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This proof resides in "contrib" because it has not completed the vetting process.

Proves soundness of the implementation of MakeNoiseThreshold for RV over hashmaps of big integers in mod.rs at commit f5bb719 (outdated<sup>1</sup>).

This is the core implementation of all variations of the thresholded gaussian or laplace mechanism.

# 1 Hoare Triple

#### Precondition

#### Compiler-Verified

MakeNoise is parameterized as follows:

- DI is MapDomain<AtomDomain<TK>, AtomDomain<IBig>>
- MI is LOPInfDistance<P, AbsoluteDistance<UBig>>
- MO is MO

The following trait bounds are required:

- Generic TK implements trait Hashable
- Const-generic P is of type usize
- Generic MO implements trait Measure
- Type ZExpFamily<P> implements trait NoiseThresholdPrivacyMap<LOPInfDistance<P, AbsoluteDistance<UBig>> MO>

#### User-Verified

None

 $<sup>^1{\</sup>rm See}\ {\rm new\ changes\ with\ git\ diff\ f5bb719..3aebf848\ rust/src/measurements/noise\_threshold/mod.rs}$ 

## Pseudocode

```
1 # analogous to impl MakeNoise<VectorDomain<AtomDomain<IBig>>, MI, MO> for RV in Rust
  class RV:
      def make_noise_threshold(
           input_space: tuple [MapDomain [AtomDomain [TK], AtomDomain [IBig]], MI],
          threshold: IBig,
6
      ) -> Measurement[
          MapDomain[AtomDomain[TK], AtomDomain[IBig]], HashMap[TK, IBig], MI, MO
9
          input_domain, input_metric = input_space
          output_measure = MO.default()
12
          threshold_magnitude = threshold.into_parts()[1] #
13
          privacy_map = self.noise_threshold_privacy_map( #
               input_metric, output_measure, threshold_magnitude
14
15
16
          match threshold.sign():
17
               case Sign.Positive:
18
                   inner = Ordering.Less
19
               case Sign.Negative:
20
                   inner = Ordering.Greater
21
22
          def function(data: HashMap[TK, IBig]) -> HashMap[TK, IBig]:
23
24
               out = []
25
               for k, v in data.items():
                   v = self.sample(v) #
26
27
                   if v.cmp(threshold) != inner:
28
29
                       out.append((k, v))
               # shuffle the output to avoid leaking the order of the input
30
               random.shuffle(out) #
31
32
               return dict(out)
33
          return Measurement.new(
34
               input_domain,
35
36
               Function.new_fallible(function),
37
               input_metric,
               output_measure,
38
               privacy_map,
39
40
```

#### Postcondition

#### Theorem 1.1.

Theorem 1.2. For every setting of the input parameters (self, input\_space, threshold, MO, TK, P) to make\_noise\_threshold such that the given preconditions hold, make\_noise\_threshold raises an exception (at compile time or run time) or returns a valid measurement. A valid measurement has the following property:

1. (Privacy guarantee). For every pair of elements x, x' in input\_domain and for every pair (d\_in, d\_out), where d\_in has the associated type for input\_metric and d\_out has the associated type for output\_measure, if x, x' are d\_in-close under input\_metric, privacy\_map(d\_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy\_map(d\_in) ≤ d\_out, then function(x), function(x') are d\_out-close under output\_measure.

Proof of data-independent errors. The precondition of Sample.sample requires that self is a valid distribution. This is satisfied by the postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap<MI, MO> on line 13. The postcondition of Sample.sample guarantees that the function only ever returns an error independently of the data.

For the proof of the privacy guarantee, start by reviewing the postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap<MI, MO>, which has an associated function noise\_privacy\_map called on line 13.

Lemma 1.3 (Postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap). Given a distribution self, returns Err(e) if self is not a valid distribution. Otherwise the output is Ok(privacy\_map) where privacy\_map observes the following:

Define function(x) as a function that updates each pair  $(k_i, v_i + Z_i)$ , where  $Z_i$  are iid samples from self, and discards pairs where  $v_i + Z_i$  is further from zero than threshold. The ordering of returned pairs is independent from the input ordering.

For every pair of elements x, x' in VectorDomain<AtomDomain<IBig>>, and for every pair (d\_in, d\_out), where d\_in has the associated type for input\_metric and d\_out has the associated type for output\_measure, if x, x' are d\_in-close under input\_metric, privacy\_map(d\_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy\_map(d\_in)  $\leq$  d\_out, then function(x), function(x') are d\_out-close under output\_measure.

Proof of privacy guarantee. Assuming line 13 does not fail, then the returned privacy map is subject to Theorem 1.3. The privacy guarantee applies when the pseudocode matches the algorithm specification, where  $Z_i$  are iid samples from self. In this case self describes the noise distribution.

We argue that function is consistent with the function described in Lemma 1.3. Line 26 calls self.sample(x\_i) on each element in the input vector. The precondition that self represents a valid distribution is satisfied by the postcondition of Lemma 1.3; the distribution is valid when the construction of the privacy map does not raise an exception. Since the preconditions for Sample.sample are satisfied, the postcondition claims that either returns an error independently of the input v, or v + Z where Z is a sample from the distribution defined by self. The keys are then shuffled on line 31 to ensure that the output is independent of the input ordering. In the Rust implementation, a random hasher is used to ensure that the output ordering is independent of the input ordering. This is consistent with Lemma 1.3.

dependent of the input ordering. This is consistent with Lemma 1.3.

Therefore, the privacy guarantee from Lemma 1.3 applies to the returned measurement.