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Revert "revert to #7677 #7679" #7715

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5 changes: 3 additions & 2 deletions Cargo.lock

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14 changes: 8 additions & 6 deletions dapps/src/handlers/mod.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ pub fn add_security_headers(headers: &mut header::Headers, embeddable_on: Embedd

// Content Security Policy headers
headers.set_raw("Content-Security-Policy", String::new()
// Restrict everything to the same origin by default.
+ "default-src 'self';"
// Allow connecting to WS servers and HTTP(S) servers.
// We could be more restrictive and allow only RPC server URL.
+ "connect-src http: https: ws: wss:;"
Expand All @@ -64,26 +66,26 @@ pub fn add_security_headers(headers: &mut header::Headers, embeddable_on: Embedd
+ "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' data: blob: https:;"
// Allow fonts from data: and HTTPS.
+ "font-src 'self' data: https:;"
// Allow inline scripts and scripts eval (webpack/jsconsole)
// Disallow objects
+ "object-src 'none';"
// Allow scripts
+ {
let script_src = embeddable_on.as_ref()
.map(|e| e.extra_script_src.iter()
.map(|&(ref host, port)| address(host, port))
.join(" ")
).unwrap_or_default();
&format!(
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' {};",
"script-src 'self' {};",
script_src
)
}
// Same restrictions as script-src with additional
// blob: that is required for camera access (worker)
+ "worker-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https: blob:;"
// Restrict everything else to the same origin.
+ "default-src 'self';"
+ "worker-src 'self' https: blob:;"
// Run in sandbox mode (although it's not fully safe since we allow same-origin and script)
+ "sandbox allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-modals allow-popups allow-presentation allow-scripts;"
// Disallow subitting forms from any dapps
// Disallow submitting forms from any dapps
+ "form-action 'none';"
// Never allow mixed content
+ "block-all-mixed-content;"
Expand Down
114 changes: 54 additions & 60 deletions ethcore/src/engines/authority_round/mod.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -44,8 +44,7 @@ use bigint::hash::{H256, H520};
use semantic_version::SemanticVersion;
use parking_lot::{Mutex, RwLock};
use unexpected::{Mismatch, OutOfBounds};
use util::*;
use bytes::Bytes;
use util::Address;

mod finality;

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -291,9 +290,11 @@ struct EpochVerifier {

impl super::EpochVerifier<EthereumMachine> for EpochVerifier {
fn verify_light(&self, header: &Header) -> Result<(), Error> {
// Validate the timestamp
verify_timestamp(&*self.step, header_step(header)?)?;
// always check the seal since it's fast.
// nothing heavier to do.
verify_external(header, &self.subchain_validators, &*self.step, |_| {})
verify_external(header, &self.subchain_validators)
}

fn check_finality_proof(&self, proof: &[u8]) -> Option<Vec<H256>> {
Expand All @@ -317,7 +318,7 @@ impl super::EpochVerifier<EthereumMachine> for EpochVerifier {
//
// `verify_external` checks that signature is correct and author == signer.
if header.seal().len() != 2 { return None }
otry!(verify_external(header, &self.subchain_validators, &*self.step, |_| {}).ok());
otry!(verify_external(header, &self.subchain_validators).ok());

let newly_finalized = otry!(finality_checker.push_hash(header.hash(), header.author().clone()).ok());
finalized.extend(newly_finalized);
Expand All @@ -327,16 +328,6 @@ impl super::EpochVerifier<EthereumMachine> for EpochVerifier {
}
}

// Report misbehavior
#[derive(Debug)]
#[allow(dead_code)]
enum Report {
// Malicious behavior
Malicious(Address, BlockNumber, Bytes),
// benign misbehavior
Benign(Address, BlockNumber),
}

fn header_step(header: &Header) -> Result<usize, ::rlp::DecoderError> {
UntrustedRlp::new(&header.seal().get(0).expect("was either checked with verify_block_basic or is genesis; has 2 fields; qed (Make sure the spec file has a correct genesis seal)")).as_val()
}
Expand All @@ -355,34 +346,35 @@ fn is_step_proposer(validators: &ValidatorSet, bh: &H256, step: usize, address:
step_proposer(validators, bh, step) == *address
}

fn verify_external<F: Fn(Report)>(header: &Header, validators: &ValidatorSet, step: &Step, report: F)
-> Result<(), Error>
{
let header_step = header_step(header)?;

