Boromisza-Habashi, D., & Pál, G. (2016). The discourse of dictatorship in Central Eastern Europe and the case of Hungarian "hate speech." In D. Carbaugh (Ed.), The handbook of communication in cross-cultural perspective (pp. 287-298). Routledge.

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The Discourse of Dictatorship in Central Eastern Europe and the Case of Hungarian "Hate Speech"

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In the present chapter we seek to identify cultural and discursive links between political authoritarianism and public expression in 20th- and 21st-century Central Eastern Europe (CEE), particularly in the so-called Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and Romania. Due to a shared historical experience, citizens of these nations are acutely aware that language use is not simply a transfer of information but rather a social phenomenon often endowed with destructive and oppressive force. In most countries of the region extreme right-wing, fascistic regimes rose to power for a brief period of time during the 20th century. These regimes were replaced with Communist dictatorships for decades after the drop of the Iron Curtain. As a result of life under authoritarian rule, a number of successive generations were forced to accept that public expression became a mechanism of tyranny. Citizens of CEE nations gradually came to terms with public expression serving the ends of intimidation, the silencing of dissent, and the abuse of rights. Political discourse became inextricably bound to practices of oppression and violence. Later, during the post-Stalin period commonly known as "the thaw," the softening grip of state socialism resulted in the emergence of sanitized forms of communication in formal, official discourse. Such discourse engendered deep suspicion in the population towards public discourse, and alienation from public life on a massive scale.

CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPEAN RESEARCH ON THE DISCOURSE OF DICTATORSHIP

The everyday reality of life in oppressive regimes and the prominence of discourse practices at every level of authoritarian rule rendered CEE theoretical reflection on the relationship between political discourse and dictatorship almost inevitable. Authoritarian discourse became a significant area of research within the region's communication scholarship. Studies within this area of inquiry borrowed from, and combined, theoretical, conceptual, and methodological approaches used in communication theory, media studies, linguistics, history, sociology, and political science. In spite of the heterogeneity of approaches and research outcomes, our conclusion is that

most scholars focused their attention on the strategic and epistemological features of authoritarian discourse or, more particularly, on political propaganda, the creation of political mythologies, and totalitarian conceptual systems.

In what follows we review four characteristics of spoken authoritarian discourse that emerge from relevant CEE scholarship (see Bakhtin, 1986; Boia, 2005; Boicu, 2014; Csizmadia, 2001; Fidelius, 1992, 1998; Głowiński, 1990; Győrffy, 2009; Havel, 1985, 1992; Jakubowicz, 1994; Jobst, 2010; Stroinska, 2002; 2011; Szabó, 1998; Tuckerová, 2006). In order to acknowledge the interdisciplinary character of research on authoritarian discourse we decided to cast a wide net and include in our review research not conceived and carried out within the strict disciplinary boundaries of communication scholarship.

The first character trait on which almost all analysts of discursive practice in totalitarian and post-totalitarian dictatorships reflect in some way was the broad and deep transformation of the language of public life. Those responsible for carrying out the transformation questioned widely accepted definitions, meanings, and interpretations of language and its use; replaced former key terms with new ones or transformed their traditionally accepted meanings; and introduced new expressions, phraseologies, and linguistic styles (see for example Jobst, 2010; Szabó, 1998). The transformation further included the forceful fixing of newly created or reinterpreted key terms' meanings; positing rigid, mechanistic relationships between signifiers and the signified; and the resulting restriction of possible (personal) interpretations (see for example Fidelius, 1998). Not surprisingly, public discourse rife with neologisms, convoluted linguistic style, ambiguity, and oxymoron invoked to many the type of public language use depicted in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. As a consequence of this analogy, CEE analysts of authoritarian discourse in everyday life began using mirror translations (metaphrases) of the Orwellian term Newspeak (e.g., *nowomowa*, *novořeč*, *újbeszél*) as an analytic category (see primarily Głowiński, 1990).

