

# Introduction to Lattice-based Attacks “Cryptography”

Di Santi Giovanni

June 7, 2021

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Linear Algebra Background</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1	Vector Spaces . . . . .	3
2.2	Lattices . . . . .	6
2.3	Lattice Problems . . . . .	7
2.3.1	SVP . . . . .	7
2.3.2	CVP . . . . .	8
<b>3</b>	<b>LLL</b>	<b>9</b>
3.1	Introduction . . . . .	9
3.2	Algorithm . . . . .	10
<b>4</b>	<b>RSA Cryptanalysis</b>	<b>12</b>
4.1	RSA Introduction . . . . .	12
4.1.1	Algorithm . . . . .	12
4.1.2	Security . . . . .	13
4.2	Lattices against RSA . . . . .	13
4.2.1	Mathematical introduction . . . . .	13
4.2.2	Recover plaintext with known MSB bits of $m$ . . . . .	15
4.2.3	Factorize modulus with known MSB bits of $p$ . . . . .	17
4.2.4	Real world case study: ROCA . . . . .	18
<b>5</b>	<b>ECDSA Cryptanalysis</b>	<b>20</b>
5.1	ECDSA Introduction . . . . .	20
5.1.1	Algorithm . . . . .	20
5.1.2	Security . . . . .	21
5.2	Lattices against ECDSA . . . . .	21
5.2.1	Recover $d$ from a pair of signatures with small $k_1, k_2$ . . . . .	21
5.2.2	Recover $d$ from many signatures with small $k_i$ . . . . .	23
5.2.3	Recover $d$ knowing MSB bits of each $k_i$ . . . . .	24

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Lattices are powerful mathematical objects that can be used in computer science and mathematics to solve an extensive range of different problems. In the recent years many post-quantum cryptographic protocols candidates involve the use of hard lattice problems, for example the **Learning With Errors** [20]. Lattice constructions can also be used in cryptanalysis to break cryptographic schemes, typically using reduction algorithms as **LLL** [9].

To introduce the mathematics of lattices a basic linear algebra background is needed, so the second chapter is a summary of the basic properties needed to understand it. We used as main resource “An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography” [8] to explain them, but we also tried to give some geometrical intuition behind some operations.

Cryptographic protocols as **RSA** and **ECDSA** are considered secure, however there are various attacks against a relaxed-model of each of them, i.e., What if we know some bits of the secret key? What if we know a part of the message before the encryption? We present an introduction to the attacks which involve lattices against these protocols. The code used to confirm the correctness of the attacks is available on the repository [23] and the main reference was “Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example” [14].

# Chapter 2

## Linear Algebra Background

We'll start with some definitions and properties needed to understand the lattices, to move later on the mathematics behind them and some hard problems related to it. At the end of the chapter the reader should be able to follow the math used in the other chapters.

### 2.1 Vector Spaces

**Definition 2.1.1** *Vector space.*

A *vector space*  $V$  is a subset of  $\mathbb{R}^m$  which is closed under finite vector addition and scalar multiplication, with the property that

$$a_1v_1 + a_2v_2 \in V \text{ for all } v_1, v_2 \in V \text{ and all } a_1, a_2 \in \mathbb{R}$$

**Definition 2.1.2** *Linear Combinations*

Let  $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k \in V$ . A *linear combination* of  $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k \in V$  is any vector of the form

$$\alpha_1v_1 + \alpha_2v_2 + \dots + \alpha_kv_k \text{ with } \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_k \in \mathbb{R}$$

**Definition 2.1.3** *Linear Independence*

A set of vectors  $v_1, v_2, \dots, v_k \in V$  is *linearly independent* if the the only way to get

$$a_1v_1 + a_2v_2 + \dots + a_kv_k = 0$$

is to have  $a_1 = a_2 = \dots = a_k = 0$ .

#### Definition 2.1.4 *Bases*

Taken a set of linearly independent vectors  $b = (v_1, \dots, v_n) \in V$  we say that  $b$  is a *basis* of  $V$  if  $\forall w \in V$  we can write

$$w = a_1v_1 + a_2v_2 + \dots + a_nv_n$$

#### Definition 2.1.5 *Vector's length*

The vector's length or *Euclidean norm* of  $v = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m)$  is

$$\|v\| = \sqrt{x_1^2 + x_2^2 + \dots + x_m^2}$$

#### Definition 2.1.6 *Dot Product*

Let  $v, w \in V \subset \mathbb{R}^m$  and  $v = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m), w = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m)$ , the *dot product* of  $v$  and  $w$  is

$$v \cdot w = x_1y_1 + x_2y_2 + \dots + x_my_m$$

or

$$v \cdot w = \|v\|\|w\|\cos\theta$$

where  $\theta$  is the angle between  $v$  and  $w$  if we place the starting points of the vectors at the origin  $O$ .

Geometrically speaking  $v \cdot w$  is the length of  $w$  projected to  $v$  multiplied by the length of  $v$  as shown in 2.1

#### Definition 2.1.7 *Orthogonal Basis*




Figure 2.1: Dot Product By 3Blue1Brown [21]

An *orthogonal basis* for a vector space  $V$  is a basis  $v_1, \dots, v_m$  with the property that

$$v_i \cdot v_j = 0 \text{ for all } i \neq j$$

If  $\|v_i\| = 1$  for all  $i$  then the basis is *orthonormal*.

