

No free lunch – a new inclusion list design

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tl;dr;

The free data availability problem is the core limitation of many inclusion list instantiations. We outline the mechanics of a new design under which the inclusion list is split into a Summary

, which the proposer signs over, and a list of Txns

, which remain unsigned. By walking through the lifecycle of this new inclusion list, we show that the free data availability problem is solved, while the commitments of the inclusion list are enforceable by the state-transition function. We conclude by modifying the design to be more data efficient.

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Related work

- [State of research: increasing censorship resistance of transactions under proposer/builder separation \(PBS\)](#) by Vitalik – Jan 2022.
- [How much can we constrain builders without bringing back heavy burdens to proposers?](#) by Vitalik – Oct 2022.
- [PBS censorship-resistance alternatives](#) by Francesco – Oct 2022.
- [Forward inclusion list](#) by Francesco – Nov 2022.
- [Censorship Résistance & PBS](#) by Justin – Sept 2022.
- [Censorship Resistance: crlists in mev-boost](#) by Quintus – July 2022.

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Acronyms & abbreviations

source

expansion

IL

inclusion list

DA

data availability

Txns

transactions

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Thanks

Many thanks to [Justin](#) and [Barnabé](#) for comments on the draft. Additional thanks to [Jon](#), [Hasu](#), [Tomasz](#), [Chris](#), [Toni](#), [Terence](#), [Potuz](#), [Dankrad](#), and [Danny](#) for relevant discussions.

1. The free data availability problem

As outlined in Vitalik's [State of research

](https://notes.ethereum.org/@vbuterin/pbs_censorship_resistance#What-are-the-design-goals-of-any-anti-censorship-scheme) piece, one of the key desiderata of an anti-censorship scheme is not providing free data availability (abbr. DA). Francesco's [Forward Inclusion List

](<https://notes.ethereum.org/@fradamt/forward-inclusion-lists>) proposal addresses this by not incorporating data about the inclusion list (abbr. IL) into any block. The slot n

IL is enforced by the slot $n+1$

attesting committee based on their local view of the p2p data. While this is an elegant solution that eliminates the free DA problem, it is a subjective enforcement

of the IL. A non-conformant block can still become canonical if, for example, the slot $n+1$

attesters collude to censor by pretending to not see the IL on time. Additionally, it adds another sub-slot synchrony point to

the protocol, as a deadline for the availability of the IL must be set.

Ideally, we want objective enforcement

of the IL. It should be impossible

to produce a valid block that doesn't conform to the constraints set out in the IL. The naïve solution is to place the IL into the block body for slot n

, allowing slot $n+1$

attesters can use the data as part of their state-transition function. This is objective because any block that doesn't conform to the IL would be seen as invalid, and thus could not become canonical. Unfortunately, this idea falls victim to the free DA problem.

The key issue here is that a proposer must be able to commit to their IL before seeing the contents of their block. The reason is simple: in proposer-builder separations (PBS) schemes ([mev-boost](#) today, potentially [ePBS](#) in the future) the proposer has to commit to their block before receiving its contents to protect the builder from MEV stealing. Because the proposer blindly commits to their block, we cannot enforce that all of the transactions in the IL are valid after the slot n

payload is executed. The figure below depicts an example:

[

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](<https://ethresear.ch/uploads/default/original/2X/f/f280d612da94a06904f8aca684cd4af0b7183593.png>)

Here the proposer commits to an IL which includes txn 0xef

, which is from: b

with nonce: 7

. Unfortunately (or perhaps intentionally), the payload for their slot includes txn 0xde

which is also from: b

with nonce: 7

. Thus txn 0xef

is no longer valid and won't pay gas, even if it is much larger than txn 0xde

; getting txn 0xef

into the IL but not the block itself may offer extreme gas savings by not requiring that the originator pays for the calldata stored with the transaction. However, since it is part of the state-transition function, it must be available in the chain history.

(Observation 1)

Any inclusion list scheme that

- allows proposers to commit to specific transactions before seeing their payload, and
- relies on the state-transition function to enforce the IL commitments,

admits free DA.

