QCop autonomously sends deregisters #105
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| // Copyright (c) 2018, The Loki Project | ||
| // | ||
| // All rights reserved. | ||
| // | ||
| // Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are | ||
| // permitted provided that the following conditions are met: | ||
| // | ||
| // 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of | ||
| // conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
| // | ||
| // 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list | ||
| // of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other | ||
| // materials provided with the distribution. | ||
| // | ||
| // 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be | ||
| // used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific | ||
| // prior written permission. | ||
| // | ||
| // THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY | ||
| // EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF | ||
| // MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL | ||
| // THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
| // SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, | ||
| // PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS | ||
| // INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
| // STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF | ||
| // THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
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| #include "service_node_deregister.h" | ||
| #include "service_node_list.h" | ||
| #include "cryptonote_config.h" | ||
| #include "cryptonote_core.h" | ||
| #include "quorum_cop.h" | ||
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| namespace service_nodes | ||
| { | ||
| quorum_cop::quorum_cop(cryptonote::core& core, service_nodes::service_node_list& service_node_list) | ||
| : m_core(core), m_service_node_list(service_node_list), m_last_height(0) | ||
| { | ||
| } | ||
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| void quorum_cop::blockchain_detached(uint64_t height) | ||
| { | ||
| uint64_t delta_height = std::abs(static_cast<int64_t>(m_last_height - height)); | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Why is this abs() ? This check should simply be |
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| if (delta_height > REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_IN_BLOCKS) | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. m_core.get_current_blockchain_height() should always be >= height, I think... There was a problem hiding this comment. Changed to use m_last_height. Height will be the height that the chain split at and blockchain has already been popped back to the split height. There was a problem hiding this comment. Should be Warn user; adjust m_last_height; } |
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| { | ||
| LOG_ERROR("The blockchain was detached, quorum cop has processed votes for: " << delta_height << | ||
| " blocks which is greater than the recommended REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_IN_BLOCKS: " << REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_IN_BLOCKS); | ||
| } | ||
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| m_last_height = height; | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Comment became outdated, so just rewriting it here. There was a problem hiding this comment. m_last_height may be from well before the blockchain detach height. Those blocks still need to be checked. if m_last_height >= blockchain detach height then we have problems with our assumption that large reorgs will not happen |
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| } | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Comment became outdated. So just rewriting it here. What's the rationale? You need to start voting from the height onwards again. This probably should be m_last_height = height; because you may not have the vote data anymore depending on the height you popped back to. |
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| static bool participates_in_quorum(const std::vector<crypto::public_key>& quorum, crypto::public_key const &my_key, size_t *index_in_quorum = nullptr) | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. The written function returns true if the pubkey does not exist in the quorum. I don't think this is intended behaviour. Implement or replace entirely with a call to std::find(). You can get the index by subtracting vec.begin() from the returned iterator There was a problem hiding this comment. Fixed the bool return. |
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| { | ||
| size_t index = 0; | ||
| for (crypto::public_key const &quorum_key : quorum) | ||
| { | ||
| if (quorum_key == my_key) break; | ||
| ++index; | ||
| } | ||
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| if (index_in_quorum) | ||
| *index_in_quorum = index; | ||
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| bool result = (index < quorum.size()); | ||
| return result; | ||
| } | ||
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| void quorum_cop::block_added(const cryptonote::block& block, const std::vector<cryptonote::transaction>& txs) | ||
| { | ||
| crypto::public_key my_pubkey; | ||
| crypto::secret_key my_seckey; | ||
| if (!m_core.get_service_node_keys(my_pubkey, my_seckey)) | ||
| return; | ||
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| time_t const now = time(nullptr); | ||
| bool been_alive_for_2hrs = (now - m_core.get_start_time()) >= (60 * 60 * 2); | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. #define please, or const time_t, whatever |
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| if (!been_alive_for_2hrs) | ||
| { | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
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| uint64_t const height = cryptonote::get_block_height(block); | ||
| uint64_t const latest_height = m_core.get_current_blockchain_height(); | ||
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| if (latest_height < loki::service_node_deregister::VOTE_LIFETIME_BY_HEIGHT) | ||
| return; | ||
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| uint64_t const execute_justice_from_height = latest_height - loki::service_node_deregister::VOTE_LIFETIME_BY_HEIGHT; | ||
| if (height < execute_justice_from_height) | ||
| return; | ||
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| if (m_last_height < execute_justice_from_height) | ||
| m_last_height = execute_justice_from_height; | ||
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| for (;m_last_height < (height - REORG_SAFETY_BUFFER_IN_BLOCKS); m_last_height++) | ||
| { | ||
