webrtc: Don't use multihash for noise prologue #3
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As elaborated in this comment, I don't think the use of multihash gives us any value here.
Both peers need to know the hash algorithm in advance and they never get to look at the wrapped hash of the other party. As such, they can't learn any information from it, so I think the use of a self-describing format doesn't make any sense.
The only thing I can think of that the use of multihash might guard against is that two different hash algorithms could produce the same hash for different certificates. I am not even sure such kinds of collisions are possible?