An Architecture for a Network Anomaly Detection Framework draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-architecture-00

Motivation and architecture of a Network Anomaly Detection Framework and the relationships to other documents describing network symptom semantics and network incident lifecycle

wanting.du@swisscom.com pierre.francois@insa-lyon.fr thomas.graf@swisscom.com vincenzo.riccobene@huawei-partners.com alex.huang-feng@insa-lyon.fr


Data Mesh organizes Data in Organizations

Enables Network Analytics use cases

Network


Device Trend

Detection



Analytical Data

draft-netana-nmop-yang-message-broker-integration



draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-architecture

Operational Data

draft-netana-nmop-yang-message-broker-integration



Network Telemetry (RFC 9232)

IPFIX (RFC 7011, RFC 9487, RFC 9160, draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry)


BMP (RFC 7854, RFC 8671, RFC 9069, draft-ietf-grow-bmp-tlv, draft-ietf-grow-bmp-path-marking-tlv, draft-lucente-grow-bmp-rel)

YANG-Push (RFC 8639, RFC 8641, draft-ietf-netconf-udp-notif, draft-ietf-netconf-distributed-notif, draft-ahuang-netconf-notif-yang, draft-ietf-netconf-yang-notifications-versioning, draft-tgraf-netconf-notif-sequencing, draft-tgraf-netconf-yang-push-observation-time)


What to monitor

Which metrics are collected

« Network operators connect customers in routing tables called Connectivity Services »




« Network Telemetry(RFC 9232) describes how to collect data from all 3 network planes efficiently »



Example: Monitoring L3 VPN's with IPFIX, BMP and YANG Push

From Connectivity Service to Realtime Network Analytics



- > Connectivity Service perspective, Connection Points are connected through Logical Connections.
- > From a BGP control-plane perspective, IPv4/6 unicast prefixes in VRF's are tagged with BGP standard communities.
 - One BGP standard community to identify the Logical Connection. One BGP standard community to identify each Connection Point.
 - > When IPv4/6 prefixes are exported from VRF's, a BGP routedistinguisher, BGP extended community route-targets and a SRv6 VPN SID for the IPv6 next-hop are allocated.
- > From a forwarding plane perspective, when IPv4/6 unicast traffic is received from the edge at the SRv6 PE, a lookup is performed, the SRv6 VPN SID is obtained and IPv6 next-hop is added when forwarded to the core.
- Swisscom collects MPLS and SRv6 provider data plane, IPv4/6 unicast customer data-plane in IPFIX and at provider edge BGP VPNv4/6 unicast in production to perform real-time data correlation.

Segment Routing IPv6 Encapsulation

RFC 9487 provides IPFIX Visibility

> Provider data-plane

Divided into an IPv6 and Segment Routing Header.

The IPv6 header shows from which PE to which next-hop it is being forwarded. The Segment Routing Header the list of segments this packet needs to pass through and points to the active segment.

> Customer data-plane

This is what we receive from the customer and encapsulate for transport through the SRv6 core

```
Destination IP
                                                                      Destination Port Protocol
    7 2022-12-22 13:50:12.823123
                                  203.0.113.46
                                                           203.0.113.30
    8 2022-12-22 13:50:12.823197
                                 203.0.113.30
                                                          203.0.113.46
                                                                                   ICMP
 Frame 7: 234 bytes on wire (1872 bits), 214 bytes captured (1712 bits)
 Ethernet II, Src: HuaweiTe_3a:2e:62 (f8:53:29:3a:2e:62), Dst: HuaweiTe_3a:33:a2 (f8:53:29:3a:33
Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: 2001:db8:3::1, Dst: 2001:db8:18:0:10::
     0110 .... = Version: 6

✓ .... 0000 0000 .... ... = Traffic Class: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)

       .... 0000 00..... Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0)
       .... 0011 0001 1101 0001 1101 = Flow Label: 0x31d1d
     Pavload Length: 180
     Next Header: Routing Header for IPv6 (43)
    Hop Limit: 253
    Source Address: 2001:db8:3::1
    Destination Address: 2001:db8:18:0:10::

▼ Routing Header for IPv6 (Segment Routing)
       Next Header: IPIP (4)
       Length: 11
       [Length: 96 bytes]
       Type: Segment Routing (4)
       Segments Left: 1
       Last Entry: 3
       Flags: 0x00
       Tag: 0000
       Address[0]: 2001:db8:2:0:40::
       Address[1]: 2001:db8:18:0:10::
       Address[2]: 2001:db8:17:0:10::
       Address[3]: 2001:db8:14:0:10::
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 203.0.113.46, Dst: 203.0.113.30
     0100 .... = Version: 4
    .... 0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)
  > Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
    Total Length: 84
    Identification: 0x0bdf (3039)
  > 010. .... = Flags: 0x2, Don't fragment
     ...0 0000 0000 0000 = Fragment Offset: 0
    Time to Live: 63
    Protocol: ICMP (1)
     Header Checksum: 0xb77c [validation disabled]
    [Header checksum status: Unverified]
    Source Address: 203.0.113.46
    Destination Address: 203.0.113.30
 Internet Control Message Protocol
```

BMP – Address Family Agnostic

RFC 9069 provides Local RIB Visibility

>BMP Per Peer Header

Shows at which RIB (Adj-RIB In, Local or Adj-RIB Out, Pre or Post Policy) and from which Peering the BGP PDU at which time was obtained.

