fn make_private_group_by

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This proof resides in "contrib" because it has not completed the vetting process.

Proves soundness of fn make_private_group_by in mod.rs at commit 0db9c6036 (outdated1).

Vetting History

• Pull Request #512

1 Hoare Triple

Precondition

To ensure the correctness of the output, we require the following preconditions:

- Type MS must have trait DatasetMetric.
- Type MI must have trait UnboundedMetric.
- Type MO must have trait ApproximateMeasure.

Pseudocode

```
def make_private_group_by(
      input_domain,
      input_metric,
      output_measure,
      plan,
      global_scale,
      threshold,
  ):
8
      input_, keys, aggs, expr_threshold = match_group_by(plan)
10
      t_prior = input_.make_stable(input_domain, input_metric)
11
12
      middle_domain, middle_metric = t_prior.output_space()
13
      grouping_columns = match_grouping_columns(keys)
14
15
      margin = middle_domain \
16
17
           .margins \
           .get(grouping_columns, Margin.default())
18
19
      # prepare a join measurement over all expressions
20
21
      expr_domain = ExprDomain(
22
          middle_domain,
```

 $^{^1\}mathrm{See}$ new changes with git diff 0db9c6036..76a98c7f rust/src/measurements/make_private_lazyframe/group_by/mod.rs

```
ExprContext.Aggregate(grouping_columns),
23
24
25
26
      m_exprs = make_basic_composition([
           make_private_expr(
27
                expr_domain,
28
29
                PartitionDistance(middle_metric),
                output_measure,
30
31
                expr,
                global_scale,
32
33
           ) for expr in aggs
      1)
34
35
      # reconcile information about the threshold
36
37
      dp_exprs = m_exprs.invoke((input_, all()))
38
      if threshold is not None and expr_threshold is not None:
39
          raise "two thresholds set"
40
41
      if margin.public_info is not None:
42
43
           threshold = None
      elif expr_threshold is not None:
44
           name, threshold = expr_threshold
45
46
           plugin = find_len_expr(dp_exprs, name.as_str())[1]
           threshold = name, plugin, threshold
47
      elif threshold is not None:
48
           name, plugin = find_len_expr(dp_exprs, None)
49
           threshold = name, plugin, threshold
50
51
      else:
           raise f"The key set of {grouping_columns} is unknown and cannot be released."
52
53
54
      # prepare supporting elements
      def function(arg):
55
56
           output = DslPlan.GroupBy(
               input=arg,
57
58
               keys=keys,
               aggs=m_exprs((arg, all())),
60
               apply=None,
               maintain_order=false,
61
62
63
           if threshold is not None:
64
               name, _, threshold_value = threshold
               output = DslPlan.Filter(
66
                   input = output ,
67
                   predicate=col(name).gt(lit(threshold_value)),
68
69
               )
70
           return output
71
72
      def privacy_map(d_in):
73
           10 = margin.max_influenced_partitions.unwrap_or(d_in).min(d_in)
           li = margin.max_partition_contributions.unwrap_or(d_in).min(d_in)
74
75
           11 = 10.inf_mul(li).min(d_in)
76
77
           d_out = m_exprs.map((10, 11, 1i))
78
           if threshold is not None:
79
80
               _, plugin, threshold_value = threshold
81
               if li >= threshold_value:
82
                   raise f"Threshold must be greater than {li}."
               d_instability = f64.inf_cast(threshold_value.inf_sub(li))
83
               delta_single = integrate_discrete_noise_tail(plugin.distribution, plugin.scale,
      d_instability)
               delta_joint = 1 - (1 - delta_single).inf_powi(10)
85
```

```
d_out = MO.add_delta(d_out, delta_joint)
86
           elif margin.public_info is None:
87
               raise "keys must be public if threshold is unknown"
88
89
90
           return d out
91
       m_group_by_agg = Measurement(
92
           middle_domain,
93
           function,
94
           middle_metric,
95
           output_measure,
96
97
           privacy_map,
98
99
      return t_prior >> m_group_by_agg
```

