



We will talk about:



Entra ID application types and configurations options



Protection and detection options



Showcasing tools and methods for getting valuable insight of applications




Will **not** be talking about this

Navigating Entra ID: Current state

- Identities are using only 1% of their granted permissions
- 85% of companies have identities with over-permissive contributor roles
- 70% of identities have not used any of their permissions granted in the last 90 days
- Workload identities outnumber human identities 10:1, which is double what was recorded in 2021
- 45% of identities are Super Admins

Attack path - Reconnaissance





Navigating Entra ID: Apps everywhere!

1st party apps

- Developed by Microsoft and are designed to work seamlessly with the Microsoft Ecosystem
- These apps tend to be forgotten but can have a quite large attack surface.
- These apps don't always result in a service principal being created in your tenant. This can lead to confusion.

Own applications


- Developed or created by the organization
- Typical misconfiguration issues with broad access (owners
- Poor credential management
- Conditional Access
- Lack of monitoring of these apps

3rd party apps

- Managing access can be more complex than 1st party.
- Supply chain review of 3rd party apps is rarely conducted. (NSM Report)
- Conditional Access policy misconfigurations.
- Too broad access
- Lack of risk detection and monitoring


Application type == Microsoft Applications

Entra ID Objects of Application Identities



Source: cloud-architekt.net/

Navigating Entra ID: What is this app we just tested?





But why bother?

- Make sure guests do not access the endpoints
- Make sure regular users do not access the endpoints
- Require allowed users to activate the PIM before use. (implies PIM)
- Protect the endpoint in the event a user token was stolen and a replay was attempted.
- PowerShell endpoints are easy targets for password sprays.
- Data Exposure: Can access sensitive data from your tenant, including user data, group data, and more. You should control who has access to this data.



Apps we might want to limit or have control of

Microsoft Graph
PowerShell /
Microsoft Graph
Command Line Tools
(14d82eec-204b4c2f-b7e8296a70dab67e)

Microsoft Graph
PowerShell (Recommended)

Azure Active
Directory PowerShell
(1b730954-16854b74-9bfddac224a7b894)

Planned for deprecation March 30!

Azure Active
Directory PowerShell
(1950a258-227b4e31-a9cf717495945fc2)


Planned for deprecation March 30!


Graph Explorer (de8bc8b5-d9f9-48b1a8ad-b748da725064)

Powerful tool that allows you to make requests and see responses against Microsoft Graph

Protecting 1st party apps with CAP


Conditional Access Policy (you will not find the two appID in deprecation):






Navigating Entra ID: Detection and Ops


Detection with log analytics -> Monitor alert. Sentinel incident or hunting






Before deprecation, you might want to find out if there is usage?

If Entra iD diagnostics is not configured? -> signings via portal or GraphSDK



Adding apps to Entra ID so we can govern them

Microsoft Azure PowerShell | Overview



Try to see what's different with this application compared to the one I will demo

Did not found service principal with AppId 1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2 so created one
Updated assignment required for 1950a258-227b-4e31-a9cf-717495945fc2 with display name Microsoft Azure PowerShell



Demo time detect and protect 1st party apps

Setup basic application governance

Setup Entra ID User settings

- Only administrators are Allowed to register applications.
- Only administrators are allowed to consent to applications.
- An admin consent workflow be configured for applications.
- Group owners should not be allowed to consent to applications.

⊗ Caution


Using the Restrict access to Microsoft Entra administration portal switch is NOT a security measure. For more information on the functionality, see the table below.


Toolkits for Entra ID Ops

- MFA Sweep
- Native Tools
 - Entra ID portal: Microsoft Entra application activity and workbooks ++
 - Security portal: App Governance
- MSIdentityTools
- Azurehound (limit 1gb on bloodhound CE version)
- AzADServicePrincipalInsights by JulianHayward
- ScubaGear State against CISA baselines
- https://graphpermissions.merill.net/

Navigating Entra ID: Consents

Delegated vs application







My recommendations

Assess and monitor	Assess and monitor identities and application continuously
Alerting	Implement alerting (automation if possible) for high value assets and applications
Process	Have a process to remove inactive, over-permissive apps and "global admins"
3 rd party control	Have routines for dealing with 3rd party vendors, service providers, and applications.