Regional scholarship described the second trait of authoritarian discourse, the imposition of uniformity and a monologic character on language use, in a variety of ways. Klemperer (1975 [1947]) and his followers referred to this process as the deliberate impoverishment of public language, vocabulary, and expression. As a number of analysts pointed out, however, the central issue was not the esthetic or stylistic transformation of spoken public language. Imposing uniformity on public discourse meant extinguishing the plurality of voices and views, and robbing unofficial vocabularies, definitions, and interpretations of their legitimacy and existence in public. This, in turn, allowed totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes to prevent dialogue, debate, and any sort of criticism regarding public affairs. These regimes' official public discourse was monologic and unilateral, and was performed by state actors who possessed a monopoly over interpretation and carried on endless monologues about society, the economy, culture, and politics. In its extreme form, authoritarian discourse was sanitized of any sort of expression that offered opportunities for critical engagement. Discussions of public issues were reduced to proclamations designed to prompt "reverent repetition" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 518).

The third defining characteristic of totalitarian discourse according to CEE scholarship was the instrumental use of public communication. Inhabitants of the region recognized that propaganda was an essential, constitutive element of public discourse in totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes. Political discourse was designed to influence and to prompt particular types of responses, rather than to capture some facet of reality in a nuanced way or to inspire complex reflection on relevant issues. Public words served the purpose of eliciting such emotional responses (enthusiasm, reverence, fear, or hatred) or those types of political mobilization that fit the political agenda of the regime. Public speech became the instrument of exercising control, instilling fanaticism, shaping the masses' attitudes toward everyday violence and oppression (see Pelle, 2001; Stroinska, 2002), and a means of molding an ideologically homogenous and unified

citizenry (Győrffy, 2009). In the discursive context of dictatorships, the primary functions of public expression were perlocution, mass effect, shaping thought, securing loyalty, and breaking resistance.

The fourth character trait emerging from regional scholarship was the attribution of sacred, magical qualities to political language use. CEE citizens were no strangers to authoritarian regimes' quasi-mystical relationship with public speech, and they recognized the fetishist attitude these regimes displayed toward the power of the publicly spoken word (see Havel, 1992; Szabó, 1998). Analysts recognized that, consciously or unconsciously, repressive regimes believed in the capacity of well-chosen words to shape reality according to their wishes. They also believed that crises could be averted by avoiding or forbidding the use of words that referred to those crises.

Political language attained the status of the sacred in a different sense as well. A number of CEE researchers described the mythical character of Marxist–Leninist–Stalinist ideology, and pointed out how these ideologies took on the structure and functions of religious systems (see for example Boia, 2005; Szabó, 1998). In particular, they identified as evidence of the quasi-religious nature of public communication such features as its preference for "firm and unequivocal" answers to important questions about human life and the history of humanity, its insistence on the "sacred" and morally unquestionable character of key terms, and its efforts to convince the public to accept Communist "dogma" beyond the limits of rational thought (Győrffy, 2009).

In the light of such findings it is not difficult to understand the forceful, dramatic analogies and metaphors CEE analysts used to express their insight into, and frustration with, the destructive social consequences of authoritarian language use. In this work we read descriptions of such discourse as a force that shackles entire societies and condemns them to mediocrity, as a poison injected into citizens' flesh that causes insanity and stupor, and as the seeds of hatred and violence.

We now turn to the examination of a particular key term, Hungarian *gyűlöletbeszéd* ("hate speech") that, for a tumultuous decade, conjured up the specter of authoritarian language use in a post-authoritarian society. Public debates about "hate speech" in Hungary were a stark reminder that elements and meanings of totalitarian discourse can continue to linger in the language use of a speech community long after the disappearance of totalitarian regimes (Andrews, 2011). The cultural analysis of discourse can demonstrate the discursive dynamics that sustained the social relevance and changing meanings of totalitarian discourse.

"HATE SPEECH" AND THE DISCOURSE OF DICTATORSHIP IN HUNGARY

Although "hate speech" (*gyűlöletbeszéd*) as a Hungarian cultural term for communication continues to surface in Hungarian public discourse from time to time, it lived a particularly rich social life between the mid-1990s and the mid-aughts (Boromisza-Habashi, 2013; Pál, 2006). During its decade of prominence, the term "hate speech" served as a flashpoint for a wide range of political and legal debates, social tensions, and activism. The term functioned as a catalyst of an intense period of introspection for a society experiencing the throes of transitioning from an authoritarian to a liberal democratic system of governance. In a fascinating way, "hate speech" provided Hungarians with the opportunity to examine and debate a broad range of issues including the legacy of an authoritarian past, the nature of social inclusion and exclusion, codes of democratic conduct, and the role of communication in public life.