---

**Algorithm 1** Gram-Schmidt Algorithm

---

```

 $v_1^* = v_1$ 
for  $i \leftarrow 2$  to  $n$  do
     $\mu_{ij} = v_i \cdot v_j^* / \|v_j^*\|^2$  for  $1 \leq j < i$ 
     $v_i^* = v_i - \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \mu_{ij} v_j^*$ 
end

```

---

Let  $b = (v_1, \dots, v_n)$ , be a basis for a vector space  $V \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ . There is an algorithm to create an orthogonal basis  $b^* = (v_1^*, \dots, v_n^*)$ . The two bases have the property that  $\text{Span}\{v_1, \dots, v_i\} = \text{Span}\{v_1^*, \dots, v_i^*\}$  for all  $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$




Figure 2.2: Gram Schmidt orthogonalization

If we take  $v_1 = (4, 1), v_2 = (2, 3)$  as basis and apply gram schmidt we obtain  $u_1 = v_1 = (4, 1), u_2 = (-10/17, 40/17)$  as shown in 2.2

**Definition 2.1.8 Determinant**

The *determinant* of a square matrix is a function that satisfies the following properties:





Figure 2.3: Lattice  $L$  spanned by  $v, w$       Figure 2.4: Lattice  $L$  spanned by  $v', w'$

1. The determinant is linear in each row.
2. The determinant reverses sign if two rows are interchanged.
3. The determinant of the identity matrix is equal to 1.

If the determinant of a matrix is 0 then the matrix is called **singular** (without an inverse).

Grant Sanderson created fantastic animations to understand the geometrical intuition behind the *determinant*[22].

## 2.2 Lattices

### Definition 2.2.1 *Lattice*

Let  $v_1, \dots, v_n \in \mathbb{R}^m, m \geq n$  be linearly independent vectors. A *Lattice*  $L$  spanned by  $\{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$  is the set of all integer linear combinations of  $v_1, \dots, v_n$ .

$$L = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n a_i v_i, a_i \in \mathbb{Z} \right\}$$

If  $v_i$  for every  $i = 1, \dots, n$  has integer coordinates then the lattice is called *Integral Lattice*.

On the figure 2.3 we show a lattice  $L$  with bases  $v = (3, 1)$  and  $w = (-1, 1)$ , and on 2.4 the same lattice  $L$  with a different basis.

## 2.3 Lattice Problems

### 2.3.1 SVP

**The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP):** Find a nonzero vector  $v \in L$  that minimize the Euclidean norm  $\|v\|$ .

Gauss's developed an algorithm to find an optimal basis for a two-dimensional lattice given an arbitrary basis. The output of the algorithm gives the shortest nonzero vector in  $L$  and in this way solves the SVP.

---

#### Algorithm 2 Gauss Basis Reduction

---

```

while true do
  if  $\|v_2\| < \|v_1\|$  then
    | swap  $v_1, v_2$ 
  end
   $m = \lfloor (v_1 \cdot v_2) \|v_1\|^{-2} \rfloor$ 
  if  $m = 0$  then
    | return  $v_1, v_2$ 
  end
   $v_2 = v_2 - mv_1$ 
end

```

---




Figure 2.5: Gauss reduction



**Example.** Let  $L$  a lattice spanned by  $v_1 = (8, 4), v_2 = (7, 5)$ , if we apply the gauss reduction algorithm we obtain  $w_1 = (1, -1), w_2 = (6, 6)$ .  $w_1$  is the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice  $L$ .

The bigger the dimension of the lattice, the harder is the problem and there isn't a polynomial algorithm to solve it.

### 2.3.2 CVP

**The Closest Vector Problem (CVP):** *Given a vector  $t \in \mathbb{R}^m$  that is not in  $L$ , find the vector  $v \in L$  closest to  $t$ , in other words find a vector  $v \in L$  that minimizes the Euclidean norm  $\|t - v\|$ .*




Figure 2.6: CVP

**Example.** Let  $L$  a lattice spanned by  $v_1 = (0, 1), v_2 = (2, 0)$ , and a target vector  $t = (2.3, 2.4)$ . The closest vector to  $t$  in the lattice  $L$  is  $w = (2, 2)$ .

Both **CVP** and **SVP** are  $\mathcal{NP}$ -hard problems, thus the complexity of the problem increments with the dimension of the lattice. They can be used as primitive to create a trapdoor functions for a cryptographic scheme.

There are various algorithms that can output a solution under certain constraints for an approximation of both **SVP** and **CVP**, for example **LLL**[9] and **Babai's algorithm**[3] respectively.

# Chapter 3

## LLL

### 3.1 Introduction

The **Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász LLL**[9] or  $L^3$  is a polynomial time algorithm to find a “short” basis of a lattice.

