# MakeNoise<VectorDomain<AtomDomain<IBig», MI, MO> for RV

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This proof resides in "contrib" because it has not completed the vetting process.

Proves soundness of the implementation of MakeNoise for RV over vectors of big integers in mod.rs at commit f5bb719 (outdated<sup>1</sup>).

This is the core implementation of all variations of the gaussian or laplace mechanism.

## 1 Hoare Triple

#### Precondition

#### Compiler-Verified

MakeNoise is parameterized as follows:

- MI implements trait Metric
- MO implements trait Measure
- RV implements trait Sample

The following trait bounds are also required:

- (VectorDomain<AtomDomain<IBig>>, MI) implements trait MetricSpace
- RV implements NoisePrivacyMap<MI, MO>

#### **User-Verified**

None

#### Pseudocode

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See new changes with git diff f5bb719..71d6c75 rust/src/measurements/noise/mod.rs

```
MO.default(),
self.noise_privacy_map(), #

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```

#### Postcondition

Theorem 1.1. For every setting of the input parameters (self, input\_space, MI, MO, RV) to make\_noise such that the given preconditions hold, make\_noise raises an exception (at compile time or run time) or returns a valid measurement. A valid measurement has the following properties:

- 1. (Data-independent runtime errors). For every pair of elements x, x' in input\_domain, function(x) returns an error if and only if function(x') returns an error.
- 2. (Privacy guarantee). For every pair of elements x, x' in input\_domain and for every pair (d\_in,d\_out), where d\_in has the associated type for input\_metric and d\_out has the associated type for output\_measure, if x, x' are d\_in-close under input\_metric, privacy\_map(d\_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy\_map(d\_in) ≤ d\_out, then function(x), function(x') are d\_out-close under output\_measure.

Proof of data-independent errors. The precondition of Sample.sample requires that self is a valid distribution. This is satisfied by the postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap<MI, MO> on line 11. The postcondition of Sample.sample guarantees that the function only ever returns an error independently of the data.

For the proof of the privacy guarantee, start by reviewing the postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap<MI, MO>, which has an associated function noise\_privacy\_map to be called on line 11.

Lemma 1.2 (Postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap). Given a distribution self, returns Err(e) if self is not a valid distribution. Otherwise the output is Ok(privacy\_map) where privacy\_map observes the following:

Define function(x) = x + Z where Z is a vector of iid samples from self.

For every pair of elements x, x' in VectorDomain<AtomDomain<IBig>>, and for every pair (d\_in, d\_out), where d\_in has the associated type for input\_metric and d\_out has the associated type for output\_measure, if x, x' are d\_in-close under input\_metric, privacy\_map(d\_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy\_map(d\_in)  $\leq$  d\_out, then function(x), function(x') are d\_out-close under output\_measure.

Proof of privacy guarantee. Assuming line 11 does not fail, then the returned privacy map is subject to Theorem 1.2. The privacy guarantee applies when function(x) = x + Z, where Z is a vector of iid samples from self. In this case self describes the noise distribution.

We argue that function is consistent with the function described in Lemma 1.2. Line 8 calls self.sample(x\_i) on each element in the input vector. The precondition that self represents a valid distribution is satisfied by the postcondition of Lemma 1.2; the distribution is valid when the construction of the privacy map does not raise an exception. Since the preconditions for Sample.sample are satisfied, the postcondition claims that either an error is returned independently of the input shift, or shift + Z where Z is a sample from the distribution defined by self. This is consistent with the definition of function(x) in the privacy map.

Therefore, the privacy guarantee from Lemma 1.2 applies to the returned measurement.