Errata 2 to rev. 1.38

TPMCmd/tpm/include/Global.h

@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@
  *  SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
-#if !defined _TPM_H_
-#error "Should not be called"
-#endif
-
 //** Description
 
 // This file contains internal global type definitions and data declarations that
@@ -52,6 +48,10 @@
 // data is private to the module but is collected here to simplify the management
 // of the instance data.
 // All the data is instanced in Global.c.
+#if !defined _TPM_H_
+#error "Should not be called"
+#endif
+
 
 //** Includes
 
@@ -104,6 +104,10 @@ typedef BYTE    TIME_INFO[sizeof(TPMS_TIME_INFO)];
 // A NAME is a BYTE array that can contain a TPMU_NAME
 typedef BYTE    NAME[sizeof(TPMU_NAME)];
 
+// Definition for a PROOF value
+TPM2B_TYPE(PROOF, PROOF_SIZE);
+
+
 // A CLOCK_NONCE is used to tag the time value in the authorization session and
 // in the ticket computation so that the ticket expires when there is a time
 // discontinuity. When the clock stops during normal operation, the nonce is
@@ -518,7 +522,9 @@ extern TPM_HANDLE       g_exclusiveAuditSession;
 
 //*** g_time
 // This is the value in which we keep the current command time. This is initialized
-// at the start of each command. The time is in mS.
+// at the start of each command. The time is the accumulated time since the last
+// time that the TPM's timer was last powered up. Clock is the accumulated time
+// since the last time that the TPM was cleared. g_time is in mS.
 extern  UINT64          g_time;
 
 //*** g_timeEpoch
@@ -715,9 +721,9 @@ typedef struct
     // Note there is a nullSeed in the state_reset memory.
 
     // Hierarchy proofs
-    TPM2B_AUTH          phProof;
-    TPM2B_AUTH          shProof;
-    TPM2B_AUTH          ehProof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF          phProof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF          shProof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF          ehProof;
     // Note there is a nullProof in the state_reset memory.
 
 //*********************************************************************************
@@ -944,7 +950,7 @@ typedef struct state_reset_data
 //*****************************************************************************
 //          Hierarchy Control
 //*****************************************************************************
-    TPM2B_AUTH          nullProof;          // The proof value associated with
+    TPM2B_PROOF         nullProof;          // The proof value associated with
                                             // the TPM_RH_NULL hierarchy. The
                                             // default reset value is from the RNG.
 

TPMCmd/tpm/include/GpMacros.h

@@ -210,8 +210,72 @@
 #define CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE     CONCAT(CONTEXT_HASH_ALGORITHM, _DIGEST_SIZE)
 #endif
 
+#ifdef TPM_ALG_RSA
+#define     RSA_SECURITY_STRENGTH (MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS >= 15360 ? 256 :          \
+                                  (MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS >=  7680 ? 192 :          \
+                                  (MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS >=  3072 ? 128 :          \
+                                  (MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS >=  2048 ? 112 :          \
+                                  (MAX_RSA_KEY_BITS >=  1024 ?  80 :  0)))))
+#else
+#define     RSA_SECURITY_STRENGTH   0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TPM_ALG_ECC
+#define     ECC_SECURITY_STRENGTH (MAX_ECC_KEY_BITS >= 521 ? 256 :              \
+                                  (MAX_ECC_KEY_BITS >= 384 ? 192 :              \
+                                  (MAX_ECC_KEY_BITS >= 256 ? 128 : 0)))
+#else
+#define     ECC_SECURITY_STRENGTH   0
+#endif // TPM_AGL_ECC
+
+#define     MAX_ASYM_SECURITY_STRENGTH                                          \
+                        MAX(RSA_SECURITY_STRENGTH, ECC_SECURITY_STRENGTH)
+
+#define     MAX_HASH_SECURITY_STRENGTH  ((CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE * 8) / 2)
+
+// Unless some algorithm is broken...
+#define     MAX_SYM_SECURITY_STRENGTH   MAX_SYM_KEY_BITS
+
+#define MAX_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS                                              \
+                        MAX(MAX_ASYM_SECURITY_STRENGTH,                         \
+                        MAX(MAX_SYM_SECURITY_STRENGTH,                          \
+                            MAX_HASH_SECURITY_STRENGTH))
+
+// This is the size that was used before the 1.38 errata requiring that P1.14.4 be
+// followed
+#define PROOF_SIZE      CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE
+
+// As required by P1.14.4
+#define COMPLIANT_PROOF_SIZE                                                    \
+            (MAX(CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE, (2 * MAX_SYM_KEY_BYTES)))
+
+// As required by P1.14.3.1
+#define COMPLIANT_PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE                                             \
+    BITS_TO_BYTES(MAX_SECURITY_STRENGTH_BITS * 2)
+
+// This is the pre-errata version
+#ifndef PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE
+#   define PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE    PROOF_SIZE
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SPEC_COMPLIANT_PROOFS
+#   undef PROOF_SIZE
+#   define PROOF_SIZE           COMPLIANT_PROOF_SIZE
+#   undef PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE
+#   define PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE    COMPLIANT_PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE
+#endif  // USE_SPEC_COMPLIANT_PROOFS || !defined PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE
+
+#ifndef SKIP_PROOF_ERRORS 
+#   if PROOF_SIZE < COMPLIANT_PROOF_SIZE
+#       error "PROOF_SIZE is not compliant with TPM specification"
+#   endif
+#   if PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE < COMPLIANT_PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE
+#       error  "Implementation.h specifies a non-compliant PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE"
+#   endif
+#endif
+
+
 