| const std::shared_ptr<quorum_state> state = m_core.get_quorum_state(m_last_height); | ||
| if (!state) | ||
| { | ||
| // TODO(loki): Fatal error | ||
| LOG_ERROR("Quorum state for height: " << m_last_height << "was not cached in daemon!"); | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
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| size_t my_index_in_quorum = 0; | ||
| if (!participates_in_quorum(state->quorum_nodes, my_pubkey, &my_index_in_quorum)) | ||
| { | ||
| continue; | ||
| } | ||
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| for (size_t node_index = 0; node_index < state->nodes_to_test.size(); ++node_index) | ||
| { | ||
| const crypto::public_key &node_key = state->nodes_to_test[node_index]; | ||
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| CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock); | ||
| bool vote_off_node = (m_uptime_proof_seen.find(node_key) != m_uptime_proof_seen.end()); | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Changed to just find the key, since the entries in the list should be under UPTIME_PROOF_MAX_IN_SECONDS +- 30seconds (depending on the pruner being called every 30s on idle). There was a problem hiding this comment. I would add a buffer. Right now there is a chance that we will drop the ping from 1 hour ago, and then this evaluation happens before the next ping arrives. There was a problem hiding this comment. If worked this out in my head correctly, this change would just require L155 to change from to So we accept proofs every 30mins, everything else is the same and prune proofs older than 1hr 10mins. |
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| if (!vote_off_node) | ||
| continue; | ||
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| loki::service_node_deregister::vote vote = {}; | ||
| vote.block_height = m_last_height; | ||
| vote.service_node_index = node_index; | ||
| vote.voters_quorum_index = my_index_in_quorum; | ||
| vote.signature = loki::service_node_deregister::sign_vote(vote.block_height, vote.service_node_index, my_pubkey, my_seckey); | ||
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| cryptonote::vote_verification_context vvc = {}; | ||
| if (!m_core.add_deregister_vote(vote, vvc)) | ||
| { | ||
| if (vvc.m_invalid_block_height) | ||
| LOG_ERROR("block height was invalid: " << vote.block_height); | ||
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| if (vvc.m_voters_quorum_index_out_of_bounds) | ||
| LOG_ERROR("voters quorum index specified out of bounds: " << vote.voters_quorum_index); | ||
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| if (vvc.m_service_node_index_out_of_bounds) | ||
| LOG_ERROR("service node index specified out of bounds: " << vote.service_node_index); | ||
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| if (vvc.m_signature_not_valid) | ||
| LOG_ERROR("signature was not valid, was the signature signed properly?"); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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| static crypto::hash make_hash(crypto::public_key const &pubkey, uint64_t timestamp) | ||
| { | ||
| // TODO(doyle): Errrr clarify what this is. Looks like crypto::cn_fast_hash should be sizeof(buf) | ||
| char buf[44] = "SUP"; // Meaningless magic bytes | ||
| crypto::hash result; | ||
| memcpy(buf + 4, reinterpret_cast<const void *>(&pubkey), sizeof(pubkey)); | ||
| memcpy(buf + 4 + sizeof(pubkey), reinterpret_cast<const void *>(×tamp), sizeof(timestamp)); | ||
| crypto::cn_fast_hash(buf, sizeof(buf), result); | ||
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| return result; | ||
| } | ||
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| bool quorum_cop::handle_uptime_proof(uint64_t timestamp, const crypto::public_key& pubkey, const crypto::signature& sig) | ||
| { | ||
| uint64_t now = time(nullptr); | ||
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| if ((timestamp < now - UPTIME_PROOF_BUFFER_IN_SECONDS) || (timestamp > now + UPTIME_PROOF_BUFFER_IN_SECONDS)) | ||
| return false; | ||
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| // TODO(doyle): the only dependency on m_service_node_lists which could be | ||
| // replaced by the lists stored in db when that is implemented - 2018-07-24 | ||
| if (!m_service_node_list.is_service_node(pubkey)) | ||
| return false; | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. The only dependency on service_node_lists. Once we get db storage of service node lists we can remove this and check if the pubkey belongs to some range of heights. I can imagine we'll want to store uptime proof over some range of heights so we have the tools to provide statistics on the network. |
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| CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock); | ||
| if (m_uptime_proof_seen[pubkey] > now - UPTIME_PROOF_MAX_TIME_IN_SECONDS) | ||
| return false; // already received one uptime proof for this node recently. | ||
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| crypto::hash hash = make_hash(pubkey, timestamp); | ||
| if (!crypto::check_signature(hash, pubkey, sig)) | ||
| return false; | ||
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| m_uptime_proof_seen[pubkey] = timestamp; | ||
| return true; | ||
| } | ||
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| void quorum_cop::generate_uptime_proof_request(const crypto::public_key& pubkey, const crypto::secret_key& seckey, cryptonote::NOTIFY_UPTIME_PROOF::request& req) const | ||
| { | ||
| req.timestamp = time(nullptr); | ||
| req.pubkey = pubkey; | ||
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| crypto::hash hash = make_hash(req.pubkey, req.timestamp); | ||
| crypto::generate_signature(hash, pubkey, seckey, req.sig); | ||
| } | ||
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| bool quorum_cop::prune_uptime_proof() | ||
| { | ||
| uint64_t now = time(nullptr); | ||
| const uint64_t prune_from_timestamp = now - UPTIME_PROOF_MAX_TIME_IN_SECONDS; | ||
| CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(m_lock); | ||
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| for (auto it = m_uptime_proof_seen.begin(); it != m_uptime_proof_seen.end();) | ||
| { | ||
| if (it->second < prune_from_timestamp) | ||
| m_uptime_proof_seen.erase(it); | ||
| else | ||
| it++; | ||
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There was a problem hiding this comment. Fixed iterator inf loop. There was a problem hiding this comment. This should be: |
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| } | ||
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| return true; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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Prune triggered every 30s if you're a service node.