

Michael Shoemate

This proof resides in "contrib" because it has not completed the vetting process.

Proves soundness of the implementation of MakeNoiseThreshold for RV over hashmaps of big integers in mod.rs at commit f5bb719 (outdated¹).

This is the core implementation of all variations of the thresholded gaussian or laplace mechanism.

1 Hoare Triple

Precondition

Compiler-Verified

MakeNoise is parameterized as follows:

- DI is MapDomain<AtomDomain<TK>, AtomDomain<IBig>>
- MI is LOPI<P, AbsoluteDistance<UBig>>
- MO is MO

The following trait bounds are required:

- Generic MO implements trait Measure
- Generic TK implements trait Hashable
- Const-generic P is of type usize
- Type ZExpFamily<P> implements trait NoiseThresholdPrivacyMap<LOPI<P, AbsoluteDistance<UBig>>, MO>

User-Verified

None

¹See new changes with git diff f5bb719..1be10256 rust/src/measurements/noise_threshold/mod.rs

Pseudocode

```
# analogous to impl MakeNoise < VectorDomain < AtomDomain < IBig >> , MI , MO > for RV in Rust
  class RV:
      def make_noise_threshold(
           input_space: tuple[MapDomain[AtomDomain[TK], AtomDomain[IBig]], MI],
           threshold: IBig,
6
      ) -> Measurement[
           MapDomain [AtomDomain [TK], AtomDomain [IBig]], HashMap [TK, IBig], MI, MO
           input_domain, input_metric = input_space
11
           output_measure = MO.default()
           privacy_map = self.noise_threshold_privacy_map( #
               input_metric, output_measure, threshold
13
14
           def function(data: HashMap[TK, IBig]) -> HashMap[TK, IBig]:
16
17
               out = []
               for k, v in data.items():
18
                   v = self.sample(v) #
19
                   if v >= threshold:
20
21
                        out.append((k, v))
               # shuffle the output to avoid leaking the order of the input
22
               random.shuffle(out) #
23
               return dict(out)
24
25
           return Measurement.new(
26
27
               input_domain,
               Function.new_fallible(function),
28
29
               input_metric,
               output_measure,
30
31
               privacy_map,
```

Postcondition

Theorem 1.1.

Theorem 1.2. For every setting of the input parameters (self, input_space, threshold, MO, TK, P) to make_noise such that the given preconditions hold, make_noise raises an exception (at compile time or run time) or returns a valid measurement. A valid measurement has the following property:

1. (Privacy guarantee). For every pair of elements x, x' in input_domain and for every pair (d_{in}, d_{out}) , where d_in has the associated type for input_metric and d_out has the associated type for output_measure, if x, x' are d_in-close under input_metric, privacy_map(d_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy_map(d_in) \leq d_out, then function(x), function(x') are d_out-close under output_measure.

Proof of data-independent errors. The precondition of Sample.sample requires that self is a valid distribution. This is satisfied by the postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap<MI, MO> on line 12. The postcondition of Sample.sample guarantees that the function only ever returns an error independently of the data.

For the proof of the privacy guarantee, start by reviewing the postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap<MI, MO>, which has an associated function noise_privacy_map to be called on line 12.

Lemma 1.3 (Postcondition of NoisePrivacyMap). Given a distribution self, returns Err(e) if self is not a valid distribution. Otherwise the output is $Ok(privacy_map)$ where privacy_map observes the following: Define function(x) as a function that updates each pair $(k_i, v_i + Z_i)$, where Z_i are iid samples from self, and discards pairs where $v_i + Z_i$ is less than threshold. The ordering of returned pairs is independent from the input ordering.

For every pair of elements x, x' in VectorDomain<AtomDomain<IBig>>, and for every pair (d_in, d_out), where d_in has the associated type for input_metric and d_out has the associated type for output_measure, if x, x' are d_in-close under input_metric, privacy_map(d_in) does not raise an exception, and privacy_map(d_in) \leq d_out, then function(x), function(x') are d_out-close under output_measure.

Proof of privacy guarantee. Assuming line 12 does not fail, then the returned privacy map is subject to Theorem 1.3. The privacy guarantee applies when the pseudocode matches the algorithm specification, where Z_i are iid samples from self. In this case self describes the noise distribution.

We argue that function is consistent with the function described in Lemma 1.3. Line 19 calls self.sample(x_i) on each element in the input vector. The precondition that self represents a valid distribution is satisfied by the postcondition of Lemma 1.3; the distribution is valid when the construction of the privacy map does not raise an exception. Since the preconditions for Sample.sample are satisfied, the postcondition claims that either returns an error independently of the input v, or v + Z where Z is a sample from the distribution defined by self. The keys are then shuffled on line 23 to ensure that the output is independent of the input ordering. In the Rust implementation, a random hasher is used to ensure that the output ordering is independent of the input ordering. This is consistent with Lemma 1.3.

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Therefore, the privacy guarantee from Lemma 1.3 applies to the returned measurement.