

COVID-19 Infection Fatality Ratio: Where we started, Where we were, Where we are


Nick Brazeau, *On Behalf of the Imperial
College COVID-19 Response Team*

“Do you have a job yet...?”



SCHOOL OF
MEDICINE

MD 1-2



SCHOOL OF
MEDICINE

PHD 1-4



Imperial College
London

MD 3-4



Whose Work am I Presenting: ICL Severity Workstream



Imperial College London



Lucy Okell



Ilaria Dorigatti



Pete Winskill




Charlie Whittaker



Patrick Walker



Azra Ghani



Bob Verity




Neil Ferguson

& Imperial College COVID Response Team

Outline

- **Introduction**
- **“Beginning”: Outbreak in Wuhan/Mainland China**
 - Limited data sources vs. High demand
- **“Middle”: First Wave Analysis**
 - Infections: The Denominator
 - Deaths: The Numerator
 - Results
- **“Now”: Has the IFR changed over time**
 - Evidence from hospitalization data
 - Future Work
- **Conclusions**




COVID-19 – Epidemiological Characteristics


- Primarily mechanism appears to be droplet/aerosol
- Extensive pre-symptomatic transmission (approximately 40-50%)
 - Asymptomatic individuals thought less infectious, but extent remains unclear
- Basic Reproduction Number (R_0) highly variable depending on the context, ranging from 2 – 4
 - 2009 H1N1 Influenza $R_0 \sim 1.4 - 1.6$
 - Measles $R_0 \sim 12 - 18$

Masks reduce airborne transmission


Infectious aerosol particles can be released during breathing and speaking by asymptomatic infected individuals. No masking maximizes exposure, whereas universal masking results in the least exposure.



Infected, asymptomatic



Healthy




COVID-19 – Disease Characteristics

- Wide variety of symptoms elicited by infection with the virus
 - Although primary complications are respiratory
 - Asymptomatic fraction ~20% - some age-variation
- Severity of disease significantly influenced by age, biological sex, and comorbidities



COVID-19 – Disease Burden to Date

- ~72.8 million cases and 1.62 million deaths reported to date.
 - Likely to be significant underestimate.




COVID-19 Fatality Ratios

Hospitalized Fatality Ratio = $\frac{\text{Deaths}}{\text{Hosp. Pop.}}$

Case Fatality Ratio = $\frac{\text{Deaths}}{\text{Cases}}$

Infection Fatality Ratio = $\frac{\text{Deaths}}{\text{Infxns}}$

“Per Capita” Fatality Ratio = $\frac{\text{Deaths}}{\text{Pop.}}$




COVID-19 Infection Fatality Ratio



- Probability of death given infection **Infection Fatality Ratio = $\frac{\text{Deaths}}{\text{Infxns}}$**
- Contested statistics throughout the COVID-19 pandemic
- Estimates:
 - 0.09 – 0.53% (Ioannidis, 2020)
 - >2% based on Estimates from Italy


Why We Care about the COVID-19 IFR: Justification for Policy



- Severity of the disease prompts public health urgency
- COVID-19 age-specific mortality closely matches annual risk of death

Why We Care about the COVID-19 IFR: S(E)IR Model Parameterization

**IFR
Estimates**



Lilith Whittles, Marc Baguelin, Rich Fitzjohn, Edward Knock, John Lees, OJ Watson,
Charlie Whittaker, Peter Winskill, Alexandra Hogan, Nick Brazeau, Giovanni Charles

Why We Care about the COVID-19 IFR: S(E)IR Model Parameterization




Imperial College London

**IFR
Estimates**





*LMIC transmission dynamics: Report 12
Damascus Death Underreporting: Report 31
Sudan Under-ascertainment: Report 39
Vaccines: Report 33*



*Lilith Whittles, Marc Baguelin, Rich Fitzjohn, Edward Knock, John Lees, OJ Watson,
Charlie Whittaker, Peter Winskill, Alexandra Hogan, Nick Brazeau, Giovanni Charles*

Outline



Setting the Scene: Late Feb. 2020

- **Situation in late Feb 2020...**
- USA: ~15 cases, 0 deaths
- UK: ~10 cases, 0 deaths
- Italy: ~100 cases, ~3 deaths
- China: ~70,000 cases, ~2000 deaths

Q. If/When this takes off in USA, how bad will it be?

- Is this a pandemic?
- What is severity of the disease (i.e. IFR)?
- How important is age?

