# fn cdp\_epsilon

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Proves soundness of fn cdp\_epsilon in cdp\_epsilon.rs at commit 0b8f4222 (outdated). This proof is an adaptation of subsection 2.3 of [CKS20].

#### Bound Derivation 1

**Definition 1.1.** (Privacy Loss Random Variable). Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathbb{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Let  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  be neighboring inputs. Define  $f: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathbb{R}$  by  $f(y) = \log \left( \frac{\mathbb{P}[M(x) = y]}{\mathbb{P}[M(x') = y]} \right)$ . Let Z = f(M(x)), the privacy loss random variable, denoted  $Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))$ .

**Lemma 1.2.** [CKS20] Let  $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$ . Let M:  $\mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Then M satisfies  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ differential privacy if and only if

$$\delta \ge \underset{Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))}{\mathbb{E}} [max(0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z})] \tag{1}$$

(2)

for all  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  differing on a single element.

*Proof.* Fix neighboring inputs  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$ . Let  $f: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathbb{R}$  be as in 1.1. For notational simplicity, let Y = M(x), Y' = M(x'), Z = f(Y) and Z' = -f(Y'). This is equivalent to  $Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))$ . Our first goal is to prove that

$$\sup_{E \subset \mathcal{Y}} \mathbb{P}[Y \in E] - e^{\epsilon} \mathbb{P}[Y' \in E] = \mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}]. \tag{3}$$

For any  $E \subset \mathcal{Y}$ , we have

$$\mathbb{P}[Y' \in E] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{I}[Y' \in E]] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{I}[Y \in E]e^{-f(Y)}]. \tag{4}$$

This is because  $e^{-f(y)} = \frac{\mathbb{P}[Y=y]}{\mathbb{P}[Y'=y]}$ . Thus, for all  $E \subset \mathcal{Y}$ , we have

$$\mathbb{P}[Y \in E] - e^{\epsilon} \mathbb{P}[Y' \in E] = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{I}[Y \in E](1 - e^{\epsilon - f(Y)})\right]$$
 (5)

Now it is easy to identify the worst event as  $E = \{y \in \mathcal{Y} : 1 - e^{\epsilon - f(y)} > 0\}$ . Thus

$$\sup_{E\subset Y}\mathbb{P}[Y\in E]-e^{\epsilon}\mathbb{P}[Y'\in E]=\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{I}[1-e^{\epsilon-f(Y)}>0](1-e^{\epsilon-f(Y)})\right]=\mathbb{E}[\max\{0,1-e^{\epsilon-Z}\}] \tag{6}$$

 $<sup>^{1}\</sup>mathrm{See}$  new changes with git diff 0b8f4222..fa3bf70f rust/src/combinators/measure\_cast/zCDP\_to\_approxDP/cdp\_ epsilon.rs

**Theorem 1.3.** [CKS20] Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Let  $\alpha \in (1, \infty)$  and  $\epsilon \geq 0$ . Suppose  $D_{\alpha}(M(x)||M(x')) \leq \tau$  for all  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  differing in a single entry.<sup>2</sup> Then M is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private for

$$\delta = \frac{e^{(\alpha - 1)(\tau - \epsilon)}}{\alpha - 1} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \tag{7}$$

*Proof.* Fix neighboring  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  and let  $Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))$ . We have

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{(\alpha-1)Z}] = e^{(\alpha-1)D_{\alpha}(M(x)||M(x'))} \le e^{(\alpha-1)\tau} \tag{8}$$

By 1.2, our goal is to prove that  $\delta \geq \mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}]$ . Our approach is to pick c > 0 such that  $\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\} \leq ce^{(\alpha - 1)z}$  for all  $z \in \mathbb{R}$ . Then

$$\mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}] \le \mathbb{E}[ce^{(\alpha - 1)z}] \le ce^{(\alpha - 1)\tau}.$$
(9)

We identify the smallest possible value of c:

$$c = \sup_{z \in \mathbb{R}} \frac{\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - z}\}}{e^{(\alpha - 1)z}} = \sup_{z \in \mathbb{R}} e^{z - \alpha z} - e^{\epsilon - \alpha z} = \sup_{z \in \mathbb{R}} f(z)$$

$$\tag{10}$$

where  $f(z) = e^{z-\alpha z} - e^{\epsilon-\alpha z}$ . We have

$$f'(z) = e^{z - \alpha z} (1 - \alpha) - e^{\epsilon - \alpha z} (-\alpha) = e^{-\alpha z} (\alpha e^{\epsilon} - (\alpha - 1)e^{z})$$
(11)

Clearly  $f'(z) = 0 \iff e^z = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} e^{\epsilon} \iff z = \epsilon - \log(1 - 1/\alpha)$ . Thus

$$c = f(\epsilon - \log(1 - 1/\alpha)) \tag{12}$$

$$= \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{\epsilon}\right)^{1 - \alpha} - e^{\epsilon} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{\epsilon}\right)^{-\alpha} \tag{13}$$

$$= \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{\epsilon} - e^{\epsilon}\right) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{-\epsilon}\right)^{\alpha} \tag{14}$$

$$= \frac{e^{\epsilon}}{\alpha - 1} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} e^{-\alpha \epsilon}. \tag{15}$$

Thus

$$\mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}] \le \frac{e^{\epsilon}}{\alpha - 1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} e^{-\alpha \epsilon} e^{(\alpha - 1)\tau} = \frac{e^{(\alpha - 1)(\tau - \epsilon)}}{\alpha - 1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} = \delta \tag{16}$$

Corollary 1. [CKS20] Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Let  $\alpha \in (1, \infty)$  and  $\epsilon \geq 0$ . Suppose  $D_{\alpha}(M(x)||M(x')) \leq \tau$  for all  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  differing in a single entry. Then M is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private for

$$\epsilon = \tau + \frac{\ln(1/\delta) + (\alpha - 1)\ln(1 - 1/\alpha) - \ln(\alpha)}{\alpha - 1} \tag{17}$$

*Proof.* This follows by rearranging 1.3.

