

# fn make\_private\_group\_by

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This proof resides in “**contrib**” because it has not completed the vetting process.

Proves soundness of `fn make_private_group_by` in `mod.rs` at commit `0db9c6036` (outdated<sup>1</sup>).

## Vetting History

- [Pull Request #512](#)

## 1 Hoare Triple

### Precondition

To ensure the correctness of the output, we require the following preconditions:

- Type MS must have trait `DatasetMetric`.
- Type MI must have trait `UnboundedMetric`.
- Type MO must have trait `ApproximateMeasure`.

### Pseudocode

```
1 def make_private_group_by(  
2     input_domain,  
3     input_metric,  
4     output_measure,  
5     plan,  
6     global_scale,  
7     threshold,  
8 ):  
9     input_expr, keys, aggs, predicate = match_group_by(plan)  
10  
11     t_prior = input_expr.make_stable(input_domain, input_metric) #  
12     middle_domain, middle_metric = t_prior.output_space()  
13  
14     by = match_grouping_columns(keys) #  
15  
16     margin = (  
17         middle_domain  
18         .margins  
19         .get(by, Margin.default())  
20     ) #  
21  
22     # prepare a joint measurement over all expressions  
23     expr_domain = ExprDomain( #
```

---

<sup>1</sup>See new changes with `git diff 0db9c6036..1dac31e rust/src/measurements/make_private_lazyframe/group_by/mod.rs`

```

24     middle_domain,
25     ExprContext.Aggregate(by),
26 )
27
28 m_exprs = make_composition([
29     make_private_expr(
30         expr_domain,
31         PartitionDistance(middle_metric),
32         output_measure,
33         expr,
34         global_scale,
35     ) for expr in aggs
36 ])
37
38 # reconcile information about the threshold
39 dp_exprs = m_exprs.invoke((input_expr, all()))
40
41 if margin.invariant is not None:
42     threshold_info = None
43 elif is_threshold_predicate(predicate) is not None:
44     name, threshold_value = is_threshold_predicate(predicate)
45     noise = find_len_expr(dp_exprs, name)[1]
46     threshold_info = name, noise, threshold_value, False
47 elif threshold is not None:
48     name, noise = find_len_expr(dp_exprs, None)[1]
49     threshold_info = name, noise, threshold_value, True
50 else:
51     raise f"The key set of {by} is private and cannot be released."
52
53 # prepare the final_predicate to be used in the function
54 if threshold_info is not None:
55     name, _, threshold_value, is_present = threshold_info
56     if not is_present and predicate is not None:
57         final_predicate = threshold_expr.and_(predicate)
58     else:
59         final_predicate = threshold_expr
60 else:
61     final_predicate = predicate
62
63 # prepare supporting elements
64 def function(arg): #
65     output = DslPlan.GroupBy(
66         input=arg,
67         keys=keys,
68         aggs=m_exprs((arg, all())),
69         apply=None,
70         maintain_order=False,
71     )
72
73     if final_predicate is not None:
74         output = DslPlan.Filter(
75             input=output,
76             predicate=final_predicate,
77         )
78     return output
79
80 def privacy_map(d_in): #
81     l0 = margin.l_0(d_in)
82     li = margin.l_inf(d_in)
83     l1 = l0.inf_mul(li).min(d_in)
84
85     d_out = m_exprs.map((l0, l1, li))
86
87     if threshold is not None:

```

```

88         _, plugin, threshold_value = threshold_info
89         if li >= threshold_value:
90             raise f"Threshold must be greater than {li}."
91         d_instability = f64.inf_cast(threshold_value.inf_sub(li))
92         delta_single = integrate_discrete_noise_tail(plugin.distribution, plugin.scale,
93             d_instability)
94         delta_joint = 1 - (1 - delta_single).inf_powi(10)
95         d_out = M0.add_delta(d_out, delta_joint)
96         elif margin.invariant is None:
97             raise "keys must be public if threshold is unknown"
98
99         return d_out
100
101     m_group_by_agg = Measurement(
102         middle_domain,
103         function,
104         middle_metric,
105         output_measure,
106         privacy_map,
107     )
108     return t_prior >> m_group_by_agg

```

## Postconditions

For every setting of the input parameters (`input_domain`, `input_metric`, `output_measure`, `plan`, `global_scale`, `threshold`) to `make_private_group_by` such that the given preconditions hold, `make_private_group_by` raises an exception (at compile time or run time) or returns a valid measurement. A valid measurement has the following properties:

1. (Data-independent runtime errors). For every pair of elements  $x, x'$  in `input_domain`, `function(x)` returns an error if and only if `function(x')` returns an error.
2. (Privacy guarantee). For every pair of elements  $x, x'$  in `input_domain` and for every pair  $(d_{in}, d_{out})$ , where  $d_{in}$  has the associated type for `input_metric` and  $d_{out}$  has the associated type for `output_measure`, if  $x, x'$  are  $d_{in}$ -close under `input_metric`, `privacy_map(d_in)` does not raise an exception, and `privacy_map(d_in) ≤ d_out`, then `function(x), function(x')` are  $d_{out}$ -close under `output_measure`.