The reasoning here is quite simple – if the conditions of (Obs. 1)

are met, the contents of the IL transactions must be available

to validate the block. Even if the block only committed to a hash of the IL transaction, we still need to see the full transaction in the clear for the state-transition function to be deterministic.

2. Core mechanics

To solve the free DA problem, we begin by specifying the building blocks of the new IL design and lifecycle, which is split into the construction

, inclusion

, and validation

phases.

Definitions

- slot n

pre-state

– The execution-layer state before the slot n

payload is executed (i.e., the state based on the parent block).

- slot n

post-state

– The execution-layer state after the slot n

payload is executed.

- InclusionList (abbr. IL)

– The transactions and associated metadata that a slot n

proposer constructs to enforce validity conditions on the slot $n+1$

block. The IL is decomposed into two, equal-length lists – Summary

and Txns

.

- Summary

– A list of (address, gasLimit)

pairs, which specify the from

and gasLimit

of each transaction in Txns

.

Each pair is referred to as an Entry

.

- Txns

– A list of full transactions corresponding to the metadata specified in the Summary

. These transactions must be valid in the slot n

pre-state and have a `maxFeePerGas`

greater than the slot n

block base fee times 1.125 (to account for the possible base fee increase in the next block).

- Entry

– A specific (address, gasLimit)

element in the Summary

. An Entry

represents a commitment to a transaction from address

getting included either in slot n

or n+1

as long as the remaining gas in the slot n+1

payload is less than gasLimit

.

- Entry

satisfaction

– An Entry

can be satisfied in one of three ways:

1. a transaction from address

is included in the slot n

payload,

1. a transaction from address

is included in the slot n+1

payload, or

1. the gas remaining (i.e., the `block.gasLimit`

minus gas used) in the slot n+1

payload is less than the gasLimit

.

(Observation 2)

A transaction that is valid in the slot n

pre-state will be invalid in the slot n

post-state if

- the slot n

payload includes at least one transaction from the same address (nonce reuse) or

- the maxFeePerGas

is less than the base fee of the subsequent block.

While transactions may fail

for exogenous reasons (e.g., the price on a uniswap pool moving outside of the slippage set by the original transaction), they remain valid

.

Inclusion list lifecycle

We now present the new IL design (this is a slightly simplified version – we add a few additional features later). Using slot n

as the starting point, we split the IL lifecycle into three phases. The slot n

proposer performs the construction

, the slot n+1

proposer does the inclusion

, and the entire network does the validation

. Each phase is detailed below.

1. Construction

– The proposer for slot n

constructs at least one IL = Summary + Txns

, and signs the Summary

(the fact that the proposer can construct multiple ILs

is important). * The transactions in Txns

must be valid based on the slot n

pre-state

(and have a high enough maxFeePerGas

), but the proposer does not sign over them.

- The proposer then gossips an object containing:
- their SignedBeaconBlock

, and

1. their IL = Summary (signed) + Txns (unsigned)

.

- their SignedBeaconBlock

, and

- their IL = Summary (signed) + Txns (unsigned)

.

- Both the block and an IL must be present in the validator's view to consider the block as eligible for the fork-choice rule

.

1. The transactions in Txns

must be valid based on the slot n

pre-state

(and have a high enough maxFeePerGas

), but the proposer does not sign over them.

1. The proposer then gossips an object containing:
2. their SignedBeaconBlock

, and

1. their IL = Summary (signed) + Txns (unsigned)

.

1. their SignedBeaconBlock

, and

1. their IL = Summary (signed) + Txns (unsigned)

.

1. Both the block and an IL must be present in the validator's view to consider the block as eligible for the fork-choice rule

.

1. Inclusion

– The proposer for slot n+1

creates a block that conforms to a Summary

that they have observed (there must be at least one for them to build on that block). * The slot n+1

block includes a slot n

Summary

along with the signature from the slot n

proposer.

1. The slot n+1

block includes a slot n

Summary

along with the signature from the slot n

proposer.

1. Validation

– The network validates the block using the state-transition function. * Each Entry in the Summary must be satisfied for the block to be valid.

