



# Neon Labs – Maintenance

## Solana Program Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: May 31st, 2022 – June 6th, 2022

Visit: [Halborn.com](https://Halborn.com)

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY	3
CONTACTS	3
1 EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW	4
1.1 INTRODUCTION	5
1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY	5
1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY	6
RISK METHODOLOGY	6
1.4 SCOPE	8
2 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW	9
3 FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS	10
3.1 (HAL-01) PROGRAM HIJACK DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF CLOSING ACTIVE MAINTENANCE ACCOUNT - HIGH	12
Description	12
Code Location	12
Risk Level	13
Recommendation	13
Remediation Plan	13
3.2 (HAL-02) NO LIMIT ON SETTING DELEGATES AND CODE HASHES - INFORMATIONAL	14
Description	14
Code Location	14
Risk Level	16
Recommendation	16
Remediation Plan	16
3.3 (HAL-03) INCORRECT ERROR MESSAGE - INFORMATIONAL	17
Description	17

	Code Location	17
	Risk Level	17
	Recommendation	17
	Remediation Plan	17
4	AUTOMATED TESTING	18
4.1	AUTOMATED ANALYSIS	19
	Description	19
4.2	AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY SCANNING	20
	Description	20
	Results	20
4.3	UNSAFE RUST CODE DETECTION	22
	Description	22
	Results	22

## DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

VERSION	MODIFICATION	DATE	AUTHOR
0.1	Document Creation	5/31/2022	Przemysław Swiatowiec
0.2	Draft Review	6/10/2022	Gabi Urrutia
1.0	Remediation Plan	06/15/2022	Przemysław Swiatowiec
1.1	Remediation Plan Review	6/15/2022	Gabi Urrutia

## CONTACTS

CONTACT	COMPANY	EMAIL
Rob Behnke	Halborn	<a href="mailto:Rob.Behnke@halborn.com">Rob.Behnke@halborn.com</a>
Steven Walbroehl	Halborn	<a href="mailto:Steven.Walbroehl@halborn.com">Steven.Walbroehl@halborn.com</a>
Gabi Urrutia	Halborn	<a href="mailto:Gabi.Urrutia@halborn.com">Gabi.Urrutia@halborn.com</a>
Piotr Cielas	Halborn	<a href="mailto:Piotr.Cielas@halborn.com">Piotr.Cielas@halborn.com</a>
Przemysław Swiatowiec	Halborn	<a href="mailto:Przemyslaw.Swiatowiec@halborn.com">Przemyslaw.Swiatowiec@halborn.com</a>



# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Neon Labs engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their governance maintenance program, beginning on May 31st, 2022 and ending on June 6th, 2022 .

Neon EVM is a tool that allows for Ethereum-like transactions to be processed on Solana, taking full advantage of the functionality native to Solana, including parallel execution of transactions. As such, Neon EVM allows dApps to operate with the low gas fees, high transaction speed, and high throughput of Solana, as well as offering access to the growing Solana market.

The security assessment was scoped to the programs provided in the maintenance GitHub repository. Commit hashes and further details can be found in the Scope section of this report.

The Maintenance program provides functionality to delegate the process of program upgrading to other users (delegates). The program can be upgraded with code that was previously white-listed only.

## 1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided 2 weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to audit the security of the programs in scope. The security engineer is a blockchain and Solana program security expert with advanced penetration testing and smart-contract hacking skills, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that program functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the programs

In summary, Halborn identified improvements to reduce the likelihood and

impact of multiple risks, which has been successfully addressed by Neon Labs. The main ones were the following:

- validation of `program_data` account in `CloseMaintenance` instruction was fixed,
- limit on setting delegates and code hashes were introduced.

## 1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual review of the code and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the program audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of programs and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices.

The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into the architecture, purpose, and use of the platform.
- Solana program manual code review and walkthrough to identify any logic issue.
- Thorough assessment of safety and usage of critical Rust variables and functions in scope that could lead to arithmetic vulnerabilities.
- Finding unsafe Rust code usage (`cargo-geiger`)
- Scanning dependencies for known vulnerabilities (`cargo audit`).
- Local cluster simulation (`solana-test-framework`)
- Scanning for common Solana vulnerabilities (`soteria`).

### RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident



and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

#### RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

#### RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL



## 1.4 SCOPE

### Code repositories:

#### 1. Neon Labs

- Repository: [maintenance](#)
- Commit ID: [d14eb160397fd5eb5baf9865ca1cf57a3e5e52d9](#)
- Programs in scope:
  1. Maintenance ([maintenance/program](#))

**Out-of-scope:** External libraries and financial related attacks.

## 2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	1	0	0	2

### LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT

		(HAL-01)		
(HAL-02) (HAL-03)				

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDATION DATE
(HAL-01) PROGRAM HIJACK DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF CLOSING ACTIVE MAINTENANCE ACCOUNT	High	SOLVED - 06/13/2022
(HAL-02) NO LIMIT ON SETTING DELEGATES AND CODE HASHES	Informational	SOLVED - 06/13/2022
(HAL-03) INCORRECT ERROR MESSAGE	Informational	SOLVED - 06/13/2022



# FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



### 3.1 (HAL-01) PROGRAM HIJACK DUE TO POSSIBILITY OF CLOSING ACTIVE MAINTENANCE ACCOUNT - HIGH

#### Description:

In the `CloseMaintenance` instruction, `program_data` is deserialized and used to get the current authority of the maintained program. The maintenance account can close only if it is not set as an authority of the maintained program.

However, as there is no validation for the `program_data` account in the `CloseMaintenance` instruction, it's possible to supply `program_data` for another program, not the one actually maintained. It could result in disposing of an active maintenance account. After disposal, any user could recreate and modify the maintenance account and set custom maintenance authority. It can create a risk of program hijacking, as the recreated maintenance account would still be an authority for the maintained program.

#### Code Location:

Listing 1: maintenance/program/src/processor.rs (Line 304)

```
304 let maintenance_record_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)
    ↳ ?; // 0
305 let program_data_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; //
    ↳ 1
306 let authority_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 2
```

Listing 2: maintenance/program/src/processor.rs (Lines 324,326-335)

```
322
323 let upgradeable_loader_state: UpgradeableLoaderState =
324     bincode::deserialize(&program_data_info.data.borrow()).map_err
    ↳ (|_| ProgramError::from(MaintenanceError::
    ↳ AuthorityDeserializationError) )?;
```

```

325
326 let program_authority: Pubkey =
327     match upgradeable_loader_state {
328         UpgradeableLoaderState::ProgramData { slot: _,
329             ↳ upgrade_authority_address } =>
330             upgrade_authority_address.ok_or(ProgramError::from(
331                 ↳ MaintenanceError::AuthorityDeserializationError))?,
332             _ =>
333                 return Err(ProgramError::from(MaintenanceError::
334                     ↳ AuthorityDeserializationError)),
335         };
336 // msg!("MAINTENANCE-INSTRUCTION: CLOSE MAINTENANCE program
337 ↳ authority {:?} ", program_authority);
338
339 if *maintenance_record_info.key == program_authority {
340     return Err(MaintenanceError::RecordMustBeInactive.into());
341 }
342
343

```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 3**

**Impact - 5**

#### Recommendation:

Consider introducing check for `program_data` account in `CloseMaintenance`. Another option could be to modify the `CloseMaintenance` instruction to derive the `program_data` account address instead of accepting this account address as a handler parameter.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was fixed by introducing the `program_data` account validation in the `CloseMaintenance` instruction. In the fixed version, `program_data`'s PDA is derived in the processing function in commit ([3469f98546719ed777703a65329b464029a82927](#)).

## 3.2 (HAL-02) NO LIMIT ON SETTING DELEGATES AND CODE HASHES - INFORMATIONAL

### Description:

The `SetDelegates` and `SetCodeHashes` instructions are used to set delegates that can upgrade the maintained program and define the correct hash of updated code.

No limits for code hashes and delegates are introduced in the program code. The number of code hashes and delegates is restricted by account size. Maintenance account can store 20 items. Due to Solana's instruction size limitation, it's possible to supply maximum 18 delegates / code hashes in one transaction. If user supply 18 delegates, `maintenance` account can store only 2 codes hashes. Going over this limit returns `BorshIo` error, which is not very verbose.