Hungarian "hate speech" attained its status as a cultural key term at the very beginning of its five-year rise to prominence (1996–2001). The term was first translated from English

and inserted into Hungarian public discourse by Hungarian legal scholars and social scientists familiar with the U.S.-American emancipatory interpretation of the term as derogatory public expression targeting historically disadvantaged social groups. The first instance of the term's use known to the authors, in an interview with social psychologist György Csepeli (Pogonyi, 1996), is worth quoting at length as it illustrates connections between "hate speech," authoritarian discourse, and related terms for talk. In the excerpt below, the interviewer (IR) is asking Csepeli (CS) for his reactions to the acquittal of Albert Szabó, the leader of a national socialist, anti-Semitic, anti-Communist political movement, and his associates from the charge of "incitement against a community" (*közösség elleni izgatás*) by the Metropolitan Court of Budapest. The court concluded that racist public expression at public lectures sponsored by the movement did not constitute incitement, and interpreted the display of totalitarian symbols at these events as "dissemination of information" (*ismeretterjesztés*).

(1) Excerpt from Pogonyi (1996)

IR	Mit szól az ítélethez szociálpszichológusként?	*What do you think about the sentence as a social psychologist?*
CS	Szerintem igenis volt gyűlöletkiváltás. A kommunikációelmélet alapján úgy ítélem meg, hogy a szó nemcsak információhordozó eszköz. A szavakban történő kommunikáció nem csupán felvilágosítás. Éppen azért, mert emberekről van szó, ez meghatározott társadalmi-politikai viszonyokat feltételez. Ilyen értelemben a szó egyúttal cselekvés is. Érzésem szerint az ítélet nem vette figyelembe ezt a cselekvési aspektust.	*I do maintain that instigation to hatred occurred. Communication theory leads me to conclude that the word is not simply a vehicle of information transfer. Verbal communication is not simply passing information to others. What we have here is talk about other people which implies particular socio-political relations. In this sense, the word is also action. My sense of the sentence is that it did not take into account the action aspect.*
IR	Most egy adott kisebbségről volt szó, nevezetesen a zsidóságról. Más kisebbségek is vannak. Bárkiről bármit elő lehet adni ismeretterjesztés címén?	*This case focused on talk about a minority, namely the Jewish minority. There are other minorities as well. Can anything be said about anyone under the guise of information dissemination?*
CS	Nem lehet. A bíróság nem vette figyelembe azt, amit a modern politológiai irodalom gyűlöletbeszédnek nevez.	*No, it cannot. The court did not take into account what modern political science calls hate speech.*
IR	Ez mit jelent közelebbről?	*What does this mean exactly?*
CS	Azt, hogy már pusztán a szavak kimondása is sértés, tehát cselekvés. Ugyanolyan, mint egy viselkedési megnyilvánulás. Nem kell tehát valakit lelőnöm vagy megpofoznom, ugyanezt szavakkal is megtehetem.	*It means that the mere utterance of words can constitute offense, and is therefore action. It is the same as an observable act. Hence I don't have to shoot or slap someone, I can do the same with words.*

The first documented public use of the term invokes the emancipatory, U.S. American interpretation of "hate speech," an interpretation that later became popular among left-leaning politicians and activists. The type of expression labeled "hate speech" is an "utterance" that constitutes an "offense" (*a szavak kimondása is sértés*, lines 30–31) targeting particular "minorities" (*kisebbségek*, line 19). Such an offense is best seen as an "observable act" (*viselkedési megnyilvánulás*, line 32), as opposed to "passing information to others" (*felvilágosítás*, line 8). It also "implies particular socio-political relations" (*meghatározott társadalmi-politikai viszonyokat feltételez*, lines 9–10) where the speaker's hatred for minorities appears justified. Csepeli's invocation of the term conforms to the dominant Hungarian event-level (Carbaugh, 1989) model of "hate speech" (Boromisza-Habashi, 2013): from the position of third-party judge, Csepeli applies the term "hate speech" (line 27) to a precipitating event featuring a message deployed by a first-party speaker (or speakers) referencing a second-party target (or target group). Pál (2010) referred to the social roles in this triad as the Savior, the Perpetrator, and the Victim. The scene of the precipitating event and the accusation is the public, broadly conceived.

