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EOS.IO Technical White Paper

\*\*\*DISCLAIMER\*\*\* The EOS.IO software introduces a new blockchain architecture designed to enable vertical and horizontal scaling of decentralized applications. This is achieved by creating an operating-system-like construct upon which applications can be built. The software provides accounts, authentication, databases, asynchronous communication and the scheduling of applications across hundreds of CPU cores or clusters. The resulting technology is a blockchain architecture that scales to millions of transactions per second, eliminates user fees, and allows for quick and easy deployment of decentralized applications.

\*\*\*PLEASE NOTE: CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOKENS REFERRED TO IN THIS WHITE PAPER REFER TO CRYPTOGRAPHIC TOKENS ON A LAUNCHED BLOCKCHAIN THAT ADOPTS THE EOS.IO SOFTWARE. THEY DO NOT REFER TO THE ERC-20 COMPATIBLE TOKENS BEING DISTRIBUTED ON THE ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN IN CONNECTION WITH THE EOS TOKEN DISTRIBUTION.\*\*\*

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- [Background]([#background])  
- [Requirements for Blockchain Applications]([#requirements-for-blockchain-applications])  
- [Support Millions of Users]([#support-millions-of-users])  
- [Free Usage]([#free-usage])  
- [Easy Upgrade/Bug Recovery]([#easy-upgrades-and-bug-recovery])  
- [Low Latency]([#low-latency])  
- [Sequential Performance]([#sequential-performance])  
- [Parallel Performance]([#parallel-performance])  
- [Consensus Algorithm (DPoS)]([#consensus-algorithm--dpos-])  
- [Transaction Confirmation]([#transaction-confirmation])  
- [Transaction as Proof of Stake (TaPoS)]([#transaction-as-proof-of-stake--tapos-])  
- [Accounts]([#accounts])  
- [Messages & Handlers]([#messages---handlers])  
- [Role Based Permission Management]([#role-based-permission-management])  
- [Named Permission Levels]([#named-permission-levels])  
- [Named Message Handler Groups]([#named-message-handler-groups])  
- [Permission Mapping]([#permission-mapping])  
- [Evaluating Permissions]([#evaluating-permissions])  
- [Default Permission Groups]([#default-permission-groups])  
- [Parallel Evaluation of Permissions]([#parallel-evaluation-of-permissions])  
- [Messages with Mandatory Delay]([#messages-with-mandatory-delay])  
- [Recovery and Stolen Keys]([#recovery-and-stolen-keys])  
- [Deterministic Parallel Execution of Applications]([#deterministic-parallel-execution-of-applications])  
- [Minimizing Communication Latency]([#minimizing-communication-latency])  
- [Read-Only Message Handlers]([#read-only-message-handlers])  
- [Atomic Transactions with Multiple Accounts]([#atomic-transactions-with-multiple-accounts])  
- [Partial Evaluation of Blockchain State]([#partial-evaluation-of-blockchain-state])  
- [Subjective Best Effort Scheduling]([#subjective-best-effort-scheduling])  
- [Token Model and Resource Usage]([#token-model-and-resource-usage])  
- [Objective and Subjective Measurements]([#objective-and-subjective-measurements])  
- [Receiver Pays]([#receiver-pays])  
- [Delegating Capacity]([#delegating-capacity])  
- [Separating Transaction Costs from Token Value]([#separating-transaction-costs-from-token-value])  
- [State Storage Costs]([#state-storage-costs])  
- [Block Rewards]([#block-rewards])  
- [Community Benefit Applications]([#community-benefit-applications])  
- [Governance]([#governance])  
- [Freezing Accounts]([#freezing-accounts])  
- [Changing Account Code]([#changing-account-code])  
- [Constitution]([#constitution])  
- [Upgrading the Protocol]([#upgrading-the-protocol---constitution])  
- [Scripts & Virtual Machines]([#scripts---virtual-machines])  
- [Schema Defined Messages]([#schema-defined-messages])  
- [Schema Defined Database]([#schema-defined-database])  
- [Separating Authentication from Application]([#separating-authentication-from-application])  
- [Light Client Validation]([#light-client-validation])  
- [Web Assembly]([#web-assembly])  
- [Inter-Blockchain Communication]([#inter-blockchain-communication])  
- [Merkle Proofs for Light Client Validation (LCV)]([#merkle-proofs-for-light-client-validation--lc-])  
- [Latency of Interchain Communication]([#latency-of-interchain-communication])  
- [Proof of Completeness]([#proof-of-completeness])  
- [Conclusion]([#conclusion])

## Background

Blockchain technology was introduced in 2008 with the launch of the bitcoin currency, and since then entrepreneurs and developers have been attempting to generalize the technology in order to support a wider range of applications on a single blockchain platform.