#### Theorem 3.1.1 *LLL*

*Let  $L \in \mathbb{Z}^n$  be a lattice spanned by  $B = \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$ . The LLL algorithm outputs a reduced lattice basis  $\{w_1, \dots, w_n\}$  with*

$$\|w_i\| \leq 2^{\frac{n(n-1)}{4(n-i+1)}} \det(L)^{\frac{1}{n-i+1}} \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, n$$

*in time polynomial in  $n$  and in the bit-size of the entries of the basis matrix  $B$ .*

Basically the first vector of the new basis will be as short as possible, and the other will have increasing lengths. The new vectors will be as orthogonal as possible to one another, i.e., the dot product  $w_i \cdot w_j$  will be close to zero.

#### Example

For example we can take the following basis (the rows are the vector) that span a lattice  $L$ .

$$L = \begin{pmatrix} 4 & 9 & 10 \\ 2 & 1 & 30 \\ 3 & 7 & 9 \end{pmatrix}$$

Applying the LLL algorithm we obtain

$$LLL(L) = \begin{pmatrix} -1 & -2 & -1 \\ 3 & -2 & 1 \\ -1 & -1 & 5 \end{pmatrix}$$

Where the first row is the shortest vector in the lattice  $L$ , and so solves the **SVP** problem. For higher dimensions however the LLL algorithm outputs only an approximation for the **SVP** problem.

## 3.2 Algorithm

---

### Algorithm 3 LLL reduction algorithm

---

Input basis  $v_1, \dots, v_n$

$k = 2$

$v_1^* = v_1$

**while**  $k \leq n$  **do**

**for**  $j = k - 1$  **to** 1 *step*  $-1$  **do**

$v_k = v_k - \lfloor \mu_{k,j} \rfloor v_j$  [size-reduction]

**end**

**if**  $\|v_k^*\|^2 \geq (\frac{3}{4} - \mu_{k,k-1}^2) \|v_{k-1}^*\|^2$  **then**

$k = k + 1$  [Lovász-condition]

**else**

        Swap  $v_{k-1}$  and  $v_k$  [swap-step]

$k = \max(k - 1, 2)$

**end**

**end**

Note: At each step,  $v_1^*, \dots, v_k^*$  is the orthogonalized set of vectors obtained with the Gram-Schmidt 1.

$\mu_{i,j}$  is the quantity  $(v_i \cdots v_j^*) / \|v_j^*\|^2$ .

Output reduced basis  $v_1, \dots, v_n$

---

The running time of the algorithm is polynomial and executes the main loop no more than  $\mathcal{O}(n^2 \log n + n^2 \log M)$  steps, where  $M = \max \|v_i\|$ .

Kelby Ludwig explains an intuition behind every steps of the algorithm [11], and Oded Regev gives a more rigorous explanation of the algorithm and the properties [19].

Some of the applications of the algorithm are the following:

1. Factoring polynomials over the integers. For example, given  $x^2 - 1$  factor it into  $x + 1$  and  $x - 1$ .
2. Integer Programming. This is a well-known  $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete problem. Using **LLL**, one can obtain a polynomial time solution to integer programming with a fixed number of variables.
3. Approximation to the **CVP** or **SVP**, as well as other lattice problems.
4. Cryptanalysis (break cryptographic protocols).

# Chapter 4

## RSA Cryptanalysis

### 4.1 RSA Introduction

#### 4.1.1 Algorithm

**RSA** is one of the earliest and most used asymmetric cryptosystem. The usual step to generate a public/private key for **RSA** is the following

1. Fix  $e = 65537$  or  $e = 3$  (public).
2. Find two primes  $p, q$  such that  $p - 1$  and  $q - 1$  are relatively prime to  $e$ , i.e.  $\gcd(e, p - 1) = 1$  and  $\gcd(e, q - 1) = 1$ .
3. Compute  $N = p * q$  and  $\phi(n) = (p - 1) * (q - 1)$
4. Calculate  $d$  (private) as the multiplicative inverse of  $e$  modulo  $\phi(n)$ .
5.  $(N, e)$  is the public key,  $(N, d)$  is the private key.

To encrypt a message  $m$  with **textbook RSA**

$$c = m^e \mod N$$

To decrypt a ciphertext  $c$

$$m = c^d \mod N$$

### 4.1.2 Security

RSA relies on the hardness of factoring the modulo  $N$  and we don't have a polynomial algorithm to factor it, so it's considered secure. However there are different attacks against textbook RSA or bad implementations:

- If  $m < N^{\frac{1}{e}}$ , then  $m^e < N$  and the modulo operation is not applied and we only need to find the  $e$ th root of  $c$  over the integers to find  $m$ .
- If  $q = p + x$  where  $x$  is small enough than it's easy to recover the factors of  $N$  computing  $A = \sqrt{N}$  and compute  $p = A - x$  for different value of  $x$  until  $N \bmod p = 0$ , then we have found  $q = N/p$ .
- It's possible to recover  $d$  if it is too small (for example to accelerate decryption) using the Wiener's attack [24].
- Other attacks can be found on the excellent survey by Dan Boneh [4].

## 4.2 Lattices against RSA

We start introducing the main ideas of Coppersmith's attack [6] and the math behind it. The attack can be used against **RSA** when a small  $e$  is used, but also to factorize the modulus if some bits of  $p$  or  $q$  are known. In 2017 the attack was used to exploit CVE-2017-15361 also named **ROCA** (Return Of Coppersmith's Attack) [15].

