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# SECURE TWO PARTY COMPUTATION

## A PRACTICAL COMPARISON OF RECENT PROTOCOLS

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### Abstract

We present implementations of several recently proposed Secure Two Party Computation protocols and perform experiments for the purpose of comparing their performance across a range of computations. Until now we have had only theoretical comparisons of these protocols, making it difficult to know which approach is the most promising.

In particular we have implemented the protocols described in [2], [4] and [5] and additionally we experiment with modifying [4] to use [5] instead of [2] as a sub-protocol.

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# 1 Introduction

Secure multi-party computation(SMC) is a long standing problem in Cryptography. We have a set of parties who wish to cooperate to compute some function on inputs distributed across the parties. However, these parties distrust one another and do not wish their inputs to reveal their inputs to the other parties. Using SMC we can perform the desired computation without any party ever knowing the other's inputs.

A commonly used example is the Millionaires problem. A group of rich persons wish to find out who among them is the richest, but do not wish to tell each other how much they are worth. Here the parties are the rich individuals, each party's inputs is their net worth and the function will return the identifier of the individual with the greatest input. Additionally, at the end of the computation no party should be able to divine anything about another party's inputs, apart from what can be inferred from their own input and the output.

For many years Yao's protocol [12] has been the most attractive avenue of theoretical research, mainly due to its conceptual simplicity and constant round nature. In particular recent work has endeavoured to produce variants of Yao's protocol that can provide security in the presence of malicious adversaries ([1], [2], [4], [5], [9], [10], [11]) and to improve the efficiency of the original protocol itself ([7], [8]).

Our contributions are as follows,

- To the best of our knowledge we provide the first implementations of the protocols of [2] and [4].
- We put forward and implement a modification of [4] using [5] for the sub-computation rather than [2] as originally proposed.
- We measure the performance of each protocol on several of the classic SMC benchmark computations.

## 2 Background to Secure Multiparty Computation

### 2.1 Security Properties

There are three main properties that we wish to achieve with any SMC protocol,

- Privacy, the only knowledge parties gain from participating is the output.
- Correctness, the output is indeed that of the intended function.
- Independence of inputs, no party can choose it's inputs as the function of other parties inputs.

In this sense we define the goal of an adversary to compromise any one of these properties.

We compare any protocol to the *ideal* execution, in which the parties submit their inputs to a universally trusted and incorruptible external party via secure channels. This trusted party then computes the value of the function and returns the output to the parties. We say that the protocol is secure if no adversary can attack the protocol with more success than they can achieve than the ideal model.

## 2.2 Security levels

Having established the goals of the adversary and how we can measure if said adversary has a valid attack, we next deal with the capabilities of the adversary. We use three main models to describe the capability of the adversary.

### 2.2.1 Semi-honest Adversary

The Semi-honest adversary is the weakest adversary, with very limited capabilities. The Semi-honest adversary has also been referred to as “honest but curious”, because in this case the adversary is not allowed to deviate from the established protocol (i.e. they are honest), but at the same time they will do their best to compromise one of the aforementioned security properties by examining the data they have legitimate access to. This is in some ways analogous to the classic “passive” adversary.

### 2.2.2 Malicious Adversary

The Malicious adversary is allowed to employ any polynomial time strategy and is not bounded by the protocol (they can run arbitrary code instead), furthermore the Malicious adversary does not care if it is caught cheating so long as it achieves its goal in the process. This is in some ways analogous to the classic “active” adversary.

### 2.2.3 Covert Adversary

The Covert adversary model is very similar to the Malicious model, again bounded by polynomial time with freedom to ignore the protocol. However, in this case the adversary is adverse to being caught cheating and is therefore slightly weaker than the Malicious adversary. A Covert adversary will accept a certain probability of detection, this probability represents the point at which the expected payoff/benefit of cheating without detection outweighs the expected cost/punishment for getting caught, effectively a game theory problem [14].

We call the probability that a Covert adversary will be caught the “deterrent probability”, usually denoted using  $\epsilon$ . Often protocols providing security against Covert adversaries take a Security parameter which varies the probability of detecting cheating.

## 2.3 Applications of SMC

Here we take time to motivate the study of SMC by giving several actual or proposed applications.

### **2.3.1 Secret Auctions - Danish Beets**

In Denmark a significant number of farmers are contracted to grow sugar beets for Danisco (a Danish bio-products company). Farmers can trade contracts amongst themselves (effectively sub-contracting the production of the beets), bidding for these sub-contracts is done via a “double auction”.

