❖ Least Privilege - Need to know basis

- ❖ Least Common Mechanism - (A principle of kernel design)
- ❖ Psychological Acceptability - Keep it usable
- ❖ Isolation - Reduce pivoting ability
- ❖ Encapsulation - Restrict communication between domains
- ❖ Modularity - Integrate security without coupling
- ❖ Layering - Defense in depth
- ❖ Least Astonishment - Transparent security

Threat Modeling


- ❖ Decompose the application
- ❖ Determine and rank threats
- ❖ Determine countermeasures and mitigation

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application_Threat_Modeling


Threat Modeling Tools

- ❖ Diagrams
- ❖ STRIDE - Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege
- ❖ DREAD - Damage Potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability

Example Diagram



Example Diagram



Demo

Disclaimer: Do not use any tools against anything you don't have explicit (preferably written) permission to attack. Computer fraud and abuse penalties are very severe.

Final Thoughts

- ❖ The need for security is obvious
- ❖ Delivering quality software means delivering **adequately** secure software
- ❖ Continuous improvement process of people, processes, and tools
- ❖ Security first attitude