Corollary 2. Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm satisfying  $\rho$ -concentrated differential privacy. Then M is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private for any  $0 < \delta \le 1$  and

$$\epsilon = \inf_{\alpha \in (1,\infty)} \alpha \rho + \frac{\ln(1/\delta) + (\alpha - 1)\ln(1 - 1/\alpha) - \ln(\alpha)}{\alpha - 1}$$
(18)

*Proof.* This follows from 1 by taking the infimum over all divergence parameters  $\alpha$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>This is the definition of  $(\alpha, \tau)$ -Rényi differential privacy.

### 1.1 Efficient computation of $\epsilon$

From 2, we have

$$\epsilon(\alpha) = \alpha \rho + \frac{\ln(1/\delta) + (\alpha - 1)\ln((\alpha - 1)/\alpha) - \ln(\alpha)}{\alpha - 1}$$
(19)

$$\epsilon'(\alpha) = \rho + \frac{\ln(\alpha\delta)}{(\alpha - 1)^2} \tag{20}$$

$$\epsilon''(\alpha) = \frac{2\alpha \ln(\alpha \delta) - \alpha + 1}{(\alpha - 1)^3 \alpha} \tag{21}$$

Notice the curve is convex so long as

$$\delta < e^{1/2 - 1/(2\alpha)}/\alpha \tag{22}$$

Otherwise the curve is concave, with a non-negative derivative for any choice of  $\alpha$ :

$$\epsilon'(\alpha) = \rho + \frac{\ln(\alpha\delta)}{(\alpha - 1)^2} \ge \rho + \frac{\alpha - 1}{2\alpha(\alpha + 1)^2} \ge 0 \tag{23}$$

We can find the minimizer  $\alpha_*$  by conducting a binary search over the interval  $(1, \alpha_{max})$ , where  $\alpha_{max}$  is discovered via exponential search for a positive derivative.

### 2 Pseudocode

#### Precondition

• Type Q must have trait Float.

### Implementation

```
def cdp_epsilon(rho: Q, delta: Q) -> Q:
      if rho.is_sign_negative():
          raise "rho must be non-negative"
      if not delta.is_sign_positive():
          raise "delta must be positive"
      if rho.is_zero():
9
          return 0
10
      # checks if derivative is positive
11
      def deriv_pos(a):
12
          return rho > -log(a * delta) / (a - 1)**2
14
      # find bounds
15
      a_min = 1.01
16
      a_max = 2
17
      while not deriv_pos(a_max):
          a_max *= 2
19
20
      # optimize alpha
21
      while True:
22
          diff = a_max - a_min
24
25
          a_mid = a_min + diff / _2
26
          if a_mid == a_max or a_mid == a_min:
27
28
              break
```

```
if deriv_pos(a_mid):
30
31
               a_max = a_mid
           else:
32
33
               a_min = a_mid
34
      # back out epsilon
35
36
      a_m1 = a_max.inf_sub(_1)
37
      numer = (a_m1.inf_div(a_max).inf_ln().inf_mul(a_m1)) \
38
           .inf_sub(a_max.inf_ln()) \
39
           .inf_add(delta.recip().inf_ln())
40
41
      denom = a_max.neg_inf_sub(_1)
42
43
       epsilon = a_max.inf_mul(rho).inf_add(numer.inf_div(denom))
44
45
      return max(epsilon, 0)
```

#### Postcondition

Either a valid epsilon is returned or an error is returned.

### 3 Proof

**Theorem 3.1.** For any possible setting of  $\rho$  and  $\delta$ , cdp\_epsilon either returns an error, or an  $\epsilon$  such that any  $\rho$ -differentially private measurement is also  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private.

Proof. The code always finds an  $\alpha_* \approx \mathtt{a\_max} \geq 1.01$ . Since  $\mathtt{a\_max} \in (1, \infty)$ , then by 2, any  $\rho$ -differentially private measurement is also  $(\epsilon(\mathtt{a\_max}), \delta)$ -differentially private. Define  $\epsilon_{cons}(\alpha)$  as a "conservative" function for computing  $\epsilon(\alpha)$ , where floating-point arithmetic is computed with conservative rounding such that  $\epsilon_{cons}(\alpha) \geq \epsilon(\alpha)$  for  $\forall \alpha \in (1, \infty)$ . Since  $\mathtt{epsilon} = \epsilon_{cons}(\mathtt{a\_max}) \geq \epsilon(\mathtt{a\_max})$ , then any  $(\epsilon(\mathtt{a\_max}), \delta)$ -differentially private measurement is also  $(\mathtt{epsilon}, \delta)$ -differentially private.

## References

[CKS20] Clément L. Canonne, Gautam Kamath, and Thomas Steinke. The discrete gaussian for differential privacy. *CoRR*, abs/2004.00010, 2020.