fn verify_timestamp(step: &Step, header_step: usize) -> Result<(), BlockError> {
match step.check_future(header_step) {
Err(None) => {
trace!(target: "engine", "verify_block_external: block from the future");
report(Report::Benign(*header.author(), header.number()));
return Err(BlockError::InvalidSeal.into())
trace!(target: "engine", "verify_timestamp: block from the future");
Err(BlockError::InvalidSeal.into())
},
Err(Some(oob)) => {
trace!(target: "engine", "verify_block_external: block too early");
return Err(BlockError::TemporarilyInvalid(oob).into())
// NOTE This error might be returned only in early stage of verification (Stage 1).
// Returning it further won't recover the sync process.
trace!(target: "engine", "verify_timestamp: block too early");
Err(BlockError::TemporarilyInvalid(oob).into())
},
Ok(_) => {
let proposer_signature = header_signature(header)?;
let correct_proposer = validators.get(header.parent_hash(), header_step);
let is_invalid_proposer = *header.author() != correct_proposer ||
!verify_address(&correct_proposer, &proposer_signature, &header.bare_hash())?;

if is_invalid_proposer {
trace!(target: "engine", "verify_block_external: bad proposer for step: {}", header_step);
Err(EngineError::NotProposer(Mismatch { expected: correct_proposer, found: header.author().clone() }))?
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
}
}

fn verify_external(header: &Header, validators: &ValidatorSet) -> Result<(), Error> {
let header_step = header_step(header)?;

let proposer_signature = header_signature(header)?;
let correct_proposer = validators.get(header.parent_hash(), header_step);
let is_invalid_proposer = *header.author() != correct_proposer ||
!verify_address(&correct_proposer, &proposer_signature, &header.bare_hash())?;

if is_invalid_proposer {
trace!(target: "engine", "verify_block_external: bad proposer for step: {}", header_step);
Err(EngineError::NotProposer(Mismatch { expected: correct_proposer, found: header.author().clone() }))?
} else {
Ok(())
}
}

Expand Down Expand Up @@ -655,26 +647,38 @@ impl Engine<EthereumMachine> for AuthorityRound {
/// Check the number of seal fields.
fn verify_block_basic(&self, header: &Header) -> Result<(), Error> {
if header.number() >= self.validate_score_transition && *header.difficulty() >= U256::from(U128::max_value()) {
Err(From::from(BlockError::DifficultyOutOfBounds(
return Err(From::from(BlockError::DifficultyOutOfBounds(
OutOfBounds { min: None, max: Some(U256::from(U128::max_value())), found: *header.difficulty() }
)))
} else {
Ok(())
)));
}

// TODO [ToDr] Should this go from epoch manager?
// If yes then probably benign reporting needs to be moved further in the verification.
let set_number = header.number();

match verify_timestamp(&*self.step, header_step(header)?) {
Err(BlockError::InvalidSeal) => {
self.validators.report_benign(header.author(), set_number, header.number());
Err(BlockError::InvalidSeal.into())
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
}
}

/// Do the step and gas limit validation.
fn verify_block_family(&self, header: &Header, parent: &Header) -> Result<(), Error> {
let step = header_step(header)?;

let parent_step = header_step(parent)?;
// TODO [ToDr] Should this go from epoch manager?
let set_number = header.number();

// Ensure header is from the step after parent.
if step == parent_step
|| (header.number() >= self.validate_step_transition && step <= parent_step) {
trace!(target: "engine", "Multiple blocks proposed for step {}.", parent_step);

self.validators.report_malicious(header.author(), header.number(), header.number(), Default::default());
self.validators.report_malicious(header.author(), set_number, header.number(), Default::default());
Err(EngineError::DoubleVote(header.author().clone()))?;
}

Expand All @@ -687,7 +691,7 @@ impl Engine<EthereumMachine> for AuthorityRound {
let skipped_primary = step_proposer(&*self.validators, &parent.hash(), s);
// Do not report this signer.
if skipped_primary != me {
self.validators.report_benign(&skipped_primary, header.number(), header.number());
self.validators.report_benign(&skipped_primary, set_number, header.number());
}
// Stop reporting once validators start repeating.
if !reported.insert(skipped_primary) { break; }
Expand All @@ -702,9 +706,8 @@ impl Engine<EthereumMachine> for AuthorityRound {
// fetch correct validator set for current epoch, taking into account
// finality of previous transitions.
let active_set;

let (validators, set_number) = if self.immediate_transitions {
(&*self.validators, header.number())
let validators = if self.immediate_transitions {
&*self.validators
} else {
// get correct validator set for epoch.
let client = match self.client.read().as_ref().and_then(|weak| weak.upgrade()) {
Expand All @@ -722,21 +725,12 @@ impl Engine<EthereumMachine> for AuthorityRound {
}

active_set = epoch_manager.validators().clone();
(&active_set as &_, epoch_manager.epoch_transition_number)
};