### Code Location:

Listing 3: `maintenance/program/src/state.rs` (Line 33)

```
33 impl AccountMaxSize for MaintenanceRecord {
34     fn get_max_size(&self) -> Option<usize> {
35         Some(649) // for delegate size = 10, hashes size = 10
36     }
37 }
```

Listing 4: `maintenance/program/src/processor.rs` (Lines 120,137,148,165)

```
117 pub fn process_set_delegates(
118     program_id: &Pubkey,
119     accounts: &[AccountInfo],
120     delegate: Vec<Pubkey>,
121 ) -> ProgramResult {
122     let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();
```



```

123
124     let maintenance_record_info = next_account_info(
125         ↪ account_info_iter)?; // 0
126     let authority_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; //
127         ↪ 1
128     if !authority_info.is_signer {
129         return Err(MaintenanceError::MissingRequiredSigner.into())
130         ↪ ;
131     }
132
133     let mut maintenance_record = get_account_data::<
134         ↪ MaintenanceRecord>(program_id, maintenance_record_info)?;
135
136     if *authority_info.key != maintenance_record.authority {
137         return Err(MaintenanceError::WrongAuthority.into());
138     }
139
140     maintenance_record.delegate = delegate;
141
142     maintenance_record.serialize(&mut *maintenance_record_info.
143         ↪ data.borrow_mut())?;
144
145     Ok(())
146 }
147
148 /// Processes Set Code Hashes instruction
149 pub fn process_set_code_hashes(
150     program_id: &Pubkey,
151     accounts: &[AccountInfo],
152     hashes: Vec<Hash>,
153 ) -> ProgramResult {
154     let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();
155
156     let maintenance_record_info = next_account_info(
157         ↪ account_info_iter)?; // 0
158     let authority_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; //
159         ↪ 1
160
161     if !authority_info.is_signer {
162         return Err(MaintenanceError::MissingRequiredSigner.into())
163         ↪ ;
164     }
165
166

```

```
159     let mut maintenance_record = get_account_data::<  
    ↳ MaintenanceRecord>(program_id, maintenance_record_info)?;  
160  
161     if *authority_info.key != maintenance_record.authority {  
162         return Err(MaintenanceError::WrongAuthority.into());  
163     }  
164  
165     maintenance_record.hashes = hashes;  
166  
167     maintenance_record.serialize(&mut *maintenance_record_info.  
    ↳ data.borrow_mut())?;  
168  
169     Ok(())  
170 }
```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

#### Recommendation:

Consider adding check for maximum amount of delegates and code hashes.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was fixed by restricting the maximum number of allowed delegates and hashes in commit ([3469f98546719ed777703a65329b464029a82927](#)).

### 3.3 (HAL-03) INCORRECT ERROR MESSAGE - INFORMATIONAL

#### Description:

Incorrect error message was identified in the `CloseMaintenance` instruction handler. A proper error message should inform that spill accounts cannot be the subjects of closing.

The lack of proper error messages affects the usability of the program, since it is more difficult for users to understand the reason for the error and solve transaction problems.

#### Code Location:

Listing 5: maintenance/program/src/processor.rs (Line 314)

```
313 if maintenance_record_info.key == spill_info.key {  
314     return Err(ProgramError::InvalidAccountData);  
315 }  
316
```

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

#### Recommendation:

It is recommended to implement more verbose and specific error message.

#### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The issue was fixed by introducing a correct error message in `CloseMaintenance` instruction in commit ([3469f98546719ed777703a65329b464029a82927](https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/pull/3469)).



# AUTOMATED TESTING



## 4.1 AUTOMATED ANALYSIS

### Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was cargo audit, a security scanner for vulnerabilities reported to the RustSec Advisory Database. All vulnerabilities published in <https://crates.io> are stored in a repository named The RustSec Advisory Database. cargo audit is a human-readable version of the advisory database which performs a scanning on Cargo.lock. Security Detections are only in scope. All vulnerabilities shown here were already disclosed in the above report. However, to better assist the developers maintaining this code, the auditors are including the output with the dependencies tree, and this is included in the cargo audit output to better know the dependencies affected by unmaintained and vulnerable crates.

id	package	categories
<a href="#">RUSTSEC-2020-0036</a>	failure	unmaintained

## 4.2 AUTOMATED VULNERABILITY SCANNING

### Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was Soteria, a security analysis service for Solana programs. Soteria performed a scan on all the programs and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

### Results:

Two untrustful accounts were found by Soteria scanner.