-#define PROOF_SIZE                      CONTEXT_INTEGRITY_HASH_SIZE
 
 // If CONTEXT_ENCRYP_ALG is defined, then the vendor is using the old style table
 #ifndef CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_ALG
@@ -221,10 +285,10 @@
 #define CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BYTES       ((CONTEXT_ENCRYPT_KEY_BITS+7)/8)
 #endif
 
-#if ALG_ECC
-#   define LABEL_MAX_BUFFER MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES
-#else
-#   define LABEL_MAX_BUFFER MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
+// This is updated to follow the requirement of P2 that the label not be larger
+// than 32 bytes.
+#ifndef LABEL_MAX_BUFFER
+#define LABEL_MAX_BUFFER MIN(32, MIN(MAX_ECC_KEY_BYTES, MAX_DIGEST_SIZE))
 #endif
 
 // This bit is used to indicate that an authorization ticket expires on TPM Reset

TPMCmd/tpm/include/TpmBuildSwitches.h

@@ -190,4 +190,17 @@
 #define ACCUMULATE_SELF_HEAL_TIMER
 #endif // ACCUMULATE_SELF_HEAL_TIMER
 
+// If the implementation is to compute the sizes of the proof and primary seed size
+// values based on the implemented algorithms, then use this define.
+#ifndef USE_SPEC_COMPLIANT_PROOFS
+#define  USE_SPEC_COMPLIANT_PROOFS
+#endif
+
+// Comment this out to allow compile to continue even though the chosen proof values
+// do not match the compliant values. This is written so that someone would
+// have to proactively ignore errors.
+#ifndef SKIP_PROOF_ERRORS 
+//#define SKIP_PROOF_ERRORS
+#endif
+
 #endif // _TPM_BUILD_SWITCHES_H_

TPMCmd/tpm/include/TpmTypes.h

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ typedef  UINT32             TPM_SPEC;
 #define  TPM_SPEC_VERSION        (TPM_SPEC)(SPEC_VERSION)
 #define  SPEC_YEAR               2017
 #define  TPM_SPEC_YEAR           (TPM_SPEC)(SPEC_YEAR)
-#define  SPEC_DAY_OF_YEAR        61
+#define  SPEC_DAY_OF_YEAR        107
 #define  TPM_SPEC_DAY_OF_YEAR    (TPM_SPEC)(SPEC_DAY_OF_YEAR)
 
 // Table 2:7 - Definition of TPM_GENERATED Constants  (EnumTable)

TPMCmd/tpm/include/VendorString.h

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ string.
 // A vendor-specific FIRMWARE_V1 is required here. It is
 // the more significant 32-bits of a vendor-specific value
 // indicating the version of the firmware
-//#define   FIRMWARE_V1         (0x20170302)
+//#define   FIRMWARE_V1         (0x20170417)
 
 // A vendor-specific FIRMWARE_V2 may be provided here. If present, it is the less 
 // significant 32-bits of the version of the firmware. 