While a number of blockchain platforms have struggled to support functional decentralized applications, application specific blockchains such as the BitShares decentralized exchange (2014) and Steem social media platform (2016) have become heavily used. Developers and businesses can then create effective monetization strategies.

Existing blockchain platforms are burdened by large fees and limited computational capacity that prevent widespread blockchain adoption.

## Requirements for Blockchain Applications

In order to gain widespread use, applications on the blockchain require a platform that is flexible enough to meet the following requirements:

## Support Millions of Users

Disrupting businesses such as eBay, Uber, Airbnb, and Facebook, require blockchain technology capable of handling tens of millions of active daily users. In certain cases, applications may not work unless a critical mass of users is reached and therefore a platform that can handle mass number of users is paramount.

## Free Usage

Application developers need the flexibility to offer users free services; users should not have to pay in order to use the platform or benefit from its services. A blockchain platform that is free to use for users will likely gain more widespread adoption. Developers and businesses can then create effective monetization strategies.

## Easy Upgrades and Bug Recovery

Businesses building blockchain based applications need the flexibility to enhance their applications with new features.

All non-trivial software is subject to bugs, even with the most rigorous of formal verification. The platform must be robust enough to share the bugs when they inevitably occur.

## Low Latency

A good user experience demands reliable feedback with delay of no more than a few seconds. Longer delays frustrate users and make applications built on a blockchain less competitive with existing non-blockchain alternatives.

## Sequential Performance

There are some applications that just cannot be implemented with parallel algorithms due to sequentially dependent steps. Applications such as exchanges need enough sequential performance to handle high volumes and therefore a platform with fast sequential performance is required.

## Parallel Performance

Large scale applications need to divide the workload across multiple CPUs and computers.

## Consensus Algorithm (DPoS)

EOS.IO software utilizes the only decentralized consensus algorithm capable of meeting the performance requirements of applications on the blockchain, [Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS)]([https://steemit.com/dpos/@dantheman/dpos-consensus-algorithm-this-missing-white-paper]). Under this algorithm, those who hold tokens on a blockchain adopting the EOS.IO software may select block producers through a continuous approval voting system and anyone may choose to participate in block production and will be given the same amount of tokens proportional to the total votes they have received relative to all other producers. For private blockchains the management could use the tokens to add and remove IT staff.

The EOS.IO software enables blocks to be produced exactly every 3 seconds and exactly one producer is authorized to produce a block at any given point in time. If the block is not produced at the scheduled time then the block for that time slot is skipped. When one or more blocks are skipped, there is a 6 or more second gap in the blockchain.

Using the EOS.IO software blocks are produced in rounds of 21. At the start of each round 21 unique block producers are chosen. The top 20 by total approval are automatically chosen every round and the last producer is chosen proportional to their number of votes relative to other producers. The selected producers are shuffled using a pseudorandom number generator from the block time. This shuffling is done to ensure that all producers maintain balanced connectivity to all other producers.

If a producer misses a block and has not produced any block within the last 24 hours they are removed from consideration until they notify the blockchain of their intention to start producing blocks again. This ensures the network operates smoothly by minimizing the number of blocks missed by not scheduling those who are proven to be unreliable.

Under normal conditions a EOS blockchain does not experience any forks because the block producers cooperate to produce blocks rather than compete. In the event there is a fork, consensus will automatically switch to the longest chain. This metric works for blockchains with blocks proportional to the total votes they have received relative to all other producers. For private blockchains the management could use the tokens to add and remove IT staff.

With fewer producers, furthermore, no block producer should be producing blocks on two forks at the same time. If a block producer is caught doing this then such block producer will likely be voted out. Cryptographic evidence of such double-production may also be used to automatically remove abusers.

## Transaction Confirmation

Typical DPoS blockchains have 100% block producer participation. A transaction can be considered confirmed with 99.9% certainty after an average of 1.5 seconds from time of broadcast.