> Encapsulated BGP PDU

Shows the encapsulated BGP PDU. In case of BMP route-monitoring, it describes whether it was a topology update or withdrawal and for BGP community, NLRI and BGP Prefix SID path attributes.

```
Time
                                                Source IP
                                                                  Destination IP
                                                                                                      Length Info
                                                                                             Protocol
           10 2023-11-06 22:12:33.943442
                                                     2001:db8:2::1
                                                                                                          1294 UPDATE Message
 Frame 10: 1294 bytes on wire (10352 bits), 1294 bytes captured (10352 bits)
> Ethernet II, Src: Cisco ff:dd:90 (40:06:d5:ff:dd:90), Dst: VMware 0e:d8:14 (00:0c:29:0e:d8:14)
> Internet Protocol Version 6, Src: 2001:db8:2::1, Dst: 2a02:a90:4007::4:2
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 39041, Dst Port: 1792, Seq: 746, Ack: 1, Len: 1220

▼ BGP Monitoring Protocol, Type Route Monitoring

      Version: 3
     Length: 227
     Type: Route Monitoring (0)
     Per Peer Header
         Type: Loc-RIB Instance Peer (3)
         0000 0000 = Flags: 0x00
         Peer Distinguisher: 0:0
         Address: 0.0.0.0
         ASN: 65536
         BGP ID: 198.51.100.191
         Timestamp (sec): 1699272753
         Timestamp (msec): 942134
     Border Gateway Protocol - UPDATE Message
         Marker: fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
         Type: UPDATE Message (2)
         Withdrawn Routes Length: 0
         Total Path Attribute Length: 156

✓ Path attributes

         > Path Attribute - MP REACH NLRI
         > Path Attribute - ORIGIN: IGP
         > Path Attribute - AS_PATH: empty
         > Path Attribute - MULTI_EXIT_DISC: 0
         > Path Attribute - LOCAL_PREF: 16400
         > Path Attribute - COMMUNITIES: 64496:299 64496:1001 64497:1 64499:1
         > Path Attribute - EXTENDED_COMMUNITIES

▼ Path Attribute - BGP Prefix-SID

             > Flags: 0xc0, Optional, Transitive, Complete
               Type Code: BGP Prefix-SID (40)
               Length: 37

✓ SRv6 L3 Service

                   Type: SRv6 L3 Service (5)
                   Length: 34
                   Reserved: 00

✓ SRv6 Service Sub-TLVs

✓ SRv6 Service Sub-TLV - SRv6 SID Information
                          Type: SRv6 SID Information (1)
                          Length: 30
                          Reserved: 00
                          SRv6 SID Value: 2001:db8:1::
                          SRv6 SID Flags: 0x00
                          SRv6 Endpoint Behavior: End.DT4 with NEXT-CSID (0x003f)
                          Reserved: 00


✓ SRv6 Service Data Sub-Sub-TLVs

✓ SRv6 Service Data Sub-Sub-TLV - SRv6 SID Structure

                                 Type: SRv6 SID Structure (1)
                                Length: 6
                                Locator Block Length: 32
                                Locator Node Length: 16
                                Function Length: 16
                                 Argument Length: 0
                                Transposition Length: 16
                                 Transposition Offset: 48
```

Measure On-Path Delay with Network Context


With draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry




- Packets are captured ingress with an optional sampler, data plane dimensions extracted, enriched with management and control plane dimensions and added with a unique flow ID to a flow cache on the node for aggregation.
- A direct export marking bit and optionally a timestamp is added to the packet when entering the OAM domain by leveraging Enhanced Alternate Marking (RFC 9341, draft-zhou-ippm-enhanced-alternatemarking) or IOAM (RFC 9378) Direct Export or E2E Option Type.
- > Each subsequent packet for the same flow increases byte and packet count. Each new flow creates a new flow ID in the flow cache.
- At each node in transit or only at the decapsulation node, delay is calculated by comparing the observation timestamp in the packet and when packet is received. Delay is populated into the flow cache together with packet and byte count as defined in draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry.

IPFIX provides statistical data plane visibility

Comprehensive IPv6 data plane coverage



- > <u>draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry</u> defines OAM agnostic on-path delay IPFIX entities.
- > <u>draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-alt-mark</u> defines Alternate Marking IPFIX entities.
- > <u>draft-spiegel-ippm-ioam-rawexport</u> defines IOAM IPFIX entities.
- defines
 Segment
 Routing
 Header
 IPFIX entities



Network Observability

System Demo

Detect L3 VPN Topology changes and its Forwarding Plane impact in Near Real-Time

What does Network Anomaly Detection mean

Monitor changes, called outliers, in networks



Network Anomaly Detection

For Connectivity Services, Network Anomaly Detection constantly monitors and detects any network or device topology change, along with their associated forwarding consequences for customers as outliers. Notifications are sent to the Network Operation Center before the customer is aware of service disruptions. It offers operational metrics for in-depth analysis, allowing to understand in which platform the problem originates and facilitates problem resolution.



Answers

What changed and when, on which connectivity service, and how does it impact the customers?



Focuses

Provides meaningful connectivity service impact information before customer is aware of and support in root-cause analysis.



Data Mesh

Consumes operational real-time Forwarding Plane, Control Plane and Management Plane metrics and produces analytical alerts.



Direction

From connectivity service to network platform.

What our motivation is

Automate learn and improve


From network incidents postmortems we network operators learn and improve so does network anomaly detection and supervised and semi-supervised machine learning.

The more network incidents are observed, the more we can improve. With more incidents the **postmortem process needs be automated, let's get organized** first by defining human and machine-readable metadata semantics and annotate operational and analytical data.

Let's get further organized by exchanging standardized labeled network incident data among network operators, vendors and academia to collaborate on academic research.

