Proposal

Should the 39.798809775 ETH

that flowed into the Lido DAO Treasury, as a result of an exploited vulnerability in SushiSwap RouteProcessor2, be sent to [sifuvision.eth

](https://etherscan.io/address/0x31d3243CfB54B34Fc9C73e1CB1137124bD6B13E1) (the affected party) as an expression of goodwill?

Voting options:

- No action

- Send 39.798809775 ETH

from the Lido Treasury to sifuvision.eth

Snapshot date:

Thursday, May 4th.

Motivation

Untangling the original post and discussion, it's clear there are two, largely orthogonal, decisions at hand:

1. A decision on an outflow of ≈40 ETH

from the Lido DAO treasury to help Sushi (this is the amount which came into the treasury as a result of the exploit).

1. A wider policy decision on whether or not the DAO should ever act as an arbiter between stakers, node operators, and third parties – and if so, how, and under what conditions.

The discussion under the original post has revolved almost entirely around the second decision – yet this has not been made clear within the discussion itself.

To minimize the risk of decisions, on both fronts, being made for the wrong reasons, it makes sense to move these two decisions into separate threads where they can be discussed individually.

Key points

Concerns of the type that Hasu and Misha have raised in the orginal thread are not especially relevant to this initial decision at hand.

In particular:

- Lido DAO does not a priori need a broader framework to make decisions on what to do about unexpected treasury inflows.

- Voting in favour of this decision does not turn the Lido DAO into an aribiter or open up a slippery slope that could detract from its neutrality.