### 4.2.1 Mathematical introduction

It's easy to find the roots of a univariate polynomial over the integers. Finding the roots of **modular** polynomial is hard, example:

$$f(x) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$$

Suppose  $N$  is an **RSA** modulus and we don't know the factorization of it. Let's have an univariate integer polynomial  $f(x)$  with degree  $n$

$$f(x) = x^n + a_{n-1}x^{n-1} + a_{n-2}x^{n-2} + \dots + a_1x + a_0$$

Coppersmith showed how we can recover the value  $x_0$  such that  $f(x_0) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$ , with  $x_0 < N^{\frac{1}{n}}$  in polynomial time using the following theorem

**Theorem 4.2.1** *Howgrave-Graham*

Let  $g(x)$  be an univariate polynomial with  $n$  monomials and  $m$  be a positive integer. If we have some restraint  $X$  and the following equations hold

$$g(x_0) \equiv 0 \pmod{N^m}, |x_0| \leq X \quad (4.1)$$

$$\|g(xX)\| < \frac{N^m}{\sqrt{n}} \quad (4.2)$$

Then  $g(x_0) = 0$  holds over the integers.

This theorem states that is possible to compute the root of  $f(x) \pmod{N}$  if we can find a polynomial  $g(x)$  that share the same root but modulo  $N^m$ . If 4.1 and 4.2 hold then we can simply compute the root of  $g(x)$  over the integers to have the same root  $x_0$  such that  $f(x_0) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}$ .

Howgrave-Graham's idea is to find this polynomial  $g$  by combining polynomials  $p_i$  who also have  $x_0$  as roots modulo  $N^m$ .

The **LLL** algorithm is fundamental because:

- It only does **integer linear operations** on the basis vectors. In this way even if the basis is different it's only a linear combination of vector that still have  $x_0$  as root modulo  $N^m$ .
- If we craft the lattice properly, the norm of shortest vector on the reduced basis will satisfy 4.2. We know the length's bound of the shortest vector that LLL could find.

We can easily create polynomials  $p_i$  ( $g_{i,j}$  and  $h_i$ ) sharing the same root  $x_0$  over  $N^m$  of  $f$  where  $\delta$  is the degree of  $f$ :

$$g_{i,j}(x) = x^j \cdot N^i \cdot f^{m-i}(x) \text{ for } i = 0, \dots, m-1, \quad j = 0, \dots, \delta-1 \quad (4.3)$$

$$h_i(x) = x^i \cdot f^m(x) \text{ for } i = 0, \dots, t-1 \quad (4.4)$$

Applying **LLL** to a lattice constructed by the coefficients of 4.3 we'll find a short vector  $v = g(xX)$  that will satisfy 4.2. If we then take  $g(x)$  we will be able to compute the root over the integer.

### 4.2.2 Recover plaintext with known MSB bits of $m$

We will use a simplified version of the Coppersmith's attack that works when the root is approximately less than  $N^{\frac{1}{6}}$ .

**Problem setup.** Let  $N$  be an **RSA** modulus of 97-bit:

$$N = 0x1a34992f64135aedaa0fe2bfd \text{ and } e = 3.$$

Before the encryption the message  $m$  is padded as

$$z = pad || m = 0xffffffffffffffffffffffff || m$$

where  $||$  is the concatenation.

The ciphertext is

$$c = z^e \mod N = 0x11701d5479bcdef207cba6937$$

Suppose that we don't know the factorization of  $N$  and we would like to know the message  $m$ . We know the padding and that the message  $m$  is 2 bytes long, composed by only ascii letters, so  $m < 0x7b7b$ .

Let's define

$$a = 0xffffffffffffffffffffffff0000.$$

which is the known padding string that got encrypted.

Thus we have that  $c = (a + m)^3 \mod N$ , for an unknown small  $m$ . We can define  $f(x) = (a + x)^3 - c$ , and so we setup the problem to find a small root  $m$  such that  $f(m) \equiv 0 \mod N$

$$f(x) = x^3 + 0x17d7f55d0c9dc5851af54957cx^2 + 0x3cf96fed2ea927527a2ed329x + 0x32882e547964b3bcf75d315e$$

**Lattice construction.** Let the coefficients of  $f$  be  $f(x) = x^3 + f_2x^2 + f_1x + f_0$  and  $X = 0x7b7b$  be the upper bound of the size of the root  $m$ . We can construct the matrix

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} X^3 & f_2X^2 & f_1X & f_0 \\ 0 & NX^2 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & NX & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & N \end{pmatrix}$$



The rows of the matrix correspond to the coefficient vectors of the polynomials  $f(x)$ ,  $Nx^2$ ,  $Nx$  and  $N$ , furthermore we know that each polynomials will be 0 modulo  $N$  if evaluated at  $x = m$ . We applied Howgrave-Graham with  $m = 1$  (the  $N^m$  parameter not the message).

With this lattice construction every vector is of the form  $v = (v_3X^3, v_2X^2, v_1X, v_0)$ , because any integer linear combination of the vector of the lattice will keep the bound  $X^i$  for  $i = 0, \dots, \dim(B) - 1$ .