There are some extraordinary cases where a software bug, internet congestion, or a malicious block producer will create two or more forks. For absolute certainty that a transaction is irreversible, a node may choose to wait for confirmation by 15 out of the 21 block producers. Based on a typical configuration of the EOS.IO software, this will take an average of 45 seconds under normal circumstances. By default all nodes will consider a block confirmed by 15 of 21 producers irreversible and will not switch to a new fork.

It is possible for a node to warn users that there is a high probability that they are on a minority fork within 9 seconds of the start of a fork. After 2 consecutive missed blocks there is a 95% probability a node is on a minority fork. With 3 consecutive missed blocks there is a 99% certainty of being on a minority fork. It is possible to generate a robust predictive model that will utilize information about which nodes missed, recent participation rates, and other factors to quickly warn operators that something is wrong.

The response to such a warning depends entirely upon the nature of the business transactions, but the simplest response is to wait for 15/21 confirmations until the warning stops.

## Transaction as Proof of Stake (TaPoS)

The EOS.IO software requires every transaction to include the hash of a recent block header. This hash serves two purposes:

1. prevents a replay of a transaction on forks that do not include the referenced block; and
2. signals the network that a particular user and their stake are on a specific fork.

Over time all users end up directly confirming the blockchain which makes it difficult to forge counterfeit chains as the counterfeit would not be able to migrate transactions from the legitimate chain.

## Accounts

The EOS.IO software permits all accounts to be referenced by a unique human readable name of 2 to 32 characters in length. The name is chosen by the creator of the account. All accounts must be funded with the minimal account balance at the time they are created to cover the cost of storing account data. Account names also support namespaces such that the owner of account @domain is the only one who can create the account @user.domain.

In a decentralized context, application developers will pay the nominal cost of account creation to sign up a new user. Traditional businesses already spend significant sums of money per customer they acquire in the form of advertising, free services, etc. The cost of funding a new blockchain account should be insignificant in comparison. Fortunately, there is no need to create accounts for users already signed up by another application.

## Messages & Handlers

Each account can send structured messages to other accounts and may define scripts to handle messages when they are received. The EOS.IO software gives each account its own private database which can only be accessed by its own message handlers. Message handling scripts can also send messages to other accounts. The combination of messages and automated message handlers is how EOS.IO defines smart contracts.

## Role Based Permission Management

Permission management involves determining whether or not a message is properly authorized. The simplest form of permission management is checking that a transaction has the required signatures, but this implies that required signatures are already known. Generally authority is bound to individuals or groups of individuals and is often compartmentalized. The EOS.IO software provides a declarative permission management system that gives accounts fine grained and high level control over who can do what and when.

It is critical that authentication and permission management be standardized and separated from the business logic of the application. This enables tools to be developed to manage permissions in a general purpose manner and also provide significant opportunities for performance optimization.

Every account may be controlled by any weighted combination of other accounts and private keys. This creates a hierarchical authority structure that reflects how permissions are organized in reality, and makes multi-user control over funds easier than ever. Multi-user control is the single biggest barrier to security, and, when used properly, it can greatly reduce the risk of theft due to hacking.

EOS.IO software allows accounts to define what combination of keys and/or accounts can send a particular message type to another account. For example, it is possible to have one key for a user's social media account and another for access to the exchange. It is even possible to give other accounts permission to act on behalf of a user's account without assigning them keys.

## Named Permission Levels

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Using the EOS.IO software, accounts can define named permission levels each of which can be derived from higher level named permissions. Each named permission level defines an authority; an authority is a threshold multi-signature check consisting of keys and/or named permission levels of other accounts. For example, an account's "friend" permission level can be set for the account to be controlled equally by any of the account's friends.

Another example is the Steem blockchain which has three hard-coded named permission levels: owner, active, and posting. The posting permission level only perform social actions such as voting and posting, while the active permission can do everything except change the owner. The owner permission is meant for core storage and is able to do everything. The EOS.IO software generalizes this concept by allowing each account holder to define their own hierarchy as well as the grouping of actions.

## Named Message Handler Groups

The EOS.IO software allows each account to organize its own message handlers into named and nested groups. These named message handler groups can be referenced by other accounts when they configure their permission levels.

The highest level message handler group is the account name and the lowest level is the individual message type being received by the account. These groups can be referenced like so: ".\*@accountname.group.subgroup.MessageType\*\*".

