An abstract specification of the *MultiPaxos* algorithm. We do not model the network nor leaders explicitly. Instead, we keep the history of all votes cast and use this history to describe how new votes are cast. Note that, in some way, receiving a message corresponds to reading a past state of the sender. We produce the effect of having the leader by requiring that not two different values can be voted for in the same ballot.

This specification is inspired from the abstract specification of Generalized Paxos presented in the Generalized Paxos paper by Lamport.

17 EXTENDS MultiConsensus

The variable ballot maps an acceptor to its current ballot.

Given an acceptor a, an instance i, and a ballot b, vote[a][i][b] records the vote that a casted in ballot b of instance i.

```
VARIABLES
25
26
          ballot, vote, propCmds
28
          \land \ \ ballot = [a \in Acceptors \mapsto -1]
29
          \land vote = [a \in Acceptors \mapsto
30
                    [i \in Instances \mapsto
31
                       [b \in Ballots \mapsto None]]]
32
          \land \quad prop\,Cmds = \{\}
33
     TypeInv \triangleq
35
          \land \quad ballot \in [Acceptors \rightarrow \{-1\} \cup Ballots]
36
               vote \in [Acceptors \rightarrow
37
                     [Instances \rightarrow
38
                          [Ballots \rightarrow \{None\} \cup V]]]
39
               propCmds \in SUBSET V
40
```

Now starts the specification of the algorithm

A ballot is conservative when all acceptors which vote in the ballot vote for the same value. In MultiPaxos, the leader of a ballot ensures that the ballot is conservative.

```
Conservative(i, b) \triangleq
52
         \forall a1, a2 \in Acceptors:
53
             LET v1 \triangleq vote[a1][i][b]
54
                     v2 \triangleq vote[a2][i][b]
55
                     (v1 \neq None \land v2 \neq None) \Rightarrow v1 = v2
56
     ConservativeVoteArray \triangleq
58
         \forall i \in Instances : \forall b \in Ballots :
59
             Conservative(i, b)
60
```

The maximal ballot smaller than max in which a has voted in instance i.

```
65 MaxVotedBallot(i, a, max) \triangleq

66 Max(\{b \in Ballots : b \leq max \land vote[a][i][b] \neq None\} \cup \{-1\}, \leq)

68 MaxVotedBallots(i, Q, max) \triangleq \{MaxVotedBallot(i, a, max) : a \in Q\}
```

The vote casted in the maximal ballot smaller than max by an acceptor of the quorum Q.

```
HighestVote(i, max, Q) \triangleq
74
       IF \exists a \in Q : MaxVotedBallot(i, a, max) \neq -1
75
76
            Let MaxVoter \stackrel{\triangle}{=} CHOOSE \ a \in Q:
77
                      MaxVotedBallot(i, a, max) = Max(MaxVotedBallots(i, Q, max), \leq)
78
                 vote[MaxVoter][i][MaxVotedBallot(i, MaxVoter, max)]
            IN
79
         ELSE
80
            None
81
```

Values that are safe to vote for in ballot b according to a quorum Q whose acceptors have all reached ballot b.

If there is an acceptor in Q that has voted in a ballot less than b, then the only safe value is the value voted for by an acceptor in Q in the highest ballot less than b.

Else, all values are safe.

In an implementation, the leader of a ballot b can compute $ProvedSafeAt(i,\ Q,\ b)$ when it receives 1b messages from the quorum $\ Q.$

```
96 ProvedSafeAt(i, Q, b) \stackrel{\triangle}{=}

97 IF HighestVote(i, b - 1, Q) \neq None

98 THEN {HighestVote(i, b - 1, Q)}

99 ELSE V
```

The propose action:

```
104 Propose(v) \triangleq
105 \land propCmds' = propCmds \cup \{v\}
106 \land UNCHANGED \langle ballot, vote \rangle
```

The JoinBallot action: an acceptor can join a higher ballot at any time. In an implementation, the JoinBallot action is triggered by a 1a message from the leader of the new ballot.

```
114 JoinBallot(a, b) \triangleq
115 \land ballot[a] < b
116 \land ballot' = [ballot \ EXCEPT \ ![a] = b]
117 \land UNCHANGED \ (vote, propCmds)
```

The Vote action: an acceptor casts a vote in instance i. This action is enabled when the acceptor has joined a ballot, has not voted in its current ballot, and can determine, by reading the last vote cast by each acceptor in a quorum, which value is safe to vote for. If multiple values are safe to vote for, we ensure that only one can be voted for by requiring that the ballot remain conservative.

