

EDIT

Thanks everyone for initial thoughts. To avoid this topic spiraling into a 100 post monster that takes 90 min to read, I'm going to break out suggestions into individual topics. I'll add to this list as we go:

- [Expiring Delegation](#)
- [Increased Total Allocation](#)
- [Developer Allocation Pilot](#)

Also, just as a point of order, my opinion is that all current treasury allocations should be subject to this next round, meaning that current delegates with votes from the treasury would be subject to have their votes reallocated subject to the parameters of the new program we design.

Original post below:

[@Doo_StableLab](#)'s proposal to delegate UNI from the treasury to active delegates has increased governance participation generally and empowered a new group of delegates. With two months to go, I thought it'd be a good idea to get a thread together so we can aggregate ideas about how to further optimize this program going forward.

Some general things i'm thinking about:

- qualification criteria

: activity level in governance is a good first step but generally misses developers who are building on and around uniswap. This is a class of ecosystem participants who might be good delegates and provide a technical viewpoint that could be valuable. I think it's worth experimenting w/ reserving some votes for developers.

- expiring delegation

: h/t [@Getty](#) as we've been chatting on and off about this for a couple months. Right now the delegates with treasury votes are in a position where they have to actively vote to revoke them. This is obviously a misalignment of incentives and relying on social consensus is not a scalable route forward. Expiring delegation solves this problem, but would need to be thoughtfully implemented so that active voting power never falls off a cliff.

- lowering ceiling for allocated votes

: when the original proposal passed, the threshold to post a governance proposal was 2.5m so the distribution algorithm was greedy based on that number. The threshold has dropped, so I'd suggest a corresponding drop in the max allocation per delegate (which also implies more delegates w/ non-zero voting power, which is probably +ev).

What else should we be thinking about?