1. Untrustful `upgrade_buffer_info` account in `Upgrade` instruction.

Untrustful Account No.1 (Critical)

The account is missing owner check:

program/src/processor.rs:184

```

178|
179| let bpf_loader_program_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 0
180| let sysvar_rent_program_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 1
181| let sysvar_clock_program_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 2
182| let maintained_program_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 3
183| let maintained_program_data_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 4
>184| let upgrade_buffer_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 5
185| let maintenance_record_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 6
186| let authority_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 7
187| let spill_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 8
188|
189| if !authority_info.is_signer {
190|     return Err(MaintenanceError::MissingRequiredSigner.into());

```

sol.process\_upgrade [program/src/processor.rs:60]

[Detailed Explanation](#)

This finding was marked as false positive, as later in instruction processing flow, this account is validated by `bpf_loader_upgradeable upgrade` instruction.

## 2. Untrustful `program_data` account in `CloseMaintenance` instruction.

Untrustful Account No.2 (Critical)

The account is missing owner check:

program/src/processor.rs:305

```
299|     program_id: &Pubkey,
300|     accounts: &[AccountInfo],
301| ) -> ProgramResult {
302|     let account_info_iter = &mut accounts.iter();
303|
304|     let maintenance_record_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 0
>305|     let program_data_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 1
306|     let authority_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 2
307|     let spill_info = next_account_info(account_info_iter)?; // 3
308|
309|     if !authority_info.is_signer {
310|         return Err(MaintenanceError::MissingRequiredSigner.into());
311|     }
```

sol.process\_close\_maintenance [program/src/processor.rs:68]

[Detailed Explanation](#)

The finding was reported with HAL-01 vulnerability in the previous chapter.



## 4.3 UNSAFE RUST CODE DETECTION

### Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with the detection of well-known security issues and vulnerabilities. Among the tools used was `cargo-geiger`, a security tool that lists statistics related to the usage of unsafe Rust code in a core Rust codebase and all its dependencies.

### Results:

Please see the next 5 pages.

Metric output format: x/y

x = unsafe code used by the build

y = total unsafe code found in the crate

Symbols:

🔒 = No `unsafe` usage found, declares `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`

? = No `unsafe` usage found, missing `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]`

⚠️ = `unsafe` usage found

Functions	Expressions	Impls	Traits	Methods	Dependency
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	? maintenance 0.1.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	? arrayref 0.3.6
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️ bincode 1.3.3
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️ └─ serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ serde_derive 1.0.137
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ └─ proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	4/4	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ └─ unicode-ident 1.0.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ quote 1.0.18
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ └─ proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠️ └─ └─ syn 1.0.95
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ └─ proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ quote 1.0.18
0/0	4/4	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ unicode-ident 1.0.0
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️ └─ borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ borsh-derive 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ borsh-derive-internal 0.9.3
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ └─ proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠️ └─ └─ syn 1.0.95
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ borsh-schema-derive-internal 0.9.3
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ └─ proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠️ └─ └─ syn 1.0.95
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ proc-macro-crate 0.1.5
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ toml 0.5.9
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️ └─ └─ serde 1.0.137
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ └─ proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	⚠️ └─ └─ syn 1.0.95
2/2	1082/1198	19/22	1/1	51/58	⚠️ └─ hashbrown 0.11.2
0/0	26/30	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ ahash 0.7.6
2/4	56/173	1/1	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ └─ getrandom 0.2.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ └─ cfg-if 1.0.0
0/21	12/368	0/2	0/0	2/40	⚠️ └─ └─ └─ libc 0.2.126
1/1	36/117	2/6	0/0	1/3	⚠️ └─ └─ once_cell 1.12.0
0/16	0/1341	0/0	0/0	0/56	└─ parking_lot_core 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ cfg-if 1.0.0
0/21	12/368	0/2	0/0	2/40	⚠️ └─ └─ └─ libc 0.2.126
0/1	0/392	0/7	0/1	0/13	└─ └─ smallvec 1.8.0
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	⚠️ └─ └─ serde 1.0.137
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	└─ └─ serde 1.0.137
4/6	389/1102	3/9	1/1	12/25	⚠️ └─ bumpalo 3.9.1
6/6	663/663	5/5	0/0	3/3	⚠️ └─ rayon 1.5.3
0/0	451/451	6/6	0/0	6/6	⚠️ └─ crossbeam-deque 0.8.1