Articles

Estimates of the severity of coronavirus disease 2019: a model-based analysis

Robert Verity*, Lucy C Okell*, Ilaria Dorigatti*, Peter Winskill*, Charles Whittaker*, Natsuko Imai, Gina Cuomo-Dannenburg, Hayley Thompson, Patrick G T Walker, Han Fu, Amy Dighe, Jamie T Griffin, Marc Baguelin, Sanggeeta Bhatia, Adhiratha Boonyasiri, Anne Cori, Zulma Cucunubá, Rich Fitzjohn, Katy Gaythorpe, Will Green, Arran Hamlet, Wes Hinsley, Daniel Laydon, Gemma Nedjati-Gilani, Steven Riley, Sabine van Elsland, Erik Volz, Haowei Wang, Yuanrong Wang, Xiaoyue Xi, Christl A Donnelly, Azra C Ghani, Neil M Ferguson*

Summary
Background In the face of rapidly changing data, a range of case fatality ratio estimates for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have been produced that differ substantially in magnitude. We aimed to provide robust estimates, accounting for censoring and ascertainment biases.

Methods We collected individual-case data for patients who died from COVID-19 in Hubei, mainland China (reported by national and provincial health commissions to Feb 8, 2020), and for cases outside of mainland China (from government or ministry of health websites and media reports for 37 countries, as well as Hong Kong and Macau, until Feb 25, 2020). These individual-case data were used to estimate the time between onset of symptoms and outcome (death or discharge from hospital). We next obtained age-stratified estimates of the case fatality ratio by relating the aggregate distribution of cases to the observed cumulative deaths in China, assuming a constant attack rate by age and adjusting for demography and age-based and location-based under-ascertainment. We also estimated the case fatality ratio from individual line-list data on 1334 cases identified outside of mainland China. Using data on the prevalence of PCR-confirmed cases in international residents repatriated from China, we obtained age-stratified estimates of the infection fatality ratio. Furthermore, data on age-stratified severity in a subset of 3665 cases from China were used to estimate the proportion of infected individuals who are likely to require hospitalisation.

Lancet Infect Dis 2020
Published Online
March 30, 2020
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(20\)30243-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30243-7)
See Online/Comment
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099\(20\)30257-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30257-7)

*Contributed equally
MRC Centre for Global Infectious Disease Analysis,
Abdul Latif Jameel Institute for
Disease and Emergency
Analytics, and Department of
Infectious Disease
Epidemiology, Imperial College
London, London, UK
I Dorigatti PhD, P Winskill PhD,


In the beginning, there was Verity et al.

Data sources


Expected total deaths by

- Age
- Location

Cases over time



Demography



China deaths line list



Time onset to death

Repatriation flight data



Diamond Princess



Point estimate of infection prevalence

Point estimates of CFR and IFR, validation

Calculating the IFR in the beginning

- **Death Data**

- Age-stratified counts deaths from WHO-China Report

- **Case Data**

- Aggregate data on cases in China
 - Aggregate data on cases outside of China

- **Infection Data**

- Repatriated flight data

Simplified Approach to get IFR and CFR (performed jointly)

1. Estimate CFR

- From aggregate data
- Given some set of onset-outcome delays

2. “Adjust” data for delays and ascertainment to get “true cases”

3. Assume infections can be determined from “true cases”
 - *Estimate IFR*



Estimating IFR in the beginning


- Imperfect data; imperfect estimate → urgency to know the relative magnitude of severity → prompt action
- Michael Ryan, executive director of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme:
“[P]erfection is the enemy of the good when it comes to emergency management. Speed trumps perfection.”