**Apply LLL.** We then apply LLL to find the shortest vector of the reduced basis:

$$v = (-0xd55d67baf71dX^3, 0x3cf3cca3200a58bfX^2, \\ 0x3854d44211e80f248449X, -0xec93bf51cf766f7b9f1e5e6)$$

We can construct the polynomial  $g$  using the coefficients of  $v$

$$g(x) = -0xd55d67baf71dx^3 + 0x3cf3cca3200a58bf x^2 \\ 0x3854d44211e80f248449x - 0xec93bf51cf766f7b9f1e5e6$$

We know that

$$g(x_0) \equiv 0 \pmod{N}, |x_0| \leq X$$

What we need to prove is that

$$\|g(xX)\| \leq \frac{N}{\sqrt{n}}$$

In this example,  $\det B = X^6N^3$ , and LLL will find a short vector with  $\|v\| \leq 2^{\frac{n(n-1)}{4(n)}} (\det B)^{\frac{1}{n}}$ . If we ignore the  $2^{\frac{3}{4}}$  factor (remember that  $n = 4$ ), then we need to satisfy

$$g(m) \leq \|v\| \leq (\det B)^{\frac{1}{4}} < \frac{N}{\sqrt{4}}$$

We have  $(\det B)^{\frac{1}{4}} = (X^6N^3)^{\frac{1}{4}} < \frac{N}{\sqrt{4}}$ , if we solves for  $X$  this will be satisfied when  $X < (\frac{N}{16})^{\frac{1}{6}}$ . We can consider the  $\sqrt{4}$  an error term to have  $X < N^{\frac{1}{6}}$ . With the numbers we have this inequality is verified, however even if the bound of the shortest vector is larger we still have some possibilities to find the correct root.

If we compute the root of  $g(x)$  over the integers we obtain  $m = 0x4142 = \text{"AB"}$  which is the correct result.

This specific lattice works to find roots up to size  $N^{\frac{1}{6}}$ , so the same construction will work if we want to find

- $\approx 170$  unknown bits of message from an RSA 1024-bit modulus
- $\approx 341$  unknown bits of message from an RSA 2048-bit modulus
- $\approx 683$  unknown bits of message from an RSA 4096-bit modulus

To compute bigger root a bigger lattice with more polynomials generated with 4.3 is needed, this method is better described in [12] and a detailed implementation in `sagemath` by David Wong is available [25].

### 4.2.3 Factorize modulus with known MSB bits of $p$

Lattices can also be used to factor a modulus  $N$  knowing the most significant bits of one of the factor. Let  $a = 2^b$  where  $b$  are the bits known of  $p$ , then  $p = a + r$  for some small value of  $r$ . We can rewrite the problem to find the root  $r$  of  $f(x) = a + x \pmod{p}$  such that  $f(r) = p \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ . Suppose that we know the bound of  $r$  such that  $|r| < X$  for some bound  $X$ .

We can construct the following lattices

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} X^2 & Xa & 0 \\ 0 & X & a \\ 0 & 0 & N \end{pmatrix}$$

Notice that the rows correspond to the polynomials  $x(x+a)$ ,  $(x+a)$ ,  $N$  and that each of these polynomials will be  $0 \pmod{p}$  when  $x = r$ . As before 4.2.2, every polynomial is scaled by  $X$  which is the upperbound.

We need to verify that the shortest vector that we can with **LLL** will be less than  $p$  because if  $g(x) < p$ , then by construction we can compute  $g(r) = 0$  over the integers. In this case we have

$$(\det B)^{\frac{1}{\dim L}} = (X^3 N)^{\frac{1}{3}} < p$$

Solving for  $X$  we obtain  $X < p^{\frac{1}{3}}$ , so this method works for every  $|r| < p^{\frac{1}{3}}$ .

To find  $r$  we just need to apply **LLL** and take the first vector (shortest) that will be of the form  $v = (v_2 X^2, v_1 X, v_0)$ .

The last step is to construct  $g(x) = v_2 x^2 + v_1 x + v_0$  (just divides every coefficient by  $X^i$ ) and computes the roots over the integers to find  $r$ . We implemented the attack against a modulus of RSA-1024 knowing the 160 most significant bits of  $p$ . The attack can be expanded until  $X < p^{\frac{1}{2}}$  with a bigger lattice.

#### 4.2.4 Real world case study: ROCA

**ROCA**[15] is a vulnerability discovered in 2017 in a software library *RSALib* in the generation of the public modulus for **RSA**. The attack is believed to affects millions of smart cards. The vulnerability resides in the generation of prime numbers, since embedded devices don't have lots of computational resources a fast way was needed. Every prime generated has the following structure:

$$p = kM + (g^a \bmod M)$$

Where  $k, a$  are random values different for every prime (unkown),  $g = 65537$  and  $M$  it's a *primorial* number. A *primorial* number  $M$  is the product of the the first  $n$  successive primes

$$M = P_n = \prod_{i=1}^n P_i$$

where  $n$  is related to key size. In the case of *RSALib* the primorial number used had similar dimension to  $p$ , and the value  $a, k$  didn't have much entropy. The modulus is

$$N = (kM + g^a \bmod M)(lM + g^b \bmod M)$$

for  $a, b, k, l \in \mathbb{Z}$ . It's equivalent to

$$N \equiv g^{a+b} \equiv g^c \bmod M$$

for some  $c \in \mathbb{Z}$  since all the multiples of  $kM$  or  $lM$  are  $0 \bmod M$ .