Consider a competing use of the term "hate speech" in the most widely recognized, and most direct, response to the interview with Csepeli by prominent Hungarian conservative historian Mária Schmidt. In the below excerpt from an opinion piece, the object of Schmidt's (1996) criticism is not "hate speech" as an "observable act" but objectionable metadiscourse *about* "hate speech."

(2) Excerpt from Schmidt (1996)

1	. . .Csepeli György a *Népszabadság*	*. . .György Csepeli also*
2	hasábjain diszkreditálta nyelvünk	*discredited the way words*
3	beszéddé összeálló szavait is:	*constitute speech in our language*
4	„a szó egyúttal cselekvés is . . .	*in* Népszabadság*: "the mere*
5	pusztán a szavak kimondása is	*utterance of words can constitute*
6	sértés, tehát cselekvés . . . Nem	*offense, and is therefore*
7	kell tehát valakit lelőnöm, vagy	*action . . . Hence I don't have*
8	megpofoznom, ugyanezt szavakkal	*to shoot or slap someone, I can*
9	is megtehetem." Így érkeztünk el	*do the same with words." This is*
10	az új nyelvpolitikai leleményhez,	*how we arrive at a new invention*
11	a „gyűlöletbeszédhez". Azért kell	*in the politics of language, "hate*
12	tehát a törvény szigorával eljárni	*speech." The reason why hate*
13	a gyűlöletbeszéddel szemben, mert	*speech must be sanctioned with*
14	a gyűlölet, mint olyan ellen úgy	*the severity of the law is that*
15	is tenni kell, a beszéd pedig	*one must act against hatred as*
16	eddigi felfogásunkkal szemben,	*such, and speech, contrary to our*
17	ha gyűlölettel párosul, egyben	*existing conception of it, becomes*
18	cselekedet is.	*action when combined with hatred.*
19	A tettekért pedig egy jogállamban	*In a constitutional state, one*
20	felelni kell.	*must be held accountable for one's*
21	Így tehát a jogállami normák	*actions.*
22	nem sérülnek, ha a büntetőjog	*Thus, the norms of the*
23	hatálya a szólásra is kiterjed. A	*constitutional state remain*
24	„gyűlöletbeszéd" olyan értelmetlen	*unbroken if we extend criminal law*
25	és egyben definiálatlan szókapcsolat,	*to speech. "Hate speech" is an*
26	melynek jelentése talán csak az	*unintelligible and also undefined*
27	osztályellenség vagy a nép ellensége	*compound whose meaning can perhaps*
28	fogalmakhoz hasonlítható, képzése	*only be compared to concepts like*
29	pedig egyenesen orwelli.	*class enemy or enemy of the people,*
30		*and its construction is downright*
31		*Orwellian.*

Schmidt's response is a typical rhetorical strategy some Hungarian political actors employed to undermine the emancipatory "hate speech" agenda (Boromisza-Habashi, 2011). Her critical reflection on "hate speech" metadiscourse also displays the deeply ingrained CEE suspicion toward political wordsmithing we discussed in the first section of this chapter. She takes issue with "hate speech" as an "unintelligible and also undefined compound" (*értelmetlen és egyben definiálatlan szókapcsolat*, lines 24–25) that is also "a new invention in the politics of language" (*új nyelvpolitikai leleményhez*, line 10). Csepeli "discredited the way words constitute speech in our language" (*diszkreditálta nyelvünk beszéddé összeálló szavait*, lines 2–3) by claiming that speech constituted action. His claim, according to Schmidt, runs counter "to our existing conception of [speech]" (*eddigi felfogásunkkal szemben*, line 16). Csepeli's lexical intervention into the Hungarian language not only serves the political agenda of persecuting speech Csepeli and his political allies finds objectionable but is also reminiscent of markedly Communist terminology such as "class enemy" (*osztályellenség*, line 27) or "enemy of the people" (*a nép ellensége*, line 27), and Communists' "Orwellian" (*orwelli*, line 29) attempt to manipulate social relations by manipulating language. Thus, Csepeli is cast as a political actor who will advance his political interests even at the cost of willfully corrupting not only the Hungarian language but also locally conceived ways of using that language and the language ideology informing that use.

