# fn make\_randomized\_response\_bool

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This proof resides in "contrib" because it has not completed the vetting process.

Proves soundness of make\_randomized\_response\_bool in mod.rs at commit f5bb719 (outdated¹).

make\_randomized\_response\_bool accepts a parameter prob of type Q and a parameter constant\_time
of type bool. The function on the resulting measurement takes in a boolean data point arg and returns
the truthful value arg with probability prob, or the complement !arg with probability 1 - prob. The
measurement function makes mitigations against timing channels if constant\_time is set.

Warning 1 (Code is not constant-time). make\_randomized\_response\_bool takes in a boolean constant\_time parameter that protects against timing attacks on the Bernoulli sampling procedure. However, the current implementation does not guard against other types of timing side-channels that can break differential privacy, e.g., non-constant time code execution due to branching.

## PR History

• Pull Request #490

## 1 Hoare Triple

#### Preconditions

- Variable prob must be of type Q0
- Variable constant\_time must be of type bool
- Type bool must have trait SampleBernoulli<Q0>
- Type Q0 must have trait Float

#### Pseudocode

```
def make_randomized_response_bool(prob: QO, constant_time: bool):
    input_domain = AtomDomain(bool)
    output_domain = AtomDomain(bool)
    input_metric = DiscreteMetric()
    output_measure = MaxDivergence(QO)

if (prob < 0.5 or prob >= 1): #
    raise Exception("probability must be in [0.5, 1)")
```

 $<sup>^1\</sup>mathrm{See}$  new changes with git diff f5bb719..760568d rust/src/measurements/randomized\_response/mod.rs

```
9
      c = prob.inf_div((1).neg_inf_sub(prob)).inf_ln()
      def privacy_map(d_in: u32) -> Q0: #
11
12
          if d_in == 0:
              return 0
13
          else:
14
               return c
16
      def function(arg: bool) -> bool: #
17
          sample = not sample_bernoulli_float(prob, constant_time)
18
19
          return arg ^ sample
20
21
      return Measurement(input_domain, output_domain, function, input_metric, output_measure,
      privacy map)
```

#### Postcondition

Theorem 1.1. For every setting of the input parameters (prob, constant\_time, QO) to make\_randomized\_response\_bool such that the given preconditions hold, make\_randomized\_response\_bool raises an exception (at compile time or run time) or returns a valid measurement. A valid measurement has the following property:

1. (Privacy guarantee). For every pair of elements x, x' in input\_domain and for every pair (d\_in,d\_out), where d\_in has the associated type for input\_metric and d\_out has the associated type for output\_measure, if x, x' are d\_in-close under input\_metric, privacy\_map(d\_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy\_map(d\_in)  $\leq$  d\_out, then function(x), function(x') are d\_out-close under output\_measure.

### 2 Proof

*Proof.* (Privacy guarantee.)

**Note 1.** The following proof makes use of the following lemma that asserts the correctness of a Bernoulli sampler function.

Lemma 2.1. sample\_bernoulli\_float satisfies its postcondition.

sample\_bernoulli can only fail due to lack of system entropy. This is usually related to the computer's physical environment and not the dataset. The rest of this proof is conditioned on the assumption that sample\_bernoulli does not raise an exception.

Let x and x' be datasets in the input domain (either  $\top$  or  $\bot$ ) that are d\_in-close with respect to input\_metric. Here, the metric is DiscreteMetric which enforces that d\_in  $\ge 1$  if  $x \ne x'$  and d\_in = 0 if x = x'. If x = x', then the output distributions on x and x' are identical, and therefore the max-divergence is 0. Consider  $x \ne x'$  and assume without loss of generality that  $x = \top$  and  $x' = \bot$ . For shorthand, we let p represent prob, the probability that sample\_bernoulli\_float returns  $\top$ . Observe that p = [0.5, 1.0) otherwise make\_randomized\_response\_bool raises an error.

We now consider the max-divergence  $D_{\infty}(Y||Y')$  over the random variables  $Y = \mathtt{function}(x)$  and  $Y' = \mathtt{function}(x')$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x \sim x'} D_{\infty}(Y||Y') &= \max_{x \sim x'} \max_{S \subseteq Supp(Y)} \ln \left( \frac{\Pr[Y \in S]}{\Pr[Y' \in S]} \right) \\ &\leq \max_{x \sim x'} \max_{y \in Supp(Y)} \ln \left( \frac{\Pr[Y = y]}{\Pr[Y' = y]} \right) \end{aligned} \qquad \text{Lemma 3.3 [1]}$$

$$&= \max_{x \sim x'} \max \left( \ln \left( \frac{\Pr[Y = \top]}{\Pr[Y' = \top]} \right), \ln \left( \frac{\Pr[Y = \bot]}{\Pr[Y' = \bot]} \right) \right)$$

$$&= \max \left( \ln \left( \frac{p}{1 - p} \right), \ln \left( \frac{1 - p}{p} \right) \right)$$

$$&= \ln \left( \frac{p}{1 - p} \right)$$

We let  $c = \text{privacy}_{\text{map}}(d_{\text{in}}) = Q0.\inf_{\text{ln}}(\text{prob.inf}_{\text{div}}(1.\text{neg}_{\text{inf}}_{\text{sub}}(\text{prob})))$ . The computation of c rounds upward in the presence of floating point rounding errors. This is because  $1.\text{neg}_{\text{inf}}_{\text{sub}}(\text{prob})$  appears in the denominator, and to ensure that the bound holds even in the presence of rounding errors, the conservative choice is to round down (so the quantity as a whole is bounded above). Similarly,  $\inf_{\text{div}}_{\text{div}}$  and  $\inf_{\text{ln}}_{\text{ln}}$  round up.

When  $\mathtt{d\_in} > 0$  and no exception is raised in computing  $\mathtt{c} = \mathtt{privacy\_map}(\mathtt{d\_in})$ , then  $\ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) \le \mathtt{c}$ . Therefore we've shown that for every pair of elements  $x, x' \in \{\bot, \top\}$  and every  $d_{DM}(x, x') \le \mathtt{d\_in}$  with  $\mathtt{d\_in} \ge 0$ , if x, x' are  $\mathtt{d\_in\text{-}close}$  then  $\mathtt{function}(x)$ ,  $\mathtt{function}(x') \in \{\bot, \top\}$  are  $\mathtt{privacy\_map}(\mathtt{d\_in})$ -close under  $\mathtt{output\_measure}$  (the Max-Divergence).

## References

[1] Shiva P. Kasiviswanathan and Adam Smith. On the "semantics" of differential privacy: A bayesian formulation. *Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality*, 6(1), June 2014.