It's possible to compute the discrete logarithm of  $g^c \bmod M$  since the size of  $|M|$  is smooth with Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [17]. With  $c$  we can set the bound to the value of  $a$  since

$$\frac{c}{2} \leq a \leq \frac{c + ord}{2}$$

where  $ord$  is the multiplicative order of the generator  $g \in Z_M$ .

Once we know the bound of  $a$  we can try to find the value of  $k$  with the Coppersmith's method [6] for every possible  $a$ .

The concept of the algorithm is the following:

---

**Algorithm 4** Exploit idea

---

**Input:**  $N, M, g, ord, X$

$c = \log_g N \bmod M$

**for**  $a \leftarrow (\frac{c}{2}, \frac{c+ord}{2})$  **do**

$f(x) = xM + (g^a \bmod M)$

$g(x) = \frac{1}{M}f(x)$  [make monic, the roots are the same]

$k = \text{coppersmith}(g(x), N, X)$  [find k]

$p = kM + (g^a \bmod M)$  [candidate]

**if**  $N \bmod p = 0$  **then**

        | return  $p$

**end**

**end**

---

In practice however the bound of  $a$  is too big, so the authors found a way to move the same problem to a smaller  $M'$  since the bitsize of  $M$  are more than sufficient for making the attack works with Coppersmith's algorithm. Their optimization find a new  $M'$  such that

- $(p, q)$  are still of the form 4.2.4, so  $M'$  must be a divisor of  $M$ .
- Coppersmith's algorithm will find  $k'$  for the correct guess of  $a'$ .
- Find a small order of  $g \in \mathbb{Z}'_M$  to make  $a'$  smaller.

We were able to reproduce the attack in sagemath against **RSA-512**, and we used as  $M'$  the value that Bruno Product [18] made available in his thesis and David Wong's implementation of Coppersmith's attack [25].

# Chapter 5

## ECDSA Cryptanalysis

### 5.1 ECDSA Introduction

#### 5.1.1 Algorithm

**ECDSA** is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (**DSA**) which uses elliptic curve cryptography. There are 3 public parameters:

- The elliptic curve  $E$ .
- The generator point  $G$ .
- The generator's order  $n$ .

We also need to create a private key  $d \in [1, n - 1]$  and public key  $Q = dG$ .  
To **sign** a message  $m$ :

1. Compute  $h = \text{MSB}(\text{HASH}(m))$  where HASH is a cryptographic hash function, for example SHA-256, and MSB take the  $n$  most significant bits.
2. Select a random integer  $k \in [1, n - 1]$  (nonce).
3. Calculate  $P = kG = (x_1, y_1)$  and set  $r = (x_1)$  if  $x_1 \neq 0$ , otherwise repeat the steps.
4. Compute  $s = k^{-1}(h + dr) \pmod n$ , if  $s = 0$  repeat the steps.
5. The signature is composed by  $(r, s)$ .

To **verify** the signature:

1. Compute  $h = \text{HASH}(m)$ .
2. Calculate  $u_1 = hs^{-1} \bmod n$  and  $u_2 = rs^{-1} \bmod n$ .
3. Compute  $P = u_1G + u_2Q = (x_1, y_1)$ , if  $P = O$  the signature is invalid.
4. If  $r \equiv x_1 \bmod n$  then the signature is valid.

### 5.1.2 Security

The security of **ECDSA** depends on the discrete logarithm problem. Given the points  $Q, G$  such that  $Q = k * G$  it's considered an hard problem to find  $k$ . However as RSA there are lots of implementation attacks

- If the same  $k$  is used to generate two different signatures it's possible to recover the secret key  $d$ . This was a real bug discovered in the Playstation 3.
- It's possible to recover  $d$  if the parameter  $k$  is not generated with a cryptographically secure pseudo random generator.
- If the elliptic curve used is not standardized (custom) then it's possible that the discrete logarithm is easily solvable [7], [10] [2].

## 5.2 Lattices against ECDSA

The lattice-based attacks presented here are based on the *HNP (Hidden Number Problem)* introduced by Boneh and Venkatesan [5] that was in a second moment generalized to prove that the most significant bits of  $k$  can potentially leak the entire nonce [16]. In 2020 a group of researcher were able to leak the MSBs of  $DH$  and  $DHE$  secrets in **TLS  $\leq$  1.2** and using a similar lattice constructions as the one we will describe to solve the *HNP* and thus breaks the protocol [13] (Raccoon Attack).

### 5.2.1 Recover $d$ from a pair of signatures with small $k_1, k_2$

**Problem setup.** Let  $p = 0xffffffffffffd21f$  and let  $E : y^2 = x^3 + 3$  be an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{F}_p$  with the generator  $G = (0xcc3b3d1a0c4938ef, 0x4ab35ff66f8194fa)$  of order  $n = 0xffffffffefa23f437$ .