« The community working on Network Anomaly Detection is probably the only group wishing for more network incidents »

Elements of the Architecture



- Service Inventory contains list of the connectivity services.
- Service Disruption Detection processes aggregated network data to decide whether a service is degraded or not.
- Service Disruption Detection Configuration defines the set of approaches that need to be applied to perform SDD.
- Operational Data Collection manages network telemetry subscriptions and transforms data into message broker.
- Operational Data Aggregation produces data upon which detection of a service disruption can be performed.
- Network Modeling establishes knowledge of network relationships.
- Data Profiling categorizes nondeterministic customer related data.
- Detection Strategies for a profile a detection strategy is defined.
- Machine Learning is commonly used to detect outliers or anomalies.
- Storage some algorithms may relay on historical (aggregated) operational data to detect anomalies.
- Alerting consolidates analytical insights and notifies.
- Postmortem refines and stores the network anomaly and symptom labels into the Label Store.
- Replaying to validate refined anomaly and symptom labels, historical operational data is replayed.

Semantic Metadata Annotation for Network Anomaly Detection

draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-semantics

 $\verb|module: ietf-symptom-semantic-metadata|\\$

module: leti-symptom-semantic-metadata +rw symptom	
+rw id?	yang:uuid
+rw event-id?	yang:uuid
+rw description?	string
+rw start-time?	yang:date-and-time
+rw end-time?	yang:date-and-time
+rw confidence-score?	score
+rw concern-score?	score
+rw tags* [key]	
+rw key string	
+rw value string	
+rw (pattern)?	
+: (drop)	
+rw drop	empty
+:(spike)	
	empty
+:(mean-shift)	
+rw mean-shift	empty
+:(seasonality-shift)	
+rw seasonality-shi	ift empty
+:(trend)	
+rw trend	empty
+: (other)	
l +rw other	string
+rw annotator	
+rw (annotator-type)	
+:(human)	
+rw human	empty
+:(algorithm)	
+rw algorithm	empty
+rw name?	string

- Symptom ID and description uniquely identifies the detected anomaly. Event ID, start/end-time and confidence/concern-score uniquely identifies the network event with its start and end time, how confident the system identified the anomaly and how concerned an operator should be.
- Tags allows to add customer information.
- Pattern describes the identified pattern of the anomaly.
- Annotator Name, Type, describes wherever the anomaly was detected by a human or algorithm and uniquely identifies the system who/which detected.

Experiment: Network Anomaly Lifecycle

draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle

« Network Anomaly Detection is an iterative process that requires continuous improvement »

4. Lifecycle of a Network Anomaly

The lifecycle of a network anomaly can be articulated in three phases, structured as a loop: Detection, Validation, Refinement.




Figure 1: Anomaly Detection Refinement Lifecycle

Each of these phases can either be performed by a network expert or an algorithm or complementing each other. Detection: The Network Anomaly

Detection stage is about the continuous
monitoring of the network through
Network Telemetry [RFC9232] and the
identification of symptoms.


Validation: Decides if the detected symptoms are signaling a real incident or if they are to be treated as false positives.

Refinement: Network operator performs detailed postmortem analysis of the network incident, collected Network Telemetry data and detected anomaly with the objective to identify useful adjustments in the Network Telemetry data collection and Anomaly Detection system.

Experiment: Network Anomaly Lifecycle

draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle

module: ietf-network-anomaly-metadata



- ID and Description uniquely identifies the detected network anomaly (as a container of symptoms).
- Description and State provide general information regarding the anomaly and .
- Annotator describes the entity that observed the network anomaly: this can be a human or an algorithm (anomaly detection system).
- Symptoms provides a list of symptoms (based on ietf-symptom-metadata) that are part of this network anomaly.

Experiment: Network Anomaly Lifecycle

draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle

Network Anomaly Detection is the art of understanding when something is not working as expected in the network.


It is an iterative process that requires continuous improvement

The detection in the different stages can either come from humans (network operation engineers) or algorithms (e.g. rule-based, Al-based).

→ Having labels structured well is key

It is crucial to make sure we can **audit the process** e2e and **involve network engineers** at any stage of the process to validate and provide feedback

→ Interoperability between teams and between "annotators" is key



Experiment:

Network Anomaly Lifecycle


```
In which state of the anomaly the
          label was generated
module: ietf-network-anomaly-metadata
 +--rw network-anomalies
    +--rw network-anomaly* [id version]
     +--rw id
                         yang:uuid
     +--rw version
                         uint32
     +--rw state
                         identityref
     +--rw annotator
        +--rw (annotator-type)
           +--: (human)
            +--rw human
                                empty
           +--: (algorithm)
              +--rw algorithm
                                empty
       +--rw name?
                                empty
     +--rw symptoms* [symptom id]
       +--rw symptom id
                          yang:uuid
```

Provide labels to ML based on the specific action to perform (e.g. Active Learning, ML Retraining,)

```
module: ietf-symptom-metadata
                     +--ro ifws:symptom
                                                                yang:uuid
                         +--ro ifws:id?
                         +--ro ifws:event-id?
                                                                yang:uuid
                         +--ro ifws:description?
                                                                string
                         +--ro ifws:start-time?
                                                                yang:date-and-time
                         +--ro ifws:end-time?
                                                                vang:date-and-time
                         +--ro ifws:confidence-score?
                                                                score
                         +--ro ifws:concern-score?
                                                                Score
                         +--ro (ifws:pattern)?
                            +--: (ifws:drop)
                            | +--ro ifws:drop
                                                                empty
                            +--: (ifws:spike)
                            | +--ro ifws:spike
                                                                empty
                            +--: (ifws:mean-shift)
                            | +--ro ifws:mean-shift
                                                                empty
                            +--: (ifws:seasonality-shift)
Labels can be filtered
                            | +--ro ifws:seasonality-shift
                                                                empty
                            +--: (ifws:trend)
 based on the tags
                              +--ro ifws:trend
                                                                empty
                            +--: (ifws:other)
                                +--ro ifws:other
                                                                string
                         +--ro ifws:tags* [key]
                            +--ro ifws:kev
                                                 string
                            +--ro ifws:value
                                                 string
                         +--ro ifws:annotator
                            +--ro (ifws:annotator-type)
                              +--: (ifws:human)
                                  +--ro ifws:human
                                                           empty
                              +--: (ifws:algorithm)
                                   +--ro ifws:algorithm
                                                           empty
                            +--ro ifws:name?
                                                           string
```

