mt76: validate rx A-MSDU subframes

Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks (CVE-2020-24588) by detecting if the
destination address of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP)
header, and if so dropping the complete A-MSDU frame. This mitigates
known attacks, although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may
remain possible.

This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a
normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means
the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042
header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU
subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation
attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack.
For details, see Section 7.2 of "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi
Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation".

Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>

mac80211.c

@@ -514,10 +514,36 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mt76_free_device);
 static void mt76_rx_release_amsdu(struct mt76_phy *phy, enum mt76_rxq_id q)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb = phy->rx_amsdu[q].head;
+	struct mt76_rx_status *status = (struct mt76_rx_status *)skb->cb;
 	struct mt76_dev *dev = phy->dev;
 
 	phy->rx_amsdu[q].head = NULL;
 	phy->rx_amsdu[q].tail = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Validate if the amsdu has a proper first subframe.
+	 * A single MSDU can be parsed as A-MSDU when the unauthenticated A-MSDU
+	 * flag of the QoS header gets flipped. In such cases, the first
+	 * subframe has a LLC/SNAP header in the location of the destination
+	 * address.
+	 */
+	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list) {
+		int offset = 0;
+
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_8023)) {
+			offset = ieee80211_get_hdrlen_from_skb(skb);
+
+			if ((status->flag &
+			     (RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) ==
+			    RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
+				offset += 8;
+		}
+
+		if (ether_addr_equal(skb->data + offset, rfc1042_header)) {
+			dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
 	__skb_queue_tail(&dev->rx_skb[q], skb);
 }