We have two signature:

$$(r_1, s_1) = (0x269fa43451c5ff3c, 0x1184ec0a74d4be7c) \\ \text{and hash } h_1 = 0xb526aef1a341cfe6$$

$$(r_2, s_2) = (0xf77cda14f5bf50a2, 0xcd1143ccc1516b02) \\ \text{and hash } h_2 = 0x84768dde659efea$$

And we know that both of these signatures use 32-bit nonce  $k$ , note that  $n$  is a 64-bit number. We can set up the problem as a system of equation

$$s_1 \equiv \frac{h_1 + dr_1}{k_1} \pmod{n}$$

$$s_2 \equiv \frac{h_2 + dr_2}{k_2} \pmod{n}$$

We don't know  $d, k_1, k_2$ , but we can write

$$d = \frac{s_1 k_1 - h_1}{r_1}$$

and rewrite the equation in

$$k_1 - s_1^{-1} s_2 r_1^{-1} k_2 + s_1^{-1} r_1 h_2 r_2^{-1} - s_1^{-1} h_1 \equiv 0 \pmod{n}$$

To simplify the equation we write  $t = -s_1^{-1} s_2 r_1^{-1} k_2$  and  $u = s_1^{-1} r_1 h_2 r_2^{-1} - s_1^{-1} h_1$ . In this way we have

$$k_1 + tk_2 + u \equiv 0 \pmod{n}$$

or

$$-k_1 = tk_2 + u - xn \text{ for some } x$$

We know that  $|k_1|, |k_2| < K = 2^{32}$ .

**Lattice construction.** We construct the lattice  $B = (b_0, b_1, b_2)$ :

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} n & 0 & 0 \\ t & 1 & 0 \\ u & 0 & K \end{pmatrix}$$

Note that the vector  $v = (-k_1, k_2, K)$  is in the lattice because

$$v = -xb_0 + k_2b_1 + b_2 = (-xn + tk_2 + u = -k_1, k_2, K)$$

for some  $x, k_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ .

Can we prove that  $v$  is a short vector that we can find with LLL?

We have

$$\|v\| = \sqrt{k_1^2 + k_2^2 + K^2} \leq \sqrt{3K^2} = \sqrt{3}K$$

And we expect the shortest vector to have length

$$\begin{aligned} &\approx 2^{\frac{1}{2}}(\det B)^{\frac{1}{3}} \\ &\approx 2^{\frac{1}{2}}(nK)^{\frac{1}{3}} \end{aligned}$$

So we want that

$$\|v\| \leq \sqrt{3}K < \sqrt{2}(nK)^{\frac{1}{3}}$$

And if we remove the smaller terms this will be satisfied when  $K < (nK)^{\frac{1}{3}}$  or  $K < \sqrt{n}$ .

In this case if we apply LLL in the second row we obtain:

$$v = (-k_1, k_2, K) = (-0x50a65330, 0x1f5b977a, 0x100000000)$$

To retrieve  $d$  we just need to compute

$$d = r_1^{-1}(k_1 s_1 - h_1) = 0xf00e5fb275bfd304$$

Source of the method:

### 5.2.2 Recover $d$ from many signatures with small $k_i$

Suppose we have many signatures  $(r_1, s_1), \dots, (r_m, s_m)$  with message hashes  $h_1, \dots, h_m$ . We can write the equivalence  $s_i \equiv k_i^{-1}(h_i + dr_i) \pmod n$  for  $i = 1, \dots, m$  and we can remove  $d$  as before to get

$$\begin{aligned} k_1 + t_1 k_m + u_1 &\equiv 0 \pmod n \\ k_2 + t_2 k_m + u_2 &\equiv 0 \pmod n \\ &\vdots \\ k_{m-1} + t_{m-1} k_m + u_{m-1} &\equiv 0 \pmod n \end{aligned}$$

And create the lattice  $B$  as

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} n & & & & & \\ & n & & & & \\ & & \ddots & & & \\ & & & n & & \\ t_1 & t_2 & \cdots & t_{m-1} & 1 & 0 \\ u_1 & u_2 & \cdots & u_{m-1} & 0 & K \end{pmatrix}$$



Same as before this lattice contains  $v = (-k_1, -k_2, \dots, k_m, K)$  that can be found using LLL.

### 5.2.3 Recover $d$ knowing MSB bits of each $k_i$

What if we know the firsts MSB bits of each  $k_i$ ?

Well, we can write  $k_i = (a_i + b_i)$ , where  $a_i$  is the known part and  $b_i$  is the unknown part that satisfies  $|b_i| < K$ . If we plug these values into the equivalence we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} k_i + t_i k_m + u_i &\equiv 0 \pmod{n} \\ (a_i + b_i) + t_i(a_m + b_m) + u_i &\equiv 0 \pmod{n} \\ b_i + t_i b_m + a_i + t_i a_m + u_i &\equiv 0 \pmod{n} \end{aligned}$$

And we can set  $u'_i = a_i + t_i a_m + u_i$  to be the value inside the lattice 5.2.2 instead of  $u_i$ . In this way the vector

$$v = (-b_1, -b_2, \dots, b_m, K)$$

is in the lattice and could be found using LLL. To recover the original  $(k_1, \dots, k_m)$  we must add to  $v$  the vector  $w = (a_1, \dots, a_m)$ .