- The signature over the Summary

must be valid.

1. Each Entry

in the Summary

must be satisfied for the block to be valid.

1. The signature over the Summary

must be valid.

Wait... that's it? yup

(well this solves the free DA problem – we introduce a few extra tricks later, but this is the gist of it). The figure below shows the construction and inclusion stages.

[

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1436×1395 365 KB

](<https://ethresear.ch/uploads/default/original/2X/5/5b7270ffeb9080537521de5c7aff82d1c2918384.png>)

- The slot n

proposer signs the Summary=[(0xa, 3), (0xb, 2), (0xc, 7)]

and broadcasts it along with Txns = [txn a, txn b, txn c]

.

- The slot n

payload includes txn c

and txn a

(order doesn't matter). These transactions satisfy (0xc, 7)

and (0xa, 3)

respectively.

- The slot n+1

proposer sees that the only entry that they need to satisfy in their payload is (0xb, 2)

, which they do by including txn b

.

- The rest of the network checks that each Entry

is satisfied and that the signature over the Summary

is valid.

Validators require that there exists at least one valid IL before they consider the block for the fork-choice rule. If a malicious proposer publishes a block without a corresponding $IL = Summary + Txns$

, the honest attestors in their slot (and future slots) will vote against the block because they don't have an available IL.

How does that solve the free DA problem?

Two important facts allow this scheme to avoid admitting free DA.

1. Potential for multiple ILs.

Since the proposer doesn't include anything about their IL in their block, they can create multiple without committing a proposer equivocation.

1. Reduced specificity of the IL

commitments.

The Summary

can be satisfied by a transaction in either the slot n

or the slot $n+1$

payload and the transaction that satisfies a specific Entry

in the Summary

needn't be the same transaction that accompanied the Summary

in the Txns

list.

By signing over the list of (address, gasLimit)

pairs, the proposer is saying: "I commit that during slot n

or slot $n+1$

, a transaction from address

will be included as long as the remaining gas in the slot $n+1$

payload is less than gasLimit

."

By not committing to a specific set of transactions

, the slot n

proposer gives the network deniability.

This concept relates to [cryptographic deniability](#) in that validators can deny having received a transaction without an adversary being able to disprove that. This property follows from the observation below.

(Observation 3)

The only way to achieve free DA is by sending multiple transactions from the same address with the same nonce.

Recall that the free DA problem arises when a transaction that was valid in the slot n

pre-state is no longer valid in the slot n

post-state but is still committed to in the inclusion list. From (Obs. 2)

, the only way this can happen is through nonce reuse (the base fee is covered by requiring the transactions to have 12.5% higher `maxFeePerGas`

than the current block base fee). This leads to the final observation.

(Observation 4)

If txn b

aims to achieve free DA, then there exists a txn a

such that txn a

satisfies the same Entry

in the Summary

as txn b

. Thus validators can safely deny having seen txn b

, because they can claim to have seen txn a

instead.

In other words, validators don't have to store the contents of any transactions that don't make it on chain, and the state-transition function is still deterministic. The figure below encapsulates this deniability.

[

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](<https://ethresear.ch/uploads/default/original/2X/5/50f1a3e21f26d3eff944a4b635432993fedf8a6c.png>)

- The slot n

proposer creates their Block

and Summary

. They notice that txn a

and txn b

are both valid at the slot n

pre-state and satisfy the Entry

0xa, 3

.

- The slot n

proposer distributes two versions of Txns

, one with each transaction.

- The slot $n+1$

proposer sees that txn b

is invalid in the slot n

post state (because txn a

, which is also from the 0xa

address, is in the slot n

payload).

- The slot $n+1$

proposer constructs their block with the Summary

, but safely drops txn b

, because txn a

satisfies the Entry

.

- The slot $n+1$

attester includes the block in their view because they have seen a valid IL (where the Txns

object contains txn a

).

- The slot $n+1$

attester verifies the signature and confirms that the Entry

is satisfied.

- Key point

– the slot $n+1$

attester never saw txn b

, but they are still able to verify the slot $n+1$

block. This implies that the attester can credibly deny having txn b

available.

