Feel free to send in a PR if you know of other leaks
| Date | Description | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2017 | AWS hosted elastic search servers hijacked |
| # | Organization / Date | Root Cause / Credential Exposure | Impact & Details | Relevance to Static Keys / S3 Usage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Large-scale AWS Keys Database & Ransomware Campaign (2025) | Public server exposed >158M AWS secret key records; 1,229 active keys used to encrypt S3 buckets and demand ransom. | Attackers encrypted S3 data using SSE-C without owner awareness. | Demonstrates that static keys become commodities → direct ransomware targeting S3. |
| 4 | Large Leak of Environment Variables (2024) | Palo Alto Networks study: >90,000 leaked .env files; 1,185 contained AWS access keys. |
Keys leaked from repos, CI/CD logs, misconfigured files. | Reinforces that static/long-lived keys end up everywhere → high-risk credentials. |
| 5 | Developer Canary Token Test (2024) | Researcher placed a fake AWS key on GitHub; it was used within minutes (days when placed only on a website). | Demonstrated active scanning for AWS keys in public code. | Proves exposure-to-compromise window is minutes → rapid detection & rotation required. |
| 6 | AWS Engineer Leak (Jan 2020) | Public GitHub repo by an AWS engineer contained system credentials including AWS key-pairs (one named rootkey.csv). |
Repo discovered within ~30 minutes; AWS remediated same day. | Even cloud vendors have human error → continuous scanning is essential. |
| 7 | Generic Code-Repo Exposures (2019–2020) | Multiple cases of AWS keys committed to GitHub/VCS; Medium posts highlight accidental leaks & attacker automation. | Often unnoticed but cumulatively large attack surface. | Emphasizes importance of scanning for AKIA..., reviewing last-used dates, disabling stale keys. |
| 8 | Honey-Bucket S3 Recon Research (2023) | Researchers deployed honey-buckets showing automated scans/downloads/deletes as soon as credentials or endpoints surfaced. | Showed constant automated reconnaissance in the wild. | Demonstrates that once keys or endpoints leak, S3 becomes an immediate target. |
| 9 | www.codespaces.com (17th of June 2014) | he attacker gained access to one of Code Spaces’ AWS IAM access keysThe exact method has never been 100% confirmed publicly, but all evidence points to: Likely vector: A compromised AWS access key This key allowed the attacker to:Log into the AWS console | The company was shutdown | Yes one single AWS Key can take a company down |