Experiment: Antagonist

anomaly tagging on historical data



Next Steps:

- Improve scalability
- Integrate and Validate with Swisscom Data

Goals:

- Build a Label Store for Network Anomaly detection
- Prove that YANG models contain all the necessary information
- Validate models across a wide range of use-cases

Done so far:

- ✓ Validation with real operational data (Cloud monitoring)
- ✓ Validation with rule-based Network Anomaly Detector (SAIN RFC9417/RFC9418)
- ✓ Validation with a ML-based Network Anomaly Detector (Autoencoder)
- ✓ Add support for Re-training of MLbased models
- ✓ Add partial support for Metadata Filtering and search
- ✓ YANG model refinements to reflect the results of the coding
- ✓ Automatic dashboard generation

Experiment: Antagonist

Supported Use Cases

Antagonist currently supports some interesting use cases, through which we validated the tool:

- UC1 Detection Enable detectors to persist network anomaly labels
- UC2 Validation Enable network Engineers to validate labels, review and compare detection results
- UC3 Refinement Enable the refinement of detectors
 - UC3.1 Improving detection rules (e.g. using SAIN RFC 9417 / 9418)
 - **UC3.2** Retraining ML models
- UC4 Active Learning Allow the network experts to validate only the necessary Labels

```
import sys
sys.path.append('..')
from demo_anomaly_detector import autoencoder_detector

# If a model has been pre-trained, it will be loaded automatically
anomaly_detector = autoencoder_detector.DemoAnomalyDetector()
```

Instantiate an anomaly detector

UC1
Detection
(1/2)

```
network_anomalies = anomaly_detector.detect(telemetry_df)
```

Run detection on telemetry data

```
## Send the data to Antagonist
for network_anomaly in network_anomalies:
                                                                     Store detected network anomalies on
   # Create network anomaly label
   net anomaly = {
                                                                     Antagonist
        "annotator": {
           "name": anomaly detector.get model name(),
           "annotator type": "algorithm"
       "description": f'Detected Network Anomaly on {machine id} - {datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(network_anomaly[0]).strftime("%Y-%m-%d at %H")}',
       "state": "incident-potential",
       "version": 1
   response = requests.post(
       f"http://{ANTAGONIST_HOST}/api/rest/v1/network_anomaly", json=net_anomaly
   response.raise for status()
   ni uuid = response.json()
```

Store detected symptoms on Antagonist

```
# Create network symptoms labels and link with the network incident
for symptom in network_anomaly[2]:
    tags = {
        "machine": machine id,
        "metric": db.get_metric_names()[symptoám[0]],
        "group": group,
   net_sym = {
        'start-time': datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(symptom[1]).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"),
        'end-time': datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(symptom[2]).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"),
        "event-id": ni_uuid,
        "concern-score": symptom[3],
        "confidence-score": symptom[4],
        "description": "Symptom",
        "pattern": "",
        "tags": tags,
        "annotator": {
            "name": f"{anomaly detector.get model name()}",
            "annotator type": "algorithm"
    # Persist the Symptom
    response = requests.post(
        f"http://{ANTAGONIST_HOST}/api/rest/v1/symptom", json=net_sym
   response.raise for status()
   symptom uuid = response.json()
   # Link the Symptom to the network anomaly
   sym_to_net = {"symptom-id": symptom_uuid, "incident-id": ni_uuid}
    response = requests.post(
        f"http://{ANTAGONIST_HOST}/api/rest/v1/network_anomaly/symptom", json=sym_to_net
   response.raise for status()
```

UC1
Detection
(2/2)


Set the tags for the Symptoms

Set the tags for the Symptoms

Post the symptom to Antagonist


Connect the network anomaly with the Symptom

UC2: Validation of Labels on the dashboards




The YANG model contains all the information that we need to automatically generate dashboards


UC2: Validation of Labels on the dashboards - Tagging Network Anomalies




UC2: Validation of Labels on the dashboards - Tagging Symptoms



UC2: Validation of Labels on the dashboards - Analysing and editing network anomalies



UC2: Validation of Labels on the dashboards – Refine network anomalies



False Positives and False Negatives can be managed and corrected easily

UC3.1 – Refinement – Improving Detection rules [SAIN] (1/2)

The SAIN Agent defines symptoms and pushes them into the Label Store

A network anomaly is created to group those symptoms together

```
symptoms = [
        'start-time': '2024-07-18T18:05:01',
        'end-time': '2024-07-18T23:12:42',
        "concern-score": 0.7, # impact score
        "confidence-score": 1.
        "description": "Symptom",
        "pattern": "",
        "tags": {
            "subservice id": '66409aa8-c0d2-4703-82f6-d18b7aaf3841',
            "subservice type": 'Device',
            "expression": "device.cpu util > 90%"
        "annotator": {
            "name": f"SAIN-Agent-{sain agent id}",
            "annotator type": "algorithm"
```

```
anomaly_dict = {
    "description": f'Device Under Stress',
    "state": "problem-potential",
    "version": 1,
    "symptoms": symptoms,
    "annotator": {
        "name": f"{sain_agent_id}",
        "annotator_type": "algorithm",
    }
}
```

