hashlock.

Security Audit

MyDexBot (DeFi)

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CAUTION

THIS DOCUMENT IS A SECURITY AUDIT REPORT AND MAY CONTAIN CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. THIS INCLUDES IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITIES AND MALICIOUS CODE WHICH COULD BE USED TO COMPROMISE THE PROJECT. THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD ONLY BE FOR INTERNAL USE UNTIL ISSUES ARE RESOLVED. ONCE VULNERABILITIES ARE REMEDIATED, THIS REPORT CAN BE MADE PUBLIC. THE CONTENT OF THIS REPORT IS OWNED BY HASHLOCK PTY LTD FOR USE OF THE CLIENT.

Executive Summary

The MyDexBot team partnered with Hashlock to conduct a security audit of their smart contracts. Hashlock manually and proactively reviewed the code in order to ensure the project's team and community that the deployed contracts are secure.

Project Context

MyDexBot is a blockchain-based automated trading platform developed by BlockBusters Tech that offers users decentralized crypto trading bots for executing strategies like grid trading and arbitrage across major decentralized exchanges such as Uniswap, PancakeSwap and SushiSwap. To support its ecosystem, the project is currently running a multi-chain presale for its native utility token (MDB), which is designed to power the platform's features, enable staking rewards, grant access to advanced bot capabilities, and provide incentives like reduced trading fees and protocol participation. The goal is to democratize access to automated DeFi trading tools and bridge sophisticated trading strategies with retail users.

Project Name: MyDexBot
Project Type: Defi
Compiler Version: ^0.8.15
Website: https://mydexbot.com/presale/
Logo:

Visualised Context:



Project Visuals:





Audit Scope

We at Hashlock audited the solidity code within the MyDexBot project, the scope of work included a comprehensive review of the smart contracts listed below. We tested the smart contracts to check for their security and efficiency. These tests were undertaken primarily through manual line-by-line analysis and were supported by software-assisted testing.

Description	**MyDexBot Smart Contracts**
Platform	**Ethereum / Solidity**
Audit Date	**December, 2025**
Scope	https://bscscan.com/address/0x3F971C6D8dDEFD21Ef99A4aF5541e38a4331EB4E#code
Contract 1	GridBot.sol

Security Rating

After Hashlock's Audit, we found the smart contracts to be **"Secure"**. The contracts all follow simple logic, with correct and detailed ordering. They use a series of interfaces, and the protocol uses a list of Open Zeppelin contracts.

The 'Hashlocked' rating is reserved for projects that ensure ongoing security via bug bounty programs or on chain monitoring technology.

All issues uncovered during automated and manual analysis were meticulously reviewed and applicable vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit Findings section. The list of audited assets is presented in the Audit Scope section and the project's contract functionality is presented in the Intended Smart Contract Functions section.

All vulnerabilities initially identified have now been resolved and acknowledged.

Hashlock found:

1 Medium severity vulnerabilities

2 Low severity vulnerabilities

1 QA

Caution: *Hashlock's audits do not guarantee a project's success or ethics, and are not liable or responsible for security. Always conduct independent research about any project before interacting.*

Intended Smart Contract Functions

Claimed Behaviour	Actual Behaviour
GridBot.sol - Add/remove trusted routers; set priceimpact; pause/unpause the contract - Place buyOrder/sellOrder, approve token transfers, and query price/estimate functions. - Execute Uniswap V2 & V3 swaps with just-in-time approvals and store per-user swap results.	**Contract achieves this functionality.**

Code Quality

This audit scope involves the smart contracts of the MyDexBot project, as outlined in the Audit Scope section. All contracts, libraries, and interfaces mostly follow standard best practices and to help avoid unnecessary complexity that increases the likelihood of exploitation, however, some refactoring were recommended to optimize security measures.

The code is very well commented on and closely follows best practice nat-spec styling. All comments are correctly aligned with code functionality.

Audit Resources

We were given the MyDexBot project smart contract code in the form of GitHub access.

As mentioned above, code parts are well commented. The logic is straightforward, and therefore it is easy to quickly comprehend the programming flow as well as the complex code logic. The comments are helpful in providing an understanding of the protocol's overall architecture.

Dependencies

As per our observation, the libraries used in this smart contracts infrastructure are based on well-known industry standard open source projects.
Apart from libraries, its functions are used in external smart contract calls.