From the perspective of our present discussion, two observations can be made about the above excerpts. First, as Pál (2008, 2009, 2010) demonstrated, "hate speech" travels across academic, legal, public, and political discursive domains and articulates with them with remarkable ease. In excerpt (1), Csepeli borrows "hate speech" from academic discourse and uses it to publicly criticize, and to distance himself from, Szabó and associates' public discourse and the Metropolitan Court's legal decision. In excerpt (2), Schmidt's criticism identifies "hate speech" as an element of partisan political discourse. Both excerpts articulate "hate speech" with totalitarian discourses. By describing the symbol use and racist talk of a national socialist group as "hate speech" Csepeli links the term to the contents of national socialist and racist discourse. Schmidt counters by associating the use of the term with Communist linguistic interventions. By forging such connections the term fosters the formation of "hate speech" as a legal, political, moral issue (Boromisza-Habashi, 2013); the formation of, and engagement between, political and moral positions with regard to such contentious issues as "hate speech" itself, the limits of free expression, the relationship between expression and action, concern with totalitarian discourse and symbolism, social relations in Hungary, and others (Boromisza-Habashi, 2010; Pál, 2010); and the negotiation of the norms of communicative conduct in public (Pál, 2010). We can see that "hate speech" took on the character of a cultural key term capable of furnishing speakers with the capacity to "unlock" particular discursive domains and political action.

Second, the two excerpts also exemplify that "hate speech" metadiscourse, and the moral authority the third-party judge claims by alleging "hate speech," is always open to normative challenge (Hall, 1988/89) in the Hungarian context. Schmidt's challenge to Csepeli aims to subvert his moral authority by claiming to expose a hidden political agenda motivating his allegation. Another prominent way of formulating normative challenges is alleging that the third-party judge's allegation is a token of the hatred she or he harbors for alleged speakers of "hate speech." Such adversarial mirroring (Boromisza-Habashi & Parks, 2014) can give rise to a cyclical form where two or more parties take turns casting their opponent(s) as perpetrators of "hate speech."

Telling the cultural story of the term "hate speech" in Hungary includes chronicling passionate, often well-intentioned but even more often unresolved public debates about the nature of "hate speech" and its effects on Hungarian society. We must not overlook, however, a point of consensus among those speakers who talked about "hate speech" as a category of observable communication. They agreed that it violated socio-cultural norms of communicative conduct

in public, although they could not agree about exactly what type of expression counted as "hate speech" and which social norms it violated. Arguably, this element of minimal consensus sustained the view that participating in debates about "hate speech" was sensible practice. In addition, minimal consensus allowed the system of cultural meanings informing the debates to remain coherent, or more particularly, to "cohere paradox, conflict, contradiction, even chaos" (Carbaugh, 1991, p. 339).

"HATE SPEECH" AND THE FLAWED FORM

In the remainder of this section we introduce the concept flawed form to elucidate the cultural significance of this minimal consensus about "hate speech." In doing so, we respond to Wilkins's (2005, this volume) account of the optimal form as an analytic and interpretive framework for understanding how speech community members identify and evaluate valued types of communicative action and valued types of speakers associated with such types. "As a particular type of pure rational action," Wilkins writes, "the optimal form is where participants evoke a standardized quality in communication. They do this based on their knowledge of communication practices that are either inadequate or excessive to the task at hand" (p. 396). Notice that the referent of "optimal" in the term "optimal form" is not the form itself but rather the type of expression identified as a result of speakers participating in the form. The optimal form is a form of cultural communication (Philipsen, 1987), a patterned "processual unit" (p. 252) of language use that allows the creation (negotiation) and affirmation (enactment) not only of a shared ideal of communication but also a shared communal identity. Wilkins uses the optimal form as an interpretive tool to capture the cultural meanings of the *asiallinen* ("matter of fact") Finnish nonverbal style. Finnish speakers invoke this style, often indirectly, to describe a valued way to conduct oneself nonverbally in public events where speech occurs. Finns talk about speaking too much (excess) or speaking for the sake of building and maintaining interpersonal relationships (substandard performance) as disruptions to *asiallinen* nonverbal conduct. From such contrastive talk, the *asiallinen* style emerges as a silent, straight-faced, thoughtful, focused presence that enables the flow of dense, factual information from speaker to listeners. This valued type, in turn, reveals cultural beliefs about the relationship between the nonverbal conduct and personal credibility of public speakers.