Thus txn b

can safely be dropped from the beacon nodes because it is not needed for the state-transition function; txn b

is no longer available. This example is slightly simplified in that txn a

and txn b

are both satisfied by the same Entry

in the Summary

(meaning they have the same gasLimit

). With different gasLimit

values, the slot n

proposer would need to create and sign multiple Summary

objects, which is fine because the Summary

is not part of their block.

3. Solving the data efficiency problem

The design above solves the free DA problem, but it introduces a new (smaller) problem around data efficiency

. The slot n+1

proposer includes the entire slot n

Summary

in their block. With 30M gas available and the minimum transaction consuming 21k gas, a block could have up to 1428 transactions. Thus the Summary

could have 1428 entries, each of which consumes 20 (address

) + 1 (gasLimit

) bytes (using a single byte to represent the gasLimit

in the Summary

). This implies that the Summary

could be up to 29988 bytes, which is a lot of additional data for each block. Based on the fact that each Entry

in the Summary

is either satisfied in slot n

or slot n+1

, we decompose the Summary

object into two components:

- ReducedSummary

– the remaining Entry

values that are not

satisfied by the slot n

payload, and

- Rebuilder

– an array used to indicate which transactions in the slot n

payload satisfy Entry

values in the original Summary

The slot $n+1$

proposer only needs to include the ReducedSummary

and the Rebuilder

for the rest of the network to reconstruct the full Summary

. With the full Summary

, the slot n

proposer signature can be verified as part of the slot $n+1$

block validation.

What the heck is the “Rebuilder

”?

The Rebuilder

is a (likely sparse) array with the same length as the number of transactions in the slot n

payload. For each index i

:

- $\text{Rebuilder}[i] = 0$

implies that the i th

transaction of the slot n

payload can be ignored.

- $\text{Rebuilder}[i] = x$

, where $x \neq 0$

implies that the i th

transaction of the slot n

payload corresponds to an Entry

in the signed Summary

, where x

indicates the gasLimit

from the original Entry

.

Now the algorithm to reconstruct the original Summary

is as follows:

```
ReconstructedEntries = [] for i in range(len(Rebuilder)): if Rebuilder[i] != 0: ReconstructedEntries.append( Entry(
address=SlotNPayload[i].address, gasLimit=Rebuilder[i] ) ) Summary =
```

sorted(ReducedSummary.Extend(ReconstructedEntries))

The Summary

needs some deterministic order to verify the slot n

proposer signature. The easiest solution is to simply sort based on the address

of each Entry

. We can further reduce the amount of data in the Rebuilder

by representing the gasLimit

with a uint8

rather than a full uint32

.

Inclusion list lifecycle (revisited)

The IL lifecycle largely remains the same, but it is probably worth revisiting it with the addition of the ReducedSummary and Rebuilder

.

1. (unchanged) Construction

– The proposer for slot n

constructs at least one IL = Summary + Txns

, and signs the Summary

(the fact that the proposer can sign multiple ILs

is important). * The transactions in Txns

must be valid based on the slot n

pre-state

(and have a high enough maxFeePerGas

), but the proposer does not sign over them.

- The proposer then gossips an object containing:
- their SignedBeaconBlock

, and

1. their IL = Summary (signed) + Txns (unsigned)

.

- their SignedBeaconBlock

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- Both the block and an IL must be present in the validator's view to consider the block as eligible for the fork-choice rule

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1. Both the block and an IL must be present in the validator's view to consider the block as eligible for the fork-choice rule

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1. (changed) Inclusion

– The proposer for slot n+1

creates a block that conforms to the Summary

they have observed. * They construct the ReducedSummary

and Rebuilder

based on the slot n

payload.

- The block includes the ReducedSummary

, Rebuilder

, and the original signature from the slot n

proposer.

1. They construct the ReducedSummary

and Rebuilder

based on the slot n

payload.

1. The block includes the ReducedSummary
, Rebuilder
, and the original signature from the slot n
proposer.

1. (changed) Validation
– The network validates the block using the state-transition function. * The full Summary
is reconstructed using the ReducedSummary
and the Rebuilder

• The slot n
proposer signature is verified against the full Summary

• Each Entry
in the Summary
must be satisfied for the block to be valid.