TPMCmd/tpm/include/prototypes/Hierarchy_fp.h

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
  */
 /*(Auto)
     Automatically Generated by TpmPrototypes version 2.2 February 10, 2016 
-    Date: Sep 22, 2016 Time: 05:27:05 PM  
+    Date: Sep  9, 2016 Time: 01:03:57 PM  
 */
 
 #ifndef    _HIERARCHY_FP_H_
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ HierarchyStartup(
 //*** HierarchyGetProof()
 // This function finds the proof value associated with a hierarchy.It returns a
 // pointer to the proof value.
-TPM2B_AUTH *
+TPM2B_PROOF *
 HierarchyGetProof(
     TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY    hierarchy      // IN: hierarchy constant
     );

TPMCmd/tpm/src/command/Context/Context_spt.c

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ ComputeContextProtectionKey(
 {
     UINT16           symKeyBits;    // number of bits in the parent's
                                     //   symmetric key
-    TPM2B_AUTH      *proof = NULL;  // the proof value to use. Is null for
+    TPM2B_PROOF     *proof = NULL;  // the proof value to use. Is null for
                                     //   everything but a primary object in
                                     //   the Endorsement Hierarchy
 
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ ComputeContextIntegrity(
     )
 {
     HMAC_STATE          hmacState;
-    TPM2B_AUTH          *proof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF        *proof;
     UINT16              integritySize;
 
     // Get proof value

TPMCmd/tpm/src/command/Hierarchy/ChangeEPS.c

@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@ TPM2_ChangeEPS(
 // Internal Data Update
 
     // Reset endorsement hierarchy seed from RNG
-    CryptRandomGenerate(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, gp.EPSeed.t.buffer);
+    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.EPSeed.t.buffer), gp.EPSeed.t.buffer);
 
     // Create new ehProof value from RNG
-    CryptRandomGenerate(PROOF_SIZE, gp.ehProof.t.buffer);
+    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.ehProof.t.buffer), gp.ehProof.t.buffer);
 
     // Enable endorsement hierarchy
     gc.ehEnable = TRUE;

TPMCmd/tpm/src/command/Hierarchy/ChangePPS.c

@@ -53,16 +53,16 @@ TPM2_ChangePPS(
     RETURN_IF_NV_IS_NOT_AVAILABLE;
 
     // Input parameter is not reference in command action
-    in = NULL;
+    NOT_REFERENCED(in);
 
 // Internal Data Update
 
     // Reset platform hierarchy seed from RNG
-    CryptRandomGenerate(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, gp.PPSeed.t.buffer);
+    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.PPSeed.t.buffer), gp.PPSeed.t.buffer);
 
     // Create a new phProof value from RNG to prevent the saved platform
     // hierarchy contexts being loaded
-    CryptRandomGenerate(PROOF_SIZE, gp.phProof.t.buffer);
+    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.phProof.t.buffer), gp.phProof.t.buffer);
 
     // Set platform authPolicy to null
     gc.platformAlg = TPM_ALG_NULL;

TPMCmd/tpm/src/command/Hierarchy/Clear.c

@@ -65,11 +65,11 @@ TPM2_Clear(
 // Internal Data Update
 
     // Reset storage hierarchy seed from RNG
-    CryptRandomGenerate(PRIMARY_SEED_SIZE, gp.SPSeed.t.buffer);
+    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.SPSeed.t.buffer), gp.SPSeed.t.buffer);
 
     // Create new shProof and ehProof value from RNG
-    CryptRandomGenerate(PROOF_SIZE, gp.shProof.t.buffer);
-    CryptRandomGenerate(PROOF_SIZE, gp.ehProof.t.buffer);
+    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.shProof.t.buffer), gp.shProof.t.buffer);
+    CryptRandomGenerate(sizeof(gp.ehProof.t.buffer), gp.ehProof.t.buffer);
 
     // Enable storage and endorsement hierarchy
     gc.shEnable = gc.ehEnable = TRUE;

TPMCmd/tpm/src/crypt/Ticket.c

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ TicketComputeVerified(
     TPMT_TK_VERIFIED    *ticket         // OUT: verified ticket
     )
 {
-    TPM2B_AUTH          *proof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF         *proof;
     HMAC_STATE           hmacState;
 //
     // Fill in ticket fields
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ TicketComputeAuth(
     TPMT_TK_AUTH        *ticket         // OUT: Created ticket
     )
 {
-    TPM2B_AUTH          *proof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF         *proof;
     HMAC_STATE           hmacState;
 //
     // Get proper proof
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ TicketComputeHashCheck(
     TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK   *ticket         // OUT: Created ticket
     )
 {
-    TPM2B_AUTH          *proof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF         *proof;
     HMAC_STATE           hmacState;
 //
     // Get proper proof
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ TicketComputeCreation(
     TPMT_TK_CREATION    *ticket         // OUT: created ticket
     )
 {
-    TPM2B_AUTH          *proof;
+    TPM2B_PROOF         *proof;
     HMAC_STATE           hmacState;
 
     // Get proper proof