# fn cdp\_delta

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Proves soundness of fn cdp\_delta in cdp\_delta.rs at commit 0b8f4222 (outdated<sup>1</sup>). This proof is an adaptation of subsection 2.3 of [CKS20].

#### **Bound Derivation** 1

**Definition 1.1.** (Privacy Loss Random Variable). Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathbb{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Let  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  be neighboring inputs. Define  $f: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathbb{R}$  by  $f(y) = \log\left(\frac{\mathbb{P}[M(x)=y]}{\mathbb{P}[M(x')=y]}\right)$ . Let Z = f(M(x)), the privacy loss random variable, denoted  $Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))$ .

**Lemma 1.2.** [CKS20] Let  $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$ . Let M:  $\mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Then M satisfies  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ differential privacy if and only if

$$\delta \ge \underset{Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))}{\mathbb{E}} [max(0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z})] \tag{1}$$

(2)

for all  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  differing on a single element.

*Proof.* Fix neighboring inputs  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$ . Let  $f: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathbb{R}$  be as in 1.1. For notational simplicity, let Y = M(x), Y' = M(x'), Z = f(Y) and Z' = -f(Y'). This is equivalent to  $Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))$ . Our first goal is to prove that

$$\sup_{E \subset \mathcal{Y}} \mathbb{P}[Y \in E] - e^{\epsilon} \mathbb{P}[Y' \in E] = \mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}]. \tag{3}$$

For any  $E \subset \mathcal{Y}$ , we have

$$\mathbb{P}[Y' \in E] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{I}[Y' \in E]] = \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{I}[Y \in E]e^{-f(Y)}]. \tag{4}$$

This is because  $e^{-f(y)} = \frac{\mathbb{P}[Y=y]}{\mathbb{P}[Y'=y]}$ . Thus, for all  $E \subset \mathcal{Y}$ , we have

$$\mathbb{P}[Y \in E] - e^{\epsilon} \mathbb{P}[Y' \in E] = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{I}[Y \in E](1 - e^{\epsilon - f(Y)})\right]$$
 (5)

Now it is easy to identify the worst event as  $E = \{y \in \mathcal{Y} : 1 - e^{\epsilon - f(y)} > 0\}$ . Thus

$$\sup_{E\subset Y}\mathbb{P}[Y\in E]-e^{\epsilon}\mathbb{P}[Y'\in E]=\mathbb{E}\left[\mathbb{I}[1-e^{\epsilon-f(Y)}>0](1-e^{\epsilon-f(Y)})\right]=\mathbb{E}[\max\{0,1-e^{\epsilon-Z}\}] \tag{6}$$

<sup>1</sup>See new changes with git diff 0b8f4222...

rust/src/combinators/measure\_cast/zCDP\_to\_approxDP/cdp\_delta/cdp\_delta.rs

**Theorem 1.3.** [CKS20] Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Let  $\alpha \in (1, \infty)$  and  $\epsilon \geq 0$ . Suppose  $D_{\alpha}(M(x)||M(x')) \leq \tau$  for all  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  differing in a single entry.<sup>2</sup> Then M is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private for

$$\delta = \frac{e^{(\alpha - 1)(\tau - \epsilon)}}{\alpha - 1} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} \tag{7}$$

*Proof.* Fix neighboring  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  and let  $Z \leftarrow PrivLoss(M(x)||M(x'))$ . We have

$$\mathbb{E}[e^{(\alpha-1)Z}] = e^{(\alpha-1)D_{\alpha}(M(x)||M(x'))} \le e^{(\alpha-1)\tau} \tag{8}$$

By 1.2, our goal is to prove that  $\delta \geq \mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}]$ . Our approach is to pick c > 0 such that  $\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\} \leq ce^{(\alpha - 1)z}$  for all  $z \in \mathbb{R}$ . Then

$$\mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}] \le \mathbb{E}[ce^{(\alpha - 1)z}] \le ce^{(\alpha - 1)\tau}.$$
(9)

We identify the smallest possible value of c:

$$c = \sup_{z \in \mathbb{R}} \frac{\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - z}\}}{e^{(\alpha - 1)z}} = \sup_{z \in \mathbb{R}} e^{z - \alpha z} - e^{\epsilon - \alpha z} = \sup_{z \in \mathbb{R}} f(z)$$

$$\tag{10}$$

where  $f(z) = e^{z-\alpha z} - e^{\epsilon-\alpha z}$ . We have

$$f'(z) = e^{z - \alpha z} (1 - \alpha) - e^{\epsilon - \alpha z} (-\alpha) = e^{-\alpha z} (\alpha e^{\epsilon} - (\alpha - 1)e^{z})$$
(11)

Clearly  $f'(z) = 0 \iff e^z = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1} e^{\epsilon} \iff z = \epsilon - \log(1 - 1/\alpha)$ . Thus

$$c = f(\epsilon - \log(1 - 1/\alpha)) \tag{12}$$

$$= \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{\epsilon}\right)^{1 - \alpha} - e^{\epsilon} \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{\epsilon}\right)^{-\alpha} \tag{13}$$

$$= \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{\epsilon} - e^{\epsilon}\right) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}e^{-\epsilon}\right)^{\alpha} \tag{14}$$

$$= \frac{e^{\epsilon}}{\alpha - 1} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha} e^{-\alpha \epsilon}. \tag{15}$$