Farmers do not wish to expose their bids as this gives information about their financial state to Danisco and so refused to accept Danisco as a trusted auctioneer. Similarly all other parties (e.g. Farmer union) already involved are in some way disqualified. Rather than rely on a completely uninvolved party like an external auction house (an expensive option) the farmers use an SMC-based approach described in [6]. Since 2008 this auction has been ran multiple times

As far as team behind this auction are aware this was the first large scale application of SMC to a real world problem, this application example in particular is important as it is a concrete practical example of SMC being used to solve a problem demonstrating this is not just a Cryptological gimmick.

### **2.3.2 Distributed secrets**

Consider the growing use of physical tokens in user authentication, e.g. the RSA SecurID. When each SecurID token is activated the seed generated for that token is loaded to the relevant server (RSA Authentication Manager), then when authentication is needed both the server and the token compute ‘something’ using the aforementioned seed. However, this means that in the event of the server being breached and the seed being compromised the physical tokens will need to be replaced. Clearly this is undesirable, being both expensive both in terms of up front clean up costs and reputation.

In the above scenario we clearly need to store the secret(the seed) somewhere, but if we can split the seed across multiple servers and then get the servers to perform the computation as a SMC problem (where each server’s input is their share of the secret, the output the value to compare to the token’s input) then we can increase the cost to an attacker, as they will now have to compromise multiple servers. Such a service is in development by Dyadic Security (full disclosure, my supervisor Prof. Nigel Smart is a co-founder of Dyadic).

### **2.3.3 PROCEED - Computation on encrypted data**

Recently US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) ended a programme called PROCEED. The eventual goal being the ability to efficiently perform computations on encrypted data without knowledge of the data. This could be used by companies such as Google to continue to provide services requiring computation on personal data without intruding on the privacy on their users.

### 3 Yao's Protocol

#### 3.1 Overview

Yao garbled circuits are one of the primary avenues of research into Secure multi-party computation. Yao first proposed garbled circuits [12]. The two parties are designated the Builder and the Executor. The Builder then constructs a circuit representing the function the parties wish to compute, this circuit is “garbled” in such a way that it can still be executed.

This garbled circuit, hardcoded with the Builder's input data, is sent to the Executing party who then obtains the data representing its input from the Builder via Oblivious Transfer (for details on OT see Section 3.5). The Executor then evaluates the circuit and obtains the output of the function.

#### 3.2 Yao Garbled Circuits

As noted above we first represent the function to compute as a binary circuit. Denote the two parties as  $P_1$  and  $P_2$ , we will denote the party building the circuit by  $P_1$  and the executing party by  $P_2$ .

Take a single gate of this circuit with two input wires and a single output wire. Denote the gate a  $G_1$  and the input wires as  $w_1$  and  $w_2$  and let  $w_3$  be the output wire. Let  $b_i \in \{0, 1\}$  be the value of  $w_i$ . Here we will take the case where  $w_i$  is an input wire for which  $P_i$  provides the value. Define the output value of the gate to be  $G(b_1, b_2) \in \{0, 1\}$ . We now garble this gate in order to obscure the inputs and outputs.

$P_1$  garbles each wire by selecting two random keys of length  $l$ , for the wire  $w_i$  call these keys  $k_i^0$  and  $k_i^1$ . The length of these keys ( $l$ ) can be considered a security parameter, and should correspond to the length of the key needed for the symmetric encryption scheme we'll be using later. Further  $P_1$  also generates a random permutation  $\pi_i \in \{0, 1\}$  for each  $w_i$ . We define  $c_i = \pi_i(b_i)$ . The garbled value of the  $i^{th}$  wire is then  $k_i^{b_i} \parallel c_i$ , we then represent our garbled truth table for the gate with the table indexed by the values for the  $c_1$  and  $c_2$ .

$$c_1, c_2 : E_{k_1^{b_1}, k_2^{b_2}}(k_3^{G(b_1, b_2)} \parallel c_3)$$

Where  $E_{k_i, k_j}(m)$  is some encryption function taking the keys  $k_i$  and  $k_j$  and the plaintext  $m$ . Since the advent of AES-NI and the cheapness of using AES we will use AES with 128 bit keys to make this function. Suppose that  $AES_k(m)$  denotes the AES encryption of the plaintext  $m$  under the 128 bit key  $k$  and  $AES_k^{-1}(c)$  denotes the decryption of ciphertext  $c$  under key  $k$ . We define  $E_K$  (and it's inverse  $D_K$ ) as follows,

$$E_K(m) = AES_{k_1}(AES_{k_2}(...AES_{k_n}(m)...)), \text{ where } K = \{k_1, ..., k_n\}$$

$$D_K(m) = AES_{k_n}^{-1}(AES_{k_{n-1}}^{-1}(...AES_{k_1}^{-1}(m)...)), \text{ where } K = \{k_1, ..., k_n\}$$

This is the intuitive extension of AES to multiple keys, chaining the encryption under all of the keys in a set order.