Estimating IFR in the beginning

	Deaths	Laboratory-confirmed cases*	Case fatality ratio			Infection fatality ratio†
			Crude	Adjusted for censoring	Adjusted for censoring, demography, and underascertainment‡	
Overall	1023	44 672	2.29% (2.15–2.43)	3.67% (3.56–3.80)	1.38% (1.23–1.53)	0.657% (0.389–1.33)
Age group, years						
0–9	0	416	0.000% (0.000–0.883)	0.0954% (0.0110–1.34)	0.00260% (0.000312–0.0382)	0.00161% (0.000185–0.0249)
10–19	1	549	0.182% (0.00461–1.01)	0.352% (0.0663–1.74)	0.0148% (0.00288–0.0759)	0.00695% (0.00149–0.0502)
20–29	7	3619	0.193% (0.0778–0.398)	0.296% (0.158–0.662)	0.0600% (0.0317–0.132)	0.0309% (0.0138–0.0923)
30–39	18	7600	0.237% (0.140–0.374)	0.348% (0.241–0.577)	0.146% (0.103–0.255)	0.0844% (0.0408–0.185)
40–49	38	8571	0.443% (0.314–0.608)	0.711% (0.521–0.966)	0.295% (0.221–0.422)	0.161% (0.0764–0.323)
50–59	130	10 008	1.30% (1.09–1.54)	2.06% (1.74–2.43)	1.25% (1.03–1.55)	0.595% (0.344–1.28)
60–69	309	8583	3.60% (3.22–4.02)	5.79% (5.20–6.34)	3.99% (3.41–4.55)	1.93% (1.11–3.89)
70–79	312	3918	7.96% (7.13–8.86)	12.7% (11.5–13.9)	8.61% (7.48–9.99)	4.28% (2.45–8.44)
≥80	208	1408	14.8% (13.0–16.7)	23.3% (20.3–26.7)	13.4% (11.2–15.9)	7.80% (3.80–13.3)
Age category (binary), years						
<60	194	30 763	0.631% (0.545–0.726)	1.01% (0.900–1.17)	0.318% (0.274–0.378)	0.145% (0.0883–0.317)
≥60	829	13 909	5.96% (5.57–6.37)	9.49% (9.11–9.95)	6.38% (5.70–7.17)	3.28% (1.82–6.18)

Outline




Data from the First Wave: Death Data

“Line List Data”
(Individual Outcome Data)



Aggregate Data
(Totals/Counts)




Cumulative or daily death counts from Ministries of Health, NGOs, or John Hopkin’s Dashboard (if not otherwise available)

Data from the First Wave: Infection Data

Serology

- Testing for antibodies
- Assays
 - Sensitivity
 - Specificity



Data from the First Wave: Infection Data



SUMMARY STATISTICS

Antibody Tests Administered
4405655


Number of Seroprevalence
Estimates
471

Countries Included **56**

WELCOME TO SEROTRACKER

We are conducting a systematic review of SARS-CoV-2 serosurveys globally and our findings are visualized on this dashboard.

You can configure the data displayed using the "Filter" toolbar on the right, and view the full list of studies we are tracking on the "Data" page.



**175 "First Wave"
Studies Screened**



Estimation Without Representation: Early Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Seroprevalence Studies and the Path Forward

Bonnie E Shook-Sa , Ross M Boyce, Allison E Aiello


The Journal of Infectious Diseases, Volume 222, Issue 7, 1 October 2020,
Pages 1086–1089, <https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jiaa429>

Published: 16 July 2020 Article history

10 Studies Included





Calculating the IFR for the First Wave





Calculating the “middle” IFR: Simple Maths


- **Goal:** Infer age-specific infection fatality ratios in a “simple” framework
- **Data Input**
 - Stratified “aggregate” deaths
 - Stratified seroprevalence
- **Approach**
 - Likelihood two pieces:
 - “Shape” determined by throwing forward the incidence curve to account for time-of-onset to time-of-death lag
 - “Pin” the AUC of the incidence curve with serology
 - Age-specific “attack rate” effects
 - Estimated within Bayesian Framework
 - Metropolis Coupled MCMC

Justification for a modeling approach





Outline





- **Serology is Useful**
- **Re-estimating Specificity**
(results not shown)
- **SeroREVersion**

Serology as a Useful Metric





- Serology correlated with mortality (within study site)
- Regions hit harder, do not have a systematically different IFR


Location

Brazil	England	New York State, USA
Denmark	Italy	Spain




Accounting for Seroreversion




Accounting for Seroreversion



Outline





Underreporting

Care Homes

Dr. [REDACTED] MD [REDACTED] · Oct 29 ...
Replies to @MRC_Outbreak [REDACTED]
These are alleged IFRs!

