# fn make\_randomized\_response

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This proof resides in "contrib" because it has not completed the vetting process.

Proves soundness of make\_randomized\_response in mod.rs at commit f5bb719 (outdated<sup>1</sup>), a constructor taking a category set categories and probability prob. The mechanism returned by make\_randomized\_response takes in a data set arg (a single category), and...

- ...if arg is in categories, the mechanism truthfully returns the same value arg with probability prob, otherwise it lies by selecting one of the other categories uniformly at random.
- ...if arg is not in categories, it returns a category chosen uniformly at random.

## PR History

• Pull Request #490

# 1 Hoare Triple

#### Preconditions

- Variable categories must be a set with members of type T
- Variable prob must be of type f64

### Pseudocode

```
def make_randomized_response(categories: set[T], prob: f64):
      input_domain = AtomDomain(bool)
      input_metric = DiscreteMetric()
      output_measure = MaxDivergence()
      categories = list(categories)
      if len(categories) < 2: #</pre>
          raise ValueError("expected at least two categories")
10
      num_categories = len(categories)
12
13
      if not (1 / num_categories <= prob <= 1): #</pre>
          raise ValueError("probability must be within [1/num_categories, 1]")
14
15
16
      # prepare constant:
      if prob == 1.0:
```

 $<sup>^1\</sup>mathrm{See}$  new changes with git diff f5bb719..57e8e29 rust/src/measurements/randomized\_response/mod.rs

```
c = float("inf")
18
      else:
19
           c = p.inf_div((1).neg_inf_sub(prob)) \
20
21
               .inf_mul(num_categories.inf_sub(1)) \
               .inf_ln()
22
23
      def privacy_map(d_in: u32) -> Q0:
24
           if d_in == 0:
25
               return 0
26
27
           else:
               return c
28
29
      def function(truth: bool) -> bool:
30
           index = categories.index(truth)
31
           sample = usize.sample_uniform_int_below(
32
               len(num_categories) - (0 if index == -1 else 1))
33
34
           if index != -1 and sample >= index:
35
               sample += 1
36
37
38
           lie = categories[sample]
39
           be_honest = sample_bernoulli_float(prob, false)
40
           is_member = index != -1
41
           return truth if be_honest and is_member else lie
42
      return Measurement(input_domain, function, input_metric, output_measure, privacy_map)
44
```

#### Postcondition

For every setting of the input parameters (categories, prob, T) to make\_randomized\_response such that the given preconditions hold, make\_randomized\_response raises an error (at compile time or run time) or returns a value.

make\_randomized\_response raises an error (at compile time or run time) or returns a valid measurement. A valid measurement has the following properties:

- 1. (Data-independent runtime errors). For every pair of members x and x' in input\_domain, invoke(x) and invoke(x') either both return the same error or neither return an error.
- 2. (Privacy guarantee). For every pair of members x and x' in input\_domain and for every pair (d\_in,d\_out), where d\_in has the associated type for input\_metric and d\_out has the associated type for

output\_measure, if x, x' are d\_in-close under input\_metric, privacy\_map(d\_in) does not raise an error, and privacy\_map(d\_in) = d\_out, then function(x), function(x') are d\_out-close under output\_measure.

### 2 Proof

Proof. (Privacy guarantee.)

The proof assumes the following lemma.

Lemma 2.1. sample\_uniform\_int\_below and sample\_bernoulli\_float satisfy their postconditions.

sample\_uniform\_int\_below and sample\_bernoulli\_float can only fail due to lack of system entropy. This is usually related to the computer's physical environment and not the dataset. The rest of this proof is conditioned on the assumption that these functions do not raise an exception.

Let x and x' be datasets that are d\_in-close with respect to input\_metric. Here, the metric is DiscreteMetric which enforces that d\_in  $\geq 1$  if  $x \neq x'$  and d\_in = 0 if x = x'. If x = x', then the output distributions on x and x' are identical, and therefore the max-divergence is 0.

Now consider the case where  $x \neq x'$ . For shorthand, we let p represent prob, the probability of returning the input, and t denote the number of categories. Note that all categories must be unique as the input data type is a set. This means duplicate categories cannot influence the output distribution.

t must be at least two, by pseudocode line 8, as any fewer would not be useful. p is restricted to [1/t, 1.0] by pseudocode line 13, as any less would not be useful.

We'll first consider all possible output probabilities, and then use this to upper bound the ratio of any two probabilities. For any outcome  $y \in \texttt{candidates}$ , the probability of observing y is one of three values:

1. When the mechanism is honest:

$$\Pr[M(x) = y | y = x] = p$$

2. When the mechanism lies:

$$\Pr[M(x) = y | y \neq x \land x \in \texttt{candidates}] = \frac{1-p}{t-1}$$

3. When the input is not in the category set, the output is uniformly sampled from the candidates:

$$\Pr[M(x) = y | y \neq x \land x \not\in \texttt{candidates}] = \frac{1}{t}$$

Lemma 2.2. The probability of case 3 is bounded by cases one and two:

$$\frac{1-p}{t-1} \le \frac{1}{t} \le p \tag{1}$$

*Proof.* 1/t is bounded above by case one (p) due to pseudocode line 13. Reusing 13,  $\frac{1-p}{t-1} \le \frac{1-1/t}{t-1} = \frac{1}{t}$ . Therefore 1/t is also bounded below by case two  $(\frac{1-p}{t-1})$ .

By 2.2, the divergence is never maximized when the input is not in the category set, which simplifies the following analysis.

We now consider the max-divergence of the mechanism over all choices of neighboring datasets.

$$\max_{x \sim x'} D_{\infty}(M(x), M(x')) \tag{2}$$

$$= \max_{x \sim x'} \max_{S \subseteq Supp(M(x))} \ln \left( \frac{\Pr[M(x) \in S]}{\Pr[M(x') \in S]} \right)$$
 (3)

$$\leq \max_{x \sim x'} \max_{y \in Supp(M(x))} \ln \left( \frac{\Pr[M(x) = y]}{\Pr[M(x') = y]} \right)$$
 Lemma 3.3 [1]

$$= \ln\left(\max\left(\frac{p\cdot(t-1)}{1-p}, \frac{(1-p)\cdot(t-1)}{p}, \frac{(1-p)\cdot(t-1)}{(1-p)\cdot(t-1)}\right)\right) \tag{5}$$

$$=\ln\left(\frac{p\cdot(t-1)}{1-p}\right)\tag{6}$$

The terms in the maximum on line 5 cover all combinations of x, x' and y. Respectively:

- 1. When y = x.
- 2. When  $y \neq x$  and y = x'.

3. When  $y \neq x$  and  $y \neq x'$ .

Pseudocode line 16 implements this bound with conservative rounding towards positive infinity. When  $d_{in} > 0$  and no exception is raised in computing  $c = privacy_map(d_{in})$ , then  $\ln\left(\frac{p \cdot (t-1)}{1-p}\right) \le c$ .

Therefore it has been shown that for every pair of elements  $x, x' \in \text{input\_domain}$  and every  $d_{DM}(x, x') \leq d_{\text{in}}$  with  $d_{\text{in}} \geq 0$ , if x, x' are  $d_{\text{in}}$ -close then function(x), function(x') are  $\text{privacy\_map}(d_{\text{in}})$ -close under output\\_measure (the Max-Divergence).

## References

[1] Shiva P. Kasiviswanathan and Adam Smith. On the "semantics" of differential privacy: A bayesian formulation. *Journal of Privacy and Confidentiality*, 6(1), June 2014.