Then  $P_1$  (the builder of the circuit) sends this garbled version of the circuit to  $P_2$  (the executor of the circuit).  $P_1$  should send the garbling key for its input bit ( $k_1^{b_1}$ ), the full encrypted truth table and  $c_1 = \pi(b_1)$ . Then  $P_2$  needs to get  $k_2^{b_2} \parallel c_2$  from  $P_2$  without revealing the value of  $b_2$ . This is done by an Oblivious Transfer (see Section 3.5) where  $P_1$  inputs  $k_2^0$  and  $k_2^1$  and  $P_2$  inputs  $b_2$ .  $P_2$  receives the output  $k_2^{b_2} \parallel c_2$  from the OT and learns nothing about  $k_2^{(1-b_2)}$ ,  $P_1$  gets no output and learns nothing about the value of  $b_2$ .

$P_2$  can then look up the entry in the encrypted truth table indexed by  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  and decrypt it using  $D_{k_1^{b_1}, k_2^{b_2}}(\cdot)$ . This will give  $P_2$  a value for  $k_3^{G(b_1, b_2)} \parallel c_3$ . Then by using  $\pi_3^{-1}$ ,  $P_2$  can extract a value for  $G(b_1, b_2)$ .

This can be extended to a full circuit, the input wires belonging to the circuits builder are hard coded and their garble keys and permuted values are sent to the executor. The values for the input wires belonging to the executor are obtained by the executor via Oblivious transfer with the builder. The executor is only given the permutations for the output wires, and therefore the intermediate wire bit values are protected.

### 3.3 Security of Yao Garbled Circuits

A naive implementation of a protocol using Yao Garbled Circuits provides only Semi-honest security. For a formal proof of Semi-honest security see [13], we shall briefly give an intuitive explanation of why naive Yao Garbled Circuits are not secure in the presence of Malicious or Covert adversaries.

Consider the case where  $P_1$  is Malicious, at no point does a naive  $P_2$  verify that the garbled circuit provided by the Builder actually computes the function the builder claims it does. This clearly breaks the Correctness requirement, but also opens up an attack on the Privacy and Independence of inputs.

There is nothing to stop the Builder providing a circuit that outputs the input of the Executor in a way that the Builder can recover, as such the Privacy of the Executor's inputs fails in the presence of a Malicious Builder. Alternatively, the Builder could provide a circuit where its input is a function of the Executor's input, thus defeating the Independence of inputs requirement.

### 3.4 Security against Malicious and Covert Adversaries

Several extensions of Yao's original protocol have been proposed in order to achieve security against Malicious and Covert adversaries. Mostly depending on an approach dubbed "cut and choose" which provides statistical security (detects cheating with a certain probability).

This relates to the old solution to dividing a cake fairly, one party cuts the cake in two, then the other party chooses a slice. In our case the Builder builds  $s$  many garbled circuits and sends them to the Executor. A subset of these circuits are chosen to be opened for the purpose of checking if they are correct.

If all check-circuits pass then the Executor evaluates the remaining circuits as usual and in the classic protocol returns the most common output. If one or more circuits produces an incorrect result this indicates cheating, furthermore if any check circuits fail during evaluation this is also taken to indicate cheating. This means  $s$  acts as a security parameter and the probability of detecting cheating is expressed in terms of  $s$ . For example cheating in the protocol proposed in [4] goes undetected with probability  $2^{-s}$

This Cut and Choose seems very simple conceptually, but creates several subtle new problems to be solved. For example whilst evaluating the many circuits we must now also ensure that both parties' inputs are consistent (same inputs to each circuit) else they might be able learn many outputs, each revealing something they should not have been able to discover.

In [1] the example is given of computing the inner product of two binary strings, in this situation the Executing party could give many different inputs each with a single bit set to 1. The output of the circuit would then give the Executor the value of the Builder's input bit corresponding to the high bit in the Executor's input.

### 3.5 Oblivious Transfer

Oblivious Transfers protocols allow for one party (called the receiver) to get exactly one out-of two (and can be extended to  $k$ -out-of- $n$  for  $k < n$ ) values from another party (called the Sender). The receiver is oblivious to the other value(s), and the Sender is oblivious to which value the receiver received.

Oblivious Transfers (OTs) were first suggested by Rabin in [15]. We define the functionality of a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol in Figure 1. Oblivious Transfers are vital to Yao Garbled Circuits, used to give the circuit Executor data it needs to evaluate the circuit under their input without revealing to the circuit Builder what those inputs were.