0/0	451/451	6/6	0/0	6/6	?	rayon-core
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	crossbeam-deque 0.8.1
3/3	418/430	9/9	0/0	26/26	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	crossbeam-epoch 0.9.8
4/4	85/85	14/14	0/0	2/2	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	crossbeam-utils 0.8.8
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	lazy_static 1.4.0
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	lazy_static 1.4.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	memoffset 0.6.5
0/0	18/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	scopeguard 1.1.0
4/4	85/85	14/14	0/0	2/2	?	crossbeam-utils 0.8.8
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	either 1.6.1
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
5/5	485/488	2/2	0/0	20/20	?	rayon-core 1.9.3
2/2	498/507	6/7	0/0	12/14	?	crossbeam-channel 0.5.4
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
4/4	85/85	14/14	0/0	2/2	?	crossbeam-utils 0.8.8
0/0	451/451	6/6	0/0	6/6	?	crossbeam-deque 0.8.1
4/4	85/85	14/14	0/0	2/2	?	crossbeam-utils 0.8.8
0/0	72/72	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num_cpus 1.13.1
0/21	12/368	0/2	0/0	2/40	?	libc 0.2.126
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	hex 0.4.3
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	?	proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	?	syn 1.0.95
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.137
3/3	423/423	1/1	0/0	2/2	?	solana-program 1.10.21
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	base64 0.13.0
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bincode 1.3.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bitflags 1.3.2
10/78	71/3973	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	blake3 1.3.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	arrayref 0.3.6
2/2	350/350	2/2	0/0	7/7	?	arrayvec 0.7.2
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	constant_time_eq 0.1.5
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.3
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	block-buffer 0.10.2
1/1	292/292	20/20	8/8	5/5	?	generic-array 0.14.5
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	typenum 1.15.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	crypto-common 0.1.3
1/1	292/292	20/20	8/8	5/5	?	generic-array 0.14.5
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_core 0.6.3
2/4	56/173	1/1	0/0	3/3	?	getrandom 0.2.6
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	typenum 1.15.0
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	subtle 2.4.1
6/6	663/663	5/5	0/0	3/3	?	rayon 1.5.3
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	borsh-derive 0.9.3

0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
8/8	202/202	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	6/6	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/1	292/292	20/20	8/8	5/5	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/1	0/14	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/1	292/292	20/20	8/8	5/5	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
2/2	206/206	0/0	0/0	7/7	?
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
18/18	370/382	325/326	7/7	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	?
0/2	0/857	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/1	176/193	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
2/4	50/150	1/1	0/0	3/3	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/21	12/368	0/2	0/0	2/40	?
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/1	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/72	0/3	0/1	0/3	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/72	0/3	0/1	0/3	?
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	4/4	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/1	292/292	20/20	8/8	5/5	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
1/1	292/292	20/20	8/8	5/5	?
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	33/33	0/0	0/0	2/2	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	3/3	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	?
2/4	50/150	1/1	0/0	3/3	?
0/21	12/368	0/2	0/0	2/40	?
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?

```

borsh-derive 0.9.3
bs58 0.4.0
  sha2 0.9.9
    block-buffer 0.9.0
      generic-array 0.14.5
    cfg-if 1.0.0
    cpufeatures 0.2.2
    digest 0.9.0
      generic-array 0.14.5
    opaque-debug 0.3.0
bv 0.11.1
  serde 1.0.137
bytemuck 1.9.1
  bytemuck-derive 1.1.0
  proc-macro2 1.0.39
  quote 1.0.18
  syn 1.0.95
curve25519-dalek 3.2.1
  byteorder 1.4.3
  digest 0.9.0
  rand_core 0.5.1
    getrandom 0.1.16
    cfg-if 1.0.0
    libc 0.2.126
    log 0.4.17
      cfg-if 1.0.0
      serde 1.0.137
  serde 1.0.137
  subtle 2.4.1
  zeroize 1.3.0
itertools 0.10.3
  either 1.6.1
itertools 0.10.3
lazy_static 1.4.0
libsecp256k1 0.6.0
  arrayref 0.3.6
  base64 0.12.3
  digest 0.9.0
  hmac-drbg 0.3.0
    digest 0.9.0
    generic-array 0.14.5
    hmac 0.8.1
      crypto-mac 0.8.0
      generic-array 0.14.5
      subtle 2.4.1
    digest 0.9.0
  lazy_static 1.4.0
  libsecp256k1-core 0.2.2
    crunchy 0.2.2
    digest 0.9.0
    subtle 2.4.1
  rand 0.7.3
    getrandom 0.1.16
    libc 0.2.126
    log 0.4.17