// always report with "self.validators" so that the report actually gets
// to the contract.
let report = |report| match report {
Report::Benign(address, block_number) =>
self.validators.report_benign(&address, set_number, block_number),
Report::Malicious(address, block_number, proof) =>
self.validators.report_malicious(&address, set_number, block_number, proof),
&active_set as &_
};

// verify signature against fixed list, but reports should go to the
// contract itself.
verify_external(header, validators, &*self.step, report)
verify_external(header, validators)
}

fn genesis_epoch_data(&self, header: &Header, call: &Call) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1059,8 +1053,7 @@ mod tests {
assert!(engine.verify_block_family(&header, &parent_header).is_ok());
assert!(engine.verify_block_external(&header).is_ok());
header.set_seal(vec![encode(&5usize).into_vec(), encode(&(&*signature as &[u8])).into_vec()]);
assert!(engine.verify_block_family(&header, &parent_header).is_ok());
assert!(engine.verify_block_external(&header).is_err());
assert!(engine.verify_block_basic(&header).is_err());
}

#[test]
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1200,3 +1193,4 @@ mod tests {
AuthorityRound::new(params, machine).unwrap();
}
}

2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion ethcore/src/engines/validator_set/contract.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ mod tests {
header.set_number(2);
header.set_parent_hash(client.chain_info().best_block_hash);
// `reportBenign` when the designated proposer releases block from the future (bad clock).
assert!(client.engine().verify_block_external(&header).is_err());
assert!(client.engine().verify_block_basic(&header).is_err());
// Seal a block.
client.engine().step();
assert_eq!(client.chain_info().best_block_number, 1);
Expand Down
14 changes: 7 additions & 7 deletions ethcore/src/state/mod.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1406,7 +1406,7 @@ mod tests {
}

#[test]
fn should_not_trace_delegatecall() {
fn should_trace_delegatecall_properly() {
init_log();

let mut state = get_temp_state();
Expand All @@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ mod tests {
}.sign(&secret(), None);

state.init_code(&0xa.into(), FromHex::from_hex("6000600060006000600b618000f4").unwrap()).unwrap();
state.init_code(&0xb.into(), FromHex::from_hex("6000").unwrap()).unwrap();
state.init_code(&0xb.into(), FromHex::from_hex("60056000526001601ff3").unwrap()).unwrap();
let result = state.apply(&info, &machine, &t, true).unwrap();

let expected_trace = vec![FlatTrace {
Expand All @@ -1441,23 +1441,23 @@ mod tests {
call_type: CallType::Call,
}),
result: trace::Res::Call(trace::CallResult {
gas_used: U256::from(721), // in post-eip150
gas_used: U256::from(736), // in post-eip150
output: vec![]
}),
}, FlatTrace {
trace_address: vec![0].into_iter().collect(),
subtraces: 0,
action: trace::Action::Call(trace::Call {
from: "9cce34f7ab185c7aba1b7c8140d620b4bda941d6".into(),
to: 0xa.into(),
from: 0xa.into(),
to: 0xb.into(),
value: 0.into(),
gas: 32768.into(),
input: vec![],
call_type: CallType::DelegateCall,
}),
result: trace::Res::Call(trace::CallResult {
gas_used: 3.into(),
output: vec![],
gas_used: 18.into(),
output: vec![5],
}),
}];

Expand Down
24 changes: 17 additions & 7 deletions ethcore/src/trace/types/trace.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -74,13 +74,23 @@ pub struct Call {

impl From<ActionParams> for Call {
fn from(p: ActionParams) -> Self {
Call {
from: p.sender,
to: p.address,
value: p.value.value(),
gas: p.gas,
input: p.data.unwrap_or_else(Vec::new),
call_type: p.call_type,
match p.call_type {
CallType::DelegateCall => Call {
from: p.address,
to: p.code_address,
value: p.value.value(),
gas: p.gas,
input: p.data.unwrap_or_else(Vec::new),
call_type: p.call_type,
},
_ => Call {
from: p.sender,
to: p.address,
value: p.value.value(),
gas: p.gas,
input: p.data.unwrap_or_else(Vec::new),
call_type: p.call_type,
},
}
}
}
Expand Down