Under this model it is possible for an exchange contract to group order creation and canceling separately from deposit and withdraw. This grouping by the exchange contract is a convenience for users of the exchange.

## Permission Mapping

EOS.IO software allows each account to define a mapping between a Named Message Handler Group of any account and their own Named Permission Level. For example, an account holder could map the account holder's social media application to the account holder's "friend" permission group. With this mapping, any friend of the account holder's social media. Even though they would post as the account holder, they would still use their own keys to sign the message. This means it is always possible to identify which friends used the account and in what way.

## Evaluating Permissions

When delivering a message of type ".\*Action\*\*", from ".\*@alice\*\*" to ".\*@bob\*\*" the EOS.IO software will first check to see if ".\*@alice\*\*" has defined a permission mapping for ".\*@bob.group.subgroup.Action\*\*". If nothing is found then a mapping for ".\*@bob.group.subgroup\*\*" then ".\*@bob.group\*\*", and lastly ".\*@bob\*\*" will be checked. If no further match is found, then the assumed mapping will be to the named permission group ".\*@alice.active\*\*".

Once a mapping is identified then signing authority is validated using the threshold multi-signature process and the authority associated with the named permission. If that fails, then it traverses up to the parent permission and ultimately to the owner permission, ".\*@alice.owner\*\*".

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## Default Permission Groups

The EOS.IO technology also allows all accounts to have an "owner" group which can do everything, and an "active" group which can do everything except change the owner group. All other permission groups are derived from "active".

## Parallel Evaluation of Permissions

The permission evaluation process is "read-only" and changes to permissions made by transactions do not take effect until the end of a block. This means that all keys and permission evaluation for all transactions can be executed in parallel. Furthermore, blocks are produced every 3 seconds and blocks are produced every 3 seconds. This means that the read-only nature of the permission evaluation process allows the permission evaluation process to be re-evaluated as they are applied.

All things considered, permission verification represents a significant percentage of the computation required to validate transactions. Making this a read-only and trivially parallelizable process enables a dramatic increase in performance.

When replaying the blockchain to regenerate the deterministic state from the log of messages there is no need to evaluate the permissions again. The fact that a transaction is included in a known good block is sufficient to skip this step. This dramatically reduces the computational load associated with replaying an ever growing blockchain.

## Messages with Mandatory Delay

Time is a critical component of security. In most cases, it is not possible to know if a private key has been stolen until it has been used. Time based security is even more critical when people have applications that require keys be kept on computers connected to the internet for daily use. The EOS.IO software enables application developers to indicate that certain messages must have a minimum period of time before being included in a block before they can be applied. During this time they can be cancelled.

Users can then receive notice via email or text message when one of these messages is broadcast. If they did not authorize it, then they can use the account recovery process to recover their account and retract the message.

The required delay depends upon how sensitive an operation is. Paying for a coffee can have no delay and be irreversible in seconds, while buying a house may require a 72 hour clearing period. Transferring an entire account to new control may take up to 30 days. The exact delays chosen are up to application developers and users.

## Recovery from Stolen Keys

The EOS.IO software provides users a way to restore control of their account when their keys are stolen. An account owner can use any owner key that was active in the last 30 days along with approval from their designated account recovery partner to reset the owner key on their account. The account recovery partner cannot reset control of the account without the help of the owner.

There is nothing for the hacker to gain by attempting to go through the recovery process because they already "control" the account. Furthermore, if they did go through the process, the recovery partner would likely demand identification and multi-factor authentication to ensure they are not the hacker and to ensure the hacker gains nothing in the process.

This process is also very different from a day-to-day transactions arrangement. With a multi-signature transaction, there is another company that is party to every transaction that is executed, but with the recovery process the agent is only a party to the recovery process and has no power over the single multi-signature. This dramatically reduces costs and legal liabilities for everyone involved.

## Deterministic Parallel Execution of Applications

Blockchain consensus depends upon deterministic (reproducible) behavior. This means all parallel execution must be free from the use of mutexes or other locking primitives. Without locks there must be some way to guarantee that all accounts can only read and write their own private database. It also means that each account processes messages sequentially and that parallelism will be at the account level.