Receiver	Sender
Inputs : $b \in \{0, 1\}$	Inputs : $X_1, X_2$
Outputs : $X_b$	Outputs : $\emptyset$

Figure 1: Formal definition of the functionality of a one-out-of-two OT protocol.

The security of Oblivious Transfers is defined in a similar way to that of SMC, the focus is on Semi-honest(passive) and Malicious(active) adversaries. Security against these adversaries is usually either computational or statistical.

A protocol is considered secure with regards to Semi-honest adversaries if neither a Semi-honest adversary in the sender role cannot learn anything about which value the receiver requested, nor can a Semi-honest adversary in the role of the Receiver learn anything about values other than the one it requested. The protocol being secure against Malicious adversaries is defined by the obvious extension of the Semi-honest case.

We primarily use OTs based on the Peikert-Vaikuntanathan-Waters OT (PVW-OT) from [18] or more precisely the modifications of the PVW-OT suggested in [2] and expanded on in [4]. However, we also use the Naor-Pinkas (NP-OT) from [19] for the protocol in [5].

## 4 Protocols

### 4.1 Lindell and Pinkas 2011

The protocol proposed in [2] is a significant improvement on their previous proposal [1]. Firstly his protocol gives an improved deterrent probability of  $\epsilon = 1 - 2^{-0.311s}$ , further the work in [3] showed how to achieve a slightly improve deterrent probability of  $\epsilon = 1 - 2^{-0.32s}$ . Secondly it removes the need for the very large number of commitments entails in [1] and thirdly it does not require the preprocessing of the circuit that inflates the number of input wires for the Executor and thus the number of Oblivious transfers needed.

The main new idea in this protocol is a modification of the PVW-OT from [18]. We refer to this new OT as the “Cut and Choose OT” (CnC OT), the Receiver generates a random  $J \subset [1, \dots, s]$  during the setup such that  $|J| = \frac{s}{2}$ , this set represents a subset of the  $s$  circuits to be opened.

This set  $J$  is then used to generate  $s$  many CRSs, each CRS to be used for a different circuit that the Builder sent. For the  $j^{th}$  CRS if  $j \in J$  then an OT using this CRS will reveal both values input by the sender rather than the usual 1-out-of-2 values, otherwise the usual OT functionality holds.

When running the OT to get its garbled inputs the parties use the  $j^{th}$  CRS for all OTs concerning the  $j^{th}$  circuit. Clearly this requires that the Executing party be able to prove that only  $\frac{s}{2}$  many of the CRSs allow the recovery of both inputs. This is achieved via a Zero Knowledge Proof detailed in Appendix B of [2].

### 4.2 Lindell 2013

In [4] Lindell proposed an further improvement on his work with Pinkas in [2]. The primary breakthroughs of this paper are the removal of the requirement that exactly half the circuits are selected as check circuits, instead each circuit is selected with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . A further breakthrough [detail the secure computation to detect cheating here]...



### 4.3 Huang, Katz and Evans 2013

Concurrently to Lindell’s work in [4] Huang, Katz and Evans produced a protocol also based along the same cut and choose paradigm, however in their approach the parties symmetrically generate a set of circuits and then evaluate each others circuits.

## 5 Implementation Details

### 5.1 Purpose of Implementation

It should be made abundantly clear that the implementation provided is not intended for real world use with actual confidentiality on the line, instead it is for the purposes of comparing the performance of the protocols under consideration. Whilst the protocols have been implemented faithfully some of the lower level details not relevant to a comparison of the protocols are ignored, for example we do not established a secure connection between the two parties.

Where possible we have implemented everything myself and reused the same code across protocols, rather than using available libraries. This maintains a consistent quality of implementation, using libraries where appropriate would improve the quality of the implementation it would do so in an uneven manner as many areas cannot be done using a library. This could potentially give one protocol an unfair advantage over another leading to skewed results.

## 6 Experiments

We shall be using the circuits provided in [20] for our experiments with varying randomised inputs, in particular we shall consider

- AES (expanded and non-expanded),
- 32-bit Addition,
- 32-bit Multiplication,
- SHA-256 hashing.

### 6.1 Measurement metrics

We shall be focusing on three main metrics for measuring performance of the protocols for both parties, namely CPU time used, wall clock time used and data sent.

### 6.2 Testing Environment

All tests were carried out between two test machines each with an i7-3770S CPU clocked at 3.10 GHz with 8096 KB of cache and 32 GB of RAM. It should also be noted that . Compilation was performed with g++ ver. 4.4.7.

### 6.3 Benchmarks

Here I give some benchmarks of key components in my implementation such as communication, ECC encryption and circuit evaluation. I include these measurements so that others intending to implement these protocols with more efficient (e.g. library supplied) components can calculate a quick

## 7 Conclusions

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