

SEEDGov Delegate Communication Thread

Following the standards of [SEEDGov](#), this is our thread with all our relevant decisions and participation in ArbitrumDAO's governance.

Our previous voting activity is detailed [here](#).

January 2025

[Constitutional AIP] Activate Arbitrum BoLD + Infura Nova Validator Whitelist

After consideration, the [@SEEDgov](#) delegation has decided to "FOR" on this proposal at the [Tally Vote](#).

Rationale

Considering what was expressed when we voted on Snapshot:

[SEED Latam Delegate Communication Thread](#)

BOLD is a leap in quality in almost every sense.

Arbitrum seeks to align itself as closely as possible with Ethereum, by openly allowing all stakeholders to act in providing security to the network. A new permissionless validation system with well-delineated incentives is a win-win for the network and those honest parties looking to lock up capital safely.

This update brings security improvements, provides solutions to existing problems, has 0 negative implications for the user, and elevates the participation of individuals and institutions in the functioning of the network, so it's definitely a YES to all.

We still believe that BoLD is a necessary step in the roadmap of any rollup that seeks to be as decentralized, censorship-resistant, and secure as possible.

Regarding the Infura whitelist, we maintain our previously stated position:

[SEED Latam Delegate Communication Thread](#)

[Non-Constitutional] Whitelist Infura Nova Validator

After consideration, the [@SEEDgov](#) delegation has decided to "FOR" on this proposal at the [Snapshot vote](#).

Rationale

Given Infura's strong reputation within the crypto ecosystem and the validator's track record of excellent uptime, we see this proposal as an easy yes.

We also share the sentiment expressed by other delegates regarding whether the DAO will need to whitelist additional validators in the future or if this is a one-time consideration.

Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0

After consideration, the [@SEEDgov](#) delegation has decided to "FOR" on this proposal at the [Snapshot Vote](#).

Rationale

From our perspective, STEP is one of the best-executed programs within the DAO.

Several strong points allow us to continue trusting the team designated for this task:

- The choice of Service Providers, including web2 institutions like Blackrock and web3-native entities like Mountain and Ondo among the selected ones, demonstrates not only reliable criteria but also a strategic deployment of funds between reputable actors from different sectors.
- The dashboard was handy for tracking the funds' evolution, although we would add more on-chain info for each holding and more details of the transactions made, providing greater clarity on the dates each investment was executed, the current location of the funds, etc.
- The reporting has also been useful, though it would be reasonable to observe the intra-month variations of each holding more easily. For instance, to observe the addition of TBILLs from OpenEden, one must compare the reports from [November](#) and [December](#) as there is no written mention or graphical indication. Despite this, the periodic updates on changes to the backing of each asset are highly valuable information.

- The estimated budget costs seem reasonable, considering that less time will be required to review applications from service providers who already participated in STEP 1.
- As expressed by @L2Beat

, perhaps in the future, this work could fall under the scope of the TMC and GM, all within a comprehensive Treasury Management strategy that we hope the OpCo will develop in coordinating these initiatives. Meanwhile, STEP has proven its value and should continue, as these precedents will aid in developing the mentioned plan, providing the DAO with experience, links to service providers, and a clear framework for executing the strategy.

To expand on the current board's criteria, we highlight the transparency and reasonability for rejecting applicants:

[STEP Committee Recommendations](#)

- No investment restrictions

, especially worrisome if a provider can use leverage

and hedging

at discretion of the manager. As one of the committee members expressed, we need something beyond common sense that stops a provider from taking our money and putting it into Argentinian peso bonds.

- Segregated portfolio companies with multiple portfolios

are an added risk. Bankruptcy remote is not just having separate bank accounts, creditors look at whether entities are in actuality separate (their own board meeting minutes, payroll with staff, etc) so that the subsidiary entities do not get rolled into the parent one during proceedings.

- Products with a tiny AUM

, exposure to a single ISIN

or having fund managers without extensive prior experience

or outsourced

to third parties are riskier bets

- Providers using their own proprietary blockchain

or solely that of a competitor

were passed on in this round

- Decentralized governance

of underlying assets which require additional due diligence and/or have exposure to the Foundation for the same add an extra layer of unpredictability

- Redemption

procedures have a lag

period measured in weeks or months or are limited to a single stablecoin

that is not USDC, USDT or DAI or require a bank transfer

- Insufficient documentation

such as not providing a PPM, investment memo, counterparty for reverse repos, guidelines, restrictions, having annual audits only or from unknown auditors or managers

- High fees

that are uncompetitive in the current rates environment

- Appears unlikely unlikely to develop secondary market liquidity

to underwrite against

- Operationally burdensome

and requires more active oversight than is desired since individual issuances mature without auto-roll

All these points speak to the committee's due diligence before approving or rejecting a Service Provider, which we highly value.

