

Access list incentives mean transactions should rarely throw an `ACCESS_LIST_EXCEPTION`

by accessing state outside of the access list. By having users provide two transaction signatures (only one of which is included onchain) we can save from having onchain access lists whenever an `ACCESS_LIST_EXCEPTION`

is not thrown. This reduces onchain transaction sizes, saves gas, and possibly improves privacy.

Construction

Let T

be an unsigned transaction (without the access list) and let A

be the corresponding unsigned access list. Currently a user sends T

, A

and $\text{sig}([T, A])$

to validators. We suggest instead that the user sends the following:

- Unsigned transaction

: T

- Unsigned access list

: A

- Optimistic signature

: $\text{sig}(T)$

- Exceptional signature

: $\text{sig}([T, A])$

Validators execute T

relative to A

. Two cases may arise:

1. Optimistic

: No `ACCESS_LIST_EXCEPTION`

is thrown, in which case only T

and $\text{sig}(T)$

must be included onchain.

1. Exceptional

: An `ACCESS_LIST_EXCEPTION`

is thrown, in which case T

, A

and $\text{sig}([T, A])$

must be included onchain.