

## TLDR

: We present a signature aggregation scheme intended as a possible alternative to BLS signatures in the context of [committee voting](#), with applications such as committee-based notorisation and [fork-free sharding](#).

### Construction

Let  $V$

be a committee of voters  $v_1, \dots, v_n$

. For a given message  $m$

every voter can cast one vote by signing  $m$

. For concreteness we set  $|V| = 423$

(as inspired by Dfinity) and require a threshold of  $t$

votes (e.g.  $t = |V|/2$

) to form a quorum.

Given at least  $t$

votes, some collateralised claimer (e.g. an eligible proposer, blockmaker or collator) can aggregate the votes by creating a bitstring  $B = \{b_i\}$

of size 423 bits, where  $b_i = 1$

represents a claim that  $v_i$

signed  $m$

, and  $b_i = 0$

otherwise. The claimer signs  $[m, B]$

to form a signature  $s$

. The cryptoeconomic aggregated signature is  $[m, B, s]$

.

During some challenge period anyone can challenge the claimer to provide the signature of  $m$

from  $v_i$

if the bit  $b_i$

is set to 1. Failure to provide the signature in time slashes half the claimer's collateral, and rewards the other half to the challenger.

### Discussion

The overhead of the aggregation scheme is 423 bits (53 bytes). Every voter (e.g. a notary, collator, validator) knows whenever the claimer is reporting a false vote from himself, so it is risk-free for the voter to challenge the claimer.

Compared to BLS signatures, the aggregation scheme does not require a setup phase among the voters. The scheme is also quantum secure if  $s$

and the votes (signatures of  $m$

) are quantum secure.