We hope they continue on the same path, prioritizing the security and liquidity of the invested assets.

Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections

After consideration, the [@SEEDgov](#) delegation has decided to distribute their votes in the following way:

[New Protocol and Ideas

](<https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x3defa5cd5570092ed229d56a5a5fc77c7f7de30eb92c8f21834a53c103936f8f>):
75% to Saurabh & Shogun - 25% to Castle Labs - NDW & Chilla

[Gaming

](<https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xe52ab17d41249186c4dc54afdb481e120572102ad222d4e2af13a92791d72344>):
100% to Nikki Tran & Adam (Flook)

[Dev Tooling on One and Stylus

](<https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x7241843c0a1ab87a5703335f28bb34ba190e31a9c294fc4d977116eae25f1db>):
100% to Andreiv

[Education, Community Growth, and Events

](<https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x0ce496fc0e16be46842dff38be15b831cde3099b7ce1e90ee3c941f5adb6aaee>):
ABSTAINING here for COI reasons

Rationale

[New Protocol and Ideas

](<https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x3defa5cd5570092ed229d56a5a5fc77c7f7de30eb92c8f21834a53c103936f8f>):
Among the candidates, we were most impressed by Saurabh - Shogun and Castle Labs - NDW & Chilla. The former demonstrated solid experience leading grant programs in GMX and Questbook, making integrations within the Arbitrum ecosystem, and conducting data analysis and metrics for tools and support. As for the latter, their extensive experience in incentive design, evaluation of protocol applications in LTIPP/STIP, and research and advisory within Arbitrum's ecosystem made them an attractive option as well.

[Gaming

](<https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0xe52ab17d41249186c4dc54afdb481e120572102ad222d4e2af13a92791d72344>):
For the Gaming Domain, both candidates were really solid:

Nikki Tran & Adam (Flook)

: Nikki possesses experience in content creation, managing Web3 campaigns, and audience growth across multiple platforms, making her a perfect fit considering the restructuring and scope change in this domain. Adam, as Co-founder of Merlyn Labs, has deep knowledge of Web3 gaming and has managed the Gaming Domain in Arbitrum for 14 months. Together, they appear to be an ideal match for the domain's needs.

Carlos Gonzalez & Alejandro Ochoa

: Carlos has technical experience in blockchain gaming, L3 appchain development, and hackathons. Alejandro, a leader in the Gaming and Blockchain sector at Afirme, has expertise in strategic investments and prominent projects in LATAM, as well as connections with major Web2 publishers

Here, we faced a difficult decision, but several factors favored Nikki and Adam:

- With the change in the domain's scope due to the GCP, Nikki's profile, with experience in content creation within the gaming sector, can be of great help when it comes to user acquisition.
- Conversely, while Alejandro's connections with major Web2 publishers are valuable, his expertise would be better leveraged within the GCP as example.
- Adam's previous experience in the domain is a strong differentiator. We have firsthand knowledge of how the domain operates and he did a great job.

[Dev Tooling on One and Stylus

](<https://snapshot.org/#/s:arbitrumfoundation.eth/proposal/0x7241843c0a1ab87a5703335f28bb34ba190e31a9c294fc4d977116eae25f1db>):
In this particular domain, [@andreiv](#)'s presentation was very convincing. While it was also a difficult decision because we know Juandi from Seasons 1 and 2, we believe that Andreiv's experience as a dev in events related to Stylus makes him a great fit for the position, potentially the candidate who can best understand initiatives like [Stylus Sprint](#).

It's not a minor detail since having context and understanding of the applications funded in that program makes it more feasible to establish synergies by prioritizing projects complementary to those developed in the Sprint.

The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO's Grant Misuse Bounty Program

After consideration, the [@SEEDgov](#) delegation has decided to "FOR

” on this proposal at the [Snapshot Vote](#).

Rationale

In light of our [previous feedback](#), we appreciate all the clarifications provided by [@Entropy](#) as well as the amendments made to the proposal.

Regarding the incorporation of this committee into the OpCo in the future, we reiterate that this could be the new composition:

[The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO's Grant Misuse Bounty Program](#)

If the program is migrated to the OpCo, the evaluation committee could include: one delegate elected by the DAO, one OAT member, and one ARDC member.

We suggest including an OAT member since only individuals with no other financial ties to the DAO can be part of OAT, making a conflict of interest unlikely. Furthermore, with OpCo established, there wouldn't be many reasons for the Arbitrum Foundation to remain in the committee, as legal agreements with SPs/Grantees would likely be signed with OpCo instead of the Foundation.