

Vitalik recently [tweeted this problem](#)

Blockquote

Cryptography problem: make an invertible, easy-in-both-directions function from $[0 \dots 2^{256} - 1]$ to $[0 \dots 2^{256} - 2]$ (or more generally, $-k$ for small k) where the exceptions to the invertibility are computationally infeasible to find.

[Vitalik's motivating use cases](#)

Blockquote

A really efficient solution could actually significantly simplify Verkle trees, erasure codes and many other constructions in ethereum, by making 32-byte chunks one-to-one mappable to F_p elements.

The author attempts a solution with efficient verification, but one that requires preprocessing, and therefore is only as infeasibly hard to crack as the preprocessing [How to hide pigeonhole collisions in 1 tweet](#)

Expanded Solution:

Blockquote

Let function $f_1(x) = S_1(x)$ yield a set of pigeon hole placements like $f_1(x)$ for any pigeon x

Let x be an integer, an index, into the range of interest, e.g. $[0 \dots 2^{256}]$

Let $S_1(x)$ = the sum of prime factors $P_1(x)$ for large integer $L_1(x)$

S_1 is a set of such sums

L_1 is a set of such large integers

Let function $f_2(x) = S_2(x) - k$ for other large integer $L_2(x)$ in set L_2

k = the number of extra "pigeons", which is 1 in Vitalik's example

Let integers set $D = S_2 - S_1$, so that $D(x) = S_2(x) - S_1(x)$ for $P_2(x)$ $L_2(x)$ and $P_1(x)$ $L_1(x)$

D is the a set of integers to shift pigeon positions from f_1 to f_2 and vice versa

C is a set of integers we add to D to resolve unwanted collisions into unused holes for any pigeon x

Let $F(D, C, f_1, f_2, x)$ be the easily bi-invertible function from f_1 to f_2 and vice versa

Assign very large integers to sets L_1 L_2 at random

Let boolean $b = (f_1 == f_2 + D - C - k)$ = collision if b is true

For easy verification of b , we can simply give away the prime factor keys

We sum

up the prime factors in a large number set L to get sums S for pigeon hole placement set f .

As extra unwanted collisions can occur, we can resolve these into unused holes and keep track of this in $C(x)$ for each $D(x)$

Keeping prime P 's a secret makes it hard for attackers to verify S and delta D .

We can make verifying S & D easy by just giving these P prime keys away for sets P_1 P_2 . This reduces the complexity to mainly just multiplying primes in P to verify that they give L with S and D . $C(x)$ can be checked for any collision offset to add to delta $D(x)$.

A more verbose blog is [linked here](#)

-Gary Bernstein