Thus

$$\mathbb{E}[\max\{0, 1 - e^{\epsilon - Z}\}] \le \frac{e^{\epsilon}}{\alpha - 1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} e^{-\alpha \epsilon} e^{(\alpha - 1)\tau} = \frac{e^{(\alpha - 1)(\tau - \epsilon)}}{\alpha - 1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha} = \delta \tag{16}$$

Corollary 1. [CKS20] Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm. Let  $\alpha \in (1, \infty)$  and  $\epsilon \geq 0$ . Suppose  $D_{\alpha}(M(x)||M(x')) \leq \tau$  for all  $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^n$  differing in a single entry. Then M is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private for

$$\epsilon = \tau + \frac{\ln(1/\delta) + (\alpha - 1)\ln(1 - 1/\alpha) - \ln(\alpha)}{\alpha - 1} \tag{17}$$

*Proof.* This follows by rearranging 1.3.

Corollary 2. Let  $M: \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{Y}$  be a randomized algorithm satisfying  $\rho$ -concentrated differential privacy. Then M is  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private for any  $0 < \delta \le 1$  and

$$\epsilon = \inf_{\alpha \in (1, \infty)} \alpha \rho + \frac{\ln(1/\delta) + (\alpha - 1)\ln(1 - 1/\alpha) - \ln(\alpha)}{\alpha - 1}$$
(18)

*Proof.* This follows from 1 by taking the infimum over all divergence parameters  $\alpha$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>This is the definition of  $(\alpha, \tau)$ -Rényi differential privacy.

## 2 Pseudocode

### Precondition

None.

### Implementation

```
def cdp_delta(rho: float, eps: float) -> float:
      """The Rust code may be easier to follow due to more commenting."""
      if rho.is_sign_negative():
           raise ValueError(f"rho ({rho}) must be non-negative")
      if eps.is_sign_negative():
6
          raise ValueError(f"epsilon ({eps}) must be non-negative")
      if rho.is_zero() or eps.is_infinite():
9
10
           return 0.0
11
      if rho.is_infinite():
12
          return 1.0
13
14
15
      a_{max} = eps.inf_add(1.0).inf_div((2.0).neg_inf_mul(rho)).inf_add(2.0)
16
      a_min = 1.01
17
18
      while True:
19
20
          diff = a_max - a_min
21
22
           a_mid = a_min + diff / 2.0
23
24
           if a_mid == a_max or a_mid == a_min:
25
               break
26
27
           # calculate derivative
           deriv = (2.0 * a_mid - 1.0) * rho - eps + a_mid.recip().neg().ln_1p()
28
29
30
           if deriv.is_sign_negative():
              a_min = a_mid
31
32
           else:
33
               a_max = a_mid
      # calculate delta
35
      a_1 = a_max.inf_sub(1.0)
36
37
      ar_e = a_max.inf_mul(rho).inf_sub(eps)
38
39
           t1 = a_1.inf_mul(ar_e)
40
41
      except OpenDPException:
42
43
           # if t1 is negative, then handle negative overflow by making t1 larger: the most
44
      negative finite float
           # making t1 larger makes delta larger, so it's still a valid upper bound
45
           if a_1.is_sign_negative() != ar_e.is_sign_negative():
46
               t1 = 1.7976931348623157e308 # f64::MIN
47
48
           else:
               raise
49
50
      t2 = a_max.inf_mul(a_max.recip().neg().inf_ln_1p())
51
52
      delta = t1.inf_add(t2).inf_exp().inf_div((a_max.inf_sub(1.0)))
53
54
```

```
# delta is always <= 1
delta.min(1.0)
```

### Postcondition

**Theorem 2.1.** For any possible setting of  $\rho$  and  $\epsilon$ , cdp\_delta either returns an error, or a  $\delta$  such that any  $\rho$ -differentially private measurement is also  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private.

### 3 Proof

Proof. The code always finds an  $\alpha_* \approx \mathtt{a\_max} \geq 1.01$ . Since  $\mathtt{a\_max} \in (1, \infty)$ , then by 1, any  $\rho$ -differentially private measurement is also  $(\epsilon(\mathtt{a\_max}), \delta)$ -differentially private. Define  $\delta_{cons}(\alpha)$  as a "conservative" function for computing  $\delta(\epsilon)$ , where floating-point arithmetic is computed with conservative rounding such that  $\delta_{cons}(\alpha) \geq \delta(\alpha)$  for  $\forall \alpha \in (1, \infty)$ . Since  $\mathtt{delta} = \delta_{cons}(\mathtt{a\_max}) \geq \delta(\mathtt{a\_max})$ , then any  $(\epsilon, \delta(\mathtt{a\_max}))$ -differentially private measurement is also (epsilon,  $\delta$ )-differentially private.

### References

[CKS20] Clément L. Canonne, Gautam Kamath, and Thomas Steinke. The discrete gaussian for differential privacy. *CoRR*, abs/2004.00010, 2020.