## 2 Proof

We now prove the postcondition of `make_private_group_by`.

*Proof.* Start by establishing properties of the following variables, which hold for any setting of the input arguments.

- By the postcondition of `StableDslPlan.make_stable`, `t_prior` is a valid transformation. [11](#)
- By the postcondition of `match_grouping_columns`, `grouping_columns` holds the names of the grouping columns. `margin` denotes what is considered public information about the key set, pulled from descriptors in the input domain. [14](#)
- By the postcondition of `make_basic_composition`, `m_exprs` is a valid measurement that prepares a batch of expressions that, when executed, satisfies the privacy guarantee of `m_exprs`. [23](#)

We now reconcile information about the censoring threshold. [38](#) In the setting where grouping keys are considered public, no thresholding is necessary. In the setting where grouping keys are considered private

information, threshold information is prepared from either `predicate` or `threshold`. By the post-condition of `find_len_expr`, filtering on `name` can be used to satisfy  $\delta$ -approximate DP.

The final predicate to be applied is the intersection of conditions necessary for filtering, and initial conditions set in the predicate. The thresholding predicate is only added to the final predicate if the threshold is not already present in the predicate.

We now move on to the implementation of the function. [64](#) The function returns a `DslPlan` that applies each expression from `m_exprs` to `arg` grouped by `keys`. `threshold_info` is conveyed into the plan, if set, to ensure that the keys are also privatized if necessary. It is assumed that the emitted DSL is executed in the same fashion as is done by Polars. This proof/implementation does not take into consideration side-channels involved in the execution of the DSL.

We now move on to the implementation of the privacy map. [80](#) The measurement for each expression expects data set distances in terms of a triple:

- $L^0$ : the greatest number of partitions that can be influenced by any one individual. This is no greater than the input distance (an individual can only ever influence as many partitions as they contribute rows), but could be smaller when supplemented by the `max_influenced_partitions` metric descriptor or `max_num_partitions` domain descriptor.
- $L^\infty$ : the greatest number of records that can be added or removed by any one individual in each partition. This is no greater than the input distance, but could be tighter when supplemented by the `max_partition_contributions` metric descriptor or the `max_partition_length` domain descriptor.
- $L^1$ : the greatest total number of records that can be added or removed across all partitions. This is no greater than the input distance, but could be tighter when accounting for the  $L^0$  and  $L^\infty$  distances.

By the postcondition of the map on `m_exprs`, the privacy loss, when grouped data sets may differ by this distance triple, is `d_out`.

We now adapt the proof from [\[Rog23\]](#) (Theorem 7). Consider  $S$  to be the set of labels that are common between  $x$  and  $x'$ . Define event  $E$  to be any potential outcome of the mechanism for which all labels are in  $S$  (where only stable partitions are released). We then lower bound the probability of the mechanism returning an event  $E$ . In the following,  $c_j$  denotes the exact count for partition  $j$ , and  $Z_j$  is a random variable distributed according to the distribution used to release a noisy count.

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[E] &= \prod_{j \in x \setminus x'} \Pr[c_j + Z_j \leq T] \\ &\geq \prod_{j \in x \setminus x'} \Pr[\Delta_\infty + Z_j \leq T] \\ &\geq \Pr[\Delta_\infty + Z_j \leq T]^{\Delta_0} \end{aligned}$$

The probability of returning a set of stable partitions ( $\Pr[E]$ ) is the probability of not returning any of the unstable partitions. We now solve for the choice of threshold  $T$  such that  $\Pr[E] \geq 1 - \delta$ .

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\Delta_\infty + Z_j \leq T]^{\Delta_0} &= \Pr[Z_j \leq T - \Delta_\infty]^{\Delta_0} \\ &= (1 - \Pr[Z_j > T - \Delta_\infty])^{\Delta_0} \end{aligned}$$

Let `d_instability` denote the distance to instability of  $T - \Delta_\infty$ . By the postcondition of `integrate_discrete_noise_tail`, the probability that a random noise sample exceeds `d_instability` is at most `delta_single`. Therefore  $\delta = 1 - (1 - \text{delta\_single})^{\Delta_0}$ . This privacy loss is then added to `d_out`.

Together with the potential increase in delta for the release of the key set, then it is shown that `function(x)`, `function(x')` are `d_out`-close under `output_measure`.

□

## References

- [Rog23] Ryan Rogers. A unifying privacy analysis framework for unknown domain algorithms in differential privacy, 2023.