no MEV income

: Based rollups forgo MEV to the L1, limiting their revenue to base fees.

Based rollups who wish to capture their own MEV could plausibly enshrine an auction mechanism inside the L1 contract, e.g. a dutch auction that forces the batch submitter to pay some ETH to the contract.

Alternatively, there could be a mechanism where the last n batches (for a small n) can be cancelled and replaced by bribing the contract with a higher payout. Of course this would come with a tradeoff of longer finality for rollup transactions (since cancelled batches are essentially reorgs from the point of view of L2), as well as wasted gas for reorg'd batches submitted by sequencers who didn't bid optimally (edit: on second thought this is also terrible because it breaks atomic composability between rollups who's batches are submitted in the same block)

Unless you explicitly defined a based rollup as one that doesnt capture its own MEV, i think the design space is broad enough to allow them to have MEV income (of course with some tradeoffs, as is always the case!) - agree with your follow-up argument that it may end up being better for the rollup to leave their MEV to the underlying L1