Severity Definitions

The severity levels assigned to findings represent a comprehensive evaluation of both their potential impact and the likelihood of occurrence within the system. These categorizations are established based on Hashlock's professional standards and expertise, incorporating both industry best practices and our discretion as security auditors. This ensures a tailored assessment that reflects the specific context and risk profile of each finding.

Significance	Description
High	High-severity vulnerabilities can result in loss of funds, asset loss, access denial, and other critical issues that will result in the direct loss of funds and control by the owners and community.
Medium	Medium-level difficulties should be solved before deployment, but won't result in loss of funds.
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are areas that lack best practices that may cause small complications in the future.
Gas	Gas Optimisations, issues, and inefficiencies.
QA	Quality Assurance (QA) findings are informational and don't impact functionality. Supports clients improve the clarity, maintainability, or overall structure of the code.

Status Definitions

Each identified security finding is assigned a status that reflects its current stage of remediation or acknowledgment. The status provides clarity on the handling of the issue and ensures transparency in the auditing process. The statuses are as follows:

Significance	Description
Resolved	The identified vulnerability has been fully mitigated either through the implementation of the recommended solution proposed by Hashlock or through an alternative client-provided solution that demonstrably addresses the issue.
Acknowledged	The client has formally recognized the vulnerability but has chosen not to address it due to the high cost or complexity of remediation. This status is acceptable for medium and low-severity findings after internal review and agreement. However, all high-severity findings must be resolved without exception.
Unresolved	The finding remains neither remediated nor formally acknowledged by the client, leaving the vulnerability unaddressed.

Audit Findings

Medium

[M-01] GridBot#buyOrder, sellOrder - Fee On Transfer Tokens Break Swap Accounting

Description

The `buyOrder` and `sellOrder` functions assume that ERC20 transfers deliver the exact requested token amount and do not account for fee-on-transfer or deflationary token behavior.

Vulnerability Details

Both `buyOrder` and `sellOrder` collect tokens from the user using `safeTransferFrom` and then pass the original `_amountIn` or `_amount` to the swap logic. This assumes that the contract receives the full transferred amount. However, for fee-on-transfer or deflationary ERC20 tokens, the actual amount received by the contract is lower than the requested amount. The functions do not measure the balance difference before and after the transfer, nor do they adjust swap inputs based on the actual received amount. As a result, the swap is executed with incorrect assumptions, and the `amountOut` validation relies on inconsistent internal accounting. The root cause is missing balance-delta validation when handling ERC20 transfers.

Impact

If fee-on-transfer tokens are used, swaps may revert due to insufficient balances, fail slippage checks unexpectedly, or produce inconsistent output values. This can lead to failed trades, degraded user experience, and incompatibility with a wide class of ERC20 tokens. While standard ERC20 tokens are unaffected, the protocol's trading reliability is reduced.

Recommendation

We recommend validating the actual token amount received by checking the contract balance before and after each transfer and using the received amount for swap calculations, or explicitly restricting supported tokens to non-fee-on-transfer ERC20 implementations.

Status

Acknowledged

Low

[L-01] GridBot - Floating and Outdated Pragma

Description

Locking the pragma helps ensure that the contracts do not accidentally get deployed using an older version of the Solidity compiler affected by vulnerabilities.

The contract allowed floating or unlocked pragma to be used, i.e., `^0.8.15`. This allows the contracts to be compiled with all the solidity compiler versions above the limit specified.

Impact

If the smart contract gets compiled and deployed with an older or too recent version of the solidity compiler, there's a chance that it may get compromised due to the bugs present in the older versions or unidentified exploits in the new versions.

Incompatibility issues may also arise if the contract code does not support features in other compiler versions, therefore, breaking the logic.

The likelihood of exploitation is low.

Recommendation

Keep the compiler versions consistent in all the smart contract files. Do not allow floating pragmas anywhere. It is suggested to use the 0.8.29 pragma version

Reference: https://scs.owasp.org/SCWE/SCSVS-CODE/SCWE-060/

Status

Acknowledged

[L-02] GridBot.sol#priceImpactPercent - priceimpact Rate Can Be Excessive

Vulnerability Details

The `priceImpactPercent` function is used by the contract owner to configure the maximum acceptable price impact applied during trade execution, and this value is later used in slippage calculations within buy and sell flows. This parameter directly affects how much deviation from the expected output amount is tolerated when validating swaps. However, the function allows the owner to set `priceimpact` to any arbitrary value without enforcing an upper bound. The root cause is the absence of validation ensuring that the configured price impact remains within a reasonable and safe range.

