

# Groups Detected

## Lazarus Group (G0032): 5.56%

[Lazarus Group](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032>) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. (Citation: US-CERT HIDDEN COBRA June 2017) (Citation: Treasury North Korean Cyber Groups September 2019) The group has been active since at least 2009 and was reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment as part of a campaign named Operation Blockbuster by Novetta. Malware used by [Lazarus Group] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032>) correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032>) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups, such as [Andarief] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0138>), [APT37] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067>), [APT38] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082>), and [Kimsuky] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094>).

**Aliases:** Lazarus Group, Labyrinth Chollima, HIDDEN COBRA, Guardians of Peace, ZINC, NICKEL ACADEMY, Diamond Sleet

**Domains:** enterprise-attack, ics-attack

**x\_mitre\_version:** 4.0

## Sandworm Team (G0034): 5.56%

[Sandworm Team] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034>) is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455. (Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) (Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) This group has been active since at least 2009. (Citation: iSIGHT Sandworm 2014) (Citation: CrowdStrike VOODOO BEAR) (Citation: USDOJ Sandworm Feb 2020) (Citation: NCSC Sandworm Feb 2020) In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with [Sandworm Team] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034>) for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide [NotPetya] (<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0368>) attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 [Olympic Destroyer] (<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0365>) attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019. (Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) (Citation: UK NCSC Olympic Attacks October 2020) Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as [APT28] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007>). (Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018)

**Aliases:** Sandworm Team, ELECTRUM, Telebots, IRON VIKING, BlackEnergy (Group), Quedagh, Voodoo Bear, IRIDIUM, Seashell Blizzard, FROZENBARENTS

**Domains:** enterprise-attack, ics-attack, mobile-attack

**x\_mitre\_version:** 4.0

## APT38 (G0082): 5.56%

[APT38] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082>) is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) Active since at least 2014, [APT38] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082>) has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which [APT38] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0082>) stole \$81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) and Banco de Chile (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018); some of their attacks have been destructive. (Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) (Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) (Citation: DOJ North Korea Indictment Feb 2021) (Citation: Kaspersky Lazarus Under The Hood Blog 2017) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group] (<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032>) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

**Aliases:** APT38, NICKEL GLADSTONE, BeagleBoyz, Bluenoroff, Stardust Chollima, Sapphire Sleet, COPERNICIUM

**Domains:** enterprise-attack, ics-attack

**x\_mitre\_version:** 3.0

## APT37 (G0067): 5.56%

[APT37](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067>) is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. [APT37](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0067>) has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: Talos Group123) North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name [Lazarus Group](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032>) instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

**Aliases:** APT37, InkySquid, ScarCruft, Reaper, Group123, TEMP.Reaper, Ricochet Chollima

**Domains:** enterprise-attack

**x\_mitre\_version:** 2.0

## FIN7 (G0046): 5.56%

[FIN7](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046>) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046>) has primarily targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, and utilities industries in the U.S. A portion of [FIN7](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046>) was run out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046>) shifted operations to a big game hunting (BGH) approach including use of [REvil](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496>) ransomware and their own Ransomware as a Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008>) Group, but there appears to be several groups using [Carbanak](<https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030>) malware and are therefore tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022)

**Aliases:** FIN7, GOLD NIAGARA, ITG14, Carbon Spider, ELBRUS, Sangria Tempest

**Domains:** enterprise-attack, ics-attack

**x\_mitre\_version:** 4.0