UC3.1 – Refinement – Improving Detection rules [SAIN] (1 / 2)

A Network Engineer does the validation and deems the network anomaly to actually be a problem

```
anomaly_dict = {

    "id": network_anomaly_id,
    "description": f'Device Under Stress',
    "state": "problem-confirmed",
    "version": 2,
    "symptoms": symptoms,
    "annotator": {
        "name": f"{sain_user_id}",
        "annotator_type": "human",
    }
}
```

A Network Engineer in the post-mortem analysis, discovers another symptom that would have helped identifying the root cause faster.

This symptom is added to the list.

```
# Refinement of symptoms
new_symptom = {
    'start-time': '2024-07-18T18:05:01',
    'end-time': '2024-07-18T23:12:42',
    "concern-score": 1, # impact on health score
    "confidence-score": 1,
   "description": "Symptom",
    "tags": {
        "subservice id": 'f803f55c-2967-4d24-a81a-f83267dc4239',
        "subservice type": 'Interface',
        "expression": "interface.receive-packet > 800000"
    "annotator": {
        "name": f"{sain user id}",
        "annotator type": "human"
symptoms.append(new symptom)
anomaly dict = {
    "id": network_anomaly_id,
   "description": f'Device Under Stress and High Network Traffic',
    "state": "problem-confirmed",
    "version": 3,
    "symptoms": symptoms,
    "annotator": {
        "name": f"{sain user id}",
        "annotator type": "human",
```

UC3.2: Refinement (Retraining a ML model)

Get the symptom generated by humans


```
import sys
sys.path.append('..')

from demo_anomaly_detector import autoencoder_detector
new_anomaly_detector = autoencoder_detector.DemoAnomalyDetector()

annotation_df = json_to_df(symptoms)
new_anomaly_detector.train(historical_telemetry_df, annotation_df, force=True)
```

Train a new model (which can then be compared with previous one - or others)

Post Maintenance Window Analysis




Overall BGP Update/withdrawals Across Swisscom MPLS/SRv6 Cores



Maintenance window was scheduled to start on April 9th 22:00 with a total of 4 migration steps.



At 12:45 CE facing interfaces on first PE **node to be phased out was disabled.**





At 23:02 CE facing interfaces on first PE **node to be migrated to was enabled.**

Triggering a VPNv4 update of 138.187.57.240/28 from 138.190.129.180 Lo0 towards route-reflectors and then to Inter-AS option B ASBR. BMP route-monitoring and CLI show commands verified successful route propagation.




At 23:34 CE facing interfaces on second PE **node to be phased out was disabled.**

Triggering a VPNv4 withdrawal of 138.187.57.240/28 from 138.187.57.5 Lo0 towards route-reflectors and then to Inter-AS option B ASBR. BMP route-monitoring and CLI show commands verified successful route propagation to route-reflector and on two Option B ASBR, but on other six after 20 mins delay.

Show command drove to wrong conclusion

```
show route table bgp.13vpn.0 protocol bgp 138.187.57.240/28 detail
                                                                        show route table bgp.13vpn.0 protocol bgp 138.187.57.240/28 detail
60633:4101214024:138.187.57.240/28 (1 entry, 1 announced)
                                                                        60633:4103214024:138.187.57.240/28 (3 entries, 1 announced)
               Preference: 170/-101
                                                                                        Preference: 170/-101
               Route Distinguisher: 60633:4101214024
                                                                                        Route Distinguisher: 60633:4103214024
               Next hop type: Indirect, Next hop index: 0
                                                                                        Next hop type: Indirect, Next hop index: 0
               Address: 0x1a963a3c
                                                                                        Address: 0x1526757c
                                                                                        Next-hop reference count: 4
               Next-hop reference count: 8
                Source: 138.190.128.116
                                                                                        Source: 138.187.57.3
               Protocol next hop: 138.187.57.5
                                                                                        Protocol next hop: 138.190.128.180
               Label operation: Push 83714
                                                                                        Label operation: Push 83118
               Label TTL action: prop-ttl
                                                                                        Label TTL action: prop-ttl
               Load balance label: Label 83714: None;
                                                                                        Load balance label: Label 83118: None;
               Indirect next hop: 0x2 no-forward INH Session ID: 0x0
                                                                                        Indirect next hop: 0x2 no-forward INH Session ID: 0x0
               State: < Delete Int Ext ProtectionPath ProtectionCand>
                                                                                       State: <Active Ext ProtectionPath ProtectionCand>
               Local AS: 64088.1116 Peer AS: 64088.1116
                                                                                        Local AS: 64088.1116 Peer AS: 60633
               Age: 5:28
                               Metric: 805
                                                Metric2: 4
                                                                                        Age: 14:29:45 Metric: 800
                                                                                                                        Metric2: 4
               Validation State: unverified
                                                                                        Validation State: unverified
               Resolving-AIGP: 4
                                                                                        Resolving-AIGP: 4
               Effective metric: 8 (IGP metric plus resolving AIGP)
                                                                                       Effective metric: 8 (IGP metric plus resolving AIGP)
               Task: BGP 64088.1116.138.190.128.116
                                                                                        Task: BGP 60633.138.187.57.3
               Announcement bits (1): 1-BMP
                                                                                        Announcement bits (2): 0-BGP RT Background 1-BMP
               AS path: 60633 64088.5 ?
                                                                                        AS path: 60633 64088.1180 ?
                Communities: 60633:204 60633:208 60633:1002 64497:4965
                                                                                        Communities: 60633:204 60633:208 60633:1001 60633:1111
64499:13338 target:60633:1100006314
                                                                        64497:4965 64499:13338 target:60633:1100006314
               Accepted
                                                                                        Accepted
               BMP: Pre: withdraw Station: DAISY BMP 1
                                                                                        BMP: Pre: advertise Station: DAISY BMP 1
               BMP: Pre: withdraw Station: DAISY BMP 2
                                                                                        BMP: Pre: advertise Station: DAISY BMP 2
                BMP: Station: <unassigned>
                                                                                                        Color: VPN Label: 83118
                                Color: VPN Label: 83714
                                                                                        Localpref: 100
               Localpref: 100
                                                                                        Router ID: 138.187.57.3
                Router ID: 138.190.128.116
                                                                                        Thread: junos-main
                Thread: junos-main
```