Impact

If the owner accidentally or maliciously sets `priceimpact` to an excessively high value, slippage protection becomes ineffective, allowing trades to execute with extreme price deviation. This can result in users receiving significantly fewer tokens than expected, leading to financial loss and erosion of trust in the platform.

Recommendation

Enforce an upper limit on `priceimpact` to ensure slippage tolerance remains within acceptable bounds.

Status

Acknowledged

QA

[Q-01] GridBot - Dead Code

Description

It is recommended to keep the production repository clean to prevent confusion and the introduction of vulnerabilities. `exchageDetails` and `dexDetails` are never used or called externally or from inside the contracts. It should be removed when the contract is deployed on the mainnet.

Impact

This does not impact the security aspect of the Smart contract but prevents confusion when the code is sent to other developers or auditors to understand and implement.

This reduces the overall size of the contracts and also helps in saving gas.

Recommendation

If the library functions are not supposed to be used anywhere, consider removing them from the contract.

Status

Acknowledged

Centralisation

The MyDexBot project values security and utility over decentralisation.

The owner executable functions within the protocol increase security and functionality but depend highly on internal team responsibility.

Conclusion

After Hashlock's analysis, the MyDexBot project seems to have a sound and well-tested code base, now that our vulnerability findings have been resolved and acknowledged. Overall, most of the code is correctly ordered and follows industry best practices. The code is well commented on as well. To the best of our ability, Hashlock is not able to identify any further vulnerabilities.

Our Methodology

Hashlock strives to maintain a transparent working process and to make our audits a collaborative effort. The objective of our security audits is to improve the quality of systems and upcoming projects we review and to aim for sufficient remediation to help protect users and project leaders. Below is the methodology we use in our security audit process.

Manual Code Review:

In manually analysing all of the code, we seek to find any potential issues with code logic, error handling, protocol and header parsing, cryptographic errors, and random number generators. We also watch for areas where more defensive programming could reduce the risk of future mistakes and speed up future audits. Although our primary focus is on the in-scope code, we examine dependency code and behaviour when it is relevant to a particular line of investigation.

Vulnerability Analysis:

Our methodologies include manual code analysis, user interface interaction, and white box penetration testing. We consider the project's website, specifications, and whitepaper (if available) to attain a high-level understanding of what functionality the smart contract under review contains. We then communicate with the developers and founders to gain insight into their vision for the project. We install and deploy the relevant software, exploring the user interactions and roles. While we do this, we brainstorm threat models and attack surfaces. We read design documentation, review other audit results, search for similar projects, examine source code dependencies, skim open issue tickets, and generally investigate details other than the implementation.

Documenting Results:

We undergo a robust, transparent process for analysing potential security vulnerabilities and seeing them through to successful remediation. When a potential issue is discovered, we immediately create an issue entry for it in this document, even though we have not yet verified the feasibility and impact of the issue. This process is vast because we document our suspicions early even if they are later shown to not represent exploitable vulnerabilities. We generally follow a process of first documenting the suspicion with unresolved questions, and then confirming the issue through code analysis, live experimentation, or automated tests. Code analysis is the most tentative, and we strive to provide test code, log captures, or screenshots demonstrating our confirmation. After this, we analyse the feasibility of an attack in a live system.

Suggested Solutions:

We search for immediate mitigations that live deployments can take and finally, we suggest the requirements for remediation engineering for future releases. The mitigation and remediation recommendations should be scrutinised by the developers and deployment engineers, and successful mitigation and remediation is an ongoing collaborative process after we deliver our report, and before the contract details are made public.

Disclaimers

Hashlock's Disclaimer

Hashlock's team has analysed these smart contracts in accordance with the best industry practices at the date of this report, in relation to: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment, and functionality (performing the intended functions).

Due to the fact that the total number of test cases is unlimited, the audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other statements of the contract. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only. We also suggest conducting a bug bounty program to confirm the high level of security of this smart contract.

Hashlock is not responsible for the safety of any funds and is not in any way liable for the security of the project.

Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on a blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their own vulnerabilities that can lead to attacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contracts.

About Hashlock

Hashlock is an Australian-based company aiming to help facilitate the successful widespread adoption of distributed ledger technology. Our key services all have a focus on security, as well as projects that focus on streamlined adoption in the business sector.

Hashlock is excited to continue to grow its partnerships with developers and other web3-oriented companies to collaborate on secure innovation, helping businesses and decentralised entities alike.

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