

The aim of this post is to describe a “minimum viable abstract VM” which does everything that we require. This could also be understood as an abstract interface specification for Taiga.

Basics

Fix a finite field F

, with:

- Multiplication: \ast_F

, with type $F \rightarrow F \rightarrow F$

- Addition: $+_F$

, with type $F \rightarrow F \rightarrow F$

- Additive identity: 0_F

, with type F

- Multiplicative identity: 1_F

, with type F

- Additive inverse: $-_F$

, with type $F \rightarrow F$

- Equality: $=_F$

, with type $F \rightarrow F \rightarrow \{0 \mid 1\}$

Fix an abstract (possibly infinite) program field P

, with:

- Multiplication: \ast_P

, with type $P \rightarrow P \rightarrow P$

- Addition: $+_P$

, with type $P \rightarrow P \rightarrow P$

- Additive identity: 0_P

, with type P

- Multiplicative identity: 1_P

, with type P

- Additive inverse: $-_P$

, with type $P \rightarrow P$

- Comparison: $<_P$

(less than, exclusive), with type $P \rightarrow P \rightarrow \{0 \mid 1\}$

Fix an abstract proving system

with two functions:

- $\text{Prove}(C, x, w) \rightarrow \pi$
- $\text{Verify}(C, x, \pi) \rightarrow \{0 \mid 1\}$

We say that this proving system is zero-knowledge

if from π

the verifier learns nothing of w

(we will omit preprocessing for the sake of simplicity)

Fix a hash function

H

, with type $P \rightarrow F$

, such that:

- H

is non-invertible, in that a computationally bounded adversary cannot compute the preimage from the output

- H

is collision-resistant, in that a computationally bounded adversary cannot feasibly find two preimages with the same output

Programs

Now, we will define programs.

Programs $PROG$

are extended multivariate polynomials over $a_0 \dots a_n \in P$

in canonical form, with designated variable b

, for example:

$$a_0^3 + 2a_1^2 - 3a_0 + 2 - b = 0$$

We extend these polynomials with control flow and reflection.

First, let's introduce the control flow primitives: comparison and branching.

Comparison

is $lt(a, b)$

, where:

- $lt(a, b) = 0$

if $a \leq_P b$

- $lt(a, b) = 1$

otherwise

Branching

is $branch(a, b, c)$

, with type $P \rightarrow P \rightarrow P \rightarrow P$

, where:

- $branch(0_P, b, _) = b$
- $branch(1_P, _, c) = c$
- $branch(_, _, _) = \text{undefined}$

Thus, for example,

$$branch((lt(a_0, a_1), a_2, a_3^2) - b = 0$$

is a valid program.

Assuming that $a \in \{0, 1\}$

, $\text{branch}(a, b, c)$

is semantically equivalent to $((1 - a) _P b) + (a _P c)$

, so we aren't changing the expressive power here, just adding explicit information about control flow.

Second, let's introduce reflection:

- reflect_P

, with type $P \rightarrow \text{PROG}$

- repr_P

, with type $\text{PROG} \rightarrow P$

- eval_P

, with type $\text{PROG} \rightarrow P \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow P$

, where the arity depends on PROG

Argument order corresponds to numbering of $a_0 \dots a_n$

.

Thus, for example,

$\text{eval_P}(\text{branch}(\text{lt}(a_0, a_1), a_2, a_3^2) - a_4 = 0, 3, 4, 5, b) = 0$

is a valid program, and so is

$\text{eval_P}(\text{reflect_P}(a_1), 3) + 2a_2 - b = 0$

The behavior of applying eval_P

with the wrong number of arguments is undefined.

Note, in particular, that we can freely swap a subprogram PROG

with $\text{eval_P}(\text{reflect_P}(\text{repr_P}(\text{PROG})))$

, where $\text{repr_P}(\text{PROG})$

can be calculated at compile-time, and thus "defer compilation".

Circuit transformation

Programs may be transformed to a circuit, by:

- factoring the polynomial
- ordering the factors in canonical form
- transforming to a circuit DAG

Stack machine compilation

The circuit DAG may then be compiled to a sequential stack machine in the standard manner. For example, define the stack machine state as $(pc, ins, data)$

, with:

- pc

the program counter

- ins

the instruction sequence

- $data$

the data stack

Stack machine operations:

- PUSH a
- NEG
- ADD
- MUL
- COMPARE
- BRANCH pc_1 pc_2
- REPR
- REFLECT
- EVAL

TODO: Figure out any stack consistency issues on branching.

Resources

Define a resource

R

as a seven-tuple (PROG, P, F, P, F, F, 0 | 1)

with fields named as follows:

- R_{logic}

of type PROG

- R_{label}

of type P

- R_{quantity}

of type F

- R_{value}

of type P

- R_{nonce}

of type F

- R_{nc}

of type F

("nullifier commitment")

- R_{ephemerality}

of type { 0_P | 1_P }

Resources with R_{ephemerality} = 0_P

are known as ephemeral

, while resources with R_{ephemerality} = 1_P

are known as persistent

.