path is still

installed.

Data collection timestamp drove to wrong conclusion

```
"timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "bew03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.190.128.117",
   "string": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:52:34"
 "timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "bew03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.187.57.4",
   "string": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:52:34"
 "timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "bew03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.187.57.3",
   "string": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:52:34'
"timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "bew03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.190.128.117",
   "string": "Wed Apr 10 2024 01:04:00
 "timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "zoi03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.187.57.3",
   "string": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:54:09
 "timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "zoi03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.187.57.4",
  "string": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:54:17
"timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "zoi03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.190.128.117",
  "string": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:54:24"
"timestamp": "Tue Apr 09 2024 23:34:21",
 "writer id": "zoi03bmp45c 20240220-1 (45ae4201)",
 "peer ip": "138.190.128.117",
   "string": "Wed Apr 10 2024 00:54:51
```

The yellow marked timestamp shows the optional BMP per-peer header observation timestamp.

The blue marked timestamp shows the timestamp being augmented on the BMP data collection and **being used for the time series** database.




Because BMP per-peer timestamp is optional, in the time series database ingestion, the data collection augmentation timestamp is used instead. Leading to false conclusions when the state change was observed.

Route-Reflector Peering and L3 VPN Traffic View




BMP Peering Statistics on Route Reflectors




but not on involved

MPLS Inter-AS option B


ASBRs due to
PR1567039.





Traffic to Voice over IP Service on affected L3 VPN

64497:4965 - Anomaly Detection - Live



Cosmos Bright Lights Anomaly Detection – 64497:4965

Max Concern Score: NA

BMP Withdrawal Score: 0.19



BMP route-monitoring
Update/Withdraw check recognize
withdrawal.

BMP peer Down/Up check did not apply.



Interface Down/Up check did not recognize.

Traffic Drop spike did not apply.



 Increased or decreased Flow Count did not apply.



Overall: 1 out of 6 checks have detected the BGP topology change. Real-time streaming implementation work in progress as expected.

Postmortem What to do next?

- Support on upcoming maintenance window with verification dashboard and active monitoring.
 - -> Done

What went well?



Work in progress Cosmos Bright Lights real-time streaming Anomaly Detection BMP route-monitoring withdrawal rule detected topology change.



BMP collected metrics are consistent across multiple vendors vs. CLI show output is vendor dependent.

What could be improved?



BMP per-peer observation timestamp should be mandatory. See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-boucadair-nmop-rfc3535-20years-later-02#section-4.7. -> To be addressed in GROW/NMOP.

BMP per-peer header should have an export timestamp. See https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-boucadair-nmop-rfc3535-20years-later-02#section-4.7. -> To be addressed in GROW/NMOP.

With <u>RFC 8671</u> (Support for Adj-RIB-Out in BMP) path propagation could have been observed on route-reflectors.

With <u>draft-lucente-grow-bmp-rel</u> (Logging of routing events in BMP) path drops could been observed on Inter-AS option B ASBRs and route-reflectors.


With <u>draft-ietf-grow-bmp-path-marking-tlv</u> path status changed could have been observed on Inter-AS option B ASBRs.

Clarify why Juniper JunOS delayed BMP export for 20 resp. 80 minutes. Due to fact that the path was still passive in the BGP RIB?

With IPFIX (deconfigured due to PR1567039) and support of IE90 ForwardingStatus (not supported on Juniper JunOS) forwarding drops could have been observed on Inter-AS option B ASBRs.

Swisscom - Cosmos Bright Lights PoC Summary

After 20 Incidents and 18 Months Time




Key Facts in V0 (2023-2024)

- ➤ 16 L3 VPNs proactively monitored.
- ➤ Individual Service Disruption Detection rule accuracy is beyond 90%. Summed accuracy is beyond 95%.
- Max Concern score ranged between 0.06 and 0.85. In average 0.46.
- In 4 cases additional YANG, in 13 cases additional BMP, in 2 cases Netconf Transaction-ID and 1 case additional L2 IPFIX metrics would have helped to gain more visibility.
- Key observability feature missing: BMP Local RIB with Path Marking.

Swisscom - Cosmos Bright Lights PoC Detail

Multiple Perspectives increases Accuracy



Key Improvements in V1 (2024)

- > >12000 L3 VPNs proactively monitored since June 2024.
- Realtime Streaming eliminates delayed ingestion falls positives and scaling.
- Improved profiling. Compares to multiple previous weeks and discard largest deviation eliminates falls positives.
 - -> Work In progress

Key Improvements in V2 (2025)

- Annotate operational and analytical Network Incident data for reproduction.
- Enabling automated workflow. From PowerPoint slide decks to data driven actionable insights.