In an implementation, the computation of safe values is done by the leader of the ballot when it receives 1b messages from a quorum of acceptors. The leader then picks a unique value among the safe values and suggests it to the acceptors.

```
Vote(a, i) \triangleq
132
             \land \ ballot[a] \neq -1
133
             \land vote[a][i][ballot[a]] = None
134
             \land \exists Q \in Quorums :
135
                     \land \forall q \in Q : ballot[q] \ge ballot[a]
136
                      \land \exists v \in ProvedSafeAt(i, Q, ballot[a]) \cap propCmds:
137
                              vote' = [vote \ EXCEPT \ ![a] =
138
                                   [@ EXCEPT ![i] = [@ EXCEPT ![ballot[a]] = v]]]
139
             \land UNCHANGED \langle ballot, propCmds \rangle
140
             \land Conservative(i, ballot[a])'
141
      Next \triangleq
143
            \vee \exists v \in V : Propose(v)
144
            \lor \exists a \in Acceptors : \exists b \in Ballots : JoinBallot(a, b)
145
            \forall \exists a \in Acceptors : \exists i \in Instances : Vote(a, i)
146
      Spec \stackrel{\Delta}{=} Init \wedge \Box [Next]_{\langle ballot, \, vote, \, prop \, Cmds \rangle}
148
```

Some properties and invariants that help understanding the algo and would probably be needed in a proof.

The maximal ballot in which an acceptor a voted is always less than or equal to its current ballot.

```
WellFormed \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \forall a \in Acceptors : \forall i \in Instances : \forall b \in Ballots :
159
            b > ballot[a] \Rightarrow vote[a][i][b] = None
160
      THEOREM Spec \Rightarrow \square WellFormed
162
       ChosenAt(i, b, v) \triangleq
164
            \exists \ Q \in Quorums : \forall \ a \in \ Q : vote[a][i][b] = v
165
       Chosen(i, v) \triangleq
167
            \exists b \in Ballots : ChosenAt(i, b, v)
168
       Choosable(v, i, b) \triangleq
170
            \exists Q \in Quorums : \forall a \in Q : ballot[a] > b \Rightarrow vote[a][i][b] = v
171
       SafeAt(v, i, b) \triangleq
173
           \forall b2 \in Ballots : \forall v2 \in V :
174
                (b2 < b \land Choosable(v2, i, b2))
175
176
      SafeInstanceVoteArray(i) \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \forall b \in Ballots : \forall a \in Acceptors :
178
           LET v \stackrel{\triangle}{=} vote[a][i][b]
179
            IN v \neq None \Rightarrow SafeAt(v, i, b)
180
```

```
182 SafeVoteArray \triangleq \forall i \in Instances : SafeInstanceVoteArray(i)
184 THEOREM Spec \Rightarrow \Box SafeVoteArray
     If the vote array is well formed and the vote array is safe, then for each instance only a unique
     value can be chosen.
190 THEOREM TypeInv \land WellFormed \land SafeVoteArray \Rightarrow \forall i \in Instances:
          \forall v1, v2 \in V : Chosen(i, v1) \land Chosen(i, v2) \Rightarrow v1 = v2
191
     In a well-formed, safe, and conservative vote array, all values that are proved safe are safe.
     THEOREM TypeInv \land WellFormed \land SafeVoteArray \land ConservativeVoteArray
197
                   \forall v \in V : \forall i \in Instances :
198
                      \forall Q \in Quorums : \forall b \in Ballots :
199
                          \land \forall a \in Q : ballot[a] \ge b
200
                          \land v \in ProvedSafeAt(i, Q, b)
201
                          \Rightarrow SafeAt(v, i, b)
202
     Correctness \triangleq
203
          \forall i \in Instances : \forall v1, v2 \in V :
204
             Chosen(i, v1) \wedge Chosen(i, v2) \Rightarrow v1 = v2
205
     THEOREM Spec \Rightarrow \Box Correctness
209
      \* Modification History
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```

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