While the *optimal form* encompasses the ways speakers identify a valued style of expression and a valued type of speaker associated with that type of expression by identifying related, non-valued types of expressions and speakers, the *flawed form* involves speakers identifying a non-valued type of expression (and types of speakers associated with the type) in order to identify related, valued types of expression and speakers. The flawed form is a useful analytic and interpretive concept to isolate interactional moments where speakers identify expressive conduct that is not, and should not be, regarded valuable and appropriate in relevant socio-cultural scenes, and then use conduct so identified as a foil to valued conduct. In the Hungarian context, instances of metadiscourse about "hate speech" are such a moments. As the optimal form, the flawed form also features speakers speaking to standardized qualities of communication. However, while the optimal form proceeds from numerous non-valued types toward a single valued type the flawed form proceeds from the single non-valued type toward numerous valued types. For example, in excerpt (1), Csepeli's response to the Metropolitan Court's decision casts all forms of public expression that count as "dissemination of information" and that do not "constitute an offense" to minorities as valuable (or at least acceptable) in comparison to "hate speech." Csepeli's contribution to the flawed form also identifies a non-valued type of speaker that tends to perform "hate

speech," namely Hungarian Neo-Nazis who threaten the identity of Hungarians as a tolerant society. In excerpt (2), Schmidt invokes "hate speech" metadiscourse to assign value to what she sees as traditional ways of speaking Hungarian and conceiving of language use as a type of human activity. She charges Csepeli with corrupting a valued style of using Hungarian and with attempting to reinstitute the hated, Orwellian speaking style of Hungary's Communist past.

Unlike the optimal form, the flawed form does not enact, or even gravitate toward, cultural consensus. There is, however, an important functional similarity between the two forms. Both can be analyzed as metacultural commentary (Carbaugh, 2007) on the nature of persons and relationships among them. Optimal and flawed forms distinguish two kinds of persons: those who use valued styles of expression, and those who use non-valued styles. The use of valued styles assigns value to their users and casts them as preferred (credible, trustworthy, upright) social types capable of using communication to forge valuable social relations. Conversely, the use of non-valued styles is the mark of dispreferred social types—such as Nazis and Communists in Hungary, and public speakers lacking ethos in Finland—who can be expected to engender flawed social relations. There is, of course, a deeper message about communication at work here, reminiscent of social constructionist theories of language use: communication has the power to make or break locally valued social arrangements in social groups of any size.

Let us summarize the contribution of the cultural approach to the study of authoritarian discourse. We have seen that "hate speech" as a Hungarian key cultural term is often used to describe and assess Nazi and Communist language use. Such use took at least two forms: a reference to "hate speech" as defined by its content (excerpt 1), and a reference to "hate speech" as a type of metadiscourse particular speakers tended to use for particular ends in particular scenes (excerpt 2). The term's ties to totalitarian discourse helped speakers establish "hate speech" as a non-valued style of public expression, and negotiate its meanings and its relationship to locally valued styles by means of the flawed form. Public debates about, and allegations of, "hate speech" created opportunities for Hungarian speakers to identify, negotiate, and evaluate the presence of totalitarian discourse in contemporary public life, and to distinguish valued and non-valued types of speakers and social relations. In sum, by virtue of its connections to an authoritarian historical and linguistic past, "hate speech" had become a potent, culturally significant, and locally recognized discursive resource for creating, sustaining, and transforming social order.

REGIONAL HATE SPEECH RESEARCH

In spite of the widespread concern in the CEE region with social tensions and totalitarian language use, research on the communication phenomenon widely known as hate speech (*gyűlöletbeszéd*, *mowa nienawiści*, *nenávistný prejav*) began only after the fall of local state socialist political systems. There are three reasons for this delay. First, in their official communication, CEE dictatorships adamantly denied the existence of religious, ethnic, socio-economic, and cultural differences between various social groups in their respective countries. They did so in order to lend credibility to propaganda about the homogenizing and unifying effect of the Marxist–Leninist value system and ideology. They also turned a blind eye to the increasingly obvious fault lines (e.g., conflict, negative attitudes, adversarial communication) between CEE countries forming along the same group differences. Second, following the logic of oppression, local regimes were almost exclusively concerned with public utterances expressing and eliciting negative attitudes toward the state, its leaders, and the kind of social order they sanctioned. The state deemed only such utterances dangerous and worthy of prosecution. Third, for decades social sciences could only be practiced under tight political control. Researchers were forced to operate between rigid