If we remove those who died FROM influenza, heart attack, cancer, accident, suicide, etc. from the deceased WITH SARS-CoV-2, the real IFR is much lower than influenza's, in the range of other corona cold viruses.

End this BS!

Mounting Evidence of COVID-19 Death Underreporting

Spain's COVID-19 death toll could be 60% higher than official count, says El País

By Reuters Staff

2 MIN READ



26th July 2020

Fears over hidden Covid-19 outbreak in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria

Number of cases may far exceed official figures amid claims of quarantining by non-state actors

31st March 2020

I work as a medic in Syria, where an unreported Covid-19 crisis is unfolding
Anonymous

The shattered health system is unable to cope with the pandemic, and we are scared to speak out about its spread

24th August 2020

WORLD, AFRICA

'Mysterious deaths' being probed in Nigeria's Kano

So far there has been nothing to suggest that deaths are linked with coronavirus, says state governor

28.04.2020

28th April 2020

At least half of mystery deaths in Nigeria's Kano due to COVID-19 - minister

By Reuters Staff

2 MIN READ



2nd June 2020

THE LANCET

Log in



WORLD REPORT | VOLUME 396, ISSUE 10252, P657, SEPTEMBER 05, 2020

Is India missing COVID-19 deaths?

Patralekha Chatterjee

Published: September 05, 2020 •

DOI: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(20\)31857-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31857-2) •



The Washington Post
Democracy Dies in Darkness




World Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East Fore

The Americas


Peru probes whether 27,253 coronavirus deaths uncounted

Case Study: Damascus, Syria

- Fit squire SEIR compartment model to death data (assuming deaths not full captured)
- Sensitivity analysis fit to excess mortality
- *Between 1% - 3% of deaths reported provides best fit to excess mortality*




OJ Watson



Report 31

“Back of Envelope” Case Study: Kenya

- Very nice study assessing seropositivity among blood donors across Kenya
- National seroprevalence: 4.3% (95% CI 2.9–5.8%) from April 30 – June 16
- 71 deaths reported by May 30 (median sample date reported)




“Back of Envelope” Case Study: Kenya

- Kenyan Population ~ 50 Million
 - 4% seroprevalence * ~ 50 million = 2 million infections
 - IFR = 0.0036%
 - Today: 1,604 deaths
 - ~90% of population infection (>>Herd Immunity Estimates)
- Num. Infxns = $\frac{Deaths}{IFR}$ = $\frac{1,604}{0.000036}$ ≈ 44.5 Million**

Should We Be Surprised?

- From WHO records, it is estimated that approximately 1 in every 4 malaria deaths appear in official national statistics.¹
- For yellow fever, less than 1% of the predicted 50,000 deaths a year across Africa are successfully diagnosed and reported.²



1. <https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/estimated-number-of-malaria-deaths>

2. *The global burden of yellow fever*. Katy A. M. Gaythorpe, Arran T. P. Hamlet, Kevin Jean, Daniel Garkauskas Ramos, Laurence Cibrelus, Tini Garske, Neil M. Ferguson medRxiv 2020.10.14.20212472; doi: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.10.14.20212472>

Care Home Deaths


- Extreme burden in the first wave
- “Separate” epidemic
- Excluding these deaths greatly reduces the IFR (results later)
- “Type” of *deaths* matter




Sources: International Long Term Care Policy Network, Avik Roy • Data as of June 26, 2020
Note: Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, & Norway do not report deaths of care home residents outside of LTC facilities




