

## PROPOSAL NAME

Delegated ApeCoin Community Voting Wallet

## TEAM DESCRIPTION

[@SmartAPE](#) // Derek Smart, DAO member and writer-of-many-words

I am an indie software developer who has been in the games industry as a gamer and game dev for over 40 years. I have designed, developed, and published over a dozen games during my career.

My first game, Battlecruiser 3000AD (aka BC3K), was a ground-breaking game that was ahead of its time. Published by Take Two interactive in 1996, it was one of their portfolio titles when [they went public](#) in 1997. So, you could say that I helped the company succeed to where it is today.

Over the decades, I have worked with some of the best software developers and publishers around the world, and my works have been featured in various online and print magazines around the world.

You can learn more about me on my professional [LinkedIn page](#).

## PROPOSAL DESCRIPTION

This proposal is for the creation of a 15M \$APE multi-sig “Community Voting Wallet” controlled by members of the DAO community.

The purpose is for the CVW to be the voting voice of the community without the influence of whale wallets which tend to override the wishes of the community whereby whale wallets vote against the community pulse.

This mechanic will require a temp check voting period during which the “pulse” of the voting community is based on a “1 wallet = 1 vote” linear voting Snapshot recipe. The results of this voting temp check then determines how the community CVW votes on proposals.

The period of the delegated wallet will last for a period of ONE YEAR (term) from the date that the wallet is used to vote in any AIP. The term can be renewed if a member puts up an AIP to extend it before the term ends. The newly created delegation cannot be used to vote in any subsequent vote concerning its own delegation (eg a vote to renew, a vote to end the delegation early, etc.).

### Background Overview

- Despite the size of the ApeCoin community, a few whale (1M+ \$APE) wallets control the outcome of most proposals up for vote.
- In fact, the majority of token holders don't actually participate in the DAO voting system.
- The voting turnout continues to decline because, as in real-life, the general consensus among voters is that they can't be bothered because they know that their vote isn't likely to count.
- In the June 2024 period alone, the average voting turnout for all AIPs was 189

(!)

- The introduction of the Horizen wallet in the voting system last Oct has thus far created a polarizing effect whereby, at 4.3M \$APE

, it is now the 2nd largest voting wallet next to the Mocaverse (delegated by Animoca) at 6.3M \$APE

. And due to the turnout of the voters, these two wallets control the outcome for every vote

in the DAO.

- The effects of whale voting wallets controlling the outcome of the DAO voting is a centralized paradigm that is outside the realms of decentralization, trust, and fairness.
- Putting caps on a voting wallet isn't the answer as that will just lead to Sybil solutions whereby that same wallet can be split into amounts below the cap, then all vote anyway.
- The Ape Foundation, acting at the behest of the DAO, has an obligation to ensure that each member of the DAO has a voice, and that the voting system is fair and equitable to all.

See also [Special Council To Propose Voting System Reform](#)

## BENEFIT TO APECOIN ECOSYSTEM

This initiative ensures that the DAO community voting, via this proposal, is fairly representative of the wishes of the community.

It can also dramatically reduce - even eliminate - the influence of whale wallets in the DAO voting system.

This community temp check Snapshot voting system is similar to the [For|Against ApeChain](#) vote which came ahead of the final AIP vote for the selected team to build ApeChain.

## STEPS TO IMPLEMENT

Within 14 days of the passing of this proposal, the Ape Foundation will put into effect the following:

1. Create a multi-sig (2-3) wallet for use by the three community members who will use this wallet to vote. The proposal author will select the three community members who will have access to the wallet.
2. Delegate 15M \$APE from the ecosystem fund wallet to the above multi-sig wallet.
3. Going forward, within 3-days of proposals going up to vote, a team of community volunteers selected by me, the proposal author, will put up a temp check Snapshot vote which will run for a period of 3-days (including weekends). It's preferable to have them up on the GWG TempChecks Snapshot.
4. The temp check voting should support the following Snapshot strategies:

1 wallet = 1 vote -: via Quadratic voting, this ignores the value of \$APE in the voting wallet

Shielded voting -: this keeps voter choices and results private until the end of the voting period

- The temp check will be a Snapshot for each of the AIPs which are up for vote at the time. This means that the number of temp-check Snapshot votes would match the number of AIPs up for vote. Instead of individual temp-check Snapshots, the community team also has the option to include a single multi-choice Snapshot that includes all AIPs that are up for vote.
- This temp check Snapshot will also require a [quadratic voting strategy](#) setup as well as Sybil resistance safeguards.
- This temp check Snapshot will support FOR, AGAINST and ABSTAIN options, in which the ABSTAIN count is not considered in the final tally of the votes.
- At the end of the 3-day temp check voting period, the CVW wallet will be used to vote for the AIP based on the voting results of the temp check Snapshot. A majority FOR or AGAINST requires the wallet to vote on the AIP based on the prevailing vote count. In the event of a tie, then the wallet would vote ABSTAIN on the AIP.
- There is no time frame during which the CVW wallet is required to vote prior to the close of the regular AIP voting period. If for some reason (e.g. Force Majeure) the CVW wallet fails to vote prior to close of the voting period, then the results of the temp check vote are discarded.

In the event of a tie:

- While mathematically it would be rare for this to occur, it's probably best to plan a contingency. And so, in the event of a tie, then the community wallet would vote ABSTAIN on the AIP.
- NOTE: I am hesitant to introduce a tie-breaker in the mix as that would rely on third-parties external to the community wallet. e.g. We could use a majority GwG member vote as the tie-breaker. And if that results in another tie, then it goes up to the Special Council for a similar majority vote of those members. And if that results in yet another tie, then

the wallet would vote to ABSTAIN.

This proposal would also apply to ApeCoin DAO election candidate voting.

## REPORTING EXPECTATIONS

The expectation is that this proposal would be implemented by the DAO's administrative team.

The community should regularly review the impact of this proposal.

If accepted, the administration and the community should review the impact of the updates after the 3-month period for conflict ends.

## OVERALL COST

Total amount requested from the ApeCoin Ecosystem Fund = 0 ApeCoin