ideological boundaries, and their reports were routinely censored. The Iron Curtain also shielded CEE social scientists, with varying degrees of success, from the influence of "Western" scientific trends, theories, and conceptual frameworks. As a result of state-imposed intellectual isolation, studies of hate speech and U.S. campus speech codes made their way into CEE only after the institutions of democratic governance and free scientific practice became well established in the mid-1990s.

To the present day, a legal approach dominates hate speech research in CEE. One consequence of this intellectual orientation is that most studies conceptualize hate speech as the violation of, or a threat to, public order and to particular kinds of rights such as the right to dignity, life, physical integrity. Another consequence of the legal approach's dominance is that the majority of hate speech scholarship applies legal theoretical, conceptual, and methodological frameworks to the hate speech problematic, with primary reference to legal texts associated with freedom of expression and human rights cases and decisions (see Bárándy, 2009; Čapek, 2013; Gliszczyńska, 2008; Halmai, 1994; Koltay, 2009; Matúš, 2004; Molnár, 2002; Priban, J., 1997; Rapčan & Rapčanova, 2012; Sajó, 2005; Výborný, 2013; Wieruszewski, Wyrzykowski, Bodnar, & Gliszczyńska-Grabias, 2010; Woiński, 2014).

A concern with the legal dimension of hate speech also permeates interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary communication research. Some communication researchers examine hateful media content and its regulation (e.g., Vincze, 2012); others focus on online communication's capacity to instigate violence against particular social groups and the possibilities of curtailing such communication (pl. Bayer; 2003; Výborný, 2013). We also find analyses of, or reflections on, legal cases and texts in research areas not commonly associated with legal scholarship such as communication theory and the philosophy of ethics (see for example Szilágyi-Gál, 2004). Our own work includes such reflections and analyses as well (Boromisza-Habashi, 2007, 2013; Pál, 2006).

The intellectual dominance of legal scholarship and the prominence of historical, sociological, and social psychological approaches in hate speech research notwithstanding, some scholars are asking and answering distinctly communication research questions. Some studies investigate linguistic forms mobilized in discursive practice labeled as hate speech (e.g., Kurteš, 2004; Molnár & Valcsicsák, 2004); others focus on the rhetorical aspect of such practice (e.g., Kowalski & Tulli, 2003); yet others take a speech act (Szilágyi-Gál, 2004, 2005) or media effects (Bajomi-Lázár, 2006) approach. Critical discourse studies explore the dynamics of exclusion and oppression between groups where intergroup differences are defined by gender, race, ethnicity, or social class, and raise the issue of opinion leaders' and political actors' accountability (Barát, 2008; Glózer, 2014; Nijakowski, 2008).

Although hate speech is a concern shared across national boundaries in CEE, international collaborations are unfortunately relatively rare. We attribute the lack of such collaborations to such regional characteristics as linguistic differences, a preference for individual as opposed to team-based academic labor, and continued political and diplomatic tensions in international relations. Understandably, research networks fail to develop due to the dearth of collaboration.

Nonetheless, two significant regional collaborations are worth mentioning. In 2000, the Adam Mickiewicz University (Poznan, Poland), Masaryk University (Brno, Czech Republic), and Eotvos Lorand University (Budapest, Hungary) formed a research network to study the relationship between hate speech and social marginalization. Participants of the "Crime and punishment: The criminalization of marginalized groups in the media" project investigated how the media in the three countries prompted and strengthened negative attitudes toward the Roma, the poor, prostitutes, and other social groups majority society deemed deviant. The project resulted in some significant publications (e.g., Margit, 2003). Another, longer-term collaboration took place at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary, where the Center for Media

and Communication Studies (CMCS) coordinated a project titled "East of West: Setting a new Central and Eastern European media research agenda." Running from 2005 to 2009, the project inspired a number of international conferences and communication research monographs, and had an important role to play in the publication of an influential English-language edited volume (Herz & Molnár, 2012).

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