Outline



$$IFR = \frac{Deaths}{Infxns}$$



Simulations: Evidence the Model Works




- Fit to complex infection curve shapes
- IFRs w/in 95% credible intervals

Results: Study Specific IFRs

Study Location	Data					Model Estimates				
	Cumulative COVID-19 Deaths	Reported Seroprevalence (dates)	Serostudy Sensitivity (%) (T+/D+ or 95% CrI)	Serostudy Specificity (%) (T-/D- or 95% CrI)	Crude IFR (95% CrI)	Sensitivity (%) (95% CrI)	Specificity (%) (95% CrI)	IFR without Seroreversion (95% CrI)	IFR with Seroreversion (95% CrI)	IFR: Care Home Deaths Excluded, no seroreversion (95% CrI)
Brazil*	51,179	2.42% (Jun. 04 - Jun. 07)	85.14 (81.93, 87.97)	99.72 (99.55, 99.85)	0.99 (0.92, 1.06)	85.32 (82.25, 88.22)	99.75 (99.61, 99.86)	1.03 (0.93, 1.16)	0.99 (0.89, 1.15)	
Denmark*	463	2.4% (Apr. 27 - May 03)	82.09 (75.51, 87.58)	99.25 (98.94, 99.56)	0.33 (0.23, 0.48)	82.41 (75.88, 87.88)	99.16 (98.73, 99.46)	0.53 (0.38, 1)	0.52 (0.37, 0.96)	0.33 (0.23, 0.6)
England*	47,954	5.94% (Jun. 20 - Jul. 03)	78.4 (65.68, 88.15)	99.44 (99.11, 99.71)	1.41 (1.38, 1.45)	79.79 (67.69, 89.31)	99.6 (99.34, 99.77)	1.18 (0.99, 1.34)	1.02 (0.85, 1.18)	0.73 (0.61, 0.83)
Italy**	34,610	2.44% (May 25 - Jul. 15)	96.04 (89.84, 99.05)	99.7 (99.59, 99.79)	2.3 (1.94, 2.72)	96.47 (90.79, 99.16)	99.69 (99.57, 99.78)	2.53 (2.3, 2.77)	2.23 (2.03, 2.44)	
Netherlands	5,767	5.5% (May 10 - May 20)	98.28 (171/174)	99.65 (281/282)	0.6 (0.58, 0.63)	98.25 (95.64, 99.53)	99.83 (99.43, 99.98)	0.62 (0.58, 0.68)	0.59 (0.55, 0.65)	
Spain*	28,116	5.27% (Jun. 08 - Jun. 22)	81.84 (75.67, 87.01)	98.79 (98.55, 99.02)	1.12 (1.08, 1.16)	84.72 (83.07, 88.52)	99.04 (98.86, 99.21)	1.14 (1.08, 1.21)	1.07 (1.01, 1.14)	0.75 (0.71, 0.8)
Sweden	4,992	7.1% (Jun. 08 - Jun. 12)	99.36 (156/157)	98.89 (267/270)	0.68 (0.46, 1)	99.29 (97.19, 99.93)	99.17 (98.13, 99.77)	1.03 (0.87, 1.37)	0.99 (0.84, 1.37)	0.55 (0.46, 1.2)
Geneva, Switzerland	262	10.84% (May 03 - May 10)	91.16 (165/181)	100 (176/176)	0.48 (0.42, 0.56)	91.49 (86.89, 94.96)	99.89 (98.76, 100)	0.49 (0.42, 0.6)	0.48 (0.4, 0.57)	0.22 (0.18, 0.27)
Zurich, Switzerland	124	1.59% (May 01 - May 31)	90.74 (49/54)	99.89 (5,497/5,503)	0.51 (0.45, 0.58)	91.8 (83.36, 96.86)	99.87 (99.74, 99.95)	0.52 (0.41, 0.67)	0.5 (0.39, 0.64)	
New York State, USA*	17,718	12.1% (Apr. 19 - Apr. 28)	89.39 (85.57, 92.55)	98.73 (98.15, 99.27)	0.75 (0.74, 0.76)	89.67 (85.99, 92.69)	98.7 (98.02, 99.19)	0.77 (0.72, 0.83)	0.75 (0.7, 0.8)	0.61 (0.58, 0.66)