Without any optimization we were able to recover the nonces with the 8 MSB bits known on the curve `secp256r1` given 100 signatures and with a probability bigger than 50% with 7 MSB bits known.

It's possible to optimize the attack to recover the nonces with less known bits as shown in the results obtained by Albrecht and Heninger [1].

# Conclusion

The results obtained from the implementation of the attacks are satisfactory and can be used against real world practical cases. There is a fair amount of probability and heuristic to make the attacks works that isn't discussed in detail. As with other branch of mathematics not all theorems and properties are proved to be useful the moment they were first introduced but can become useful years later as the hidden number problem that become crucial for the Raccoon Attack. The study on how to exploit side-channel attacks (ex. knowing some bits of  $p$  in **RSA**) has been proven useful with **ROCA**. The most used cryptographic protocol used has been proved secure but it's very easy to implement them wrong and side-channel vulnerabilities can heavily compromise the security of the protocol.

# Bibliography

- [1] Martin R. Albrecht and Nadia Heninger. On bounded distance decoding with predicate: Breaking the "lattice barrier" for the hidden number problem. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/1540, 2020. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1540>.
- [2] Araki, Satoh, Semaev, and Smart. Smart-ass attack: For elliptic curves  $e/fp$  of size  $p$ , the ecdlp can be solved very efficiently, 1997.
- [3] L. Babai. On lovász' lattice reduction and the nearest lattice point problem. *Combinatorica*, 6(1):1–13, Mar 1986.
- [4] Dan Boneh. Twenty years of attacks on the rsa cryptosystem. 1999. <https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/RSA-survey.pdf>.
- [5] Dan Boneh and Ramarathnam Venkatesan. Hardness of computing the most significant bits of secret keys in diffie-hellman and related schemes. In Neal Koblitz, editor, *Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '96*, pages 129–142, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1996. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- [6] Don Coppersmith. Finding a small root of a bivariate integer equation; factoring with high bits known. In Ueli Maurer, editor, *Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT '96*, pages 178–189, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1996. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- [7] Kenneth Giuliani. Attacks on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, 1999.
- [8] Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, and J.H. Silverman. *An Introduction to Mathematical Cryptography*. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2 edition, 2014.
- [9] H.W. jr. Lenstra, A.K. Lenstra, and L. Lovász. Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients. *Mathematische Annalen*, 261:515–534, 1982.

- [10] Florian Luca, David Mireles Morales, and Igor Shparlinski. Mov attack in various subgroups on elliptic curves. *Illinois Journal of Mathematics - ILL J MATH*, 48, 07 2004.
- [11] Kelby Ludwig. Building lattice reduction (lll) intuition, 2017. <https://kel.bz/post/111/>.
- [12] Alexander May. *Using LLL-Reduction for Solving RSA and Factorization Problems*, pages 315–348. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010.
- [13] Robert Merget, Marcus Brinkmann, Nimrod Aviram, Juraj Somorovsky, Johannes Mittmann, and Jörg Schwenk. Raccoon attack: Finding and exploiting most-significant-bit-oracles in tls-dh(e). Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/1151, 2020. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1151>.
- [14] Gabrielle De Micheli and Nadia Heninger. Recovering cryptographic keys from partial information, by example. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/1506, 2020. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1506>.
- [15] Matus Nemec, Marek Sys, Petr Svenda, Dusan Klinec, and Vashek Matyas. The Return of Coppersmith’s Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli. In *24th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’2017)*, pages 1631–1648. ACM, 2017.
- [16] Phong Q. Nguyen and Igor E. Shparlinski. The insecurity of the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm with partially known nonces. *Des. Codes Cryptography*, 30(2):201–217, September 2003.
- [17] S. Pohlig and M. Hellman. An improved algorithm for computing logarithms over  $gf(p)$  and its cryptographic significance (corresp.). *IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory*, 24:106–110, 1978.
- [18] Bruno Product. Optimization of the roca (cve-2017-15361) attack, 2019.
- [19] Oded Regev. Lll algorithm, 2004. [https://cims.nyu.edu/~regev/teaching/lattices\\_fall\\_2004/ln/111.pdf](https://cims.nyu.edu/~regev/teaching/lattices_fall_2004/ln/111.pdf).
- [20] Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. In *Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing*, STOC ’05, page 84–93, New York, NY, USA, 2005. Association for Computing Machinery.

- [21] Grant Sanderson. Dot product plot, 2016. <https://youtu.be/LyGKycYT2v0?t=105>.
- [22] Grant Sanderson. Geometric explanation of determinant, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ip3X9L0h2dk>.
- [23] Giovanni Di Santi. Introduction to lattices attack, 2021. <https://github.com/meowmeowxw/lattice-based-attacks>.
- [24] M.J. Wiener. Cryptanalysis of short rsa secret exponents. *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, 36(3):553–558, 1990.
- [25] David Wong. Lattice based attacks on rsa, 2015. <https://github.com/mimoo/RSA-and-LLL-attacks>.