1. The full Summary
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1. The slot n
proposer signature is verified against the full Summary

1. Each Entry
in the Summary
must be satisfied for the block to be valid.
The figure below demonstrates this process.

[
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1500×1408 357 KB
](https://ethresear.ch/uploads/default/original/2X/f/f977b22928245e5b7513848bfde47c313aa9cfe4.png)

• (unchanged) The slot n
proposer signs the Summary=[(0xa, 3), (0xb, 2), (0xc, 7)]
and broadcasts it along with Txns = [txn a, txn b, txn c]

, which must be valid in the slot n

pre-state.

- (unchanged) The slot n

payload includes txn c

and txn a

(order doesn't matter).

- (changed) The slot n+1

proposer sees that entries 0,2

in the Summary

are satisfied, so makes the ReducedSummary=(0xb, 2)

. This is the only entry that they need to satisfy in slot n+1

, which they do by including txn b

in their payload.

- (changed) The slot n+1

proposer constructs the Rebuilder

by referencing the transaction indices in the slot n

payload needed to recover the addresses. The Rebuilder

array also contains the original gasLimit

values that the slot n+1

proposer received.

- (changed) The slot n+1

attesters use the Rebuilder

, the ReducedSummary

, and the slot n

payload to reconstruct the full Summary

object to verify the signature.

This scheme takes advantage of the fact that most of the Summary

data (the address

of each Entry

satisfied in slot n

) will be already stored in the slot n

payload. Rather than storing these addresses twice, the Rebuilder

acts as a pointer to the existing data. The Rebuilder

needs to store the gasLimit

of each original Entry

because the transaction in the slot n

payload may be different than what originally came in the Txns

.

*-thanks for reading!

_*

FAQ

- What is the deal with the maxFeePerGas

?

- One of the transaction [fields](#) is maxFeePerGas

. This specifies how much the transaction is willing to pay for the base fee. To ensure the transaction is valid in the slot n post-state, we need to enforce that the maxFeePerGas

is at least 12.5% (the max amount the base fee can increase from block to block) higher than the current base fee.

- One of the transaction [fields](#) is maxFeePerGas

. This specifies how much the transaction is willing to pay for the base fee. To ensure the transaction is valid in the slot n post-state, we need to enforce that the maxFeePerGas

is at least 12.5% (the max amount the base fee can increase from block to block) higher than the current base fee.

- Why do we need to include the ReducedSummary

in the slot n+1

payload?

- We technically don't! We could use a Rebuilder

structure to recover the Summary

entries that are satisfied in the slot n+1

payload as well. It is just a little extra complexity that we didn't think was necessary for this post. This ultimately comes down to an implementation decision that we can make.

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structure to recover the Summary

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payload as well. It is just a little extra complexity that we didn't think was necessary for this post. This ultimately comes down to an implementation decision that we can make.

- What happens if a proposer never publishes their IL, but gets still accumulates malicious fork-choice votes on their block?
- Part of the honest behavior of accepting a block into their fork-choice view is that a valid IL accompanies it. Even if the

malicious attesters vote for a block that doesn't have an IL, all of the subsequent honest attesters will vote against that fork based on not seeing the IL.

- Part of the honest behavior of accepting a block into their fork-choice view is that a valid IL accompanies it. Even if the malicious attesters vote for a block that doesn't have an IL, all of the subsequent honest attesters will vote against that fork based on not seeing the IL.
- Can the slot n

proposer play timing games with the release of their IL?

- Yes, but no more than they can do already. It is the same as if the slot n

proposer tried to grief the slot $n+1$

proposer by not sending them the block in time. They risk not accumulating enough attestations to overpower the proposer boost of the subsequent slot.

- Yes, but no more than they can do already. It is the same as if the slot n

proposer tried to grief the slot $n+1$

proposer by not sending them the block in time. They risk not accumulating enough attestations to overpower the proposer boost of the subsequent slot.