Results: Age-Specific IFRs




Results: Best Guesses of the IFR

Age-Band (years)	IFR (%) without Seroreversion (95% PI)	IFR (%) with Seroreversion (95% PI)
0-4	0 (0, 0.04)	0 (0, 0.03)
5-9	0.01 (0, 0.06)	0.01 (0, 0.06)
10-14	0.01 (0, 0.11)	0.01 (0, 0.1)
15-19	0.02 (0, 0.19)	0.02 (0, 0.17)
20-24	0.03 (0, 0.31)	0.02 (0, 0.28)
25-29	0.04 (0, 0.48)	0.04 (0, 0.43)
30-34	0.07 (0.01, 0.73)	0.06 (0.01, 0.66)
35-39	0.1 (0.01, 1.06)	0.09 (0.01, 0.96)
40-44	0.16 (0.02, 1.5)	0.15 (0.02, 1.35)
45-49	0.25 (0.03, 2.07)	0.23 (0.03, 1.85)
50-54	0.39 (0.05, 2.79)	0.36 (0.05, 2.48)
55-59	0.61 (0.1, 3.7)	0.56 (0.1, 3.28)
60-64	0.95 (0.19, 4.84)	0.88 (0.18, 4.28)
65-69	1.49 (0.35, 6.32)	1.37 (0.34, 5.58)
70-74	2.32 (0.65, 8.25)	2.15 (0.63, 7.29)
75-79	3.62 (1.21, 10.84)	3.37 (1.18, 9.59)
80-84	5.66 (2.23, 14.37)	5.28 (2.19, 12.75)
85-89	8.84 (4.05, 19.3)	8.27 (3.98, 17.21)
90+	17.25 (9.63, 30.9)	16.23 (9.48, 27.81)


Overall (LIC)	0.24 (0.15, 0.43)	0.21 (0.14, 0.38)
Overall (LMIC)	0.4 (0.26, 0.67)	0.37 (0.24, 0.61)
Overall (UMIC)	0.62 (0.41, 1)	0.56 (0.38, 0.91)
Overall (HIC)	1.15 (0.78, 1.8)	1.06 (0.73, 1.62)

- "Risk" of death doubles every eight years of age
- IFR ranges from 0.15 – 0.43% in LIC
- IFR ranges from 0.78 – 1.8% in HIC

Verity et al. Holding up to the Test of Time




Contrasting the IFR Across Studies



IFR Estimates in the “Wild”




Infection Fatality Ratio of COVID-19 vs. Seasonal Influenza



Source: <https://github.com/mbevand/covid19-age-stratified-ifr>

Note: the vertical lines on one COVID-19 IFR curve (Poletti) are caused by the IFR being estimated to be zero for age groups 0-19 and 20-49.

IFR Estimates in the “Wild”





Trevor Bedford @trvrb

Replies to @trvrb

Thus, getting COVID as a 35-44 year old roughly increases yearly risk of death by 1.5X. So, small in absolute terms, but sizable in relative terms. Using above IFR estimates from @mrc_outbreak gives the following distribution of increased yearly risk of death across ages. 13/14

8:13 PM · Dec 9, 2020 · Twitter Web App

Outline



Has the IFR changed over time

nature

NEWS FEATURE · 11 NOVEMBER 2020

Why do COVID death rates seem to be falling?


Hard-won experience, changing demographics and reduced strain on hospitals are all possibilities – but no one knows how long the change will last.

Has the IFR changed over time?

OPEN

Improving Survival of Critical Care Patients With Coronavirus Disease 2019 in England: A National Cohort Study, March to June 2020

The COVID-19 death rate dropped in about 21,000 people admitted to critical-care units in England between March and June 2020. Reductions in mortality were apparent even after adjusting for age, sex, ethnicity and pre-existing health conditions.



October 26, 2020

ONLINE FIRST OCTOBER 23, 2020—BRIEF REPORT

Trends in COVID-19 Risk-Adjusted Mortality Rates

Leora I Horwitz, MD, MHS^{1,2,3*}, Simon A Jones, PhD^{1,2}, Robert J Cerfolio, MD⁴, Fritz Francois, MD³, Joseph Greco, MD⁵, Bret Rudy, MD⁶, Christopher M Petrilli, MD³

¹Center for Healthcare Innovation and Delivery Science, NYU Langone Health, New York, New York; ²Department of Population Health, NYU Grossman School of Medicine, New York, New York; ³Department of Medicine, NYU Grossman School of Medicine, New York, New York; ⁴Department of Surgery, NYU Grossman School of Medicine, New York, New York; ⁵NYU Winthrop Hospital, Mineola, New York; ⁶Department of Pediatrics, NYU Grossman School of Medicine, New York, New York.





FIG. Adjusted and Unadjusted Mortality or Hospice Rate, by Month of Admission.