In an EOS.IO software-based blockchain, it is the job of the block producer to organize message delivery into independent threads so that they can be evaluated in parallel. The state of each account depends only upon the messages delivered to it. The schedule is the output of a block producer and will be deterministically executed, but the process for generating the schedule need not be deterministic. This means that block producers can utilize parallel algorithms to schedule transactions.

Part of parallel execution means that when a script generates a new message it does not get delivered immediately, instead it is scheduled to be delivered in the next cycle. The reason it cannot be delivered immediately is because the receiver may be actively modifying its own state in other threads.

## Minimizing Communication Latency

Latency is the time it takes for one account to send a message to another account and then receive a response. The goal is to enable two accounts to exchange messages back and forth within a single block without having to wait 3 seconds between each message. To enable this, the EOS.IO software divides each block into cycles. Each cycle is divided into threads and each thread contains a list of transactions. Each transaction contains a set of messages to be delivered. This structure can be visualized as a tree where alternating layers are processed sequentially and in parallel.

## Block

Threads (Sequential)

Cycles (Sequential)

Messages (Sequential)

Receiver and Notified Accounts (parallel)

Transactions generated in one cycle can be delivered in any subsequent cycle or block. Block producers will keep adding cycles to a block until the maximum wall clock time has passed or there are no new generated transactions to deliver.

It is possible to use static analysis of a block to verify that within a given cycle no two threads contain transactions that modify the same account. So long as that invariant is maintained a block can be processed by running all threads in parallel.

## Read-Only Message Handlers

Some accounts may be able to process a message on a pass/fail basis without modifying their internal state. If this is the case then these handlers can be executed in parallel so long as only read-only message handlers for a particular account are included in one or more threads within a particular cycle.

## Atomic Transactions with Multiple Accounts

Sometimes it is desirable to ensure that messages are delivered to and accepted by multiple accounts atomically. In this case both messages are placed in one transaction and both accounts will be assigned the same thread and the messages applied sequentially. This situation is not ideal for performance and when it comes to "bidding" users for usage, they will get billed by the number of unique accounts referenced by a transaction.

For performance and cost reasons it is best to minimize atomic operations involving two or more heavily utilized accounts.

## Partial Evaluation of Blockchain State

Scaling blockchain technology necessitates that components are modular. Everyone should not have to run everything, especially if they only need to use a small subset of the applications.

An exchange application developer runs full nodes for the purpose of displaying the exchange state to its users. This exchange application has no need for the state associated with social media applications. EOS.IO software allows any full node to pick any subset of applications to run. Messages delivered to other applications are safely ignored because an application's state is derived entirely from the messages that are delivered to it.

This has some significant implications on communication with other accounts. Most significantly it cannot be assumed that the state of the other account is accessible on the same machine. It also means that while it is tempting to enable "locks" that allow one account to synchronously call another account, this design pattern breaks down if the other account is not resident in memory.

All state communication among accounts must be passed via transactions included in the blockchain.

## Subjective Best Effort Scheduling

The EOS.IO software cannot obligate block producers to deliver any message to any other account. Each block producer makes their own subjective measurement of the computational complexity and time required to process a transaction. This applies whether a transaction is generated by a user or automatically by a script.

On a launched blockchain adopting the EOS.IO software, at a network level all transactions are billed a fixed computational bandwidth cost regardless of whether it took .01ms or a full 18 ms to execute it. However, each individual block producer using the software may calculate resource usage using their own algorithm and measurements. When a block producer concludes that a transaction or account has consumed a disproportionate amount of the computational capacity they simply reject the transaction when they are unable to allocate enough resources to the underlying protocol.

In general so long as even 1 block producer considers a transaction as valid and under the resource usage limits then all other block producers will also accept it, but it may take up to 1 minute for the transaction to find that producer.

In some cases a producer may create a block that includes transactions that are an order of magnitude outside of acceptable ranges. In this case the next block producer may opt to reject the block and the tie will be broken by the third producer. This is no different than the real world where a producer may create a block that includes transactions that are an order of magnitude outside of acceptable ranges. In this case the next block producer may opt to reject the block and the tie will be broken by the third producer. This is no different than the real world where a producer may create a block that includes transactions that are an order of magnitude outside of acceptable ranges. In this case the next block producer may opt to reject the block and the tie will be broken by the third producer. This is no different than the real world where a producer may create a block that includes transactions that are an order of magnitude outside of acceptable ranges. 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