```

1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	log 0.4.17
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_chacha 0.2.2
2/2	636/712	0/0	0/0	17/25	?	ppv-lite86 0.2.16
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_core 0.5.1
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_core 0.5.1
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
8/8	202/202	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha2 0.9.9
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	typenum 1.15.0
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	log 0.4.17
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand 0.7.3
0/1	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rustversion 1.0.6
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_bytes 0.11.6
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.137
8/8	196/196	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha2 0.10.2
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/1	0/14	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cpufeatures 0.2.2
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha3 0.10.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	digest 0.10.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	keccak 0.1.2
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-frozen-abi 1.10.21
0/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	bs58 0.4.0
2/2	206/206	0/0	0/0	7/7	?	bv 0.11.1
1/1	292/292	20/20	8/8	5/5	?	generic-array 0.14.5
1/1	122/122	2/2	0/0	4/4	?	im 15.1.0
0/0	100/100	0/0	0/0	9/9	?	bitmaps 2.1.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	typenum 1.15.0
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_core 0.6.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_xoshiro 0.6.0
0/0	15/15	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rand_core 0.6.3
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
6/6	663/663	5/5	0/0	3/3	?	rayon 1.5.3
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/1	323/643	0/0	0/0	20/39	?	sized-chunks 0.6.5
0/0	100/100	0/0	0/0	9/9	?	bitmaps 2.1.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	typenum 1.15.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	typenum 1.15.0
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	lazy_static 1.4.0
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	?	log 0.4.17
0/0	147/282	4/6	0/0	7/7	?	memmap2 0.5.3
0/21	12/368	0/2	0/0	2/40	?	libc 0.2.126
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde 1.0.137
0/0	16/16	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_bytes 0.11.6
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.137
8/8	196/196	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	sha2 0.10.2
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-frozen-abi-macro 1.10.21
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	?	proc-macro2 1.0.39

0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔴	proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔴	syn 1.0.95
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.31
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror-impl 1.0.31
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔴	proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔴	syn 1.0.95
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-frozen-abi-macro 1.10.21
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	solana-sdk-macro 1.10.21
0/0	1/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔴	bs58 0.4.0
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔴	proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/1	0/1	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	rustversion 1.0.6
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔴	syn 1.0.95
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.31
12/14	432/496	16/16	2/2	9/9	🔴	wasm-bindgen 0.2.80
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	cfg-if 1.0.0
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔴	serde 1.0.137
0/1	0/0	0/1	0/0	0/1	?	wasm-bindgen-macro 0.2.80
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-macro-support 0.2.80
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔴	proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔴	syn 1.0.95
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-backend 0.2.80
4/6	389/1102	3/9	1/1	12/25	🔴	bumpalo 3.9.1
0/0	7/7	1/1	0/0	0/0	🔴	lazy_static 1.4.0
1/1	16/18	1/1	0/0	0/0	🔴	log 0.4.17
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔴	proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔴	syn 1.0.95
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-shared 0.2.80
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	wasm-bindgen-shared 0.2.80
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	spl-governance-tools 0.1.2
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	arrayref 0.3.6
0/0	22/22	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔴	bincode 1.3.3
0/0	7/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔴	borsh 0.9.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔴	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	5/5	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔴	serde 1.0.137
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	serde_derive 1.0.137
3/3	423/423	1/1	0/0	2/2	🔴	solana-program 1.10.21
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	spl-token 3.3.0
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	arrayref 0.3.6
18/18	370/382	325/326	7/7	0/0	🔴	bytemuck 1.9.1
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num-derive 0.3.3
0/0	6/12	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔴	num-traits 0.2.15
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num_enum 0.5.7
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	num_enum_derive 0.5.7
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	proc-macro-crate 1.1.3
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	thiserror 1.0.31
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	🔒	toml 0.5.9
0/0	12/12	0/0	0/0	3/3	🔴	proc-macro2 1.0.39
0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	?	quote 1.0.18
0/0	50/50	3/3	0/0	2/2	🔴	syn 1.0.95



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

 **HALBORN**