October 23, 2020

50

⚠ Same Shape, Same Pin, New IFR approach



⚠ Heavy work in progress (i.e. model still may fail)


Comments on Vaccines & the IFR

Report
33

- Do COVID-19 Vaccines Block Transmission or just Dz
 - *Transmission*
 - IFR will change in complicated ways
 - *Only Dz:*
 - IFR will drop along with deaths (removing from numerator *but not* denominator)
- Moving forward, interested in:
 - IFR in vaccinated
 - IFR in unvaccinated
 - (IFR before vaccination)



Alexandra Hogan Pete Winskill




Comments on Vaccines & the IFR

- IFR is only one piece of the puzzle
 - Herd Immunity Thresholds
 - 2009 H1N1 Influenza $R_0 \sim 1.4 - 1.6$ (PMC3735127; PMC3084966)
 - (20-40% of population immune for control*)
 - COVID-19 $R_0 \sim 2 - 4$
 - (50-75% of population immune for control*)
- Huge success stories with improvements in care/treatment (*to be further described*) and available vaccines
 - Good place because of action, not in spite of it

Mass vaccination has had a profound effect on some diseases

For example, vaccine introduction in England and Wales saw cases drop over the following years

○ Vaccine introduced




Source: Cases of notifiable infectious diseases, Public Health England

BBC

$R_0 \sim 2 - 4$ $R_0 \sim 5$ $R_0 \sim 12 - 18$

Take-Aways

- **Serologic Data**
 - Useful metric for disease burden
 - Need to account for sens, spec, and seroreversion
- **“First Wave” IFR Estimates**
 - Significant pattern by age (“risk” doubles every 8 years)
 - 10-15x higher than seasonal influenza
 - Not considering long-term sequelae
 - Large variation in IFRs even in similar wealth brackets/demographics
- **The IFR has *likely* decreased over time**
 - ! Future work needed



All models are
wrong, but
some are
useful.

- George Box

Acknowledgements



& Imperial College COVID Response Team



Funding

- **Imperial College London**
- F30AI143172
- UNC MD/PhD Program



Acknowledgements



@IDEELlabs

<https://www.med.unc.edu/medicine/infdis/ideel/>

QUESTIONS & Discussion

Reproducibility & Data Availability

- Software Package: *mrc-ide/COVIDCurve*
- Analyses: *mrc-ide/reestimate_covidIFR_analysis*



GitHub

Reports Available Online (link below or google “Imperial COVID Reports”)

- <https://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/covid-19/covid-19-reports>
- Report 34: IFR Analyses from Serologic Data



Nick Brazeau, MD/PhD Candidate
nbrazeau@med.unc.edu




@NFBrazeau

Posterior Predictive Checks



Results: Posterior Predictive Checks - Deaths



Results: Posterior Predictive Checks - Serology



Results: Posterior Predictive Checks - Serology




Bayesian Approach

MCMC (one slide)


Prior

Starting Guess
(flatter = none)




Likelihood


Draw a parameter,
and see how
consistent w/ data
"Plug and Play"




Posterior



Combination is the posterior, or the probability
of parameter given data ("evidence")
i.e. it's what you want
statistics to be




We ask the Markov Chain Monte Carlo to
wander around in a specific way until it
seems to find a set of parameters that
are consistent with the data




Acknowledgements: DrJ

drjac^oby

<https://github.com/mrc-ide/drjacoby>



MCMCMC: Cheaper Lunch



Takeaway: Better algorithms \rightarrow better sampling \rightarrow better exploration of parameter space (thereby allowing us to have fewer assumptions at start)

Study Inclusion/Exclusion

Supplementary Table 1 - Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for Seroprevalence Studies: We assumed that dexamethasone treatment was considered routine clinical practice approximately one-month after the RECOVERY trial results were released (*; PMID: 32678530). Studies conducted after the introduction of dexamethasone were excluded, as we assumed that this change in clinical practice caused shifts in the IFR that were not comparable to pre-treatment periods.


Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Serosurvey in a defined geographic area representing a national or subnational geographic unit for which data on COVID deaths in all age groups are also available up to the date of the serosurvey.• Sampling framework is defined.• Sample sizes available for serosurvey, or uncertainty in the seroprevalence is explicitly quantified.• Sero-assay sensitivity and specificity estimates available.• At least 100 COVID-19 deaths observed in the study area by the serosurvey midpoint.• First date of the serosurvey is before the introduction and widespread use of dexamethasone treatment (August 17, 2020)*	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Study participants selected based on being healthcare workers, having symptoms of COVID, referring themselves for a test or self-selection into the study (for example, choosing to go for an antibody test in a clinic or responding to an advert).• Studies of outbreaks within a confined setting that does not include a representative sample of the general population (e.g. a school, a military ship).• Studies exclusively or primarily in a narrow age group (e.g. school survey).• Surveys of patients in clinical settings (assumed higher contact with health systems and healthcare workers).

Vaccines and Flu vs. COVID

- Assuming random distribution → no immediate effect
- Does vaccine block infxn or severe dz
 - Muddy the waters → who knows bc serology doesn't work
 - Major modifier
- IFR in non-vaccinated population vs. population
- Covid not less dangerous → just mitigated infxns/control
 - Not dying because of control measures → not necessarily covid less bad
 - Waning of VE
- IFR is one part of the puzzle
- R₀ between flu and COVID huge (1.3 vs 2.5)
- Optimism – but even if IFR has halved and we just lifted everything, we are still not even 50% of deaths → good place bc of action not in spite of


Re-estimating Specificity from Regional Data

Re-estimating Specificity



- Regional surveys allow for “true” estimation of specificity in the general population
- At zero deaths (assume zero infections), FPR

Re-estimating Specificity



Propagating Uncertainty

Propagating Uncertainty

- Know test characteristics but not true Sens/Spec
 - Know serovalidation numbers
- No idea what the true IFR is
- Know the infection curve should look similar to the death curve but no idea exactly how that relates (i.e. onset to outcome distribution changes)

*Why
Bother?*

Bayesian analysis of tests with unknown specificity and sensitivity*

Andrew Gelman[†] and Bob Carpenter[‡]

8 July 2020

Santa Clara Cautionary Tale

↓
Bayesian Approach

Parameters: "No free lunches"

Parameter	Count	Distribution
Age-Specific IFRs	Number of Age Groups	Uniform(0,1); Uniform(0, 0.4)
Knots	5	Uniform(0,1); Uniform(E-14, E)
Spline Y-Positions	5	Uniform(0,1); Uniform(0, popN)
Attack Rate Noise Scalars	Number of Age Groups	Truncated-Normal(1, 0.05) Bounds: 0.5, 1.5
Mean of Onset from Infection to Seroconversion	1	Truncated-Normal(18.3, 0.1) Bounds: 16, 21
Mean of Onset from Infection to Death	1	Truncated-Normal(19.8, 0.1) Bounds: 18, 20
Coefficient of Variation of Onset from Infection to Death	1	Beta(2550, 450)
Weibull Shape Pattern for Seroreversion	1	Truncated-Normal(3.67, 0.5) Bounds: 2, 5
Weibull Scale Pattern for Seroreversionn	1	Truncated-Normal(130.4, 0.1) Bounds: 127, 133

- Simple Model
- Few Assumptions
 - “Uninformative” Priors
- Norelates (i.e. onset to outcome distribution changes)

Sensitivity and Specificity based on Serovalidation Numbers


Sens: Beta(T+ (+) 0.5, D+ (-) T+ (+) 0.5)

Spec: Beta(T- (+) 0.5, D- (-) T- (+) 0.5)

MCMC (one slide)


Prior

Starting Guess
(flatter = none)




Likelihood


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
Posterior




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We ask the Markov Chain Monte Carlo to
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


MCMCMC: Cheaper Lunch



- Simple Model
 - Many peaks of similar height (i.e. many “almost right” sets)
- Many parameters
 - Curse of dimensionality
- Inefficient sampling...Can't brute force our way out in time.
- Who you gonna call?


MCMCMC: Cheaper Lunch



Takeaway: Better algorithms \rightarrow better sampling \rightarrow better exploration of parameter space (thereby allowing us to have fewer assumptions at start)

First vs Second Wave Parts

Has the second wave affected the same or different parts of the UK?



Data from ONS (<https://tinyurl.com/y7vefxce>). England and Wales only
code available at https://github.com/bobverity/COVID_datavis

Real-Time-Modeling UK



*Lilith Whittles, Marc Baguelin, Rich Fitzjohn, Edward Knock, John Lees
and Bob Verity*
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