Network Anomaly Detection Framework

Detect service interruption faster then humans can

Incident and Problem Management:

Some Key Terms for Network Incident and Problem Management
 <u>draft-ietf-nmop-terminology</u>

Network Anomaly Detection:

- Semantic Metadata Annotation for Network Anomaly Detection <u>draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-semantics</u> ------
- Experiment: Network Anomaly Lifecycle <u>draft-netana-nmop-network-anomaly-lifecycle</u>

« Addressing the need to detect connectivity service interruption faster than humans can and facilitate collaboration by enabling exchange on labeled data with standardized semantics on a common framework. Please consider to attend **IETF 120 NMOP working** group session on Friday 13:00 – 15:00 or go onto the mailing list and contribute to the discussion. »

Relevant Papers for more Details

Practical Anomaly Detection in Internet Services: An ISP centric approach

Alex Huang Feng*, Pierre Francois*, Kensuke Fukuda[‡], Wanting Du[‡], Thomas Graf[†], Paolo Lucente[§], Stéphane Frénot*

*INSA Lvon, Inria, CITI, UR3720, Villeurbanne, France alex.huang-feng@insa-lyon.fr, pierre.francois@insa-lyon.fr, stephane.frenot@insa-lyon.fr [‡]National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan kensuke@nii.ac.jp †Swisscom, Zurich, Switzerlan wanting.du@swisscom.com, thomas.graf@swisscom.com §pmacct.net, Barcelona, Spain paolo@pmacct.net

SPs. Therefore, monitoring and anomaly detection has become essential for SPs. In this paper, we present an one-gion greater an one-gion greater and project aimed at identifying anomalies in Internet services provided by an ISS. We aim at detecting anomalies within the domain managed by the ISP that impact the customers and the domain managed by the ISP that impact the customers and educated the special properties of the special properties and the special properties of the special

I. INTRODUCTION

Internet services include providing global Internet reachabildetecting anomalies in the global Internet topology [4, 5]. depend on the ISP peerings to reach the Internet and an production data [7]-[9]. incident between them and the Internet can have detrimental In this paper, we focus on detecting anomalies within a implications for their business.

Adviser—I-leastlying assemilie in a network is a crutial colorer for latenties Service Proteiner (SPN). Assemilier (SPN), a broad that impact the traffic of the ISP contoners can lead integrated that impact the traffic of the ISP contoners can lead integrated their customers. They closely spervise network traffic to interpretation of the company, Moreover, gheet anomalised their customers. They closely spervise network traffic to include the contoners of the company of the company detection has been designed under the contoners. They closely spervise network traffic to include the contoners of the contoners of

inear reat time, giving innormation that allows the operator to regularities in the cash. Most research projects saming at describe the collected network telemetry metrics and illustrate how they are processed using open-source solutions. We introve solutions, but introve as set of use cases showing that an ISP can monitor Internet services using IEF standard metrics. researchers have been able to develop methods to detect anomalies in data from the public domain, with a focus on

ity for customer Autonomous Systems (ASes) connected to an Simulated environments mimicking the deployed network Internet Service Provider (ISP) and serving private customers and manually generated anomalies have also been used to within the ISP (e.g. FTTH). Disruptions in the network that test anomaly detection [6]. Very few projects use production affect the connectivity of an ISP not only significantly degrade data coming from an ISP to detect anomalies and root cause the organization's reputation but also have implications on the analysis within a single domain. AD within an AS have only company's revenue. Customers subscribed to Internet services been investigated by very few researchers having access to

mplications for their business.

Today, routing between different ASes is established using and find unwanted traffic flows impacting their business. We BGP [1]. ISPs managing an AS configure policies in their describe the target use cases in Section II. Instead of solely routers based on the business relationship they have with using BGP activity as a source of data, as done in [7], we their neighboring ASes. Generally, ISPs classify their BGP use a larger set of monitoring information, allowing us to neighbors into Customers, Settlement-free Peers and Tran-sit Providers. Customer ASes compensate the ISP to reach authors in [8] focus on detecting performance issues from the Internet, Settlement-free peers are mutual arrangements end-to-end users, while the work presented in this paper also between two ISPs to exchange Internet traffic without any covers anomalies impacting the traffic from peerings. In [9] financial compensation and Transit Providers provide access anomaly detection is based on traffic information with a focu on network intrusion detection, while the project presented

Daisy: Practical Anomaly Detection in large BGP/MPLS and BGP/SRv6 VPN Networks

Alex Huang Feng alex.huang-feng@insa-lyon.fr Univ Lyon, INSA Lyon, Inria, CITI, EA3720 Villeurbanne, France

Thomas Graf thomas.graf@swisscom.com Swisscom Zurich, Switzerland

Pierre Francois pierre.francois@insa-lvon.fr Univ Lyon, INSA Lyon, Inria, CITI, EA3720

Wanting Du wanting.du@swisscom.com Zurich, Switzerland

Stéphane Frenot stephane.frenot@insa-lyon.fr Univ Lyon, INSA Lyon, Inria, CITI, EA3720

> Paolo Lucente paolo@pmacct.net Barcelona, Spain

We present an architecture aimed at performing Anomaly Detection for BGP/MPLS VPN services, at scale. We describe in modern, large BGP/MPLS VPN and BGP/IPv6 Segment Routing VPN deployments. We describe an architecture required to collect the necessary routing information at scale. We discuss the various dimensions which can be used to detect anomalies, and the caveats of the real world impacting the level of difficulty of such anomaly detection and network modeling. We argue that a rule-based anomaly detection approach, defined for each customer type, is best suited given the current state of the art. Finally, we review the current IETF contributions which are required to benefit from a fully open, standard, architecture.

