

Continuing the discussion from [DRAFT: Position paper on resource pricing](#):

There exists an unintentional and uncoordinated version of [this](#) attack which is inevitable due to its decentralized nature. Suppose that a small portion of users (e.g., 5%) are rational enough to pay less fee by waiting whenever their transactions are not an emergency. For instance, a wallet client has a built-in feature that asks how much the user is willing to wait if the base fee is currently declining. The simple strategy here is to wait as long as the mempool is considerably less than (e.g., half) the target size full. This gives a somewhat reliable prediction that the current block will not be full enough, and the base fee will decrease. Otherwise, the client will broadcast the transaction. This optimization is simple enough to be implemented and is very likely to be used by some people shortly after EIP-1559. However, this will result in the same result as mentioned [before](#), which is the base fee will converge to zero over time. The intuition behind this is that even though users act uncoordinated, their incentives are well aligned to not broadcast transactions whenever blocks are less-than-target full. Therefore, their collective behavior mimics that of an attacker in the [previous](#) version. For a thorough simulation, see [here](#).