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Clarify that CAs can generate their own keys #238
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2.8
Mozilla Root Store Policy v. 2.8
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What about calling them subscriber certificates vs end-entity?
From: Tim Hollebeek ***@***.***>
Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2022 12:22 PM
To: mozilla/pkipolicy ***@***.***>
Cc: Subscribed ***@***.***>
Subject: [mozilla/pkipolicy] Clarify that Subscribers can always generate their own keys, even if they are a CA (Issue #238)
This one has come up a few times in the Validation Subcommittee of the CA/Browser Forum, and came up again in a side discussion today.
Mozilla policy currently contains the following:
"CAs MUST NOT generate the key pairs for end-entity certificates that have an EKU extension containing the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-serverAuth or anyExtendedKeyUsage."
This can be read as prohibiting key generation for certificates that CAs issue to themselves, which I don't believe was the intent.
I think it's pretty simple to fix ... for example:
"CAs MUST NOT generate the key pairs for end-entity certificates that have an EKU extension containing the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-serverAuth or anyExtendedKeyUsage, unless the certificate is being issued to the CA itself."
There are probably lots of other ways to fix it. Also, using CA organization here would be a slight improvement over the bare term "CA", which is somewhat ambiguous.
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The reason I didn't use the term "end entity certificate" is that this happens at a point in time where there is no certificate yet. In fact, I probably should have said Applicant instead of Subscriber. Fixed. |
timfromdigicert
changed the title
Clarify that Subscribers can always generate their own keys, even if they are a CA
Clarify that Applicants can always generate their own keys, even if they are a CA
Feb 24, 2022
BenWilson-Mozilla
added a commit
to BenWilson-Mozilla/pkipolicy
that referenced
this issue
Feb 28, 2022
Because this would be a relatively minor change, I believe we could put this fix into version 2.8 to address Issue mozilla#238 now, rather than later.
BenWilson-Mozilla
changed the title
Clarify that Applicants can always generate their own keys, even if they are a CA
Clarify that CAs can generate their own keys
Apr 4, 2022
Resolved in version 2.8 |
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This one has come up a few times in the Validation Subcommittee of the CA/Browser Forum, and came up again in a side discussion today.
Mozilla policy currently contains the following:
"CAs MUST NOT generate the key pairs for end-entity certificates that have an EKU extension containing the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-serverAuth or anyExtendedKeyUsage."
This can be read as prohibiting key generation for certificates that CAs issue to themselves, which I don't believe was the intent.
I think it's pretty simple to fix ... for example:
"CAs MUST NOT generate the key pairs for end-entity certificates that have an EKU extension containing the KeyPurposeIds id-kp-serverAuth or anyExtendedKeyUsage, unless the certificate is being issued to the CA itself."
There are probably lots of other ways to fix it. Also, using CA organization here would be a slight improvement over the bare term "CA", which is somewhat ambiguous.
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