TODO: Same as the commitment for now.

Define the commitment
of a resource $R_{\{commitment\}}$
as $hash(R)$

.

Define the address
of a resource $R_{\{address\}}$
as $R_{\{commitment\}}$

.

Define the nullifier
of a resource $R_{\{nullifier\}}$
as n
such that $hash(n) = R_{\{nc\}}$

.

Define the type
of a resource $R_{\{type\}}$
as $hash(R_{\{logic\}}, R_{\{label\}})$

.

Define the delta
of a resource $R_{\{delta\}}$
as the two-tuple $(R_{\{type\}}, R_{\{quantity\}})$

.

Partial transactions

Define a partial transaction

PTX

as a six-tuple $(Set\ F, Set\ F, Set\ \pi, D, Set\ P, PROG)$

with fields named as follows:

- $PTX_{\{created\}}$

of type $Set\ F$

(commitments to newly created resources)

- $PTX_{\{consumed\}}$

of type $Set\ F$

(nullifiers for consumed resources)

- $PTX_{\{proofs\}}$

of type $Set\ \pi$

(proofs for consumed and created resources)

- $PTX_{\{delta\}}$

of type $Set\ (F, F)$

(as resource delta above)

- $PTX_extradata$

of type $Set \setminus P$

(extradata possibly used as input by proofs)

- $PTX_executable$

of type $PROG$

(possibly empty)

A partial transaction is valid

w.r.t. a past commitment set CS

if and only if:

- For each commitment c

in $PTX_created$

, a valid proof π

is included in PTX_proofs

such that, for some resource R

with $R_commitment = c$

, $*Verify(R_logic, (in, out, extradata, 1), \pi) = 1$

, with $in \setminus subset PTX_consumed$

, $out \setminus subset PTX_created$

, $extradata \setminus subset PTX_extradata$

.

- $Verify(R_logic, (in, out, extradata, 1), \pi) = 1$

, with $in \setminus subset PTX_consumed$

, $out \setminus subset PTX_created$

, $extradata \setminus subset PTX_extradata$

.

- For each nullifier n

in $PTX_consumed$

, a valid proof π

is included in PTX_proofs

such that, for some resource R

with $R_nullifier = n$

and $R_commitment \setminus in CS$

. $*Verify(R_logic, (in, out, extradata, 0), \pi) = 1$

, with $in \setminus subset PTX_consumed$

, $out \setminus subset PTX_created$

, $extradata \setminus subset PTX_extradata$

- $\text{Verify}(R_{\{\text{logic}\}}, (\text{in}, \text{out}, \text{extradata}, 0), \pi) = 1$

, with $\text{in} \subseteq \text{PTX}_{\{\text{consumed}\}}$

, $\text{out} \subseteq \text{PTX}_{\{\text{created}\}}$

, $\text{extradata} \subseteq \text{PTX}_{\{\text{extradata}\}}$

- $\text{PTX}_{\{\text{delta}\}} = \sum_{R \in \text{PTX}_{\{\text{consumed}\}}} R_{\{\text{delta}\}} - \sum_{R \in \text{PTX}_{\{\text{created}\}}} R_{\{\text{delta}\}}$

A partial transaction is balanced

if and only if $\text{PTX}_{\{\text{delta}\}} = 0$

A partial transaction may be executed

by running PROG

, which may additionally:

- read resources by $R_{\{\text{address}\}}$
- read from and add to $\text{PTX}_{\{\text{extradata}\}}$
- add to $\text{PTX}_{\{\text{created}\}}$

(altering $\text{PTX}_{\{\text{delta}\}}$

)

- add to $\text{PTX}_{\{\text{consumed}\}}$

(altering $\text{PTX}_{\{\text{delta}\}}$

)

Partial transactions may be composed

either sequentially

or concurrently

, where sequential

composition uses the output commitment set as input to the next transaction, and concurrent

composition does not. In both cases, nullifier sets may not conflict.

Recursion

Abstractly, recursion may be achieved as follows: define a resource R

with:

- $R_{\{\text{label}\}}$

set to the consensus provider identity

- $R_{\{\text{quantity}\}}$

set to 1

- $R_{\{\text{value}\}}$

set to the commitment and nullifier trees

- $R_{\{\text{nonce}\}}$

an incrementing counter

- $R_{\{nc\}} = \text{hash}(0_F)$
- $R_{\{ephemerality\}} = 1$
- $R_{\{logic\}} = \text{verify_partial_tx} \ \&\ \text{verify_signature}$

where the partial tx is checked with respect to the input and output commitment and nullifier sets in $R_{\{value\}}$

and the signature is checked with respect to the consensus provider identity in $R_{\{label\}}$

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