- What happens if a proposer credibly commits (e.g., through the use of a TEE) to only signing a single Summary

?

- Justin came up with a scenario where a proposer and a transaction originator can collude to get a single valid Summary

published (e.g., by using a TEE) that has an Entry

that is only satisfied by a single transaction. This would break the free DA in that all honest attesters would need to see this transaction as part of the IL they require to accept the block into their fork-choice view. We can avoid this by allowing anyone

to sign arbitrary Summary

objects for any slot that is at least n

slots in the past. The default behavior could be for some validators to simply sign empty Summary

objects after 5 slots have passed.

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to sign arbitrary Summary

objects for any slot that is at least n

slots in the past. The default behavior could be for some validators to simply sign empty Summary

objects after 5 slots have passed.

- How does a sync work with the IL?
- This is related to the question above, because seeing a block as valid in the fork-choice view requires a full IL for that slot. If we allow anyone to sign ILs for past slots, the syncing node can simply sign ILs for each historical slot until it reaches the head of the chain.
- This is related to the question above, because seeing a block as valid in the fork-choice view requires a full IL for that slot. If we allow anyone to sign ILs for past slots, the syncing node can simply sign ILs for each historical slot until it reaches the head of the chain.
- Why use uint8

instead of uint32

for the gas limits in the Summary

?

- This is just a small optimization to reduce the potential size of the maximum Summary

by a factor of four. The constraint would be that the Txns

must use less than or equal to the uint8 gasLimit

specified in the corresponding entry. This becomes an implementation decision as well.

- This is just a small optimization to reduce the potential size of the maximum Summary

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must use less than or equal to the uint8 gasLimit

specified in the corresponding entry. This becomes an implementation decision as well.

Appendix 1: Rebuilder

encoding strategy

The slot n

proposer has control over some of the data that ends up in the slot $n+1$

Rebuilder

, and thus can use it to achieve a small amount of free DA (up to 1428 bits = 178.5 bytes

). The technique is quite simple. Let's use the case where the proposer's payload contains 1000 transactions, which allows the proposer to store a 1000-bit message for free, denoted msg

. Let $payload[i]$

and $msg[i]$

denote the i th

transaction in their payload and the i th

bit in the message respectively.

1. The slot n

proposer self-builds a block, thus they know the contents of the block before creating their Summary

.
1. To construct their Summary

, for each index i

, do * if $\text{msg}[i] == 0$

, don't include $\text{payload}[i]$

in the Summary

.
• if $\text{msg}[i] == 1$

, include $\text{payload}[i]$

in the Summary

.
1. if $\text{msg}[i] == 0$

, don't include $\text{payload}[i]$

in the Summary

.
1. if $\text{msg}[i] == 1$

, include $\text{payload}[i]$

in the Summary

.
It follows that by casting Rebuilder

from a byte array to a bit array, msg

is recovered. Since the Rebuilder

is part of the slot $n+1$

block, msg

is encoded into the historical state. However, the fact that this is at most 178.5 bytes per block makes it unlikely to be an attractive source of DA. Additionally, it's only possible to store as many bits as there are valid transactions to include in the slot n

payload. The maximum is 1428 if each transaction is a simple transfer, but historically blocks contain closer to 150-200 transactions on average.

Appendix 2: ReducedSummary

stuffing

It is also worth considering the case where the slot n

proposer tries to ensure that the slot $n+1$

ReducedSummary

is large. The most they can do is self-build an empty block while putting every valid transaction they see into their Summary object. With an empty block, the slot $n+1$

ReducedSummary

is equivalent to the slot n

Summary

(because none of the entries have been satisfied in the slot n

payload). As we calculated above, the max size of the ReducedSummary

would be 29988 bytes, which is rather large, but only achievable if there are 1428 transfers lying around in the mempool. Even if that happens, the slot n

proposer just gave up all of their execution layer rewards to make the next block (at most) 30kB larger. Blocks can already be much larger than that (some are hundreds of kB), and post-4844, this will be even less relevant. Thus this doesn't seem like a real griefing vector to be concerned about. We also could simply use a Rebuilder

for the slot $n+1$

payload as well if necessary.