ACM Reference Format:

Alex Huang Feng, Pierre Francois, Stéphane Frenot, Thomas Graf, Wanting Du. and Paolo Lucente. 2023. Daisy: Practical Anomaly tion in large BGP/MPLS and BGP/SRv6 VPN Networks. In Applied Networking Research Workshop (ANRW '23), July 24, 2023. San Francisco, CA, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3606464.3606470

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers of and counts permissions. To Copy or makings, or appointing to post on servers to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions ⊕acm.org.

ANRW '23, July 24, 2023, San Francisco, CA, USA

© 2023 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to

ACM ISBN 979-8-4007-0274-7/23/07...\$15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3606464.3606470

Customers subscribing to BGP/MPLS VPN services usually come along with stringent Service Level Agreements. Conanomalies in their services in a timely fashion, while accommodating for scale. Around 10 thousand L3 VPNs in our Swisscom use case. Long-lasting outages, detected by the customer before the service provider, are detrimental to the perception of service quality, and may dramatically impact

The goal of the presented architecture is to provide an anomaly detection solution that scales while being flexible on the following aspects: (i) the dimensions that must be used to detect anomalies are multiple; (ii) VPN customers wear different profiles in terms of normal and abnormal values for such dimensions; (iii) the amount of information collected to produce values for such dimensions is extremely large in such deployments: around 175 thousand messages/second in our use case; (iv) the operating costs for managing an anomaly detection solution must be kept low; and (v) the networking platforms providing the service may come from different vendors and have different monitoring canabilities

The remainder paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we define what is considered a network anomaly and preser the associated challenges behind its detection. In Section 3. we describe the Daisy architecture. In Section 4, we review the ongoing IETF efforts aimed at filling the gaps for a fully open, standard, Anomaly Detection (AD) implementation And finally, in section 5, we present the first results of Daisy

We describe some of the challenges associated with customer diversity, and a non-exhaustive list of anomalies targeted by the base recipes from our limited proof of concept deployment

Paper "Practical Anomaly Detection in Internet Services: An ISP centric approach"

Published at AnNet Workshop (In conjunction with IEEE NOMS) Seoul, South Korea (6–10 May 2024)

Open access: https://hal.science/hal-04655324

Paper "Daisy: Practical Anomaly Detection in large BGP/MPLS and BGP/SRv6 VPN Networks" published

at ACM/IRTF ANRW'23

San Francisco, USA (24 July 2023)

Open access: http://hal.science/hal-04307611



Handling Operational YANG Modelled Data

State of the Union

Nowadays network operators are using machine and human readable YANG RFC 7950 to model their configurations and obtain YANG modelled data from their networks.

Network operators organizing their data in a Data Mesh where a message broker such as Apache Kafka facilitates the exchange of messages among data processing components.

Today, subscribing to a YANG datastore, publishing a YANG modeled notifications message from the network and viewing the data in a time series database, manual labor is needed to perform data transformation to make a message broker and its data processing components with YANG notifications interoperable.

« Even though YANG is intend to ease the handling of data, this promise has not yet been fulfilled for Network Telemetry RFC 9232 »

From YANG-Push to Network Analytics


Aiming for an automated data processing pipeline

A network operator aims for:

- An automated data processing pipeline which starts with YANG-Push, consolidates at Data Mesh and ends at Network Analytics.
- Operational metrics where IETF defines the semantics.
- Analytical metrics where network operators gain actionable insights.


We achieve this by integrating YANG-Push into Data Mesh to:

- Produce metrics from networks with timestamps when network events were observed.
- Hostname, publisher ID and sequence numbers help us to understand from where metrics were exported and measure its delay and loss.
- Forward metrics unchanged from networks
- Learn semantics from networks and validate messages.
- Control semantic changes end to end.



Elements of the Architecture

Workflow Diagram



- Network Orchestration subscribes to YANG datastore.
- Network Node informs Data Collection on subscription state and publishes YANG metrics with YANG-Push.
- Pata Collection obtains for each subscription the YANG module dependencies and the YANG modules on the network node, registers it in the YANG Schema Registry and prefixes the forwarded YANG notifications with the obtained schema ID.
- YANG Schema Registry issues for a Message Broker subject a schema ID for each new schema tree, compares a new schema tree with an existing and versions it.
- Time Series Database Ingestion consumes YANG-Push notifications from Message Broker, obtains schema tree from YANG schema registry, validates YANG notifications against schema and uses schema to populate into database table.

Address YANG Specification and Integration Gaps

Aiming for an automated data processing pipeline

YANG Specifications Gaps:

- YANG model for NETCONF Event Notifications
 <u>draft-ahuang-netconf-notif-yang</u>
- Validating anydata in YANG Library context
 <u>draft-aelhassany-anydata-validation</u>

YANG Integration Gaps:

- Support of Network Observation Timestamping in YANG Notifications
 <u>draft-tgraf-netconf-yang-push-observation-time</u>
- Support of Hostname and Sequencing in YANG Notifications
 <u>draft-tgraf-netconf-notif-sequencing</u>
- Support of Versioning in YANG Notifications Subscription
 <u>draft-ietf-netconf-yang-notifications-versioning</u>
- Augmented-by Addition into the IETF-YANG-Library
 <u>draft-lincla-netconf-yang-library-augmentation</u>

« Addressing those gaps are a prerequisite to enable an automated data processing chain as described in draft-ietf-nmop-yang-message-broker-integration.

Please consider to attend IETF 120 NMOP working group session on Friday 13:00 – 15:00 or go onto the mailing list and contribute to the discussion. »