

In a recent paper, [2310.01155.pdf \(arxiv.org\)](#), we study economics of the proposal and how rollups might react to it.

By modeling the cost of a rollup as a sum of two parts, blob posting costs and delay costs, we obtain that small rollups may opt for posting in a regular blockspace market, while large rollups will post in the new data market. Then, we proceed with joint blob posting strategy for two rollups and its effect on the equilibrium price. Results are intuitive: if both rollups were using blob data market, the price goes down, otherwise it goes up, as the demand for the blob market is increasing. Towards the end, we discuss how joint blob posting cost can be shared between (two) rollups, as a function of how much data each rollup contributes to. For this reason, we employ a Nash bargaining solution and obtain that the larger rollup always pays more than half of the posting cost, but less than it would pay proportionally. On the other hand, small rollup improves its per-transaction cost more than large rollup does, in this cost sharing setting.

Any feedback is welcome.