

Great analysis on current inclusion list (IL) designs, [@barnabe](#)!

In the base fee manipulation part (quote below), you said that you expect this design to be implemented in the future. I was wondering if you could provide some context, specifically given this change would enable the builder to have more freedom to censor transactions.

barnabe:

We expect this capability to eventually be adopted, as it loosens the constraints of block packing and by extension allows for more valuable blocks.

Also, one feeling I got from reading this analysis is that: censorship resistance of the network depends on the honest validators/proposers because:

1. the greedy validators will auction off the IL rights.
2. the censoring validators will not include censored transactions in the IL.

What is left is the honest validator. Only the honest validators will properly use the IL to include the censored transactions (on a probabilistic scale if we assume the validator does not have a "censored transaction detector").

Would this be a fair assessment?