Postconditions

For every setting of the input parameters (input_domain, input_metric, output_measure, plan, global_scale, threshold) to make_private_group_by such that the given preconditions hold, make_private_group_by raises an exception (at compile time or run time) or returns a valid measurement. A valid measurement has the following property:

1. (Privacy guarantee). For every pair of elements x, x' in input_domain and for every pair (d_in, d_out), where d_in has the associated type for input_metric and d_out has the associated type for output_measure, if x, x' are d_in-close under input_metric, privacy_map(d_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy_map(d_in) \leq d_out, then function(x), function(x') are d_out-close under output_measure.

2 Proof

We now prove the postcondition of make_private_group_by.

Proof. Start by establishing proof properties of the following three variable.

- By the postcondition of StableDslPlan.make_stable, t_prior is a valid transformation.
- By the postcondition of match_grouping_columns, grouping_columns holds the names of the grouping columns. margin denotes what is considered public information about the key set, pulled from descriptors in the input domain. By the postcondition of make_basic_composition,
- m_exprs is a valid measurement that prepares a batch of expressions that, when executed, satisfies the privacy guarantee of m_exprs.

In the case where grouping keys are considered public, no thresholding is performed. In the setting when grouping keys are considered private information, it is necessary to know if a suitable release for the data set length is made that can be used to filter sensitive keys.

The function returns a DslPlan that applies each expression from m_exprs to arg grouped by keys. The measurement for each expression expects data set distances in terms of a triple:

- L⁰: the greatest number of partitions that can be influenced by any one individual. This is no greater than the input distance (an individual can only ever influence as many partitions as they contribute rows), but could be tighter when supplemented by the max_influenced_partitions metric descriptor.
- L^{∞} : the greatest number of records that can be added or removed by any one individual in each partition. This is no greater than the input distance, but could be tighter when supplemented by the max_partition_contributions metric descriptor.

• L^1 : the greatest total number of records that can be added or removed across all partitions. This is no greater than the input distance, but could be tighter when accounting for the L^0 and L^{∞} distances.

By the postcondition of the map on m_exprs, the privacy loss, when grouped data sets may differ by this distance triple, is d_out.

Adapted from [Rog23] (Theorem 7). Consider S to be the set of labels that are common between x and x'. Define event E to be any potential outcome of the mechanism for which all labels are in S (where only stable partitions are released). We then lower bound the probability of the mechanism returning an event E. In the following, c_j denotes the exact count for partition j, and Z_j is a random variable distributed according to the distribution used to release a noisy count.

$$\Pr[E] = \prod_{j \in x \setminus x'} \Pr[c_j + Z_j \le T]$$

$$\ge \prod_{j \in x \setminus x'} \Pr[\Delta_\infty + Z_j \le T]$$

$$\ge \Pr[\Delta_\infty + Z_j \le T]^{\Delta_0}$$

The probability of returning a set of stable partitions ($\Pr[E]$) is the probability of not returning any of the unstable partitions. We now solve for the choice of threshold T such that $\Pr[E] \geq 1 - \delta$.

$$\Pr[\Delta_{\infty} + Z_j \le T]^{\Delta_0} = \Pr[Z_j \le T - \Delta_{\infty}]^{\Delta_0}$$
$$= (1 - \Pr[Z_j > T - \Delta_{\infty}])^{\Delta_0}$$

Let d_instability denote the distance to instability of $T - \Delta_{\infty}$. By the postcondition of integrate_discrete_noise_tail, the probability that a random noise sample exceeds d_instability is at most delta_single. Therefore $\delta = 1 - (1 - \text{delta_single})^{\Delta_0}$. This privacy loss is then added to d_out.

Together with the potential increase in delta for the release of the key set, then it is shown that function(u), function(v) are d_out -close under output_measure.

References

[Rog23] Ryan Rogers. A unifying privacy analysis framework for unknown domain algorithms in differential privacy, 2023.